PROPOSITION LXV.

All real Distinction is of two kinds.

Every real entity is physically separable from another real entity, in one of two ways; either so, that both can exist apart, at least by virtue of the Divine Omnipotence; or so, that one only of the two can continue to exist on the desition of the other to which it had previously been united, In the latter case, the two cannot be made to exist apart, even by the infinitely Powerful; because actual inherence in another, is of the Essence of one of the two entities. Yet, the Distinction is real; because the principal entity can exist independently of that which inheres in it. The first mentioned kind of separation or separability involves a Distinction, which is called Real Distinction the Greater; the last mentioned, a Distinction which is called Real Distinction the Less.

The Greater Real Distinction includes Distinction between substantial Beings, as it is clear to see. Such is the Distinction between William and James, between a man and a dog, between two trees or two boards. But it also includes the Distinction that subsists between Substances and their Accidents, as well as between Accidents one with another. This may at first sight appear strange; since Accidents have a transcendental relation to the Substances which they inform. But it will be seen later on, when the nature of Accidents is treated ex professo, that though aptitude to inhere in another is of the Essence of Accident, actual inhesion is not; consequently, it is absolutely possible that Accidents should exist, apart from the Subject or Substance that they inform. Thus, therefore, the Quantity, Smell, Colour, Taste, Pulpiness of an Apple are distinguished from the Substance (or Matter and substantial Form), of that Apple by a Greater Real Distinction. In the same way, is the Colour of the same Apple distinguishable from its Taste or Savour; and, a fortiori, the Colour v.g. in one apple from the Colour in another, because they are actually separated.

It was for a long time a subject of perplexed discussion, whether there was any other real Distinction than the one that has been just described. The question amounted to this, whether there were any traces of a Distinction which precedes all intellectual operation, (and must, therefore, be real), wherein one of the two entities, that are the subjects of the Distinction, cannot, by any exercise even of Almighty power, exist in a state of separation from the other; in other words, where such separate existence in the entity alluded to amounts to a metaphysical impossibility. That there are, however, instances of such a Distinction, will appear on a little consideration. Thus, nobody can doubt that the union of soul and body in a man is something real; if it were not, you would only have to place a body and a soul in juxtaposition, so to speak, and a man would ipso facto be formed, In the case of inanimate bodies, it is obvious; for the union, e.g. of oxygen and hydrogen, in due proportion, produces a new substance. It is furthermore manifest that both soul and body can exist, -- the latter, for a time at least, -- without this union; for, as a fact, they do so exist after death. here, then, is the case of a Distinction which antecedes all action of the mind, and is, consequently, real. Yet, on the other hand, it is equally plain that this substantial union between the soul and body of man cannot possibly exist apart from, or independently of, that soul and body of which it is the union. There is no one whose common sense would allow him to doubt this for a moment. The idea perishes in its own absurdity. Take another instance My body is in a certain posture, -- say, sitting. That posture is real, if anything sensible is real; for it can be seen, and it produces real effects of repose and the like. It is further clear, that my body can be separated from that sitting posture; for the next moment I may be standing or kneeling. And this separability is antecedent to any intellectual operation; for it exists in the nature of things. Yet, who would ever dream of the possibility of a sitting posture existing by itself, independently of the Being whose posture it is? These instances are sufficient to show, that there really are such Distinctions.

But now arises a question of no small importance. If this union between the soul and body and the posture of a man are real, they must be entities distinct, the one from the soul and body, the other from the man; in which case it is not easy to understand why it is a metaphysical impossibility, (in other words, why it is a contradiction in terms), that they should exist apart from these latter. And, indeed, the difficulty would be insoluble, if they were real entities distinct from their Subject; but such is not the case. They are real, it is true; but their reality is wholly contained in their Subject; in a word, they are real modifications of the Subject. Consequently, the Subject can do without them; but they cannot do without the Subject. Let it be supposed, for the sake of a clearer illustration of the matter, that the union between soul and body were a real entity really distinct from the entity of soul and body; what would be the result? It would itself require a union of itself with soul and body; and the new union, as being likewise a distinct union, would require a fresh union; and so on, for ever. It is for this reason that the Distinction, now under consideration, is often called a real Modal Distinction; for it is a Distinction between the Subject and its Mode, or modification. But, if its entity is only in the Subject, and is, in and by itself, nothing, it is easy to see why it is absolutely impossible that it should exist independently of the Subject; for, though real, it is only real in the Subject.

There is another question connected with the present inquiry, which it may not be unprofitable to examine. Why are these Modes introduced at all? The answer so far is plain. There they are in nature; and we are bound, as philosophers, to consider them, because they are facts. But to the further question, What is the reason for their being there? What necessity is there for their existence? a more elaborate answer must be given. The ultimate reason for the necessity of these Modes, in the instance of created beings, is to be found in the imperfection of the latter. For it is owing to the imperfection of their Nature, that they are dependent, or composite, or limited, or changeable, according to various states of presence, union, or termination; and it is because of their dependence, composition, limitation, or changeableness, that they require Modes by which all these conditions may be accomplished in them. Thus, for instance, the body is dependent in considerable measure on the soul, and the soul on the body. Hence the necessity of union. But union, as we have seen, cannot be an entity in itself; therefore, there is need of a Mode or modification of both soul and body, by which the immediate union takes place, since it is that which is the union. In like manner, water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen; a Mode is, consequently, required for the combination of these two, in order to the evolution of a new substantial Form. So again, Quantity and Extension would go on for ever, if there were no limits; they would be infinite. Now, the limit of Quantity is Figure or Shape, which cannot be an independent entity in itself. It is, then, a Mode, dependent for its reality on Quantity or Extension. Once more; bodies change. They are present now in one place, now in another. They change in bulk, shape, colour, hardness or softness, and the like. Living bodies assimilate fresh external Matter to themselves, so that the entity which was before foreign to them, becomes their own. In all these and similar instances there is a real change, involving a new union, which must be a Mode. Now, in the majority of these conditions of created Being arising out of its essential imperfection, the result cannot be produced by means of entities entirely distinct from the Being that is their Subject; yet it is equally manifest that they cannot be produced by nothing. For nothing is produced by nothing. There remains only, then, this modification of the Subject itself, in accordance with the explanation already given.

From all that has been stated it is plain, that a Mode is a most imperfect entity; because it wholly depends for its reality on the Subject or Subjects to which it belongs and of which it is the Mode. Consequently, the Distinction between the Mode and the Modified is not simply and entirely a Distinction between entity and entity; it is more truly a Distinction between an entity and its modification. Hence, the reason why such Distinction is called the Minor Real Distinction; in contrast with the Greater Real Distinction, wherein the two terms distinguished are, both of them, real entities in their own right.

NOTE I.

Another kind of Distinction has been introduced by some writers, which has received the name of Potential Distinction; but it will be found, on examination, to be included under the Greater Real Distinction. It is derived from the peculiar nature of the integral parts that constitute a continuous whole. For, in such Natures, each part, if divided from the remainder, becomes a distinct complete entity; and ceases to have the nature of a part. Thus, if there be a jug of water, the whole of the water is one mass composed of integral parts. But, if the water is poured into three glasses, it becomes three distinct entities, whole and complete; no one of which has anything of the nature of a part. In this important respect such entities differ from Matter and Form in material substance, which, even when separated, retain, nevertheless, the nature of a part. Accordingly, it is maintained, that there is a notable difference in the Distinction between the integral parts, in their mutual connection and their mutual separation. In the former case they are actually parts, potentially totalities; in the latter ease, on the contrary, they are potentially parts, actually totalities. Such is the reason which has suggested the introduction of this Potential Distinction. Now, it is to be observed that under the term, Distinction, which is negative, two negations may be included. For, first of all, it may include the denial that one entity is another entity; and this is the formal meaning of the word, as used here in opposition to Unity. But it may also include the denial that one entity is actually united with another; and this second meaning is, as it were, adventitious. Taking the word, then, in its formal sense, there can be no reasonable doubt that the integral components of a continuous whole are really distinguished from each other as partial entities; whereas, in the latter sense, there is no Distinction at all between them, though there may be. If, therefore, it seems good to call such a future contingent Potential Distinction, so let it be; for it is profitless to quarrel about words. One can only say, that it is unnecessary; and that there can be no real actual Distinction, which is not included in either the Greater or the Modal.

NOTE II.

Another objection to the completeness of the division contained in the present Proposition, is founded on the separability of different Modes, -- sometimes in the same Subject of modification, sometimes in different Subjects. Thus, Subsistence and local Presence are two Modes existing in one and the same Subject. Now, the Distinction between the two cannot be called a logical Distinction; for they have different principles and affections. Moreover, they are really separable; for, the one ceasing to be, the other can continue. But, again, it cannot be called a Greater Real Distinction; because this latter can subsist only between real entities, and Modes are not in themselves entities. Lastly, it cannot be said to be a Modal Distinction, first of all because, as is supposed, one is not a Mode of the other; secondly, because the two are often mutually separable from each other. Accordingly, it would seem as though there were sufficient reason for admitting a new kind of Distinction. If, however, the nature of a Mode, as it has been explained above, is duly realized; it will be seen that these cases of Distinction are embraced under the division given in this Thesis. To begin with really distinct Modes in one and the same Subject, -- it cannot be, that they should be otherwise than modally distinguished. For, since they have no proper entity of their own, in themselves they afford no element of the Greater Real Distinction. On the other hand, they cannot find any foundation for such Distinction in their Subject; seeing that the Subject of both, according to the hypothesis, is the same. Then, as to Modes existing in different Subjects, it is sufficiently clear that they must be distinguished by the Greater Real Distinction. For, since their entity is not separable from the entity of their respective Subjects; such as is the nature of the Distinction between the Subjects, such likewise will be the Distinction between the Modes. But the supposition is, that the Subjects are divided from each other by the Major Real Distinction; therefore, so will the Modes be also, whether they be homogeneous or heterogeneous.

NOTE III.

Yet another sort of Distinction has been conceived, as between the Including and the Included; in fact, the Distinction which subsists between a whole and any one of its parts. For the two Subjects of Distinction are not wholly the same, nor yet wholly different; because the whole is its part, and something more. It is observable, at the outset, that Distinction of such a nature is to be met with in Logical, as well as in the Greater Real, and in Modal, Distinction. Thus, not only is a human body distinct from its arm or leg, and subsistence from the substance which it terminates; but Genus is thus separate from its Species; i.e. as a whole from its part. In Real Distinction, which alone is at present under consideration, the examples range themselves under the Greater or Less Distinction, according to the nature of the case. Thus, -- to take the first instance given, -- there is a Greater Real Distinction between the whole human body and the leg; because the entities of the two are really distinct, and they are also physically separable. For, though it is true that if the leg were cut off the whole human body, (i.e. the integral body), would not remain; yet there would still be a human body. And this sufficiently shows that there is a real entity in the whole, which in no wise belongs to the part. Nor can it be said, that this supposes a disruption of the whole and, therefore, a change in the hypothesis. For a whole, qua whole, is conceptual, rather than real; albeit it has a real foundation in the entity, which is conceived as a whole.

NOTE IV.

It may be asked, What are practically the signs by which Real Distinction generally, and then the two kinds of Real Distinction, can be recognized? In answer to this question, the following canons, borrowed from Suarez, are given.

i. If two objective concepts are of such a nature that they are really separable in one and the same individual, it is a sign of Real Distinction between them; for that which is individually one, cannot be divided in itself and therefore cannot be separated from itself.

ii. Two canons are given, whereby to ascertain the existence of the Greater Real Distinction between two objective concepts

a. If both can be physically preserved in being, without real mutual union; it is a sign of the. Greater Distinction between the two.

b. If the one can be immediately, i.e. without the intervention of a third entity, preserved in existence independently of the other, and conversely; it is a most sure sign of the same Distinction.

iii. When one extreme can be physically separated from the other extreme, but not conversely, i.e. when the separability is not mutual; it is sufficient evidence of the presence of Modal Distinction.

Spite, however, of these canons, grave difficulties may not unfrequently occur touching individual cases. For it may be, for example, that instances of the permanence of one extreme, after its separation from the other, have never as yet been met with, and the mind has, in consequence, no foundation for judging that the distinction is more than Modal; whereas the said extreme may be capable of separate existence, by the action of the Divine Omnipotence. under such circumstances, we must do our best, by a careful examination of the essential nature of the entities, their grade of perfection, the office they are intended to fill, and the like; and, with such materials, form a conclusion as to the particular instance.