PROPOSITION LXXXIV.

Truth is predicated of Being according to analogy of proportion.

PROLEGOMENON.

It would ill harmonize with the purpose of the present work, to discuss ex professo what may be called the historical origin of the word, Truth. Besides, it seems to be admitted on all hands, that it was primarily used to express the conformity of judicial thought with its object; and that it was thence borrowed to represent the conformity of the senses and of simple Apprehension with their object, the conformity of language with thought, and the conformability of Being with Intelligence. It is of much greater importance to the metaphysician, that he should accurately determine whether this form of Truth, which is predicated of these various subjects, is the same, or different; -- in other words, whether it is predicated of them univocally or analogously; and, if the latter, by what sort of analogy. And here, the origin and universal acceptation of the word will be of some service. Let it suffice, then, to say that, by the general consent of mankind, the proper and peculiar home of Truth is the intellect.

The present Proposition really embraces two Members; the one implicit, the other explicit. For it explicitly states that Truth is predicated of Being, according to analogy of proportion; which necessarily implies that it is not predicated univocally of Thought and Being. Wherefore,

I. It has to be shown, that Truth is not predicated univocally of Thought and of Being. An attribute is predicated univocally of its various subjects, when the form, which it expresses, is the same in each subject, and equally or independently appertains to each and all. But the Truth which is predicated of Thought, is not of the same form as the Truth which is predicated of Being. On the contrary, they are entirely distinct. For the latter is a Transcendental and, therefore, an essential attribute or passion of all real Being; the former, as will be seen, is an adventitious perfection of only a certain class of Being. The one is identified with the entity of its subject; the other is not. Therefore, Truth cannot be predicated univocally of the two.

II. The second Member of the Thesis is much more important, by reason of its intimate connection with the doctrine established in the present Article. It asserts, that Truth is predicated of Being according to analogy of proportion. This implies, that the judicial concept is the primary analogate; Being, the secondary. Nor will it be necessary to prove the position; since it has been sufficiently established in the Prolegomenon. In addition, it has been virtually proved in the preceding argument. For, if the form predicated is simply different, as has been shown, in the several analogates, the analogy of attribution is thereby excluded; since, in this latter, the form is the same with respect to all the analogates. Therefore, it must be analogy of proportion. But, for the sake of its connection with the main subject, the declaration of this Member shall be extended. The reader may remember that, in the first class of analogy of attribution, the form is intrinsic only in the principal analogate, and is predicated of the secondary analogates by extrinsic denomination. Thus, -- to repeat the example given once before, -health in man is intrinsic; whereas it is predicated of food, v.g. an apple, by extrinsic denomination from the form of health in man. May not, then, Truth be in the same way predicable of Being according to such analogy of proportion? For Being is true, in that it is capable of causing Truth in the intellectual Judgment; and, furthermore, it is admitted that Truth formally and primarily appertains to the intellect. Here, therefore, are all the elements required for the verification of such analogy. But if this were really so, then Ontological Truth would denote nothing more than an extrinsic denomination; which is an opinion that has been rejected already. For it has been shown, that Ontological Truth essentially includes in its concept the entity of the Being of which it is predicated. It may, however, be further urged that the distinctive character of Ontological Truth, -- the quasi-Difference which distinguishes it from Being, is this causal conformability; and that this is the reason for the transfer of the name from Thought to Being. True; but there still remains the fact, that Ontological Truth necessarily includes also the entity of Being as subject of this conformity and, therefore, is a real passion or perfection of Being. The instance of analogy of attribution of the first class, adduced more than once in these pages, will serve to illustrate the present contention. For, besides the attribution of healthiness to an apple by reason of its conformity with animal health; the term is likewise applied in another sense to the same apple, according to analogy of proportion. It is said to be healthy and sound, because of the normal disposition of its elements, and the absence of partial corruption; which is manifestly an intrinsic perfection. But, as has been urged before, if Ontological Truth denoted nothing else than an extrinsic denomination, it could no longer claim to be a true attribute or perfection of Being. Therefore, Truth is predicated of Being according to analogy of proportion, not of attribution. In what, then, does the proportion between Ontological and Conceptual Truth consist? To answer this question, was the principal motive for the introduction of the discussion concerning Conceptual Truth.

The proportion consists in this, that both forms include a conformity, either actual or aptitudinal; so that, as Conceptual Truth consists in the conformity of Thought with Being, so Ontological Truth consists in the conformity of Being with Thought. Further; neither of them is a real absolute perfection, or a real or even logical or predicamental relation.

Once more; each is differentiated in its own sphere by a simple connotation. Add to this, that there is an intimate conjunction between them; since they stand to one another in the relation of Measured to Measure. These points of similarity and conjunction are sufficient to hinder us from pronouncing, as some have done, that the use of the word in the two cases is equivocal; and seem to justify the opinion, that it is analogous according to analogy of proportion.^{1}

{1} St. Thomas, 1ae xvi, 2, c.; cf. I Sentt. d. xix, Q. 5, a. I, o, v. in.; De Verit. Q. I, a. 4, c.