ARTICLE III.

Evil.

As Multitude is the opposite of Unity, and Falsity is the opposite of Truth; so, Evil is the opposite of Goodness. It would appear, then, that each one of the Transcendental attributes has its opposite. If so, how is it that Being, the fourth Transcendental, has no opposite, like its attributes? It is true that there is a logical opposition between Being and not-Being; but not-Being is Nothing, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as a metaphysical opposite, which is necessarily in some sort real. It may, consequently, be held for certain, that Being has no opposite such as belongs to Unity, Truth, and Goodness. But why? The matter is worthy of our examination.

What is the nature of the opposition that subsists between the Transcendental attributes and their respective opposites? The opposition is privative, i.e. such as intercedes between a form or perfection and the privation of it; for instance, between sight and blindness. Multitude is entity deprived of that form of intrinsic indivision which constitutes Unity. Falsity is entity deprived of that perfection of conformity between Being and concept which constitutes Truth. And Evil, as will be seen, is entity deprived of that consonancy and consequent appetibility which constitute Goodness. But a form and the privation of a form demand a Subject. A form informs; and if there be privation, there must of necessity be something or somebody that is deprived. Now, Being is in no Subject; for it is the ultimate, in which are founded all things; itself founded in nothing else. Therefore, it never can become a term of privative opposition. But Unity, Truth, and Goodness are so intimately founded in Being, that the latter enters into the essential declaration of the former. Therefore, they admit of such opposition; since their opposites, like themselves, have Being for their Subject. Such is the explanation of the Angelic Doctor. 'Being,' he remarks, 'is the primal concept of the intellect; wherefore, it can have no opposite in the shape of contrary or privative, but only of negative, opposition; because, as it has no foundation in any Subject, so neither could its opposite. For opposites are referred to the same subject. But Unity, Truth, and Goodness, in their proper concepts, have their proper foundation in the concept of Being. Therefore, they admit of contrary or privative opposition, as based on Being; just as they are themselves based on Being. Hence it is plain, that Truth and Falsity, Goodness and Evil, do not stand to one another in the same relation as Being and Nothing. . . . Wherefore, as every privation of a particular Being has a foundation in the Good; so, the False likewise has a foundation in a truth, because it has a foundation in an entity. Accordingly, as that in which there is Falsity or Evil, is a Being, though incomplete; so, in like manner, that which is evil or false is an incomplete Goodness or Truth.'^{1} It is clear at once, that there can be no contrary opposition, except in relation to one and the same subject. Thus, there is no contrary opposition between heat in fire and cold in water; though there would be such opposition, if the same water were cold and then hot. So, in like manner, there would be no privative opposition between a wingless snake and a winged bird; but, if a winged bird lost its wings, or should have been born without them, there would be a privative opposition between its normal and abnormal state. It is worthy of remark, that contrary opposition seems to include privative; but the two differ, in that the latter is a simple defect, -- absence or want of due perfection, -- while the former, in addition, includes some positive form. Thus, cold and hot water are contraries; and cold water supposes the privation of the form of heat, but includes (speaking metaphysically) the positive form of cold.^{2}

There are four points, touching the question of Evil, which will be discussed in the present Article. The first regards the precise nature of Evil. The second embraces the divisions of the same. The third is occupied with its causes. The last determines its place in Metaphysics.

A. THE PRECISE NATURE OF EVIL.

PROPOSITION CV.

Evil is the privation of perfection in Being.

The Evil, like the Good, may be understood in two ways. For it may stand either for the subject which is so denominated, or for the denominating privation itself; just as white, for instance, sometimes designates the thing which is informed by the accident, (as when an ethnographist speaks of the Whites); sometimes the accident itself, (as when white is reckoned among colours according to the vulgar idea). In the one case, Being is represented under the quasi form of a privation; in the other case, privation is represented as existing in Being. The difference is of some moment. For, if evil is taken in the concrete, the direct object of thought is Being; if in the abstract, the direct object of thought is not-Being. Now, Being, as such, is always good and desirable absolutely, and is only accidentally avoided; whereas not-Being is absolutely shunned, and is only by accident desired, (i.e. when not-Being is preservative of one's own Being), as a sheep -- to adopt the illustration of St. Thomas,^{3} -- desires the absence or non-presence of the wolf. It is evident, then, that, in the present Article, Evil is considered in the abstract as antagonistic to Goodness.

Of the existence of Evil there can be no possible doubt; for we meet with it at every turn in the pathway of life. Indeed, its continuous omnipresence in the universe ever has been, and still is, one of the most perplexing problems proposed to metaphysical inquiry. Many philosophers have been thereby led to sustain the preposterous theory of a duality of principles in the constitution of nature; while others have used it as an argument against either the Omnipotence or the infinite Goodness of the Creator. The solution of the problem belongs to the theologian rather than to the philosopher; for it could never have been discovered by pure reason and, therefore, seems to postulate a Divine Revelation. In Philosophy, the fact of the existence of Evil is accepted simply as a fact; and, the fact being assumed as incontestable, an examination is instituted touching the nature of Evil.

The Proposition consists of two Members or parts. In the former it is asserted, that Evil is a privation; in the latter; that it is a privation in Being.

I. It is proved that Evil is a privation by the following disjunctive syllogism. Evil is either something positive, something purely negative, or something privative. But it is neither something positive, nor something purely negative. Therefore, it is a privation. The Minor contains two members which will be proved separately.

i. That Evil is nothing positive, is proved by a threefold argument, borrowed from the Angelic Doctor. For the Good is essentially desirable; and, consequently, as Evil is opposed to Good, Evil is opposed to the Desirable, as such. But, that whatever is opposed to the Desirable (or, in other words, to appetibility), as such, can be nothing positive, is demonstrably proved in three ways. For, first of all, the Desirable, or object of desire, is an end. Now, the order of ends exactly corresponds with the order of efficient causes; so that, in proportion as the latter is higher and more universal, in a like proportion, the former will be also higher and more universal. The reason is, that the end is the directing intention of the efficient cause. If, then, there be a supreme efficient Cause, there must be a supreme Good or supreme End, under which all other Goods can be reduced. But, further, these two must be identical. For the supreme Cause must be the supreme Mover, Himself therefore unmoved by any other. Wherefore, He must be His own End, or supreme Good; seeing that He is self-moved. Hence, He must be at once Alpha and Omega; the first efficient Cause, and the only final Cause to Himself, (if it may be allowed to use the term Cause in His regard), and the ultimate final Cause to every other. As, therefore, from the supreme efficient Cause proceeds all particular or limited Being, so from the supreme Good proceeds all limited Good; and the limited Being and the limited Good are identical, as the supreme efficient and supreme final Cause are identical. For, the supreme efficient Cause is essential Goodness, and His own essential Goodness is the supreme and complete End, -- more especially if we take into account that the effect is of the nature its efficient cause, -- it cannot but be, that Being and the Good should be identical. If, then, all Being is desirable and good; that which is opposed to the Desirable, as such, cannot be Being, i.e. cannot be anything positive. The second argument is this. Every existing entity has a natural inclination and desire for something or other which is agreeable to its nature; and, consequently, that agreeable object must in turn find a consonaney or appetibility in the entity which it thus satisfies. But there is no appetibility in Evil. Wherefore, it cannot he anything positive. There is a further confirmation of the above argument. For that which has a natural inclination for something agreeable to itself, has a natural inclination for the Good; and, therefore, a concord or consonancy with it. But Evil is opposed to the Good; and, consequently, cannot have a consonancy with it. Accordingly, anything which has such natural appetite or inclination, cannot be evil. But all Being, i.e. everything that is positive, has this natural inclination. Therefore, Evil cannot be anything positive. Lastly: there is nothing which is a more prominent and stronger object of desire than Being itself. Wherefore, everything naturally desires the preservation of its own being; and avoids and resists, with all its might, whatever tends to the destruction of its being. Consequently, Being is itself especially desirable. If, then, Evil is opposite to the Desirable as such, and universally opposed to it; it follows, that it is opposed to Being and cannot be anything positive.^{4}

The same assertion, that Evil can be nothing positive, follows as a Corollary from the hundredth Proposition, in which it is declared that every Being, as such, i.e. so far as it is something positive, is Good; whence it is concluded, that nothing which is positive can be evil, in so far as it is positive.

ii. Neither can Evil be a pure negation. For the only negation that can be supposed in the case, is negation of some perfection. But, if Evil were a pure negation of some perfection, it would follow that every finite Being would be ipso facto essentially evil. For, to be finite, means to have a limit; i.e. to have a perfection limited off from ulterior perfection. Consequently, finite Being means Being with a negation of ulterior perfection; that is, Evil according to the hypothesis. In this way a man would be evil, because he had not the wings of a bird, or the strength of a lion, or the swiftness of a race-horse; and a beast would be evil, because it has not the mind of a man; and a stone evil, because it has not the vegetative life of a plant. Again; it would follow, that entities not yet existing would be evil, as including in themselves the negation of existence. And so, all future generations of men and things would be evil, because they came to be.

It only remains, therefore, that Evil should be a privation; that is, the absence, or want, or (if you please) the negation, of a due perfection. The word, due, which contains within it the differentia (or essential characteristic) of privation, leads to the second Member of the present Proposition.

II. Evil is the privation of perfection in Being. This second Member of the Proposition follows, as a Corollary, from the former. It only requires a distinct conception of the term, privation. For a privation of perfection is the absence or want of a perfection which ought to be there. But where? Surely, a privation essentially connotes something that has been deprived of something else; in other words, a Subject of such privation. It further denotes that this something, or Subject, has a natural claim to that of which it has been deprived; for here is precisely the difference between privation and simple absence. A man is properly said to be deprived of sight, but the same cannot be said of a stone; because sight is a natural perfection of the former, while it is quite foreign to the latter. Furthermore; a real privation must be the privation of a perfection, because privation of an evil would be no privation, and because everything that is positive and connatural with a thing must be perfective of its entity. With these distinguishing characteristics of privation for a guide, the truth of this second Member is made clear. For, if privation requires a Subject, or something that has been deprived; that something must be either Being or nothing. But, if nothing has been deprived, there can be no privation. Again: that which is capable of a real perfection, must be Being; for the subjective potentiality is something real, and connotes something real and potential in which itself is. Once more; that which has in its own nature a claim to such perfection, must be Being; for Nothing has neither a nature nor a claim to nature. Therefore, Evil is the privation of perfection in Being and, consequently, the privation of perfection in the Good; for every Being is, as we have seen, good. Hence, there can be no Evil save in the Good. But herein lurks a seeming contradiction; for, according to this doctrine, we can justly call Evil good, since whatsoever is in an entity, as part of itself, either participates in its nature or, at least, cannot be opposed to it. It will assist towards the solution of this difficulty, if we signalize three uses of the word, Good, in connection with the present subject. The perfection itself of which the Subject is naturally capable, is called good. The Subject, as informed with the given perfection, is called good; and the same Subject, as capable naturally of such perfection, is called good. Further, the term is justly applied in all three cases. As to the first two there can be no doubt; but, as the justice of the predication in the last instance might not perhaps so plainly appear at first sight, it may not be amiss to add a word or two by way of explanation. A natural tendency or aptitude in an entity is something positive and real. So that, in an entity endowed with such aptitude, there is a double Goodness, viz. the Goodness of its Being, and the Goodness of its aptitude or perfectibility. Few would be inclined to doubt that a blind man, for instance, is naturally better than a stone in this, if in no other respect; that he has a natural aptitude for sight, even though as a fact he has been deprived of it. To resume: The Evil destroys the Good, as understood according to the first-named use of the word; for it is the perfection that is good, and the perfection is wanting. According to the second use of the word, the Evil diminishes the Good; because the Subject is deprived of its due perfection. But, assuming the last application of the term, the Good is undiminished; for the Subject always remains with its natural aptitude or perfectibility, even under its actual privation. Now, the only real opposition in the concrete is between the Evil and the Good, as understood in the first way; because the two terms are referred to the same formal object. But, when in the present Proposition it is affirmed that Evil is the privation of perfection in Being, and when it is, consequently, said by the Doctors of the School that Evil is in the Good, the term Good is evidently employed in the last of these three senses. It is, therefore, meant that the privation exists in an entity that has a natural aptitude for the perfection of which it has been deprived, and that, in such wise, the Evil is in the Good. But this involves no contradiction; because Evil is predicated of one object, Good of another; or, at least, it is predicated of the same object under two perfectly distinct points of view.

COROLLARY.

It follows from the above declaration, that unmixed Evil is an impossibility; for Evil is always founded in the Good. Unmixed Evil would destroy itself;^{5} because it involves the absence of all good and, therefore, the impossibility of privation, which requires a positive Subject.

DIFFICULTIES.

I. It is hard to understand how moral Evil can be a mere privation; because the positive act of the will is evil. For, in the commission of a sin, the will chooses Evil instead of Good. But the choice of the will is a positive act; therefore, an evil choice is an evil positive act.

ANSWER. It is quite true that moral Evil includes a positive act; because it has its seat in the free-will of the intelligent creature. And, for this reason, there is a certain peculiarity in moral Evil, which will appear later on. Nevertheless, formally considered, it, like every other form of Evil, is a mere privation. That this truth may be more clearly recognized, it will be well to analyze a sin, and to consider its somewhat complex constituents. As it will be easier to pursue the analysis in the concrete, take an act of drunkenness. The senses (or, it may be, the imagination, which is the memory of the senses), render the stimulating draught present to the mind, and the conscious mind recognizes it as a natural Good. The sensual appetite is excited; and the will, under the influence of this sensual excitement, is aroused from its potential indifference, and wishes for the draught. It is now in, what the philosophers of the School term, its first or inchoate act. Up to this, all is positive; all is good. The action of the senses or of the imagination, the mental consciousness, the aroused appetite, the indeliberate motion of the will, -- all are natural and good. There is as yet no moral Evil. But now, the will, by what has been called its second act, -- an act of deliberate choice, -- wills the draught; though the man is aware that it will cause drunkenness, and lead him into a breach of the moral law. An act of deliberate choice always and in its very nature presupposes at least a virtual cognition of the law in the mind; without it there can be no sin. Spite of this cognition of a higher Good than the sensual Good proposed to it in the assumed instance, -- spite of the known violation of the natural order which such election must involve, the will freely elects the latter. Here there is Evil; but how? The action of the intellect is good. The choice of the will is entitatively good; for it is entitatively an act, and every faculty is perfected by its act. But the act is morally evil. Why? Because it is inordinate. But what is meant by saying that it is inordinate? We surely mean that the action is out of the right order, that is, deprived of that orderliness by which it is naturally perfectible and which it naturally claims. Consequently, the Evil in the act of the will is reduced to a privation. Thus, then, moral differs from physical Evil, in that it essentially includes a positive act, (for evil habit is reducible to evil act), and the object of the volition or act is a positive Good; but, nevertheless, the object becomes morally evil and the choice evil, because the choice of that Good as an end carries along with it an aversion from the due end of human action. That aversion, however, is not positive; it is a privation, consequent on the positive act. To adopt the beautiful illustration of St. Thomas; -- 'As, in the things of nature, there cannot be two ultimate substantial forms actually perfecting the same portion of matter; so, there cannot be two ultimate ends of the will. Wherefore, as a natural agent, by the fact of its introducing one form, causes the loss of the other form; so the will, in like manner, by the mere fact that it adheres, as to its last end, to some object which is not its due end, is turned away from its constituted end, (and it is in this that the complete nature of moral Evil essentially consists), apart from the actual intention of the will,^{6} which does not expressly intend this aversion from the supreme Good.

II. Suffering is an Evil; but suffering is something positive. There is no man in his senses who can doubt that a toothache, for instance, is something more than a mere privation of perfection. The same may be said of violent grief, such as arises, not unfrequently, from the death of a near relative or from loss of reputation. In like manner, nothing can be plainer than that a sweet thing is positively pleasant, and a bitter thing, (such as aloes), is positively displeasing and painful to the sense of taste. Therefore, not all evils are mere privations.

ANSWER. -- This difficulty deserves minute examination, by reason of its complexity. There are so many elements, intrinsic as well as extrinsic, which enter into the constitution of suffering; that there is the greatest risk of confounding one thing with another, and so, of drawing an erroneous conclusion. What is suffering? As the word sufficiently indicates, it is a passion of the soul, produced in it by the presence of an Evil. In man, this passion may be produced either in the sensitive or in the intellectual part of the soul. Hence, two kinds of suffering; to wit, spiritual suffering or grief, and bodily suffering or pain. These two kinds of suffering are produced by two corresponding kinds of Evil; grief by a spiritual, pain by a bodily, Evil. Moreover, the Evil, which is the cause of suffering, is twofold. The one is intrinsic and immediate, i.e. something or other in the soul; the other mediate and, for the most part, either really extrinsic to the soul or relatively and conceptually extrinsic. Furthermore, this extrinsic Evil may be either evil in itself, or evil only in respect of something else. Let us consider each one of these constitutives separately, according to the two forms of suffering.

I. It must be admitted that the passion itself is an act and, therefore, something positive. But is it absolutely in itself evil? On the contrary, it is a Good, an excellence, a perfection of our nature; -- to limit the question to human suffering for the sake of succinctness, though, as regards corporal suffering, the conclusions apply to animals equally with man. For the passion of suffering serves to indicate the presence of an Evil, and necessarily includes an apprehension of it either sensile or intellectual. But this is simply a perfection; and is, moreover, of the greatest advantage. For, as to pain, if there were no such passion in the human soul; animal life might be extinguished by the tyrannous action of an Evil, of which, in such case, the victim would be unconscious. In a somewhat similar manner, moral Evil might continue unobserved to prey on the life of the will; unless there should intervene that remorse of conscience, which awakens the culprit to a sense of the presence of the Evil. So, again, if there were no power of grieving for the loss of relatives or for a ruined reputation; there would result an insensibility which would seriously affect the wellbeing of social life as well as individual culture and morality. In itself, therefore, suffering is a great Good; though under both its forms, it is a relative Evil, i.e. it is evil to the sufferer. But why? Because of the immediate cause to whose presence it bears witness. It is itself a useful admonitor; but it testifies to the presence of an Evil, -- of something noxious, repugnant, disagreeable in the soul. Let this Evil be the next subject for consideration.

II. The immediate Evil, to which suffering calls attention, is always something interior, (or rather intrinsic), in the whole composite, man. In pain, this immediate Evil is the partial corruption of the Subject. In toothache, for instance, the pain arises from a decayed tooth, or from an abscess formed at the root, or from some other local indisposition; each of which is partial corruption, as the word indisposition clearly denotes. Is it in itself an Evil, then? Certainly, it is; but, at the same time, it should be noted that it is a mere privation. It is not the tooth in itself that gives pain, but the decayed tooth, or the decay of the tooth; and that is a simple privation. In grief, which is spiritual pain, the immediate and intrinsic cause is entitatively one with the sorrow itself; yet here, too, the analogy with pain may be traced by attentive introspection. For the grief is the passion itself, which is caused by an indisposition of the soul, -- that which often goes by the name of low spirits, a mode of expression sufficiently indicative of its privative character.

III. It remains to consider the mediate or extrinsic cause, In the case of pain, this may be natural or adventitious. Thus, a toothache or, more properly speaking, a decayed tooth, may proceed from a derangement, general or local, of the vital powers, or from the effects of a medicinal poison, such as mercury; in which latter case the mercury would be a more remote, the vitiation produced in the body, a less remote, cause; but both would be mediate. Pain may be the result of an adventitious cause, in two ways; by misadventure, or by design. It is produced by misadventure, when the inflicting cause acts upon us by accident; when it is designed, it assumes for the most part the shape of punishment. Now, in the instance of a natural mediate cause, (which is not extrinsic, therefore, to the composite as a whole), we are in presence of a simple privation. The body is out of order, as it is expressively said. If it be an adventitious mediate cause, the causal entity is in itself good. Thus, the mercury which produces salivation is not only an entity with its own proper nature and perfection; but that very property, by the action of which toothache may have been produced, forms part of its perfection, so that without it the mercury, as such, would be incomplete. Take, again, the case of caning. It is true that the effect of the cane is to produce a partial and temporary corruption of the body; as can be more clearly discerned, when the operation has been excessive or severe. But the cane produces those disagreeable impressions on the body, by a real virtue proper to its own nature, which we are ready to recognize when it is exercised on a dusty carpet. So, the energetic hand that holds the cane, uses it as an instrument of penance, by virtue of a bodily energy which contributes to the perfection of the man. To apply this to one of the instances brought forward in the objection; -- the sweetness in sugar-candy is a positive perfection of that substance; but equally so is the bitterness of aloes to that inspissated juice. It may also be of service to remark here parenthetically, that the action of the nerves of taste, which refers the sweetness and the bitterness to the sensitive faculty of the soul, is a real perfection of those nerves; and, moreover, that the formal sensations in the soul of sweet and bitter are positive acts and, therefore, positive perfections likewise. But the cause of the pain in the former cases, and of the distaste in the latter as touching the aloes, is this; that these causes and objects are not consonant with man and are, consequently, in relation to him, a relative Evil. This is very clearly illustrated in instances of partial tastes and distastes which are not the result of any morbid condition. There are some persons who cannot endure cheese; and the writer knows of a person who has an unconquerable aversion to apples. Yet, to the majority of mankind, neither cheese nor apples are an Evil. The same does not hold good of grief or spiritual sorrow. For the death of relatives or dear friends is, according to the common phrase, a loss; sins and faults are inordination; a ruined reputation is a disadvantage. All are a deprivation. To sum up; -- sorrow, whether in the shape of bodily pain or spiritual grief, is something positive and in itself a Good. The immediate intrinsic cause of both is an Evil; but then, it is a mere privation. The mediate cause of pain, if intrinsic, is a mere privation and evil, but cannot be strictly termed a cause; if extrinsic, it is absolutely in itself a Good, (though in certain cases it may be an incomplete and deficient Good), and is only relatively an Evil. It now remains to consider pain and grief adequately, as including, i.e. all these constitutives in one. Is pain an Evil? A sensible Evil it undoubtedly is; but can it in no sense become a Good? For it must be remembered that Goodness is not like Truth. A concept is either true or false; and if false, it can under no conceivable circumstances be true. But a thing may be evil under one point of view, and good under another; by reason of the diversity of appetites in our complex nature. It is absolutely certain, then, that bodily pain becomes, in unnumbered cases, a useful Good. To take the instance of corporal punishment, -- not only is the vindication of justice in itself a great moral Good, as restorative of order; but it may become of service to the culprit, by assisting him in overcoming temptations to sin and crime, and in forming virtuous habits. Hence, the prominence assigned by the Philosopher in his Ethics to pleasure and pain as instruments in the work of education. And, of the two, pain is more effective than pleasure; because we naturally shrink from that which tends to not-Being with far more energy than we pursue that which is consonant with Being or contributes to its perfection. With irrational animals pain is the most efficacious means of training. And now, is grief, adequately considered, an Evil? To this question a like answer must be given. Grief is undeniably a physical Evil, and is incompatible with a state of perfection. Still, presupposing the Evils natural or moral which occasion it, grief is in itself good, when measured; and is a most useful instrument in the moral purification of man. There is no need of referring to the objection in detail; as the principles here developed easily suggest the answer.

III. No one would deny that monstrosities are natural Evils; yet, they are frequently positive entities. Thus, a man with six fingers and six toes is a monstrosity; yet he really receives four new members. Similarly, a child born with two heads has an important addition to his body; yet it is precisely this addition which is to him a natural Evil. Much the same may be said of giants. Therefore, there are some natural Evils that are not privations.

ANSWER. The natural Evil does not formally consist in the positive addition, or rather in the number added; but in the number as added. To explain: -- The sixth finger and sixth toe and the second head are not in themselves evil. If they were cut off from the body to which they belong, no one would regard them as monstrosities, unless they were themselves malformations; and in such case we go back to the same question. The Evil consists in the addition of these members to a body already fully constituted in its natural form and proportion, both of which are destroyed by the addition. Hence, such addition is commonly called a deformity, because it deprives the body of its appointed form. Consequently, it is a mere privation.

B. DIVISIONS OF EVIL.

I. Evil is divided into metaphysical, physical, and moral. Metaphysical Evil is only called such analogically; and, in this manner, is predicated of the limitation of finite Being. But, as this limitation is not a privation but a simple negation, and is only called evil by an analogy of proportion; it is wisely disregarded. Physical Evil is the privation of a merely natural Good in Being; such as, in man, are blindness, ignorance, death. Moral Evil is the privation, in an intelligent Being, of some moral Good.

II. Evil, as referred exclusively to the rational creature, is divided into criminal or sinful Evil and penal Evil; in other words, into the Evil of sin and the Evil of punishment. The former is the privation of a moral Good, when that privation is dependent on the free-will of the Subject. The latter is the privation of some Good (either natural or moral) in man, for the sake of repairing the order which has been violated by the sin of the Subject.

III. Evil is either absolute or relative. Absolute Evil, or that which is in itself an Evil, is that which is in itself the privation of some Good; Relative Evil is that which is not in itself an Evil, but on the contrary a Good; yet relatively to some other entity, in which it causes the privation of a Good, it is called an Evil. Thus, the substantial form of fire is in itself a Good; but it is an Evil to water, inasmuch as it tends to deprive this latter of its natural property of cold, and even of its substantial form. So, the avenging justice of the judge is a Good in itself; but it is a sensible Evil to the prisoner under sentence.

{1} 'Ens est prima conceptio intellectus. Unde enti non potest aliquid opponi per modum contrarietatis vel privationis, sed solum per modum negationis. Quia, sicut ipsum non fundatur in aliquo, ita nec oppositum suum; opposita enim sunt circa idem. Sed unum, verum, et bonum, secundum proprias intentiones, fundantur supra intentionem entis; et ideo possunt habere oppositionem contrarietatis vel privationis fundatae super ens, sicut et ipsa super ens fundantur. . . . Unde, sicut quaelibet privatio entis particularis fundatur in bono, sic et falsum fundatur in aliquo vero, sicut in aliquo esse. Unde, sicut illud in quo est falsitas et malitia, est aliquod ens, sed non est ens completum; ita etiam illud quod est malum vel falsum, est aliquod bonum vel verum incompletum.' In I d. xix, Q. v, a. I, ad 8m.

{2} It is necessary to be constantly reminding the reader, that he is invited to consider these, and similar, examples from a metaphysical, not a physical, point of view. Aristotle knew, just as well as our modern physicists, that cold is a privation. Oion to men thermon katêgoria tis kai eidos, hê de psuchrotês sterêsis, are his words in his work De Generat. et Corrupt., L. i, c. 3, p. m.; but privations, (though not as privations), are in a sense causes, and in a sense accidental Forms. Cold, for instance, is not a mere privation; save as heat may he described as a privation of cold. For, first of all, it (i.e. that sensile something which is ordinarily called cold) is natural to some bodies. Then, it really acts. It is used medically as an anaesthetic. Besides, it is chemically producible. But no natural act terminates in a simple privation; for a simple privation is entitatively nothingness. One almost despairs of ever being able to persuade physicists, that it is lawful to look at the phenomena which are their special study from any other point of view than their own, and to speak of them in terms which are not current in the laboratory or class-book of Physics. Many of these experimentalists are nothing loth to cabin the soul of man in the glass-case of an electrical machine; but are ready with a protest, when we elevate their cold, and heat, and light, into a higher sphere of contemplation; forgetful of the fact, that there are two sides to the statue.

{3} De Ma. Q. i,a. I, ad 17m.

{4} See St. Thomas, De Ma. Q. x, a. I, o.

{5} Arist. Eth. Nic. L. iv, c. 11. See St. Thomas, 1ae x1ix, 3, c.

{6} 'Sicut enim in naturalibus non possunt esse duae formae substantiales ultimae actu perficientes eamdem partem materiae, ita non possunt esse duo ultimi fines voluntatis. Unde, sicut agens naturale ex hoc quod inducit unam formam, causat defectum alterius formae; ita etiam voluntas, ex hoc quod alicui tanquam ultimo fini inhaeret quod debitos sibi finis non est, avertitur a fine ultimo sibi debito, in quo completur ratio mali culpae, praeter intentionem voluntatis.' Ia 2 d. xxxiv, a. 3 C.