PROPOSITION CXV.

D. THE PLACE OF EVIL IN METAPHYSICS.

Evil is justly excluded from a place among the attributes of Being.

The truth of this Proposition commends itself at once so decidedly to the common sense of most men, that it may be regarded as axiomatic; and it might, therefore, be thought a waste of time to burden a self-evident truth with superfluous declaration. And yet, it is not without its difficulties. For Evil is plainly enough distinct from Being; more so, indeed, than the three attributes which are universally assigned to it. It is moreover, predicated of Being, and lends its name to Being. It may perhaps be said in reply, that Goodness is one of the attributes of Being, and that, consequently, Evil, which is the opposite of Goodness, could not be an attribute; because this would suppose the existence of opposites, a perfection and its privation, in one and the same Subject. But it is a sufficient answer to this objection, that Good and Evil may co-exist in the same Subject under different respects. For instance, a good statesman may be a bad man; and a bad statesman may be a good man. So good weather may be bad for green crops; and a good waller may be a bad setter or mason. It may, further, be objected against the admission of Evil among the attributes of Being, that it is formally a mere privation. But this objection proves too much; and, therefore, proves nothing. For it tells equally against unity; which is universally acknowledged to be an attribute of Being; since unity is formally indivision, i.e. privation of division, in Being. Lastly, it cannot be said that Evil is not coextensive with Being; because, though no Being, as such, is absolutely evil, nevertheless, there is no Being whatsoever, (God Himself included), that is not relatively evil. For God is an Evil to those whom He condemns to punishment. Moreover it has been admitted, that there is a certain reality in Evil; indeed, common sense teaches us as much. Therefore, there is abundant reason for including Evil among the attributes of Being.

Nevertheless, Evil is justly excluded from the catalogue, for the three following reasons.

I. Evil, in its formal character of Evil, does not express anything belonging to the nature of Being, but, on the contrary, a tendency to not-Being, -- the deficiency, diminution, of Being; so much so, that, as the Philosopher justly remarks, perfect Evil destroys itself and is No-thing. Consequently, the assumed parallel between Evil and unity does not hold good. For Evil is a disease of Being; unity is a perfection. And it is a sign of this, that unity essentially includes Being in its formal concept; whereas Evil is formally a privation, and if it includes Being, includes it as a Subject in obliquo. For it cannot be represented as deprived Being, as unity, or the one, can be described as undivided Being; but rather as privation in Being. Besides, unity is the privation of imperfection, which is tantamount to a position or real perfection; whereas Evil is the privation of real perfection. Hence, unity circumscribes and defines the integrity of Being and, as a consequence, its entity; whereas Evil defines defect or loss of entity.

II. Evil is not convertible with Being. Yet this is a necessary property of every true attribute. For, under one point of view, Evil overlaps Being; while, under another point of view, Being overlaps Evil. If we consider Evil in itself, for the reason that it does not essentially include entity in its concept but only privation of entity, that to which the name of Evil is legitimately given is not necessarily Being at all; for the privation is itself an Evil, though not in itself, (for in itself it is nothingness), but relatively to that entity in which it is. It is in this way that sins of omission are real moral Evils, though independent of all real entity. On the other hand, if we consider Being ia itself, it cannot be denied that there are innumerable beings that are in no sense evil. For it is most certain that ia God there is no defect or privation. Hence, Evil cannot attach to Him in such wise. Neither is He absolutely undesirable to any other Being whatsoever; but, on the contrary, infinitely desirable, and absolutely necessary to the perfection of all things whatsoever. And, if He is sometimes apprehended as undesirable; either the apprehension is false, or it is founded in a Divine operation that is disagreeable to some man or body of men, and this resultant Evil is attributed to God. But it is a mere extrinsic denomination; and does not properly constitute Evil.

III. All true attributes of Being are the absolute, essential, intrinsic, properties or consequents of Being. But Evil is neither an absolute, essential, nor intrinsic, consequent of Being. For we have seen, that it requires the extrinsic action of some efficient cause; for the very reason that it is not in itself intrinsic to Being. It is neither absolute nor essential; seeing that it is in every case caused by accident and unintentionally.

COROLLARY.

Evil is considered in Metaphysics as the opposite of Goodness; just as multitude finds a place there as the opposite of unity; and falsity, as the opposite of truth.