CHAPTER XIX.
ABSOLUTE TRUTH.

§ 347. In the chapter on "Development and Validity" we saw that an absolutist of the Hegelian type regarded all development as a reconciliation of differences in a higher synthesis, and hence inferred that, until the complete and total synthesis of all differences is realised, knowledge is not only imperfect, but is subject to indefinite modification. Truth consists in a totality of syntheses; it is the complete harmony and unification of every part of knowledge. What we strive to know is Reality itself, and Reality is a system in which each part is related to all the rest and cannot be understood in isolation from the rest. It is a coherent, organised whole, an individual whole, a whole which is essentially intelligible; and as such it is at once the Object which we seek to know, the Ideal towards which our knowledge tends, and the Criterion by which it must be judged. Truth, therefore, is only another aspect of Reality itself, and is defined by Dr. Joachim as "the systematic coherence of a significant whole."

On this point there is substantial agreement among all absolutists, though in regard to points of secondary importance they differ. The Hegelian, for instance, identifies Reality and Thought, whereas Mr. Bradley maintains that Thought is only a fundamental 'difference' of Reality. Thought, he says, can never equate itself with Reality; for in thought content and existence are essentially distinct, whereas in the Absolute they are one. Nevertheless, as it is the Experience of the Absolute which constitutes Reality, so it is the manifestation of that Experience in finite centres, where it is broken up by analysis and reunited in synthesis, that constitutes human truth, a truth which is ever approaching but never attains the systematic coherence of an individual whole. It is essential to truth, says Dr. Joachim, to "manifest itself in the thinking of finite subjects."^{1} The Absolute somehow reveals itself in us, and our human thinking is thus in some way or other the reproduction of the one eternal consciousness, "in respect, at least, of its attribute of self-origination and unification of the manifold."^{2} So says T. H. Green; and again: "Finite experiences are rooted in the Ideal. They share its actuality and draw from it whatever being and conservability they possess." "Perfection of truth and of reality has in the end," Mr. Bradley tells us, "the same character. It consists in positive, self-subsisting individuality."

Less or more [our judgments] actually possess the character and type of absolute truth and reality. They can take the place of the Real to various extents, because containing in themselves less or more of its nature. They are its representatives, worse or better, in proportion as they present us with truth affected by greater or less derangement. Human truths are true according as it would take less or more to convert them into reality.^{3}

And again, Professor Bosanquet declares that "for Logic, at all events, it is a postulate that 'the truth is the whole.' The forms of thought have the relation which is their truth in their power to constitute a totality."

§ 348. Three doctrines underlie this Absolute theory of Truth: the doctrine (1) that relations intrinsically modify their terms; (2) that all parts and single judgments get their meaning from the whole; and (3) that the part played by the mind in the making or finding of truth is essential and intrinsic. That this is so should, I think, be clear from what has already been said of the general standpoint of Absolutism in previous chapters. Hence I shall merely quote one or two passages from Dr. Joachim's Nature of Truth to illustrate the point.

Dr. Joachim rejects the correspondence notion of truth precisely because and precisely in so far as it contradicts the three fundamental doctrines of Absolutism mentioned above. "There is no correspondence," he says, "between two simple entities, nor between elements of wholes considered as simple beings, i.e., without respect to the systematisation of their wholes."^{4} "If we identify, distinguish, or in any way relate A and B -- two simple entities -- we have eo ipso retracted their simplicity; and their simplicity never existed, if their nature justified our proceedings." A purely external relation is meaningless, and would be "a third independent entity which in no intelligible sense relates the first two." Every relation qualifies and modifies intrinsically its terms.^{6}

§ 349. Correspondence, indeed, is admitted as a 'symptom of truth,' but this correspondence depends primarily on something which itself conditions the being and the nature of the correspondence.^{7}

Correspondence, when attributed to wholes, is simply a name for identity of purpose expressed through materially different constituents as an identical structure, plan, or cycle of functions; and, when attributed to the parts, it means identity of function contributed mainly by materially different constituents towards the maintenance of the identical plan or purpose.^{8}

Even the unity of the elements is derived from the whole. Hence, "correspondence, as a constitutive condition of truth, sinks more and more into the background," and instead "truth is seen to depend on the nature of the idea expressing itself in the inner structure of the corresponding wholes." And this idea acquires its own significance, its fulness of meaning and its power to constitute truth, from "a larger significant system to which it contributes."^{9}

§ 350. Again, "truth is not truth unless it is recognised." The finding of truth as a historical process in my mind is irrelevant to the nature of truth, yet truth must be for some mind if it is to exist at all.^{10} The real factor in knowledge cannot be external to mind or unrelated to consciousness. Truth is independent of this or that mind, quâ this or that mind, and to its stubborn and independent nature all thinking must conform under pain of error; yet 'this independent truth lives and moves and has its being in the judgments of finite minds.' It is essential to it to be expressed, and it is expressed as a system of knowledge which constitutes and is constituted by the intellectual individualities of many finite thinkers.^{11} If the truth of my judgments be regarded as the correspondence between two factors in knowledge, the one vague, imperfectly articulate, and more or less unmediated feeling, i.e., the common environment which is the world, the other a reflective judgment, a distinctly conceived synthesis of Thing and Property, then my judgment is true only if, as a whole of parts, it exhibits an inner structure identical in structure with the real factor, or some subordinate whole within the real factor. Yet the two factors are not independent. The 'real' factor is 'uniquely tinged with our respective individualities,' and the mental factor is communicable and so not purely personal. The correspondence cannot be one of structure only, the difference being merely 'material;' for a purely external relation is impossible. The matter of the 'felt-whole' and of 'thought-whole' must affect their respective forms. They cannot consist of elements together with a scheme of relations.^{12} Facts, again, if regarded as objects of possible sensations or judgments, are not independent; but are essentially related to sensating and thinking. They are only a partial factor, dependent for its being and nature upon another factor, and incapable of being in itself or independent.^{13}

For Absolutism, then, there is no hard and fast separation between knowledge and reality. Knowledge is an attempt to express reality, to think it and in so far as our knowledge approximates to reality itself it is true.

Anything is true [says Dr. Joachim] which can be conceived (!), [and] to conceive means to think out clearly and logically, to hold many elements together in a connection necessitated by their several contents; [while] 'the conceivable' is a significant whole, a whole possessed of meaning for thought, [a whole] such that all its constituent elements reciprocally determine one another's being as contributory features in a single concrete meaning^{14}

§ 351. Several important corollaries are deduced from this 'Coherence-notion' of truth. First of all 'necessity' is hypothetical. Strictly speaking, there are no 'necessary truths.'

Necessity says Professor Bosanquet is a character attaching to parts or differences inter-related within wholes, universals or identities. If there were any totality such that it could not be set over against something else as a part or difference within a further system, such a totality could not be known under an aspect of necessity.^{15}

Necessity is thus dependent on the Whole. It may be used synonymously with 'self-evidence' and 'propriety' to express the fact that in knowledge we are not free, but are under a constraint exercised upon us by the content of knowledge itself, such that some judgments have to be accepted and others to be rejected."^{16} But the 'content of knowledge' in this case is a more or less clear apprehension of some whole (space, for example), but ultimately of the Whole or of Reality itself.

As a consequence of this doctrine, Professor Bosanquet is forced to find some other name for the Laws of Thought. He cannot call them 'necessary truths,' since, concerned as they are with the nature of being itself, they cannot be regarded as dependent on any whole less than Reality itself. Hence Professor Bosanquet treats them as postulates.

I call these principles by the name of Postulates he says because when presented to me as abstract reflective ideas they operate as guides to knowledge which lead to their suhsequent substantiation in a concrete form. As reflective conceptions, then, they are postulates, i.e., principles which we use because we need them.^{17}

Thus, the absolutist, having set up the systematic coherence of a significant whole as the sole criterion of truth is forced to take an almost pragmatic view of the fundamental laws of being and of thought.

§ 352. Another corollary to the Coherence-notion of Truth is the doctrine that truth cannot be predicated of any single judgment in isolation^{18} Dr. Joachim rejects the view that "what is true is eo ipso absolutely true." Partial truths are not 'true about a part of the matter, but false when taken as equivalent to the whole.' Nor do we add to them or supplement them by further determination. Such a view "would make it impossible to show that the truth of true judgments is essentially the truth of a system of knowledge and it would make it equally impossible to show that the truth of systems of knowledge is borrowed from the Ideal experience, which is struggling for self-fulfillment in them."^{19} The judgment that a triangle with equal angles has also equal sides, or that 3² = 9 is not true at all, if taken in isolation for in isolation such judgments are practically meaningless. Every judgment is "a piece of concrete thinking which occurs in a particular context, issues from a special background, concentrates in itself various degrees of knowledge; and by these determining factors its meaning is coloured." A judgment is the inseparable unity of thinking and of the object thought; so that to the boy who is learning the multiplication table, the judgment 3² = 9 possesses probably a minimum of meaning; while to the arithmetician it is perhaps a symbol for the whole science of Arithmetic.^{20} The numerical system in its fundamental features is assumed in every judgment that anyone makes about numbers. And similarly in Science no universal judgment can be violated without destroying its determinate meaning; and, therefore, in isolation such a judgment cannot be absolutely true.^{21} Isolated judgments are at best mutilated fragments, caricatures, faint shadows of truth.^{22}

§ 353. Absolute truth, then, is an Ideal; it is not something which actually exists. It is an organised individual experience, self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled, but its organisation is the process of its self-fulfilment and the concrete manifestation of its individuality. The whole is not, if 'is' implies that its nature is a finished product prior or posterior to the process, or in any sense apart from it.

Human knowledge -- not merely my knowledge and yours, but the best and fullest knowledge in the world at any stage of its development -- is clearly not the significant whole in the ideally complete and individual sense. Hence truth is, from the point of view of the human intellect, an ideal, and an ideal which can never as such or in its completeness be actual as human experience.^{23} Human knowledge may have degrees of truth in proportion as it contains more or less of the nature of the Real,^{24} and its degree of truth will depend upon its completeness and its systematic coherence; but human knowledge can never attain the ideal of Absolute truth which is the completely individual, self-sustained, significant whole, the articulate connectedness of which demands discursive experience in a system of judgments.^{25} All human knowledge, therefore, is wanting, not only in completeness, but also in certainty. No portion of knowledge is certain, says Dr. Mellone, until all portions have been so developed that they may be seen to form an all-inclusive whole. And as this would be omniscience. it is impossible for man so long as he remains finite. Thus, human knowledge is only an approximation, as yet very inadequate and far removed from the ideal; and therefore, except within the bare facts of our sensations and mental images, it is uncertain, and may have to be completely transformed.^{26}

§ 354. The doctrine of Absolute Truth which I have briefly outlined above, chiefly in the words of Dr. Joachim, its principal exponent, itself undoubtedly contains much that is true; and yet also much that, to my mind, seems false. It is based on assumptions which I cannot admit; and it leads to consequences which, to a seeker after knowledge and truth, are, on account of the scepticism they imply, extremely repugnant. The assumptions upon which it is founded have alreadv been discussed, with the result that they proved to be not only unnecessary and useless as an explanation of the data of experience, but also self-contradictory. Relations presuppose qualities, and modifications in relations arise from modifications in the qualities. But the relation is not a link between the qualities except in so far as the objects related are apprehended in a single mental act; and if a relation exist objectively at all, it exists as an attribute of each object, not of the two taken together. When I apprehend the nature of a simple entity to be A and the nature of another simple entity to be B, and then combine these two judgments in one and say A is different from B, I do not see why 'either the simplicity of A and B is destroyed or else my judgment is unfounded.' Again, granted that the correspondence between two wholes is due to identity of structure or identity of function in the parts, and that this presupposes a universal idea which is expressed in each, it by no means follows that the universal is really one, or that it is the ground of a real whole. The 'correspondence' is sufficiently accounted for by the logical unity of the universal under which are apprehended the structural similarities of the objects that correspond. And a logical unity gives us, not a real whole, but a logical whole, a whole for thought. That logical and teleological wholes imply a Divine mind which apprehends them and has constructed them according to a rational plan which they imperfectly realise, may be granted; but this rational plan is expressed in substantial real unities or individuals, co-existing and interacting, but not necessarily postulating an immanent ground. And, lastly, if the real factor in knowledge does get a unique tinge from the mental factor, that 'tinge' must vitiate the objectivity of knowledge and the alleged independence of truth, unless, indeed, it can be distinguished from the real and objective factor which would thus be left untinged.

Dr. Joachim's novel definition of truth as the "systematic coherence of a significant whole," if interpreted in the sense in which he interprets it, seems to me an unwarrantable assumption. Human knowledge does become more coherent and more systematic as it advances, and on this account is more adequate to represent Reality; but truth can hardly be identified with this 'coherence' which is only one of its properties. Nor is coherence of much practical use as a criterion of truth, for it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to compare two theories in regard to their degree of systematisation and coherence.

§ 355. The sceptical consequences which follow from this doctrine of absolute truth are disastrous for human truth. Professor Bosanquet's view of necessity as essentially dependent on the whole, if taken in combination with the doctrine that a part is unintelligible in abstraction from the whole, destroys the axiomatic character of all 'necessary truths.' But, in the first place, why should necessity be restricted to the parts and be denied of the whole? The whole, it is admitted, exists of itself, for itself, and through itself; and so may surely be said to necessitate itself, or to constitute a factual necessity. And, secondly, why may not a part manifest, without mutilating, some character or aspect of the whole? If it does, the laws of thought may still be necessary truths, though in this view only hypothetically necessary; but, if it does not, they are reduced to the status of postulates, and the certainty of human knowledge is taken away. For if the laws of thought are merely postulates, all human knowledge is a postulate; since the validity of the laws of thought is presupposed in every judgment that we make. And if these postulates are due merely to human needs, human knowledge ceases to be objectively valid until we can prove that what human needs force us to postulate is itself objectively valid; and this we cannot do without assuming the validity of the laws of thought. At first sight, Mr. Bradley's Intellectualism seems to be irreconcilable with the pragmatic position adopted by Professor Bosanquet in regard to the Laws of Thought. "In all cases," says the former, "that alone is valid for the intellect which in a calm moment it is incapable of doubting;" and in the next sentence the intrinsic necessity of axioms seems to be admitted, for we read: "It is only that which for thought is compulsory and irresistible -- only that which thought must assert in attempting to deny it -- which is a valid foundation for metaphysical truth."^{27} But Mr. Bradley's concession that "the theoretical axiom is the statement of an impulse to act in a certain manner destroys the force of his intellectual criterion and seems to make it as subjective as that of Professor Bosanquet and the pragmatists. For, though theoretical needs are distinguished from practical needs, and though we are told that "thinking is the attempt to satisfy a special impulse," it is still a subjective and a psychological impulse that prompts us to think; and though the attempt to think "implies an assumption about reality" which becomes 'our intellectual standard or axiom,' that assumption about reality is an assumption, the objective validity of which cannot be known, but is merely postulated.

§ 356. The subjectivity of axioms in Absolutism may be traced back to the Copernican Revolution of Kant. There are but two alternatives. Either the content of thought is determined by the object or it is determined by the structure of the mind and in the latter case it is subjective. And though the identification of Thought and Reality once more restores a certain objectivity to the content of our axiomatic principles as to the content of other thoughts; it does so only again to deprive us of it by the doctrine that no truth short of the whole truth is really true. Axioms, like other single and isolated judgments, are but 'mutilated shreds of knowledge,' torn from a larger whole and liable to indefinite modification before they can be joined up in the coherent system of Absolute Truth. Dr. Joachim acknowledges that this view is inconsistent with the 'obvious' interpretation which we put upon 'true judgments,' and that the ordinary doctrine that what is once true is always true seems at first sight unanswerable. But, he urges, if this view of isolated judgments is false, it would be impossible to show that all partial truths are derived from the truth of the whole; hence isolated judginents must be sacrificed. Personally, I should prefer to sacrifice the doctrine that truth is a whole, rather than have to mutilate my premisses in order to make them lead to the conclusion which I might desire to deduce. Dr. Joachim, however, has elected to hold fast to the Coherence-notion of truth at all costs, and so has sought about for some means of reconciling the doctrine that no isolated judgment can be true with the apparent fact that such judgments are true and persist in remaining true in spite of growth and development. Hence, he has discovered that isolated judgments on examination turn out to be practically meaningless.^{28}

This I cannot admit. I am quite willing to grant, of course, that the proposition 'three threes are nine' for the boy who is only just learning the multiplication table has only a 'minimum of meaning,' in the sense that he knows little of its relations to other arithmetical propositions of a more complex nature. Still the proposition has meaning and very definite meaning even for a small boy in a Preparatory School, provided he has been properly taught, and has not merely learnt his tables like a parrot. It implies that he already knows something of the way in which numbers may be grouped and combined. Nor do I think that as the boy develops into a mathematician the proposition 'three threes are nine' undergoes any intrinsic modification. It is still the same item of knowledge that it always was, though the arithmetician knows more about it, because he knows its relation to other items of knowledge and its place in the general science of Arithmetic.

The doctrine that every item of knowledge is related to every other item of knowledge is true; but to suppose that each item is intrinsically affected by its relations to other items, and, in consequence, changes as these other items become known, seems to lead to absurdity. It is difficult, for instance, to see how one's knowledge (v.g.) of the Constitution of Sparta can be affected by one's knowledge of the Law of Specific Gravity, or how one's knowledge of the multiplication table can be modified by what one learns later of the anatomy of the Amphioxus. No one dreams that 'isolated' judgments express the whole truth about reality, nor does anyone deny that as knowledge grows in any particular branch of science the judgments in which it is expressed acquire fuller significance. But this is very different from asserting that isolated judgments are intrinsically modified as knowledge grows, and is quite compatible with the facts of actual knowing, which the Coherence-theory is not. It is useless, however, to discuss the matter further, for it rests entirely upon the view that one takes of relations. If relations are a kind of physical nexus binding objects together and arising simultaneously and on the same level within an organic whole, then it is doubtless impossible to know an object without knowing its relations; but if the relations are essentially dependent upon the nature of the objects related, though not vice versa as well, then it is possible to know an object without knowing its relations; and, as those relations become known, one's previous notion of the object will not necessarily have to be changed, but will merely become larger, fuller and more significant.

§ 357. Closely, connected with the Absolute theory of Truth is the absolute theory of Error. Error is defined by Mr. Bradley as "the qualification of Reality in such a way that in the result it has an inconsistent content;"^{29} and by Dr. Joachim as "that form of ignorance which poses, to itself and to others, as indubitable knowledge, or that form of false thinking which unhesitatingly claims to be true, and in so claiming substantiates or completes its falsity."^{30} There are no judgments which are false as such, says Dr. Joachim. The judgment '2 + 3 = 6' is no more false, as such, than a road is wrong per se. It is false because its meaning is part of a context of meaning, and a part which collides with other parts. The judgment is really 2 + 3 conceived under the conditions of the numerical system = 6.^{31} How the judgment 2 + 3 = 6 or any other judgment involving numbers can be conceived, or can have any meaning whatsoever apart from the numerical system, is more than I can understand. If such a judgment is made intelligibly and means anything at all it implies that the notions of 'units,' 'addition of units,' 'sums of units,' and 'equality' are already understood; and when these are understood (i.e., as soon as it is possible to make the judgment at all) the assertion that 2 + 3 = 6 at once becomes false; and false as such, so it seems to me, because between the notions which it involves there is an obvious contradiction.

§ 358. Mr. Bradley's view of error is somewhat less sceptical. He admits that "every judgment, whether positive or negative, and however frivolous in character, makes an assertion about Reality;" and that "the content asserted cannot be altogether an error;" though he adds that "its ultimate truth may quite transform its original meaning."^{32} The expression 'quite transform its original meaning,' however, is clearly an exaggeration. The original meaning will have to be transformed only in so far as it is erroneous. This is implied in the doctrine of degrees of Truth and of Reality; for we are distinctly told that "of two given appearances the one more wide or more harmonious is more real (and more true). It approaches nearer to a single, all-containing individuality. To remedy its imperfections, in other words, we should have to make a smaller alteration."^{33}

But the real question is whether in a given claim to truth or in a system of such claims we can distinguish parts which will have to be modified from parts which will not; or, in other words, whether we can locate our errors. And upon this question Realism and Absolutism are in violent antagonism. The absolutist with his theory that Reality is one organic whole in which each part is essentially dependent upon the rest, denies that any one part can be truly known until the whole is known, and so is forced to take up a sceptical attitude in regard to human knowledge and human truth. The realist, on the other hand, while admitting that the universe is a logical whole, or a whole such that each of its parts is systematically related to all the rest and would be apprehended as such by an intelligence which should be capable of understanding the whole universe, affirms that each part and each aspect of the universe expresses truly, though inadequately and incompletely, the systematic plan of the whole. He affirms that, were our knowledge complete, the relation between 3² and 9 would still be one of equality, and that the circumference of a circle would still be π times its diameter. And he does so on good grounds. For not only is there no evidence that any intrinsic change has taken place. or is likely to take place, in regard to judgments such as these; but the absolutist in order to establish the contrary doctrine which is implied in the Coherence-notion, would have to prove that every relation of every object so modified each and all its other relations that unless every one of them was fully known, our knowledge of the rest would not only be inadequate and partial, but false; and this he cannot do. New experience does sometimes render erroneous what was formerly taken to be true; but this cannot be said to be a general rule, nor can we say that an increase of knowledge entirely destroys the validity of those interpretations we stigmatise as false. Often enough, as we have seen in a previous chapter, within a theory we can distinguish what may possibly be false from what is certainly true; and in general, as our conception of things and their relations grows more and more systematic, we find that axioms and first principles, as well as facts, remain for the most part, unchanged, subordinate hypotheses and explanations the scope of which is comparatively narrow, alone being subject to modifications and reversals.

§ 359. But apart from the testimony of experience there is an impasse in Dr. Joachim's theory of truth, which, as we saw when discussing Absolutism from the metaphysical point of view,^{34} no ingenuity on the part of absolutist has been able to eliminate or overcome. I refer to the difficulty, or, rather, the impossibility, of explaining metaphysically the relation of finite centres of experieuce to the Absolute Ground upon which they depend. In what way does the Absolute manifest itself in finite centres, and how, if our thoughts are wholly a manifestation of the Experience of the Absolute, can we reconcile human error with Absolnte Truth? We do make mistakes. We affirm that S is P when it is not P; and to say that the error is removed when P is referred to a larger whole does not get rid of the falsity of our previous statement, a falsity which is inconceivable if the absolute is really responsible for our thoughts. Indeed, Dr. Joachim frankly confesses that 'the reconciliation of the modal nature of finite subjects with this self-assertive independence,' and 'the conception of the individuality of the significant whole as a life timelessly self-fulfilled through the opposition which it creates, and in creating overcomes' are mysteries, and mysteries which he does not attempt to solve. But neither he nor any other absolutist seems to recognise that between the 'modal' nature of the finite subject and its 'self-assertive independence,' between a life timelessly self-fulfilled and lives which are contingent and temporal, and between the creation of something opposed and different and the overcoming of that opposition and difference, there is a flat contradiction which can be solved only by denying the fundamental assumptions upon which it rests. This objection is, in my opinion, fatal to Absolutism, and shows that the idea which it endeavours to express is one-sided and full of inconsistency. Absolutism has this in its favour, that it appeals to our love of unity and to our desire for union with the Divine; and for this reason has elicited the sympathy even of an analytic mind such as that of the late Professor Sidgwick. But it is vague and indefinite, and it fails to explain just that which we all of us desire most to know -- the relation which holds between God and man. Its failure, too, is not merely one of ignorance, but of positive error. The conception of the finite mind as a vehicle of the Eternal Consciousness, in which the latter is ever trying in vain to realise and express itself, seems to merge the individual in the Absolute. Man becomes merely a particular collection or synthesis of the thoughts of an Eternal Ego, a 'finite centre of experience' entirely dependent upon the Ground for its nature, its character, and even its individuality. Personality and Freedom are thus declared to be illusions, arising from the human point of view, instead of fundamental truths which every human mind is forced to recognise in the data of his experience; while human knowledge, ever tinged by 'the confused mass of idiosyncrasies which distinguish this mind from that,' is, and is destined to remain, incomplete, and to an unascertainable extent erroneous.

{1} The Nature of Truth, p. 163 and cf. p. 20.

{2} Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, § 77.

{3} Appearance and Reality, pp. 362, 363.

{4} Logic, i., p. 3.

{5} The Nature of Truth, p. 10.

{6} Ibid., p. 11, and cf. pp. 43 et seq. 49.

{7} Ibid., p. 16.

{8} Ibid., p. 10.

{9} Ibid., p. 16.

{10} Ibid., p. 14.

{11} Ibid., pp. 20, 22.

{12} Ibid., pp. 23, 24.

{13} Ibid., p. 41.

{14} p. 66.

{15} Logic, vol. ii., p. 235.

{16} Ibid., p. 232.

{17} Ibid., p. 206.

{18} Ibid., p. 92.

{19} loc. cit., pp. 87-89.

{20} pp. 92, 93.

{21} pp. 97 et seq.

{22} p. 102.

{23} Ibid., pp. 76, 79.

{24} Appearance and Reality, p. 262 (but cf. whole of chap. xxiv.).

{25} The Nature of Truth, pp. 223, 114.

{26} Essays in Phil. Criticism and Construction, Introduction.

{27} Appearance and Reality, p. 252.

{28} Nature of Truth, pp. 87 et seq.

{29} Appearance and Reality, p. 189.

{30} The Nature of Truth, p. 142.

{31} Ibid., p.

{32} Appearance and Reality, p. 366.

{33} Ibid., p. 364. (Italics mine.)

{34} Cf. § 195.