University of Notre Dame
Jacques Maritain Center   


The Problem and Theory of Freedom
in Human Existence


OUTLINE OF INTRODUCTORY LECTURE

October 7, 1940

In this first lecture, we shall first of all distinguish two essentially different manners of being free.

On the one hand, I am free when I am acting without being constrained by any external agent: in this way a bird sings. We shall call this kind of freedom, freedom of spontaneity.

On the other hand, I am free when I am acting without being determined or necessitated, even internally, by any cause whatsoever. That kind of freedom, or freedom of choice, is properly free will. It is free will that we are to scrutinize this year from a metaphysical point of view. The object for us, and the special difficulty, is, while aiming at free will or freedom from any necessity, not to attain merely spontaneity, or freedom from any constraint.

This course of lectures will be divided into the following parts:

In the Introduction, we shall enumerate briefly -- enumerate without as yet discussing them -- the main objections and difficulties of a philosophical order which stop and stump like enigmas our natural feeling of freedom. I shall limit myself to five main difficulties:

After this Introduction, the First Part of the course will deal with the existence of free will, and give us the opportunity to answer the first difficulty.

The Second Part will deal with the nature of free will, and give us the opportunity to answer the four other difficulties.

The Third Part, if we do not lack time, will be dedicated to a brief examination of two most significant metaphysical positions: the Leibnizian position and the Bergsonian one.

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