THIRTEENTH LECTURE
The fourth objection made against free will is grounded on the fact that many human actions considered as free, can in certain cases be foreknown and forecast by normal or abnormal human knowledge. Therefore these actions are not really free.
In discussing this objection one must distinguish diverse categories of human foreknowledge, and begin by eliminating the foretellings which rely on the statistical constancy of a class of fortuitous events taken as a whole, when the proportion of the enumerated events is sufficiently great. Such a constancy concerns hazard, not freedom, and can be explained by the very lack of determining reasons which should have to be supposed if the result were to be different.
The first category to be discussed deals with collective events, but with collective events which can be foretold because there is an objective reason, naturally well grounded in reason, for a great many people to choose a certain course in certain given circumstances. In this category foreknowledge does not suppose any dominance of the inclinations or passions upon free will, but only the rational character of ree will itself, and the constancy of man's rational nature.
The second category deals with collective events which can be foretold becuse they correspond to strong inclinations, instincts or passions present in a group of people, be it according to the psycho-physical temperament, or according to the tendencies and preconceptions of social environment, or according to moral customs, virtues or vices, or according to some reawakening of primitive or magic mentality. In such cases (except with acts proceeding from virtues, which virtues by themselves fortify freedom) the possibility of foreknowing relies on the fact that freedom is weak in mankind, and that the majority of men follow affective inclinations rather than the judgment of the mind. We have previously noted that freedom acts on the background of the psychical determinism of natural or acquired tendencies; that is a normal condition for man. But the possibility of foreknowing with more or less probability, even with certainty, such collective behaviours does not involve any possibility of foreknowing with infallible certainty the actual behaviour of any human person individually taken.