APPENDIX

Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach

**Published article**

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Project Overview

Our Perspectives on Politics article gives little information the disaggregated indicators of democracy that we propose to collect. This appendix defines the categories, identifies experts and a project manager who will oversee the measurement of the component, lists any existing organizations and datasets that cover the component, and outlines the specific indicators that we hope to measure as part of this project.

Categories. The indicators are divided into fourteen categories: (I) Sovereignty, (II) Formal and descriptive representation, (III) Elections, (IV) The executive, (V) The legislature, (VI) The judiciary, (VII) Political parties and party system, (VIII) The media, (IX) Other civil society associations, (X) Direct democracy, (XI) Subnational politics, (XII) Civil liberty, (XIII) Social equality, and (XIV) Deliberative democracy. These are categories of convenience that correspond to our project managers’ areas of expertise. They do not have a one-to-one correspondence with the conceptions or components described in the article. (If you want to skip to a specific section of this document search on the number of that section as listed above, e.g., “(I)”.)

Sources. Within each category, indicators are subdivided into (a) those that will be coded by country experts and (b) those that will be collected or calculated by project managers – from (a), from extant sources, or from their own original coding. Note that there is some overlap between these divisions, i.e., situations in which initial data collection might be carried out by project managers and subsequent data verification or coding of missing data carried out by country experts. Note also that some of the indicators to be collected by project managers from extant sources are included in VDem primarily for the purpose of measurement validation and might not be employed to construct aggregated components and conceptions.

Integrated/Not yet integrated. Indicators already integrated into the on-line V-Dem database have a variable number in parentheses. Indicators without a variable number will need to be added at a later date. If these indicators are listed in the first section (EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE) they will need to be added prior to the next phase of coding.

Additional information. Please see the project website: www.v-dem.net.
1 Sovereignty

PROJECT MANAGER: MICHAEL BERNHARD (U. OF FLORIDA)

Additional experts: Karen Adams (U. of Montana), Tanisha Fazal (Columbia), Erik Gartzke (UCSD), Robert Jackson (Boston University), Stephen Krasner (Stanford), Douglas Lemke (Penn State), Kunle Owolabi (U. of Notre Dame).

Organizations: Correlates of War project.

Studies, datasets: Karen Adams (dataset), Correlates of War (dataset), Kristian Gleditsch and Michael Ward List of Independent States (dataset) http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/statelist.html.

GENERAL QUESTION: IS THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY SOVEREIGN?

Notes: Democracy assumes self-government. To the extent that a polity is governed by others rather than by itself, it is less democratic. Often sovereignty is limited by issue, as with protectorates that are self-governing on domestic issues but not in control of their defense or foreign policies or trade relations.

Potential obstacles: Few, as long as attention is limited to the most obvious types of international status, such as independent states, colonies, protectorates, and such. More problematic but not insurmountable if we introduce internal restraints on sovereignty like dual power and civil war.

EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE

1.1 Domestic autonomy (sv01domaut)

To what degree would you consider the state under consideration politically autonomous from the control of other states with respect to issues of domestic policy? [Such concerns should pertain to the state and its citizens. Foreign nationals who enjoy privileges of extraterritoriality as a function of normal international convention, or treaties negotiated by the state should not be included in your evaluation.]

0: Control by external actors. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either de facto or de jure. The most common examples of this are direct colonial rule and military occupation (dissolution of domestic government and replacement by external occupation authorities, e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (e.g. during WWII -- Vichy France, Arrow Cross Hungary, the Italian Social Republic). Control of some part of the territory by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (France during WWI and the USSR during WW II). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (e.g. countries under German occupation during WWII).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called “satellite” states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial
powers grant limited powers of national self-government to their possessions (e.g., protectorates and limited home government).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy (the EU, integrated military commands in alliances, free trade agreements).

1.2 International autonomy (sv02inlaut)
To what degree would you consider the state under consideration politically autonomous from the control of other states with respect to issues of foreign policy? [Such concerns should pertain to the state and its citizens. Foreign nationals who enjoy privileges of extraterritoriality as a function of normal international convention, or treaties negotiated by the state should not be included in your evaluation.]

0: Control by external actors. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either de facto or de jure. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (dissolution of domestic government and replacement by external occupation authorities, e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (e.g. during WWII -- Vichy France, Arrow Cross Hungary, the Italian Social Republic). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (e.g. countries under German occupation during WWII).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called “satellite” states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (the status of Finland or Austria following WWII).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy (the EU, integrated military commands in alliances, free trade agreements).

1.3 State authority over territory (sv03stter)
Please do your best to estimate the percentage of the national territory over which the state can assert control in the face of challenges to its authority. [With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its territory. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the areas over which it is hegemonic, e.g. where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (e.g., the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the FARC in Colombia, the Taliban in Afghanistan). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in
contravention to state authority (e.g. narcotics traffickers in Colombia, opium growers in parts of Indochina, warlords in the post-1911 period in China). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over parts or a sizeable share of its territory (e.g., Zaire after the fall of Mobutu, contemporary Somalia).

1.4 State authority over population (sv04stpop)

Please do your best to estimate the percentage of the population in the national territory over whom the state can assert control in the face of challenges to its authority. [With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its population. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the populations over which it is hegemonic, e.g. where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (e.g., the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the FARC in Colombia, the Taliban in Afghanistan). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention to state authority (e.g. narcotics traffickers in Colombia, opium growers in parts of Indochina, warlords in the post-1911 period in China). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over parts or a sizeable share of its territory (e.g., Zaire after the fall of Mobutu, contemporary Somalia).]
2 Formal and Descriptive Representation

*PROJET MANAGER: PAMELA PAXTON (UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN)*

*Additional experts:* Matt Golder (Florida State U.), Bonie Meguid (Rochester), Tatu Vanhanen (University of Tampere, Finland, emeritus), Kenneth Bollen (UNC), Melanie Hughes (Pittsburgh); Drude Dahlerup (Stockholm).

*Organizations:* IDEA, IPU, U.S. Department of State.

*Studies, datasets:* IDEA (Global Survey of Voter Turnout); Moon et al. (2006); Paxton et al. (2003); Vanhanen (2000), US Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service (2001), Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU), IDEA Quota Database; Paxton, Hughes, and Green (2008); U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports; Cederman et al. (2009) Comparative Constitutions Project.

*GENERAL QUESTIONS:* WHO IS ALLOWED TO VOTE AND WHO VOTES? WHO IS ELIGIBLE FOR PUBLIC OFFICE AND WHO ACTUALLY ATTAINS IT? DOES THE LEGISLATURE REFLECT POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS?

*Notes:* All items below pertain to major national elections -- parliamentary and (if applicable) presidential elections. (Presidential elections may not be relevant if the presidency is a weak office with little policymaking power.)

**EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE**

2.1 **Resident noncitizens who cannot vote (el01noncit)**
Please estimate the percent of the population that are resident noncitizens who cannot vote, per election law.

[text]

2.2 **Citizens who cannot vote by law (el02citnvl)**
Is there a significant percentage of citizens who are prohibited by law from voting?

0: Restricted suffrage. Restrictions on suffrage in election law are significant enough that less than 70 percent of the population can vote. Examples include restrictions based on gender and restrictions based on membership in larger ethnic or religious groups.

1: Semi-restricted suffrage. Suffrage is restricted per election law such that the percentage of the population that can vote per election law is between 70 and 95 percent. Examples of restrictions that could create semi-restricted suffrage include a high age minimum for voting (e.g., 25), restrictions based on membership in small ethnic or religious groups, restrictions based on criminal conviction if the number of such convictions is high, and certain citizenship requirements.

2: Full/nearly full suffrage. The percentage of citizens who can vote per election law is high (above 95%) with listed restrictions affecting only a small percent of the population (e.g., persons incompetent to manage their own affairs, persons with an infectious disease, those with undischarged bankruptcies.)
2.3 Citizens who cannot vote in practice (el03citnvp)
Is there a significant percentage of citizens who cannot vote in practice?
0: Restricted suffrage. In practice, restrictions on suffrage are such that a significant (more than 30%) percent of citizens find it difficult (or cannot) vote. Access to registration is restricted, and/or electoral law is enforced unevenly and/or voter intimidation is widespread.
1: Semi-restricted suffrage. Suffrage is restricted in practice so that 10 to 30 percent of the population finds it difficult (or cannot) vote. There may be some barriers to registration, some groups may experience intimidation during elections, etc.
2: Full/nearly full de facto suffrage. The percent of the population that can vote in practice is high. Access to registration/voting is widespread, electoral law is enforced equally across groups in society, and intimidation does not occur.

2.4 Comments representation (el04commrep)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on electoral representation.
[text]

2.5 Gender quota (lg15qugen)
Is there a national-level gender quota for the lower (or only) house of the legislature?[If you answer 1, 2, or 3, proceed to the next question. If you answer 0, skip to question lgpqgen.]
0: No national level gender quota
1: Yes, a statutory gender quota for all parties without sanctions for noncompliance (e.g., rejection of party list or financial penalty)
2: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with sanctions for noncompliance (e.g., rejection of party list or financial penalty)
3: Yes, there are reserved seats for women.

2.6 Gender quota sanction (lg16qugens)
Does the quota contain a placement mandate (for example, no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the same gender)?[Only answer this question if you answered (1)-(3) on the previous question.]
0: No
1: Yes

2.7 Party gender quotas (lg17pqgen)
Please list any party-level gender quotas for the lower (or only) house of the legislature. Please record: (1) the official name of any party with a voluntary gender quota, and (2) the level of the quota (e.g., 30% women).[If you enter information about any party quota, proceed to the next question. If no legislative party has a gender quota, type "none" and skip to question lgminpct.]
[text]

2.8 Gender placement mandates (lg18genman)
For the party gender quotas listed above, do they contain placement mandates (for example, no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the same gender)? Please record the name of each party and the nature of its placement mandate.
[text]
2.9 Ethnic group representation (lg19ethnic)
Considering all disadvantaged ethno-linguistic groups in the country, how well represented are these groups (as a whole) in the lower (or only) house of the legislature? [An ethno-linguistic group is defined ethnically, racially, religiously, and/or linguistically according to understandings in a country at a particular time. Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage and/or pervasive cultural, economic and/or structural discrimination. Some groups, such as the Chinese in many parts of Asia, face the second type of disadvantage but not the first. Others face the first but not the second. Either qualifies an ethno-linguistic group as disadvantaged.]

0: There are no such disadvantaged groups
1: They have no representation at all
2: They are under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population
3: They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population
4: They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population

2.10 Name of groups (lg20groupid)
Please state the name/s of the disadvantaged groups you were thinking of in responding to the previous question: [The groups you were considering could of course vary over time. Please allow your response to take this into account.]

[text]

2.11 Minority quota (lg21qumin)
Is there a national-level minority quota for the lower (or only) house of the legislature? [If there is a unicameral legislature, skip the remaining questions on the legislature and go to the next survey in your queue.] Only code “yes” if the groups covered by the quota have full voting rights in parliament.

0: No national level minority quota
1: Yes, statutory minority quota for all parties without sanctions for noncompliance
2: Yes, a statutory minority quota for all parties with sanctions for noncompliance (e.g., nonapproval of party list)
3: Yes, there are reserved seats for a minority group

TO BE COLLECTED BY PROJECT MANAGER
2.12 Date of first male suffrage, even if restricted.
2.13 Date of universal male suffrage.
2.14 Date of first female suffrage, even if restricted.
2.15 Date of universal female suffrage.
2.16 Percent of adult citizens who are allowed to vote.
2.17 Turnout
What percent of all adult citizens (male/female) voted?
2.18 Candidate restriction by gender
Does the constitution restrict eligibility for the executive or legislature by gender?

2.19 Candidate restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language
Does the constitution restrict eligibility for the executive or legislature by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

2.20 Percent female national legislators in the lower (or only) chamber of the legislature.

2.21 Presence of a female president

2.22 Presence of a female prime minister

2.23 Presence of a minority president

2.24 Presence of a minority prime minister
3 Elections

**PROJECT MANAGER:** STAFFAN LINDBERG (UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA)

**Additional experts:** Jörgen Elklit (Aarhus U., Denmark), Matthijs Bogaards (Jacobs University, Bremen), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Judith Kelly (Duke), Gerry Munck (USC), Andrew Reynolds (UNC), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Rakesh Sharma (IFES), Susan Hyde (Yale).

**Organizations:** ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Carter Center, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), National Democratic Institute (NDI), OAS Department of Cooperation and Electoral Observation.

**Studies, datasets:** Bjornlund (2004); Carter Center et al. (2005); Elklit, Reynolds (2005); Eriksson (2002); European Union (2007); Gerken (2009); Hyde & Malinov (2009); Munck (2006); Project on International Election Monitoring; Schedler (2006b); Hicken et al. (in progress), Polity IV, Lindberg (2009), Nohlen et al (1999, 2002).

**GENERAL QUESTION:** ARE ELECTIONS FREE AND FAIR?

**Notes:** Elections might be differentiated by (a) lower house, (b) upper house, and (c) presidency. In some cases, (b) and/or (c) is nonexistent or inconsequential, in which case it should be ignored. If no election occurs in a given year, then many of these questions will be filled out with the same value as for the last election in order to make it useful for continuous time-series (unless of course rules or norms pertaining to elections have changed in the interim). If more than one election occurs in a given year there will be two entries for that country in that year. (This complicates data analysis, but it is essential to the purpose of the dataset, which is to provide primary-level data that can be used for further analysis.)

**Potential obstacles:** Only a few indicators will be measurable before recent years. (If these rules were always defined in constitutions, the Elkins and Ginsburg project would be sufficient; but often they are contained in electoral laws and such.)

**EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE**

### 3.1 NEMB autonomy (el05embaut)

For this election, was there a National Election Management Body (NEMB) that was reasonably autonomous from government? [NEMB refers to whatever national government bureau(s) is assigned responsibility for setting up and overseeing elections.]

0: No: The NEMB was completely controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body so as to make free, fair, and secret elections impossible under any circumstances.

1: Half: The NEMB was partially influenced by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body so that free, fair, and secret elections could not be fully guaranteed.

2: Yes: The NEMB was fully autonomous (The elections may still not have been free, fair, and secret but due to other circumstances outside of the NEMB’s direct control)
3.2 NEMB capacity (el06embcap)
For this election, did the National Election Management Body have a reasonable administrative capacity (staff & resources) carry out its mandate?

0: No: There were significant deficits in terms of number of staff, quality of staff, the staff's commitment to impartiality, financial or other material resources so as to make free, fair, and secret elections impossible under any circumstances.

1: Some: There were partial deficits in terms of number of staff, quality of staff, the staff's commitment to impartiality, financial or other material resources to the effect that free, fair, and secret elections could not be fully ensured in all parts of the country even if other conditions were favorable.

2: Yes: There may have been some inadequacies in terms of administrative capacity but these were not of the magnitude to influence the overall quality of the election other than on the margin or in very limited portions of the country (less than 1% of the population affected).

3.3 Disclosure of campaign donations (el07donate)
Six months prior to this election, were there disclosure requirements for large donations to election campaigns that were generally observed?

0: No.
1: There were disclosure requirements in place but they were generally not observed or enforced.
2: Yes.

3.4 Public campaign finance (el08pubfin)
Six months prior to this election, was public financing available that played a significant role for most parties in funding their campaigns?

0: No. No public financing was available.
1: Some: There was public financing available but it was so small and/or with restrictions that it played a minor role for political parties/candidates' campaigns.
2: Yes. Public financing constituted at least one third of the estimated expenditures by candidates and/or parties during the course of a typical campaign and it created a meaningful difference in levelling the playing field.

3.5 Free and fair election (el09frfair)
Was this election overall free and fair?

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people'.

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (who became president; who won the legislative majority; or a significant share of legislative seats for one or more parties).

2: Maybe. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (defined as above).
4: Yes, entirely. There was some amount or human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences for the exercise of the people's electoral rights.

3.6 Comments electoral regime (el10comreg)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the electoral regime.
[text]

3.7 Multiparty election (el11multpar)
Was this election multiparty?

0: No. Election was no-party or single-party and there was no meaningful competition at the constituency level. The definition of single-party includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all de facto controlled by the dominant party.

1: Not really. Election was no-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates and/or independents were allowed to contest seats in the constituencies.

2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party was allowed to contest but either competition was highly constrained in number (such as only 2 or 3 parties could legally contest) or in character (such as when some but not all opposition parties are banned), or conditions such as civil unrest, lack of infrastructure, or other ‘man-made’ conditions (excluding natural disasters) prevented competition in large portions of the country.

3: Almost. Elections were multiparty in principle but either at least one opposition party was prevented (de jure or de facto) from contesting this election, or conditions such as civil unrest, lack of infrastructure, or other ‘man-made’ conditions (excluding natural disasters) prevented competition in a smaller portion of the territory.

4: Yes. Elections were multiparty (even though parties that are not committed to democratic principles may not have been permitted to contest, e.g. the exclusion in many democracies of far-right/left extremist parties and the exclusion of pure ethnic parties in some African countries).

3.8 Electoral intimidation (el12intim)
In this election, were opposition candidates/parties or their supporters subject to intimidation, violence, and/or harassment (for example detaining leaders, disrupting rallies, shutting down opposition newspapers and offices, violent attacks) by the ruling government?

0: Yes. There was systematic, almost daily, and almost nation-wide harassment and/or intimidation of opposition leaders and supporters conducted by the ruling government and/or its party agents during the election campaign period and polling day.

1: Yes, some. There was non-systematic, but almost weekly, and in some parts of the country, harassment and/or intimidation conducted by the ruling government and/or its party agents during the election campaign period and polling day.

2: Restrained. There was some periodic, and in one part of the country, or only directed towards a portion of opposition groups, harassment and/or intimidation conducted by the ruling government and/or its party agents during the election campaign period and polling day.

3: Almost. There were only a few instances of, targeted at a few people only, harassment and/or intimidation conducted by the ruling government and/or its party agents during the election campaign period and polling day.
4: None. There was no harassment and/or intimidation of opposition conducted by the ruling government and/or its party agents during the election campaign period and polling day (Note: There can still have been some politically motivated civil (i.e., on-governmental) violence during the campaign and polling day).

3.9 Executive turnover (el13turrex)
Did the incumbent president or prime minister lose his/her position as a result of this election, according to official results?

0: No. The president/prime minister is the same individual as before an executive election.
1: Half. The president/prime minister is a different individual than before the election but from the same party (or substantially same party even if the name was changed).
2: Yes. The incumbent president’s party’s candidate lost presidential elections or the incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and the new prime minister is from a different party than before the elections.

3.10 Legislative turnover (el14tvrleg)
Did control of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

0: No. The majority party is the same or ruling coalition of parties consists of the same parties (substantially the same parties even if one or more changed names).
1: Somewhat. A coalition forming a ruling majority in the legislature (or occasionally a ruling minority in parliamentary systems) consists of some old and some new parties compared to before the election.
2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature.

3.11 Comments electoral competition (el15comcom)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the electoral competition.

[text]

3.12 Voter registry (el16rgstry)
In this election, was there a reasonably accurate voters registry in place, and was it used?

0: No: There was no registry, or the registry was not used in this election.
1: No: There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised in the last elections and/or the share of votes contesting could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation).
2: Uncertain: There was a registry and it was used in this election but it is unclear whether the effect of potential flaws and the use of the registry had a significant impact.
3: Yes, somewhat: The registry was either not fully updated or not fully accurate (not more than 10% of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised and/or there could be some double-voting and impersonation but it would not have affected the results significantly).
4: Yes: The voter registry is reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and was used in a reasonably adequate way.
3.13 Voting irregularities (el17irreg)

In this election, was there evidence of intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud? [Examples of intentional irregularities and vote fraud include vote buying, suspiciously high turnout figures, fake/double IDs, impersonation, invalidation of large number of votes for poor reasons, preventing voters from reaching polling stations, lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes.]

0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide irregularities that greatly affected the one person, one vote principle.
1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country, which nevertheless significantly violated the principle of one person, one vote.
2: Restrained. There were some periodic irregularities, even if only a limited number or only in one part of the country, and it is unclear to what extent they undermined the principle of one person, one vote.
3: Almost. There were probably only a few instances of irregularities. Even if the number was greater it is not clear that they were intentional or that they disfavored particular groups' access to participation. Thus they did not substantially violate the principle of one person, one vote.
4: None. There was no evidence of intentional irregularities. (Note: Do not count the common unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions such as heavy rains, bridges that break down, etc).

3.14 Election boycotts (el18boycot)

In this election, did any opposition parties boycott?

0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election, or all opposition was banned.
1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they constituted a major opposition force.
2: Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.
3: Minor. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they were relatively insignificant ones.
4: No parties or candidates boycotted the election.

3.15 Losers accept election result (el19accept)

Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this election?

0: None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned.
1: A few but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.
2: Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.
3: Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not were relatively insignificant parties.
4: All parties and candidates accepted the results.
3.16 **Peaceful election (el20peace)**
Was the period immediately before, during, and after the election free from violence conducted by civilians and related to the conduct of the election and the political campaigns?

0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week, in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.

1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.

2: Somewhat. There were some short outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in one small part of the country. Not more than one person died and the number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.

3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.

4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred during the campaign, on polling day, or in the immediate post-election period.

3.17 **Comments electoral participation (el21compcp)**
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on electoral participation and legitimacy.

[Text]

3.18 **Date of breakdown of an electoral regime**
Breakdowns are defined as coups, civil wars, invasions by foreign powers, change of political regime to a no-electoral regime, and other situations that interrupt the normal cycle of elections.

Format: YYYY-MM-DD.

**TO BE COLLECTED BY PROJECT MANAGER**

3.19 **Date of last presidential election**
If n/a, leave blank.

Format: yyyy-mm-dd.

3.20 **Accumulated number of presidential elections**
A count of how many elections has been held in this category of elections including the last one, regardless of constitutional and unconstitutional changes and interruptions by periods of non-electoral regimes. Indicates ‘democratic stock’ or experience. If n/a, leave blank.

[count]

3.21 **Uninterrupted, consecutive number of presidential elections**
A count of how many elections has been held in this category of elections including the last one, since the last unconstitutional change of government/interruption by a period of non-electoral regimes. Indicates ‘democratic stock’ or experience. If n/a, leave blank.

[count]
3.22 **Date of last upper house election**
If n/a, leave blank.
Format: yyyy/mm/dd.

3.23 **Accumulated number of upper house elections**
A count of how many elections has been held in this category of elections including the last one, regardless of constitutional and unconstitutional changes and interruptions by periods of non-electoral regimes. Indicates ‘democratic stock’ or experience. If n/a, leave blank.
[count]

3.24 **Uninterrupted, consecutive number of upper house elections**
A count of how many elections has been held in this category of elections including the last one, since the last unconstitutional change of government/interruption by a period of non-electoral regimes. Indicates ‘democratic stock’ or experience. If n/a, leave blank.
[count]

3.25 **Date of last lower house/single chamber election**
If n/a, leave blank.
Format: yyyy/mm/dd.

3.26 **Accumulated number of lower house/single chamber election**
A count of how many elections has been held in this category of elections including the last one, regardless of constitutional and unconstitutional changes and interruptions by periods of non-electoral regimes. Indicates ‘democratic stock’ or experience. If n/a, leave blank.
[count]

3.27 **Uninterrupted, consecutive number of lower house/single chamber elections**
A count of how many elections has been held in this category of elections including the last one, since the last unconstitutional change of government/interruption by a period of non-electoral regimes. Indicates ‘democratic stock’ or experience. If n/a, leave blank.
[count]

3.28 **Electoral regime**
At this time, are regularly scheduled elections – past and future – on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent? (If the answer is no, the implication is that they have been suspended or postponed in violation of election law or well-established precedents).
0=No, or suspended or postponed in violation of election law or well-established precedents.
1=Yes

3.29 **Election monitors (1)**
In the last election, were election monitors from all parties and independent domestic election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?
0=No
3.30 Election monitors (2)
In the last election, were independent international election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?

0=No
1=Yes
4 The Executive

**Project Manager:** Jan Teorell (Lund University)

**Additional experts:** Kirk Bowman (Georgia Institute of Technology), John Carey (Dartmouth), Steven Fish (UC Berkeley), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Fabrice Lehoucq (UNC Greensboro), Gerardo Munck (USC), Anibal Perez-Linan (U. of Pittsburgh), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Matthew Shugart (UCSD).

**Organizations:** Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins and Ginsburg)

**Studies, datasets:** Amorim Neto (cabinet ministers in Latin America); Banks (2009), Bowman, Lehoucq & Mahoney (2005); Cahoon (World Statesmen), UNDP (2004: 77-84), Metcalf (2000).

**Turnover:** Bienen, van de Walle (1991); Gandhi, Cheibub (ACLP dataset); Goemans, Gleditsch, Chiozza (2009); Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak (dataset).

**General questions:** Who is the head of the government? How is the chief executive (s) selected? Is the executive constrained? How frequent is executive turnover? Is the executive accountable?

**Potential obstacles:** Much of the information may be obtained from coding information available in Cahoon’s website (worldstatesmen.org), from Banks’ Cross-National Time-Series dataset, the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) and from the ARCHIGOS project. Main obstacles will be in obtaining historical data, in the verification of historical sources, and in the aggregation of multiple questions/measures into a single concept (e.g., constraints on the executive).

**Note:** The executive is understood as the person or persons formally in charge of administering the national bureaucracy, including the most essential departments (e.g., finance, infrastructure, foreign affairs, military). This may be an individual (e.g., president) or a collective body (e.g., cabinet or collegial presidency). In the case of colonies and protectorates, some of the executive functions may be administered by a foreign power but there will still be an executive in charge of domestic affairs. In the case of monarchies and military governments, there is sometimes some ambiguity about who is running the ship of state. However, there is, in modern times, always (to our knowledge) an individual or body (e.g., cabinet) who are formally charged with running the national government. This will be known as the executive.

**Expert Questionnaire**

4.1 **HOS = HOG? (ex01hoshog)**

Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)? [See definitions of “head of state” and “head of government” in the glossary and consult the coding tutorial on semisovereign territories. If the executive is unified, the next questions refer to the HOS and the HOG. If the effective HOS is someone other than the official HOS, or there is no official HOS, the following questions apply to the effective HOS. If multiple HOSs/HOGs were appointed in any year, please answer this question with respect to the HOS/HOG holding office as of December 31.]

0: No, there is a dual executive.

1: Yes, there is a unified executive.
4.2 Title of HOS (ex2tithos)
What is the title of the head of state? [See definition of “head of state” in the glossary. Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If multiple HOSs were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to the HOS holding office as per December 31, and the title (s) of previous HOSs in the "Comments" question at the end of your survey or section (see the coding tutorial).]

4.3 Name of HOS (ex3namhos)
What is the name of the head of state? [If you find this question very cumbersome and time-consuming to answer for all years, please at least reply for the most recent years and then skip to the next question] [If the HOS is a collective body, provide the name of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, the names of ALL persons on the body. If multiple HOSs were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to the HOS holding office as per December 31, and the name (s) of previous HOSs in the "Comments" question at the end of your survey or section (see coding tutorial).]

4.4 HOS appointment date (ex4whenhs)
What was the date of appointment of the head of state? [If you find this question very cumbersome and time-consuming to answer for all years, please at least reply for the most recent years and then skip to the next question] [Enter date in YYYY-MM-DD format; for example, 1953-11-26: If multiple HOSs were appointed any given year, please provide here the date of appointment of the *last* HOS, i.e., the one holding office as per December 31, and the date (s) of appointment of previous HOSs in the "Comments" question at the end of your survey or section (see coding tutorial).]

4.5 How HOS appointed (ex05pathhs)
How did the head of state gain access to office? [If you select 0: or 1:, proceed to the next question. If you selected 2: -5:, skip to question exaphos. If you selected 6: -7:, skip to question exremhos.]  
0: through unconstitutional means such as a coup  
1: appointed by some other body than the ones below  
2: appointed by a foreign power  
3: appointed by the ruling party  
4: through hereditary succession or appointment by a royal council  
5: appointed by the military  
6: appointed by the legislature  
7: through a popular election

4.6 Other appointing body for HOS (ex06othhs)
Describe the body/appointment procedure: [Answer this question only if you selected 0: or 1: on the previous question.]
4.7 HOS selection by legislature (ex07aphos)
Was the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state? [Answer this question only if you selected 2:-5: on question ex05paths. By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the HOS has to have majority support in the legislature although no vote is taken on his/her appointment.]

0: No
1: Yes

4.8 HOS removal by legislature (ex08remhos)
Can the legislature, or either house of the legislature, without the involvement of any other agencies, remove the head of state from office?

0: No
1: Yes

4.9 HOS removal by election (ex09rmelhs)
Can the head of state be removed from office directly by a popular election?

0: No
1: Yes

4.10 Nonelectoral removal of HOS (ex10rmoths)
Can the head of state be removed from office by a body other than the electorate or the legislature? [If yes, proceed to next question. If no, skip to question exdfdshs.]

0: No
1: Yes

4.11 Which nonelectoral body can remove HOS? (ex11otrmhs)
Which kind of body or bodies has the power to remove the head of state from power? [Answer this question only if you answered yes 1: on the previous question.]

[text]

4.12 De facto dissolution by HOS (ex12dfdshs)
Has the head of state the power in practice to dissolve the legislature? [Examples of when the HOS is prompted to dissolve the legislature include: after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet. Examples of restrictions include: by frequency (e.g., "once a year"), by time point within term (e.g., "not within the last sixth months of the HOSs term"), and by the requirement that the HOS must then himself/herself stand for election.]

0: No
1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events
2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions
3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions

4.13 HOS de facto appoints cabinet (ex13dfcbhs)
Has the head of state the power in practice to appoint, or is the approval of the head of state necessary in practice for the appointment of, cabinet ministers?

0: No
1: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet
2: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature
3: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature
4: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature

4.14 HOS de facto dismisses ministers (ex14dfdmhs)
Has the head of state the power in practice to dismiss, or is the approval of the head of state necessary in practice for the dismissal of, cabinet ministers? [An example of when the HOS is prompted to dismiss cabinet ministers could be: after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature. An example of a restriction could be: only provided the HOS proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature’s approval (“constructive dismissal”).]
0: No
1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events
2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions
3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions

4.15 HOS de facto veto power (ex15dfvths)
Has the head of state the power in practice to veto legislation? [By "veto", we mean both a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) and package vetoes (concerning whole bills). An "absolute majority" means at least half of the whole membership of the legislature, a "qualified/exatrodinary" majority more than half]
0: No
1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote
2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote
3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a a qualified/extraordinary majority vote
4: Yes, with no possibility of override

4.16 HOS de facto proposes legislation (ex16dfpphs)
Has the head of state the power in practice to propose legislation? [By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. By "exclusive policy areas", we mean areas of legislation in which the HOS himself/herself ALONE, not the legislature, may initiate legislative bills.]
0: No
1: Yes, but not in exclusive policy areas
2: Yes, also in exclusive policy areas

4.17 HOS respects constitution (ex17rpcths)
How well would you say the head of state respects the constitution?
0: The HOS violates the constitution whenever he/she wants to, without legal consequences.
1: The HOS often violates the constitution without legal consequences, but still respects it in some ways.
2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3).
3: The HOS rarely violates the constitution, and when it happens he/she faces legal charges.
4: The HOS never violates the constitution.
4.18 HOS independence (ex18ndpths)
How often would you say the head of state makes decisions independently, that is, without being pressured by other political agencies or government institutions?

0: Never
1: Not usually
2: About half of the time
3: Usually
4: Always

4.19 HOS prevails (ex19prvlhs)
If the preferences of the head of state conflict with the status quo and he/she decides to initiate reforms, how likely would you say he/she is to get his/her way? [If there is a unitary executive (the HOS is also the HOG), skip the remaining questions on the executive and go to the next survey in your queue. If the effective HOG is someone other than the official HOG, the remaining questions in this survey apply to the effective HOG.]

0: Extremely unlikely
1: Unlikely
2: About as likely as unlikely
3: Likely
4: Extremely likely

4.20 Comments head of state (ex20commhs)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the head of state.

[text]

4.21 Title of HOG (ex21tithog)
What is the title of the head of government? [See definition of “head of government” in the glossary. Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of its title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If multiple HOGs were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to the HOG holding office as per December 31, and the title(s) of previous HOGs in the "Comments" question at the end of your survey or section (see the coding tutorial).]

[text]

4.22 Name of HOG (ex22namhog)
What is the name of the head of government? [If you find this question very cumbersome and time-consuming to answer for all years, please at least reply for the most recent years and then skip to the next question] [If the HOG is a collective body, provide the name of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, the names of ALL persons on the body. If multiple HOGs were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to the HOG holding office as per December 31, and the name(s) of previous HOGs in the "Comments" question at the end of your survey or section (see the coding tutorial).]

[text]
4.23 HOG appointment date (ex23whenhg)
What was the date of appointment of the head of government? [If you find this question very cumbersome and time-consuming to answer for all years, please at least reply for the most recent years and then skip to the next question] [Enter date in YYYY-MM-DD format; for example, 1953-11-26: If multiple HOGs were appointed any given year, please provide here the date of appointment of the *last* HOG, i.e., the one holding office as per December 31, and the date(s) of appointment of previous HOGs in the "Comments" question at the end of your survey or section (see coding tutorial).]

4.24 How HOG appointed (ex24pathhg)
How did the head of government gain access to office? [If you select 0: or 1:, proceed to the next question. If you selected 2: -5:, skip to question exaphog. If you selected 6: -7:, skip to question exremhos.]
0: Through unconstitutional means such as a coup
1: Appointed by some other body than the ones below
2: Appointed by a foreign power
3: Appointed by the ruling party
4: Through hereditary succession or appointment by the head of state or a royal council
5: Appointed by a military junta
6: Appointed by the legislature
7: Through a popular election

4.25 Other appointing body for HOG (ex25othhg)
Describe the body/appointment procedure: [Answer this question only if you selected 0: or 1: on the previous question.]

4.26 HOG selection by legislature (ex26aphog)
Was the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of government? [Answer this question only if you selected 2: -5: on question ex24pathhg. By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the HOG has to have majority support in the legislature although no vote is taken on his/her appointment.]
0: No
1: Yes

4.27 HOG removal by legislature (ex27remhog)
Can the legislature, or either house of the legislature, without the involvement of any other agencies, remove the head of government from office?
0: No
1: Yes

4.28 HOG removal by election (ex28rmelhg)
Can the head of government be removed from office directly by a popular election?
0: No
1: Yes
4.29 Nonelectoral removal of HOG (ex29rmothg)
Can the head of government be removed from office by a body other than the electorate or the legislature? [If yes, proceed to next question. If no, skip to question exdfdshg.]

0: No
1: Yes

4.30 Which nonelectoral body can remove HOG? (ex30otrmhg)
Which kind of body or bodies has the power to remove the head of government from power? [Answer this question only if you answered yes 1: on the previous question.]

[Text]

4.31 De facto dissolution by HOG (ex31dfdshg)
Has the head of government, alone or together with cabinet ministers, the power in practice to dissolve the legislature? [Examples of when the HOG/cabinet is prompted to dissolve the legislature include: after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet. Examples of restrictions include: by frequency (e.g., "once a year"), by time point within term (e.g., "not within the last sixth months of the HOGs/cabinets term"), and by the requirement that the HOG must then himself/herself stand for election.]

0: No
1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events
2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions
3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions

4.32 HOG de facto appoints cabinet (ex32dfcbhg)
Has the head of government the power in practice to appoint, or is the approval of the head of government necessary in practice for the appointment of, cabinet ministers?

0: No
1: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature
2: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature

4.33 HOG de facto dismisses ministers (ex33dfdmhg)
Has the head of government the power in practice to dismiss, or is the approval of the head of government necessary in practice for the dismissal of, cabinet ministers? [An example of when the HOG is prompted to dismiss cabinet ministers could be: after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature. An example of a restriction could be: only provided the HOG proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature’s approval ("constructive dismissal").]

0: No
1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events
2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions
3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions

4.34 HOG de facto appoints/ dismisses CINC (ex34dfvthg)
Has the head of government, alone or together with cabinet ministers, the power in practice to veto legislation? [By "veto", we mean both a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) and package vetoes]
An "absolute majority" means at least half of the whole membership of the legislature, a "qualified/extraordinary" majority more than half.

0: No
1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote
2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote
3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote
4: Yes, with no possibility of override

4.35 HOG de facto proposes legislation (ex35dfpphg)
Has the head of government, alone or together with cabinet ministers, the power in practice to propose legislation? [By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. By "exclusive policy areas", we mean areas of legislation in which the HOS himself/herself ALONE, not the legislature, may initiate legislative bills.]

0: No
1: Yes, but not in exclusive policy areas
2: Yes, also in exclusive policy areas

4.36 HOG respects constitution (ex36rpcthg)
How well would you say the head of government and the cabinet ministers respect the constitution?

0: The HOG violates the constitution whenever he/she wants to, without legal consequences.
1: The HOG often violates the constitution without legal consequences, but still respects it in some ways.
2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3).
3: The HOG rarely violates the constitution, and when it happens he/she faces legal charges.
4: The HOG never violates the constitution.

4.37 HOG independence (ex37ndpthg)
How often would you say the head of government and the cabinet ministers make decisions independently, that is, without being pressured by other political agencies or government institutions?

0: Never
1: Not usually
2: About half of the time
3: Usually
4: Always

4.38 HOG prevails (ex38prvlhg)
If the preferences of the head of government and the cabinet ministers conflict with the status quo and they decide to initiate reforms, how likely would you say they are to get their way?

0: Extremely unlikely
1: Unlikely
2: About as likely as unlikely
3: Likely
4: Extremely likely
Note: all the following questions but the last pertain to *de jure* term limits. These may be coded using secondary sources such as (though coders will have an opportunity to comment on these codings). The last question, on *de facto* practices, will of course have to be answered by experts. (JG decided, tentatively, to collect data only on consecutive term limits rather than on cumulative term limits, in the view that the latter is not very significant.)

4.39 **Number of terms allowed (HOS)**
How many consecutive terms is the HOS allowed to serve?
- 0: 1
- 1: 2
- 2: 3
- 3: No term limits

4.40 **Number of years allowed (HOS)**
If there is a limit on the consecutive number of years the HOS allowed to serve, what is this number? [Numeric]

4.41 **Number of terms allowed (HOG)**
How many terms is the HOG allowed to serve?
- 0: 1
- 1: 2
- 2: 3
- 3: No term limits

4.42 **Number of years allowed (HOG)**
If there is a limit on the number of consecutive years the HOG allowed to serve, what is this number? [Numeric]

4.43 **Observance of term limits (HOS & HOG)**
Are constitutional or statutory limits pertaining to the HOS or HOG generally respected?
- 0: No
- 1: Yes

**TO BE COLLECTED BY PROJECT MANAGER**

A number of the questions in the survey – e.g., the name and title of HOS and HOG and term limits - may be answerable from secondary sources such as Archigos, CCP, Henisz; [worldstatesmen.org](http://worldstatesmen.org); [rulers.org](http://rulers.org). Ideally, this would be filled in prior to distribution of the survey to experts, and the latter could comment on any possible errors.
5 The Legislature

PROJECT MANAGERS: STEVEN FISH (UC BERKELEY) MATTHEW KROENIG (GEORGETOWN)

Additional experts: Joel Barkan (University of Iowa), John Carey (Dartmouth), Scott Desposato (UCSD), John Huber (Columbia), Mark Jones (Rice), Lanny Martin (Rice), Robert Mattes, Scott Morgenstern (U. of Pittsburgh), Shaheen Mozaffar (Bridgewater State College).

Organizations: Inter-Parliamentary Union
Studies, datasets: African Legislatures Project (ALP); Fish, Kroenig (2009).

GENERAL QUESTION: HOW INDEPENDENT AND EMPOWERED IS THE LEGISLATURE?

EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE

5.1 Legislature bicameral (lg01bicam)
Is the legislature unicameral or bicameral? [The "legislature" is an assembly of deputies or representatives with powers to consider, pass, amend, or repeal laws. If you are considering a semisovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the Parliament in London). If there exists no legislature 0: in any year, you may skip to the next section or survey.]

0: No legislature exists
1: Unicameral
2: Bicameral

5.2 Lower/only legislature name (lg02namelo)
What is the name of the lower (or only) house of the legislature? [See definition of "lower house" in the glossary, and consult the coding tutorial on how to treat semisovereign territories. Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower (or only) house of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.]

[text]

5.3 Lower/only legislature elected (lg03electlo)
What percentage of the lower (or only) house of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections? [0 to 100]

5.4 Lower/only legislature legislates (lg04legislo)
Is the approval of the lower (or only) house of the legislature necessary to pass, amend or repeal legislation?

0: No
1: Yes
5.5 Lower/only legislature can question officials (lg05questlo)
Can the lower (or only) house of the legislature question executive branch officials? [By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.]
0: No
1: Yes

5.6 Lower/only legislature investigates (lg06investlo)
Can the lower (or only) house of the legislature conduct independent investigations of the executive? [For example, does the constitution give the legislature the power to set up investigatory committees?]
0: No
1: Yes

5.7 Executive oversight (lg07otovst)
Does a body other than the legislature have the right to question and/or conduct investigations of executive branch officials? [If yes, proceed to the next question. If no, skip to question lgamend.]
0: No
1: Yes

5.8 Name of executive oversight body (lg08otname)
Which kind/s of bod/ies has/have this power? Describe the body: [Only answer this question if you answered yes 1 on the previous question.]
[text]

5.9 Lower/only legislature amends constitution (lg09amend)
Can the legislature, or either house of the legislature, without the involvement of any other body, change the constitution?
0: No
1: Yes

5.10 Lower/only legislature declares war (lg10decwarlo)
Is the approval of the lower (or only) house of the legislature necessary to declare war?
0: No
1: Yes

5.11 Lower/only legislature amnesties (lg11pardonlo)
Does the lower (or only) house of the legislature have the power to grant amnesty or pardon?
0: No
1: Yes

5.12 Lower/only legislative immunity (lg12immunelo)
Are members of the lower (or only) house of the legislature immune from arrest and/or criminal prosecution?
0: No
1: Yes
5.13 Lower/only regular legislative sessions (lg13seshlo)
How long was the lower (or only) house of the legislature in session?
   0: Not in session
   1: In session about a month or less
   2: In session between 1 and 6 months
   3: In session 6 months or more

5.14 Lower/only legislative committees (lg14commslo)
Does the lower (or only) house of the legislature have a committee system?
   0: No, there are no committees
   1: Yes, but there are only special, no permanent, committees
   2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but not very significant in affecting the course of policy
   3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

5.15 Upper legislature name (lg22nameup)
What is the name of the upper house of the legislature? [See definition of “upper house” in the glossary, and consult the coding tutorial on how to treat semisovereign territories. Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the house in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.]
   [text]

5.16 Upper legislature elected (lg23electup)
What percentage of the upper house of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?
   [0 to 100]

5.17 Upper legislature legislates (lg24legisup)
Is the approval of the upper house of the legislature necessary to pass, amend or repeal legislation?
   0: No
   1: Yes

5.18 Upper legislature can question officials (lg25questup)
Can the upper house of the legislature question executive branch officials? [By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify]
   0: No
   1: Yes

5.19 Upper legislature investigates (lg26investup)
Can the upper house of the legislature conduct independent investigations of the executive? [For example, does the constitution give the legislature the power to set up investigatory committees?]
   0: No
   1: Yes
5.20 Upper legislature declares war (lg27decwarup)
Is the approval of the upper house of the legislature necessary to declare war?
   0: No
   1: Yes

5.21 Upper legislative immunity (lg28immuneup)
Are members of the upper house of the legislature immune from arrest and/or criminal prosecution?
   0: No
   1: Yes

5.22 Upper legislature amnesties (lg29pardonup)
Does the upper house of the legislature have the power to grant amnesty or pardon?
   0: No
   1: Yes

5.23 Upper regular legislative sessions (l30gseshup)
How long was the upper house of the legislature in session?
   0: Not in session
   1: In session about a month or less
   2: In session between 1 and 6 months
   3: In session 6 months or more

5.24 Upper legislative committees (lg31commsup)
Does the upper house of the legislature have a committee system?
   0: No, there are no committees
   1: Yes, but there are only special, no permanent, committees
   2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but not very significant in affecting the course of policy
   3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking

5.25 Comments legislature (lg32commnt)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the legislature.
   [text]

TO BE COLLECTED BY PROJECT MANAGER

5.26 Executive oversight and investigation – de facto
Question to be formulated

5.27 Sufficient staffing
Are minority parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) and committees able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the majority party or coalition?
5.28 Frequency of investigations
How often does the legislature investigate the executive?

5.29 Investigations resolved against the executive
How often do such investigations culminate in decisions unfavorable to the executive?
6 The Judiciary

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Organizations: Human Rights Watch (see also organizations listed under Civil Liberties); The World Justice Project (American Bar Association), World Bank, Comparative Constitutions Project

Studies, datasets: American Bar Association (2007); Tate et al (2002); Carrubba, Gabel, Helmke, Martin, Staton (2008); Executive Opinion Survey of the Global Competitiveness Report (available for 80 countries in 2002); Vera Institute of Justice (2003); La Porta et al (2004); Feld and Voigt (2003); Ríos-Figueroa (2006); Kaufmann Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007); Henisz (2000); Keith (2002); Tate and Keith (2007); Howard and Carey (2004); Clague et al (1999); Cingranelli and Richards (2008); Bertelsmann (2008); Ríos-Figueroa and Staton (2009); Elkins and Ginsburg (2009); Gwartney and Lawson (2007)

General Question: How independent, empowered, and effective is the judiciary?

Notes:
The judiciary is a core element of a liberal democracy. It is the piece of the state primarily responsible for ensuring that governments respect formal limits on their power. Under a liberal democratic concept, the constraints that judiciaries can place on power should increase in two dimensions: empowerment and independence. First, in order to place a meaningful constraint on government, judiciaries must be formally authorized to review governmental policies and issue legally binding, influential resolutions. Second, judges must exercise their powers independently of government interests. Their decision-making process must be autonomous, so that we can say that judges are the “authors of their own opinions” (Kornhauser 2002). In addition, resolutions must bind governments in practice, so that leaders are not simply able to ignore their obligations (Cameron 2002). The judicial component of the project, which will be led by our team at Emory, will identify and document existing measures of empowerment and independence for all autonomous states in the world, as far back as 1900 whenever possible. In addition, we will produce two new measures of judicial independence. These tasks will require a moderate amount of data collection and several statistical innovations to address known (and related) problems of measurement error and missing data. We summarize our approach briefly below.

Empowerment. For each state and year between 1900 and the present, we wish to answer whether the constitution endows the judiciary with the power of constitutional review. In addition, we wish to know whether the effects of decisions from this court bind the government generally or only with respect to the parties of a particular case. For limited years and countries, we can obtain this information from existing sources (Ríos-Figueroa and Staton 2010). In addition, the Constitutions Project (Elkins and Ginsburg 2009) has coded this information for every constitution since 1787. The primary data collection challenge with these data will be locating all available sources and documenting their availability.

Independence. Scholars typically attempt to measure judicial independence in one of two ways. First, they look to formal, constitutional institutions, which should insulate judges from external
interference (e.g. long tenure, independent budgets, appointment rules that allow for expert, non-political judgment). This approach provides an indicator of *de jure* independence. Second, scholars look to measure whether the actual behavior of judges appears to be autonomous and whether judicial decisions do, in fact, bind governments. This approach provides an indicator of *de facto* independence. Judicial scholars have produced over thirteen cross-national *de jure* and *de facto* measures. Although there is reasonable evidence for the validity of only the *de facto* measures, the same cannot be said for the *de jure* measures (Ríos-Figueroa and Staton 2010). Using the information on judicial institutions generated by the Constitutions Project, we can develop a new *de jure* measure, which can be traced back to 1900 without trouble. We will replicate Ríos-Figueroa’s new index of judicial independence (currently limited to Latin America states) for each state and year available in the Constitutions Project (Ríos-Figueroa 2010). This effort will require a moderate about of research assistance collecting and cleaning data.

**A New Measure of *de facto* Judicial Independence**

The *de facto* judicial independence variables that we collect are manifest, or observable indicators, of the underlying concept of judicial independence which is itself not directly observable. It is therefore essential to combine the information contained in these measures to produce a final, unified measure that can be utilized by applied researchers. The alternative is a fragmented collection of variables that, while generally correlated positively with one another, may be discrepant in important ways that lead researchers to arrive at different substantive conclusions based on what is often an arbitrary decision of which variable to include in an analysis (e.g. Munck and Verkuilen 2002).

A range of statistical methods currently exist for scaling observed data onto a latent dimension based on their manifest characteristics; Jackman (2008) provides a broad and current review of the state of the field. From the perspective of this project, however, known problems with the source data—as well as with the data collection process—mean that directly applying any current measurement models will produce scalings that are incomplete, flawed, and potentially unreliable.

PIs Linzer and Staton propose to develop a new latent variable model that will lead to the creation of a unified, time series, cross-sectional measure of *de facto* judicial independence, which overcomes three major challenges. First, there is far from perfect agreement among the indicators about the status of judiciaries around the globe and over time. Even when indicators for some countries or during certain years tend to agree, large amounts of data are missing systematically. Some measures are available only for a limited time series (e.g. 1990-1999) whereas others are only available for a single cross-section (e.g. 2003). Moreover, even in years where research teams attempted to measure the concept for every state, the availability of data is often correlated with a state’s level of economic development. Typically teams were less likely to report on underdeveloped states, but there are measures, which are missing for developed states. Finally, the indicators of judicial independence are more likely to agree with one another among more developed states than they are among less developed states.

The fact that measures are simply unavailable for many years makes entire classes of analyses, which depend on a reasonable time series, impossible to conduct. That measurement error and missing data patterns are correlated with economic development raises the strong possibility that inferences are biased and may depend in important ways on which indicators are chosen.

Our approach depends fundamentally on recognizing that our individual measures are reporting
information on an unobserved latent trait of the world’s judiciaries. Yet, we can make use of the
information contained in each existing measure in order to estimate the unobserved trait, especially
so since the indicators generally agree with one another. Specifically, PIs Linzer and Staton will
develop a latent variable model, which will be sensitive to the issues of measurement error and
missing data described above. This is currently an active field of research among political
methodologists; e.g. Blackwell, Honaker, and King (2010). Our team is uniquely qualified to produce
this measure. Staton has experience evaluating the validity of existing measures and knows the
theoretical and empirical literatures well. Linzer is a political methodologist with expertise in latent
variable and clustering models, and has authored a software package for the estimation of latent
class models, which are widely used to model inter-rater agreement (Linzer and Lewis 2010).

EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE

6.1 High court name (ju01hostname)
Five questions about the judiciary follow. In two of them (juhcind and juhccomp), which deal with high
courts, we ask you to consider either the highest ordinary court in the state or the constitutional court.
Given the instructions we have provided for selecting the correct court, please enter here the name of
the court you are focusing on? [See definition of “high court” in the glossary, and consult the coding
tutorial on how to treat semisovereign territories. Please provide an as accurate as possible literal
translation of the name of the court in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription
thereof, within parentheses.]

6.2 High court independence (ju02hcind)
Judicial decisions are sometimes merely reflections of the wishes of sitting governments. Other times,
judicial decisions reflect only the way that judges view the legal record. Thinking about this distinction,
how often would you say the high court in the judicial system makes decisions that merely reflect
government wishes in cases that are salient to the government? [See rules defining "high court" under
juh01cname. By "sitting government", we mean the executive branch of the government, including its
head, the cabinet, ministries etc. Only consider the government that actually resides within the country
or semisovereign territory in question (such as the governor-general and his local administration in a
British colony or a Commonwealth country, not the King/Queen or government of England).]

6.3 Lower court independence (ju03ncind)
Again with the same distinction in mind, how often would you say that the remaining judges make
decisions that merely reflect government wishes in cases that are salient to the government? [In this
question, we are looking for a summary judgment for the entire judiciary, excluding the court that you
just considered in "juh02cind." You should consider judges on both ordinary courts and specialized
courts. See rules defining "governments" under ju02hcind. If you are considering a semisovereign
territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to the courts seated within the
territory in question, not abroad.]
6.4 Compliance with high court (ju04hcomp)
Judicial decisions sometimes require governments to make changes in salient policy areas, changes that governments would rather not make. With this in mind, how often would you say that the government in salient policy areas comply with decisions of the high court with which they disagree? [See rules defining "high court" in the glossary, and "government" under ju02hcind.]

0: Never
1: Not usually
2: About half of the time
3: Usually
4: Always

6.5 Compliance with judiciary (ju05comp)
Now considering the remainder of the judiciary, how often would you say the government comply with judicial decisions with which they disagree? [In this question, we are looking for a summary judgment for the remainder of the judiciary (aside from the high court), excluding the court that you just considered in "juh04ccomp." See rules for defining the remainder of the judiciary in "ju03ncind." See rules defining "government" under ju02hcind.]

0: Never
1: Not usually
2: About half of the time
3: Usually
4: Always

6.6 Judicial review (ju06review)
Is any court in the judiciary empowered to carry out constitutional review of governmental policies (e.g. statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions)? [By constitutional review, we mean that a court is empowered to invalidate (either generally or only with respect to the parties of the dispute) a policy (law, decree, regulation, etc.) on the grounds that it violates a constitutional provision. If the state is a federation, please focus on the federal judiciary. If you are considering a semisovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to judicial bodies seated within the territory in question, not abroad.]

0: No
1: Yes

6.7 Constitution respected in practice (ju07rsppra)
In some countries the constitution is a dead letter, whereas in others it is well respected in actual political practices. With this distinction in mind, how would you describe the situation with respect to those parts of the constitution that regulate the powers and obligations of different national-level government institutions? [If you are considering a semisovereign territory, such as a colony, please
answer this question with respect to the colonial "charter" or whatever written document regulates the powers and obligations of different national-level government institutions within the territory in question, not in the colonizing country.

0: There is no constitution, or the constitution is a dead letter that has no relationship to the actual system of government
1: The constitution is often violated without any legal consequences, but it is still followed in some ways
2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3)
3: The constitution is sometimes violated without legal consequences, but it is usually respected
4: The constitution is generally well respected

6.8 Judiciary comments (ju08commnt)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the Judiciary.

[text]

FORMAL INSTITUTIONAL RULES

6.9 Case Selection (court type)
What kind of high court are you considering?
1: supreme court
2: constitutional court
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine

6.10 Case Selection Confidence (ctconf)
Please enter a number that reflects your intuitive confidence on the scale described below.
1: [Enter Number]
Instructions: The scale we are using replicates that used by the general project. Please enter a multiple of 10 between 0 and 100. The meaning of the numbers is as follows.
0: I have no idea at all.
10: I know almost nothing about from my reading this but there is a very small chance that I guessed correctly.
20: I feel like I know a little about this but there is only a small chance that my response is correct.
30: I believe that this response is more likely to be right than wrong, but I feel very uncertain.
40: I think this response is close, but this is very hard to assess and I don’t feel like I have all the relevant information.
50: I believe this response is probably correct, but I can imagine substantial differences of opinion.
60: I am fairly sure that this response is correct, but I can imagine substantial differences of opinion.
70: I am fairly sure that this response is correct, thought I can imagine a few differences of opinion.
80: I feel confident that this response is correct, but there is a small chance that I am wrong.
90: I feel very confident that this response is correct and there is very little chance that I am wrong.
6.11  Court Name (courname)
What is the proper name (in English) of the court you have selected?
1: [open-ended response]
99: Not Applicable

6.12  Court Name Confidence (cnconf)
Please enter a number that reflects your intuitive confidence on the scale described in
1: [Enter Number]

6.13  Concrete or Abstract Review (concrete)
What type of constitutional review is the court you have selected empowered to carry out?
1: concrete
2: abstract
3: concrete and abstract
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to determine

Instructions: Concrete review involves constitutional interpretation in the presence of a real case or legal controversy. For example, consider a presidential system in which the legislature passes a law granting the president wide discretion to manage national parks via the regulations of an environmental agency. Imagine that this agency makes it illegal to carry firearms on park property. A week after the regulation becomes effective, a hunter is arrested and fined for carrying a rifle in a national park. In his defense, he argues that a) the regulation violates a constitutional right to bear arms and b) that congress violated the constitution by delegating law making power to the executive. When a court evaluates the law (and regulation) in this context, it is engaging in concrete constitutional review. In contrast, abstract review does not require a real case or controversy. Instead, judges can evaluate a policy with respect to the constitution on the basis of a merely hypothetical situation. Continuing the example from above, suppose that after the law granting the president discretion to regulate the national parks is passed but prior to the agency enacting the regulation, a group of legislators ask a court to declare the statute an unconstitutional delegation of law making power to the president. When a court evaluates this argument, it does so absent a real controversy. No person has been directly harmed here. Indeed, the president has not even attempted to use this new power to do anything. When a court evaluates the law in this context, it is carrying out abstract constitutional review.

6.14  Concrete or Abstract Confidence (conconf)
Please enter a number that reflects your intuitive confidence on the scale described in
1: [Enter Number]

6.15  Fixed Number of Judges at All (fixnumberA)
Does the constitution require a specific size for the court you have selected?
1: Yes, the constitution fixes the entire size of the court
2: No, however, it does require that the court be no smaller than a particular number
90: No, size is explicitly left to non-constitutional law
6.16 Fixed Number Confidence (fixconfa)
Please enter a number that reflects your intuitive confidence on the scale described in
1: [Enter Number]

6.17 Number of Judges (fixnumberb)
Answer only if answer to v4a is “(1)” or “(2).”
What is the constitutional requirement identified in v4a?
1: [Enter number]

6.18 Fixed Number Confidence (fixconfb)
Please enter a number that reflects your intuitive confidence on the scale described in
1: [Enter Number]

6.19 Fixed Budgetary Requirement (fixbudgeta)
Does the constitution require that a fixed portion of the federal budget be allocated to the judiciary?
1: Yes
2: No
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to determine

6.20 Fixed Budgetary Requirement Confidence (fixbconf)
Please enter a number that reflects your intuitive confidence on the scale described in
1: [Enter Number]

6.21 Nature of Budgetary Requirement (fixbudgetb)
Answer only if answer to v5a is “(1)”
What proportion of the federal budget does the constitution require be allocated to the judiciary?
1: [Enter number]

6.22 Nature Budgetary Requirement Confidence (fixbconf)
Please enter a number that reflects your intuitive confidence on the scale described in
1: [Enter Number]

6.23 Is CJ Appointment Process Different? (cjadifferent)
Is the Chief Justice of the court appointed via a different process than regular members?
1: Yes
2: No
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to determine
6.24 CJ Appointment Difference Confidence (cjadconf)
Please enter a number that reflects your intuitive confidence on the scale described in
1: [Enter Number]

6.25 Is CJ Removal Process Different? (cjrdifferent)
Is the Chief Justice of the court removed via a different process than regular members?
1: Yes
2: No
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to determine

6.26 CJ Removal Difference Confidence (cjrdconf)
Please enter a number that reflects your intuitive confidence on the scale described in
1: [Enter Number]

INDICATORS FROM CCP

6.27 Type of Courts (levjud)
Does the court system provide for any of the following?
1: supreme or top court only
2: supreme court and other courts to be determined by law
3: supreme court and specific other courts, such as provincial or city courts
4: other courts mentioned, but no supreme court
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified

Instructions: By ordinary courts, we mean non-specialized courts. For example, the Supreme Court, Appellate Courts, and District Courts in the United States By contrast, specialized courts include the constitutional court, military courts, and administrative courts.

6.28 Specialized Courts (judcrts)
For which of the following specialized courts does the constitution contain provisions?
1: administrative courts - [JUDCRTS-1]
2: constitutional court-[JUDCRTS-2]
3: courts of amparo-[JUDCRTS-3]
4: military courts-[JUDCRTS-4]
5: courts charged with hearing cases against holders of public offices-[JUDCRTS-5]
6: tax courts-[JUDCRTS-6]
7: labor courts-[JUDCRTS-7]
8: religious courts-[JUDCRTS-8]
9: special court-[JUDCRTS-9]
Instructions: If religious courts, labor courts, tax courts, military courts, courts charged with hearing cases against public officials, or courts of amparo are mentioned, please list any special provisions for these courts in the comments section.

6.29 Supreme Court Name (supname)
What name is given to the highest ordinary court? (Asked only if LEVJUD is answered 1, or if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3)
1: [open-ended response]
99: Not Applicable

6.30 Chief Justice (CJ) Highest Ordinary Court (hoccj)
Is the selection process specified for the chief justice or the other justices of the Highest Ordinary Court? (Asked only if LEVJUD is answered 1, or if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3)
1: Chief Justice only
2: Regular Justices only
3: Both with same procedure
4: Both with different procedures for each
5: Neither
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
99: Not Applicable

6.31 CJ Nomination (chiefnom)
Who is involved in the nomination of the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? (Asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4)
1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)-[CHIEFNOM-1]
2: Head of Government-[CHIEFNOM-2]
3: the Government/Cabinet-[CHIEFNOM-3]
4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature-[CHIEFNOM-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature-[CHIEFNOM-5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission-[CHIEFNOM-6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission)-[CHIEFNOM-7]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[CHIEFNOM-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section-[CHIEFNOM-96]
97: Unable to Determine-[CHIEFNOM-97]
98: Not Specified-[CHIEFNOM-98]
6.32 CJ Approval (chiefap)
Who is involved in the approval of nominations for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? (Asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4)

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)-[CHIEFAP-1]
2: Head of Government-[CHIEFAP-2]
3: the Government/Cabinet-[CHIEFAP-3]
4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature-[CHIEFAP-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature-[CHIEFAP-5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission-[CHIEFAP-6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission)-[CHIEFAP-7]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[CHIEFAP-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section-[CHIEFAP-96]
97: Unable to Determine-[CHIEFAP-97]
98: Not Specified-[CHIEFAP-98]

6.33 CJ Term (chfterm)
What is the maximum term length for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? (Asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4)

1: [open-ended response]
99: Not Applicable

Instructions: Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

6.34 CJ Restrictions (chftrmnmn)
What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court? (Asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4)

1: Only one term permitted, total
2: Only two terms permitted, total
3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
5: No term limits
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

6.35 Highest Ordinary Court Judge Nominations (supnom)
Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the highest ordinary court? (Asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4)

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)-[SUPNOM-1]
2: Head of Government-[SUPNOM-2]
3: the Government/Cabinet-[SUPNOM-3]
4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature-[SUPNOM-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature-[SUPNOM-5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission-[SUPNOM-6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission)-[SUPNOM-7]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[SUPNOM-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section-[SUPNOM-96]
97: Unable to Determine-[SUPNOM-97]
98: Not Specified-[SUPNOM-98]

Instructions: By judicial council/commission, we are referring to an independent body that is composed of experts in law who are important in the selection process for judges.

6.36 Highest Ordinary Court Approval (supap)
Who is involved in the approval of nominations to the highest ordinary court? (Asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4)
   1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)-[SUPAP-1]
   2: Head of Government-[SUPAP-2]
   3: the Government/Cabinet-[SUPAP-3]
   4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature-[SUPAP-4]
   5: Second Chamber of the Legislature-[SUPAP-5]
   6: Judicial Council/Commission-[SUPAP-6]
   7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission)-[SUPAP-7]
   90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[SUPAP-90]
   96: other, please specify in the comments section-[SUPAP-96]
   97: Unable to Determine-[SUPAP-97]
   98: Not Specified-[SUPAP-98]

6.37 Highest Ordinary Court Terms (supterm)
What is the maximum term length for judges for the highest ordinary court? (Asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4)
   1: [open-ended response]
Instructions: Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

6.38 Highest Ordinary Court Restrictions (suptermn)
What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms of members of the highest ordinary court may serve? (Asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4)
   1: Only one term permitted, total
   2: Only two terms permitted, total
   3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
   4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
   5: No term limits
   90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law
   96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Instructions: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified

6.39  Ordinary Court Name (ordname)
What name is given to the ordinary courts? (Asked only if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3)

1: [open-ended response]

Instructions: Please list the name in the order given in the constitution.

6.40  Nomination of Ordinary Judges (ordnom)
Who is involved in the nomination of judges to ordinary courts? (Asked only if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3)

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) - [ORDNOM-1]
2: Head of Government - [ORDNOM-2]
3: the Government/Cabinet - [ORDNOM-3]
4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature - [ORDNOM-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature - [ORDNOM-5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission - [ORDNOM-6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) - [ORDNOM-7]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law - [ORDNOM-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section - [ORDNOM-96]
97: Unable to Determine - [ORDNOM-97]
98: Not Specified - [ORDNOM-98]

6.41  Approval of Ordinary Court Nominations (ordap)
Who is involved in the approval of nominations to ordinary courts? (Asked only if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3)

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) - [ORDAP-1]
2: Head of Government - [ORDAP-2]
3: the Government/Cabinet - [ORDAP-3]
4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature - [ORDAP-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature - [ORDAP-5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission - [ORDAP-6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) - [ORDAP-7]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law - [ORDAP-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section - [ORDAP-96]
97: Unable to Determine - [ORDAP-97]
98: Not Specified - [ORDAP-98]
6.42 Constitutional Court Nominations (connom)
Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the constitutional court? (Asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2)

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)-[CONNOM-1]
2: Head of Government-[CONNOM-2]
3: the Government/Cabinet-[CONNOM-3]
4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature-[CONNOM-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature-[CONNOM-5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission-[CONNOM-6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission)-[CONNOM-7]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[CONNOM-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section-[CONNOM-96]
97: Unable to Determine-[CONNOM-97]
98: Not Specified-[CONNOM-98]

6.43 Approval of Constitutional Court Nominations (conap)
Who is involved in the approval of judges to the constitutional court? (Asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2)

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)-[CONAP-1]
2: Head of Government-[CONAP-2]
3: the Government/Cabinet-[CONAP-3]
4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature-[CONAP-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature-[CONAP-5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission-[CONAP-6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission)-[CONAP-7]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[CONAP-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section-[CONAP-96]
97: Unable to Determine-[CONAP-97]
98: Not Specified-[CONAP-98]

6.44 Special Procedures for Removing Constitutional Judges (conrem)
Does the constitution mention any special procedures for removing members of the constitutional court? (Asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2)

1: Yes
2: No
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
99: Not Applicable

6.45 Procedures from Removing Constitutional Judges (conremp)
What are the details of the process for removing members on the constitutional court? (Asked only if CONREM is answered 1)

1: [open-ended response]
### 6.46 Term for Constitutional Judges (conterm)
What is the maximum term length for judges for the constitutional court? (Asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2)

1: [open-ended response]
99: Not Applicable

Instructions: Please answer 0 if the term length is not specified, and answer 100 if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

### 6.47 Restrictions on Constitutional Judge Terms (conlim)
What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms judges on the Constitutional Court may serve? (Asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2)

1: Only one term permitted, total
2: Only two terms permitted, total
3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
5: No term limits
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Instructions: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

### 6.48 Constitutional Review (interp)
To whom does the constitution assign the responsibility for the interpretation of the constitution?

1: Any Ordinary Court-[INTERP-1]
2: Constitutional Court/Council-[INTERP-2]
3: Supreme Court Only-[INTERP-3]
4: Special chamber of the Supreme Court-[INTERP-4]
5: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature-[INTERP-5]
6: Second Chamber of the Legislature-[INTERP-6]
7: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required-[INTERP-7]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[INTERP-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section-[INTERP-96]
97: Unable to Determine-[INTERP-97]
98: Not Specified-[INTERP-98]

Instructions: If the constitutional court is mentioned in the constitution, you need to check it here regardless if they are explicitly given the power of interpretation. If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."
6.49 **Standing - Constitutional Review (challeg)**
Who has standing to initiate challenge to the constitutionality of legislation?

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)-[CHALLEG-1]
2: Head of Government-[CHALLEG-2]
3: the Government/Cabinet-[CHALLEG-3]
4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature-[CHALLEG-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature-[CHALLEG-5]
6: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required-[CHALLEG-6]
7: Lawyers-[CHALLEG-7]
8: Public (by complaint)-[CHALLEG-8]
9: the Courts-[CHALLEG-9]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[CHALLEG-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section-[CHALLEG-96]
97: Unable to Determine-[CHALLEG-97]
98: Not Specified-[CHALLEG-98]

Instructions: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

6.50 **Type of Constitutional Review (chalstag)**
At what stage of the legislative process can bills be reviewed for constitutionality?

1: Pre-promulgation
2: Post-promulgation
3: either
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified

6.51 **Effects of Constitutional Review (chaluncn)**
What is the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality?

1: law is void-[CHALUNCN-1]
2: void for specific case, but law still exists-[CHALUNCN-2]
3: returned to legislature for revision/reconsideration-[CHALUNCN-3]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[CHALUNCN-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section-[CHALUNCN-96]
97: Unable to Determine-[CHALUNCN-97]
98: Not Specified-[CHALUNCN-98]

6.52 **Amparo (amparo)**
Does the constitution provide for a right to petition for ‘amparo’?

1: Yes
2: No
6.53 Dismissal Procedures (jrem)
Are there provisions for dismissing judges?
1: Yes
2: No
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine

6.54 Dismissal Rationale (jremcon)
Under what conditions can judges be dismissed? (Asked only if JREM is answered 1)
1: general dissatisfaction (i.e. dismissal is fairly unrestricted)-[JREMCON-1]
2: crimes and other issues of conduct-[JREMCON-2]
3: treason-[JREMCON-3]
4: violations of the constitution-[JREMCON-4]
5: incapacitated-[JREMCON-5]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[JREMCON-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section-[JREMCON-96]
97: Unable to Determine-[JREMCON-97]
98: Not Specified-[JREMCON-98]

6.55 Dismissal Proposal (jrempro)
Who can propose the dismissal of judges? (Asked only if JREM is answered 1)
1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)-[JREMPRO-1]
2: Head of Government-[JREMPRO-2]
3: the Government/Cabinet-[JREMPRO-3]
4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature-[JREMPRO-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature-[JREMPRO-5]
6: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required-[JREMPRO-6]
7: Public Prosecutor-[JREMPRO-7]
8: Judicial Council-[JREMPRO-8]
9: Public-[JREMPRO-9]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[JREMPRO-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section-[JREMPRO-96]
97: Unable to Determine-[JREMPRO-97]
98: Not Specified-[JREMPRO-98]

Instructions: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."
6.56 Dismissal Vote (jremfirp)
What proportion of the vote is needed in the first (or only) chamber to propose the dismissal of judges? (Asked only if JREMPRO is answered 4)
1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

6.57 Dismissal Vote 2 (jremsecp)
What proportion of the vote is needed in the Second Chamber to propose the dismissal of judges? (Asked only if JREMPRO is answered 5)
1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

6.58 Dismissal Vote 3 (jrembotp)
What proportion of the vote is needed in Both Chambers to propose the dismissal of judges? (Asked only if JREMPRO is answered 6)
1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable
6.59 Dismissal Approval (jremap)
Who can approve the dismissal of judges? (Asked only if JREM is answered 1)

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)-[JREMAP-1]
2: Head of Government-[JREMAP-2]
3: the Government/Cabinet-[JREMAP-3]
4: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature-[JREMAP-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature-[JREMAP-5]
6: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required-[JREMAP-6]
7: Public Prosecutor-[JREMAP-7]
90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law-[JREMAP-90]
96: other, please specify in the comments section-[JREMAP-96]
97: Unable to Determine-[JREMAP-97]
98: Not Specified-[JREMAP-98]

Instructions: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

6.60 Dismissal Approval Vote 1 (jremfira)
What proportion of the vote is needed in the first (or only) chamber to approve the dismissal of judges? (Asked only if JREMAP is answered 4)

1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

6.61 Dismissal Approval Vote 2 (jremseca)
What proportion of the vote is needed in the Second Chamber to approve the dismissal of judges? (Asked only if JREMAP is answered 5)

1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
6.62 Dismissal Approval Vote 3 (jrembota)
What proportion of the vote is needed in Both Chambers to approve the dismissal of judges? (Asked only if JREMAP is answered 6)
1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

6.63 Dismissal Details (jremproc)
[What are the details of the process to remove judges? (Asked only if JREM is answered 1)
1: [open-ended response]
99: Not Applicable

6.64 Judicial Salaries (judsal)
Does the constitution explicitly state that judicial salaries are protected from governmental intervention?
1: Yes
2: No
96: other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine

TO BE COLLECTED BY PROJECT MANAGER

Empowerment:

6.65 Does any court in the judiciary have the power of constitutional review?
6.66 Is constitutional review concentrated in one court or can it be carried out throughout the judiciary?
6.67 Are the effects of constitutional review resolutions general (erga omnes) or specific to the parties?
6.68 Is constitutional jurisdiction abstract or concrete? Both?
6.69 Is access to courts with constitutional review restricted to public officials?

Independence:
6.70  Does the judiciary select its own judges?
6.71  Does the high court select its own members?
6.72  Describe tenure rules?
6.73  Is tenure longer than tenure of appointers?
6.74  Can removal be initiated by government, simple majority, etc?
6.75  Does the constitution fix the number of judges on the high court?
6.76  Does the constitution provide a fixed budget for the judiciary?
7 Political Parties and Party System

PROJECT MANAGER: ALLEN HICKEN (UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN).

Additional experts: Stefano Bartolini (EU Institute, Florence), Pradeep Chhibber (UC Berkeley), Kenneth Janda (Northwestern), Mark Jones (Rice), Richard S. Katz (Johns Hopkins University), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Herbert Kitschelt (Duke), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Scott Mainwaring (Notre Dame), Peter Mair (EU Institute, Florence), Karen Remmer (Duke), Kenneth Roberts (Cornell), Eric Wibbels (Duke).

Organizations: Comparative Manifestoes Project.

Studies, datasets: Carey (dataset), Database on Political Institutions (World Bank); Janda (dataset); Wiesehomeier-Benoit (dimensions of party competition); Coppedge (classification of Latin American parties).

GENERAL QUESTIONS: ARE POLITICAL PARTIES WELL INSTITUTIONALIZED? DOES THE PARTY SYSTEM OFFER A VARIETY OF MEANINGFUL CHOICES TO VOTERS?

Notes:
“Party” may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Note that the identity of a party may be obscured by name changes. If the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization.

Questions below refer to all parties in a polity, considered as a whole. However, larger parties should be given greater weight in calculating answers so that the party system is adequately represented.

Potential obstacles: Some inconsistent election results from different sources; lack of systematic collection of information about internal party politics.

EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE

7.1 Party organizations (ps01orgs)
Do political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?

0: No parties
1: Few parties
2: Most parties
3: All parties

7.2 Distinct party platforms (ps02plats)
Do political parties for national-level office have publicly available party platforms that are distinct from one another? [The parties that should be counted in the affirmative must have platforms that are both distinct and publicly disseminated. However, this question is not intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms]

0: No parties
1: Few parties
2: Most parties
3: All parties
7.3 Legislative party cohesion (ps03cohesv)
Do members of parliament in the same party generally vote together in the national legislature?

0: Seldom (<30%)
1: Sometimes (>30%)
2: Usually (> 60%)
3: Almost Always (> 90%)

7.4 Party switching (ps04switch)
Do members of parliament change or abandon their party between elections?

0: 10% or more of incumbents switch or abandon parties
1: 5%
2: 2%
3: 0%

7.5 Multiparty cabinet (ex05mpcab)
How many political parties is the cabinet composed of?

0: The cabinet is non-partisan
1: One party
2: Two parties
3: Three or more parties

7.6 Ethnic/religious parties banned (ps06baneth)
Are any ethnic or religious parties banned?

0: At least one ethnic or religious party is banned.
1: No ethnic or religious parties are banned.

7.7 Regional/local parties banned (ps07banreg)
Are any regional or local parties banned?

0: At least one regional or local party is banned.
1: No regional or local parties are banned.

7.8 Extremist parties banned (ps08banext)
Are any extremist parties banned?

0: At least one extremist party is banned.
1: No extremist parties are banned.

7.9 Other parties banned (ps09banoth)
Are any other types of parties banned?

0: At least one other type of party is banned.
1: No other type of party is banned.

7.10 Barriers to parties (ps10bars)
How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?
0: Parties are effectively banned.
1: There are significant obstacles (e.g., party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).
2: There are modest barriers (e.g., party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).
3: There are no substantial barriers.

7.11 Comments parties and party systems (ps11commnt)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on Parties and Party Systems.
[text]

TO BE COLLECTED BY PROJECT MANAGER

7.12 Degree of party system nationalization
Difference in the average effective number of parties nationally and locally.
Source: CLEA

7.13 Electoral formula
What is the electoral formula for legislative elections (lower chamber)
Source: Golder 2006, CLEA, various

7.14 District Magnitude
What is the average district magnitude for legislative elections (lower chamber)
Source: Golder 2006, CLEA, various

7.15 Number of electoral parties
What is the effective number of electoral parties?
Source: CLEA

7.16 Number of legislative parties
What is the effective number of legislative parties?
Source: CLEA

7.17 Vote share of largest vote-getter
What percent of the vote was received by the largest party or winning candidate in the final (or only) round?
   Specify name of party or candidate:
Source: DPI.

7.18 Vote share of second-largest vote-getter
What percent of the vote was received by the second largest party or second most successful candidate in the final round?
   Specify name of party or candidate:
Source: DPI.
7.19 Seat share of largest party
What percent of the seats in the lower/upper house was obtained by the largest party?

Specify name of party:

Source: DPI.

7.20 Seat share of second largest party
What percent of the seats in the lower/upper house was obtained by the second largest party?

Specify name of party:

Source: DPI.
8 The Media

*Project Manager:* Hollis Semetko (Emory University)

*Additional experts:* Devra Moehler (Annenburg School, University of Pennsylvania), Pippa Norris (Kennedy School of Government); Erik Nisbet (Ohio State), Wisdom Tettey (University of Calgary).

*Organizations:* IREX

*Studies, datasets:* IREX Media Sustainability Index, http://www.irex.org/msi/index.asp; Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index; Index of internet freedom developed by the Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University.

*General Question:* Are media outlets independent, representative of diverse interests/points of view, and able to reach the citizenry?

*Notes:* Larger media outlets should be given greater weight in calculating answers so that the media system is adequately represented.

**Expert Questionnaire**

8.1 Government censorship effort (me01cenef)

Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the major media (print, broadcast, internet)? Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selective distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.

0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.
1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.
2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.
3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.
4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

8.2 Critical media (me02crit)

Of the major media outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?

0: None
1: Only an exceptional and marginal few outlets.
2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.
3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.

8.3 Range of media perspectives (me03range)

Do the major media (newspapers, radio, TV, and Internet) represent a wide range of political perspectives?

0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.
1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.

2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.

3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media (newspapers, radio, TV, or Internet).

8.4 Harassment of journalists (me04harjrn)
Are individual journalists harassed - i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed -- by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?

0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.

1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.

2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.

3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and when this happens, those responsible for the harassment tend to be identified and punished.

8.5 Self-censorship (me05slfcen)
Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?

0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough.

1: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues.

2: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.

8.6 Access to media (me06access)
Approximately what percentage of the population has access to any media (newspapers, radio, television, or Internet) that are sometimes critical of the national government?

8.7 Media bias (me07bias)
How severe is media bias during election campaigns?

0: The major media cover only the campaign of the official party or candidates, or no campaign coverage, or there are no campaigns to cover.

1: The major media cover a variety of campaigns but at least one newsworthy party or candidate is systematically ignored by the major media.

2: The major media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates.

8.8 Free campaign media (me08frcamp)
Do parties or candidates receive free access to national broadcast media during election periods?

0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.

1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.

2: All parties receive free access.
8.9  **Paid campaign media (me09pdcamp)**
Are parties or candidates able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media during election periods?

0: Not at all.
1: It is permitted without limit.
2: It is permitted but regulated to foster fair competition.

8.10  **Paid interest group media (me10paidig)**
Are interest groups able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media during election periods?

0: Not at all.
1: It is permitted without limit.
2: It is permitted but regulated to foster representation of diverse perspectives.

**TO BE COLLECTED BY PROJECT MANAGER**

8.11  **Newspapers in capital city**
How many daily newspapers are there in the capital city?

8.12  **Radio broadcasting stations**
How many radio broadcasting stations are there?

8.13  **Television broadcasting stations**
How many television broadcasting stations are there?

8.14  **Phone subscribers**
Number of fixed and mobile phone subscribers in the country

8.15  **Internet subscribers**
Number of internet and broadband subscribers in the county
9 Civil Society Associations

**PROJECT MANAGER:** MICHAEL BERNHARD (UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA).

**Additional experts:** Sheri Berman (Barnard College), Lena Blomstrand (Head of Civil Society Center, Sida), David Campbell (Notre Dame), Grzegorz Ekiert (Harvard), Andrew Green (independent scholar), Gretchen Helmke (Rochester), Marc Howard (Georgetown), Jude Howell (Director, Centre for Civil Society, LSE), Jan Kubik (Rutgers), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Susan Stokes (Yale), Lucan Way (University of Toronto), Meredith Weiss (SUNY Albany).

**Organizations:** Center for Civil Society (UCLA), Centre for Civil Society (LSE), Civil Society Center (Sida, Sweden), National Endowment for Democracy (Washington, DC), Center for Civil Society and Democracy (Georgetown)

http://www1.georgetown.edu/departments/democracyandgovernance/programs/cdacs/36905.html,

Center for Civil Society Studies (Johns Hopkins University)


**Studies, datasets:** Anheier (2004); Andrew Green (proposal); Helmke, Levitsky (2004); Civil Society Index (CIVICUS, the Civil Society Center at Sida and Helmut K. Anheier), European Social Survey. The U.S. “Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy” Survey (http://www.uscidsurvey.org/), World Values Survey.


**GENERAL QUESTION:** IS CIVIL SOCIETY (LEAVING ASIDE ELEMENTS CONSIDERED IN OTHER SECTIONS) INDEPENDENT AND WELL ORGANIZED?

**Notes:** “Civil society organization” refers to any of the following: an interest group, a social movement, church group, or classic NGO, but not a private business, political party, or government agency. Must be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions. Questions about civil liberties, of obvious significance to civil society, are covered in a separate section.

**EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE**

9.1 Entry and exit of organizations (cs01eeorgs)

To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civic organizations into politics? [See definition of "civil society" in the Glossary, which is found in References.]

0: monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over civic organization. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity.

1: substantial control. The government licenses all civil society organizations and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose them. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The
government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity.

2: moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent civil society organizations is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience.

3: minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses civil society organizations, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence.

4: unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses civil society organizations, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.

9.2 Civil society repression (cs02reprss)
Does the government attempt to repress civil society (whether its efforts are successful or not)? [See definition of "civil society" in the Glossary, which is found in References.]

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of oppositional groups. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional civil society organizations who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic.

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade civil society organizations from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of civil society’s actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, or bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional civil society organizations from acting or expressing themselves. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase.

4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

9.3 Civil society consultation (cs03cnsult)
Are major civil society organizations routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members? [See definition of "civil society" in the Glossary, which is found in References.]

0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from societal input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize civil society organizations after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large.
1: To some degree. Civil society organizations are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.
2: Yes. Important civil society organizations are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

9.4 Civil society structure (cs04struc)
Civil societies inevitably involve a mix of larger and smaller organizations. Please characterize the relative influence of large mass constituency organizations versus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed organizations. [See definition of "civil society" in the Glossary, which is found in References.]

0: The state does not allow civil society organizations to influence public policy.
1: Large encompassing organizations dominate. The government and civil society are linked formally through a corporatist system of interest intermediation; or, due to historical circumstances, particular large organizations are highly influential. The voice of such organizations is recognized by the government and is accorded special weight by policymakers.
2: Neither large encompassing nor small organizations dominate. Influence is contingent on circumstances. Organizations, both large and small, contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers.
3: Small organizations dominate. Many small organizations contend with one another to have their voices heard by policymakers.

9.5 Civil society participatory environment (cs05prtcpt)
Which of these best describes the attitudes of citizens towards participating in civil society organizations? [See definition of "civil society" in the Glossary, which is found in References.]

0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of adult citizens may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.
1: Voluntary associations exist but few are political, and the minority of adult citizens who are active in them are not typical.
2: There are many diverse voluntary associations, political and non-political, but the minority of adult citizens who are active in them are not typical.
3: There are many diverse voluntary associations, political and non-political, and it is considered normal for adult citizens to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them, if not more.

9.6 Civil society comments (cs06commnt)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on Civil Society. [If you wish to use this space to assign multiple ratings to a single year on any of the previous questions, consult the Basic Coding Rules].

[text]

TO BE COLLECTED BY PROJECT MANAGER
9.7 What are the major religious organizations?
9.8 What are the major labor and business associations?
9.9 What are the major additional civic associations?
10 Direct Democracy

Project Manager: David Altman (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

Additional experts: Shaun Bowler (UC Riverside), Anita Breuer (Cologne), Todd Donovan (Western Washington), Markus Freitag (Konstanz), Archon Fung (Kennedy School of Gov, Harvard), Elisabeth Gerber (Michigan), Sara Hobolt (Oxford), Simon Hug (Geneve), John Matsusaka (USC), Maija Setälä (Turku), Caroline J. Tolbert (Iowa), Adrian Vatter (Zurich).

Organizations: Centre for Democracy (C2D) University of Zurich, IRI-USA.

Studies, datasets: C2D, Suchmaschine für direkte Demokratie, National Conference of State Legislatures (for the US only).

General question: How possible is the use of citizen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy (MDDs)?

Note: Direct democracy can be a very tricky aspect of democratic life. Not everything included in the concept correlates positively with democracy either in theory or in practice. For example, the abuse of MDDs by grotesque dictatorships makes this argument self-explanatory. But even in the democratic world, plebiscites are notably different from popular initiatives or referendums. Probably different MDDs relate to “democracy” differently. Some countries have legal provisions for MDDs but have never used them. At the same time, others use MDDs without any legal basis for them. Furthermore, if we measure direct democracy as the frequency of use, we might be rewarding polarized and divided societies instead of considering direct democracy as an institutional device that serves as a threat and therefore it fosters negotiations and agreements before solving the problem at the ballot-box. From this perspective, a successful MDD is the one that is never used.

Expert Questionnaire

10.1 CI-MDDs permitted (dd01legci)

Is there legal provision for special popular votes initiated by the citizenry? [These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either a new law or a constitutional amendment, or rejection of a recently approved law.] [If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question dd12legpb.]

0: not allowed
1: constitutionally allowed but a dead letter in practice
2: allowed but with intervening institutional veto
3: allowed but non-binding
4: allowed and binding
5: constitutionally mandated

10.2 Citizen initiative level (dd02levci)

At what level(s) of government can these citizen-initiated votes be held? [If you answer 0, proceed to the next question. If you answer 1, skip to question ddlegpb. If you answer 2, answer questions ddsigci through ddcrcdi only for the national level.]

0: Only at the national level
1: Only at a subnational level
2: At both national and subnational levels

10.3 Citizen initiative signatures (dd03sigci)
What is the barrier to entry in terms of signatures? Enter the number of signatures required as a percentage of the adult population.

[Text]

10.4 CI signature gathering (dd04gathci)
How much circulation time is allowed for signature gathering?

0: up to 60 days
1: up to 6 months
2: up to one year
3: more than one year, or no limit

10.5 CI scheduling (dd05schdci)
How is the vote scheduled?

0: Citizen-initiated votes are concurrent with election of authorities
1: Citizen-initiated votes are not concurrent with election of authorities.

10.6 CI theme exemptions (dd06themci)
Are there any thematic exemptions?

0: extensive thematic exemptions
1: only narrow thematic exemptions aside from incompatibility with international law and human rights
2: No exemptions except incompatibility with international law or human rights

10.7 CI approval threshold (dd07threci)
Must some threshold of approval be reached in order for the vote to be binding? Express your answer as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

[Text]

10.8 CI binding threshold (dd08bindci)
Must some threshold of participation be reached in order for the vote to be binding? Specify the required turnout as a percentage of registered voters.

[Text]

10.9 CI campaign restrictions (dd09campci)
Are there any campaign restrictions?

0: no restrictions on spending
1: spending regulation without public subsidies
2: spending regulation plus public subsidies provided to both sides

10.10 CI vote took place (dd10voteci)
Was there a national-level popular vote initiated by the citizenry this year?

0: No
1: Yes, there was just one.
2: Yes, there was more than one.

10.11 CI credible vote (dd11credi)
Was the vote a credible reflection of the will of the voters?
0: not credible due to extremely high turnout or marginal of victory, unfair election conditions
   (rampant vote-buying, violence against opposition, reports by international observers, etc.)
1: credible.

10.12 Top-down initiatives permitted (dd12legpb)
Is there legal provision for special popular votes initiated by the authorities? [These are measures
   referred to the ballot by the legislature, the executive, or both. Most often these concern referred laws,
   constitutional amendments, or bond questions.] [If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip the
   remaining questions in this survey.]
0: not allowed
1: Constitutionally allowed but a dead letter in practice
2: allowed but with intervening institutional veto
3: allowed but non-binding
4: allowed and binding
5: constitutionally mandated

10.13 Top-down initiatives level (dd13levpb)
At what level of government can votes initiated by the authorities to be held?
0: Only at the national level
1: Only at a subnational level
2: At both national and subnational levels

10.14 Top-down initiatives scheduling (dd14schdpb)
How is the vote scheduled?
0: Votes initiated by the authorities are concurrent with election of authorities
1: Votes initiated by the authorities are not concurrent with election of authorities.

10.15 Top-down initiatives approval threshold (dd15threpb)
Must some threshold of approval be reached in order for the result of such votes to be binding? Express
your answer as a percentage of registered voters.
   [text]

10.16 Top-down initiatives binding threshold (dd16bindpb)
Must some threshold of participation be reached in order for such votes to be binding? Express the
required turnout as a percentage of registered voters.
   [text]

10.17 Top-down initiatives campaign restrictions (dd17camppb)
Are there any campaign restrictions?
0: no restrictions on spending
1: spending regulation without public subsidies
2: spending regulation plus public subsidies provided to both sides

10.18 Top-down vote took place (dd18votepb)
Was there a national-level popular vote initiated by the authorities this year?
   0: No
   1: Yes, there was just one.
   2: Yes, there was more than one.

10.19 Top-down initiatives credible vote (dd19credpb)
Was the vote a credible reflection of the will of the voters?
   0: not credible due to extremely high turnout or marginal of victory, unfair election conditions
      (rampant vote-buying, violence against opposition, reports by international observers, etc.)
   1: credible.

10.20 Comments: direct democracy (dd20commnt)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on direct democracy.
   [text]
11 Subnational Politics

PROJECT MANAGER: KELLY MCMANN (CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY)

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Organizations: United Cities and Local Government, Global Observatory on Local Democracy and Decentralization


GENERAL QUESTIONS: HOW DEMOCRATIC IS A COUNTRY SUBNATIONALLY? TO WHAT EXTENT ARE SUBNATIONAL FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES DEMOCRATIC IN DESIGN AND OPERATION? TO WHAT EXTENT DO NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES OPERATE DEMOCRATICALLY IN SUBNATIONAL TERRITORIAL UNITS?

Notes:

Subnational units affect democracy in a country in numerous ways. Certain subnational units may diverge greatly from the average on multiple indicators so that for particular categories, components, dimensions, or models they differ from the country as a whole, resulting in enclaves. Or, a significant minority of subnational units may diverge greatly on an indicator from the rest of the units so that the average value is less meaningful. For example, journalists may be harassed in some subnational units and not others. Finally, consistently across a subnational level the value of an indicator or values of a set of indicators may be different than at the national level. For example, provincial elections may be freer and fairer than national elections.

Numerous levels of subnational units exist: states/provinces, districts, cities/villages. For this category to be manageable, it makes sense to focus on the first subnational level, state/provinces. Where data from lower levels already exist in usable form, they will be included.

To evaluate subnational influence it is necessary to examine the extent to which subnational formal institutions, such as executives, representative bodies, and judiciaries, and subnational formal processes, such as elections and eligibility and attainment of public office, are democratic in design and operation. It is also necessary to examine the extent to which national or potentially national-level institutions and processes, such as political parties, media, civil society organizations, and civil liberties operate democratically in subnational units.
Essentially, this category takes a subnational perspective on all the other categories, with the exception of sovereignty, which is specific to the national level in the context of democracy in a country. Categories 2-6—formal and descriptive representative, elections, the executive, the legislature, the judiciary—are designed to focus exclusively on the national level. Categories 8, 9, 10, 12, 13—media, civil society organizations, civil liberties, direct democracy, and social inequality—are not conceptualized as being territorially bound. The category political parties explicitly includes a subnational component: “Do parties have local sections (constituency groups), or are they centered on the capital and on a restricted group of local notables?”

It is useful to note that this category does not include indicators to evaluate the extent to which citizens directly participate in the regulation of the local community through particular institutions or processes, as this more likely would fit under the Direct Democracy category. For this reason the Subnational Politics category also does not include measures of whether subnational institutions and processes are influential relative to their national counterparts. Either of these threads could, however, be included.

Most of the indicators for the subnational politics category will be expert survey questions because of a dearth of existing data. My review of datasets on local government, decentralization, and related topics, my review of datasets PMs indicated that they may use, and my correspondence with PMs about their categories revealed few multicity datasets. The few existing datasets include contemporary information about the territorial structure of government in countries (GOLD), data on local referenda and initiatives across time (Center for Research on Direct Democracy), and the extent of geographic concentration of minorities (Minorities at Risk). (Data on gender quotas in subnational elections also exist, but the database is not exhaustive.) Most subnational datasets examine government provision of services and decentralization, not democratic institutions or processes. Subnational democracy studies examine only a few countries.

_Potential Obstacles_: It may be difficult to find experts with detailed knowledge of subnational units. Historical data will be even more difficult to obtain from experts. On a positive note, no other democracy dataset even addresses this issue, so data from expert surveys will be a major contribution.

**EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE**

11.1 _Region of stronger civil liberties (cl11snmore)_
If there is unevenness in the respect for civil liberties across the country, please identify the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly STRONGER. If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, “cities in the north”)

[Text]

11.2 _Stronger civil liberties pop% (cl12snmpct)_
Approximately what percentage of the total population of the country lives in these areas where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly STRONGER?

[Text]
11.3 Region of weaker civil liberties (cl13snless)
If there is unevenness in the respect for civil liberties across the country, please identify the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly WEAKER. If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, “cities in the north”).

[Text]

11.4 Weaker civil liberties pop% (cl14snlpct)
Approximately what percentage of the total population of the country lives in these areas where government officials’ respect for civil liberties is significantly WEAKER?

[Text]

11.5 Comments civil liberties (cl15commnt)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on civil liberties.

[Text]

11.6 Subnational level 1 elected (el22snloc1)
Name the lowest subnational level at which elections are held for one or more office. If there is no clear name for the level, list the names of the main units at that level (for example, “counties and cities” for the United States). [If no elections are held at any subnational level, enter "none" and proceed to your next survey.]

[Text]

11.7 Subnational level 2 elected (el23snloc2)
If there is a higher subnational level at which elections are held for one or more office, enter its name, using the previous guidelines for naming. [If no elections are held at a higher subnational level, enter "none" and skip to question elffell.]

[Text]

11.8 Subnational level 3 elected (el24snloc3)
If there is an even higher subnational level at which elections are held for one or more office, enter its name, using the previous guidelines for naming. [If no elections are held at an even higher subnational level, enter "none" and skip to question elffell.]

[Text]

11.9 Least powerful subnational level (el25snelim)
Of the subnational levels you identified as having elections, indicate which ONE has the LEAST de facto responsibilities, e.g., making laws, providing primary education, maintaining roads, policing, etc., and resources to carry out those responsibilities. [In the rest of this survey, ignore this level. The remaining questions in this survey will refer to the one level you identified as the “lower subnational level” or two levels you identified as the “lower subnational level” and the “higher subnational level”].

[Text]

11.10 Free and fair local elections (el26ffell)
How free and fair are elections for offices at the lower subnational level relative to elections for national offices? [“Lower subnational level” refers to the one level you identified as having elections OR the
lower of the two levels you identified as having elections OR if you identified more than two levels as having elections, the lower of the two levels you did not eliminate.]

0: Elections for offices at the lower subnational level are, on average, less free and fair than elections for national offices.
1: Elections for offices at the lower subnational level are, on average, about as free and fair as elections for national offices.
2: Elections for offices at the lower subnational level are, on average, more free and fair than elections for national offices.

11.11 Local executive elected (el27snexl)
At the lower subnational level, is the executive usually elected?
0: No
1: There is no executive at this level.
2: Yes

11.12 Local assembly elected (el28snlgl)
At the lower subnational level, is the assembly usually elected?
0: No
1: There is no assembly at this level.
2: Yes

11.13 Local judges elected (el29snjul)
At the lower subnational level, are judges usually elected?
0: No
1: There is no judiciary at this level.
2: Yes

11.14 Rank of local executive (el30lrkex)
What is the typical de facto relationship between the executive and any other branches of government at the lower subnational level? [A branch is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another branch or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another branch, but it cannot similarly constrain the other branch.]

0: There is no executive at the lower subnational level.
1: The executive is not subordinate to any other branch of government at this level.
2: The executive is subordinate to only one other branch of government at this level.
3: The executive is subordinate to two or more other branches of government at this level.

11.15 Rank of local assembly (el31lrkas)
What is the typical de facto relationship between the assembly and any other branches of government at the lower subnational level? [A branch is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another branch or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another branch, but it cannot similarly constrain the other branch.]

0: There is no assembly at the lower subnational level.
1: The assembly is not subordinate to any other branch of government at this level.
2: The assembly is subordinate to only one other branch of government at this level.
3: The assembly is subordinate to two or more other branches of government at this level.

11.16 Rank of local judiciary (el32lrkj)
What is the typical de facto relationship between the judiciary and any other branches of government at the lower subnational level? [A branch is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another branch or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another branch, but it cannot similarly constrain the other branch.]

0: There is no judiciary at the lower subnational level.
1: The judiciary is not subordinate to any other branch of government at this level.
2: The judiciary is subordinate to only one other branch of government at this level.
3: The judiciary is subordinate to two or more other branches of government at this level.

11.17 Free and fair intermediate-level elections (el33ffelm)
How free and fair are elections for offices at the higher subnational level relative to elections for national offices? [“Higher subnational level” refers to the higher of the two levels you identified as having elections OR if you identified more than two levels as having elections, the higher of the two levels you did not eliminate. If you did not identify a higher subnational level as having elections, jump to el40snless.]

0: Elections for offices at the higher subnational level are, on average, less free and fair than elections for national offices.
1: Elections for offices at the higher subnational level are, on average, about as free and fair as elections for national offices.
2: Elections for offices at the higher subnational level are, on average, more free and fair than elections for national offices.

11.18 Intermediate executive elected (el34snexm)
At the higher subnational level, is the executive usually elected?

0: No
1: There is no executive at this level.
2: Yes

11.19 Intermediate assembly elected (el35snlgm)
At the higher subnational level, is the assembly usually elected?

0: No
1: There is no assembly at this level.
2: Yes

11.20 Intermediate judges elected (el36snjum)
At the higher subnational level, are judges usually elected?

0: No
1: There is no judiciary at this level.
2: Yes
11.21 Rank of intermediate executive (el37mrkex)
What is the typical de facto relationship between the executive and any other branches of government at the higher subnational level? [A branch is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another branch or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another branch, but it cannot similarly constrain the other branch.]

0: There is no executive at the higher subnational level.
1: The executive is not subordinate to any other branch of government at this level.
2: The executive is subordinate to only one other branch of government at this level.
3: The executive is subordinate to two or more other branches of government at this level.

11.22 Rank of intermediate assembly (el38mrkas)
What is the typical de facto relationship between the assembly and any other branches of government at the higher subnational level? [A branch is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another branch or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another branch, but it cannot similarly constrain the other branch.]

0: There is no assembly at the higher subnational level.
1: The assembly is not subordinate to any other branch of government at this level.
2: The assembly is subordinate to only one other branch of government at this level.
3: The assembly is subordinate to two or more other branches of government at this level.

11.23 Rank of intermediate judiciary (el39mrkju)
What is the typical de facto relationship between the judiciary and any other branches of government at the higher subnational level? [A branch is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another branch or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another branch, but it cannot similarly constrain the other branch.]

0: There is no judiciary at the higher subnational level.
1: The judiciary is not subordinate to any other branch of government at this level.
2: The judiciary is subordinate to only one other branch of government at this level.
3: The judiciary is subordinate to two or more other branches of government at this level.

11.24 Less free and fair subnational elections (el40snless)
If there is unevenness in the freeness and fairness of subnational elections (at any level) please identify the areas of the country where elections are significantly LESS free and fair. If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, “cities in the north”)

11.25 Less free and fair subnational population (el41snlpop)
Approximately what percentage of the total population of the country lives in these areas where elections are significantly LESS free and fair?

11.26 More free and fair subnational elections (el42snmore)
If there is unevenness in the freeness and fairness of subnational elections (at any level) please identify the areas of the country where elections are significantly MORE free and fair. If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, “cities in the north”).
11.27 More free and fair subnational population (el43snmpop)
Approximately what percentage of the total population of the country lives in these areas where elections are significantly MORE free and fair?
[text]

11.28 Comments subnational elections (el44comsn)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on subnational elections.
[text]
12 Civil Liberty

**PROJECT MANAGER:** SVEND-ERIK SKAANING (AARHUS UNIVERSITY, DENMARK).

**Additional experts:** Arthur Banks (independent scholar), David Beetham (U. of Leeds, emeritus), David Cingranelli (SUNY, Binghamton), Christian Davenport (U. of Notre Dame), Todd Landman (Essex).


**Studies; datasets:** Arat (1991); Cingranelli & Richards (1999); Cingranelli & Richards (n.d.); Freedom House (2006); Gibney & Dalton (1996); Green (2001); Landman (2004); Landman, Carvalho (2009), Skaaning (2006a, 2006b, 2008); Cederman et al. (2009).

**Additional sources of information:** State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (main source), supplemented by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World (narrative country reports), Amnesty International’s Annual Reports, Human Rights Watch’s World Reports, and – especially when going back in time – country narratives found in reports, books, articles, and newspapers.

**GENERAL QUESTION:** DO CITIZENS ENJOY FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FREEDOM FROM POLITICALLY MOTIVATED PERSECUTION BY GOVERNMENT?

**Notes:**
Civil liberties issues pertaining specifically to voting, elections, media, parties, and CSOs are covered in other sections.
Potential obstacles: Difficult to find relevant information regarding periods before the 1980s.

**EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE**

**12.1 Freedom of discussion (cl01disc)**
Is there freedom to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? [This indicator specifies the extent to which individual citizens are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment or arrest by the public authorities.]

0: Not respected by the government. Hardly any freedom of speech exists. The government has a comprehensive public surveillance apparatus that uses report on political statements that are independent and/or critical of the government. As a rule, antigovernment conversations are harshly repressed.

1: Weakly respected by the government. Expression of political opinions that are independent and/or critical of the government do exist but are frequently exposed to interventions and prohibitions.

2: Mostly respected by the government. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there are no interventions and prohibitions on political statements.

3: Unrestricted. Fully respected by the government. Freedom of speech among private citizens in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.
12.2 Freedom of academic & cultural expression (cl02acfree)

Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression? [This indicator specifies the extent to which there is academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression - especially regarding activities and works of a political and quasi-political nature - without fear of repression or intimidation by the government or its agents.]

0: Not respected by the government. Censorship and intimidation are practiced frequently. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted and controlled by the government.

1: Weakly respected by the government. Violations of academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but they are mostly limited to overt criticism of the government.

2: Mostly respected by the government. Limitation on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are either very soft or are isolated to very few cases.

3: Fully respected by the government. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.

12.3 Freedom of religion (cl03relig)

Is there freedom of religion? [This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, that is, the right of the citizens to have and change religion or belief of own choice and alone or in community manifest their religion or belief in practice, worship, observance, and teaching in private or public as well as proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions.]

0: Not respected by the government. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. As a rule any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of any religious community in detail.

1: Weakly respected by the government. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But major religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled. Members of several minor religious groups are not allowed to teach or practice their religion or face severe restrictions concerning registration, places of worship, etc. Voluntary conversions can be seriously restricted. Instances of discrimination and/or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.

2: Mostly respected by the government. There are minor restraints on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but there are generally no interventions or prohibitions on communities or individual worshippers. Only minor restrictions against a few minority religions in terms of denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries to enter the country, not allowing citizens or foreigners to proselyte, or hindering the access to or construction of places of worship. Instances of discrimination and/or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion take place but are uncommon.

3: Fully respected by the government. Citizens enjoy the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel, solicit and receive contributions, publish, and engage in consultations without undue interference. There are no government restrictions on establishing and maintaining places of worship. All religious groups may worship freely and uphold contact with their coreligionists abroad. Active missionary presence is not restrained. It does not count as a restriction if religious communities have to register, if the public authorities routinely grant registration and do not
abuse the process to discriminate against a religion, and if the government does not constrain the right to worship before registration.

12.4 Freedom of movement (cl04move)
Is there freedom of movement and residence? [This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have freedom of movement and residence, that is, the right of the citizens to settle and travel within their country as well as to leave and return to their country of own choice without being subject to actual limitations or restrictions by the government or its agents.]

0: Not respected by the government. As a rule, citizens are not allowed to choose their place of residence and to travel within and out of the country. The government rarely permits emigration and foreign travel. Such restrictions are often combined with restrictions on residence and travel inside the country and the rigid provision of identity papers and detailed registration procedures. Transgressors are severely punished. Many people discredited by the government are either exiled or are not allowed to travel at all.

1: Weakly respected by the government. The government restricts the right to travel and/or residence of own choice for many people. This can be in the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad and frequent problems with regard to change residence and travel permits, restrictions on certain groups based on ethnic origin, political observation etc., who are not allowed to travel into, within, or out of the country or who are ostracised or expelled from their homes.

2: Mostly respected by the government. Restrictions predominantly limited to a few isolated cases, but as a rule there are no prohibitions. Most citizens are allowed freedom of movement, but minor or few restrictions are imposed on them such as hindrances to register residence in certain cities or areas or if some highly educated or especially skilled people are prevented from leaving the country. Other likely restrictions are the provision of exit visas needed for travel or emigration, requirements to surrender passports upon completion of foreign travel and request of their return for further use, or few persons are not allowed to travel within or outside the country or they are exiled and/or not permitted to return. Other examples of minor restraints are restriction on movement in some areas near the border or characterized by conflict, safe-conduct passes required for certain areas, the imposition of a limited curfew, or adult persons need permission to travel or emigrate from members of the family.

3: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of movement to travel domestically and abroad, as well as for emigration and repatriation is not restricted by the public authorities. Citizens have the right to move freely within the country, choose residence, travel and reside abroad, and return. No restrictions exist, except perhaps for entry to (and not from) indigenous reservations or limited military areas. If parents are not allowed to leave the country with their children without permission of the other parent, it is not accounted a violation. This also applies to roadblocks or the like by the police or the military and for restrictions on the movement of refugees or other non-citizens.

12.5 Freedom from torture (cl05tort)
Is there freedom from torture? [This indicator specifies the extent to which torture is practiced. Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or agents. This includes the use of physical and other force by police and prison guards that is cruel, inhuman, or degrading.]
0: Not respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.
1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced occasionally but is often not incited and approved by the leaders of government.
2: Mostly respected by the public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases and is not incited or approved by the leaders of government.
3: Fully respected by the public authorities. Torture generally does not take place.

12.6 Freedom from murder (cl06kill)
Is there freedom from political or extrajudicial killings? [Extrajudicial killings are killings by the government or its agents without due process of law. These killings may result from the deliberate, illegal, and excessive use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or other agents of the state whether against criminal suspects, detainees, prisoners, or others. Political killings are killings by a government or its agents as a result of involvement in political activities or support political actions.]
0: Not respected by the public authorities. Political and extrajudicial killings are practiced frequently and they are incited and approved by the leaders of government.
1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. Political and extrajudicial killings are practiced occasionally but they are often not incited and approved by the leaders of government.
2: Mostly respected by the public authorities. Political and extrajudicial killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by the leaders of government.
3: Fully respected by the public authorities. Political and extrajudicial killings generally do not take place.

12.7 Freedom from servitude (cl07slave)
Is there freedom from slavery, servitude, or forced labor? [Slavery is any situation in which people are treated as property and their work or service is exacted under the menace of penalty (especially violence) and for which the person has not offered himself voluntarily. This does not include any work or service which forms part of normal civil obligations, and it cannot be equated simply with poor wages or working conditions or situations when workers feel unable to leave job because of the real or perceived absence of employment alternatives.]
0: Slavery, servite or forced labor regularly found in several economic sectors
1: Slavery, servite or forced labor are regularly found in a few economic sectors
2: There are small, but persistent amounts of slavery, servite or forced labor.
3: Very little, occasional slavery, servitude or forced labor.
4: No slavery, servitude or forced labor.

12.8 Respect for law (cl08rspct)
Are public officials impartial and subject to the law in the performance of their functions? [This indicator specifies the extent to which there is effective control of public servants so that policy implementation in individual cases is characterized by impartiality whereas undue bias and corruption are sanctioned.]
0: Not respected by the public officials. Corrupt, arbitrary, or discriminatory implementation of the law is the rule in all parts of the public administration.
1: Weakly respected by the public officials. Corruption or discriminatory practices are common in most parts of the public administration.
2: Mostly respected by the public officials. Corruption or discriminatory practices take place but they are not common or isolated to few, specific parts of the public administration.

3: Fully respected by the public officials. In general, the civil servants are not engaged in corrupt and discriminatory practices and deviations from this rule are prosecuted rigorously.

12.9  Access to justice (cl09acjust)
Is there equal, secure, and effective access of citizens to justice, due process, and redress? [This indicator specifies the extent to which trials are fair, citizens can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, and citizens have effective ability to seek redress if the public authorities have violated their lawful rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal as well as presumption of innocence and protection from ex post facto laws.]

0: Not respected by the public authorities. Citizens hardly ever get a fair trial and in practice citizens do not have the opportunity to successfully petition public authorities to redress grievances.

1: Weakly respected by the public authorities. In practice, due process rights are incomplete, trials are characterized by systematic biases against major groups in society (women, poor, ethnic or religious minorities, etc.), and the citizens' means of effective petition and redress are highly limited.

2: Mostly respected by the public authorities.

3: Fully respected by the public authorities. As a rule, the citizens' access to fair trials and redress is equal, secure, and effective

12.10 Property rights (cl10propty)
Is private property protected? [This indicator specifies the extent to which the government protects private property. It measures the degree to which the laws protect private property rights and the degree to which the government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts.]

0: Private property is outlawed by the government, and virtually all property belongs to the state.

1: Private property is weakly protected by the government. The enforcement of contracts is highly inefficient, much property belongs to the state, and expropriation is common.

2: Private property is moderately guaranteed by the government. The enforcement of contracts and the punishment of unlawful confiscation of private property is inefficient. Expropriation is possible but uncommon.

3: Private property is mostly guaranteed by the government. Contracts are mostly enforced efficiently, unlawful confiscation of private property is mostly punished, and expropriation is very unlikely.

4: Private property is guaranteed by the government. Contracts are enforced efficiently, unlawful confiscation of private property is punished, and there is virtually no expropriation.
13  Social Equality

PROJECT MANAGER: JOHN GERRING (BOSTON UNIVERSITY)

Additional experts: Mick Moore (Center for the Future State/Institute for Development Studies, Sussex), Deborah Yashar (Princeton), Raúl Madrid (Texas-Austin), Kathryn Hochstetler (University of New Mexico), Ayesha Jalal (Tufts—History and Sociology), Alex Pacek (Texas A&M) [See http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/33/8/995].

Organizations:
Studies; datasets:

GENERAL QUESTION: WHAT SOCIETAL FACTORS MIGHT IMPACT THE GOAL OF POLITICAL EQUALITY?

EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE

13.1 Disadvantaged social groups (list)
Are certain religious, linguistic, caste, or ethnic groups politically disadvantaged relative to other citizens? Examples of political disadvantage include (but are not limited to): (a) exclusion from suffrage, (b) voting turnout rates significantly below the national average, (c) gross under-representation in public office (including top positions in the army and civilian bureaucracy), (d) harassment or social stigma targeted at these groups (rather than more generally, to all citizens) which may have ramifications for political participation, (e) exclusion from the public sphere, (f) economic deprivation significantly below the national average, (g) geographic isolation that may contribute to political disempowerment. If the answer is yes, please list the groups that suffer from political disadvantage. If the answer is no, leave blank. (If there is no obvious English translation of a foreign term for a group, use the original language.)

[Text]

13.2 Disadvantaged social groups (%)
Adding these groups together (but not counting the same individuals twice), about what percentage of the total citizenry are included in the category of “politically disadvantaged”? (Note: we are not concerned here with the political disadvantages of non-citizens.) If there are no politically disadvantaged groups, enter 0.

[Insert number from 0-100]

13.3 Enabling institutions
Are there state programs or other institutionalized practices that are designed to enable these groups to participate on an equal footing in spite of socioeconomic disadvantages? Note: I don’t think this question, in its current form, is answerable. My recommendation: drop it, unless it can be reformulated.

13.4 Enabling institutions effective
Are these enabling institutions effective?
Note: I don’t think this question, in its current form, is answerable. My recommendation: drop it, unless it can be reformulated.
TO BE COLLECTED BY PROJECT MANAGER

13.5 Educational attainment
Data coverage: 1950-present.

13.6 Primary Schools
Number of primary schools (public and private; secular and religious)
Statesmen’s Yearbook (annual) – all collated in CLIO.
Data coverage: to be determined.

13.7 Students
Number of students – all levels (primary, secondary, tertiary) and all schools.
Sources: British Colonial Office Lists, British Colonial Office Reports, Comin, Hobijn (2009), Mitchell
(1993, 2003a, 2003b), Statesmen’s Yearbook (annual) – all collated in CLIO.
Data coverage: to be determined.

13.8 Teachers
Number of teachers – all levels (primary, secondary, tertiary) and all schools.
Statesmen’s Yearbook (annual) – all collated in CLIO.
Data coverage: to be determined.

13.9 Land distribution
The distribution of total land holdings (disposable land per farm) across the total extent of agricultural
land, expressed as a Gini coefficient.
Data coverage: to be determined.

13.10 Infant mortality rate
Number of infant deaths per 1000 live births in a given year.
Data coverage: to be determined.

13.11 Life expectancy
Expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates.
Data coverage: to be determined.
14 Deliberative Democracy

PROJECT MANAGER: JOHN GERRING (BOSTON UNIVERSITY)
Additional experts: John Dryzek, Andre Bächtiger, Jurg Steiner
Studies; datasets: Bächtiger (2004); Dryzek (2009); Mutz (2008); Ryfe (2005); Steiner et al. (2004); Thompson (2008).

GENERAL QUESTION: ARE POLITICAL DECISIONS THE PRODUCT OF PUBLIC DELIBERATION?

EXPERT QUESTIONNAIRE

14.1 Reasoned justification (dl01reason)
When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do elites give reasoned justifications for their positions? [Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.]

0: No justification: Elites tend to say only that something should or should not be done, but no reason is given.

1: Inferior justification: Elites tend to give a reason as to why something should or should not be done, but no linkage is made between the proposed policies and the reason — the inference is incomplete. This code also applies if a conclusion is merely supported with illustrations.

2: Qualified justification: Elites tend to offer a single reason that one should expect that the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome.

3: Sophisticated justification: Elites tend to offer more than one complete justification.

14.2 Common good (dl02common)
When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do elites justify their positions in terms of the common good? [Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.]

0: Little or no justification tends to be offered.

1: Specific group, party, or constituency interests tend to be offered as justifications, and these groups/parties/constituencies are not especially disadvantaged.

2: Justifications are generally based on references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.

3: Justifications are generally based on explicit statements of the common good, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

14.3 Respectful debate (dl03rspect)
When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do elites recognize, respond to, and incorporate positions taken by opposing groups/parties? [Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.]

0: Elites either ignore opposing views or make condescending or belittling statements about them.

1: Elites recognize and argue against opposing views.
2: Elites recognize and sometimes integrate opposing views in their thinking on a policy.

14.4 Respect counterarguments (dl04countr)
When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments during debate? [Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.]

0: Counterarguments tend to be ignored.
1: Elites tend to acknowledge a counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose the argument.
2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.
3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they may also make negative statements.

14.5 Range of consultation (dl05conslt)
When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at the elite level? [Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.]

0: There tends to be no consultation, or consultation only with an inner circle of close advisors.
1: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party or parties.
2: Consultation includes the former plus a few select elites from outside the inner circle or ruling party.
3: Consultation engages elites from all important parts of the political spectrum.

14.6 Engaged society (dl06engage)
When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations? [This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media. Questions about popular participation (e.g. voting, demonstrating, ...) are taken up elsewhere in this survey.]

0: Society below the elite level tends to be either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.
1: Some sub-elitist groups participate in debates but their participation is organized by and controlled by elites.
2: Some autonomous deliberation takes place below the elite level, but it is confined to a small number of specialized groups.
3: Large numbers of ordinary citizens, whether affiliated with organized groups or not, tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Popular deliberations is common and unconstrained.

14.7 Comments deliberative democracy (dl07commnt)
Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on Deliberative Democracy.

[text]
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