Chapter 8
Political Culture and Democratization

This chapter begins the survey of empirical testing of theories of the creation and survival of democratic regimes. Subsequent chapters will survey the impact of institutions, socioeconomic development and performance, and other factors, all of which emphasize forces external to individuals. In non-cultural approaches, individuals are in a sense interchangeable: their political behavior is determined by their social class, their occupation, their role in an institutional context, and so forth. In cultural approaches, people are not interchangeable: they are different inside and therefore respond differently to the same external forces. Those who study political culture believe that we cannot discover useful theories without getting inside the heads of political actors.

Any discussion of political culture must begin by defining it. I begin this chapter by siding with the dominant behavioral understanding of culture, while acknowledging that it tends to be thin. I then critique macro-macro comparisons, which are tantalizing but superficial, and argue that the causal pathways linking individual attitudes to regime outcomes must be more clearly specified. This principle frames the subsequent section, which takes stock of the micro-level evidence that is relevant for each causal linkage in mass-led transitions or survival.

Versions of Political Culture

The notion of political culture came to U.S. political science from German sociology, where it had a long and diverse lineage by the early 20th century. The German tradition did not coalesce into a single coherent definition of culture; rather, different authors emphasized different characteristics of culture: as the sum total of all societal norms and practices, a legacy of history, norms or accepted ways of thinking and acting, a set of psychological orientations, a system that organizes society, or something that humans create and pass along to the next generation (Lane and Ersson 2005 17-24). This holistic understanding of political culture resonated well with the national/ethnic stereotypes and racism that were widespread in the West in the first decades of
the century, and it was common at the time for U.S. political scientists to use “national character” as an explanation: the French act one way, the English another, etc. Cultural theories have fallen out of favor more than once since the Second World War — partly because of their dalliances with racism and ethnocentrism — but reformulated versions have been proposed periodically.

Today a variety of cultural approaches can be found in political science. The dominant version of political culture since the 1960s has been a behavioral approach that borrows from psychology and uses survey research and experiments. Nevertheless, other kinds of cultural theories survive that owe more to anthropology and the earlier German tradition. The anthropological view, most famously described by Clifford Geertz (Geertz 1973), holds that culture is a property of a whole society, or subgroups within society, but in any case not of individuals (Elkins and Simeon 1979). Culture consists of both attitudes and behaviors, especially those that have become stable and routine and unquestioned. Culture is therefore is relatively static, in this view. Culture is also rich and complex: there are many attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, these cultural elements cohere, united by their own internal logic. In this view, individuals may deviate from cultural norms, but the culture exerts pressure on them to conform. For this reason, individuals cannot be fully understood apart from the culture in which they live. This approach calls for verstehen, which in German simply means “understanding,” but in English-language academic circles has come to mean an empathic, deep understanding of the culture by a perceptive scholar who knows it intimately enough to see it through the eyes of its members (Schedler 2004). This approach emphasizes the meaning of words and actions to the actors themselves. Several authors have claimed to describe cultures that are distinctively favorable or unfavorable for democracy. For example, Howard Wiarda has repeatedly argued that Latin American societies have a “corporatist” culture influenced by the teachings of St. Thomas
Aquinas and the hierarchical organization of the Catholic Church (Wiarda 2004). This corporatist culture carries values antithetical to individualism, pluralism, and capitalism, all of which have been associated with political democracy. Another example is Lucian Pye’s Asian Political Culture, which derives various orientations to political authority – some compatible with democracy, others not – from thick descriptions of family structure and child-rearing practices in seventeen Asian countries (Pye 1985).

One common criticism of this anthropological approach, or at least of its extreme stereotype, is that it exaggerates the homogeneity of a society. Societies, especially large ones on the scale of nations, always contain subgroups with their own sub-cultures, and these often contain individual dissenters (Dalton 2002; Knight 2001). Another common criticism is that while a static version of culture may be very useful for explaining political stability, it provides no leverage for explaining political change. A third weakness is that this approach forces the social-scientific community to trust the subjective judgment of self-appointed expert interpreters of a culture, as it would be difficult or impossible for other researchers to replicate the expert’s field experience, even if they had access to extensive documentation. Nevertheless, it is probably true that this approach yields more detailed, accurate, and insightful portraits of a culture than a battery of survey questions can. A recent reformulation, inspired by later work in critical anthropology, rectifies some of the drawbacks. The "semiotic practices" approach does not assume that cultures are uniform or static or internally coherent. Rather, culture is the ongoing

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1Harry Eckstein argued that even a relatively static concept of culture can make a few testable predictions about political change: that in response to external shocks, cultures will change slowly while preserving some essential characteristics, and if the external shock is overwhelming, will go through a period of formlessness before new cultural patterns emerge (Eckstein 1988). Note, however, that all of these predictions concern the impact of other things on culture, not the impact of culture on other phenomena such as democratization.
process in which individuals “make meaning” by engaging in political activity (Wedeen 2002). In this view, culture becomes a hive of constantly evolving activity that is means different things to different participants. This approach strives for even more fine-grained and exhaustive descriptions of a culture, which demand even more skill and effort to collect and analyze texts, conversations, and practices.

At the opposite extreme lies the behavioral approach to culture, inspired by psychology. In this approach, culture is merely the aggregation of individuals' attitudes and (in some applications) behaviors. Culture does not exist except in the minds of individuals, although for some purposes it may be useful to describe the culture of a group, society, or nation by referring to the collective distribution of attitudes or an average attitude. This approach takes as little as possible for granted concerning the uniformity, stability, and coherence of attitudes. It may be that certain attitudes are dominant, that various attitudes go together because they are constrained by underlying value orientations, and that these patterns are stable or slowly changing; but in this approach, these are hypotheses to be tested, not features that can be safely assumed or asserted, even after extensive “soaking and poking” by an insightful expert. The best way to understand culture, according this approach, is to conduct rigorous survey research. Sometimes researchers also conduct psychological experiments. One early example of this approach with relevance for democratization was The Authoritarian Personality, a project that began as a study of anti-semitism in 1943 but eventually led to a scale measuring a “right-wing authoritarian” personality presumed to be supportive of fascist regimes (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1981; Stone, Lederer, and Christie 1992). On the democratic side, the landmark study was The Civic Culture, which used public opinion surveys in five countries to identify a cluster of attitudes that the authors believed to be most propitious for stable democracy (Almond and Verba 1965). Both studies suffered fierce
criticism on methodological grounds, much of which was justified (Verba 1980). However, because their mistakes inspired others to do better, they founded what is now a vast body of survey research on political culture and democratization.

Whether an anthropological or a psychological approach is better depends on one’s purpose. If the goal is to provide a rich, “thick” description of a small, relatively homogeneous community, then the prolonged immersion that anthropological approaches require is likely to lead to better insights. But if one’s goal is to develop and test fairly general ideas about the impact of political culture on democratization, then survey research and statistical analysis are indispensable. Because the goal of this book is to summarize and critique what we know about general theories of democratization, I must devote the bulk of my attention in this chapter to survey research. But in some respects, the distinction between these approaches is not absolute. Anthropological researchers must get to know a range of community members well to make any claim that their portrait represents the entire community, and a survey questionnaire is useless if it forces respondents to choose among answers that mean nothing to them. A well-designed survey implements verstehen: it anticipates all the likely answers and offers respondents choices that they can agree with whole-heartedly.²

Beyond the study of small, homogeneous communities, the psychological approach is superior overall to any anthropological approach. By making questionnaires more comprehensive and more in tune with how people really think, survey research can approach thick description; but survey research has valuable advantages that anthropological approaches can never equal. Only survey research takes samples that are demonstrably representative of a population,

²This statement paraphrases a remark by Juan Linz at a dinner in his honor in Philadelphia, September 2, 2006.
eliminating the need to rely on the authority of one observer. Only survey research can reveal how a population is distributed among different attitudes – a great improvement over asserting that the culture is homogeneous or admitting that it is heterogeneous without revealing the sizes of the subgroups. Only survey research can rigorously test a claim that certain attitudes cohere in a more fundamental structure. Only survey research can tell us whether certain attitudes or patterns really are stable. And only survey research, in combination with probability theory and statistics, can estimate how confident we can be that a sample is representative, that a subgroup is of a certain size, that an underlying cultural dimension exists, or that attitudes are changing or stable.

In my view, statistical concepts provide the best way of thinking about, describing, and analyzing political culture, provided that a survey captures individual attitudes validly and reliably. Statistics make it possible to describe the average (or median or modal) opinions, perceptions, beliefs, and norms of the collective without ignoring the dispersion of individuals around the group’s central tendency. Any useful generalization about the culture of a group must pay attention to both the central tendency and the dispersion. For example, an anthropological article once described Venezuela’s political culture in elaborate and fascinating detail (Coronil and Skurski 1991). It claimed that Venezuelans do not feel responsible for their own prosperity; rather, they believe that the “magical state” should provide for them by distributing the proceeds from oil exports equally among all citizens. Furthermore, the state should be headed by a strong leader with a direct, unmediated relationship with “the people,” who punishes any dishonest politicians who seize more than their share of the wealth. This description has the ring of truth, and it seems to explain a lot about the popularity of President Hugo Chávez (1999-present). Survey research, however, shows that this portrait is a caricature that simplifies and exaggerates reality. According to the 2004 Latin Barometer, 47 percent of the population rejected “get tough” (“mano dura”)
leadership, and Venezuela was the Latin American country with the highest percentage of people felt that they, rather than the government, were responsible for their own well-being (LatinoBarómetro 2004 15-16). Coronil and Skurski’s characterization of Venezuelan political culture was useful for highlighting some tendencies that were probably stronger in Venezuela than in some other societies, but it underplayed Venezuelan subcultures. Ignoring these discrepancies would make it impossible to understand why President Chávez ever faced any opposition. Survey research would not obscure absolute unanimity on a broad set of attitudes, if it existed. But the lack of such findings so far suggests that interpretive approaches lead to necessarily inaccurate, oversimplified distortions of reality.

Statistics are also essential for testing claims about the internal coherence of a culture. Because a culture is not just any jumbled mix of beliefs and norms, it is important for cultural analysts to find out whether there really are underlying cultural orientations that structure a larger set of attitudes. More concretely, this means that certain attitudes are closely associated with one another, and with some underlying dimension or dimensions. One can test for associations among attitudes by cross-tabulating or correlating indicators of those attitudes. Factor analysis is often used to see whether these relationships are structured by a common underlying dimension. For example, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have shown that a dimension ranging from a focus on physical survival to an emphasis on self-expression meaningfully structures forty or more attitudes across dozens of countries (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

The fundamental difference between the anthropological and psychological or statistical approaches to political culture is that the latter holds that the attributes of a culture should not be asserted by an authority or merely assumed; rather they should be demonstrated with evidence. This principle applies to descriptions of individual attitudes, claims about the structuring of
attitudes, relationships between attitudes and behavior, and claims that any aspect of a culture is dynamic or static. Before the 1990s, lack of data made it practically impossible to demonstrate trends or stability in political culture beyond a handful of countries and topics. However, repeated waves of surveys – especially the U.S. National Election Studies, the EuroBarometer, and the World Values Surveys – have begun to make such generalizations possible. Unfortunately for the anthropological approach, these studies cast doubt on the alleged stasis of political culture. In fact, much of this research has been devoted to explaining patterns of change such as the decline of institutional trust and the emergence of postmaterialist values.

**Macro-Macro Studies**

The kind of political culture research that is most obviously relevant for democratization examines associations between national averages of individual-level attitudes and levels of democracy, the duration of democratic regimes, or the probability of regime transitions. Almond and Verba’s *The Civic Culture* inaugurated this line of research (Almond and Verba 1965). This study of the United States, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico argued that democracy was most likely to thrive and survive where citizens possess a “civic” culture. Such a culture is a balance of “participant” traits, which incline citizens to take an interest in politics and participate in elections and other activities that make democracy work, and “subject” traits, which incline citizens to respect the law and the authority of the state and the government. Because this was the first cross-national survey project, it was path-breaking for its time but amateurish by today’s standards. Critics pounced on it for using unrepresentative samples, asking invalid questions, overestimating the stability of attitudes and underestimating the impact of short-term political events, and drawing unwarranted connections between cultural patterns and regimes; in general, for reaching conclusions not justified by the evidence. But it hinted at what would be possible if such research
were done more rigorously, and therefore inspired innumerable other studies (Verba 1980).

In subsequent decades, comparative survey research became much more rigorous and abundant. Consequently, social scientists gained the ability to describe attitudes, trends, and relationships with much greater confidence. And as knowledge of political culture improved and trends became evident, theories about the impact of culture on democratization evolved considerably. In *The Crisis of Democracy*, Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki argued that slow economic growth and high inflation were eroding the capacity of governments in the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan at the same time that citizen demands on government were increasing. They predicted that the growing gap between expectations and performance would eventually undermine confidence in leaders, institutions, and democracy itself (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975). Some scholars predicted that many advanced democracies would fail within a few decades (Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton 2000 3-6). One of these predictions did come true: confidence in institutions did decline, even outside wealthy Western countries. In most countries, confidence or trust in “government,” legislatures, courts, politicians, civil service, armed services, police, and especially political parties fell from the 1970s to the 1990s (Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton 2000 13-21). There were signs of widespread deterioration in other symptoms of civic culture as well: electoral turnout, party membership, generalized social trust, and face-to-face participation in voluntary associations (Putnam 1995).

Nevertheless, Western democracies did not fail, and support for democracy is strong, if not stronger than before. It has been suggested that this paradox can be explained by the moderation of inflation and by the conservatism of the 1980s, which lowered expectations of government (Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton 2000 3-6). But these reasons are incompatible with declining trust in institutions. Two other arguments are more convincing. First, Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer's
This line of thought is appealing, although it may be too optimistic. It is probably too soon to be confident that increased individual autonomy and less-institutionalized forms of participation will be compatible with stable, well-functioning representative democracy in the long run.

This book modifies the conclusions of Inglehart's voluminous earlier work on postmaterialism, which I do not discuss in detail here because Inglehart and Welzel's book is more rigorous and is based on much additional data, and therefore entirely supercedes the earlier research.
identify two fundamental dimensions that structure national-average attitudes across countries. The first is the preference for traditional (especially religious) authority vs. secular-rational authority. The second is an “emancipative values” dimension ranging from concern with basic economic or physical survival to an emphasis on elite-challenging self-expression. The authors also confirm the existence of various civilizations, defined by religion and colonial heritage, which tend to occupy distinct positions on these two dimensions. For example, Confucian national cultures tend to be relatively secular and survival-oriented, Islamic national cultures tend to be traditional and survival-oriented, English-speaking national cultures tend to be relatively traditional and oriented to self-expression, and Protestant European national cultures tend to be secular and oriented to self-expression. Societal values shift along both dimensions in response to economic transformations, in two phases. First, industrialization shifts the source of authority from religion and tradition to secular states, science, and technology. But often before this cultural shift is complete, post-industrial transformations (particularly the growth of the service sector) halt secularization and promote the questioning of authority of any type. Any country’s average position today in this two-dimensional cultural space is a function of which civilization it started from and how far industrial and post-industrial transformations have shifted its values toward secular-rational authority and self-expression values.

Contrary to the modernization theory of the 1960s, Inglehart and Welzel argue that secularization has nothing to do with democratization: secular culture is as compatible with Communism and fascism as it is with liberal democracy. Instead, the cultural tendency that really matters is the level of self-expression values. There is a logical connection between having a large proportion of citizens who value self-expression - who feel economically secure, independent from elite domination, and claim “the ability to make decisions and actions based on autonomous
choices” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 47) – and the probability of a country having a democratic regime in which representatives respect citizens’ demands. Inglehart and Welzel argue explicitly that the Linz-O’Donnell-Schmitter elite-bargaining frameworks for understanding regime change underestimated the impact of political culture:

Democracy is not simply the result of clever elite bargaining and constitutional engineering. It depends on deep-rooted orientations among the people themselves. These orientations motivate them to press for freedom, effective civil and political rights, and genuinely responsive government – and to exert continual vigilance to ensure that the governing elites remain responsive to them (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 300).

Inglehart and Welzel present massive evidence and sophisticated analyses to support most of their key arguments. Their two fundamental dimensions are robust, i.e., they appear even when different sets of countries and different sets of variables are used. They show that the traditional-secular/rational dimension is associated more strongly with the degree of industrialization, and the survival-self-expression dimension more with the degree of post-industrial transformation (in a contemporary cross-section). They show that cultural zones cannot be reduced to economics or regime experience. They show that wealthier countries have tended to experience value shifts in the same direction and that these shifts are associated with increases in elite-challenging political activity. They distinguish between formal democracy and “effective” democracy, which incorporates information about elite integrity. They go to great lengths to show that self-expression values cause stable democracy but stable democracy does not cause self-expression values, while controlling for a variety of competing causes. (More about this below.)
Nevertheless, the analysis is not airtight. Macro-macro comparisons generally are vulnerable to several criticisms. Inglehart and Welzel’s book partially overcomes some of them, but not all, so it is still useful to evaluate their contribution while discussing five problems frequently encountered in other macro-macro analyses.

One of the biggest challenges in cross-national survey research is achieving conceptual validity. When surveys must be administered in different languages and different cultural contexts, where the meaning of words and symbols can vary in subtle ways, designing questionnaires that can measure what is demonstrably the same concept across many countries requires care, experience, and trial and error. The Civic Culture was harshly criticized for its failure to do this, for example, in its mishandling of the difficult-to-translate standard U.S. question, “Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked at all?” One common tactic for dealing with this problem is simply to keep trying a variety of questions until a consensus develops that it validly measures what it purports to measure. A question is more likely to be valid to the extent that it elicits the answers that were expected from respondents, it is strongly correlated with questions designed to measure the same concept, and it is strongly correlated with factors that were expected to cause it and with phenomena that it was expected to cause. Another tactic, which has become very common in survey research, is to use factor analysis to create an index that measures a fundamental dimension captured imperfectly by multiple survey questions. Each question can be thought of as a reflection of both the concept that one wishes to measure and one or more contaminating ideas. The more questions one has that capture the concept of interest, even if each

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5Concept validation is discussed in much greater depth in Adcock and Collier (Adcock and Collier 2001).
one is quite contaminated, the more feasible it is to isolate the variation in each one that reflects the concept from the contaminants. Factor analysis (or a common variant of it, principal-component analysis) is simply a statistical technique that reveals whether it is useful to reduce multiple questions or variables to a simpler set of underlying dimensions. The factor analyst still must use subjective judgment to interpret what the underlying dimensions are, but factor analysis is extremely useful for identifying how many dimensions there are and which variables reflect which ones.

Inglehart and Welzel’s two dimensions are indices constructed from just this kind of factor analysis. Because interpreting dimensions requires as much art as science, they remain subject to challenge, especially when an analyst claims to have identified universal values that have the same meaning in all countries. For example, it is not obvious that all of the variables included in the index of self-expression values really belong there. Is rejection of science really part of self-expression? Tolerance of homosexuality? A preference for female leaders? Describing one’s own health as good? (Inglehart and Welzel 2005 Table 2.4). More generally, is “self-expression” the best label for the commonality in all these attitudes? Are “elite-challenging values,” “individual autonomy,” and “human development,” different labels Inglehart and Welzel often attach to this same dimension, really interchangeable? Are all of these the same as “post-materialism,” the label that Inglehart favored for over 20 years before revising and reinterpreting his index? If not, why did the interpretation change? The dimensions Inglehart and Welzel identify are robust enough that there is little doubt that they are real, but there is some fuzziness around the edges of the interpretation that has been imposed on them.

A second common problem in macro-macro comparisons is that it is hard to disentangle the impact of culture from that of other static or slowly changing country characteristics, such as
institutions, geography, level of economic development (within a short time-frame), world-system position, or particular historical legacies. This problem is strictly insuperable when the data are cross-sectional: a “snapshot” of many countries at one instant in time. Unfortunately, for many years all comparative survey research was cross-sectional because there were no repeat surveys for large numbers of countries (Diamond 1999; Inglehart 1977; Muller and Seligson 1994). But even though public-opinion time series are now available for many countries, it is still difficult to distinguish the impact of cultural characteristics that change slowly from the impact of fixed effects or gradual trends that tend to move in a consistent direction. If many countries are simultaneously becoming more democratic, more prosperous, and shifting toward self-expression, then it is very hard to say with confidence whether it is the economy or culture that is driving democratization. One of the great strengths of Inglehart and Welzel’s study is that it is the first to take advantage of the three waves of World Values Survey data from 1981 to 2001. This span of time is long enough to contain some dramatic cultural shifts and to contain changes in democracy and economic performance that do not necessarily parallel changes in culture. This makes it possible for the first time to estimate the relative impacts of culture and economic development on democratization. By the standards of more advanced time-series research - for example, analyses of presidential approval ratings month by month over many years, which makes strong causal inferences possible - Inglehart and Welzel’s research design is still primitive. It does not go beyond examining the impact of a change in culture (and control variables) in one period on changes in democracy in one subsequent period, across anywhere from 19 to 81 countries. It is still much more a cross-sectional analysis than a dynamic analysis. Nevertheless, it is a clear advance over other cross-national cultural research on democratization in this respect.

A third weakness of cross-sectional research designs is that they say nothing about the
direction of causation. Even if culture and regimes are strongly associated, cross-sectional analyses leave open the possibility that regimes shape culture, rather than culture shaping regimes. Indeed, this was a contentious issue in cultural research on democratization as long as studies were cross-sectional, and some of the most rigorous analyses persuaded many political scientists that a democratic culture was a by-product, not a cause, of democracy (Muller and Seligson 1994; Przeworski 1986). However, Inglehart and Welzel report a fairly sophisticated series of tests to show that the causal order is as they claim: economic transformations cause shifts in values, which then make countries become more democratic and remain so. More specifically, they rely on the notion (standard in quantitative analysis) of “Granger causality,” which holds that one can infer causation when 1) the cause temporally precedes the effect, 2) one controls for any factor that might affect both the cause and the effect, and 3) one also controls for past values of the effect (Granger 1969). In their most rigorous test, Inglehart and Welzel demonstrate that self-expression in the early 1990s has a significant impact on average levels of democracy in 1997-2002, controlling for socioeconomic resources and average levels of democracy in 1981-1986; but average levels of democracy in 1981-1986 have no significant impact on self-expression in the early 1990s, controlling for socioeconomic resources and self-expression values in 1981 (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 180-186). I regard this evidence as inconclusive because the before and after samples that Inglehart and Welzel used were quite different. To test the impact of self-expression on democracy, they used a large, diverse sample of 61 countries; but to test the impact of democracy on self-expression, they had to use a smaller, more homogeneous sample of just the 19 countries in the 1981 wave of the World Values Survey. Purely because of the difference in sample sizes and diversity, we should expect the coefficients for the impact of democracy on values to be smaller and less significant than the coefficients for the impact of values on
Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 186-206) report other analyses of the direction of causation. Nevertheless, Inglehart and Welzel raised the standard for demonstrating that influence flows from culture to regime.  

Studies that associate regimes with highly aggregated indicators of attitudes often suffer from a fourth problem. It is usually called the ecological fallacy, meaning the error of assuming that a relationship between variables at a higher level of analysis also holds at a lower level of analysis. The classic example is the positive association between the size of the Black population in Southern U.S. congressional districts in the 1950s and the share of the vote won by segregationist candidates: the positive association at the district level does not mean that Blacks were voting for segregationists (Robinson 1950). One may also commit the opposite, individualistic fallacy of believing that a relationship among individuals must hold when aggregated to districts, states, nations, or any higher level of analysis. For example, the fact that observant Muslim citizens of countries on periphery of the Middle East tend to support democracy more than non-observant Muslims should not lead us to predict that Islamic countries tend to be democratic (Tessler 2002). The simple fact is that a relationship at the national level says nothing about the relationship at the individual level, and vice versa. This is a paradox, but Figure 8.1 shows how it works. Each of the three lines in each of the nine figures shows a hypothetical

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6Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 186-206) report other analyses of the direction of causation. One model of self-expression in the early 1990s substitutes the mean self-expression level of each country’s regional culture in the same period for prior levels of self-expression in the same country. A model of effective (rather than formal) democracy in 2000-2002 substitutes the number of years of democracy before 1995 for the “prior democracy” control. A series of models reject six additional social and economic control variables, but one at a time rather than in combination. There is also an interesting test of Eckstein’s congruence hypothesis, showing that “the more the cultural demand for freedom exceeded its institutional supply around 1986, the greater were the subsequent moves toward more democracy, from 1987 to 2002” (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 189-90). These additional tests lend support to Inglehart and Welzel’s claims, although one has to wonder whether, out of the many tests that their data made possible, the authors chose to present the confirming ones and omit any that undermined their thesis.
relationship between two variables at a lower level of analysis, such as a relationship among individuals within a country. The relationship across the three lines in each of the nine figures shows the relationship at a higher level of analysis, such as relationships across countries. Every kind of relationship—positive, negative, or null—is possible at each level, independently of the relationship at the other level. This could be called the ecological paradox: one can never assume that it is safe to make cross-level inferences.

Some of Inglehart’s harshest critics have accused him of committing the ecological fallacy. Davis and Davenport, for example, claim that the post-materialism dimension does not exist at the individual level (because some of its components do not covary), and that it cannot be valid at the cross-national level if it is invalid at the individual level (Davis and Davenport 1999). Seligson similarly argues that the apparent cross-national relationship between mean national self-expression values and democracy is spurious because there is no corresponding relationship between self-expression and support for democracy at the individual level (Muller and Seligson 1994; Seligson 2001). Inglehart mounts two somewhat contradictory defenses against these charges (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, chapter 10). On the one hand, he insists that political culture is a system-level (national) phenomenon whose relationship with democracy is appropriately studied at the system level. Critics who demand confirmation of the relationship at the individual level are committing the individualistic fallacy, he contends. On the other hand, he goes out of his way to report that some of the relationships he identifies at the system level also exist at the individual level, although much less strongly (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 51). If the relationship
were purely a system-level phenomenon, this evidence would be irrelevant. Furthermore, his expositions of the theory behind these relationships frequently refer to the motives and behavior of individuals (see pp. 25-46). In summary, Inglehart and Welzel present strong empirical evidence that countries with a high percentage of the population with self-expression values are very likely to be democracies, but the evidence prohibits them from claiming that there is a powerful dimension of survival vs. self-expression values at the individual level within many countries, or that individuals who value self-expression do more, on average, to produce or sustain democracy than their fellow-citizens who care more about mere survival. Why the relationship exists cross-nationally therefore remains a mystery, which I will discuss further in the next section.

Finally, there is a related but more subtle problem in these macro-macro comparisons that has attracted little notice. Cross-national comparisons of means sacrifice information about variability within each case. In effect, they ask us to believe that all respondents hold the national mean attitude or that there is a purely random relationship at the individual level. To deal with this problem and the previous one, it would be advisable for scholars to use hierarchical linear modeling (also known as random-coefficients models), which takes intra-country variability into account when estimating cross-national relationships. Such models can also allow the relationship between two variables to be different (positive, negative, or anywhere in between) within countries than it is across countries. If researchers were to develop a good theory to resolve the ecological paradox, such models would allow them to test it.

**A Comprehensive Framework**

This critique of macro-macro comparisons suggests that a fundamental problem with cultural theories of democratization is that the alleged cause and the effect are on different levels
of analysis. Culture (understood as individual attitudes) is a micro-level phenomenon, but
democratization is necessarily a macro-level phenomenon. Attempts to bring the two together in
an explanation casually shift the level of analysis of either the cause or the effect. As we will see,
micro-micro studies translate regime change or survival into individual level actions or attitudes,
such as protest, voting, strikes, tolerance, trust, or regime support. The macro-macro studies
aggregate individual attitudes into a national mean attitude. The latter is a defensible move, but it
is certainly not the only way, and probably not the best way, to shift levels (Granovetter 1978). It
is the best way only if theory says that a) the impact of culture is a matter of degree: the larger the
proportion of the population that has the attitude in question, the greater the impact on
democratization; and b) it does not matter which citizens have the relevant attitude: generals and
beggars are interchangeable. Even if a theory made these assumptions explicit and justified them,
it would be incomplete because it would not tell us how clusters of attitudes translate into
behavior by certain actors to bring about the regime outcome.

In order to avoid shifting levels, or even to know how best to shift levels, it is essential to
develop theories that specify the causal mechanism linking culture to regime survival and regime
change. At present we do not have such a theory, but we can describe several of its elements.
First, a cultural theory of democratization would have to connect attitudes to behavior. Which
attitudes produce which kinds of actions? How reliably? Under what conditions? Without an
understanding of this linkage, we are left to imagine a population magically willing a regime into
existence or oblivion. Second, a theory must identify which citizens are in a position to have a
significant impact on the regime. The attitudes and actions of military officers, politicians, judges,
police, guerrillas, and union leaders are clearly more consequential than those of ordinary citizens,
especially if the latter are not politically active. Therefore, an adequate theory should focus
attention on the actors whose subculture really matters. But the set of actors who are influential depends on the institutional context. So, third, a cultural theory of democratization should be conditioned on the initial regime and the direction of the regime transition. More actors, especially mass actors, are relevant for the survival or breakdown of democracy than for the survival or breakdown of non-democratic regimes. For the study of transitions to democracy, one would want to pay more attention to the official party if the initial regime is totalitarian, to the military if it is a military authoritarian regime, to the ruling family in a traditional monarchy, to parties and the legislature if it is an electoral authoritarian regime, and to the dictator’s cronies if it is a sultanistic regime (Linz and Stepan 1996). Each context requires a distinct variant of the theory, depending on who the most directly relevant actor is. Fourth, there are various pathways to regime change (or consolidation) within each context. A democracy can break down by military coup, presidential coup, civil war, revolution, or a more subtle slide into human rights violations, party proscriptions, manipulated elections, or other illiberal practices. Different actors and behaviors are relevant for each one. Sixth, a theory should also distinguish among phases of a transition. Mass actors can play a leading role in a regime breakdown and their pacific behavior is essential for its survival, but only elites can create the institutions of a new regime (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). A theory of the impact of culture on regimes should therefore be highly conditional. Each kind of transition requires a different variant of the theory for different contexts that focuses attention on different actors, behaviors, and attitudes.

Specifying the conditions under which culture could matter for regime change would be a substantial improvement, but an adequate theory should also tell us more about the dynamics of culture. The most common criticism of theories of political culture has been that culture is too static to explain political change. This criticism is directed more against the anthropological
understanding of culture (which I dismiss as unworkable for other reasons) than against the individualistic behavioral view that prevails today. But a behavioral understanding of culture is entirely compatible with a more dynamic and powerful causal role for attitudes. Breakdowns should be associated with declines in support for democracy among key actors, transitions to democracy should be associated with increasing support for democracy at least among some actors, and democratic consolidation requires, by definition, the spread and strengthening of regime support. An adequate cultural theory of regime change should incorporate and explain these attitudinal changes.

Such a theory would ideally show how the attitudes of the most directly relevant actor are influenced by the attitudes of other, indirectly relevant, actors. In some cases, for example, the most directly relevant actor is the military. Why do some top military officers sometimes reject democracy and carry out a coup? They are not completely isolated from the rest of society, so it would be good to know to what extent they are responding to, or anticipating, a rejection of the democratic regime by business elites, foreign powers, the middle class, or the Church. Or if the armed forces decide not to initiate a coup in spite of difficult structural conditions, it may be that they are constrained by the attitudes of these other groups in society. Theories of regime change that focus exclusively on elites may give culture too little credit if they ignore the broader cultural environment that influences elite actions. Influence can flow in both directions, however. The phenomenon known as leadership can be understood as elite influence on mass attitudes. For democratization, therefore, it would be useful to know to what extent the positions of elites (executive, party leaders, business leaders, the military, leaders of ethnic or religious groups) move

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7Even if we assume that all actors have equal influence, merely allowing behavior to be contingent on the number of other actors who have taken action leads to complex theories that can often make counterintuitive and unstable predictions (Granovetter 1978).
mass opinion for or against democracy.

It is also important to understand how different kinds of attitudes are interrelated. Certain attitudes seem to be closely connected to behaviors that would affect regime change and stability, such as support for the incumbent regime and government or the rejection of violence. But other attitudes, such as moderation, political trust, social trust, tolerance, and evaluations of government performance, may affect these attitudes and gradually move them toward a threshold of regime change. A good cultural theory should make these connections explicit. It should also identify non-attitudinal factors that directly affect attitudes that are relevant for regime change. These could include generation-defining events such as the Great Depression, wars, Watergate, and the 9/11 attacks; learning; crime; and corruption scandals. Whose attitudes are affected? Which attitudes are affected? How quickly? How long do these effects last? All of these questions are relevant for a cultural theory of democratization.

No one has ever surveyed enough actors at sufficiently frequent intervals to test such a complete theory. However, a simulation can reveal the kinds of patterns that we should be looking for. Suppose that we have four elite actors – the executive, the legislature, the courts, and the military. Suppose further that each one has an orientation toward the regime that ranges from 1 (pro-democracy) to 0 (anti-democracy). Let us also assume that there is a mass public that has a variety of attitudes, also ranging from 0 to 1. Some are political support attitudes, from the very general and abstract to the very specific. These include support for democracy as an abstract principle, for the actual democratic regime, for the government, for government leaders, and for

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8In this example, I will not attempt to connect elite or mass attitudes to regime outcomes. However, it would not be hard to make these connections in a loose way: military coup when the military opposes democracy, presidential coup when the executive and military oppose democracy but the courts and legislature support it, consolidation when all actors move toward unanimous support for democracy, and so on.
government policies (which could be further broken down, if necessary). The mass public also has other attitudes that may be related to democracy, such as trust, tolerance, and moderation. Finally, the simulation lumps together all the non-attitudinal factors as a single variable that we will call “performance.” It stands for economic performance, maintenance of public order, war, corruption scandals, and every other event that might influence elite or mass attitudes. Again, this variable could be broken up into a variety of variables to make the simulation more realistic, but this is not necessary in order to identify the fundamental patterns that interest us here.

I have programmed a spreadsheet simulation that incorporates all these actors and attitudes and also allows one to define how much of an impact each element has on each other element, i.e., how much each elite’s support for democracy is responsive to or constrained by mass attitudes and performance, how much mass attitudes are influenced by elite leadership, and how the various mass attitudes are interconnected and influenced by performance. These impacts are repeated in any number of iterations until all the attitudes converge on an equilibrium. The simulation therefore reflects all the elements of an ideal framework for understanding the impact of culture on democratization. It is a framework rather than a theory, however, because it is completely open-ended. Its flexibility makes it compatible with an infinite variety of different theories. Its usefulness lies in its ability to derive the eventual consequences of any set of assumptions about culture and democratization.

The patterns of convergence reveal which actors, and which attitudes, are most important in each scenario. If one specifies purely top-down influence (elite positions shape mass attitudes, but elites are not constrained by mass attitudes) and if performance is neutral, then mass attitudes

9This spreadsheet, which includes color graphs that cannot be reproduced here, is available from the author on request.
eventually converge on the average position of the elite actors. If one specifies purely bottom-up influence (the mass public constrains elites, who exercise no leadership over the mass public), then elite positions converge on the average mass position. If influence flows in both directions, then the simulation reveals vicious or virtuous circles that spiral toward the positions of the most influential actors. Such scenarios are completely endogenous: every element is both a cause and an effect. If elites have more influence over the mass public than the mass public has over elites, then positions converge toward elite positions faster than they do toward the mass public’s positions. If the patterns of influence are more bottom-up than top-down, then convergence is faster toward the mass public’s positions. However, if any element is exogenous – a cause but not an effect – then all the endogenous elements converge toward its position. For example, if performance has a prolonged and consistently positive impact (without being influenced itself by mass attitudes or elite positions) and is the only exogenous element, then eventually the elite and the mass public converge toward pro-democratic attitudes. In the same way, negative performance leads to anti-democratic attitudes.

In practice, performance (or whatever the relevant exogenous forces are) is rarely so consistently and uniformly positive or negative in the long term; it is variable, so attitudes may never converge. Nevertheless, this simulation suggests an agenda for research on political culture and democratization. First, the most important question is whether any elements in the system are exogenous, because they will drive the whole process in the long run. Second, we must specify which elements are endogenous, because they will tend to vary together. Third, it would be very interesting to know whether the patterns of influence are more bottom-up or more top-down. The answer has obvious implications for democratic theory, as well as for understanding democratic breakdown and consolidation.
Cross-national survey research has been growing explosively, but it is still not adequate for answering these questions (Norris 2004). This framework would require surveying not only the mass public, but also any elite groups whose behavior may be relevant for regime change or consolidation. Furthermore, all these surveys would have to be repeated frequently, at intervals of weeks or months, to be able to detect patterns of convergence. It may be impossible to carry out such research, especially in non-democratic regimes where elites refuse to grant interviews. Nevertheless, we can take stock of the research that has been possible by comparing it with this framework’s ideals. Which pieces of this big picture have been filled in, and which remain blank?

**Political Culture and Mass-Led Regime Change or Consolidation**

The best place to begin taking stock of the literature is with the pathways to regime change or survival in which the mass public takes the leading role. These are only a minority of the pathways because usually elite involvement is necessary and the mass public plays only the indirect role of pushing or constraining elite attitudes and actions.

These institutions do not emerge spontaneously by a group of demonstrators courageously confronting Communist police with the chant, “We are the people.” The chant was a challenge to the authority of an undemocratic regime; it was not a draft constitution for a new democracy. (...) [E]lites propose, the masses dispose (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998 8).

But the mass public can play the most direct role in democratic consolidation and regime-
threatening disturbances such as rioting, civil war or insurgency, and massive peaceful demonstrations calling for regime change (in either direction).

Many scholars reject the notion of democratic “consolidation” because it presupposes a situation in which it is no longer possible for a democratic regime to break down. However, “consolidation” can be interpreted in a less categorical way, to mean that a breakdown is very unlikely in the near future, while recognizing that in the distant future all bets are off. In this sense, democratic consolidation is not a regime attribute that can be observed; rather, it is a prediction that can be made if one has a sound understanding of the warning signs of imminent regime breakdown. Linz and Stepan propose a conception of democratic consolidation based on this kind of understanding (Linz and Stepan 1996 chapter 1). They propose that there are three dimensions of consolidation – behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional – and that consolidation is achieved when civil society, political society, economic society, the state, and the rule of law all reinforce one another. This complex framework is discussed more fully in chapter four. Here, the important point is that, according to Linz and Stepan, attitudes are by definition an essential aspect of democratic consolidation; specifically, most citizens must be committed to democratic rules of the game and expect to resolve conflicts within the rules of the game recognized by the regime.

Violent mass disturbances such as rioting and civil war can initiate a transition from either democracy or non-democracy. Although such disturbances cannot complete a transition to a new regime without elites taking a leading role, they can be sufficient first steps and they should be examined here because mass attitudes presumably help cause them. Peaceful demonstrations can similarly start but not finish a transition, although they involve different attitudes and actions.

The bulk of survey research on public opinion and regime stability or change can be
situated under the heading of mass attitudes that either signify the acceptance of democracy or presumably contribute to mass actions that could conceivably undermine it. I have carefully hedged this heading (“presumably,” “conceivably”) because the research in question rarely states explicitly, much less tests, how its findings are relevant for regime change. Therefore, I will discuss it as an isolated body of research in this section and discuss research on its linkage to regime outcomes in subsequent sections. The aspects of culture that have been most studied in this regard are support for democracy, political trust, interpersonal trust, tolerance, moderation, and self-expression values. Later I will discuss some indirectly relevant aspects of culture such as religion, ethnicity, and social capital, which may influence these more directly relevant attitudes.

**Support for “Democracy” and Democratic Institutions**

One would expect that if any attitude is closely associated with democracy, it would be support for democracy as the best form of government. This is not the case, however: an index of four democracy-support variables is correlated at only .351 with Freedom House scores for 1995 and at .506 with average Freedom House scores for 1981-2000 (Inglehart 2003). Clearly, there are many countries that are not democratic despite strong popular support for it, and many countries that are democratic despite weaker support. Democracy does not come about simply because many people want it, or fail whenever they become disillusioned with it. There are several reasons for the weak correlation. First, there is surprisingly little variation in support for “democracy” in principle (Norris 1999b). Questions that ask whether respondents support something called “democracy” tend to find high and stable support almost everywhere. In the World Values Surveys in 38 countries in the mid-1990s, for example, the percentages of people who agreed relatively
strongly with the statements, “Democracy may have many problems but it’s better than any other form of government” and “Having a democratic system” is very good or fairly good “way of governing this country” averaged 90 percent in Western Europe and 81 to 86 percent in the six other regions, falling below 71 percent in no country except Russia, where it was 51 percent (Klingemann 1999 35-36, 45). Using a different question, the regional Barometers found lower, but still majority, support: an average of 80 percent in Western Europe, 70 percent in twelve relatively democratic African countries, 59 percent in Latin America, and 56 percent in East Asia (Mattes and Bratton 2003 4). Furthermore, there does not seem to be a trend in any direction since the 1970s, when systematic cross-national survey research began (Norris 1999b 9-13).

A second reason for the weak correlations is that simply asking people whether they support democracy probably does not tell us what we want to know about culture and democratization. For one thing, it is important to gauge the levels of relative support for democracy compared to alternative regimes. Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer argue that the “Churchillian” hypothesis applies well to Eastern Europe and Russia: we should expect democracy to survive despite low support when citizens believe it is the worst form of government except for all the rest (1998, chapter 5). Mattes and Bratton (2003) confirm this argument in Africa. It is also reasonable to suppose that high support for democracy could coexist with non-democracy if the non-democratic regime had even higher support. For another thing, correlations between support for democracy and indicators of democracy such as the Freedom House index or Polity may underestimate the association because the democracy indicators were not designed to capture

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10“Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? A) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government; B) In certain situations, a non-democratic government can be preferable; or C) To people like me, it doesn’t matter what form of government we have” (Mattes and Bratton 2003 3).
differences in the quality of democracy. If we had more sensitive indicators at the high end of democracy, we might find that societies with a very high level of support for democracy are in fact more democratic than societies with only a moderately high level of support.\footnote{Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 191-196) show that self-expression values are more strongly correlated with “effective democracy” (an interaction of the Freedom House index and the World Bank’s “control of corruption” variable) than they are with formal democracy.} Many of the new democracies are not very democratic, and there is some evidence that their citizens tend to be less supportive of democracy (Diamond 1999). As long as we use indicators that make all democracies appear equally democratic, the observed relationship appears weak.

But the most important reason for the weak correlation is that “democracy” means different things to different people. For example, summarizing survey research in three Latin American countries in 1999, Roderic Camp reports that “First, among Latin Americans there is no consensus on what democracy means. Second, only Costa Ricans see democracy in largely political terms, very similar in content to the view professed by North Americans. Third, the Mexicans and Chileans... view democracy in social and economic, not political, terms” {Camp, 2001 #342 @ 15-16}. Because of these divergent interpretations, asking people whether they support “democracy” is, in effect, asking them whether they support whatever democracy means to them. Because democracy has become practically synonymous with “good government,” it is not surprising that support is so high virtually everywhere. The best example of this is Venezuela. The 2005 Latin Barometer reported that support for democracy was higher in Venezuela than in any other Latin American country except Uruguay, at a time when Freedom House and many international observers were lamenting the rise of the illiberal, less democratic, regime of Hugo
In reality, Venezuelans were bitterly divided about their regime. Chávez’s supporters believed that their leader had replaced a corrupt, elitist regime with the country’s first true democracy, while his opponents believed that Chávez was destroying a fairly successful liberal political democracy. They all agreed that “democracy” was good, but they had entirely incompatible understandings of the word. For this reason, Mitchell Seligson has said that “if you want to measure support for democracy, the one thing you should never do is use the word “democracy” in the question.”

There is some debate about whether this is good advice, as there has long been a divide between idealists, for whom “meaning for the analyst has taken priority over meaning for the participants” and a phenomenological approach, which respects subjective meaning more(Welch 1993 9). Several research projects have sought to describe what “democracy” means to the citizens themselves ((Beetham et al. 2002; Camp 2001; Pérez Liñán 1998; Schaffer 2000). This can be fascinating work that furthers the goal of thick understanding. However, it must not tempt political scientists into concept stretching. If we are interested in the nature, causes, or consequences of what we mean by “democracy,” we cannot surrender the authority to define the concept to our research subjects. It is important not to confuse concepts with words. One book that makes this mistake is Schaffer’s Democracy in Translation, which reveals that in Senegal, the Wolof word demokaraasi connotes evenhandedness, mutuality, and consensus more than competition (Schaffer 2000). This is all very interesting, but its lesson for those who wish to measure support for Western-style liberal political democracy in Senegal is that the Wolof cognate

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12Seventy-six percent of Venezuelans agreed with the statement, “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government,” compared to 77 percent in Uruguay and 53 percent in the average Latin American country (LatinoBarómetro 2005 51)


Because respondents cannot help but interpret the word “democracy” in their own ways, it is more useful to examine survey questions that refer to institutions and practices that we mean by democracy rather than to some undefined version of democracy (Levi and Stoker 2000; Norris 1999b). Some surveys ask whether it would be preferable to let the army rule or to have “a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections” (Moreno 2001 48). The most common questions of this sort ask how much confidence or trust respondents have in various institutions, some of which are inseparable from liberal democracy, such as elections, political parties, and the legislature. Although confidence tends to be high in the political community and the principle of democracy, confidence in specific democratic institutions tended to decline from the 1960s to the 1990s in older democracies and was very low in most of the newer democracies (Levi and Stoker 2000 481; Newton and Norris 2000 54-58; Norris 1999b 10). Engagement with parties declined in 17 out of 19 wealthy democracies, confidence in parliament declined in 11 out of 14 countries, and in 12 out of 13 countries, growing numbers of citizens agreed that “politicians are only interested in votes,” “MPs are out of touch,” politicians and government “don’t care about people like me,” “politicians are untrustworthy,” and “there are many dishonest politicians” (Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton 2000 3-19). In Latin America by 2005, confidence had sunk to an average of 31 percent in the courts, 28 percent in congress, and 19 percent in political parties (LatinoBarómetro 2005 55).

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As noted above, the fear that this trend presaged the breakdown of even established democracies was not fulfilled by the first decade of the 21st Century, and some came to believe that it is healthy for citizens to distrust their representatives. This optimistic view makes sense in the wealthy, older democracies, at least in the medium term. Individuals who distrust democratic institutions tend to be if anything more, not less, supportive of democratic principles. But it is hard to discount the possibility that distrust of institutions will eventually metastasize into a rejection of democracy in principle (Norris 1999a 261-64). As Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton note, “If the decline in public confidence is justified (because of growing corruption, for example), then we might applaud citizens’ ire but not its cause, just as we would be glad to have discovered a child's fever without being glad that her temperature was high” (2000, 22). I share with Norris “a nagging concern that where regimes are not widely believed to be legitimate then public opinion will not act as an effective deterrent against anti-democratic forces” (Norris 1999a 268). This is especially plausible in the newer democracies. In Peru and Venezuela, voters elected anti-party presidents who dissolved congress or rendered it irrelevant, and in Ecuador and Bolivia, congresses removed presidents in semi-constitutional maneuvers. The public in all of these cases had little confidence in parties or congress, but more information is required before we can make a solid connection between culture and these regime changes. When majorities voted for anti-party politicians, did they intend to give a mandate to weaken liberal democratic institutions, or were their intentions betrayed? When legislatures removed presidents, was public opinion mostly supportive, or merely powerless to prevent it? These are the kind of questions that would be answered if studies of culture and regime change were refocused on specific causal pathways.

Other Mass Attitudes

But it may be that attitudes that are not explicitly about democracy or democratic
institutions may have a greater impact on the birth and survival of democracy. The related attitude that has been most studied is generalized interpersonal trust, sometimes called simply “social trust,” to distinguish it from “political trust” in politicians and political institutions. Interpersonal trust was one of the components (along with political efficacy and pride in institutions) of Almond and Verba’s civic culture, which they believed to favor stable democracy in the U.S. and Britain, compared to West Germany, Italy, and Mexico (Almond and Verba 1965). Other scholars fleshed out the reasons for this hypothetical connection (Sullivan and Transue 1999). Inglehart was best known for emphasizing the cultural shift to postmaterialism, but he also argued that interpersonal trust (combined with subjective well-being) lowers the stakes in politics, which favors democratic legitimacy and stability. Putnam et al. (1993, 177-181) added that social trust – a natural by-product of face-to-face participation in secondary associations – is self-reinforcing, because if society is generally trusting, it becomes rational for individuals to be trusting as well, and unwise to be distrustful. This virtuous circle encourages public officials to be responsive, which improves the quality of democracy, and presumably high-quality democracies tend to be more stable.

Putnam’s finding that trust and social capital are on the decline in the U.S. raised concerns that the quality of democracy, and eventually its survival, was in jeopardy (Putnam 1995).

The evidence is mixed, however, for any general decline of trust or for a strong impact of social trust on democracy. Generalized trust has declined in some democracies, but not in others (Stolle and Hooghe 2004). The evidence for a causal relationship has been mixed. For example, one study using World Values Survey data for 17 countries reports that there is an association between social trust and trust in the police, civil service, and parliament at the aggregate, cross-national level, but not at the individual level (Newton and Norris 2000). This is probably because there tends to be much less cultural variation within countries than between them (Inglehart and
Welzel 2005, 69), which may make it impossible to detect this kind of weak relationship except in cross-national samples, where the variation on both variables is wider. This interpretation is consistent with a study of three Latin American countries in which social trust at the individual level is weakly related to support for democracy only when the model includes no country dummies, which capture more general cross-national differences (Seligson 2001). When actual democracy, rather than support for democracy, is the dependent variable, the most extensive and rigorous study finds that interpersonal trust explains only 15 percent of effective democracy and has no significant impact on formal democracy (Freedom House), even in a simple cross-sectional model with only one control variable (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 252). As Inglehart and Welzel conclude, the cultural variable that has the most direct and important impact on democracy is probably not interpersonal trust.

What is the centrally important variable, then? Over the years, various scholars have pointed to tolerance (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 245-72), moderation or consensus (McClosky 1964; McClosky 1983), and subjective well-being (Inglehart 1977). But again, the most extensive and rigorous study – Inglehart and Welzel’s – concludes that all other attitudes take a back seat to self-expression values. In a comparison of approximately 60 countries, the level of self-expression in the early 1990s explains 32 percent of formal democracy and 55 percent of effective democracy, averaged for 2000-2002 (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 252). Political trust, overt preference for democracy, obedience, and other values are significantly related to democracy only to the extent that they are correlated with self-expression, for their coefficients fail to reach conventional significance levels when models control for self-expression (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 255). There are many reasons to reserve some skepticism about their finding: the available samples limit the analysis of change to just the impact of values in the early 1990s on average levels of
democracy in 2000-2002, their models fail to control for anything except prior democratic experience, the causal pathways and relevant actors are undefined, and there is still some doubt about how to interpret “self-expression values” (which in the section in question are confusingly redubbed “liberty aspirations” (258-263). But the best evidence available at this point suggests that the aspect of culture that is most closely associated with democracy cross-nationally and over time is self-expression.

Culture and Behavior

Inglehart and Welzel spin an elaborate and plausible theory about the causal pathway that links self-expression values to democratic transitions (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 224-228). They argue that transitions happen when and where self-expression values increase the numbers of civil rights activists and dissidents. As these changes swell the ranks of civil rights movements and back them up with greater mass support, it becomes more likely that liberal elites will endorse regime change. When pro-democracy activists eventually take the initiative, these elites are less likely to attempt to repress them.

These are excellent hypotheses that suggest possible causal connections in several stages, and Inglehart and Welzel produce empirical evidence in support of two links in their chain. They demonstrate that elites (those with education) almost always value self-expression more than society in general does (220). They also show that self-expression in the early 1990s is strongly associated with Anheier et al.’s Civil Society Index for 2000 in 31 countries (r=.81) (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 229). They also refer to several confirming case studies.\(^\text{15}\) Unfortunately, this

\(^{15}\)Inglehart and Welzel also examine the relationship between self-expression and the fate of potentially transitional authoritarian regimes (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 227-229). Unfortunately, they report average self-expression for each category of outcome rather than the probability of each regime outcome based on levels of self-expression. This switches the dependent and independent variables, rendering the analysis meaningless, despite the fact that
evidence tells us nothing about several of the other links in the hypothesized chain. Are the individuals who value self-expression the same individuals who are politically active? Do societies that value self-expression more also consider civil rights and other movements more legitimate? Does the growth of self-expression increase the probability that elites will support democracy and refrain from repressing prodemocracy activists? Is this true for the elites who can actually make a difference? We must look elsewhere to find out whether all the elements of this plausible theory are empirically true.

Thorough testing is essential because there are compelling competing arguments suggesting that mass culture does not have an important impact on transitions to democracy. One strain of theorizing holds that attitudes and behaviors that we usually think of as antithetical to democracy may actually help spur transitions, or at least not harm them. Nancy Bermeo argues that moderation is not required for transitions to democracy (Bermeo 1997). She points out that Portuguese democracy emerged from a Socialist revolution and Spanish democracy has coexisted with Basque terrorism. She also calls attention to successful transitions in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, South Korea, Peru, and the Philippines despite high strike rates. Echoing Barrington Moore, who argued that violence was necessary to break the power of conservative anti-democratic classes, Elisabeth Wood makes the case that armed insurgencies in South Africa and El Salvador brought authoritarian elites to the bargaining table (Moore 1966; Wood 2001). In these cases, the economic costs of violence were necessary to persuade business, political, and military leaders that it was time to share power.

These arguments do not contradict Inglehart and Welzel’s finding of an association between culture and transitions to democracy as much as it might appear at first glance, for two self-expression was measured for an earlier year than the outcomes.
reasons. First, Bermeo’s brief is with moderation, which is not one of Inglehart and Welzel’s self-expression values. In fact, extremism and perhaps even violence may have more in common with the qualities that Inglehart and Welzel emphasize: challenging elite authority and being critical rather than passive citizens. Second, extremism and violence are usually characteristics of a minority, not the majority culture. It is perfectly possible for the majority to be moderate and peaceful even where there is an extreme or violent minority, and the existence of such a minority may in fact make authoritarians more eager to transfer power to moderates. Such a situation would resemble formal theories that focus on pacts or alliances between softliners and moderates: in effect, a “good cop, bad cop” routine acted out on an immense stage. A synthesis of these two theories would suggest that a good combination for transitions to democracy may be two subcultures: one radical, violent, but minority; the other moderate, peaceful, and the majority. But at this point this is mostly speculation, tested in only a handful of cases studies.

It is also possible that mass culture has no impact on transitions. One of the most prominent students of culture and democracy, Larry Diamond, has stated that “[d]emocratic culture is certainly not a precondition for the initiation of democracy. . .” because elites and activists usually have decisive influence at this stage, as opposed to during consolidation (Diamond 1993 423). It could also be that a democratic mass culture has only indirect influence. Mass support for democracy (or moderation, tolerance, or trust) may percolate up through society, either inducing elites to change their minds or replacing authoritarian elites with new leaders who are more in sync with attitudes of the majority culture.

There are opposing points of view about the impact of political culture on the survival of democracy. On the one hand, Linz and Stepan argue that belief in democracy as “the only game in town,” the only legitimate means for resolving conflict, is one of the defining aspects
of democratic consolidation; and democratic consolidation, in turn, means a low probability of breakdown. To complete the syllogism, the more people believe in democracy, the less likely democracy is to break down and the more likely it is to survive. In Linz and Stepan’s definition of “consolidation,” supportive mass attitudes and behavior are absolutely required: citizens who want political change must shun violent means in favor of peaceful, constitutional activity (Linz and Stepan 1996 6). They accept fundamental democratic rules and comply with the law; if they protest, they do so peacefully. Ideally, they vote, and they do not vote for anti-system parties or leaders. Inglehart and Welzel argue that the rise of self-expression values similarly helps existing democracies survive. The more citizens value self-expression, the more social movement activists there are, the more legitimate non-activists consider them to be, and the more likely elites are to be responsive to mass demands. Such democracies are more effective and therefore more likely to survive. (See Diamond 1999, 239-250 for a discussion of twelve ways in which social movements can contribute to the survival of democracy.)

On the other hand, there are many reasons to question any tight linkage of democratic survival and mass culture. First, now that public opinion surveys have become common in new democracies, we know that democratic regimes can often survive for years even when the public has little confidence in political parties, legislatures, courts, elections, and other democratic institutions. Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998) have pointed out that we should not expect disillusionment to turn citizens against democracy unless they believe that some alternative regime is preferable. In the absence of a more legitimate alternative, democratic regimes can hobble on without enthusiastic support for a long time. Second, Putnam’s thesis has come in for heavy criticism. It is not clear that participation in voluntary associations promotes trust and cooperation; at the very least, such effects depend on the type of association. One would not expect salutary
consequences unless citizens have face-to-face contact, the group is more horizontal than hierarchical, and it reaches out into the community rather than bonding members into a united front against outsiders. Weimar Germany was full of associations, which did not stop, and may have aided, the rise of Nazism. Third, it is anything but clear how participation in clubs, social movements, and other secondary associations affects major outcomes such as regime change. There has been considerable research on social movements, but it has mostly focused on their causes rather than their consequences. It seems clear, for example, that democracy favors the formation of social movements, but whether social movements favor democracy remains an open question.\footnote{Nevertheless, Marco Giugni has laid out an interesting agenda for how to proceed to study the consequences of social movements (Giugni 1999).}

Fourth, much of what we do know suggests that elite opinion matters much more than mass culture. Democracies can fail despite a broad popular preference for democracy. In Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times, Nancy Bermeo advances the provocative argument that mass public opinion almost never favors authoritarianism (Bermeo 2003). Rather, elites – the executive, party leaders, parts of the armed forces – mistakenly interpret the demands of anti-democratic minorities as representative of the majority, and overreact. Sometimes elites install a right- or left-wing nondemocratic regime in the mistaken belief that the majority wants it, and sometimes they lead a coup to prevent what they falsely perceive as a revolution from taking place. Bermeo’s thesis may contradict the naive assumption of political culture theorists that regimes express mass preferences, but it is quite plausible from a layperson’s understanding of politics: the squeaky wheel gets the grease and silent majorities tend to be ignored. Her brief cases studies of the failed democracies of inter-war Europe lack the public opinion evidence necessary to make her case.
convincingly; it is always possible that elites judged, and responded to, mass opinion correctly, even if it was not fully expressed by votes, membership, or the other available indicators of behavior. However, her more detailed analysis of four more recent South American cases - Brazil 1964, Uruguay 1973, Chile 1973, and Argentina 1976 - have the benefit of public opinion data, which does establish that these right-wing military authoritarian regimes were not a fulfillment of the wishes of the majority. In Brazil, although there was majority support for land reform, which conservatives and the military considered threatening, the majority never wavered in its preference for democracy. In Uruguay, majorities wanted the military to remove President Bordaberry but only in order to restore democracy; the military assumed power in spite of massive popular opposition and resistance (Bermeo 2003, 135-37). In Chile there was polarization that was dangerous for democracy, but only among party elites, not among the mass of voters (chapter 5). Most Argentines in 1976 may have been exhausted by violence and strikes and grateful for the military removal of Isabel Perón, but there is little evidence that they preferred prolonged military rule (chapter 6). Bermeo's argument is convincing for these cases in the narrow sense that popular majorities appear not to have turned against democracy per se or to have been polarized to the point of having more people at the extremes than in the center.

However, while making her case, Bermeo also demonstrates that there is sometimes majority support for military coups (when the majority believes that the interruption would be brief) and does not exclude the possibility that non-majority levels of polarization may sometimes lead to disruptions of political order that make it difficult for democracy to survive, even if relatively few desire that outcome. Her evidence is therefore compatible with the possibility that mass, though not necessarily majority, attitudes make an indirect contribution to the breakdown of democracy. Overall, however, her analysis reinforces the conclusion that the search for cultural
explanations of regime change should not focus on the mean or modal attitudes of the undifferentiated mass of ordinary people, but on the attitudes of groups in society who are in a position to effect change, whether they are extremist social movements, political party leaders, or military officers.

A fifth counterargument is that elite leadership shapes culture rather than culture constraining elite attitudes and actions. Most of the research on this question has examined the relationship between US members of Congress and their constituents, regarding policy, not regime choice, so the implications of this relationship for regime change are virtually unexplored, although they remain worth exploring rigorously. The one exception to this is the attention paid to ethnic violence. In this line of research, few scholars believe that violence (which obviously can undermine democracy) is an automatic expression of deep, primordial hatreds. Rather, contemporary emphasis is on “political entrepreneurs” (leaders), who reinforce latent religious, ethnic, racial, linguistic, and national identities and exploit them to maximize their own political power. It has also been shown that leaders sometimes have the ability to prevent violence where it otherwise would be expected to break out (Varshney 2003).

Sixth, it has often been argued that culture is epiphenomenal: it has little direct, independent impact once one controls for the forces and events that shape both culture and the outcomes that it supposedly causes. Welch cause this the phenomenon of the “retreating cause”: the closer one comes to understanding when, where, and why culture matters, the more it appears that “culture” is only a mask for the forces that really matter (Welch 1993). On this point, however, I find Inglehart and Welzel’s arguments more convincing than the alternative. Empirically, there are more differences across countries than within countries; structural factors move countries from their cultural starting points; and culture is inertial, slowing or dampening the
impact of other forces. But more rigorous testing would be desirable.

There two other ways that it is commonly thought that mass culture might affect the survival of democracy. First, democracy may die not with a bang, but a whimper: apathy, withdrawal from participation, abstention, delegitimization of institutions and leaders. Perhaps democracy dies not because citizens care too much, but because they care too. This seems to be the motivating assumption behind the large literature on political culture and turnout, party membership, group membership, and voting behavior (Norris 2002; van Deth and Scarborough 1995). We should obviously be concerned about declines in these forms of participation if they signal the slow death of democracy. But it is hard to list many countries that have gone this far.

**Conclusion**

The history of cultural research on democratization is a history of conceptual refinement. The early ways of thinking about culture were far too simplistic, but as research has become more empirical, it has also become much more nuanced and precise. Furthermore, as research has broadened from close examination of small societies to generalizations about many diverse societies, the complexity of what has been found has progressively driven toward conceptual and theoretical refinement. Therefore, if this approach teaches us anything, it is that there is no unanimity in any political culture.

The central problem is how to connect individual-level characteristics to regime outcomes at the macro level. Scholars have had trouble keeping everything in focus at once. Some study national aggregates and show us cross-national variation, but lose sight of subcultures and causal mechanisms. Others confine their attention to the individual level and turn up many interesting relationships, but lose sight of how and why relationships at this level may matter at the macro
level. The only solution is to specify the causal mechanisms that bridge levels of analysis and test them appropriately. But research in this vein is more of a promise than an accomplishment.

Another problem is the fact that the research agenda has been distorted by the availability of data. There has been much more research on the impact of attitudes on the survival or breakdown of democracy than on transitions to democracy simply because it is easier to do surveys in democracies and because democracies are more likely to have the means to pay for surveys. However, this is beginning to change. Oddly enough, there has been much more effort devoted to polling samples of hundred or thousands of ordinary citizens – whose impact on regimes is questionable – than to surveys of party leaders, military officers, business leaders, or other elites whose opinions are much more likely to be consequential for regime change. Elite surveys are hardly unknown, but each one is custom-designed for a particular project, so it is difficult for them to cumulate into a coherent body of knowledge. And if we are ever going to understand the relative influence of elites on masses and masses on elites, we would have to survey both in repeated, simultaneous waves. This has never been done in research on regime change.

What we have at present is a collection of tantalizing pieces, but not a whole picture. We have many more questions than answers. But before we can prioritize our questions, we need to devote more attention to an overall theory that would suggest how to link the macro and micro levels of analysis: which groups matter, for what kind of regime change, following which scenario, under what conditions, and how do these groups influence one another?
Figure 8.1: Illustration of the Ecological Paradox

Each line represents the individual-level relationship within one country.
References


