Chapter 4

Inductive Approaches: Checklists, Frameworks, and Boolean Analysis

On some level, we political scientists think we understand some things about the causes of democratization; we share a conventional wisdom. However, the conventional wisdom is fragmented: it consists of dozens of propositions about the conditions that favor democracy. Although there is a core of propositions that most scholars consider credible, this conventional wisdom is poorly integrated. We tend to consider each proposition in isolation, standing or falling on its own, without affecting our belief in other propositions. Admittedly, there are lumps of related propositions here and there, but for the most part it is a thin soup. The conventional wisdom is not, therefore, an integrated theory of interwoven propositions. In this sense, our understanding of democratization resembles a checklist: a list of independent, unconnected items. Checklists are useful for reminding us about all the varied factors that may be important. Unfortunately, just as a grocery list is not a short story, a checklist is not a coherent and integrated explanation.

There is no official screening committee that certifies that a proposition is generally true and rigorously supported before it comes to be a part of the conventional wisdom. Rather, our "wisdom" is just that: a matter of convention. Whatever ideas many scholars have found convincing at one time or another come to be part of what we think we know. Because different scholars are convinced by different things, the conventional wisdom is a hodgepodge of ideas originating from diverse sources. To be sure, some propositions have survived repeated testing in large samples using the most rigorous techniques in our toolkits. But many of them are the
conclusions of less rigorous studies that were so convincing, in their way, that we have incautiously assumed the conclusions to be generally true. Many comparativists are impressed by intimate knowledge of the politics of a particular country or a region, so the conclusions of case studies and intra-regional comparisons sometimes yield insights of a particularly solid kind, and we sometimes elevate these insights to the status of universal truth. Some ideas have been treated as received wisdom since the infancy of comparative politics, when the field was limited to comparisons of Britain, France, and Germany. Other propositions originate in logically persuasive arguments, which are universally true. . . once you grant their premises; but the questionable truth of the premises is fine print that compilers of the conventional wisdom tend to overlook. Quite a few propositions survive simply because they resonate well with common sense--our informal theory, as discussed in chapter 3--or with ideological convictions. ("Free markets and free societies go together.") In a few cases, we frail and fallible humans have been convinced by our own wishful thinking: it must be true because we need it to be true. What is amazing is that, in spite of the diverse origins and uneven rigor of these ideas, scholars who periodically take inventory of what we know about democratization tend to list the same few-dozen propositions.

This chapter begins with a summary of the conventional wisdom, followed by a critique of this checklist-style knowledge. Checklists are indispensable memory-jogging aids, and they can even make reliable predictions at the extremes, but they are much less useful for the intermediate cases and they fall short of the standards for integrated theory. This section contains a demonstration of what a checklist can and cannot do. The chapter then summarizes and critiques several efforts to integrate disparate propositions into a more coherent theory: Linz and
Stepan's *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*; O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead's *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, and Linz and Stepan's *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Although all are steps in the direction of integration, they are ultimately theoretical frameworks—stylized inductions—that continue to share some characteristics with checklists. The chapter concludes with an introduction to Boolean analysis, which is useful for testing checklists and other large sets of qualitative hypotheses but ends up highlighting the limitations of inductive approaches.

**The Conventional Wisdom**

Because democratization is one of the central puzzles of comparative politics, there is always space in journals for well-read scholars to publish inventories of our knowledge. My summary of the conventional wisdom is based on eight well-known inventories of this type by Dankwart Rustow (1970), Robert Dahl (1971), Larry Diamond (1996), Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (1995), Juan Linz (1978), Samuel Huntington (1991), and Doh Chull Shin (1994). This should be an authoritative survey of the conventional wisdom, as the list includes several of the most-cited social scientists in the world and three past presidents of the American Political Science Association. The inventories span the period from 1970 to 1999. Nevertheless, their content remains similar, testifying to the durability of the conventional wisdom.

One of the constants of the conventional wisdom is that it is important to distinguish among stages of democratization. At the very least, we must distinguish between the conditions that favor *transitions* to democratic regimes and conditions that make it possible for democracy to *survive*. Ever since Rustow's 1970 article, the conventional wisdom has warned that the forces
that help democracies survive may be quite different from the forces that enabled them to become democracies in the first place. We should also treat the preconditions for democracy as a separate stage, as a great deal of research focuses on conditions that laid the necessary groundwork for democracy (especially in early modern Europe) but that, in themselves, were not sufficient for a transition to mass political democracy. Other ways of defining what it is we are explaining identify other possible stages of democratization, although there is less consensus on their importance. O'Donnell and Schmitter claimed that liberalization of an authoritarian regime was a necessary stage prior to transition. Obviously, breakdown is also a stage if democratization includes reversals; according to Linz, a crisis of a democratic regimes is a stage prior to breakdown and reequilibration is an alternative to breakdown. Many scholars have written about the consolidation of democratic regimes in ways that suggest that consolidation is something more ambitious than mere survival. Notions of consolidation often stipulate that beyond surviving, regimes undergo legitimation and may achieve democratic deepening or improve the quality of democracy, and that these achievements favor regime survival. Each of these stages--preconditions, liberalization, transition, crisis, reequilibration or breakdown, legitimation, consolidation, deepening, improving quality, and survival--may have its own set of causes, distinct from the causes of other stages. To simplify my discussion, however, I will reduce all of these to just three basic stages--preconditions, transition, and survival. Different authors discuss different stages and use different terminology but, as table 4.1 shows, almost everyone recognizes the divisions between the transition, pre-transition, and post-transition stages.¹

I will survey the conventional explanations for these stages of democratization under four headings: culture and leadership, economy and society, the state and institutions, and
international influences. Table 4.2 lists the major hypotheses involving mass political culture or elite leadership. It also identifies the sources that mention each hypothesis, or one in a very similar vein, and the stage of democratization that is affected, according to each source. I have listed only hypotheses that were mentioned by more than one source, but I suspect that most of these sources would list all of these ideas if they were all equally comprehensive. A few additional stray hypotheses are mentioned in the source notes. Similar tables accompany the discussion of other kinds of hypotheses, below. Altogether, these tables list 55 different supposed causes of democracy.

*Culture and Leadership*

One of the oldest hypotheses is that democratic regimes spring from, and are sustained by, a democratic political culture. This notion goes back at least to Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America*, a French nobleman’s 1835 description of what was then a novel regime. Although Tocqueville discussed the geography and laws of the United States as conditions that favored democracy, in the end he gave the greatest weight to the “mores” of its citizens: “the sum of the moral and intellectual dispositions of men in society,” particularly Christian religion and the widespread understanding of the basic procedures of self-government, reinforced by constant practice (de Tocqueville 1969: ch.9:305).

Tocqueville saw the democratic culture of the United States in historical perspective, as the vanguard of inexorable human progress toward equality: “. . .the gradual progress of equality is something fated. The main features of this progress are the following: it is universal and permanent, it is daily passing beyond human control, and every event and every man helps it along” (de Tocqueville 1969:12). The rise of fascism in the early 20th Century destroyed the belief
in unstoppable progress, but this thinking survives more modestly in propositions that there is a democratic Zeitgeist or spirit of the times that ebbs and flows, shaping every national culture’s openness to democracy. Some scholars have turned to this idea to account for waves of democracy and its reversal. Most scholars believe that the defeat of the Axis powers in the Second World War discredited fascism and vindicated democracy; during the Cold War, democracy sometimes took a back seat to anti-communist authoritarianism; and an international bias for democracy fostered and sustained the Third Wave longer than expected, even in unlikely places (Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1991).

The behavioral revolution in the social sciences in the 1960s made this view look simplistic. In order to study “culture,” scholars conducted national surveys, which established that culture does not ebb and flow uniformly in all countries. Furthermore, in order to measure “culture” in these surveys, researchers had to define it more precisely. They reduced democratic culture to a set of attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, and norms, such as tolerance, open-mindedness, pragmatism, participation, efficacy, civility, trust, cooperation, and support for democracy and democratic institutions. Where these cultural traits prevail among the mass population, democracy is more likely to be founded and less likely to fall victim to bitter or violent clashes.

Much of the theorizing about culture has been inspired by the fact that modern democracy first arose in the states of the northwest of Europe and in some of the (principally British) colonies that they founded. The most obvious difference between northwestern Europe and Southern or Eastern Europe is religion, so religion has always been an important strand of thinking about democratization. Protestantism, it is alleged, encourages individualism and resistance to state control, while Roman Catholicism requires submission to a hierarchical
authority. Protestantism also, according to Max Weber, gave rise to capitalism (Weber 1958), which then favored democratization by empowering a bourgeoisie to the point that it was able to check state authority. More recently, Lipset and Huntington have argued that both Protestant and Catholic forms of Christianity, and perhaps Hinduism as well, favor democracy, while Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and Confucianism work against it, at least for the present (Huntington 1993:25-9; Lipset 1959:3-7). This shift in thinking clearly corresponds to the spread of democracy to the Catholic countries of Southern Europe and Latin America and the continuing resistance to democracy in the Middle East and China. Whether it is a causal relationship remains an open question.

An unintended consequence of the behavioral revolution was a weakening of the claim that a mass civic culture was necessary for democracy, because survey research documented an appalling lack of democratic values in the United States and other stable democracies. In actual democracies, voters’ “belief in liberal democratic values does not extend beyond limited recognition of platitudes; given a concrete situation, ordinary people see nothing wrong with abrogating freedom of speech, press, or religion for those with whom they disagree”(Katz 1997:52). Methodological objections to cultural hypotheses (to be discussed in chapter 8) reinforced the decline of this school of thought. By 1970, Rustow and Dahl were emphasizing that elite values and beliefs were far more important than mass culture, and for the next 15 years mass culture received little attention (Diamond 1993). Elites could bring democracy into being and hold it together as long as they were tolerant, moderate, ready to compromise, pacific, successful at finding solutions to pressing problems and, above all, convinced that democracy is a better form of government than any other (Diamond 1993; Lijphart 1977; Linz 1978). This
emphasis on elites gathered additional strength during the third wave, as O’Donnell and Schmitter portrayed transitions from authoritarian rule as complex yet voluntaristic processes in which elite strategizing could have a decisive impact. At the extreme, some scholars also argued that there were “democracies without democrats”: democratic regimes founded as peaceful solutions to conflicts between leaders who had, at best, only an instrumental commitment to democracy (DiPalma 1990; Przeworski 1987; Waterbury 1999). In time, they argued, these leaders might come to value democracy as an end in itself, but democratic values did not create democracy; it was the other way around.

In the meantime, however, other scholars revived speculation about the importance of a democratic political culture for regime survival. They granted that democracies could come into being without a mass democratic culture, but argued that if mass culture did not become democratic, the quality of democracy would be compromised and the regime would be in danger of breaking down. Robert Putnam, for example, reported that democratic government is more efficient and responsive where citizens participate in secondary associations that link them to broader networks of trust (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993). Linz and Stepan included in their definition of consolidation the requirement that “Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces” (Linz and Stepan 1996:6). Similarly, Larry Diamond wrote that “The essence of democratic consolidation is a behavioral and attitudinal embrace of democratic principles and methods by both elites and mass,” and warned that many of the new
democracies fall short of this standard, leading to “illiberal,” “pseudo-,” or “hollow” democracies (Diamond 1996:20). The current conventional wisdom synthesizes both recent strands of theory into a hypothesis that elite leadership matters more for transitions and mass culture matters more for consolidation, deepening, and survival.

Economy and Society

Aside from Rustow, who explicitly rejected most structural determinants of democracy, comparativists agree that the economic characteristics of countries affect their chances of becoming or remaining democratic. Three economic hypotheses have been particularly prominent in the literature: that democracy is associated with 1) economic equality, 2) a high standard of living, and 3) capitalism (Table 4.3). Initially, these were mentioned as preconditions for democracy, but since the 1980s scholars have emphasized their association with transitions or survival instead, as democracy is increasingly found in some very poor or inegalitarian economies, such as India and Brazil. The association between democracy and wealth (measured by per capita energy consumption, gross domestic product, or gross national product) has received the most attention, and because practically all large-sample statistical studies have confirmed it, it is almost an article of faith in democratization research (Diamond 1992; Reuschemeyer 1991).

Within this conventional wisdom, however, there are two areas of profound disagreement. First, scholars disagree over whether wealth promotes both transitions and survival, or survival only. Before the 1990s, almost everyone agreed that a high standard of living helped democracies survive and made transitions more likely in non-democracies. But Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi’s (1997) article, “Modernization and Democracy:
Theories and Facts,” challenged this longstanding conventional wisdom with its claim that the
observed association between wealth and democracy is entirely due to the tendency of wealthy
countries to remain democratic once they experience transitions, which are caused by many
factors other than economic development (Przeworski et al. 2000:1-141). Others have since
attempted to salvage the older view, so this debate continues (Boix and Stokes 2002; Brinks and
Coppelge 1999).

The second area of disagreement concerns the reasons for the association between wealth and
democracy. The disagreement arises because the association is an empirical generalization,
not a complete theory with actors, motives, context, and mechanisms, and is therefore compatible
with many different stories. Some of these stories stay close to economics. One theory is that
wealthy countries have fewer economic crises, which would increase feelings of relative
deprivation, deprive governments of legitimacy, and make a regime breakdown more likely
(Gasiorowski 1995; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Freedom from economic crises is therefore the
reason that wealthy countries tend to be more democratic. The opposite side of this coin is that
transitions are more likely when authoritarian regimes experience the same kind of
delegitimating economic crisis.4 Some other stories connect the economy to cultural explanations
already discussed. Lipset, for example, proposed that wealth, economic security, and education
encouraged a belief in secular reformist gradualism, fostered cross-pressures that would diminish
radicalism, and diversified opinions in society and increased interest in politics, all of which
favored democratic survival (Lipset 1959).

The most prominent theories connecting economy and democracy, however, have
claimed that economic development--first the commercialization of agriculture, later
industrialization and rising standards of living--transforms social structure, creating new social actors and interests who promote and protect democracy. These actors--the bourgeoisie (owners and managers of capital), petty bourgeoisie (shopkeepers and craftsmen), free agricultural laborers, the middle class, and eventually the industrial working class--formed class alliances to reduce the power of the monarch and the bureaucracy, increase the power of parliament, and eventually extend the suffrage to all adult males. There have been many variations on this theme. Johnson argued that the "middle sectors" were the bearers of democracy in Latin America (Johnson 1958). Moore, saying "no bourgeoisie, no democracy," argued that in Western Europe the bourgeoisie played a pivotal role by allying with the landed aristocracy to check the crown, but only where the aristocracy participated in the commercialization of agriculture instead of repressing its agriculture workforce (Moore 1966:418). Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens disagreed, arguing that the working class was the most consistent promoter of democracy and that the middle class often resisted democratic progress (though less so in Latin America) (Reuschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992:1-29). Ruth Collier identified a variety of different roles that organized labor has played in democratization in Europe and the Americas (Collier 1999). Nevertheless, all these authors share the belief that social classes created by capitalist development are the agents of democratization.

The rise of communist states in the 20th Century reinforced the belief in capitalism itself as a precondition for democracy, because this modern alternative to capitalism is also nondemocratic. The idea is further reinforced by classic liberal ideology, which holds that free markets and free societies are inseparable components of freedom. However, even most advocates of the capitalist development hypothesis recognize an important qualifier: if economic
growth inevitably or initially increases inequality (the Kuznets hypothesis), then democracy is less likely to arise, less likely to be stable, or more likely to be of poor quality. There are three reasons for this qualification. First, unequal development should create only a small middle class and an impoverished working class, both of which would be too weak to achieve their desire for political rights. Second, even if democratic institutions were adopted in an unequal society, inequalities would generate zero-sum conflict, distrust, demagoguery, and extremism, making a regime breakdown more likely. Finally, in a socially unequal democracy many citizens would remain subject to oppressive clientelistic social relationships that would prevent them from exercising their full rights as citizens (Muller 1988).

As Table 4.3 notes, the conventional wisdom about democratization also includes several hypotheses about societal characteristics that are not necessarily related to the economy. These hypotheses spring from the belief that most non-economic social cleavages are less tractable than class divisions. Economic conflicts can often be settled by redistributing resources; non-economic conflicts, in contrast, usually involve ascriptive differences that are categorical, acquired at birth or otherwise not freely chosen, immutable, and therefore non-negotiable (Horowitz 1985:55-7). These ethnic, religious, linguistic, and racial conflicts are thought to be especially likely to end in violence; a prospect that can both discourage attempts to inaugurate democracy (especially in states that have not resolved the nationality question) and precipitate regime breakdowns. However, the conventional wisdom is not quite so bleak. Aside from the obvious hypothesis that democracy is easier to achieve and sustain in homogeneous societies, it holds out two hopes for democracy in spite of these cleavages. First, social (and economic) cleavages are less threatening to democracy if they are cross-cutting rather than overlapping.
When cleavages overlap, they reinforce one another and increase the chance of deep, unresolvable conflict; when they cut across one another, each cleavage by itself is less salient, less deeply felt, and therefore less likely to become a major source of political tension (Lipset 1960:74-9). Second, the literature supports the hope that political institutions such as federalism and grand coalitions can dampen or manage social cleavages well enough to enable democracy to survive (Lijphart 1977). This takes us into the next section, but the basic principle is that no significant minority should be relegated to permanent opposition status. Institutions must allocate every group a share of power, at least some of the time.

*The State and Political Institutions*

Table 4.4 summarizes the major democratization hypotheses that concern the state and political institutions. It should not be surprising that few of these hypotheses concern transitions to democracy; some concern preconditions, but most promise to explain the survival of democratic regimes once they are established. Theories about state characteristics posit that there are certain basic functions that any viable state must perform regardless of the type of regime. If the state lacks the capacity to perform these functions adequately, the regime cannot survive. The most fundamental characteristic is simply being a state, that is, in Weber's definition, “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1958:78). This hypothesis would seem to be true by definition because regimes can exist only within states, but in practice "stateness" can be partial or a matter of degree. In relative terms then, democracy is less likely to survive where there are secessionist forces that challenge the boundaries of the state, or where insurgents or large numbers of less violent citizens refuse to recognize the regime’s claim to a monopoly of the legitimate use of
force. Similarly, democracy is thought to be at risk where the state is unable to maintain public order or the civilian government does not command the obedience of the armed forces.

By a similar but less extreme logic, democratic regimes are more likely to survive where poor state capacity does not hobble governmental performance. More specifically, some desirable state capacities are the faithful execution of the laws by the bureaucracy, predictable policymaking and implementation, the uniform and impartial application of the law to all citizens, and the absence of widespread corruption. Any regime, democratic or not, can be found in a state lacking these qualities; and as in any other regime, citizens tend to blame the regime for the failings of the state.

Specific political institutions logically cannot be preconditions for democracy or causes of democratic transitions because institutions are precisely the entities that change when a country becomes democratic. If institutions matter for democratization, therefore, they matter for regime survival. The only exceptions are political parties, whose existence and nature often transcend any specific regime. It has been argued, for example, that democratic transitions are more likely to succeed if institutionalized political parties are present in the streets and at the negotiation table (Levine 1976).

One commonly-mentioned institution is the division of powers into separate bodies that are self-governing for certain issues or within subnational territories. Specific examples include federalism, regional autonomy, bicameralism, municipal autonomy, consociationalism, and central bank independence (Lijphart 1999:243-57). Several of these institutions are believed to help manage social cleavages by allowing each group to govern itself on its own issues without imposing its will on other groups. In table 4.4 I list as another institution Dahl’s “historical
sequence” of instituting contestation before inclusion. Although this sequence is not an institution per se, the reasoning behind it is that this sequence encourages the formation of institutions that help democracy survive. Dahl proposed that with this sequence, “the rules, the practices, and the culture of competitive politics developed first among a small elite, and the critical transition from nonparty politics to party competition also occurred initially within the restricted group. . . . Later, as additional social strata were admitted into politics they were more easily socialized into the norms and practices of competitive politics. . . ” (Dahl 1971:36). These rules and practices and parties are all institutions, even when they are informal. Few other inventory-takers have picked up Dahl’s famous sequence for their lists (Huntington did, without endorsing it), but most of them do list the effective mutual guarantees and well-institutionalized, competitive political parties that theoretically result from this sequence.

In the past decade the most lively debate about institutions and democratic survival has concerned the alleged advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary and presidential regimes. Juan Linz articulated the best-known and most comprehensive critique of presidentialism (Linz 1994). He claimed that presidential democracies are prone to impasses between the president and congress that are likely to escalate into regime crises due in part to the psychologically aggrandizing impact of direct presidential elections. And once such a stalemate occurs, Linz reasoned, presidential constitutions provide no institutional mechanisms for resolving the crisis, and breakdown is therefore more likely. In a parliamentary system, there would be a vote of no confidence and the cabinet would fall or new elections would be held, all without risk to the regime. Other scholars have chipped away at this thesis ever since, claiming that it is true only in certain circumstances, that it is overstated, that it is a spurious association, or that it is true for
reasons different from Linz’s. Nevertheless, the logic behind the argument and the robust empirical association have preserved the presidentialism thesis as a part of the conventional wisdom.

*International Causes*

The most recently-developed family of hypotheses about the causes of democracy concern international factors. Many scholars were fascinated by the dramatic “third wave” of democracy that washed over Southern Europe in the 1970s, Latin America from 1978 to 1990, and then Eastern Europe, Africa, and parts of Asia in the 1990s. This temporal and geographic clustering of transitions could not be a coincidence, the product of domestic forces working independently yet simultaneously; there had to be an international or transnational dimension to democratization (Huntington 1991:31-4; Starr 1991). This was a novel hypothesis in the early 1990s; Rustow did not even mention it in 1970, and Dahl in 1971 discussed only the most obvious international cause: postwar occupation of West Germany, Austria, and Japan by the Allies.

Although it is now generally agreed that democracy diffuses internationally, it remains unclear how or why it diffuses. One of the most common hypotheses is that the idea or norm of democratic government spreads, perhaps through a process of historical learning. Many people questioned democracy in the wake of the Russian Revolution, during the rise of fascism in Europe, and in the Americas after the Cuban Revolution; and democracy regained favor as a standard for good government after the Allied victory in the Second World War, the fall of the Franco regime in Spain, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In some hard-to-specify way, democratization accelerates when its rival models of government are discredited.
There are, however, a few concrete hypotheses about how democracy spreads internationally. A few regional organizations--the European Union, NATO, and the Organization of American States, among others--now require member countries to be democratic. Countries that aspire to the benefits of membership therefore have an incentive to undergo a transition, and existing members have a disincentive to risk a breakdown (Pevehouse 2002). In addition, transnational organizations such as party foundations, labor organizations, professional associations, and the Catholic Church sometimes exert international pressure on governments to become or remain democratic (Huntington 1991:72-85). Some national governments themselves have a policy of promoting democracy abroad, which they pursue by aiding parties and pro-democracy organizations, overseeing elections, mustering diplomatic pressure, and imposing economic sanctions. Few scholars believe that such efforts are the most powerful determinants of democratization, but many believe that international pressure can tip the balance toward democracy in close cases (Carothers 1999; Whitehead 1986).

One of the oldest international hypotheses is that a British colonial past favors later democratization. This idea came about as a way to the account for the anomalous success of democracy in India and is sustained by the positive examples of the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Canada, and the English-speaking Caribbean. It is also reinforced by the fact that the British often protected some political rights and allowed some colonists to elect representatives (though not Governors-General) before independence. It is an increasingly controversial thesis, however, as some former British colonies are not notably successful democracies (Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Guyana, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Singapore, Zimbabwe) and British colonial rule was harsh and exploitative in some respects. Nevertheless, it
is common to read that British colonial rule favored eventual democratization in some countries, even if it was detrimental in others.

**What Checklists Tell Us**

This is a condensed summary of most of the conventional wisdom. All of these checklist items could be formulated differently and most of them have nuances that I have glossed over, but this is a fairly comprehensive overview. Later chapters will go into the details; for now the important point is that there is a very large body of commonly-accepted propositions about democratization. It is surprising that there is so much agreement on these ideas when, as subsequent chapters will show, this conventional wisdom comes from such unsystematic and methodologically diverse sources.

In spite of its unsound origins, checklist-based knowledge is appealing because it seems to work, roughly. It gives us an intuition about democratization that can actually make useful predictions. To illustrate this point, Annabella España Nájera compiled a small database to see whether such a checklist does a good job of predicting how democratic a country is. She classified a sample of 17 countries on 16 common checklist items for approximately the year 2000. She then added up the ratings for each country and compared them with Freedom House scores for the same year. Her ratings are in Table 4.6. The checklist "worked" much better than most people would expect: there is a definite positive relationship between the number of satisfied conditions and the Freedom House score for each country. This relationship has a correlation coefficient of .820 and the checklist tally explains 65 percent of freedom levels in a bivariate regression. This demonstration makes it easy to appreciate the appeal of the kind of knowledge that comes from checklists.
At the same time, it is important to understand the limitations of checklists. First, the predictions are not very precise. For example, in Table 4.6, satisfying six items on the checklist enables one to make predictions only within a wide range, from 5 to 11 on the Freedom House index. If there were more cases in this demonstration, the ranges would be more consistently wide. Second, as inspection of the table suggests, the predictions that one can make are more reliable at the extremes. This is because only some of the conditions actually and consistently matter. Some conditions belong on the checklist, but others are spurious “causes” that should not be included. This is not a problem at the extremes. A relatively comprehensive checklist can efficiently discriminate between the countries that satisfy most of the true conditions for democracy and countries that satisfy few of them. It does not matter that the favored cases get credit for items that do not really belong on the checklist, because they also get credit for the items that do matter; and it does not matter that the unfavored cases fail to get misleading credit, because they also fail to get credit that should matter for democracy. But the intermediate cases, which satisfy the true conditions only partially, yield more uncertain predictions, because they get some credit from true items and some from false items and there is no way to tell which is which.

This is the third limitation of checklists: they do not tell us which items matter and which do not. If we interpret the checklist to mean that every item is necessary for democracy, then every democracy should satisfy every condition. If we interpret the checklist to mean that every item is sufficient for democracy, then no condition should be satisfied for any non-democracy. But in Table 4.6, no condition fits every democracy, some conditions fit non-democracies, and no democracy satisfies every condition. Logically, these conditions cannot all matter in this strict sense. However, we might want to interpret checklists in a less rigid way. It may be that some
conditions are powerful causes and others, weak causes. But a fourth limitation of checklists is that they do not say how much any item matters; in effect, they assign all items equal weight. It is also possible that each item matters conditionally: that one cause matters only in the presence of another cause, or that the impact is reversed under some conditions, or that the causal process leading to democracy is distinct in different regions of the world. But if so, these are not relationships that a checklist typically conveys. The final limitation is therefore that in a checklist every item is independent of the others. Checklists never tell us how the items on them should be used, alone or in combination, to explain or predict democratization.

Should we regard checklists as theory? By my criteria, we should not. Checklists are not general, in the sense that every proposition on them has been empirically confirmed in a large number of cases. As Barbara Geddes has observed,

Authors. . . are frequently aware of the tentativeness of the evidence supporting their arguments and indicate their awareness in the caveats they attach to them. Readers, however, tend to ignore the caveats and give greater weight to unsystematic evidence than it deserves. Many studies in which authors have carefully hedged their explanatory claims are discussed in seminars, cited in literature reviews, and summarized in qualifying exams as though the tentative arguments advanced were actually supported by solid evidence (Geddes 1997:18).

Checklists are not really thick, either. They list a lot of propositions, but each proposition is stated in a very general way, devoid of the particularities of specific cases. And as just argued, checklists do not integrate propositions. They are loose bundles of isolated, unrelated propositions. By these criteria, then, checklists are a pre-theoretical kind of understanding. They
are undeniably useful as reminders, and they may often make good predictions, but they are not theories.

**Moving Beyond Checklists: Inductive Theoretical Frameworks**

Because of these limitations of checklists, some scholars have sought to integrate a large but more modest number of propositions into a complex but coherent theoretical framework. The Johns Hopkins University Press published three books of this type that have been especially influential in democratization research: Linz and Stepan's *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (1978); O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead's *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (1986), and Linz and Stepan's *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (1996). These works all use chapter-length country studies (by the authors themselves in *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, by other contributors in the other two works) to suggest reasons for the breakdowns, transitions, or consolidations in each case. The authors then synthesize a more general framework that classifies the actors and key steps in these processes, and they suggest conditions, relationships and choices that tend to lead to one outcome or another. The result is a partially integrated body of inductively-generated concepts and propositions that lies somewhere between a checklist and a theory. This section summarizes these three frameworks and some hypotheses that spring from them, explains why they have been influential, and clarifies their limitations as theories of democratization.

**Linz: The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes**

Linz and Stepan’s *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* began with a short paper by Linz that laid out a basic model inspired by the cases of Spain, Weimar Germany, and Brazil. Linz and Stepan then commissioned case studies of breakdowns or reequilibrations of democracy
in Finland, Italy, Germany, Spain, Austria, Portugal, Greece, Northern Ireland, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and Chile. Drawing on the insights of these studies, Linz then wrote a longer essay, which was published as a separate book (Linz 1978).

It is impossible to summarize Linz’s long essay without omitting conditions, exceptions, and qualifications that he would consider crucial. Nevertheless, the following skeletal version summarizes the Linzian model in a way that is faithful to its strengths and weaknesses. Democracies enter into a crisis when a very difficult problem arises. The difficult problem could be violence in the streets, ethnic conflict, or a deep economic crisis. The problem is also perceived as pressing, that is, many people believe that a solution must be found quickly. In addition, it becomes increasingly obvious that the democratic government is unable to provide an efficacious and effective solution in the short term. In the meantime, an irresponsible opposition promises an easy and quick solution. As a result, public opinion becomes polarized, with pro-democracy leaders increasingly isolated and semi-loyal (or hidden disloyal) leaders gaining in support.

In some cases, according to Linz, either an extreme multiparty system or presidentialism worsens this polarization. Extreme multiparty systems have a centrifugal tendency that encourages irresponsibility and the politics of outbidding, culminating in the collapse of the center of the political spectrum. Presidential, as opposed to parliamentary, systems promote zero-sum politics, and therefore hinder accommodation and coalition building, ending in polarization. (This was a precursor to his later critique of presidentialism.) But in all countries, even without parliamentary constitutions or extreme multiparty systems, polarization is driven by any of six unwise choices by leaders. First, some choose to pursue an overly ambitious agenda,
which inevitably and unnecessarily threatens those targeted by it and nevertheless disappoints its initial supporters. Second, some leaders practice vindictiveness toward the old regime. Third, some leaders choose to exclude old enemies from power. Fourth, some leaders refuse to work with the old state and therefore build up a new, parallel bureaucracy or military, which is costly and divisive. Fifth, some leaders unwisely alienate intellectuals. Sixth, some leaders pass responsibility for problem-solving onto courts, the military, or other actors that lack a popular mandate. This choice is especially damaging when these other actors lack the capacity to solve the problem within the constraints imposed by a democratic regime.

Leaders who make these unwise choices find themselves increasingly isolated. When they reach the point of no return, the powerful opposition unites behind disloyal leaders to overthrow the isolated incumbent. This is not an inevitable outcome. If incumbents practice moderation, refrain from punishing their adversaries, share power with rivals and intellectuals, work with the existing state institutions, and take responsibility for solving problems themselves, then they can defuse the crisis and “reequilibrate” the democratic regime.

This is a very appealing framework for two basic reasons. First, it simplifies reality, but not too much, and in a way that promises to be useful. The framework outlines a process with a beginning (crisis), and end (breakdown or reequilibration), and a crucial turning point (the reaction of incumbents to irresponsible opposition). By identifying the beginning, Linz also specified the domain: the set of cases to which the framework applies. By identifying a turning point, he asserted that crises do not necessarily culminate in breakdown, which is intuitively plausible and focuses attention on pivotal moments in the process. The framework simplifies reality by identifying key actors: incumbents, loyal opposition, semi-loyal opposition, and
disloyal opposition. The fact that these actors are defined by their orientation to democracy practically guarantees that they are the relevant actors for understanding the fate of the regime. This attention to the actors assumes that individual leaders can make a decisive difference—an assumption that not all political scientists would share. But at the same time, the framework places the leaders in a relationship with the mass public (which could become polarized) so that it is not a purely voluntaristic approach. The framework also places the leaders in a structural context, both institutional (the type of party system and constitution) and sociological (the unsolvable social, economic, or national problems they face), which influences their choices.

The second source of the framework's appeal is its flexibility, which allows it to be adapted to a variety of dissimilar situations. The nature of the initial crisis could concern economic decline, hyperinflation, national humiliation, terrorism, crime, irredentism, ethnic conflict, or other problems. Many different kinds of actors could fit into the categories of loyal, semi-loyal, and disloyal opposition: political parties, armed services, business, labor, religious leaders, peasants, ethnic minorities, guerrillas, governors, and so on. These categories can be adapted to any of the groups found in any regime in crisis. The framework includes two variations on the basic process for presidential democracies and extreme multiparty systems. Finally, there are six different kinds of actions that leaders could take that would increase polarization.

This appealing framework also has two limitations. First, it leaves too much room for interpretation. How do we know, for example, whether there is an initial crisis or not? The multiplicity of relevant types of crisis actually makes this question harder to answer, for few societies in the world are problem-free in all of these areas. Probably it is a matter of degree, but
the framework does not specify how bad the problem must be to qualify as a crisis. It does say that many citizens must consider it a pressing problem that requires a quick solution. But this just restates the question: how many citizens? How pressing? How quick? These unanswered questions leave room for scholars to disagree about the regimes to which the framework applies. The set of six actions that tend to increase polarization also invite interpretation. How many of these must the incumbent do to increase polarization—one, three, or all? What if the incumbent mixes wise and unwise actions, such as working with existing state institutions and having moderate ambitions, but also alienating intellectuals (who may prefer a more ambitious agenda) and being vindictive toward the leaders of the old regime? The framework does not define what would happen in such cases, and this allows those applying the framework to interpret incumbent behavior selectively. Also, several key concepts are slippery to the point of circularity. For example, opposition leaders who promise a quick, easy solution to an "unsolvable" problem are by definition "irresponsible." The trick is to know whether a problem is truly unsolvable; this is something that politicians and experts can debate forever. Another example: whether a leader is "semi-loyal" is a highly consequential interpretation that is hard to make. This is doubly true for the "hidden disloyal" opposition Linz mentions. If the framework does not provide clear criteria for classifying actors, we cannot use it to generate testable hypotheses. A final example: Linz argues that a breakdown happens when polarization passes a "point of no return." But "point of no return" is just a metaphor for the last chance to avoid a breakdown. Logically, once that point is passed, breakdown is unavoidable. This is a matter for post hoc judgment, not something that we can actually observe or measure, so it has no predictive utility.
The second limitation of Linz's framework is that it has not been subjected to tests that would confirm its generality. The *Breakdown* project included 14 case studies, but they were fodder for Linz's inductive reasoning, not tests. If they had been tests, the framework would not have fit them all well, despite its flexibility. Realizing this, Linz and Stepan themselves presented their project as something less than a general theory: “Although we are concerned with middle-level generalizations, it is the editors’ view that the historicity of macro-political processes precludes the highly abstract generalizing of ahistorical social scientific models of the type susceptible to computer simulations and applicable to all past and any future cases” (Linz and Stepan 1978:ix). This is why I have chosen to call this project a theoretical framework rather than a theory.

*O'Donnell and Schmitter: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*

The *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* project sought to explain transitions rather than breakdowns, but in many other respects it was very similar to the *Breakdown* project. Guided by an initial essay by O'Donnell, the editors commissioned 13 European and Latin American case studies, which were published in a multi-volume work (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986a). Unlike Linz and Stepan, the *Transitions* editors also commissioned seven comparative chapters that were published separately (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986b). But like Linz, O'Donnell and Schmitter wrote a summary volume that attempted to distill the case studies and comparisons into a single theoretical framework (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

The parallels between the two projects extend to the content of the frameworks they developed. O’Donnell and Schmitter’s framework simplified reality in ways very similar to Linz’s framework. The *Transitions* authors pinpointed a beginning, crucial turning point, and an
end of the process; defined the actors with respect to their orientation to democracy; and placed
the actors in a relationship with a mass public. The beginning of the process, according to
O’Donnell and Schmitter, is always a division within the authoritarian leadership between
hardliners (duros), who favor continuing authoritarian rule, and softliners (blandos), who favor a
more open regime. The softliners succeed in creating an opening (abertura) that allows for
political liberalization. When pro-democracy opposition figures tentatively explore the new
freedom without being punished, others become more courageous. Civil society undergoes a
"resurrection," which punctures the regime's facade of legitimacy and increasingly transfers
authority to opposition leaders. Negotiations ensue among the hardliners, the softliners, and the
opposition over fundamental military, political, and economic questions. The turning point
comes when the regime sets a date for elections. Before that point, the opposition could get out of
hand, giving the hardliners a pretext for a coup. After that point, the opposition needs the
softliners to guarantee that the elections will actually be held and the softliners need the
opposition to behave moderately so as to vindicate the softliners' strategy of opening. Faced with
this shared interest between softliners and the opposition, the hardliners lose control of the
process, which makes completion of some kind of transition increasingly likely.

Like Linz's Breakdown framework, the Transitions framework builds in several alternate
paths. The most important is the urgency of the opening, which ranges from a speedy
"extrication" to a painfully slow "transition from above." When the military wants to extricate
itself from responsibility for an economic or military calamity, the transition is faster and more
certain, as in Argentina in 1982-83. When a military government earns some legitimacy from
successful governance, it can dictate the pace and the terms of the transition over a longer period
of time, as in Brazil from 1974 to 1985. The *Transitions* framework also builds in flexibility by recognizing that some countries face far more difficult negotiation agendas than others. In some countries, negotiations must reconcile opposition demands for transitional justice with military officers' demands for immunity; in other countries this is less of an issue. In some countries there are deep struggles over the constitution, the electoral law, and the rights of political parties, while in other countries there are few objections to restoring the pre-coup rules of the game. There are also many important decisions to make about the rules governing the relations among business, labor, and the state that vary from country to country. Finally, in some countries some or all of these issues are temporarily decided in a formal, explicit pact, while in others no formal pact is signed, even though a "pacted transition" is always desirable, according to the authors.

In two respects O’Donnell and Schmitter sought to distinguish their *Transitions* framework from the *Breakdown* framework, but the differences are more in style than substance. First, O’Donnell and Schmitter gave greater emphasis to uncertainty:

One of the basic arguments (which we share) of the Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan volume . . . is that none of those breakdowns was fatalistically bound to occur. . . . This, however, does not detract from the fact that crucial personae during the breakdown period seem in retrospect like actors in a Greek tragedy, anticipating their fate but fulfilling it to the bitter end. . . . What actors do and do not do seems much less tightly determined by “macro” structural factors during the transitions we study here than during the breakdown of democratic regimes (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:19).

I am not convinced that transitions are actually less certain than breakdowns. O’Donnell and Schmitter’s claim may have been influence by their vantage point, looking retrospectively at
completed breakdowns and prospectively at ongoing transitions, and sympathetically seeing through the eyes of the losers in breakdowns and of the potential winners in transitions.\textsuperscript{8} Especially in comparison to the more macro-causal, structural theories, both frameworks stand out as unusually voluntaristic. Only game-theoretic explanations give greater weight to individual decision-making and less to context. This emphasis is undoubtedly a consequence of the approach that was used, in both projects, to develop the framework. There is a danger of myopia—giving too much weight to micro-causes and too little to macro-causes—whenever one pays close attention to cases. Admittedly, whether these frameworks give too much or too little weight to the choices made by leaders is an empirical question; it may be that scholars who take a structural approach need bifocals. However, the fact that all of the cases included in the \textit{Transitions} project ended up with successful transitions in spite of the many micro-level uncertainties suggests that structural factors should have been credited with greater weight.

O’Donnell and Schmitter were also more openly prescriptive. In fact, they saw themselves as writing a kind of manual for democratizers (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:5). Most of their advice urged the democratic opposition to strengthen the regime softliners in their struggle with the hardliners until after the transition was complete, so that the friends of democracy would have powerful allies inside the regime. Therefore, the authors argued, opposition leaders should not encourage a popular upsurge that might provoke a backlash; they should be patient until elections are convoked; and they should do whatever is necessary, even collaborate in designing a biased electoral law, to ensure that parties of the right and center-right do well in the first elections. This is not really very different from the aims of Linz and Stepan, however. Linz wrote that
our problem formulation seeks to point out opportunities that democratic leaders might use to assure the consolidation, stability, persistence, and reequilibration of their regimes, as well as the pitfalls likely to be encountered in the process. We would hope that our knowledge will help them in their efforts, even though our insights, if valid, should also be useful to those who want to attend a ‘school for dictators’ (Linz 1978:5)

In view of the many similarities between the two projects, it is not surprising that the Transitions framework shares many of the limitations of the Breakdown framework. Slippery concepts that require judicious interpretation play a fundamental role in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, most obviously in the terms "hardliner," "softliner," and "opposition." As with Linz and Stepan, these actors are defined by their objectives, not by any more objective characteristic. This is a problem because the framework cannot generate testable hypotheses unless there is some reliable way to identify these actors in specific situations. For example, the framework suggests that an opening happens when softliners gain ascendancy over the hardliners, but empirically, what does this mean? If it means that there are some actors whom we could a priori identify as softliners, the framework does not tell us how to identify them (much less how to know when they become ascendant):

During these transitions, in many cases and around many themes, it is almost impossible to specify ex ante which classes, sectors, institutions, and other groups will take what role, opt for which issues, or support what alternative. Indeed, it may be that almost all one can say is that, during crucial moments and choices of the transition, most--if not all--of those "standard" actors are likely to be divided and hesitant about their interests and ideals and, hence, incapable of coherent collective action.
If it means that hardliners become softliners, the framework begs the question of why they switched camps. Either way, it borders on circular reasoning: if there was an opening, the softliners must have become ascendant (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:4). O'Donnell and Schmitter recognized this problem but believed that it is impossible to employ "normal science methodology" due to the high degree of indeterminacy embedded in situations where unexpected events (fortuna), insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices, confusion about motives and interests, plasticity, and even indefiniteness of political identitites, as well as the talents of specific individuals (virtù), are frequently decisive in determining the outcomes (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:4-5).

Not surprisingly, these ideas that are so hard to test were not really tested. Although many case studies were written for the project, they were not treated as tests but as examples (where they conformed to the framework) or alternate paths (where they did not). If the case studies had been used as tests, parts of the framework would not have fit well in some cases. Indeed, transitions as complex and unpredictable as O'Donnell and Schmitter claimed could hardly be expected to fit any framework well, except in being complex and unpredictable.

Linz and Stepan: Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation

In 1996, Linz and Stepan published another collaborative work on democratization, this time on transitions and consolidation rather than breakdowns (Linz and Stepan 1996). The later book also differs in being truly co-authored rather than edited, and in covering a more recent set of regime changes that extended their earlier Southern Europe-Latin America domain to Eastern
Europe. Thus, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (henceforth referred to as *Problems*) was based on the authors’ own case studies of Spain, Portugal, Greece, Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Estonia, and Latvia. Because a more diverse set of cases was included, and probably because the authors analyzed the cases themselves, *Problems* yields a much more integrated set of propositions and gives greater weight to structural factors and less to the free will of individual leaders. It is, however, still a basically inductive approach.

The fundamental insight of Linz and Stepan is that the type of regime from which a country transits affects the transition paths it can take and the problems it must solve to become a consolidated democracy. They define four different types of non-democratic regime—totalitarian, authoritarian, post-totalitarian, and sultanistic—and define each in terms of its degree or type of pluralism, ideology, mobilization, and leadership (Linz and Stepan 1996: ch. 3). Because each regime type has a different mix of actors and different relationships among them, certain transition paths are available to some regimes but not others. For example, the path of extrication from above by a hierarchical military is available for authoritarian regimes (if they have a hierarchical military), but not to the other regimes, because their armed forces are subordinated to or penetrated by the official party or the “sultan’s” personalistic network (Linz and Stepan 1996:57). Similarly, because each regime type has many facets, any transition from one regime type to another (to democracy in all these cases), is a transition on multiple fronts. Simply holding elections cannot change every aspect of the regime; it is also necessary to allow or create an active and independent civil society, encourage a variety of political ideologies, substitute participation for mobilization or demobilization, and install leaders who agree to be checked by
the rule of law.

Furthermore, “democratic consolidation” is itself as complex as any regime type. According to Linz and Stepan, democracy is consolidated behaviorally, when no groups try to secede or overthrow the government by force; attitudinally, when most citizens are committed to democratic rules of the game; and constitutionally, when all groups expect to resolve conflicts within the rules recognized by the regime (Linz and Stepan 1996: ch. 1). The authors also reveal the causes that can produce this happy state of affairs: democratic consolidation happens, and continues, when five arenas reinforce one another. These arenas are civil society, political society (the party system and elections), economic society (business and labor and economic policy), the state apparatus, and the rule of law. Because each type of non-democratic regime lacks one or more of these arenas, democratic consolidation faces a different set of problems, depending on the initial regime type. In this sense, Linz and Stepan propose a path-dependent model.9

It is not, however, a purely path-dependent model, for four other conditions can intervene to shape transitions and the prospects for consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996: ch. 5). First, Linz and Stepan argue that “stateness”—agreement about territorial borders and citizenship rights—is a prerequisite for democratic consolidation. Second, international forces (foreign policies, the Zeitgeist, and diffusion) can influence transitions and consolidation. Third, domestic economic performance can affect democratization through its impact on the legitimacy of either pre-democratic or democratic governments. Finally, the constitutional legacies that democratic governments inherit and the decisions they make about constitutional reform affect their ability to deal with emerging problems in ways that most citizens consider legitimate.

The Problems framework has great appeal for its ability to distinguish among the
Southern European, Latin American, and East European cases covered in the book, especially across these three regions. Why is it that the least-successful regimes are found in the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe, democratic but only partially consolidated regimes in Latin America, and consolidated democracies in Southern Europe? In Table 4.7, the most successful democracies are in the upper-left portion and the least successful ones are clustered in the lower-right corner. As the table shows, two factors discriminate well between the eastern and western countries: prior regime type and political economy. All of the eastern cases except Poland had non-democratic regimes that were not authoritarian, and all suffered the truly wrenching adjustment from a state-socialist economy to capitalism. The western cases had it relatively easy with transitions from classic authoritarian regimes and less traumatic economic transitions. Latin American economies had a rough time in the 1980s, to be sure, but not as difficult as those in the east; and the Southern European economies actually benefited economically during their transition years. The economic incentives also distinguish well between the Southern European and the Latin American cases. Spain, Portugal, and Greece could look forward to subsidies if they joined the European Union, which required democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996:219-20). For Latin America, however, democratic transitions coincided with the "Lost Decade" of economic decline, stabilization, and structural adjustment programs.

The Problems framework also distinguishes to some extent among the more and less successful democracies within regions. In Latin America, the two most consolidated regimes, Uruguay and Argentina, restored their pre-coup constitutions, which were relatively legitimate. Brazilian consolidation was hampered by military interference in the constituent assembly; and Chile had to live with a constitution inherited from the Pinochet dictatorship. In the post-
communist states, there are two factors that sort out the more and less successful cases (Linz and Stepan 1996:435-9). First, the prior regimes differed enough to set these countries on different paths. At one end, Poland had a basically authoritarian regime; at the other, Romania under Ceaușescu had a totalitarian regime with some arbitrary and personalistic "sultanistic" elements. The remaining cases were post-totalitarianism, but some were more evolved than others. Post-totalitarianism was in the early stages in Bulgaria, "frozen" in Czechoslovakia, and "mature" in Hungary. Second, some of these states had to deal with challenges to the state--particularly the USSR/Russia and its former republics--while Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania had achieved stateness before 1989. Putting these two factors together, the more unified states that started from an authoritarian or mature post-totalitarian regime had an easier time of inaugurating and consolidating democracy than the states that had different regimes or stateness problems.

Despite its many virtues, this framework share several limitations with the other inductive frameworks discussed in this chapter. One need look no farther than the regime types themselves to find slippery concepts. The “post-totalitarian” regime type is defined very carefully, but the authors place a heavy explanatory burden on its three evolutionary degrees—the mature, frozen, and early post-totalitarian subtypes. The authors also make a convincing case for the distinctness of sultanistic regimes, yet the only case in this book with sultanistic characteristics (Romania) is classified as a “totalitarian-cum-sultanistic” regime. If these regime types were as useful as the authors claim, it should not be necessary to modify them so much in order to apply them.

In addition, the relationships among Linz and Stepan’s explanatory factors are not completely clear. Table 4.7 actually makes these relationships appear to be clearer and simpler than they are in the book, but there are some puzzles even in the table. Why, for example, do
constitutional constraints matter a great deal for the Southern European and Latin American cases but not for the post-communist cases? And which matters more for the post-communist cases, stateness or the degree of post-totalitarianism? If stateness matters more, then the relative success of Czech democracy is a puzzle; if the prior regime matters more, then Hungary’s difficulties are puzzling. And of course, the large empty white spaces in the table indicate areas in which the framework yields no predictions. Like a checklist, this framework does make useful predictions at the extremes, but for the mixed cases, its predictions are undefined. The authors seem to be free to refer to their explanatory factors selectively, as needed to explain any of their outcomes, but they do not commit themselves to any systematic correspondence between each possible set of causes and the possible outcomes. Actually, it would be very hard for them to do so, for there are more than one thousand possible combinations of causal conditions. It is practically guaranteed, therefore, that Linz and Stepan could always identify something unique about each case that could account for its degree of success at democratic consolidation.

Finally, as in the Breakdown and Transitions projects, the propositions advanced in the Problems volume are not really tested. Scholars pursuing this approach move constantly back and forth between the cases and the framework they are constructing, always seeking to improve the fit between them. This may be the best way to produce propositions that are likely to survive rigorous testing later on, but because the framework is derived inductively from the cases, evaluating it by how well it fits these same cases is not a fair test. Nevertheless, the fit of the Problems framework is not perfect. If it were “tested” with the cases included in the volume, it would fail in a few respects. For example, most observers would agree that Greece has a less consolidated democracy than Spain or Portugal, but the framework suggests that it should be
more consolidated. The prior regime was authoritarian like those of Spain and Portugal, it had
the same positive economic and international incentives to democratize, it had achieved
stakeness, and its constitution-making environment was as unconstrained and favorable as
Spain’s. Another example is the disparity between Russia and the Baltic republics. All are in the
same cell of Table 4.7: post-totalitarian prior regimes with stateness problems and a wrenching
economic transformation. Yet Russia has not achieved democracy, Lithuania has, and Estonia
and Latvia are close. The differences are simple enough to explain by referring to the size of the
territory, the level of economic development, the severity of the stateness problem, the length of
totalitarian rule, the length of any pre-totalitarian experience with democracy, or elite attitudes
toward citizenship for ethnic Russians; and Linz and Stepan refer to all of these to account for
the disparity (Linz and Stepan 1996: ch. 19 & 20). The problem is that none of these explanatory
factors are part of their theoretical framework. Rather, they are ad hoc arguments that are
required to fill in the gaps between the framework and the reality. Such arguments do not
strengthen the framework; on the contrary, they are evidence of its limitations.

Boolean Analysis

Boolean analysis is a procedure that associates sets of explanatory conditions with
outcomes that one wishes to explain. A Boolean analyst systematically codes each case as
possessing (1) or not possessing (0) each hypothesized cause and as achieving (1), or not (0) the
outcome to be explained, such as democratic survival. A computer program then groups together
all the cases that have the same combination of causes and classifies them as positive
confirmations (all causes = 1, outcome = 1), negative confirmations (all causes = 0, outcome =
0), contradictions (all causes = 1, outcome = 0, or vice versa), or mixed (some causes are 1,
others 0). Unlike checklists and frameworks, therefore, Boolean analysis can be used to test individual propositions systematically using evidence that did not originally inspire the propositions.

In practice, scholars also use Boolean analysis in a more inductive way. Instead of counting only the all-1 causes as positive confirmations, only the all-0 causes as negative confirmations, and all other combinations as “mixed,” analysts can count some mixed combinations as “noncontradictory” as long as all the cases sharing the same causal combination had the same outcome. Software is available that can search systematically for all the contradictory and non-contradictory combinations. The number of causal combinations can be large, and each one can be quite complex. For example, if there are five proposed causes, A-E, of democratic survival, then Boolean analysis can produce conclusions such as

\[
\text{IF } \{[(A \text{ and } B \text{ and } C) \text{ or } (B \text{ and } C \text{ and } D) \text{ or } (C \text{ and } D \text{ and not } A)] \text{ and not } E\}, \\
\text{THEN the democratic regime survives.}
\]

Boolean analysis can also produce reduced-form statements that boil down such complex formulas to the simplest expression that is not contradicted, such as (for the same example), “IF not E, THEN the democratic regime survives.”

Charles Ragin, the best-known advocate of Boolean analysis, argues that it is more appropriate than conventional statistical methods for testing theories in comparative politics that involve multiple causal paths (Ragin 1987). Statistical analysis usually tries to fit the same model to every case, but Boolean analysis assumes that different countries can take different paths to the same outcome, and can search for these different paths. Boolean analysis can therefore be an inductive method for discovering how to integrate propositions. Boolean analysis, frameworks,
and checklists are overlapping approaches. Like frameworks but unlike checklists, Boolean analysis tries to integrate propositions and assumes that there are multiple causal paths. Like checklists but unlike frameworks, Boolean analysis reduces each proposition to an either/or item and typically examines a large number of such items.

Boolean analysis is still rare in comparative politics, so there is only one clear application of it in the democratization literature. However, it is a very good example that serves the useful purpose of summarizing the strengths and weaknesses of both checklists and frameworks. In 1994 Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Gisèle DeMeur published a Boolean analysis of democratic survival hypotheses using 16 countries in inter-war Europe as the domain (Berg-Schlosser and Meur 1994). The authors tested nine theories or theoretical frameworks elaborated by Lipset, Vanhanen, Moore (as amended by John Stephens), Luebbert, Hermens, Sani and Sartori, Dahl, and Linz. Between them, these works advanced nearly 50 different propositions about democratic survival, so this study amounts to a test of a quite extensive checklist, albeit in a medium-sized, geographically compact, and historically bounded sample.

This test illustrates well the characteristics of the kind of knowledge that we obtain from checklists and frameworks. First, it is revealing that different scholars trying to explain the same outcomes in subsets of the same countries in the same period came up with such different sets of propositions. The objectively true causes do not just leap out at anyone who looks at the historical record. Every scholar brings to these analyses his or her own world views, conceptual lenses, hunches, blinders, and biases, and therefore inevitably creates a selective and subjective version of events. This fact alone is sufficient to justify treating the propositions generated by inductive approaches as hypotheses, not confirmed theories.
Second, the frameworks do not work especially well when they are applied beyond their original domains. Berg-Schlosser and DeMeur found that a few cases fit most of these frameworks quite well: 7 of the 9 theories correctly predicted democratic survival in Britain and breakdown in Italy, and 6 of the 9 correctly predicted the breakdown in Spain. These cases were relatively easy to predict, even using quite different frameworks. The other 13 countries, however, had a net confirmation rate of only 15 percent. Furthermore, the average country was a mixed case in 5 of the 9 frameworks, and the average framework classified 56 percent of the countries as mixed. These results are analogous to the tendency of checklists to predict well at the extremes but not in the middle.

Due to the large number of mixed cases, none of the frameworks correctly predicted every outcome. Moreover, six of the nine frameworks were contradicted by at least one country when they did make a clear prediction. The most successful set of hypotheses was taken from Lipset’s *Political Man*, which was positively or negatively confirmed in 10 cases and contradicted by one, for a predictive success rate of 56 percent. No other framework predicted as many as half of the cases correctly. In fact, the average success rate for all 9 frameworks was 28 percent. Clearly, these frameworks tend to lack general empirical confirmation. Furthermore, although these frameworks make progress toward theoretical integration, they are not integrated enough to avoid a high proportion of undefined predictions, which makes them vulnerable to selective interpretation and application.

Berg-Schlosser and DeMeur also carried out some exploratory inductive analysis, searching for reduced sets of propositions within each framework that did not result in contradictions. The simplest of these tended to be trivial. For example, Linz’s proposition (as
rendered by the authors) that “democracy survives where the anti-democratic upper classes do not intervene in politics” fits all the cases perfectly but borders on circular reasoning (Berg-Schlosser and Meur 1994:243). Similarly, in the exploratory analysis of Dahl’s propositions, the authors find that “when democratic legitimacy is strong and the military does not intervene, democracy survives,” which they admit is “trivial or almost tautological” (Berg-Schlosser and Meur 1994:269). They also found several far more complex causal combinations. A good example comes from the section on Dahl, which concludes that democracies survive when 1) there are no anti-system parties and power resources are dispersed, or 2) there is an ethno-linguistic cleavage in a strongly egalitarian society, or 3) when there are segmented subcultures, each subculture is organized and unified by strong leadership (Berg-Schlosser and Meur 1994:269). These propositions “work,” but they are hardly general. Combination (2) in the preceding sentence, for example, applies only to Finland and Belgium, so we lack a solid basis for generalizing to the rest of the world.

The limitations of Boolean analysis stem directly from the tendency to increase the theoretical possibilities far beyond the number of available cases. The number of possible combinations of dichotomous variables is $2^x$, where $x$ is the number of variables being considered. In theory, with just 5 variables there are 32 possible causal combinations; with 10, there are 1,024; with 50, there are $1.13 \times 10^{15}$! A framework does not have to be very complex before every case has its own unique combination of causal factors, which then must coincide with only one outcome, and most other causal combinations have no cases and undefined outcomes. In practice, associations among variables prevent predictions from outstripping sample size quite so quickly, but it is still a real problem. In Berg-Schlosser and DeMeur’s analysis, the
analyses of Dahl’s and one of Linz’s frameworks placed all but two countries in their own unique explanatory categories, and the second Linzian analysis had all the countries in unique categories.

This is a problem that is common to all inductive analyses; Boolean analysis merely has the advantage of exposing it more clearly. One of the first things that students of comparative politics learn is that we suffer from the “many variables, small N” problem: too many possible causes, too few cases to test them all. What fewer have realized is that open-ended searches for combinations of variables augments the “many variables, small N” problem exponentially. Our task is not merely ruling out A and B and C; it is ruling out A, B, C, AB, AC, BC, and ABC. Checklists and frameworks are indispensable for reminding us about all the things that may matter, but they do not give reliable guidance about which things really do matter, how much, or in what combinations. The conventional wisdom is more conventional than wise. In order to learn how much to trust the items on a checklist, we need strong theoretical guidance and rigorous empirical testing. The rest of this book critically examines how well the sources from which our checklist items sprang meet these theoretical and empirical requirements.
## Table 4.1: Different Terminology for Equivalent Stages of Democratization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preconditions</td>
<td>Background conditions</td>
<td>Transformation of hegemony into near-polyarchy</td>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>End of authoritarianism</td>
<td>Decay of authoritarian rule</td>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>Prerequisites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>Genesis or decision phase</td>
<td>Inauguration</td>
<td>Instauration</td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>Installation</td>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>Transition attempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival</td>
<td>Habitation</td>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>Re-equilibration</td>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>Consolidation</td>
<td>Consolidation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Consolida-</td>
<td>Break-</td>
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<td>tion</td>
<td>down</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4.2: Leadership and Cultural Causes of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Stages Affected, according to each source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mass Political Culture</strong></td>
<td>Source: A B C D E F G H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass support for democracy in general and rejection of non-democracy</td>
<td>S  T3  T  S  S  S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance and pluralist values</td>
<td>X  X  TS  S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital, public trust, civility, cooperation</td>
<td>T3  S  S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass support for this specific regime and rejection of prior regime</td>
<td>T3  S  S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatism and flexibility</td>
<td>TS  S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestantism</td>
<td>X  T1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity; at least, not Islam or Confucianism</td>
<td>T3  X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Elite Leadership

| Elite belief in the superiority of democracy                       | S  X  X  T1  T  S  S                      |
| Divisions among the preceding nondemocratic leaders                | PT  T3  P  T                              |
| Moderate leadership that is willing to compromise                  | X  X  TS  S                              |
| Nonviolent leadership that works within the system                 | X  TS  S                                |
| Efficacious leadership                                             | S  X  S                                 |
| Continual adjustment, reform, and renewal                         | S  S  S                                 |
| Pacts                                                               | T  T  TS                                 |
| Contingency and strategy                                           | T  X  T                                 |
| Cooperative and competitive political relationships                | X  S                                     |

**Key:**
The letters in the right-hand columns denote the stage of democratization that each cause is thought to affect.
P=preconditions, T=transition, S=Survival, X=any or all stages. Huntington (column D) specifies different causal processes for each wave of democracy. The numbers in this column refer to waves of democracy: T1=first wave, T2=second wave, T3=third wave.

**Sources:**
A: Rustow (1970:337-63). Rustow also believed that democracy arises as a convenient solution to a prolonged conflict between two camps, but argued that the nature of the conflict varies by country.
C: Huntington (1991: 37-38). In this passage, Huntington summarizes the conventional wisdom without endorsing it. He also mentions an “instrumental rather than consummatory culture” and both consensus and absence of consensus on political and social values.
D: Huntington (1991:106-107). In this passage, Huntington summarizes his own understanding of the causes of each of the three waves of democratization.
E: Lipset (1994). Lipset also mentions individualism and the separation of church and state.
G: Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1995) passim. The authors also mention strong leadership, in particular the depoliticization of cleavages by leaders.
### Table 4.3: Economic and Social Causes of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>The Economy</th>
<th>Source:</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic equality and poverty reduction</td>
<td>no X X T1 P S S S</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High standard of living</td>
<td>no X X T1 TS T TS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Market economy; limited state ownership and control</td>
<td>X X P S TS TS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recent good economic performance; no economic crisis</td>
<td>X T3 S S S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic crisis</td>
<td>T3 T T</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rapid growth</td>
<td>T3 TS T</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low or decreasing relative deprivation</td>
<td>X S</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Society</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong civil society vis-a-vis the state; checks on state power</td>
<td>X T1 S TS TS S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Either no deep ethnic divisions; or cross-cutting ones</td>
<td>S X X S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy and education</td>
<td>no X T1&amp;3 T TS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Large middle class, especially small business, professionals, and students</td>
<td>X T1&amp;3 T TS</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No permanent minority excluded completely or indefinitely</td>
<td>S S S</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>T1 T TS</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>If commercial/industrial, then decentralized economy</td>
<td>T1 T</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dispersed inequalities; cross-cutting cleavages</td>
<td>X S</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-clientelistic elite-mass relationships</td>
<td>X S</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
The letters in the right-hand columns denote the stage of democratization that each cause is thought to affect. P=preconditions, T=transition, S=Survival, X=any or all stages. Huntington (column D) specifies different causal processes for each wave of democracy. The numbers in this column refer to waves of democracy: T1=first wave, T2=second wave, T3=third wave.

**Sources:**
B: Dahl (Dahl 1971: 203). Dahl also argued that polyarchy was more likely in agrarian societies if farmers were independent smallholders.
C: Huntington (1991:37-38). In this passage, Huntington summarizes the conventional wisdom without endorsing it. His list also included a feudal aristocratic past (from Barrington Moore).
D: Huntington (1991:106-107). In this passage, Huntington summarizes his own understanding of the causes of each of the three waves of democratization. Unlike other authors, he also claims that third-wave transitions are more likely in an intermediate zone of development.
E: Lipset (1994).
H: Diamond (1996) passim. Diamond also argues that democracy is more common in small states and that this tendency accounts for the disproportionate success of former British colonies.
Table 4.4: State and Institutional Causes of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Characteristics</th>
<th>Source:</th>
<th>Stages Affected, according to each source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective control over national territory; national sovereignty</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to maintain public order</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of widespread corruption</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian control of the military</td>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictable policymaking and implementation</td>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective government oversight of the bureaucracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>P</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political Institutions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Source:</th>
<th>Stages Affected, according to each source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A parliamentary, not presidential, constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalized political parties</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization (devolution or federalism; strong local government)</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective guarantees for the civil liberties of all ethnicities</td>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization itself</td>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contestation before inclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An electoral system that balances representation and governability</td>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
The letters in the right-hand columns denote the stage of democratization that each cause is thought to affect. P=preconditions, T=transition, S=Survival, X=any or all stages. Huntington (column D) specifies different causal processes for each wave of democracy. This column is blank because Huntington did not consider these causes useful for explaining waves of democracy.

**Sources:**
B: Dahl (Dahl 1971: 203). I have omitted Dahl well-known argument that transitions occur when the costs of repression exceed the costs of toleration.
C: Huntington (1991:37-38). In this passage, Huntington summarizes the conventional wisdom without endorsing it. He also mentioned internal democracy in political organizations.
D: Huntington (1991:106-107). In this passage, Huntington summarizes his own understanding of the causes of each of the three waves of democratization.
E: Lipset (1994).
G: Diamond, Linz, and Lipset (1995) passim. The authors also list among their facilitating conditions the restriction of the military’s role to national defense, an aggregative rather than representational party system, and mechanisms for recruiting and training leaders.
### Table 4.5: International Causes of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Stages Affected, according to each source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Influences</td>
<td>Source: A B C D E F G H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstration effects, contagion, and snowballing</td>
<td>T T3 T T T TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The demise of historic rivals to democracy</td>
<td>T2 T T TS TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force, conquest, or weak or temporary occupation</td>
<td>T T T2 T T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic or economic assistance, sanctions, or conditioningity</td>
<td>T T3 TS TS TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British colonial past</td>
<td>X T2 P TS no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in a regional organization, or desire to join</td>
<td>T3 TS TS TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion of democratic values and models</td>
<td>T3 T TS TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational organizations and activities</td>
<td>T3 TS TS TS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External assistance to prodemocracy movements</td>
<td>T3 T T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
The letters in the right-hand columns denote the stage of democratization that each cause is thought to affect.
P=preconditions, T=transition, S=Survival, X=any or all stages. Huntington (column D) specifies different causal processes for each wave of democracy. The numbers in this column refer to waves of democracy: T1=first wave, T2=second wave, T3=third wave.

**Sources:**
C: Huntington (1991:37-38). In this passage, Huntington summarizes the conventional wisdom without endorsing it.
D: Huntington (1991:106-107). In this passage, Huntington summarizes his own understanding of the causes of each of the three waves of democratization. He also mentions military defeats suffered by dictatorship, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the shifts of the Catholic Church to a pro-democracy position.
E: Lipset (1994).
Table 4.6: Using a Checklist to Predict Democracy in 2000
(Each “•” means the condition was satisfied.)

| Conditions thought to favor democracy | Austria | Finland | Italy | France | Brazil | Nicaragua | Haiti | India | Peru | Tanzania | Nigeria | Russia | Indonesia | Ivory Coast | Thailand | Uganda | Iraq |
|---------------------------------------|---------|---------|-------|--------|--------|-----------|-------|-------|------|----------|---------|--------|-----------|------------|---------|--------|
| Capitalist economy                    | •       | •       | •     | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Separation of church and state        | •       | •       | •     | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Democratic neighbors                  | •       | •       | •     | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Educated population                   | •       | •       | •     | •      | •      | •         |       | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| High standard of living               | •       | •       | •     | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| No excluded minority                  | •       | •       | •     | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Democratic political culture          | •       | •       | •     | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Elite belief in democracy             | •       | •       | •     | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Cooperative leadership                | •       | •       | •     | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Ethnic homogeneity                    | •       | •       | •     | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| National unity                        | •       | •       | •     | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Former British colony                 |         |         |       | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     |       | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Relatively equal distribution of wealth|         |         |       | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Competition before inclusion          |         |         |       | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Imposition during postwar occupation  | •       |         |       | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Majority Protestant population         |         |         |       | •      | •      | •         | •     | •     | •    | •        | •       | •      | •          | •           | •       | •      |
| Number of favorable conditions         | 13      | 12      | 11    | 10     | 7       | 6         | 6     | 5     | 4    | 3        | 3       | 3      | 3          | 3           | 3       | 3      |
| FH combined score in 2000              | 14      | 14      | 13    | 13     | 10      | 10        | 5     | 11    | 9    | 8        | 8       | 6      | 9          | 5           | 11      | 5      |

**Source:** Unpublished research by Annabella España Nájera, January 2003. Coding criteria and sources are described in the appendix to this chapter.
Table 4.7: Basic Distinctions Made by the Linz and Stepan Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Post-Totalitarian</th>
<th>Totalitarian-cum-Sultanistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stateness achieved</td>
<td>stateness problems</td>
<td>mature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Prosperity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Decline</td>
<td>Constitutional constraints</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrenching Transformation from State Socialist to Capitalist Economy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Stateness achieved</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stateness problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix: Coding Criteria and Sources for Checklist Demonstration

Capitalist economy: Coded 1 if liberal capitalist principles are pursued by the government and economic elite (e.g. open markets, private property) (Department of State 2003).

Separation of church and state: Coded 1 if there is a clear separation of church (that is, no official religion) and state, and there is freedom of religion (Banks and Muller 1999; Department of State 2003).

Democratic neighbors: Coded 1 if all of the country's closest neighbors, those that share a border, have a democratic government in place (if Political Rights + Civil Liberties < 5)(Freedom House 2003).

Ethnic Homogeneity: Coded 0 if the effective number of ethnic groups (ENETH) exceeds 1.5. ENETH is the reciprocal of the sum of squared ethnic group shares of the population (CIA 2003); for Italy and France (Cox 1997).

Educated population: Coded 1 if the country has a literacy rate equal to or above the median literacy rate of the sample (81%) (Department of State 2003).

High standard of living: Coded 1 if per capita GDP exceeded or was equal to the sample median, $1,726 (Statistical Division of the United Nations Secretariat and International Labor Office 2003).

No excluded minority: Coded 1 if there is respect for minorities, that is, an absence of a cultural majority that does not tolerate some ethnic minority group (Department of State 2003).

Democratic political culture: Coded 1 if challenges to government are forwarded through democratic channels, citizens have the right to organize and protest, and government and opposition work within the system in their dealings with each other and citizens. (This
applies since the latest transition, attempted coup, or violent secessionist clash)
(Department of State 2003).

Elite belief in democracy: Coded 1 if the elite generally believe in democratic principles and work according to them in their attempts to gain office and/or gain power. That is, there have been no recent coup attempts or anti-establishment strategies since the latest transition, attempted coup, or secessionist and violent clash (Department of State 2003).

Cooperative leadership: Coded 1 if the elite, despite differences, work within the system and with each other to achieve change and therefore maintain or achieve democracy. No serious attempts to discredit the opposition are made, beyond what would be considered 'negative' campaigning examples. No political parties are banned (Department of State 2003; Human Rights Watch 2003).

National unity: Coded 0 if there are any terrorist activities against the government by nationals or violent secession movements (CIA 2003; Department of State 2003; Human Rights Watch 2003).

Former British colony: Coded 1 if the country was under the control of the British Empire, or a protectorate of the British Empire (Department of State 2003). We do not include Iraq because it was a League of Nations British mandate only briefly, from 1919 to 1932. However, if Iraq is coded as a former British colony, the correlation reported in the text is still .805.

Relatively equal distribution of wealth: Coded 1 if GINI measure was lower than 27 (World Bank 1999).

Competition before inclusion: Initial coding by Coppedge based on research assistance for
Robert A. Dahl. This was revised in accordance with passages in Dahl (1971), and codings of European cases in Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Gisèle De Meur (1994). Note:

France is coded 1 despite its being an example of simultaneous inclusion and contestation in *Polyarchy*, based on the French Revolution. The Third and Fourth Republics afforded sufficient elite experience with democracy that is more relevant to today's French democracy.

Imposition during postwar occupation (Department of State 2003).

Majority Protestant population (Department of State 2003).

Notes

I am grateful to Annabella España Nájera, Kathleen Collins, and Alan Dowty for advice on this chapter.


O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:


Reuschemeyer, Dietrich. 1991. Different Methods, Contradictory Results? Research on


Endnotes

1. Table 1 omits works by Lipset and Diamond, such as Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, “Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?”; Diamond, Developing Democracy; and Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited,” because these scholars tend to see democratization as a continuum of movement among finely shaded regime types. These are more interesting questions for them than the more dramatic regime changes. Nevertheless, they also use terms denoting stages such as democratic development, instauration, establishment, and institutionalization or consolidation.

2. Waterbury notes that Rustow’s 1970 article stated this position first.


4. Some formal theorists have developed arguments that economic elites force regime changes in order to maximize their tax-adjusted rate of profit. For example, see Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2001). However, this way of thinking has not yet entered the conventional wisdom.

5. A good overview and critique of this literature is in José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi (2002).

6. I am grateful to the Department of Political Science of the University of Notre Dame for the research assistantship that made Annabella España Nájera’s research possible. We worked together to choose variables on the basis of plausibility and data availability. I selected the countries. First I chose Finland, Austria, Italy, France, Russia, and India, to ensure that some of the largest and best-known countries would be included. I then add 11 others taken from a random sample of 40, again favoring countries that would be relatively well known to readers. This is not, therefore, a random sample, but it is numerically representative of regions and was not deliberately designed to confirm or frustrate the checklist’s predictions.

7. As Linz was my dissertation advisor, I can state this with some authority. I approach this section with trepidation because all of the authors reviewed here have been my professors, advisors, colleagues, or friends. I have tried to ignore these relationships in order to approach objectivity. If I have been too harsh, it is because I am trying too hard, and I ask for their understanding.

8. As I sit here in March 2003 observing Hugo Chávez’s assaults on Venezuelan democracy, I am very conscious of the great uncertainty of this possible breakdown.

9. This is, in my opinion, the best path-dependent model anyone has yet devised. For that reason, I am tempted to discuss it alongside the comparative history works in chapter 5. However, because it builds on the earlier Linz and Stepan and O’Donnell and Schmitter works and share some traits with them, I am discussing it here.
10. I figure the combinations by multiplying the number of favorable/unfavorable values that each independent causal factor can take on. Stateness can be present or absent, so it has at least 2 values. According to Problems table 4.2, there are at least 17 different available paths from the prior regimes to democracy. There are three kinds of of international influences (foreign policies, Zeitgeist, and diffusion) and each can be at least favorable or unfavorable independently of the others, leading to $2^3 = 8$ combinations. Political economy can, at the very least, be favorable, unfavorable, or disastrous, to recognize the differing economic performance across the three regions and its impact on legitimacy. Finally, chapter 5 (pp. 81-83) lists 6 different constitution-making environments. If each of these conditions is independent of the others, the number of combinations is obtained by multiplying them: $2 \times 17 \times 8 \times 3 \times 6 = 4,896$ possible sets of causal conditions. Even if we ignore Poland so that we can assume that prior regime type and paths are perfectly associated with the degree of economic decline, we get $2 \times 6 \times 8 \times 2 \times 6 + 2 \times 11 \times 8 \times 1 \times 6 = 1,680$ possible sets of causal conditions in the Linz and Stepan framework.

11. Although most statistical analyses do fit the same model to all cases, it is possible to use interaction terms to model multiple paths statistically. This practice has become increasingly common in quantitative democratization research, as we shall see in chapter 11.

12. The net confirmation rate is the number of confirmations minus the number of contradictions, divided by the number of frameworks.

13. Of course, propositions do not work when people make mistakes. Hungary actually contradicts part one of the preceding formula, according to Table 7 on p. 268 of the Berg-Schlosser article.