Disarmament and demobilisation (DD) programmes are vital components of strategic peacebuilding. DD provisions govern the collection and disposal of arms and ammunition, and oversee the discharge of active-duty combatants from the state’s armed forces, rebel groups, or both. Using data from the Peace Accords Matrix database, this report compares the five most recent cases of DD implementation: Nepal (2006), Liberia (2003), Macedonia (2001), Indonesia-Aceh (2005) and South Sudan (2005). A comparative analysis reveals several common patterns in the kinds of provisional and operational choices associated with efficient DD implementation. Having a definite timeline and largely completing the process prior to the first elections creates an incentivised environment for a timely DD process while diminishing the risks of election-related violence. Economic incentives associated with the process of cantonment can increase the duration of DD programmes. External actors with a strong mandate can solve problems faster and have been instrumental in achieving a swift DD progression. Disarmament programmes must be realistically matched to conflict settings. This can include the use of mobile collection units, which have proved to be successful in cases where a primary centralised site is not sufficient.

Executive summary

Disarmament and demobilisation (DD) programmes are vital components of strategic peacebuilding. DD provisions govern the collection and disposal of arms and ammunition, and oversee the discharge of active-duty combatants from the state’s armed forces, rebel groups, or both. Using data from the Peace Accords Matrix database, this report compares the five most recent cases of DD implementation: Nepal (2006), Liberia (2003), Macedonia (2001), Indonesia-Aceh (2005) and South Sudan (2005). A comparative analysis reveals several common patterns in the kinds of provisional and operational choices associated with efficient DD implementation. Having a definite timeline and largely completing the process prior to the first elections creates an incentivised environment for a timely DD process while diminishing the risks of election-related violence. Economic incentives associated with the process of cantonment can increase the duration of DD programmes. External actors with a strong mandate can solve problems faster and have been instrumental in achieving a swift DD progression. Disarmament programmes must be realistically matched to conflict settings. This can include the use of mobile collection units, which have proved to be successful in cases where a primary centralised site is not sufficient.
Introduction

Disarmament and demobilisation (DD) programmes are vital components of strategic peacebuilding and form a “symbiotic” microcosm of the entire peacebuilding process.\(^1\) Such programmes help to remove the organisational capacity of the warring parties to reconstitute an armed challenge or retaliate during the peace agreement implementation process. They can offer former protagonists some tangible escape from the security dilemmas and credible commitment problems inherent to post-conflict settings. Case studies that have explored DD implementation illustrate how local conditions generate difficulties in the implementation environment that vary dramatically among cases, revealing both the complexities and difficulties of DD implementation.\(^2\)

Disarmament provisions, as part of a peace accord settlement, govern the collection and disposal of the arms and ammunitions of the former combatants. In some instances the parameters of disarmament also include civilian population segments. We define demobilisation as the formal and controlled discharge of active-duty combatants from the armed forces of the state and rebel group(s). The Peace Accords Matrix (PAM) database contains qualitative and quantitative information on 29 comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) from 1989 to 2006. In the PAM project we define a peace agreement as being comprehensive when the major parties in the conflict are involved in the negotiation process and substantive issues underlying the dispute are included in the process.\(^3\) Of those 29 CPAs, 21 of them (or 72\%) contain a disarmament provision, 20 (or 69\%) include a demobilisation provision\(^4\) and 19 cases (66\%) contain both provisions in the CPA. This report is based on the five most recent cases of DD implementation worldwide, but draws on experiences from other disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) cases as well: Nepal (2006), Liberia (2003), Macedonia (2001), Indonesia-Aceh (2005) and South Sudan (2005).\(^5\)

These five cases are used for several reasons. Firstly, DDR programmes have evolved a great deal in recent decades, from the military-centric approaches of the cold war era to the more comprehensive approaches in the 1990s and 2000s. The Brahimi Report of 2000\(^6\) roughly marks the consolidation of an integrated approach to DDR that encompasses not only military issues, but the larger political, humanitarian and socioeconomic difficulties facing former combatants and their communities. For this reason, we examine cases of DDR implementation that took place after the Brahimi Report, on the assumption that they best reflect the current state of knowledge in design and implementation. For this reason the cases also form an application of a most similar systems case study design. The cases vary in the efficiency of DDR implementation, while containing most (but not all) of the same features. By choosing cases that are similar in most respects, we are able to hold constant as many extraneous variables as possible, which make the differences


\(^3\) For more on CPA definition, see PAM (Peace Accords Matrix), https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/static/Comprehensive_Peace_Agreement_Definition.pdf.

\(^4\) Madhav Joshi & John Darby, “Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM): a database of comprehensive peace agreements and their implementation, 1989-2006”, paper presented to the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, CA, April 4th 2012. The PAM database currently has 29 CPA cases. These cases are Bangladesh, the Philippines (Mindanao), Angola (2002), Angola (1992), El Salvador, Guatemala, Sierra Leone (1999), Sierra Leone (1996), Mozambique, South Africa, Burundi, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan, Northern Ireland, Djibouti (1994), Djibouti (2001), Indonesia, Croatia, Cambodia, Timor-Leste (East Timor), Ethiopia and Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Dijboui, Liberia, Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Niger, Macedonia, Mali, and Rwanda. Among these cases, Guinea-Bissau, the Philippines (Mindanao), Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Djibouti (1994) did not have a DD provision. Cases with a disarmament provision but without a demobilisation provision are Macedonia, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea. South Africa is the only case with a demobilisation provision but no disarmament provision. For more information, visit PAM (Peace Accords Matrix), https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/.

\(^5\) The CPAs in Nepal and South Sudan have not yet been made available in the public version of the PAM database.

starker. The cases also vary in terms of the DD components that have been investigated as part of the PAM project, as well as regionally. Our assessment will focus on how the components of the DD provisions were framed in the actual peace accord, and how institutional composition, external actors and economic incentives either facilitated or hindered their implementation. The report concludes with some recommendations for ongoing peace processes.

Nepal

In November 2006 the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) signed a CPA with the government that ended its decade-long insurgency against the Nepalese monarchy. The agreement called for the confinement of the CPN-M army in temporary cantonments (camps) that also housed their arms and ammunition in secured containers. The army of the Nepalese government was to be confined to its barracks and required to stow an equal number of arms and ammunition in secured containers. The United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) remotely monitored the containers. The language of the accord is ambiguous in terms of how DD should proceed following cantonment. Subsequent rounds of negotiations led to the Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies in December 2006 that clarified some of the procedures related to the cantonment process. It also established a Joint Monitoring Co-ordination Committee (JMCC) and a multiparty Special Political Committee (SPC) to supervise, integrate and rehabilitate the CPN-M combatants. Verification of the DD programmes would be conducted by UNMIN.\(^7\)

The initial implementation phase that included the cantonment process and the containment of weapons proceeded smoothly. In the first phase of the cantonment process the JMCC and UNMIN registered 32,250 CPN-M guerrillas across seven primary cantonment sites and 21 satellite cantonment sites. In all, 3,475 weapons were turned in and registered during phase one.\(^8\) Under a dual security arrangement, CPN-M leaders were allowed to retain a few commanders and a small number of weapons for their personal protection. In the second phase of the verification process that began in June 2007, 8,640 of those registered during phase one did not participate further in the verification process. This level of turnover in the verification process is most likely due to inflated participation in the registration phase. The CPN-M started a recruiting campaign that occurred after the accord was signed in order to register as many combatants as possible to increase its ranks in the new integrated Nepalese army. Another 4,008 individuals that were registered in phase one were disqualified after processing revealed that they were underage or had been recruited to register by the CPN-M after the signing of the ceasefire code of conduct in May 2006. Ultimately, UNMIN verified 19,602 CPN-M combatants as meeting the criteria for reintegration.\(^9\) Having completed the verification process, a constituent assembly election was held in April 2008. The CPN-M, the clear victors in the election, became the largest political party in the government.

In the cantonments, the formal DD processes did not unfold in a timely manner. There was resistance to demobilisation, given the electoral success of the CPN-M, and economic incentives to prolong cantonment, as the ex-combatants were being paid by the state (with external support).\(^10\) Incentives to prolong cantonment also extended beyond the camps because the CPN-M collected party dues from those in cantonment who were receiving compensation.\(^11\) Given the original goals of the CPN-M (to capture state power), its electoral success and secured funding removed much of its incentive to expedite the DD process. Even those who were disqualified in the verification process were not formally discharged from the camps by the SPC until February 2010.

Meanwhile, the government political process was characterised by contentious debate and bargaining over the number of CPN-M combatants to be integrated into the Nepalese

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\(^10\) ICG (International Crisis Group), “Nepal’s fitful peace process”, Asia Briefing no. 120, Kathmandu/Brussels, ICG, April 7th 2011.

army and the amount of compensation to be given to demobilised soldiers. The main political parties finally agreed in December 2011 to integrate 6,500 combatants into the army. Ex-combatants had to choose among three compensation packages to start in April 2012: (1) integration into the Nepalese army; (2) voluntary retirement; or (3) rehabilitation. Of those that were eligible, 17,074 combatants participated, of which 9,705 opted for integration into the state army. Those in cantonments were not pleased with the final deal struck between their leaders and the government. The CPN-M leadership had promised group entry into the Nepalese army, rank considerations based on combatants’ current level of education, and high-ranking positions to People’s Liberation Army commanders. The final deal contained none of these promises.

To pre-empt insurrection in the cantonments, the CPN-M chairman made a dramatic decision that the Nepalese army should take control of the cantonments, combatants and weapons containers. Within a day all the cantonments and weapons came under the control of the army. This development, perceived as a betrayal by many in the cantonment sites, led to a large decline in the number of those wanting to be part of the government army. The number of combatants seeking integration declined from 9,705 in the initial regrouping process to 3,194.

After four years of interparty negotiations, some 16,000 CPN-M combatants were formally demobilised. The bulk of ex-combatants returned to society with their compensation monies ranging from NR600,000 to NR900,000, depending on their rank and years of service.

### Liberia

The Accra Peace Agreement of August 2003 called for the prompt disarmament and demobilisation of all combatants, including government troops, rebel troops and paramilitaries. It was agreed that DD implementation would start within 30 days after a new national transitional government was installed. The accord asked for the Armed Forces of Liberia to be confined to barracks and all arms to be placed inside secured armouries. Arms and ammunition would be monitored by the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), which would also have an active deployment at all DD locations. The Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) was established to verify data provided by the government, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) about their forces, arms and ammunition. The accord also established the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (NCDDRR) to co-ordinate DDR activities; the commission comprised representatives from the warring parties and various stakeholders, including the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union. The accord also asked for international financial and technical support to assist in the implementation process. UNMIL was to be directly involved in the management of the entire process.

The disarmament and demobilisation of combatants was originally scheduled to begin with the establishment of the NCDDRR in November of 2003. The number of combatants to be demobilised was estimated to be between 103,000 and 107,000. The first phase of the DD process was completed by December 17th and involved the disarmament and demobilisation...
of 1,000 combatants from each side, including women and children, who were provided with separate facilities in the cantonment sites.\(^{21}\) Combatants were to be given a total payment of $300 in two installments of $150 from the trust fund established to fund the DDRR process and managed by the UN Development Programme. The first installment was paid several weeks into the demobilisation process, while the second followed reintegration.

The initial disarmament phase of the DD programme in Liberia broke down almost immediately into riots and protests as ex-combatants demanded immediate payment in return for their weapons. Acting quickly to address the situation, UNMIL decided to provide $75 to each combatant in exchange for his/her weapons, with the remaining $75 to be paid after the demobilisation process was completed.\(^{22}\) After the unrest abated, UNMIL stopped offering immediate payment in exchange for weapons. In the first phase of the DD programme 12,664 combatants were registered and 8,686 weapons were collected.\(^{23}\) The second and third phases of DD ran from April to October 2004 and formally disarmed and demobilised 101,449 former combatants, 22,313 of whom were women and 11,024 children. In total, 27,892 weapons were collected in the various phases and DD officially ended in October 2004.

In Liberia it was illegal to possess weapons after the DD process was over, yet the economic incentives to do so were considerable. Next door in Côte d’Ivoire another civil war was ending and a DDR programme was being planned that promised a total of $900 to each combatant for his/her weapons. Since this was considerably higher than the $300 being offered in Liberia, many combatants had decided to hold onto their weapons.\(^{24}\) As a result, the NCDDRR decided that UNMIL would still continue to conduct mobile disarmament operations.\(^{25}\) This mobile programme officially ended in July 2009. The final tally for the Liberian DD process was 103,019 combatants disarmed and demobilised (91,737 adults and 11,282 children; 78,052 males and 24,967 females).\(^{26}\) During the DD process 612 disarmed combatants had identified themselves as foreign nationals: 308 from Guinea, 242 from Sierra Leone, 50 from Côte d’Ivoire, 7 from Nijeria, 4 from Mali and 1 from Ghana.\(^{27}\)

### Macedonia

In August 2001 the government of Macedonia and Ushtria Clirimtare e Kombëtare (UCK) signed the Framework Agreement or Ohrid Agreement, which called for comprehensive voluntary disarmament and disbandment of all ethnic Albanian armed groups. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) troops were to assist and support the DD process.\(^{28}\) The Macedonian accord did not contain a specific provision related to the demobilisation of UCK combatants.

NATO officially began Operation Essential Harvest on August 27th 2001 with the deployment of approximately 3,500 NATO troops for a 30-day period to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their arms.\(^{29}\) In terms of the number of weapons to be collected, the government of Macedonia insisted that at least 60,000 weapons were to be collected and destroyed; however, rebel leaders had proposed and NATO had accepted a much lower estimate of 3,000.\(^{30}\) At the end of the 30-day mission, NATO forces had collected a total of 3,875 weapons.\(^{31}\) After the disarmament process, laws were passed making it illegal to possess weapons. After the completion of the disarmament phase, a UCK leader announced

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27 UN, Secretary-General’s Report to the UN Security Council, December 17th 2004.
in the press that all ethnic Albanian rebels had formally disbanded, returning to civilian life. He also invited Macedonian police to enter areas formerly under rebel control.\textsuperscript{32}

The Macedonian government insisted, however, that the bulk of the ethnic Albanian combatants had retained their weapons. Fearful that ethnic conflict would resume in the future, the government launched a 45-day weapons amnesty programme by offering those who handed over guns a chance to win a car in a lottery and amnesty from prosecution for illegal possession. Whether out of fear of prosecution on the part of ex-combatants or because of the lottery, the programme collected an additional 7,500 weapons, of which 6,400 were guns. It also collected some 100,000 pieces of ammunition and 165 kg of explosives.\textsuperscript{33}

\section*{Indonesia-Aceh}

The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in August 2005 between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), ending the civil war there that began in December of 1976. In the MoU GAM agreed to undertake the decommissioning of arms, ammunition and explosives held by its soldiers. GAM committed to the handover of at least 840 weapons. The four-stage process would start on September 15th 2005 and end by December 31st 2005. The accord also required the relocation of non-organic military and police forces to be completed in four stages concurrent with the decommissioning of GAM armaments. In the accord GAM also agreed to demobilise all of its 3,000 soldiers and not to wear uniforms or display any military insignia after signing the MoU. For its part, the government agreed not to carry out a major mobilisation of its military forces against GAM. The accord provided for the establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) with representatives from the European Union and the Association of South-East Asian Nations countries to verify the implementation of the commitments made by the signatories of the MoU.\textsuperscript{34}

The disarmament and demobilisation of GAM combatants was completed by the specified deadline. On December 21st 2005, 840 weapons were surrendered to the AMM. The collected weapons were then publicly destroyed. After the disarmament process was over, GAM announced the dissolution of its military wing on December 27th.\textsuperscript{35} In its effort to transform itself into a civilian political party after the DD process, GAM created a civil organisation called the Aceh Transition Committee.\textsuperscript{36} In an act of good faith, the government pulled 25,890 non-organic military troops and 5,791 police out of Aceh, leaving behind 14,700 troops and 9,100 police.\textsuperscript{37} Within a year of the completion of the DD process post-conflict elections were held in Aceh between December 2006 and January 2008.

\section*{Sudan}

In Annexure I of Sudan’s 2005 CPA, the Sudan People’s Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudanese government outlined a DDR programme that would start the peacebuilding process. The DDR process was to be sustained through co-operation and co-ordination with local non-governmental organisations and the international community. The agreement was inclusive of women and children, and outlined a commitment to demobilise child soldiers within six months of the signing of the CPA.\textsuperscript{38}

The 2005 Sudan CPA provided for the establishment of the National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC) with responsibility for policy formulation, oversight, review, co-ordination and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Agence France-Presse, “Rebels in Macedonia officially disband”, September 27th 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{35} “Indonesia”, Keessing’s Record of World Events, vol 51, December 2005, p 46984; C. Beeck, “Re-paving the road to peace: analysis of the implementation of DD&R in Aceh Province, Indonesia”, Brief no. 35, Bonn, BICC, July 2007.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Beeck, “Re-paving the road to peace”, 2007.
\end{itemize}
evaluation of the Northern and Southern Sudan DDR Commissions. The Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) was mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR process in the northern states, whereas the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC) was responsible for carrying out similar activities in the southern states. The CPA also contained provisions for the establishment of state DDR commissions that would manage and implement DDR programmes at the state and local levels. The CPA called on all parties to co-ordinate their activities with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations on issues related to DDR implementation. For the transitional period (until the establishment of the NDDRCC), the CPA also provided for an interim DDR programme.

Despite the extensive institutional framework established by the CPA, coupled with international technical and financial support, the Sudanese accord did not specifically provide for any process of cantonment, nor did the parties provide any numerical goals to be achieved in terms of how many combatants would be dealt with or the number of weapons to be collected. Neither the government army (the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF) nor the SPLA provided an estimated number of combatants to be disarmed and demobilised. Part of the explanation for this omission has do with the large number of shifting factions and other armed groups (OAGs) that fought in addition to the two primary protagonists. Recognising this, the CPA called for these groups to align themselves either to SAF or the SPLA. After several months of alliance formation, SAF had gained some 43,000 members of OAGs, while the SPLA reported its overall strength to be about 270,000 troops. These figures were almost universally rejected as inflated by the organisations involved.39

As agreed to in the CPA, interim institutional mechanisms required to disarm and demobilise combatants from both sides were put into place at national and state levels in the north and south. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the UN Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Resource Centre provided expert assistance and advice on demobilisation procedures.40 Following the establishment of the multiparty NDDRCC on February 18th 2006, the NDDRC, the SSDDRC, and DDR commissions at the state level were established and the DDR programme was officially under way.41

The first demobilisation phase took place in February 2006 when the SPLA, in co-ordination with the United Nations Children’s Fund, demobilised 142 child soldiers.42 SAF also unilaterally demobilised 957 combatants from its aligned OAGs, which were verified by UN military observers.43 As the numbers were reported, it became evident that around 180,000 combatants would be participating in the DDR programme. Because it was linked with other security provisions, such as the formation of the Joint Integrated Units and their redeployment, the first phase of the larger DDR programme did not begin until 2009 and succeeded in disarming and demobilising 25,000 combatants from each side. Between February and August 2009 only 12,500 combatants were actually disarmed and demobilised. By the end of 2010 a total of 33,693 ex-combatants – 23,678 in the north and 10,015 in the south, including 6,258 women – had been demobilised.44 As of May 2011 a total of 36,069 combatants, including 5,985 female and 3,356 disabled participants, went through the demobilisation process in northern Sudan. In southern Sudan a total of 12,525 combatants, including 6,188 female and 617 disabled participants, were demobilised.45

Since the DDR process in Sudan started behind schedule and remained so for most of its duration, it was not completed prior to the referendum on South Sudan’s independence. Following the January 2011 referendum, the DDR process was continued in the Republic of

41 In the NDDRCC, the minister of the presidency was the chair and other members of the council were cabinet members, as well as the SAF and SPLA chiefs of staff, the general commissioners for DDR for the northern and southern states, and other dignitaries to be appointed by the presidency.
South Sudan. The SSDDRC was reinstituted as the Republic of South Sudan DDR Commission by the interim National Constitution in July 2011. The commission expected to demobilise and disarm 90,000 ex-combatants; by December it had demobilised 12,525. One of the more unique features of DDR in Sudan was the lack of any data on the number of weapons collected throughout the process. The most common explanation given is that the majority of soldiers turned in their guns before the DDR programme got started, with many returning home.

Comparative analysis

What are the specific provisions, factors, or combination of factors associated with a timely DD implementation programme? Table 1 shows a covariance matrix of relevant provisions found in the cases discussed above. Of the five cases we compared, disarmament and demobilisation were negotiated in every case except Macedonia, where the accord simply asked for the disbandment of ethnic Albanian troops back to their communities. The DD programme was completed relatively swiftly in Macedonia and Indonesia-Aceh, and is still ongoing in Nepal and Sudan. The disarmament of combatants was successfully completed in every case except South Sudan, where the bulk of soldiers, for various reasons, had no weapons to turn in by the time they were processed. In all cases, the demobilisation process was inclusive in that there was no requirement for each combatant to hand over a weapon to enter the DD process.

One common denominator in timely DD programmes is the presence of a specified implementation timeline which usually requires specifying the likely number of participants. Having a definite timeline for the DD process worked well in Liberia, Macedonia and Aceh. In the case of Nepal, no specified timeline was followed, and the parties constantly negotiated and renegotiated the terms of the DD process in a protracted bargaining process. In some cases – like Nepal, Sudan and Liberia – specifying the number of combatants proved to be less realistic, due in part to the large number of individuals who performed non-combat roles during the conflict. Where disarmament has been hailed as being successful, the number of arms not collected in the initial phases of disarmament has also been proven to be alarmingly high. In the case of Macedonia, the lotto-amnesty programme took in roughly twice the number of weapons as the initial disarmament programme. In Liberia the mobile disarmament centres continued to take in weapons for almost five years. In both of these cases the possession of weapons after the completion of the disarmament process was regarded as illegal. This suggests that the initial disarmament phase should be seen as a trust-building measure and will need to be followed by additional efforts. In these cases subsequent disarmament phases were quite productive.

46 This 90,000 estimate meant demobilising half of the SPLA combatants, including male and female as well as child soldiers, elderly personnel, the wounded and disabled, and women associated with armed forces. For DD in South Sudan, see Republic of South Sudan DDR Commission, http://www.ssddrc.org/ddr-in-south-sudan.html.

Holding elections during the DD process added additional layers of complication to an already complicated process in Nepal and Sudan. In Nepal the CPN-M was seen as the winner of the election, which hindered compliance and improved its bargaining position. In Sudan there was no adherence to any timeline and election results led to the DDR programme being transferred to a new independent polity. The beleaguered DD process in Nepal resulted from incentives on the part of the CPN-M to maintain its armed forces. In Sudan the SPLM had similar incentives to remain mobilised, should secession be the result of the referendum. Because the objectives of the rebel groups were different in Aceh and Macedonia, they had no incentive to maintain their armed forces. In Liberia the state army was decommissioned for restructuring; this removed the capacity or incentive to remain mobilised.

Economic incentives can also affect the duration of DDR programmes. In Nepal the process dragged on for more than five years because the CPN-M leadership benefited financially from keeping people in the cantonments. In Sudan delays were blamed on the apathetic attitude of the SPLA leadership toward the DDR process, the unusually large number of rebel forces, and the fact that many rebels were paid by the SPLA and were thus in no hurry to be demobilised. As would be expected, DD programmes that offered compensation packages (Nepal, Liberia, Sudan) tended to have more participants than those that lacked compensation (Macedonia and Indonesia-Aceh). In Nepal the payment structure led to high participation rates and incentives to stay in the camps as long as possible. In Sudan the economic disincentives tended to outweigh the economic incentives, which lowered turnout.

The strength of third-party mandates also appears to be related to DD effectiveness. External actors with a strong mandate were instrumental in achieving a timely progression in cases like Macedonia and Liberia. In Nepal, Sudan and Aceh external actors, although present, were less engaged in a co-ordinating capacity and more heavily engaged in verification and monitoring missions. A more limited mandate hindered the effectiveness of external actors in these cases. In Aceh smaller rebel forces allowed for a smooth process, despite weak third-party commitments. In Nepal and Sudan weaker third-party mandates contributed to a protracted bargaining process over implementation procedures and a weaker commitment on behalf of the CPN-M and SPLM, respectively, to fully detach themselves from their military wings.

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Table 1: Comparison of factors affecting the DD process (DD provisions, mechanism and processes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Nepal</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Macedonia</th>
<th>Indonesia-Aceh</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
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<tr>
<td>Specific timeline</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Specific numbers to be demobilised</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Specific number of weapons to be collected</td>
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<td>DD sequenced with other provisions of the CPA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Involvement of external actors</td>
<td>UNMIN</td>
<td>UNMIL/ ECOWAS/ISF</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>AMM</td>
<td>UNMIL/ UNMISS*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate for external actors</td>
<td>Weak/ supervisory</td>
<td>Strong/ direct</td>
<td>Strong/ direct</td>
<td>Weak/ supervisory</td>
<td>Weak/ supervisory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic incentives</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonment</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Multiparty institutional mechanism</td>
<td>JMCC/ SPC</td>
<td>NCDDR/ JMC</td>
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<td>Special group provision (women and children)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>DD completed before elections?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* UN Mission in South Sudan.
Conclusion and recommendations

Despite a small number of recent cases to draw from, our comparative analysis reveals several common patterns regarding the kinds of provisional and operational choices associated with efficient DD implementation. Firstly, the existence of a specified timeline offered a momentum to the implementation process that clearly seemed to be lacking in deviant cases. Parties should be rewarded for meeting realistic implementation deadlines and sanctioned for not meeting these deadlines, thus creating an overall incentive structure for meeting provisional goals.

DD implementation can also be sequenced with the implementation of other provisions or reforms. In Aceh the government engaged in parallel acts of withdrawing its non-organic military and police forces. Moreover, successful DD implementation should be sequenced as a precondition for post-conflict elections, as in Liberia and Aceh. This creates an incentivised environment for completing the DD process in a timely manner, while also diminishing the risks of violence associated with the electoral process or election results. Drawing from these cases and others, the benefits of postponing elections until after DD implementation appear to outweigh the costs.

As acknowledged in previous works on DD implementation, cantonment is associated with both benefits and risks. It is clear that DD can occur without cantonment. Due to the benefits of cantonment for combatants and sometimes insurgency leaderships, participation in the DDR process will likely increase. However, protracted stays in cantonments usually breed a discontent with the pace of the process and subsequent restlessness. The scope of cantonment in these cases resulted from negotiations that took into account the number of combatants and the geographical scope of the conflict rather than from design. It is recommended, however, that the stay of female and child combatants in cantonments be as brief as possible. This requires an expedited demobilisation process for these combatants, as well as disabled combatants. Efforts in this regard have been part of recent DD programmes.

The cases suggest that a strategy of gradualism should be used in the disarmament process. Rebel leaders are reluctant to fully disarm, but are likely to agree to some kind of initial “down payment” of arms. The cases reveal that this reluctance on the part of rebel groups can also be overcome in subsequent disarmament missions as the rebels gain confidence in the transition process. Mobile collection units have proved to be successful in cases where a primary centralised site is either insufficient due to the geographical scope of the conflict or where the initial number of collected arms was inadequate. As levels of trust between the two sides and confidence in the peace process grow over time, additional phases of collection and disposal have been productive.

Lastly, as seen with the rioting in Liberia, unforeseen problems may arise over implementation details. A stronger mandate and a stronger co-ordinating capacity for external actors result in more efficient problem solving, as seen in the rapid response by UNMIL in Liberia. In addition, consensus building forged through multiparty mechanisms in the government should be used to reach bargaining solutions on disputed issues related to DD policy and implementation.