Can Cultural Capital Theory Be Reconsidered In Light Of World Polity Institutionalism? Evidence from Spain*

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Abstract

According to world polity institutionalism, an emerging world culture, centered on the value of the individual as a “citizen of the world” has taken hold in most advanced industrial societies. To date, there has been no systematic study of the relationship between broader forms of subjective citizenship such as those of interest to institutional theorists, and the patterns of cultural taste and consumption of concern to sociologists of culture. Using data from the 1994 and 1995 CIRES surveys conducted in Spain, this article attempts to fill this gap. I analyze the relationship between three different forms of subjective citizenship - national (Spain), international (European community) and postnational (world community) - and the propensity to display omnivorous patterns of cultural choice and to draw symbolic boundaries through the expression of cultural dislikes. If both subjective connections to the world polity and the turn toward inclusive forms of cultural taste and consumption emanate from the same global cultural logic, there should be a positive relationship between those patterns of geographic identification most closely connected to the world polity and cultural omnivorosity, and a negative association between world polity identification and taste exclusiveness. Regression results support this view: in relation to subnational forms of subjective citizenship, postnational identification is positively related to both broad consumption and negatively associated with exclusionary taste patterns. Further, the effects of traditional cultural capital predictors are shown to be mediated by the individual link to world culture. The results are discussed in the context of situating the cultural capital paradigm and the somewhat limited model of the social actor inherited from Bourdieu within the wider framework of an institutional theory of the production of modern personhood and legitimate individual agency through cultural taste and consumption.
1 Introduction

Starting with Bourdieu’s (1967, 1968, 1977, 1980, 1984, 1986, 1990; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977) initial conceptual and empirical contributions, and continuing with the extension and revision of his original theoretical scheme to research on culture and stratification outside of France (Bryson, 1996; DiMaggio, 1982; DiMaggio and Mohr, 1985; Holt, 1998; Lamont, 1992; Mohr and DiMaggio, 1995), cultural capital research has produced important theoretical and empirical advances in our understanding of the role of culture in the maintenance and reproduction of social stratification and inequality. However, because most of the Anglophone reception of Bourdieu’s work by empirically minded researchers has consisted of drawing out and testing some of the implications of his theory of social reproduction (Brubaker, 1985), certain conceptual ambiguities related to his larger metatheoretical presuppositions have gone rather unnoticed. The most important of these consists of Bourdieu’s model of the social actor, who is conceptualized as following the deeply socialized scripts inscribed in the *habitus* and simultaneously engaging in purposive strategizing action in the course of vying for advantageous positions within historically circumscribed fields. These two contrasting images of the social actor in Bourdieu’s work recapitulate a homologous longstanding issue in the Anglo-American sociological tradition: the debate between the undersocialized versus oversocialized conceptions of the individual in classical social theory (Granovetter, 1985; Wrong, 1961). Thus, insofar as Bourdieu’s work has been the most important influence in the empirical study of culture consumption and cultural taste for the last two decades, primarily under the form of what I will refer to as the “cultural capital paradigm” (Bryson, 1996; DiMaggio, 1982; Lamont and Lareau, 1988), whatever conceptual tensions are present in his original theoretical scheme are implicitly transferred to this research tradition and surreptitiously color both the choice of questions on the part of researchers and their subsequent interpretations of the data (Kuhn, 1962).

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1 This statement applies to the empirical literature on Bourdieu’s theory of cultural taste. More general exegetical treatments (i.e. Alexander 1995; Evens 1999; King 2000) have pointed to important tensions in Bourdieu’s practice theory and his conception of the *habitus*, that are somewhat related to the ones that I focus on here. Bourdieu himself, of course also addressed related issues, especially in his more metatheoretical writings (1977, 1990, 1998a).
While it is possible to be satisfied with a purely conceptual or interpretive treatment of this issue, in order to better deal with this theoretical strain in the cultural capital paradigm I will take a different path. Using recently systematized developments in the conception of “actors” in modern society from institutional theory (Frank and Meyer, 2002; Meyer, Boli and Thomas, 1994; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000), I will argue that insofar as Bourdieu’s ambiguous notion of the social actor has become an entrenched component of the cultural capital framework, then this paradigm has to be substantially revised to include a more institutionally and culturally grounded image of actorhood that sidesteps this ambiguity (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). This alternative formulation of the grounds of social action brings with it an emphasis on global cultural models that are constitutive of individuality and actorhood themselves (Meyer et al., 1994). Further, I will show how some of the empirical results that have emerged from recent research on culture consumption and that have posed problem for the traditional cultural capital paradigm (i.e. the cross-national emergence of the cultural omnivore) can be explained by this new framework. Finally, I will demonstrate the payoff of this conceptual merging of the two research programs by testing some of the empirical implications of the conjoined approach. The analysis shows that not only is there an intrinsic connection between certain features of the “world culture” isolated by institutionalist researchers and the more prestigious patterns of cultural taste and consumption, but that the effects related to the usual predictors of the forms of cultural involvement that have been the focus of the cultural capital paradigm may be mediated by allegiance to these institutionalized world culture precepts.

1.1 The Cultural Capital Paradigm

Why do we tend to observe different styles of culture consumption and taste? Pierre Bourdieu offered a groundbreaking analysis of the interested consequences of disinterested behavior (Sayer, 1999), such as appreciation for the arts, when he introduced the concept of *cultural capital* (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986). According to Bourdieu, people accumulate a set of implicit competences and cultural resources during the course of socialization into their designated class stratum (Bourdieu, 1984). This crystallized and embodied (Holt, 1997) knowledge about, and ability to “correctly” consume, cultural objects operates as a sort of social currency that can be transformed into other types of (material and social) benefits and resources (Bourdieu, 1984, 1986; DiMaggio, 1982; Holt, 1997). The basic imagery here is one
of a purposive actor that is able to utilize acquired competence in order to gain advantage over others.

While this formulation may be taken as implying a sort of “forward-looking” (Macy, 1990: 811), cynical calculation on the part of the social actor, Bourdieu has argued (i.e. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) that this is a gross oversimplification of his point of view because the competences and abilities that he theorizes are operative in this context are instantiated in practical, not conscious-calculative, action (Bourdieu, 1990, 1998a), given that they emanate from the generative capacities of the habitus. Critics have countered that if this is the case, then he has really fallen back into objectivism, and his theory becomes just another mechanical description of systemic reproduction devoid of agency (Alexander, 1995; Evens, 1999; King, 2000). I submit that the problem with Bourdieu’s conceptual framework is not that he errs on one side or the other of the agency/structure or oversocialized/undersocialized debate (or that he is an “objectivist” in any meaningful sense of the term), but that in either case he retains an undertheorized and essentially realist notion of the (social) actor. That is, whether seen as strategizing within positional fields or acting out the deep scripts of the habitus, Bourdieu’s actors remain conceptualized as “raw agents” (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000), and not as institutionally and culturally constituted loci of agency, personhood and identities (Frank and Meyer, 2002; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). 2

In this respect, it is important to emphasize that as Loic Wacquant (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) and other commentators (i.e. Vandenberghe, 1999) have rightly

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2 This is a problem that is more evident for Bourdieu’s “generalized materialism” (Bourdieu 1980; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) which emphasizes competition, and the zero-sum striving for positions and resources within fields of action, and not necessarily for other aspects of Bourdieu’s framework, especially his conception of the habitus as both a reality maintaining and a reality generating matrix of schemes of perception and action (Bourdieu 1990). This latter formulation, which focuses on how social reality is sustained through the application of ultimately analogical and metaphorical schemes (i.e. light/heavy, dark/light, male/female) that give shape and provide specific material form (in a very literal sense) to the physical spaces and bodies of participants in those social worlds (i.e. his discussion [Bourdieu, 1990] of the embodied dispositions and automatisms constitutive of Kabyle femininity, or the cosmogical meanings contained in the physical layout of the Kabyle household). This is an underexploited facet of Bourdieu’s work that has received little attention from commentators (in comparison to his conflict theory), and which is not necessarily incompatible with institutional conceptions of actorhood and action (as opposed to the habitus as “internalized necessity” or society writ small, which devolves back into Parsonian oversocialization).
emphasized, Bourdieu’s main metatheoretical commitment is to a relational ontology whose primary elements are fields, habitus and forms of capital, not “individuals” as conceptualized in some versions of ontological or methodological individualism (i.e. Coleman, 1990; Collins, 1981). However, most of the relational elements in Bourdieu’s schema, with the possible exception of the notion of fields as composed of relationally defined objective positions, recede to the background whenever he engages in explanatory analysis of particular empirical cases, where he ultimately relies on some version of the purposive individual (whether conceptualized as acting strategically or practically) negotiating her way through the overarching structure of the field (for the most penetrating version of this line of criticism see Mohr, forthcoming). Consequently it is not unfair to say that at least when it comes to the practical deployment of his theoretical scheme, Bourdieu remains committed to some version of “raw” individual agency, however sophisticated its “praxeological” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) elaboration may be.3

1.2 The Institutional Model of the Actor

As a way to attempt to resolve some of these ambiguities, I now turn to sociological institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Jepperson, 1991; Meyer et al, 1994) which I argue offers a much richer conception of actorhood and agency than that found in the dominant formulations of Bourdieu’s conflict theory and implicitly inherited by his North American interpreters. According to institutional theory, conceptions of modern actorhood and individual agency represent the “devolved” legacy of a centuries-old project of diffusion, rationalization and legitimation of Western Judeo-Christian conceptions of agents and action initially believed to reside in a non-empirical spiritual realm (Eisenstadt, 1986). Over time this agency was transferred from the supernatural world to secular corporate structures of political governance (Meyer et al, 1994). This resulted in the diffusion and cultural legitimation of the “project of the state” (Thomas and Meyer, 1984) and the post-World War II emergence of a primarily secular, individualistic world-culture with

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3 However, what is not the case, is the usual portrayal of Bourdieu as a “structuration” theorist who counterposes individuals to structures (as in King, 2000); it can be shown that in Bourdieu’s explanatory schema, it is the interplay of two ontologically differentiated structural orders, that of internalized (psychological) structures and the objective structures of the field that generates practical action (for more elaboration on this point, see Lizardo, 2004).
agency and the capacity for legitimate action now increasingly seen as the exclusive purview of individual “persons”. This development can in turn be seen as the unwinding and further elaboration of this very same cultural logic (Boli and Thomas, 1997, 1999; Frank and Meyer, 2002; Jepperson, 1991, 2000; Meyer et al, 1994; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000), one which Weber ([1914]1978) identified with the distinctively modern process of rationalization in religious sphere and later in other institutional loci of society (Parsons, 1951).

There are two basic aspects of the elaboration of individual agency during the most recent (postwar) period that are of direct relevance to cultural capital theory. First, the modern stratification system is ordered according to the enactment of legitimate form of agency (Weber, [1914]1978); that is, not all action carries the same type of capacity to confer actors with cultural standing and symbolic authority. The standards of legitimacy are ordered from pure self-interested agency (at the lowest level) to one that is performed on behalf of universal and impersonal principles (occupying the highest level):

This relative proximity to high culture, and the putatively disinterested carrying of it, helps to account for peculiar idealist features of the modern stratification system, ones not adequately addressed in the literature…the lowest status in this system is accorded to those categorized as simply self-interested actors…a little higher are those certified agent-actors with more agency, in more rationalized and universalized structures…High status is accorded to those who do not really work at all (in any conventional sense)…but rather serve the great exogenous cultural principles: the professional and the scientists who are often agents of no real principal. These are people who get the Nobel prizes or more prosaically, the highest prestige ratings in surveys (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000: 116).

Bourdieu (1984, 1998a, 1998b) has made a related point in arguing that in order to operate properly, cultural capital must show itself in a “disinterested” appreciation for collectively valued cultural forms (DiMaggio, 1991a). However, a problem immediately arises when the possibility of “feigned disinterest” is brought to the fore. In this sense Bourdieu’s analysis is almost always bound to take the character of a “hermeneutics of suspicion” (Ricoeur, 1970), in which the actor’s claims to be acting on behalf of abstract principles are unmasked and shown to be part of their
self-serving attempts at advancement within fields (which Bourdieu [1998a: 88-89] himself acknowledges). While Bourdieu was far from naïve as to the repercussions of this theoretical issue (see for example 1990, 1998a, 1998b) he never abandoned his original position, developed as far back as his early work on the French educational system (i.e. Bourdieu, 1967), that “disinterest” is a practical strategy of domination, and that the ability to portray interested actions as disinterested is in fact one of the primary weapons that the dominant classes utilize in order to maintain their advantaged positions and the larger social and cultural order that sustains them. This system is sustained through a massive process of shared misrecognition (which include both the dominant and the dominated [Bourdieu, 1998b: 121]) through which all class fractions incorporate the schemas of perception and classification of the dominant group, resulting in the institutionalization of symbolic violence or, the imposition of ultimately arbitrary categories of perception and classification as natural modes of thought (for a related Durkheimian elaboration of this view of institutionalization see also Douglas [1986]).

The institutional solution to this dilemma is to speak not of action, but of “enactment” (Jepperson, 1991), consequently coming very close to Bourdieu’s (1990) own tendency to refer to action as not determined by foreseeable goals, but as caused by a practical “feel for the game”. However, as opposed to relying on Bourdieu’s agonic metaphor, institutional theory construes the very practical capacity for action and the question as to what or who constitutes an actor not as an exogenous given, but as an open question subject to the influence of cultural models, rationalized “theorization” and cognitive elaboration (Meyer et al, 1994; Strang and Meyer, 1993). To put it succinctly, while in Bourdieu’s framework the practical

4 Bourdieu’s empirical analyses of the artistic (1994), cultural (1984, 1995), educational (1994) and academic fields (1988) consist of extended “socio-analyses” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) of each of those social arenas aimed at showing the general applicability of this basic dictum, originally inspired by Weber’s ([1922]1993) study of the religious field (Bourdieu, 1998b). Bourdieu’s final aim was consequently to develop a general economy of symbolic goods and symbolic domination (Bourdieu, 1980, 1985) as a way of generalizing the classic Weberian problematic of rationalization and legitimation of contingent and historical cultural orders in the multiple value spheres of modern society (Brubaker, 1985).

5 This is also related to recent advances in institutional theorizing related to formulations of practical action as “skillful” (Fligstein, 2001), and of fluid role-taking and role-assigning behavior in terms of “robust action” (Leifer, 1988; Padgett and Ansell, 1993).
capacity to play and the rules of the game are acknowledged to be socially constructed, in institutional theory the practical capacities (for action) the rules of the game, and players themselves, are assumed to undergo the process of cultural constitution (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000).\(^6\) In this sense institutional theory avoids the interest and demystification problem by considering the very capacity for agency of the focal actor to be constituted by his or her exposure to, and embeddedness within, rationalized cultural realms. In other words, from an institutional viewpoint, disinterest and action on behalf of impersonal cultural principles (i.e. beauty), rather that being part of some overarching system of misrecognition serving to sustain the imposition of some arbitrary set of cultural meanings and classifications (Bourdieu, 1998b) and thus forcing the analyst into the realist trap of taking as given the interests of the dominant (i.e. maintenance of the current order), is itself part of the package. From this point of view, highly institutionalized (scripted) action in the realm of culture is thus an integral part of the recipe that constructs modern individuals, and ultimately their (conscious and practical) interests.

This is important, because it analytically separates the ontological meaning of culture from its significatory aspects (Meyer et al, 1994: 17). Bourdieu’s emphasis in the latter role of culture has been his most influential contribution and constitutes the core of the cultural capital paradigm. From this point of view patterns of cultural involvement and modes of cultural appropriation and acquisition are construed as a sign of distinction or as communicative act of ritual exclusion and boundary marking (Bryson, 1996; DiMaggio, 1987; Lamont, 1992), marking the separation of class fractions or other collectively recognized groups in the social field. However, in the modern stratification system, culture not only marks divisions between a given set of actors but may also be constitutive of those actors themselves (Meyer et al, 1994), that is, to borrow imagery from Peterson (2000), culture is implicated in the process of collective (auto)production of modern identities and vocabularies of motive (Mills, 1940). In terms of cultural capital theory, certain

\(^6\) This drawback is most salient in Bourdieu’s theory of the state and bureaucratic structures (Bourdieu, 1994); while the state may be a site where individuals operate and deploy and access in differential degrees the means and sources of symbolic and coercive power, the state or some other supraindividual entity can never, as in institutional theory (Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez, 1997; Thomas and Meyer, 1984) be considered a possible legitimate actor in its own right. This is simply beyond Bourdieu’s mesolevel social ontology.
patterns of cultural involvement, may not only demarcate positions between different types of individuals, but may be involved in the definition of what it means to be a (certain type of) individual, allowing outside observers (and the actor herself) to match identities to actions and situations (March and Olsen, 1989): this aspect of culture is able to “[assign] reality to actors and action, to means and ends” in addition to “endowing actor and action, means and ends, with meaning and legitimacy” (Meyer et al, 1994: 17).

For instance, in the hierarchy of legitimacy of the modern stratification system, agency on behalf of impersonal ideas (i.e. good taste, aesthetic values, etc.) enjoys a privileged position over agency on behalf of the self (a curious development on its own behalf). These are two ways of demonstrating the capacity to be an actor, and not two mutually exclusive explanatory frameworks for action (that is, we are not necessarily forced to unmask agency on behalf of impersonal ideas as a masked exercise in self-serving agency). Consequently, from the institutional point of view, the capacity to enact agency cannot be separated either from the principles (truth, fairness, beauty, etc.) on behalf of which that agency is enacted, because there can be no ego-centric action without an (ultimately socially constructed) ego (Goffman, 1959, 1963). Consequently, the focus of attention shifts towards the socio-cultural environment that produces the templates constitutive of those entities and (id)entities that are perceived as being endowed with the capacity to act, which includes individuals among other actors (states, organizations, etc.) in the modern system (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000).

This is not to say that Bourdieu’s framework does not allow interests to be culturally constructed by the immanent logic of each field of action (the scientific, the religious, the artistic, the political, etc.); in fact he acknowledges (Bourdieu, 1998: 79-85) that the particular interests exhibited by each actor are determined and circumscribed by the historically specific set of values, and schemes of action, appreciation and classification that are valued in each field:

To the reduction of conscious calculation, I oppose the relationship of ontological complicity between the habitus and the field. Between agents and the social world there is a relationship of infraconscious, infralinguistic complicity: in their practice agents constantly engage in theses which are not posed as such. Does a human behavior really always have as an end, that is, as a goal, the result which is the end, in
the sense of conclusion, or term, of that behavior? I think not. What is, therefore, this very strange relationship to the social or natural world in which agents aim at certain ends without posing them as such? Social agents who have a feel for the game, who have embodied a host of practical schemes of perception and appreciation functioning as instruments of reality construction, as principles of vision and division of the universe in which they act, do not need to pose the objectives of their practice as ends.

In this respect Bourdieu sidesteps the charge of reductive economism that has been leveled against him (i.e. Alexander, 1995); because he views economic interest as simply a special case of the general species of interests that can be developed in different societal spheres (Bourdieu, 1998a: 86). Further, notice that Bourdieu’s conception of the agent’s practical competences as “functioning as instruments of reality construction, as principles of vision and division of the universe in which they act” does not put him very far from the microfoundations of institutional theory which takes Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) classic text as its primary starting point (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Consequently, it can be said that by taking both actors and actions as subject to a process of “deep” cognitive constitution, institutional theory simply radicalizes an insight already present in Bourdieu’s own action theory.

1.3 The Cultural Omnivore and the Expansion of Personhood

The second important point derived from institutional theory that is of direct relevance to cultural capital theory concerns the institutional analysis of modern personhood. As cultural conceptions of legitimate agency become increasingly likely to be transferred from supraindividual corporate structures (states, professions, and other collectivities) to individual actors, a process that has dramatically accelerated since World War II, the person has emerged as the central construct of an increasingly global cultural model (Frank and Meyer, 2002). This modern construct of the person is characterized by its transcendence of local designations and ascriptions, and by the universal equality of all entities designated as bearers of personhood within and across geographical and political boundaries. This development is correlative with the increasing rationalization and overall expansion of available roles and identities at the socio-structural level (Frank and Meyer, 2002). This has increased the supply (and demand for) of possible realizations and variations of apparently distinctive enactments of modern individuality. The modern person is
consequently viewed as having an almost unlimited capacity to choose, and nearly everything can become part of an individual’s project of identity self-constitution (Giddens, 1991). Cultural objects gain increasing importance in this process, as the individual is able to use taste and culture consumption as an integral part of their “unique” identity. This process is coupled with the imperative of egalitarianism built into the construct of contemporary personhood, which in turn requires that extant symbolic and ritual distinctions demarcating different realms of cultural expression (DiMaggio, 1987) and class-related socially constructed divisions demarcating “high” versus “popular” culture realms (i.e. DiMaggio, 1991b), be superseded in favor of a “postmodern” aesthetic that crosses and subverts those boundaries:

Personhood accords broadened…rights to choice and taste. For example, moderns can claim exceptionally varied tastes in food, unconstrained by religion, nationally, or class. Of course the rationalized role system constrains on some food preferences in the name of health and safety, but the ability to build secure food stratification, with and low cuisines is very limited …so also with music, art and other cultural matters, which increasingly flout distinctions of high and low taste (Frank and Meyer, 2002: 93).

This is what has been detected and labeled in recent empirical studies on cultural taste and consumption as the emergence of the “cultural omnivore” first empirically detected in the U.S. (Peterson and Kern, 1996; Peterson and Simkus, 1992) and later in other Western industrialized countries such as The Netherlands (i.e. Van Eijck, 1999), Spain (Lopez Sintas and Garcia Alvarez, 2002) and Great Britain (Warde and Tampubolon, 2002; Warde et al, 1999, 2000), and as Peterson and Annand (2004: 325) note in their recent review of the literature, with similar results having been obtained in Canada and France as well. While initially the rise of the omnivore was interpreted as an unexplained anomaly of Bourdieu’s theory of taste and as evidence

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7 The fact that mass produced cultural objects (DiMaggio, 1991a) are the primary elements that are used in the creation of unique identities constitutes an ironic development (Bell, 1976). Meyer and Jepperson (2000) point to this as one of the integral structural contradictions of modern personhood: while the cultural model emphasizes individual uniqueness and idiosyncrasy, the rationalization of the cultural scripts for enacting agentic individuality become increasingly standardized across spheres.
that his original framework lacked applicability outside of France (but see Holt, 1997 for a critique of this view), the cross-national evidence suggests that increasingly Catholic taste and consumption patterns among the upwardly mobile cannot be considered a phenomenon unique to the U.S., but as common to other Western European countries as well. So far no explanation has been offered for this remarkable behavioral and symbolic convergence among similar crass strata in different Western polities, but if institutional theory is correct, then this is no mystery. As increasingly transnational notions of modern individuality, personhood, and agency have become part of the global cultural model of modern societies (Frank, Meyer and Miyahara, 1995), then such a structural isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) in the relationship between individuals and cultural objects is to be expected. As Frank and Meyer (2002: 90-91) note: “All faces of modern individualism are highly cultural in character, rather than idiosyncratic outcomes of particular local situations. They are formed in very general or universalistic terms, [and] occur in forms that are scripted worldwide…” (emphasis added).

If we think of the cultural omnivorousness and the “multicultural” (Bryson, 1996, Fridman and Ollivier, 2002), tolerant approach to expressions of taste as the modern institutionalized form of individual action in the field of cultural taste and consumption, then the spread of these similar forms of cultural involvement across a wide range of different polities in the developed world can be explained. Without a doubt, their rise to popularity is no doubt related to other large-scale changes in Western cultural classifications systems, which as DiMaggio (1987: 542) notes, have “…entered a period of culture declassification…Artistic classification systems are becoming more differentiated and less hierarchical, classifications weaker and less universal.” To the list of socio-structural factors that DiMaggio cites in order to explain this change, (the nationalization of previously local elites and the subsequent decline of communal ritual distinctions, the commercialization and industrialization of culture production and the growth of higher education), the institutional approach would add the accompanying rise of a distinctively modern conception of individuality, personhood, and the normatively appropriate uses of culture that sustains and defines those notions of the modern actor (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000).
2 Empirical Implications

The above exploration of alternative ways to conceptualize the constitution of individuality and agency through involvement in the field of leisure culture derived from institutional theory allow us to partially rethink the cultural capital framework. Culture consumption and taste, and through it, the accumulation of (multi)cultural capital and flexible cultural competences, can now be seen as directly related to global cultural models that emphasize legitimate ways of enacting personhood, agency and individuality (Boli and Thomas, 1999; Frank and Meyer, 2002; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). Modern actors position themselves vis a vis culture and valued cultural symbols in the same way that they position themselves in relation to other generally legitimate cognitive models related to the construction of the modern individual, such as universal human rights and the inviolability of personhood, as opportunities to enact (Jepperson, 1991) legitimated forms of disinterested agency. This enactment however, must be filtered and is constrained by allegiance to the underlying world cultural principles of universalism and rationalized voluntarism (Boli and Thomas, 1999). The leveling of ritual distinctions between modes of culture consumption recently experienced in industrialized Western polities (DiMaggio, 1987), are evidence of the reorganization of expressive practical activities under the influence of the universal individualist world cultural model that positions choice and individual freedom above received tradition, rigid classifications schemes and ritualized boundary distinctions.

All of the recent empirical developments that have roused the interest of researchers concerned with culture consumption, in particular the rise of extensive (in opposition to narrow or exclusive) patterns of taste and consumption as the favored mode of relating to culture among the young, upwardly mobile class fragments in Western polities (Peterson, 1992; Peterson and Anand, 2004; Peterson and Kern, 1996; Van Eijck, 1999), are therefore intrinsically related to the extension and deployment of a global cultural model that enshrines the values of universal individualism and the sacred status of the person (Frank and Meyer, 2002). This connection is underscored by the fact that both the legitimate modes of culture appreciation and consumption and the basic components of the global cultural model (Boli and Thomas, 1997) are transmitted through the same “globalizing institutions,” namely increasingly standardized and cross-nationally similar educational systems and school curricula (Benavot, Cha, Kamens, Meyer and Wong, 1991; Meyer, Ramirez and Soysal, 1992) and the web of international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs) that has enveloped the world polity throughout the last 100 years and especially since World War II (Boli and Thomas, 1997, 1999). We can therefore expect to find an empirical association between omnivore cultural taste as the most prestigious way in which modern individuals relate to the field of culture and enact their actorhood, and basic elements of the world-cultural model emphasized by institutional theorists.

What are the basic building blocks of world culture? While rationalized world culture consists of a number of different interrelated components (i.e. universalism, individualism, rational-voluntaristic authority and the primacy of rationalizing [scientific] discourse), all of these,

Come together in the construct of world citizenship. Everyone is an individual endowed with certain rights and subject to certain obligations; everyone is capable of voluntaristic actions that seek rational solutions to social problems: therefore everyone is a citizen of the world polity (Boli and Thomas, 1997: 182, italics mine).

Following this lead, I will concentrate on examining the relationship between patterns of taste and consumption and what I will refer to as translocal patterns of subjective citizenship of which a sense of world citizenship is the most extreme—and substantively important—example. Previous research in the American context (i.e. Bryson, 1996) has examined the connection between patterns of musical dislike and attitudes related to tolerance and intergroup relations. However, no attempt has yet been made to link inclusive taste and more inclusive forms of “imagined community” identification (Anderson, 1991). This last factor can vary from the most local form (identification with local towns or cities) to its most global form (identification with the world community). I will begin by to proposing some general hypotheses regarding how different forms of subjective citizenship might affect expressions of cultural taste and consumption.

3 Hypotheses

3.1 World Culture and Culture Consumption

As discussed above, modern industrialized polities have converged into an increasingly isomorphic world cultural model that is transmitted and reproduced through legitimating state (and more recently international) institutions, of which the
educational system is a prime example (Benavot et al, 1991; Meyer et al, 1992). Further, the cultural tools used to decode legitimate culture and the arts are acquired largely through exposure to formal (especially higher) education which “…increases the extent to which persons are trained in artistic classification systems and the ease with which they appropriate new artistic genres” (DiMaggio, 1987: 447).

If this is the case, then there should be a direct association between certain key tenets of rationalized global culture and the accumulation of cultural capital in the form of less exclusivist taste for, and probability of, consumption of diverse forms of legitimated cultural forms (DiMaggio, 1991a). One of the main components of world culture is its emphasis on an individualist ontology in which the person is seen as the primary locus of agency (as opposed to non-empirical or corporate actors) and as transcending local attachments and identification with primordial communities (Anderson, 1991; Jepperson, 2000; Meyer et al, 1994; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). This rationalized vision of the individual as citizen of the world lies at the center of global culture (Boli and Thomas, 1997, 1999). If this is correct, then we would expect that translocal subjective citizenship, especially identification with the world community, should be related to omnivore consumption. However we should not expect identification with the nation to be related to broader patterns of consumption, as this sort of communal idea forms part of an older, nationalist, nineteenth century pre-global culture (Anderson, 1991). It is also reasonable to expect the effects of the two forms of supranational subjective citizenship (world and European) not to be the same; institutional theory leads us to expect that the connection between dominant modes of enacting agency (such as the display of omnivore taste) should be more strongly related to postnational identification with the world community in comparison to international identification with a nascent continental polity such as the European Union. Because the E.U. is both a relatively late entrant into global culture and represents an extension of the older logic of nationalism, it should be more weakly connected to the individualist global culture in which such corporate structures become delegitimated as proper vehicles of political action and sources of ritual solidarity:

_H1: Individuals who think of themselves as citizens of the World are more likely to consume a wider variety of cultural forms than individuals who think of themselves as citizens of the European Union or as citizens of Spain._
3.2 World Culture and Cultural Dislikes

As Bryson (1996) and Fridman and Ollivier (2002) have noted, following and extending the work of Bourdieu (1984) and Peterson (1992), the primary form of status distinction among the more advantaged class fractions in modern societies appears to have become one wedded to an ideology of apparent openness to a wide variety of cultural forms and expressions of cultural taste. This is in direct contrast to the traditional closure formulation inherited from Weber ([1914]1978) and Bourdieu (1984), which emphasizes distinction and the upper class rejection of more “vulgar” lower class tastes (Simmel, 1957). For Bryson (1996), punning on Bourdieu’s initial terminology, this new cultural currency may function as a type of “multicultural capital”, while Fridman and Ollivier refer the same phenomenon as “conspicuous openness” as a reference to the popular notion developed by Bourdieu’s notable forebear (Veblen, [1912]1945). Using the institutional model outlined above, I submit that the rise of openness and tolerance as the predominant taste culture of the younger upper middle class is not disconnected from the rise of a particular conception of the equality value of all cultural expressions associated with the individualized universalism of world culture (Boli and Thomas, 1999). The basic component of this universalist model of individuality consist of respect for personhood as the “master identity” which supersedes all other more specific racial, national, ethnic, etc., identifications (Frank and Meyer, 2002). Consequently, taste distinctions based on those older forms of corporate or group-related differentiations among individuals become delegitimized, leading to a lower likelihood of expression of exclusionary taste judgments, and openness to a (selective) diversity of cultural experiences for those who identify with the world polity. It is in this sense that Frank and Meyer (2002: 93) contend that in the modern system, “tastes, like personhood, are equal.” If this is the case, then we should expect that the attitude of conspicuous openness should be more pronounced among those individuals closest to world culture. Thus, multicultural capital should be concentrated among those who seem to identify more with institutionalized patterns of individuality and agency in the cultural field. Conversely, as the distance between the individual and world cultural precepts increases, then we should expect the more exclusionary attitude of the “univores” discussed in Bryson (1997) to be more prevalent:
H2: Individuals who identify as citizens of the World are more likely to express a lesser number of cultural dislikes than individuals who think of themselves as citizens of the European Union, citizens of Spain or citizens of a subnational entity.

3.3 World Culture and Traditional Predictors of (Multi)Cultural Capital

What are the implications of an institutional formulation of cultural involvement and symbolic boundary drawing for traditional views regarding the predictors of cultural capital and judgments of taste? If the recent spread of institutionalized models of individual agency that dictate certain patterns of involvement in the leisure culture realm constitute an alternative way of linking persons to cultural choice and taste patterns, then we should expect that the more “realist” predictors of cultural participation, such as parental class background, current class standing, education, and measures of availability of cultural outlets at the location where the individual resides, should be more strongly associated with “omnivore” patterns of cultural choice or less exclusive variants of taste for those individuals who identify with some more local form of imagined collectivity. Among those more closely connected to world culture, that is those who are more broad in their subjective identification (such as “citizens of the world”), we should expect a weaker association between realist predictors of cultural (or “multicultural”) capital and inclusive patterns of cultural involvement and cultural taste.

This is consistent with previous research on the process of institutionalization (Strang and Meyer, 1993; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983), which predicts a looser connection between actor-level (realist) attributes and the likelihood of displaying a specific behavior, schema or practice when the actor in question is embedded in the relevant cultural and normative environment. If the institutional approach proposed here is correct, then we should observe a similar process at work for individuals who are already connected to world culture. In sum, for individuals who are “disconnected” from world cultural models (in this case, those who identify with a local or national geographic entity) cultural capital predictors should have their strongest effects; for those who are already connected to world culture, and the putatively standardized models of individuality that it offers, standard cultural capital predictors should a weaker effect. One possible exception to this pattern is individual educational attainment, since, as argued above, both world cultural models and tacit cultural competences may be acquired through exposure to standardized school curricula.
**H3:** For individuals who think of themselves as citizens of the world, there is a weaker association between traditional (class background, respondent’s education, income, etc.) and structural (availability of culture producing organizations) predictors of cultural capital, and more inclusive patterns of culture consumption and less exclusive patterns of cultural dislikes.

### 4 Data and Measures

The data for this study were obtained from the April of 1994 and February of 1995 surveys conducted by the *Center for Research on Social Reality* (CIRES, 1994, 1995) in Spain. The CIRES survey series consisted of a series of questionnaires administered in Spain from 1990 to 1996, including special topic modules. Each survey is composed of a stratified (according to the size of autonomous regions and municipalities) random sample of all non-institutionalized Spanish citizens aged 18 and over. The studies that I selected concerned themselves with “Culture as Consumption” and “Leisure Culture”. Respondents were asked about how they spent their leisure time, and their preferences regarding the movies, the opera, galleries, and other cultural activities. They were also asked questions regarding their attitudes toward national and international political developments. I pooled the samples from the 1994 and 1995 surveys, yielding a final sample of 2400 respondents. For more details on the sampling procedures, and the makeup of the questionnaire consult CIRES (1994, 1995).

#### 4.1 Dependent Variables

**Omnivore Culture Consumption.** The culture modules of the 1994 and 1995 CIRES survey also contained a number of items that asked respondents whether they had engaged in various activities during the past year. Respondents are coded as 1 if they engaged in the activity in the past year and zero otherwise. I construct an omnivore consumption scale (standardized to range between zero and one by dividing by the maximum) by adding the binary responses to the following nine items (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82): 1) going to the museum, 2) going to art exhibits, 3) going to a monument, 4) going to a national park, 5) going to a book fair, 6) going to craft fairs, 7) going to a trade fair, 8) going to lectures, and 9) going to music or theatre festivals. These set of activities is similar to that used by Lopez Sintas and Garcia Alvarez (2002) in their analysis of omnivore culture consumption in Spain using the single 1994 survey. These activities have a good representation of both popular (crafts and trade fairs, musical festivals) and more elite (highbrow) activities such as book fairs, art exhibits and lectures on intellectual topics.
Number of Cultural Dislikes. The culture modules of the 1994 and 1995 CIRES survey also contained a series of questions that tapped the respondents liking of a variety of culture and leisure related activities. Respondents were asked to select from an 11-point semantic-differential scale (raging from zero to ten) with “I don’t like it at all” and “I like it a lot” at the extremes and 5 as the midpoint. I count the respondent as not liking a particular cultural form if she gives it score of four or below. I utilize taste data that were collected for 14 forms of cultural participation and media consumption: 1) visiting galleries 2) visiting museums, 3) visiting historical cities, 4) visiting monuments, 5) going to the theater, 6) going to the opera, 7) going to the movies, 8) attending general cultural events, 9) reading the newspaper, 10) reading magazines, 11) reading “general” books and 12) reading “specific” books, 13) watching television and 14) listening to the radio. I then constructed an additive scale by adding the binary variables corresponding to each item, where one indicates expressing dislike for it. The “cultural dislikes” scale shows good inter-reliability among items with a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.89, and ranges from 0 to 14, with zero indicating expressing no dislikes and fourteen as showing dislike for all cultural forms.

4.1 Subjective Citizenship

The main independent variable, a measure of subjective citizenship, was obtained from an item that formed part of a recurring module on “Supranational Identification” (CIRES, 1994, 1995). The specific question reads: “We all feel more attached to some groups than to others. More concretely, and from this list of geographic spaces, which do you feel more identified with? I mean, do you feel above all to be a citizen of 1) your town or city, 2) your province, 3) your autonomous community, 4) Spain, 5) Europe (EEC), 6) The West, 7) The World, 8) None.” Figure 1 shows the distributions of respondents in each subjective citizenship category.

Figure 1 Here

More than two thirds of respondents (68.8%) identify with some sort of subnational entity. This is not surprising given the multi-ethnic history of the Iberian Peninsula, which has been home since medieval times to a host of different ethnic and cultural enclaves. Little more than a fifth (22.6%) of all respondents report a purely national (Spanish) subjective citizenship. Only a relatively small minority report feeling a connection to a community that supersedes the nation state, with 1.8% feeling themselves to be citizens of the European Union or the West. It is
notable that the number of respondents that say that they feel themselves to be “citizens of the world” is more than triple this last amount (5.7%). This indicates that world citizenship is a much more entrenched communal identity than the more recent political invention of the European union or the older “civilizational” divide that separated The West from “the rest”, supporting the claims of institutional theory regarding the informal establishment of world citizenship as a phenomenon endemic to a modernizing global culture and predating the formation of more recent international conglomerates (Meyer et al, 1997; Boli and Thomas, 1997).

I created three binary variables from the original geographic identification item: 1) national equals one when the respondent reports thinking of him or herself as citizen of Spain and zero otherwise. 2) International equals one when the respondent reports a political identification with either the European Union or The West and zero in any other case. Finally, 3) postnational equals one for those who claim world citizenship. The rest of the respondents (including those that respond “none”, who are less that one percent of the sample) are considered to have a local subjective citizenship and they represent the reference category.

4.2 Class and Status Indicators

I include the following set of variables to account for the respondent’s location in the class and prestige/status order: 1) Respondent’s income is reported as monthly income in categorical form. There are nine income categories, ranging from a minimum 45,000 Spanish Pesetas (about $340 1995 U.S. Dollars) to 450,000 or more ($3,400 U.S. dollars) given that these surveys predated the introduction of the Euro (1999).³ 2) Respondent’s Education is an ordinal that that ranges from zero (unable to read) to 8 indicating the possession of an advanced (postgraduate) degree.⁴ In order to take into account the intergenerational transmission of cultural resources and their well-documented effects on predicting high-status patterns of cultural choice

³ The 9 income categories were recoded to equal their midpoint in the thousands. The “not applicable” category was treated as missing and replaced by the sample mean. In order to control for any estimation biases resulting from the mean replacement procedure, a dummy variable coded as one when the respondent was missing on income and zero otherwise, was added to each one of the regression models (not shown on tables).

⁴ In Spain primary education is free and compulsory (from age six to fourteen). Secondary school attendance optional, but students deciding not to attend secondary school have to attend vocational training until age sixteen.
I use 3) **Class Background** is an eight-category ordinal variable that indexes the respondent’s father’s education (mother’s education was not available) in the same scale as the respondent’s education. We should expect respondents who come from these types of more advantaged class backgrounds to be more likely to display high-status patterns of culture consumption.

### 4.3 Post-Fordist Identity Variables

Recent research in culture consumption and taste (Katz-Gerro, 2002; Katz-Gerro and Shavit, 2002) has brought attention to the issue of the effect of “Post-Fordist” symbolic identifications that go beyond traditional measures of class and status on patterns of cultural choice. These include any form of group level identity, ranging from gender, to ethnicity and religion. In order to partial out the effect of these type of identifications from that of patterns of subjective citizenship, I include controls for 1) **Gender**, a binary variable with women coded as one; it is a commonplace in the literature to find that women report consuming and liking more cultural forms than men (Bihagen and Katz-Gerro, 2000), so we should expect a similar result here. 2) **Religion** a dichotomous indicator that equals one if the respondent is Catholic and zero otherwise; and 3) **Ethnicity/Nationalist identity** consists of binary indicators that equal one if the respondent reports having either a “pure” Basque or a “pure” Spanish identity with those who report more mixed identities as the base category. If the association between cosmopolitanism and “multicultural capital” (Bryson, 1996) obtains for these data, then we should expect strong ethnic or nationalist identifications to result in either narrower patterns of culture consumption or a higher number of cultural dislikes.

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8 This last measure is extracted from a five category item with the following categories: “only Spanish”, “more Spanish than Basque, equally Spanish and Basque”, “more Basque than Spanish”, and “only Basque”. Respondents are considered to identify as Basque if they answered “only Basque” and Spanish if they answered “only Spanish”. About 46% percent of respondents report identifying equally as Spanish and as members of their ethnic category. 26% say that they identify exclusively or almost exclusively with their ethnic or linguistic group, while 30% prefer an exclusive Spanish identity; the rest of the respondent’s were coded as either “don’t know” or missing.
4.4 Demographic and Structural Variables

I also control for the traditional vectors of sociodemographic and structural variables, related to the characteristics of the respondent’s place of physical residence: 1) Age is a continuous variable measured in years. 2) City Size is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 8 with 1 indicating that the respondent lives in a town of less than 2000 inhabitants and 8 for those respondents who live in Madrid or Barcelona. 3) Geographic mobility is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 3 with one indicating that the respondent resides in the province where she was born, 2 for those respondents who moved from the province of birth but who are living in the same province that they were living at age 15 and 3 for those respondents who are living in a province that is not the same as the one that they lived in at age 15. It is important to control for mobility, as mobile respondents may pick up cultural tastes as they come into contact with a more diverse range of social contacts (Relish, 1997). 4) Marital status is a binary variable that equals 1 if the respondent reports being married or cohabitating and zero otherwise. 5) Household size consists of the number of persons currently residing in the respondent’s household. 6) the Availability of cultural outlets scale is a scale obtained from adding the binary indicators of 12 items that asked respondents whether their town contained (among other outlets), a movie theatre, a theatre, a gallery, a library, a cultural center, an art foundation and a civic center. It is important to control for availability, since it is likely that respondents may develop tastes or report higher culture consumption rates simply as a function of the accessibility of organizations dedicated to the production of cultural objects and performances (DiMaggio, 1991a; Peterson, 1992). The scale ranges from 0 to 12. Finally, I control for survey year, in order to take into account any temporal trends present in the data. Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviations of all of the variables used in the analysis.

Table 1 Here

5 Results

5.1 Subjective citizenship and Omnivore Consumption

First I investigate whether there is a relationship between different forms of subjective geographic identification and broader patterns of cultural choice net of standard sociodemographic factors. The first model in table 2 shows the unstandardized coefficients corresponding to the regression of the culture
consumption scale against the class and status indicators, the identity variables and the subjective citizenship variables. In support of hypothesis 1, the most translocal form of subjective citizenship does have a net effect on culture consumption: those who identify as “citizens of the world” are more likely to participate in a wider variety of cultural activities, in comparison to all other types of respondents. In terms of direct involvement in a wider range of cultural activities, international (Those who identify with Europe or the West) and national (those who think of themselves as citizens of Spain) identifiers are no different from subnational identifiers, (who show subjective allegiances to their town, province or autonomous community). Therefore, the expectation that the effect of world citizenship would be stronger than that of international subjective citizenship is confirmed.

The effect of the class/status and identity variables on omnivore consumption is consistent with expectations and previous research in the cultural capital tradition, suggesting that the institutional and cultural capital models are not necessarily competing but complementary: coming from a more advantaged class background (as indexed by father's education) increases cultural omnivorousness, as does higher levels of educational attainment and income. The availability of cultural outlets also increases the breadth of cultural participation, indicating that culture-producing organizations do have an active role in determining patterns of cultural choice: as the availability of cultural outlets increases so does the propensity of respondents to consume a wider variety of cultural offerings. Finally, older respondents and respondents who identify as exclusively Spanish and Catholic are less likely to participate in a diverse set of activities. This last effect confirms previous research on the importance of identity related variables such as religious tradition in determining certain lifestyle consumption patterns (Katz-Gerro and Shavit, 2002).

Table 2

5.2 Subjective citizenship and Cultural Dislikes

As noted above, if “multicultural capital” can be considered part of the modern package of individuality and personhood, we should expect connection to world cultural models to inhibit the degree to which respondents engage in symbolic boundary drawing through cultural rejection. In order to test this contention, I regress the same set of independent variables shown in the first model of table 2 on the cultural dislike scale. As shown in the second model of table 2, subjective citizenship has strong effects on patterns of cultural dislikes. As suggested by the
institutional hypothesis, broader patterns of subjective citizenship are associated with a lower likelihood of rejecting cultural forms. This indicates that there is a connection between the adoption of certain world cultural models and more “tolerant” attitudes toward varied cultural activities, or what Bryson (1996) refers to as “multicultural capital”, offering support for hypothesis 2.

In contrast to the culture consumption model, the cultural dislikes model shows strong effects for international identification in addition to postnational identification. Further, I also find a differentiation between those who identify with the nation and subnational identifiers, with those who think of themselves as citizens of Spain less likely to express dislike for more cultural forms than those with more local patterns of collective identification. Consequently, it appears that those who are the most likely to express a wider variety of dislikes are also those with the more local patterns of subjective citizenship. This suggests that the “univore” style of cultural expression (Bryson, 1997), which is characterized by a higher likelihood of rejection and dislike of certain cultural forms, may also be sustained by narrower geographic identifications (as in strong “state” based cultures of the American South [Bryson, 1997]). This impression is given more credence by the negative effect of geographic mobility on the propensity to express cultural dislikes: insofar as more mobile respondents lose their sense of strong attachment land or territory, and are able to develop wider ranging networks of contacts, they are less likely to express a large number of cultural dislikes.

The institutional approach developed above leads us to expect a stronger effect for world citizenship in comparison to the other translocal patterns of citizenship (national and international). While the magnitude of the postnational citizenship coefficient appears to slightly exceed that of the international citizenship, F tests indicate that the coefficients are not statistically distinguishable. This suggests that the negative effect of international identification on the number of cultural dislikes is comparable to that of postnational identification. However, the fact that the postnational coefficient can be distinguished from the national coefficient (F=2.97, p<0.04, one tailed test) while the international coefficient cannot (F= 1.57, p<0.11, one tailed test), indicates that a model in which the international and national effects are equated would not lose a significant amount of explanatory power. This suggests that in their effects on cultural dislikes, the international logic is closer to the logic of national subjective citizenship than is the idea of world citizenship, as we would expect given the institutional argument.
Once again the effect of traditional cultural capital variables on the number of cultural dislikes mirror those of Bryson (1996) in her research on musical dislikes: more educated respondents and those who come from more advantaged class backgrounds are less likely to express a wide variety of cultural dislikes. Suggestively, I also find that the availability of cultural outlets reduces the propensity to express a large number of dislikes, indicating that part of the univore aesthetic of taste rejection, may be tied to the lack (or the homogeneity) of culture-producing organizations in the geographical regions where univores are more likely to be found. Since univores are more likely to possess lower levels of educational attainment and income, then this association may be mediated by the fact that low income and low education populations may be disproportionately concentrated in areas that lack access to culture-producing organizations.

Another important finding concerns the effect of strong ethnic and nationalist identification. Consistent with expectations of a negative association between cosmopolitanism and multicultural capital, respondents who think of themselves as “only Basque” or “only Spanish” are significantly more likely to express a wider range of cultural dislikes than respondents who have a mixed ethno-political identity (identification as Catholic has no significant effect). Also consistent with previous research is the finding that older respondents are more likely to express a wider range of cultural dislikes and that women are less likely to do the same as men (Bryson, 1996).

5.3 Predictors of Cultural Capital and Patterns of Subjective Citizenship

If identification with the world community constitutes part of an institutionalized complex that defines the proper way to enact individuality for modern persons, then we should expect a looser association between “realist” predictors of omnivore consumption and multicultural capital among those individuals already connected to world culture (hypothesis 3). Traditional cultural capital predictors, on the other hand, should have a stronger effect as the distance of the individual from world culture increases, or in this case as the pattern of subjective citizenship becomes more local. Is there any evidence that this is the case? Tables 3 and 4 shows selected coefficients from six regression models identical to those shown in table 2, but estimated separately for three groups of respondents. The respondents are divided according to their subjective citizenship response: subnational identifiers (the
reference category in the models shown in table 2) national identifiers and international identifiers as a single group, and postnational identifiers (those who claim world citizenship). If hypothesis 3 is correct, traditional cultural capital predictors, especially those associated with class background should have a weaker effect for this last group. The results shown in table 3 are mostly in agreement with this contention: class background as measured by father’s education is a significant predictor of culture consumption only among the most local (subnational) identifiers, and has a significantly negative association with the likelihood of expressing cultural dislikes only for subnational and national identifiers but not for postnational respondents (first two columns of table 4). Income follows a similar pattern, having a significant association with both omnivore consumption and cultural dislikes only for those respondents most disconnected from world culture (subnational citizens). The results for respondent's education are more ambiguous however. In terms of predicting omnivore consumption, respondent’s education has the strongest effect for postnational identifiers, in contradiction to institutional expectations. However, something like this was to be expected, due to the fact that cultural capital theory and the institutional model both predict that higher levels of educational attainment would be associated with high-status patterns of cultural choice. For cultural dislikes on the other hand (table 4), the pattern followed by the effect of education is that predicted by the institutional model: for postnational respondents, the negative effect of education, while significant with at the 0.10 level, is also the weakest of the three groups, with the education coefficient being about 47% smaller in comparison to national identifiers and 54% smaller than the corresponding effect for subnational citizens.

Table 3 Here

The selective effect of the availability of culture producing organizations is also in accord with the institutionalist argument, which predicts that structural factors should be less important in determining culture consumption and taste patterns for those already embedded in the institutionalized individualism of the world polity. Consistent with this viewpoint, availability has significant effects on consumption and the expression of cultural dislikes only among those respondents that report

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9 I do not estimate a regression model for international identifiers only because they constitute less than 2% of the population in these data, and would result in an unacceptably low sample size.
identification with a subnational entity or Spain. For those who identify with the world, their likelihood of consuming a wider variety of cultural offerings or of expressing a larger number of cultural dislikes is independent of the structural availability factor. This indicates that, for this group of respondents, both omnivore consumption and the display of multicultural capital are less driven by the social construction of lifestyle and taste that occurs through organizational activities and more by the cultural connection to the world polity's institutional environment.

Table 4 Here

The effects of ethnic and nationalist identity, while not part of the standard arsenal of cultural capital theory, follow a similar pattern as the one noted for traditional cultural capital predictors, at least for the models predicting cultural dislikes. As we saw in the last model of table 2, strong identification as either Basque or Spanish increases the probability of expressing cultural dislikes. However, as shown in the last three models of table 4, this negative effect is only operative for subnational and national respondents; among postnational respondents, expression of strong ethnic or nationalist identity has no significant effect on the number of cultural dislikes, and in fact the coefficients are in the wrong (negative) direction. This suggests that allegiance to world cultural models of individuality may “buffer” individuals from the intolerance producing effects of stronger ethno-political identifications.

When it comes to cultural involvement, religious and nationalist identities have more complex effects than those expected given the institutional account. In the consumption models we saw that both identification as Catholic and identification as only Spanish decreased the probability of engaging in more inclusive patterns of culture consumption. Identification as “only Spanish” and Catholic both have negative effects on omnivore consumption among postnational and subnational respondents. However, they do not seem to have a significant effect among national respondents. This indicates, as was already evident from table 2, that ethno-political identifications have a more consistent effect on the “symbolic” (as opposed to behavioral) aspects of action in the leisure culture field, especially those associated with boundary drawing through cultural dislikes. Consumption among those who identify as citizens of the world, however, appears to be affected by nationalist and religious identity.
6 Discussion

6.1 Summary of the Results

The above results have established a connection between identification with a transnational world community, a key piece of the global cultural package identified by institutional theory (Boli and Thomas, 1997), and patterns of omnivore consumption and cultural taste and symbolic boundary drawing, phenomena which have up to this point been thought as primarily conditioned by “realist” factors, such as respondent’s class background or educational attainment or by presumably incompatible national differences such as those between France and U.S. (Bryson, 1996; Lamont, 1992). The results show that connection to the world polity by way of identification with transnational geographical entities (the E.U., the world) serves as an independent predictor of broader patterns of culture consumption and less restrictive forms of expression of cultural taste, net of traditionally considered factors in the cultural capital paradigm and more recently conceptualized determinants, such as expression of post-Fordist identities related to gender, religion and ethnicity (Katz-Gerro and Shavit, 2002).

Further, I show that for both most deeply connected to rationalized world cultural models, the effect of typical realist predictors of cultural omnivorousness or multicultural capital is muted, as is the influence of post-Fordist identifications and structural factors related to the surrounding ecology of culture producing organizations. This suggests that these newly emerging forms of consumption and taste may be connected to a wider set of institutionalized normative and ontological commitments constitutive of the individualist culture of the modern system (Frank and Meyer, 2002), and are at least partially independent of the usually considered individual and contextual attributes. This is evidence for Meyer and Jepperson’s (2000) paradox of an increasingly scripted and standardized enactment of individualism (at least within the relatively small percentage of the population that is connected to world culture), even as the latter calls for uniqueness and idiosyncrasy of tastes and cultural expression. In contrast, the “standard” cultural capital effects are more clearly operative for respondents who are most disconnected from world cultural models and schemas. A similar pattern of results is shown to apply to the expression of strong ethno-political identities (with some exceptions in regard to culture consumption), with allegiance to these identities having a positive effect on
exclusionary expressions of taste only among those least connected to the world polity.

6.2 Limitations and Future Research

This article represents a partial effort to show the connection between what has traditionally been thought of as discrete elements of cultural practice, subjective citizenship and patterns of taste and practice, in order to argue that they form part of a more encompassing cultural model constitutive of modern individuality. However, national-level data can only show this to be the case for one country. Future research should be concerned with pursuing this type of inquiry in a cross-national design, in order to test whether similar relationships hold in other settings. Is there cross-national variation (in the Western context) in the relationship between broad cultural taste and world subjective citizenship? Do individual level linkages to INGO’s and other global institutions serve to mediate this connection?

Another important avenue of future study would be one that aimed at further specifying the link between the ability to enact the dominant world cultural models and stratification, both at the national and individual level. This can be done by studying the interpenetration between access to world cultural resources and patterns of individual enactment of modern personhood that go beyond broad cultural taste, as this may simply be a partial component of a more global cultural complex. Other elements, such as the proliferation of rationalized “others” on behalf of which legitimate agency can be enacted such as ecological and animal rights movements (Frank, 1997), the emergence of superficially local but increasingly more global and self-reflexive forms of identity and the diffusion of therapeutic models of personhood (Frank et al, 1995), all play a role in both national and individual level linkages to world culture should therefore be related to other forms of material and social inequalities. Researchers should also begin to investigate different forms of cross-national convergence in individual level practices in relation to culture and other rationalized meaning systems, such as religion and science.

In a related note, students of the determinants of culture consumption and taste expressions may also begin to uncover linkages between different patterns of cultural choice and these other components of modern personhood. We should expect, for instance, that other indicators of rationalized voluntarism, such as the tendency to engage in social action on behalf of modern rationalized entities (i.e. the environment), should be connected to individual level indicators of multicultural
capital and conspicuous openness. Consequently, participation in organizations dedicated to this type of institutionalized rational activity in the world polity, whether it be human rights, social justice, or animal rights, should indirectly impact the way in which individuals use culture to signal social information (DiMaggio, 1987), and enact individuality and modern personhood (Frank and Meyer, 2002). Conversely participation in organizational structures that look to actively disconnect individuals from the world polity (such as inward looking religious sects, or strong ethno-nationalist identifications) should impact the manner in which culture is used and tastes are expressed in the opposite way, by creating more restricted consumption profiles, and increasing the chances of drawing strong symbolic boundaries across different cultural tastes that are not associated with the in-group. This approach would give us more purchase in conceptualizing the determinants of the “univore” style of cultural involvement (Bryson, 1997).

7 Conclusion

In this paper I have argued for a partial reorientation of cultural capital theory and research around certain guiding concepts and orienting strategies derived from sociological institutionalism, especially that strand of institutional theory advocated by John Meyer and his associates (Boli and Thomas, 1997, 1999; Frank and Meyer, 2002; Meyer et al, 1994; Meyer et al, 1997; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). This in no way entails the dismissal of established empirical findings or the replacement of extant theoretical orientations in the cultural capital paradigm with institutional concepts. Rather, the aim of the present effort is toward a productive refocusing on an alternative set of issues and questions. This may help revitalize this line of research by providing new empirical findings, alternative theoretical and conceptual puzzles pointing to new lines of future research, and theoretical integration across initially divergent theoretical traditions. The results reported in this article are a case in point: while we find some mediation of the expected effects of cultural capital variables, indicators derived from institutional theory do not make the persistent

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10 Pierre Bourdieu was once again a pioneer in this regard as shown in his chapter on politics in Distinction. The fact that his lead has not been followed in this regard, insofar as recent studies in the cultural capital paradigm have proceeded in isolation from studies of political attitudes (but see Bryson, 1996), has resulted in an undue narrowing of the research subject matter in the field.
influence of class background disappear. Future theoretical work should continue to explore tensions and commonalities between Bourdieu's conception of practical action and the notions of the enactment and the social construction of agency and actorhood derived from sociological institutionalism. In this manner the Weberian/Veblenian strand of Bourdieu's work, one most clearly seen in recent attempts to interpret the rise of multicultural capital in a conflict-theoretic framework as a new kind of distinction (Bryson, 1996; Fridman and Olliver, 2002), can be wedded to more the institutional ideas of the “deep” constitution of personhood, individuality and action.

While this is no way will get rid of the (ultimately productive) tension between more rationalist notions of the uses of culture which emphasize a “logic of consequences” (i.e. cultural capital as part of the repository of practical strategies of group distinction and competition) versus the more normative and constitutive institutional approach which stresses a “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen, 1989), it will at least allow for an orienting strategy that recognizes this inherent duality in the way that culture is autoproduced and deployed at the local socio-interactional level (Peterson, 2000; Peterson and Anand, 2004), and how these processes aggregate in order to produce structured macro-level patterns of cultural choice and taste.

One advantage of the sociological intuitionalist approach is that culture consumption and taste can in this way be situated in a more encompassing theoretical context, while moving past the fruitful but ultimately limiting “capital” metaphor (Bourdieu, 1986). Instead of the entrenched dualism of culture as resource and the individual as repository, the relationship between cultural models and the social actor can be reframed in terms of the institutional metaphors of constitution (Jepperson, 2000; Meyer et al, 1994), co-constitution (Breiger, 2000; Mohr and Duquenne, 1997, Mohr and Lee, 2000) and enactment (Jepperson, 1991; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). The dominant modes of consuming culture can then be seen as necessarily connected to other (legitimate) forms of enactment of modern agency, such as allegiance to the basic tenets of world culture and participation in the larger project of rationalization of nature and the social world.
References


Figure 1. Percentage of Respondents in Each Subjective Citizenship Category
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables Used in the Analysis.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>45.08</td>
<td>18.18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Marital Status</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>City Size</td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Geographic Mobility</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Religious Identification</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ethnic Identification</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nationalist Identification</td>
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<td>0.40</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Monthly Income</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Father’s Education</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Availability Scale</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Measures to Values:*

1. Reported Years of Age
2. Married or Cohabiting (1)
4. Eight category ordinal variable: 1) Less than 2,000, 2) 2,001-5,000, 3) 5,001-10,000, 4) 10,001-50,000, 5) 50,0001-100,000, 6) 100,001-250,000, 7) more than 250,000, 8) Madrid or Barcelona.
5. Three-category ordinal variable: 1) never moved; 2) have not moved since age 15; 3) moved since age 15.
6. Female (1)
7. Catholic (1)
8. Think of self as “Only Basque” (1)
9. Think of self as “Only Spanish” (1)
10. Nine-category ordinal variable: 1) unable to read, 2) able to read, 3) completed primary education, 4) completed first phase of post-primary education (for ages 6-12), 5) completed second phase of primary education (for ages 13-16), 6) completed first phase of secondary education, 7) completed second first of secondary education, 8) college degree, 9) post-graduate degree.
11. Nine-category ordinal variable: 1) 45,000 or less, 2) between 45,000 and 75,000, 3) between 75,000, and 100,000, 4) between 100,000 and 150,000, 5) between 150,000 and 200,000, 6) between 200,000 and 275,000, 7) between 275,000 and 350,000, 8) between 350,000 and 450,000, 9) more than 450,000.
12. Same as n. 10.
Table 2. OLS Regression Models Showing the Effect of Subjective Citizenship on Culture Consumption and Cultural Taste.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Culture Consumption</th>
<th>Cultural Dislikes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.001**</td>
<td>0.019**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married/Cohabiting</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.379*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.107*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Size</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Mobility</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.509*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.234)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female=1)</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.495**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-0.053**</td>
<td>-0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.895**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>-0.029**</td>
<td>0.788**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>0.038**</td>
<td>-0.514**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Income</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
<td>-0.248**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's Education</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>-0.181**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability Scale</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
<td>-0.223**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Year (1995=1)</td>
<td>0.036**</td>
<td>0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Subjective Citizenship</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.442*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Subjective Citizenship</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.969*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.406)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post National Subjective Citizenship</td>
<td>0.109**</td>
<td>-0.971**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>2,296</td>
<td>2,296</td>
</tr>
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</table>

** p<0.01 * p<0.05 two tailed
Table 3. OLS Regression Models Showing the Effect of Traditional and Structural Cultural Capital Predictors on Culture Consumption Three Subsets of Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Subnational</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Postnational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong></td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Catholic</strong></td>
<td>-0.048*</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>-0.180**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basque</strong></td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spanish</strong></td>
<td>-0.030*</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.134**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>0.037**</td>
<td>0.039**</td>
<td>0.050**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>0.021**</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Father's Education</strong></td>
<td>0.011*</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Availability Scale</strong></td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²</strong></td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p<0.01 *p<0.05 two tailed

Note: All Three Models include controls for the following variables: Age, Marital Status, Household Size, Geographic Mobility, and Survey Year.
Table 4. OLS Regression Models Showing the Effect of Traditional and Structural Cultural Capital Predictors on Cultural Taste Three Subsets of Respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cultural Dislikes</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subnational</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Postnational</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.586**</td>
<td>-0.234</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
<td>(0.482)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-0.290</td>
<td>-0.733</td>
<td>-0.352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.424)</td>
<td>(0.594)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque</td>
<td>0.843**</td>
<td>2.612*</td>
<td>-0.720</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.292)</td>
<td>(1.103)</td>
<td>(0.925)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>0.898**</td>
<td>0.773*</td>
<td>-0.646</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.246)</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
<td>(0.754)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.555**</td>
<td>-0.475**</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.280**</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father’s Education</td>
<td>-0.214**</td>
<td>-0.182**</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Availability Scale</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** p<0.01 *p<0.05 two tailed

Note: All Three Models include controls for the following variables: Age, Marital Status, Household Size, Geographic Mobility, and Survey Year.