

Highbrow Omnivorousness on the small screen? Cultural industry systems and patterns of cultural choice in Europe¹

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Abstract

To date, Peterson and Kern's (1996) "highbrow omnivorousness" hypothesis has been examined mainly for the case of musical taste. In this paper we attempt to extend this framework to a relatively unexplored cultural domain, that of television consumption. Using data from the 2001 Eurobarometer we hypothesize that highbrows will be more likely to consume a wide variety of other forms of popular culture, namely television programming. The results fail to unambiguously confirm the highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis: in some EU countries, highbrows consume a wider variety of television programming than non-highbrows, in other countries, highbrows are indistinguishable from non-highbrows, while in a third group of countries, highbrows are *snobbier* than non-highbrows in their television consumption choices. We attempt to explain this cross-national heterogeneity in the highbrow/non-highbrow difference in television consumption using DiMaggio's (1977) organizational theory of culture production. In our "contingent highbrow omnivorousness" framework, we propose that in commercialized, profit-oriented cultural industry systems, highbrow snobbery rather than omnivorousness will be the norm. In relatively less commercialized, profit-oriented contexts, highbrow the snobbery effect will be weaker. Classifying countries by the degree of market orientation of the television production field yields results that are consistent with this hypothesis.

1 Introduction

After the consolidation of a fine arts production, dissemination and evaluation field in Europe and the U.S. in the second half of the 19th century (Bourdieu 1987, DiMaggio 1991, DeNora 1991), the cultural stratification system of Western societies became solidified around the opposition between the transcendent value of the “higher” cultural pursuits such as canonically prescribed classical music and the plastic arts and the “lower” forms of popular culture, a collective model of cultural valuation that has been referred to as the elite/mass regime (Peterson 1992). One of the most fundamental and more recently well-documented social changes in the post-industrial West has been the demise of this cultural stratification system and its replacement by one based on the contrast between a mobile upper middle class elite conversant with both high status genres and popular culture, and a working/lower service class who shuns most kinds of aesthetic pursuits with the exception of a few select folk or popular forms (Peterson 1997; DiMaggio 1987, 1991).

This is what has been referred in the recent literature as the omnivore/univore cultural stratification system (Peterson 1992; Peterson and Simkus 1993). In a much cited article, Peterson and Kern (1996) subject to empirical test their “highbrow omnivorousness” hypothesis in an attempt to provide empirical evidence of the emergence of this new pattern of audience segmentation. They challenge the standard picture of a radical incompatibility between the consumption of the most “legitimate” and “consecrated” forms of culture and the consumption of either mass produced popular culture or other “lowbrow” and “middlebrow” cultural forms. Instead, they propose that persons who choose traditionally elite cultural forms will also be more likely to enjoy as wide a variety of other popular and folk arts as other individuals.

Using data from the 1982 and 1992 waves of the Survey for Public Participation in the Arts (fielded in the United States), Peterson and Kern (1996) find support for this hypothesis. Classifying musical genres as either “lowbrow” or “middlebrow” and respondents as either “highbrow” or “other” they find few or no statistically significant differences between the average number of the former two types of musical genres chosen by highbrows (operationalized as those who picked either opera or classical music as their favorite music and who reported consuming both of those genres) and the rest of the respondents. In addition, they find that these differences are much smaller for the more recent period, with highbrows in 1992 choosing on average a *higher number* of middlebrow genres than other respondents. They conclude that “...these findings suggest that in 1992 highbrows...have become more omnivorous than others” (902), and that “[t]aken together, the findings...support the assertion that omnivorousness is replacing snobbishness among Americans of highbrow status” (903-904). Peterson and Kern’s results served to confirm similar empirical findings examined in earlier research by Peterson and Simkus (1993) and Peterson (1992) at the aggregate level of occupational groups, as well as the theoretical predictions of DiMaggio (1987).

Peterson and Kern take this as evidence that high status individuals’ cultural consumption patterns had shifted from a “snob” regime in which lowbrow genres were shunned, to an omnivore regime in which there is no incompatibility between the consumption of low-status cultural forms and traditional high status offerings. This empirical generalization led to a rethinking of the principles of organization of the cultural stratification system of

contemporary societies, as well as a reformulation of the types of status displays and habits of cultural engagement that serve to define high status in the modern system. According to Peterson (1992: 252), "...elite taste is no longer defined simply as the expressed appreciation of the high art forms and a corresponding moral disdain of, or patronizing tolerance for, all other aesthetic expressions." Instead, "...the aesthetics of elite status are being redefined as the appreciation of all distinctive leisure activities and creative forms along with the appreciation of the classic fine arts." For DiMaggio (1987, 1991) this means that in the Western "Artistic Classification System", ritual boundaries across popular and fine forms have weakened, creating a situation of "declassification." Peterson concludes that given the fact that "...status is gained by knowing about, and participating in (that is to say, by consuming) many if not all forms, the term 'omnivore' seems appropriate for those at the top of the emerging status hierarchy."

The shift toward "omnivorousness" as a new basis of cultural stratification was first empirically detected in the U.S. (Peterson and Kern 1996; Peterson and Simkus 1993). However, a spate of recent research has shown that a similar empirical pattern of highbrow omnivorousness is applicable to other Western industrialized countries. The omnivore-univore pattern has been shown to exist in The Netherlands (i.e. van Eijck 2001; van Rees, Vermunt and Verboord 1999; van Eijck and van Rees 2000), Spain (López-Sintas and García Álvarez 2002), Australia (Emmison 2003) and Great Britain (Warde and Tamplin 2002; Warde et al 1999, 2000; Chan and Goldthorpe 2005), and as Peterson and Anand (2004: 325) and Peterson (2005) note in recent reviews of the literature, with similar results having been obtained in Canada and even France as well. In fact the overall association between socioeconomic status—especially if measured by way of educational attainment—and the consumption of high status culture (classical music, opera, the arts) coupled with openness to and actual consumption of a wider range of less prestigious cultural activities is such a robust finding that it now appears rather unremarkable to note, as López-Sintas and García Álvarez (2002) do in their recent study of culture consumption in Spain, that "omnivores show up again."

2 Broadening the scope of the omnivore thesis

In this paper we broaden the scope of research on the highbrow omnivorousness phenomenon in two primary ways. First, we further extend Peterson and Kern's original hypothesis—connecting highbrow taste to more extensive choices in non-elite forms—into a *cross-national* context (Katz-Gerro 2002; Peterson 2005) by using survey data from 15 EU countries.²

2.1 Previous Comparative Culture Consumption Research

Previous cross-national work has compared consumption patterns between Britain and Switzerland (Lambert, Bergman and Prandy 2005), and between Italy, Israel, West Germany, Sweden and the U.S. (Katz-Gerro 2002, 2006). In addition De Graaf (1991) analyzed data

² One of the first major works in the sociology of the arts was Bourdieu and Darbel's (1991) cross-national study of museum audiences in five European countries first published in French in 1966.

on the consumption of fine arts culture in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Netherlands. Nevertheless relatively very little of this research has been done with an eye to directly extending Peterson's original framework, and therefore it is unclear whether this previous research sheds any light on this question. Lambert et al (2005) for instance, find broad support for the omnivore thesis in their data but very few significant differences between England and Switzerland. Their analysis is limited to a few rather heterogeneous items related to leisure consumption, this is contrast to the original Peterson and Kern study, which used more detailed data on musical genres and which we attempt to replicate here.

Katz-Gerro's (2002) article offers a systematic analysis of five countries (Sweden, the U.S., Israel, Italy and West Germany) that provides an important advance over previous single country-analyses. Katz-Gerro finds suggestive cross-national differences in the linkage between highbrow taste and socio-demographic characteristics which appear to be connected to broad political and social differences across the different countries. She finds that social class predicts cultural consumption in each of the five countries, but in varying ways. In the U.S., Israel and Sweden, highbrow consumption is more likely for white-collar professionals than those in other classes, while in West Germany and Italy, highbrow consumption is more likely for the working classes. In a similar study, Kraaykamp and Nieuwbeerta (2000) look at the effects of parental sociodemographic characteristics on highbrow consumption on five former socialist societies (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). They find strong effects of parental cultural and economic resources on the likelihood of consuming high status culture across all five countries. Like Katz-Gerro's, Kraaykamp and Nieuwbeerta's analysis was limited to exploring the *predictors* of highbrow culture consumption, and thus is not directly relevant to the issue of the cross-national applicability of the omnivore thesis, which deals instead with the higher proclivity of highbrows to also consume non-elite cultural forms (Peterson and Kern 1996). In this paper, we are concerned instead with the *effects* of highbrow taste on the consumption of non-elite culture, and with cross-national differences that can be traced specifically to the country-specific context of culture production systems rather than broader cross-national differences in political institutions as in Katz-Gerro's (2002) study.

2.2 Highbrow taste across different media fields

In this paper we contribute to the project of extending the scope of applicability of the highbrow omnivorousness effect, which has for the most part been observed in the realm of musical consumption (Bennett 2006; Bukodi 2007; Fisher and Preece 2003; Lopéz-Sintas and García-Álvarez 2006; van Rees et al 1999), to alternative cultural domains. We do this by attempting to ascertain whether respondents who exhibit a highbrow taste pattern are more omnivorous in their consumption of *popular television* programming. In this way we explore the degree to which the highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis is applicable to a realm of culture production that most closely approximates the ideal type of a "mass culture" regime of culture production (Adorno 2001; Crane 1993; DiMaggio 1977). In this manner we join other sociology of taste scholars in attempting to advance Peterson's (2005: 267) suggestion to test "...the omnivore idea across the full range of style choices."

One important limitation of the recent literature on omnivorousness (i.e. Bryson 1996; Bukodi 2007; Coulangeon and Lenel 2007; Katz-Gerro, Raz and Yaish 2007; Sonnett 2004; Torche 2007; van Eijck 2001; van Rees et al 1999; Wright 2006) is that most of what is assumed to be known regarding the omnivore thesis has been based on patterns of consumption related to two fairly specific culture consumption domains (music and book publishing). These domains may be organized in a manner that *facilitates* the “aestheticization of the popular,” or the application of methods of evaluating and consuming popular art generally reserved for highbrow art, that Peterson (2005: 276; see also Blewitt 1993 and Frith 1998) suggests is necessary for the highbrow omnivorousness effect to obtain. Less is known, however, about differences in the patterns of consumption of highbrows versus others in the culture consumption domains were the “industrialization” and “bureaucratization” of culture production is most advanced and which therefore were of primary interest to mass culture theorists and the members of the Frankfurt school. These culture production and consumption realms—of which television is the archetype—may also be the ones in which the ability to aestheticize the popular characteristic of contemporary culturally privileged class fractions may reach empirically ascertainable limits (Ang 1985).³

This is not to deny that fruitful research has been conducted examining the taste patterns of television (and other popular culture domains such as film) audiences. Scholars working in multiple Western countries have found various differences in viewing behavior and genre preferences in television audiences, including distinctions by age, gender, social status and education attainment (Bennett 2006; Bennett, Emmison and Frow 1999; Bihagen and Katz-Gerro 2000; Kraaykamp, van Eijck, Ultee and van Rees 2007; Kuipers 2006; López-Sintas and García Álvarez 2006; van Eijck and van Rees 2000). Blewitt (1993) for instance, offers a Bourdieuan explanation for differences in audience composition for Art House and Hollywood films, and Chan and Goldthorpe (2005) find a stratified cinema attendance pattern, similar to that found by Bourdieu (1984: 26).

When it comes specifically to television consumption, Bennett (2006) using data from the *Cultural Capital and Social Exclusion* (CCSE) project in England finds that indeed television is not a “distinction-free” zone but that instead, a fairly strong partition of genres into high, medium and low legitimacy categories—as given by the education, age, gender and occupational status of the respondents—can be observed. Kuipers (2006) in an analysis of Television comedy audiences in the Netherlands finds similar results. Education and age strongly structure the space of television-humor likes and dislikes, with education driving overall cultural knowledge (Bourdieu 1984; Erickson 1996) and with knowledge driving the ability to provide judgments of taste, such that those with a liking for “highbrow” comedy were also more knowledgeable about lowbrow genres and also more likely to dismiss them

³ For instance, van Eijck and van Rees (2000) find—using time-diary data from two points in time in the Netherlands (1975 and 1995)—that the linkages between types of reading behavior and types of television consumption behavior appear to have evolved in a manner partially consistent with the notion of highbrow omnivorousness. In the most recent period respondents with high levels of educational attainment—which they tentatively label as *media omnivores*—are also more likely to combine reading choices from heterogeneous domains and are also the ones that are more likely to cross genre boundaries in their television programming choices.

(Kuipers 2006: 371-374). van Rees and van Eijck (2003) analyze how various print (newspapers and magazines), electronic and visual media consumption practices, including Television viewing, cohere with one another. They find that audiences do segment themselves into media-use clusters that are strongly patterned by age, education, and gender, among other socio-demographic markers.

Most of this research, however, falls short of following Peterson's (2005) call in at least three ways. First, it does not provide comparative analyses of patterns of audience segmentation and cultural choices across broad cultural realms (such as television versus music or art versus film), instead remaining primarily limited to one cultural domain at a time (for an exception, see van Rees, Vermunt and Verboord 1999; van Eijck and van Rees 2003; van Rees and van Eijck 2003). Second, because most of this research uses data collected at one country at a time, there is no assessment of the effect of the characteristics of the culture production regimes of different types of social settings. In the following, we attempt to contextualize cross-national differences in culture consumption behavior by focusing on a critical facet of the culture production regimes of each country. Thirdly, relatively few researchers have attempted a systematic empirical assessment of the *highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis* across two culture consumption domains as organizationally—from the production point of view (DiMaggio 1977)—distinct as music and television.⁴ In terms of Peterson and Kern's (1996) highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis the comparison between television and music is of particular theoretical interest since the appeal of the omnivore thesis has been primarily sustained by the fact that its empirical implications are so largely at odds with traditional "mass culture theory" predictions (DiMaggio 1987; Peterson 1992). Therefore, we find that further empirical tests of consumption patterns in realms of cultural choice that would be expected to be closest to this category of cultural goods constitute a significant contribution to the cultural consumption literature (DiMaggio 1977, 1991).

3 Data and Hypotheses

In this study we use micro-level data of the culture consumption habits of EU citizens taken from the August-September 2001 Eurobarometer (Christensen 2003). The Eurobarometer is designed to provide regular monitoring of the social and political attitudes of the EU population. Since the early 1970's, representative national samples in all European Union (formerly European Community) member countries have been collected in each spring and each autumn. More recent versions of the Eurobarometer (starting in the autumn of 1990) have included supplementary surveys on special issues of topical interest. The 2001 Autumn Eurobarometer (N=16,200) included such a special "module" related to participation in a wide variety of cultural activities, from mass-media (radio and television) to music and the arts. The Eurobarometer includes stratified probability samples of citizens of the EU aged 15 and over residing in the 15 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,

⁴ A partial exception to this is Kraaykamp et al (2007) who empirically explore the general link between occupational status and patterns of media consumption in the Television and literary reading domains. They find that both of these clusters of cultural practices are strongly patterned by status, with high occupational status predicting increased consumption of serious literature and decreased consumption of television programming.

Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.⁵

The main empirical expectation in our study is support for the “highbrow omnivorousness” hypothesis as applied to television consumption and, as a replication of Peterson and Kern’s (1996) study, to musical consumption. Thus, if the highbrow omnivorousness thesis is applicable to music consumption in Europe in the very same way as Peterson and Kern (1996) demonstrated that it was applicable for the U.S., then we should expect that:

Highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis (music): *across all EU countries, highbrow respondents are either more or equally likely to consume non-elite musical genres as other respondents.*

Extending this same logic to the consumption of popular television we should find that:

Highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis (television): *across all EU countries, highbrow respondents are either more or equally likely to consume a wide range of different types of popular television programming as other respondents.*

4 Variables

4.1 Music

Each respondent in the Eurobarometer survey was asked the following question: What kind of music do you listen to? Responses were organized into 11 broad musical categories. Country-specific factor analyses revealed that opera and classical music loaded consistently on a separate “elite taste” factor. We therefore consider the remaining nine musical genres as non-elite: 1) rock and roll and pop rock, 2) heavy metal or hard rock, 3) easy listening, 4) electronic dance music or “house,” 5) techno or ambient, 6) rap or hip hop, 7), folk or traditional music (including American country music), 8) jazz and blues, and 9) world music. The respondent is counted as having consumed the musical form if she reports having listened to a recorded performance of the genre at least once in the past month. We then added all of the responses to create an omnivore music consumption scale, similar to Peterson and Kern’s (1996) “middle-brow” and “lowbrow” music consumption measure. Across all 15 countries, respondents report consuming 3.29 non-elite music genres on average.⁶ There is suggestive cross-national variation around the grand mean, with the average number of non-highbrow genres consumed ranging from a low of 2.74 in Greece to a high of 3.98 in Finland (see Table 1).

⁵ Samples sizes for individual countries range from a low of 609 for Luxembourg to a high 1,093 for Austria. For most of the other countries the sample size hovers around 1000. The combined sample for East and West Germany consists of about 2,000 respondents.

4.2 Television

Respondents were also asked to report the types of television programs that they customarily watched. We count a respondent as liking a given type of television offering if he or she reports having watched a program in that category at least once in the past month. There are eight categories that we consider *popular* television: 1) soap operas/TV drama series, 2) music programs, 3) sport programs, 4) films and movies, 5) children’s programs, 6) talk shows, 7) home shopping programs, and 8) entertainment programs (a category that includes game shows, cooking shows, reality television, and other similar fare). Factor analysis results—not shown—suggested that neither television news nor documentary watching could be considered popular television (as they loaded in a separate latent factor in all countries from the other items and had a high correlation with highbrow status as defined below), so we exclude them from our measure of popular television omnivorousness. Categories such as music programs, films and movies, and talk shows could be considered highbrow rather than popular (for instance, documentary films as opposed to blockbuster movies), but these eight genres loaded together in the factor analysis results, so we consider them to be part of the popular television genre group. Across all 15 EU countries respondents chose an average of 2.14 types of popular television programs.⁷

4.3 Highbrow Taste

We take advantage of a series of arts participation questions included in the Eurobarometer module in order to follow Katz-Gerro’s (2002) strategy of developing country-specific measures of highbrow taste for each of the 15 EU countries included in the survey. We proceed by taking the binary responses to five items associated with the fine arts (DiMaggio and Useem 1978) and book publishing (van Rees, Vermunt and Verboord 1999) consumption field and subjecting the country-specific tetrachoric correlation matrix among all five items to a factor analysis. Respondents were asked whether they 1) attended a dance or ballet performance, 2) attended a classical music or opera performance, 3) attended a live theatre or drama performance, 4) visited a domestic or foreign gallery or museum, or 5) read a book for pleasure in the last year. Table 2 shows the factor loadings for the first factor as well as the proportion of variance explained by the first principal factor for each country. As in Katz-Gerro’s (2002) four-country study, an overwhelmingly dominant “fine arts consumption” factor emerges for each of the 15 EU countries (with the proportion of variance explained 50% for all countries), exhibiting high factor loadings (above 0.6) for most of the items. We use the expected latent factor score for each individual (given their response pattern weighted by the factor loadings for each item across countries) as our measure of highbrow status.

⁷ Once again there is important cross-national variation around this overall mean. This ranges from a low of 1.66 television genres chosen in Greece to a high of 2.57 in Finland, the most culturally active country in the Eurobarometer (see Table 1)

5 Results

5.1 Musical choices

The first three columns of table 3 show the results of bivariate regressions of the highbrow taste score against the musical omnivorousness measure for each of the 15 EU countries included in this study. The first column of the table shows the coefficient estimate, the second the F-statistic corresponding to the test of the hypothesis that the coefficient is in fact zero, and the third column the p-value related to that test. The beta coefficient can be interpreted as the increase in the number of musical genres consumed (in the case of a positive effect) produced by a one standard deviation increase in the predicted highbrow taste score. For instance, the significant beta coefficient for Belgium of .84 indicates that the number of musical genres consumed increases by .84 for every one standard deviation increase in highbrow score for individuals in this country. Because 12 of the 15 countries have significantly positive results, we find strong support for Peterson and Kern's (1996) highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis in the European context for the case of music consumption. That is, in 2001 for 80% European countries highbrows are either statistically more likely to choose a higher number of non-elite musical genres than non-highbrows, or, in the case of Netherlands, Luxembourg and Sweden, choose as many genres as non-highbrows. This suggests, in accordance with the omnivore-univore thesis, that in the realm of music, those who exhibit the propensity to engage the finer arts "are also more likely most capable of applying this aesthetic disposition to less consecrated areas" of cultural practice (Bourdieu 1984: 263; see also Holt 1998).

5.2 Television

Hypothesis 2 suggests that a similar highbrow omnivorousness pattern discussed by Peterson and Kern (1996) and which obtains in the present case for music consumption should also be observed for television consumption. The last three columns of Table 3 show the results. In contrast to the mostly uniform and systematic pattern of highbrow advantage in omnivore consumption over non-highbrows for music, the results for television appear to be much more ambiguous. Inconsistent with the omnivore thesis, highbrows tend to display a *snobbish* consumption pattern (consuming a lower variety of television programming on average, as indicated by significantly negative beta coefficients) in Denmark, France, Luxembourg and Austria ($p < 0.05$). In addition, non-significant results reveal that in Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Finland and Sweden highbrows appear to be statistically indistinguishable from non-highbrows. On the other hand, significantly positive beta coefficients indicate that highbrows in Greece and Portugal consume a *larger* number of television program types than non-highbrows ($p < 0.05$). Taken together, this pattern of results *is largely inconsistent* with the omnivore thesis, or at best provides mixed support for it. Thus, it appears that Peterson and Kern's (1996) highbrow omnivorousness generalization cannot be unambiguously applicable to a "mass culture" domain such as television consumption (DiMaggio 1977).

How can we explain this cross-national heterogeneity in the highbrow-non-highbrow difference in television consumption? It is possible that the apparent lack of clear applicability of the highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis in the case of television consumption might have something to do with the fact that the mechanisms governing the choices of symbolic goods that belong to a media culture domain such as television are

driven by a different dynamic than those that pertain to a domain such as music. That is, cultural consumption choices are mediated, in part, by the production context of cultural goods. For instance, television production, with its centralized hierarchies and restricted allowance for creative control on the part of producers differs in critical ways from production within the music industry (Crane 1992; DiMaggio 1977; Dowd 2004). We suggest that the macro-level production context of cultural goods can be seen as *mediating* the linkage between “the aesthetic disposition” indexed by highbrow taste and the propensity to engage in the “selectively tolerant” mode of cultural choice characteristic of omnivore consumption in non-elite aesthetic domains.

The results shown in Table 3 suggest that the degree of clear-cut applicability—*between the* culture production domains of television and music—of the highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis will decrease (with individuals reverting to a highbrow snobbishness pattern in some cases) the closer the culture production field in question fits the ideal type of a “mass culture industry” (Adorno 2001; DiMaggio 1977). This implies that the observed variation in the highbrow/non-highbrow difference *within* the domain of television consumption choices might be related to cross-national differences in the way in which the television production field is organized. Is there any way to get some empirical leverage on this hypothesis? In the following, we take advantage of cross-national differences in the institutional and organizational structure of television production and dissemination to examine this possibility.

6 A “contingent highbrow omnivorousness” framework

In developing our “contingent highbrow omnivorousness” hypothesis we turn to DiMaggio’s (1977) classification of cultural industry systems along a dimension that separates those fields that are organized in accordance to a production logic that stresses reproducibility, sameness and a market orientation, and those which stress uniqueness, producer autonomy and a non-profit orientation. DiMaggio explains that the cultural industry systems characteristic of contemporary industrial societies have been criticized for homogeneity of goods and for favoring predictability over innovation in their appeal to the lowest common denominator of taste in effort to attract the maximum number of consumers (Adorno 2001). DiMaggio contends that although such cultural uniformity is possible, other more diverse and creative outcomes are just as likely, and that the extent to which innovation and creativity are obtained is a function of the *organization of production* in cultural industries.

More specifically, elaborating Stinchcombe’s (1959) classic distinction in organizational theory, DiMaggio points to the fact that most popular culture is produced in accordance to neither a pure “craft” system in which the creator is highly autonomous, nor according to a pure “bureaucratic” system with little creative initiative and a lot of top-down control. Instead, most popular culture industries have developed a compromise between these two administrative arrangements, settling on what he refers to as a *brokerage* system. In a brokerage system, boundary personnel—such as book editors, movie producers, talent agents and other representatives—intervene between creators and culture industry managers (Hirsch 1972; Negus 2002). Depending on the specific incentive structures and socially prescribed interests of these actors, and their relative closeness to either the creative or managerial pole, brokerage arrangements in popular culture production fall along a spectrum

between two extremes. On one end, boundary personnel strike a balance in acting on behalf of the interests of both the cultural creator and industry managers—thus balancing autonomy and marketability concerns—which DiMaggio refers to as *pure* and *entrepreneurial* brokerage. On the other end, boundary personnel are simply extensions of the production organization, which DiMaggio describes as *centralized* brokerage.

Thus the ultimate interests of most culture creators and cultural industry managers are somewhat at odds. The former desire “to innovate, to generate new cultural forms, and to deal with new areas of content” while the latter are much more concerned with managing the rampant demand uncertainty and massive product failure characteristic of most popular culture industries through strategies aimed at minimizing risk and maximizing predictability and control. Managers will thus be likely to attempt to control their markets and “coordinate their creative divisions, so that creation remains routine, predictable and guaranteed to produce materials acceptable to the widest range of individuals in the...market.” To the extent that they are successful in this strategy “the popular culture produced by that industry will be mass cultural;” however to the extent that “they are unable both to prevent competition and to control creators, the industry will provide varied cultural offerings” (DiMaggio 1977: 439).

From this perspective, the industry-level market structure is conceived of as determining the dominant brokerage strategy which is in turn seen as regulating the degree to which the culture produced in that industry is “*mass* cultural” (when creative autonomy is low and when a highly homogenous product directed at the widest possible market). Non-mass cultural goods (which DiMaggio calls either “class” or “pluralistic” culture) obtains when market conditions allow for an either pure or entrepreneurial brokerage system, in which creative autonomy is higher and therefore a more diverse range of symbolic goods is produced and targeted at demographically segmented markets.

In contrast to DiMaggio (1977), who traces differences in industry structure *across* different culture production domains (television, music, publishing, etc.), we capitalize on the fact that an analogous degree of variation along some of DiMaggio’s dimensions can be observed cross-nationally across all fifteen EU countries *within* the realm of television programming production. We differ from DiMaggio’s work and previous empirical research, however, in focusing not on market concentration (Lee 2004; Peterson and Berger 1975) or structural decentralization of the industry (Dowd 2004). Measures of industry concentration are appropriate if the goal is to compare different states of an industry over time, when it is assumed that the institutional logic of the industry (i.e. profit-making) remains relatively constant. Instead, we hypothesize that within the television production field at a given point in time, the key axis of cross-national variation is that which deals with the dominant *institutional logic* of the industry (Thornton and Ocasio 1999). That is, we believe that cross-national differences in the strength of the highbrow omnivorousness effect are partially driven by variation in the extent to which the television production field functions according to a commercial, for-profit logic.

Furthermore, it is our interest to measure this dissimilarity in market-orientation versus not-for-profit orientation, a dimension that we consider at least partially orthogonal to industry concentration. The reason for this is that it is reasonable to suppose that at all empirically plausible levels of concentration, a for-profit-oriented television production field will tend to

produce cultural goods that can easily be labeled as commercialized “mass culture” by upscale audiences than one that is dominated by a less commercialized, profit-oriented logic. We hypothesize that given the typically high levels of market concentration and centralized production that characterizes the television production industry, producers embedded in high-revenue, high-profit national television industry systems will be much more likely than producers who belong to low-revenue, less profitable industry systems to commercialize television programming. We expect that highbrow consumers will react to television programming styles produced in commercialized, profit-oriented media regimes with snobbish consumption patterns, rejecting commercialized programming and the perceived homogeneity and predictability that characterize it. On the other hand, we expect that similar television programming styles produced in a less commercialized context will be less likely to be rejected by highbrow audiences. If our contingent highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis is correct, then we should expect highbrows to be more snobbish when the national television production system is commercialized and profit-oriented than when it is less so:

Contingent omnivorousness hypothesis: In EU countries in which television programming is less (more) commercialized and profit-oriented, highbrow respondents will be more (less) likely to consume different types of popular television programming as non-highbrows.

6.1 Measure of for-profit orientation of the national television production field

In the European context a possible proxy for the dominance of a for-profit logic could be the extent to which the national television field is dominated by private versus state-supported enterprises. The bulk of the contemporary research on the subjects suggests however that this would be a poor approximation. Differences between European for profit and non-profit television stations are less pronounced since the early 1990s when private television broadcasting emerged in force (Tsourvakas 2004; Blumler and Hoffmann-Riem 1992). While it is true that public broadcasts are still characterized by more cultural, political, social and educational programming than is for-profit broadcasting (which is generally entertainment focused), the differences between private and public television stations are much less pronounced than one would expect and in some types of programming (i.e. broadcasts dedicated to news and information) non-existent (Leon 2007). The reason for this is that in “mixed” European television systems state-supported enterprises are forced to compete against private enterprises, and are thus have become increasingly forced to rely on private and commercial sources of support in addition to the state (O’Hagan and Jennings 2003). Public television stations are in addition subject to contradictory mandates on the part of government authorities—to entertain *and* to inform/educate (O’Hagan and Jennings 2003)—which forces them to compete with commercial stations in their own turf. Furthermore, some private stations include a substantial amount of “serious” programming in an attempt to break the monopoly on cultural legitimacy of the state-supported stations (Leon 2007). This type of competition appears to have released “isomorphic” pressures that have made state-supported television stations more like their private counterparts and vice versa (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Thus, the simple private/public division cannot be used as a reliable indicator of the extent to which the national television field is commercialized.

Instead of measures of relative dominance of state-owned versus private stations (i.e. audience share, number of television stations of each type), we index the extent of profit-orientation and commercialization of the national television production field by using measures of total industry revenue and average performance of all television stations. We reason that commercialization and profit-orientation will be more intensive in high total revenue, high performance (in terms of reported levels of profit) systems. As noted by DiMaggio (1977), the fact that for-profit actors as the total amount of resources invested in television production increases, the willingness to take risks and the propensity to exert centralized control over creative projects on the part of culture-industry managerial staff increases. Thus, as the amount of money and other material resources that is devoted to television programming increases, we should expect the tendency toward mass cultural forms to increase as well.

For each EU country we index the total level of profit-orientation of the television production field using the predicted principal factor score from a country-level factor analysis that includes the standardized score for that country on three television-industry commercialization measures: (1) the average total revenue for all television stations for the period 1999-2001, (2) the per capita total revenue of public television stations in that country for the year 2000 and (3) the average profit-performance (in terms of profit margin) for the years 1996-2000. All data were obtained from the European Audiovisual Observatory Statistical Yearbook. Table 4 shows the standardized scores for each country on each of the three profit-orientation and commercialization measures and the predicted principal factor score. By our synthetic measure the most commercialized, profit-oriented systems in the EU 15 are England and Germany while the three least profit-oriented systems are Portugal and Greece. We were unable to obtain comparable data for Luxembourg, which tends to be an outlier among EU countries, possibly biasing any type of cross-national comparison (Meyer 2000)—i.e., its television industry is highly commercialized given the size of the country and it lacks public stations. Given this, the analyses reported below pertain to the remaining 14 pre-expansion EU countries, excluding Luxembourg.

6.2 Results

Is profit-orientation of the national television industry associated with the relative degree of televisual omnivorousness of respondents who are consumers of the fine arts? In Figure 1 we divide the 14 EU countries for which we have data on characteristics of the television industry into two groups: high profit-orientation (above the median in the profit-orientation factor score) and low profit orientation (below the median). The figure shows the beta coefficient from a bivariate regression (similar to those reported in Table 3 for each separate country) corresponding to the effect of being a consumer of highbrow fare on the range of popular television consumption for respondents in each group of countries and the 95% confidence interval around the estimate. The results are broadly consistent with our contingent highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis. In the countries that score below the median in the commercialization and profit-orientation factor score, fine arts consumers are *more* likely to report having watched a broader range of different types of television programming genres. In countries that feature higher-revenue, higher-profit performance television industry systems the result is reversed: more intensive fine arts participants are *less* likely to consume a broader range of television programming styles. It is unlikely that the profit-orientation of the local television industry is the *only* explanation for this result.

However, profit orientation does appear to capture at least a substantial part the systematic influences that appear to be driving the cross-national differences in the highbrow effect.

6.2.1 Multilevel models

In Table 5 we provide results from a more rigorous test of the contingent highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis. The table presents the coefficient estimates of two multilevel regression models with the omnivore television and music scales as the dependent variables. Multi-level models specify direct effects of variables *within* a level (as in traditional linear regression) as well as interaction effects of variables *between* levels. Often the levels studied with this type of model are individuals and the groups to which they belong (such as citizens within countries). In this case, we utilize multilevel models to investigate the mediating effect of individual-level variables on country-level consumption behavior. In the models, both the regression intercept and the coefficient estimate pertaining to the effect of highbrow taste on television omnivorousness is allowed to vary across countries. This allows each country to have unique slopes and intercepts in their regression equations for predicting the dependent variables. This type of multilevel random intercept model takes into account cross-national heterogeneity in the pooled fifteen-country sample by including an additional error term in the model which in contrast to the usual regression disturbance—which is different for each individual—is allowed to vary *across countries* but is the same *within* countries. Thus the additional random effect can be taken as a measure of all cross-national heterogeneity—as measured by the estimated variance of the country-specific error term—that is not accounted for by the individual and country-level variables included in the model.

In addition, by allowing the effect of highbrow taste to vary across countries (the random coefficient part), the model in effect fits a separate regression line for each of the 15 EU countries. This is a way of explicitly modeling what we already saw in Table 3: highbrow status has heterogeneous effects across the different EU societies, being positive in some, negative in others and null in yet a third group. Finally, the inclusion of the fixed effect corresponding to the cross-level interaction between highbrow status and the profit-orientation factor score (centered at its grand mean of zero) explicitly models what we saw in Figure 1: variation in the effect of highbrow taste on television omnivorous consumption appears to be tied to the relative degree of market orientation of the television production field in each country. A significant coefficient for the interaction term between market orientation and highbrow taste will indicate that highbrow taste differs based on the type of market environment in which one lives and consumes culture. If our contingency hypothesis is correct, we should find that this interaction effect is negative (the *more* commercialization the *less* likely it is for fine arts consumers to report viewing a wide variety of television programs).

As shown in the first column of Table 5, the contingent highbrow omnivorousness hypothesis appears to be on the right track. Consistent with its primary empirical implication, the cross-level interaction is negative and statistically significant ($t=-2.42$), suggesting that highbrows embedded in more commercialized, profit-oriented television production regimes are “snobbier” than the cross-national average. As noted by Friedrich (1982: 804-809), in the presence of an interaction effect, the main effect of highbrow taste (standardized and centered to a mean of zero) becomes a conditional effect, and therefore has to be interpreted in relation to the null value of the market orientation variable (which is

centered at the grand mean for all countries) and vice versa. Thus, the main effect of industry profit-orientation is positive but not statistically significant at conventional levels ($t=1.79$).

This suggests that the relative commercialization of the television production field has no effect on the relative breadth of choices among those who score in the average range in the highbrow taste scale, which is in contrast to its strong depressing effect as the highbrow taste score increases above the mean. Similarly, in countries at the average of television market orientation, highbrows are no different from non-highbrows in the breadth of their popular television programming choices ($t=0.38$). Figure 2 shows how the (marginal) effect of highbrow status on popular television consumption varies across different levels of the television market orientation variable, using the methods discussed in Friedrich (1982).⁸ The thick black line is the expected effect of highbrow status on television consumption, while the thin dashed lines is the 95% confidence interval around this effect. Consistent with expectations, at lower levels of market orientation, highbrows are *media omnivores* when it comes to popular television. Towards the middle of the range, highbrows are no different from non-highbrows in the extensiveness of their television consumption behavior (as shown by the fact that the 95% confidence interval includes the zero line). However, as the television market becomes tilted toward a for-profit logic, highbrows begin to display a *snobbier* (and statistically discernable) pattern of cultural choice.

These findings hold net of standard sociodemographic controls (gender, age, education, occupational status). The fact that the basic result remains even after controlling for individual-level heterogeneity suggests that this effect has little to do with individual differences between highbrows and non-highbrows (or cross-national differences in population composition associated with these variables) related to age, education, gender, and the other variables included in model 3, but that it is a macro-level mediating effect of the industry structure of television production on the behavior of highbrow respondents. In particular, the strong negative effects of education shown in table 5 are consistent with the results reported by Kraaykamp et al (2007) who find that high status individuals tend to consume less television than low status individuals in the Netherlands.

The second column of table 5 shows the estimates from the same random intercept and random coefficient multilevel model but with the music omnivore scale as the dependent variable. Here we can see two ways in which music consumption differs from television consumption in these data. First, the main effect of highbrow status is positive and statistically significant for the pooled sample (as could be guessed by looking at the first three columns of table 3)—consistent with the highbrow omnivorousness thesis. Second, the market orientation of the television production field does *not* mediate this relationship ($t=-0.74$), suggesting that the effect of television profit-orientation applies exclusively to consumption of symbolic goods associated with television and not to other types of cultural offerings. This supports our claim that our measure of commercialization is picking up a

⁸ We use the Stata implementation of Friedrich's (1982) formulas developed and made available online by Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder (2007).

specific quality of the context in which cultural offerings produced in the realm of television are being received and not some diffuse quality of the cultural environment of the given society.

7 Discussion and conclusion

7.1 Summary of the results

In this paper we have attempted to extend the notion of highbrow omnivorousness to television consumption. This is a culture production domain that is sufficiently different in theoretically relevant ways (Bennett 2006; Crane 1993; DiMaggio 1977) to produce an illuminating contrast to music consumption, the cultural domain that has been the focus of the bulk of research on omnivore consumption to date. The results show that Peterson and Kern's (1996) highbrow omnivorousness thesis cannot be unproblematically extended to this realm. When it comes to television consumption, there is wide cross-national variation in the effect of highbrow status on omnivorous patterns of cultural choice in television programming. In some countries, highbrows either consume a wider range of television programming than non-highbrows or have statistically indistinguishable patterns of cultural choice, but in other countries, highbrows tend to have much more restricted ("snobbish") patterns of television consumption than non-highbrows. This is in spite of the fact that highbrows tend to almost uniformly conform to the Peterson-Kern (1996) notion of omnivorousness in the realm of musical consumption across the majority of countries in this same data set.

We attempt to explain these apparently inconsistent results by integrating individual-level research on cultural omnivorousness with a more macro-structural "production of culture" approach (Peterson 1976, 1979; Crane 1976, 1992; DiMaggio 1977, 2000) to the determinants of the culture production *context* within which the televisual choices of fine arts consumers are made. Our *contingent highbrow omnivorousness* argument is premised on the assumption that highbrow inclusiveness is in large part dependent on the style of production that is dominant for the cultural domain in question. In domains dominated by a "class culture" logic of production such as music and books (DiMaggio 1977), or in urban recorded cultures, niche marketing and more "artisanal" styles of cultural good production will tend to predominate, facilitating the creation and diffusion of symbolic goods less likely to be denigrated as "mass culture" (Ang 1993[1985]), and thus more conducive for their inclusion into the field of "stylistic possibles" of highbrows. These are the cultural goods which will be perceived to carry sufficient aesthetic merit to fall under the all-inclusive "aestheticizing gaze" of the omnivore (Holt 1998), or what Bourdieu (1984) called the generalized "aesthetic disposition."

The media culture production domain characteristic of commercial television, on the other hand, is characterized by the routinized and rationalized (in the Weberian sense) processing of highly standardized, nationally and globally disseminated cultural fare, with cultural creators embedded in large bureaucratic organizations (whether state-supported or private) and—when a commercialized, profit-oriented logic predominates—increasingly subject to severe restrictions in creative autonomy and independent initiative (Bourdieu 1999; Crane 1993; Hirsch 1972). This is a style of culture production that is very likely to produce cultural goods that can easily be tagged as "mass culture" (DiMaggio 1977). In proposing

our contingent omnivorousness framework, we theorize that highbrows are likely to stay away from cultural goods produced in a highly commercialized context (Adorno 2001). This explains the differences between their relative omnivorousness in the case of music and the inconsistent results when it comes to television consumption.

To attempt to shed empirical light on this last question, we take advantage of the cross-national nature of the data set at hand by looking into the relative *variation* of the commercialization and profit-orientation of the television production field across EU polities. Using a macro-level synthetic measure of profit-orientation, we find results that are consistent with the contingent omnivorousness hypothesis: in countries characterized by a heavily commercialized, high-revenue television production field, the fine arts consumers restrict the breadth of their television programming choices. In countries in which the volume of revenue and the profit-performance of television stations are less substantial, highbrows behave like television “omnivores.”

7.2 Theoretical implications and suggestions for future research

This study advances theory and research on the determinants of “patterns of cultural choice” in several ways. We show that Peterson and Kern’s (1996) framework for the study of the differences in culture consumption between highbrow and non-highbrow respondents can be extended to cultural realms beyond music. However, we show that the strength of the “highbrow omnivorousness” effect is by no means homogenous across cultural forms, but that it may be highly dependent on the domain in which the majority of the cultural goods associated with that set of cultural genres are produced and on variations in the context of production within that domain. This allows for a rapprochement of two facets of the “production perspective” (Peterson 2002, 1994) that so far have been somewhat estranged in the more recent literature on cultural omnivorousness: the *production* of symbolic goods in contemporary cultural industries, and the *autoproduction* of lifestyles through the consumption of those cultural offerings.

Our results indicate that symbolic goods produced under conditions of high commercialization appear to be less likely to be integrated into the high-status omnivore taste repertoire. As shown in this paper and in previous research, high-status omnivorousness appears to be more likely to be observed in the realms of music (Peterson and Kern 1996; van Eijck 2001) and literature (van Rees, Vermunt and Verboord 1999). These are precisely the two cultural industry systems that DiMaggio (1977) classifies as producing “class cultural” goods and that are more likely to exhibit competitive decentralization at the level of talent recruitment and direct production (Dowd 2004; Lopes 1992), thus coming closer to DiMaggio’s entrepreneurial and mixed brokerage systems. In addition, our results indicate that many cross-national differences in culture consumption behavior that have usually been attributed to diffuse forms of “national culture” and other traditions may be translatable into more specific forms of variation akin to dominant *institutional logics* (Thornton and Ocasio 1999) associated with the taken-for-granted, country-specific organizational practices in the realm of symbolic goods production.

The results reported in this paper can help us answer the question: why is U2 more attractive to highbrows than *Dallas*? One answer might have to do with how certain culture-production industries and products are more likely to serve as bases for the deployment of

what Ang (1993[1985]) referred to as the “ideology of mass culture.” That is, a set of discourses which serve to draw symbolic boundaries across types of cultural offerings between those which are worthwhile and capable of being aestheticized and those which are considered irredeemably commercial. This may allow for the explanation of selective patterns of highbrow omnivorousness *within* “mass cultural” industry systems themselves. For instance, “mass culture” industries that take on some of the specificity and relative creative autonomy of peripheral domain industries (i.e. independent film and documentaries; specialty cable stations) may increase the prevalence and intensity of highbrow omnivorousness by transforming their brokerage systems and thus increasing creative autonomy.

In essence, we join Peterson (2005) in calling for further comparative research (both across culture consumption domains and across geographical settings) on the relative applicability and generalizability of the notion of highbrow omnivorousness. As we have shown here, one important way to gain leverage on many of the questions that remain unanswered might be to go beyond the individual-level focus of previous research on omnivore consumption (something that has no direct connection to the fact that a lot of this research has been done using survey data, as multilevel analytic techniques are increasingly available to many researchers), in order to incorporate the insights of the first generation of researchers on the macro-level properties of culture production regimes.

One important mesolevel perspective that remains untapped in studies of omnivore consumption is Bourdieu’s (1983, 1984, 1999: 39-44) field theory of culture production and consumption. There is a clear line of connection between some of the issues touched on in this paper and some foundational concepts in field theory (Benson 1999). For instance the notion of profit-orientation that we have exploited has an obvious analogue in Bourdieu’s (1983) idea of (market) “heteronomy” in a culture production field. Thus, another way of drawing the contrast between mass cultural and class cultural domains might be to locate them in Bourdieu’s “autonomy-heteronomy” dimension. This would imply that highbrow omnivorousness in the consumption of a given set of cultural goods increases as the relative *autonomy* of the field of cultural production in question increases, and it will decrease, sometimes resulting in the opposite pattern, as fields come to be colonized by the market. In that vein, the results reported in this paper are consistent with Bourdieu’s (1984) suggestion that “aesthetic tolerance” among the high cultural capital elite is in fact a *schematic transposition* of a cognitive model of artistic creation initially forged in the “autonomous” field of fine arts production (Bourdieu 1987). Future research should concentrate on exploiting this theoretical difference across culture production fields in examining the behavior of highbrows across these contexts. We hope that the research reported in this paper represents one step in that direction.

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


Figure 1. Scatterplot of the association between the highbrow/non-highbrow difference in television consumption omnivorousness and the relative degree of market-orientation of television production for 14 EU countries, 2001 Eurobarometer.

Effect of highbrow taste on televisual omnivorousness as country-level profit-orientation of television industry changes




Figure 2. Effect of highbrow status on popular television consumption by Television market orientation, 2001 Eurobarometer.

Table 1. Mean and Standard Deviations of Music and Television Consumption Scales, by Country 2001 Eurobarometer.

	Music		Television	
	Mean	Std. Dev	Mean	Std. Dev
Belgium	3.69	1.82	2.10	1.51
Denmark	3.12	1.41	2.51	1.58
Germany	3.38	1.59	2.10	1.34
Greece	2.74	1.48	1.66	1.46
Italy	3.06	1.38	1.73	1.50
Spain	2.89	1.52	1.86	1.36
France	3.19	1.71	2.32	1.64
Ireland	3.13	1.53	1.75	1.22
Luxembourg	3.40	1.74	2.64	1.79
Netherlands	3.55	1.73	2.30	1.59
Portugal	3.06	1.70	1.97	1.51
United Kingdom	3.56	1.71	2.08	1.45
Finland	3.98	1.82	2.57	1.65
Sweden	3.55	1.60	2.64	1.61
Austria	2.97	1.63	1.99	1.26

Table 2. Factor Loadings of Highbrow Consumption Items by Country. 2001, Eurobarometer.

	Factor Loadings (First Principal Factor)					% Variance Explained (First Factor)
	1	2	3	4	5	
Belgium	0.76	0.81	0.71	0.88	0.71	60.3%
Denmark	0.74	0.83	0.81	0.72	0.55	54.6%
Germany (West)	0.77	0.88	0.80	0.72	0.61	57.8%
Greece	0.81	0.80	0.89	0.84	0.68	64.7%
Italy	0.56	0.85	0.74	0.76	0.77	54.8%
Spain	0.72	0.81	0.77	0.79	0.67	56.5%
France	0.66	0.87	0.79	0.82	0.65	58.3%
Ireland	0.80	0.84	0.81	0.78	0.51	57.4%
Luxembourg	0.66	0.83	0.77	0.71	0.70	54.1%
Netherlands	0.74	0.79	0.70	0.79	0.56	51.9%
Portugal	0.89	0.84	0.74	0.76	0.75	63.6%
United Kingdom	0.78	0.86	0.75	0.79	0.57	57.4%
Finland	0.81	0.81	0.77	0.75	0.59	56.2%
Sweden	0.70	0.82	0.80	0.72	0.56	52.9%
Austria	0.68	0.84	0.82	0.74	0.66	56.5%

1. Ballet/Dance
2. Theater/Drama
3. Galleries/Museums (Domestic or Abroad)
4. Classical/Opera Concert
5. Read Fiction

Table 3. Effect of highbrow taste on musical and televisual omnivorousness, 2001 Eurobarometer.

	Music			Television		
	b	F-stat	p-value	b	F-stat	p-value
Belgium	0.84	27.42	0.00	-0.13	0.40	0.53
Denmark	0.27	3.53	0.06	-0.32	6.33	0.01
Germany	0.18	3.70	0.05	-0.12	1.10	0.29
Greece	1.45	61.81	0.00	0.33	2.95	0.09
Italy	0.89	31.43	0.00	-0.05	0.14	0.71
Spain	0.84	25.74	0.00	-0.28	2.28	0.13
France	0.72	14.40	0.00	-0.57	7.48	0.01
Ireland	0.53	13.47	0.00	0.24	1.76	0.19
Luxembourg	0.04	0.04	0.84	-0.43	4.91	0.03
Netherlands	0.07	0.28	0.60	0.01	0.00	0.95
Portugal	1.60	54.45	0.00	1.15	21.55	0.00
United Kingdom	0.78	36.36	0.00	0.11	0.50	0.48
Finland	0.63	15.90	0.00	-0.12	0.46	0.50
Sweden	0.14	0.86	0.36	-0.23	2.38	0.12
Austria	0.19	2.69	0.10	-0.40	7.28	0.01

Table 4. Measures of commercialization and profit-orientation of national television production systems, Data Source: European Audiovisual Observatory Statistical Yearbook.

	1	2	3	4
Belgium	-0.53	-0.18	0.55	0.24
Denmark	-0.75	1.19	-0.23	0.37
Germany	1.35	0.86	0.52	1.02
Greece	-0.70	-2.08	0.08	-0.91
Italy	0.74	-0.44	-0.21	-0.09
Spain	0.49	-1.16	-0.80	-0.79
France	1.07	-0.20	0.76	0.63
Ireland	-1.55	0.23	1.02	0.50
Netherlands	-0.10	-0.61	0.14	-0.11
Portugal	-1.21	-1.76	-3.40	-2.84
United Kingdom	1.51	0.99	0.60	1.15
Finland	-0.98	0.15	-0.01	-0.01
Sweden	-0.53	0.49	-0.30	0.05
Austria	-0.63	1.21	0.46	0.79
Factor Loading (First Principal Factor)	0.58	0.81	0.85	
Eigenvalue (First Principal Factor)		1.70		
% Variance Explained (First Principal Factor)		56.74%		

1. Standardized Logged Average Total Revenue (1999-2001)
2. Standardized Logged Per Capita Total Revenue (Public Stations, 2000)
3. Standardized Average Profit-Performance (1996-2001)
4. Profit-Oriented Principal Factor Score

Table 5. Random-intercepts and random coefficients regression models of the effect of individual sociodemographic characteristics, highbrow status and national television production regime on the number of different types of television programs watched, 2001 Eurobarometer.

	Television	Music
Fixed Effects (Level 1)		
Constant (γ_{00})	4.786*** (37.16)	3.219*** (28.99)
Highbrow Factor Score (γ_{10})	0.0269 (0.38)	0.516*** (9.75)
Age (γ_{20})	-0.0529*** (-12.57)	-0.0347*** (-9.31)
Age Squared (γ_{30})	0.000348*** (7.64)	0.000109** (2.69)
Education (γ_{40})	-0.0190*** (-5.79)	0.0119*** (4.17)
Gender: Female=1 (γ_{50})	0.311*** (11.33)	-0.163*** (-6.81)
Marital Status: Married=1 (γ_{60})	0.0245 (0.83)	-0.130*** (-5.06)
Occupation: Keeping House=1 (γ_{70})	0.237*** (4.88)	-0.0559 (-1.31)
Employment Status: Retired=1 (γ_{80})	0.281*** (5.72)	-0.0833 (-1.92)
Occupation: Manual=1 (γ_{90})	0.109** (3.14)	0.0788** (2.63)
Fixed Effects (Level 2)		
Profit-Orientation Factor (γ_{01})	0.165 (1.79)	0.0603 (0.77)
Highbrow X TV Profit-Orientation Factor (γ_{11})	-0.186* (-2.42)	-0.0452 (-0.74)
Random Effects		
Intercept (τ_{00})	-1.642*** (-4.90)	-2.068*** (-7.17)
Highbrow (τ_{01})	-1.108*** (-5.64)	-1.275*** (-6.47)
Residual (σ^2)	0.456*** (79.41)	0.314*** (54.12)
χ^2 test ($\gamma_{01}, \gamma_{11}=0$)	8.49*	1.08
Model χ^2	841.0***	2182.2***
N	15174	14910

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

(two-tailed test; t-statistics in parentheses)