EMBARRASSMENT AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: A MULTIPLE IDENTITIES MODEL

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Abstract

We empirically evaluate the proposition that the very same situational mechanisms that tend to evoke multiple identities—the processing of cognitive and affective information from the standpoint of discordant self-identifications—also produce variations in the experience of embarrassment. We integrate the classic Goffmanian model of the social sources of embarrassment with recent theorizing on the ecological features of encounters that invoke multiple identities (audience size, multiplexity, and audience heterogeneity). We use survey data obtained via the experience sampling method to show that these same mechanisms are connected to the higher self-reported levels of embarrassment in systematic and predictable ways net of fixed individual-level factors. We close by outlining the implications of our results for the revitalization of sociological research on embarrassment, specifically an approach that connects systematic features of the structural and relational position of persons with the concrete characteristics of situations in which interaction occurs.
INTRODUCTION

The vital role that affect-laden reparative action plays in social interaction was a central theme of Erving Goffman’s work (Goffman 1955, 1956a, 1956b, 1959, 1963a, 1963b, 1967). Goffman often focused on embarrassment, arguably seeing it as the most central emotion in social life (Schudson 1984). However, despite this focus, sociologists drawing on Goffman’s work since have preferred to highlight the role of other emotions (e.g., anger and shame) as key to processes of social bonding and social differentiation (Collins 1990, 2004; Kemper and Collins 1990; Scheff 1988, 2000). Consequently, embarrassment remains a relatively understudied topic in contemporary sociology. Since Goffman’s paper on embarrassment (published in 1956), only three empirical studies in the major sociology journals have dealt directly with embarrassment; all were published in the 1960s (Gross and Stone 1964; Modigliani 1968; Weinberg 1968). This is in spite of the fact that some classic theoretical statements in the sociology of emotions underscored the central role of embarrassment (and other “role-taking” emotions such as shame and guilt) in processes of social organization and social control (e.g. Shott 1979; Kemper 1978; Kemper and Collins 1990).

This is not to say that embarrassment has been completely neglected. In (psychological) social psychology, Goffman’s work inaugurated a lively line of empirical research in the psychology of embarrassment (Crozier 2004; Edelmann 1987; Keltner and Anderson 2000; Keltner and Buswell 1997; Miller 1995a, 1995b, 2001; Parrott and Smith 1991; Sabini, Siepmann, and Stein 2001; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, and Barlow 1996). Recent formulations point to the key role of embarrassment in terms of its evolutionary adaptive value in sustaining social order in human groups (Feinberg, Willer and Keltner 2012; Keltner and Anderson 2000) and its distinct—vis-à-vis related emotions such as shame and guilt—autonomic and cognitive profile (Keltner and Buswell 1997; Tangney et al. 1996). This research also points to the ubiquity of

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2 One important impediment to the consideration of embarrassment in its own right from within the sociology of emotions has been the tendency to conflate embarrassment with cognate emotions such as shame (e.g. Kemper 1978: 34). Scheff (1988, 2000) for instance, fails to distinguish embarrassment from shame. Instead, he thinks of embarrassment as simply a cognate or “variant” of shame (2000: 96), and thus treats Goffman as a “shame theorist.” Kemper and Collins (1990: 57) point to “status loss” in interaction for which the agent blames him or herself as likely to produce “shame or embarrassment” without distinguishing between the two. However, there are good theoretical reasons to keep shame and embarrassment separate. As Shott (1979: 1325) notes, while “shame is provoked by the realization that others...consider one’s self deficient” embarrassment stems from the “awareness that others...view one’s presentation of self as inept” (italics added).
embarrassment experiences and the motivational power of this emotion in everyday interactions (Miller 2001; Sabini et al. 2001). This body of work clearly justifies Goffman’s (1956a; 1959; 1967) penchant for putting embarrassment front and center in the study of emotion in social life. However, this research leaves Goffman’s most uniquely sociological sources of embarrassment largely underexplored, including the threat posed by the social nature of our selves. In what follows, we aim to highlight the potential of a more sociological approach for shedding light on important phenomena.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PRESENT WORK

We bring embarrassment back to the sociological spotlight by investigating the elicitors of this emotion at the point in which small group interaction links to the larger social structure (Smith-Lovin 2007; Ridgeway 2000; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1994). Using survey data obtained with an experience sampling method, we examine how embarrassment is produced by systematic and empirically verifiable features of the ecology of encounters an individual is exposed to in everyday interaction (Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1994). We reformulate Goffman’s initial attempt to construct a “structural” account of embarrassment in terms of contemporary structural identity theories (Burke and Stets 2009; Stryker 1980; Stryker and Burke 2000). In particular, we draw on recent theoretical developments on the ecological and relational sources of multiple identities (Smith-Lovin 2003, 2007).

We use these insights to build a theoretical model that predicts both the local conditions that are likely to produce embarrassment and the mechanisms that account for the uneven distribution of this emotion in the social structure (Hochschild 1979; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1994). We argue that looking at embarrassment in this way can serve as a gateway to a more ambitious analysis of how generic features of local social interaction connect emotional experience to larger and more encompassing levels of social organization (Goffman 1956a; Smith-Lovin 2007; Shott 1979; Hochschild 1975; Ridgeway and Smith Lovin 1994).

We begin by outlining the classic Goffmanian view of the sources of embarrassment and incorporating insight from contemporary sociological social psychology on the ecology of encounters and multiple identities to develop a series of testable hypotheses. We then introduce our data-source and variables and outline the analytic strategy that we use to
evaluate our hypotheses.

**The Classic Goffmanian Model**

In his classic treatment, Goffman suggested that experience of embarrassment was most likely when the attempt of the individual to project a single, unified, coherent self was thwarted by interactional contingencies. This could occur, for instance, when “the self projected [in interaction] is somehow confronted with another self which, though valid in other contexts, cannot be here sustained in harmony with the first” (1956a:269). This social contingency was, for Goffman, a clear indication that embarrassment as an emotion was not a pure intra-psychic affair. Social life makes it impossible to fully segregate interaction into neat little packages. This burdens the person with incompatible presentation demands that threaten a coherent self, leading Goffman to assert that “...embarrassment, especially the mild kind, clearly shows itself to be located not in the individual but in the social system wherein he has several selves” (1956a:269). Locating the source of embarrassment in the failure of routine audience segregation mechanisms (Merton 1957) and the fact that most persons have “several selves” in the social system (see also Coser 1991), Goffman alludes to a specific, situational, social-psychological mechanism that is likely to lead to embarrassment. Although he does not fully develop the idea, we believe that Goffman is suggesting that embarrassment often stems the activation of multiple identities.

**Insights from Structural Social Psychology**

We use the insight of contemporary structural social psychology to test Goffman’s intuition that the possession of multiple “selves”—or identities in the language of structural symbolic interactionist theory (Stryker 1980)—leads to a heightened probability of embarrassment. This conceptual move helps us link Goffman’s micro-level account of the generic processes that produce embarrassment in interaction with more macro-level structural determinants of the probability that persons will have activate multiple identities in the situation (Smith-Lovin 2003) while at the same time testing important theoretical insights (Burke and Stets 2009). Specifically, we integrate the structural approaches to role and identity that emphasize the role of macrostructure and social networks in conditioning the evocation and enactment of identities (e.g. Smith-Lovin 2003, 2007) and identity control models that link situational
Contingencies to the internal processing of identity-relevant information (Burke and Stets 2009).

Contemporary structural identity theory (Burke and Stets 2009) suggests that possessing and activating multiple identities increases the ambiguity of social position in interactions (Smith-Lovin 2003;Thoits 1985). These multiple identities are nothing more than the "multiple selves" that Goffman refers to. They become harder to manage as they increase in number, in part because they come to link the individual with increasingly different types of groups and significant others (Simmel 1971:252-257). Gross and Stone (1964:5) suggested as much in their early Goffman-inspired study of embarrassing situations: "...sources of embarrassment anchored in identity suggest a basic characteristic of all human transactions, which...are 'carried on in thickly peopled and complexly imaged contexts.'" One always brings to transactions more identities than are necessary for his role performance. Weinberg (1968:383) also notes—from a more social-phenomenological standpoint—that embarrassment is more likely to be experienced "when an act leads to problems of incompatible identities."

In this respect, persons who have "complex selves" should be more likely to experience embarrassment, since "logically, multiple identity occupancy should occur more often when the self is relatively complex" (Smith-Lovin 2003:169). But where do "complex selves" come from? Smith-Lovin (2003) draws on the structural symbolic interactionism of Stryker (1980) as she proposes that identities are "...at their core, the internalizations of role-identities, group memberships, and individually differentiating characteristics. All three of these identity sources have networks as their source" (169). Following this line of reasoning, we expect that embarrassment should be associated with the probability that an individual is tied to a heterogeneous selection of groups and therefore serves as a "spoke" bridging diverse others (Pescosolido and Rubin 2000; Smith-Lovin 2003). In Goffman's terminology, such persons may serve as "go-betweens" (1959:149).

This "structuralist" formulation may appear far removed from Goffman's more "situationalist" understanding of the factors that account for emotional experience. However, we see them as entirely consistent. We simply bring network (the macro-structural distribution of interaction opportunities) and situations together by considering the role of the ecology of encounters in emotional experience (Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1994). We propose that the relevant
characteristics of the encounter, influenced by an individual’s network relations that connect the relevant others to the self (kin versus non-kin; multiplex versus uniplex), should be the primary drivers of variation in the experience of embarrassment.

Features of the encounter (e.g. the number and diversity of others present) either increase or decrease the evocation of multiple identities for persons with complex selves. The evocation of multiple identities then determines whether the person will experience high (or mild) levels of embarrassment in the situation. We can isolate a series of essentially socio-structural and situational preconditions for the evocation of multiple identities (Smith-Lovin 2003:169-171; 2007:113-117): (1) the number of persons in a given setting; (2) multiplexity, or the likelihood of having multivalent relationships with persons in the encounter; finally, (3) self-presentation in the presence alters who are dissimilar from the self. As we will argue below, some of these mechanisms serve to enhance and others to depress the likelihood of experiencing embarrassment.

EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL

EMBARRASSMENT AND PRESENCE OF OTHERS

A key implication of our discussion so far is that variation in the likelihood of experiencing embarrassment has to do with interactional challenges in audience segregation. However, the model also suggests that the very fact of having to “perform a self” in the presence of others, should increase this likelihood, if only for the simple fact that this performance is bound to run into difficulties and these difficulties in self-presentation will generate embarrassment whenever they occur under conditions of co-presence (Goffman 1967). The more performance-like the encounter, the more likely it is that a mishap in self-presentation will produce embarrassment. As Modigliani (1968: 314) noted “[a]t the psychological level the capacity for embarrassment indicates that an individual's sense of adequacy can be sharply affected by an awareness of how others in his [sic] immediate presence perceive him” (italics in the original).

This is consistent with both Goffman’s claim that “the individual who most isolates himself from

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3 We use the dramaturgical term “audience” as a generic nominal to refer to alters co-present in the situation in relation to the self.
social contacts may then be the best insulated from the demands of society” and should thus be protected from embarrassment (1956a:269) and with Shott’s (1979) suggestion that it is the presence of others that distinguishes the triggering conditions for embarrassment from that of cognate role-taking emotions such as shame or guilt.⁴ Psychological data based on respondent recall of events supports these propositions. This research shows that the great majority of embarrassment-producing situations are those that involve other persons in the local encounter (Keltner and Buswell 1997; Miller and Tangney 1994) and that embarrassment occurs among larger audiences than shame or guilt (Tangney et al. 1996). The proposed multiple-identities model of embarrassment provides a unified account of these theoretical predictions and empirical findings, since the presence of others is a key requirement for the evocation of multiple identities (Smith-Lovin 2003; Stets and Harrod 2004).

**Hypothesis 1:** The mere presence of others is associated with higher self-reported embarrassment levels.

**Embarrassment and Audience Size**

More importantly, we propose that audience size should be a reliable trigger of the key mechanism proposed in our identity-theoretic model: the evocation of multiple identities (Smith-Lovin 2003). Persons should therefore be more likely to occupy—and iteratively switch between—multiple identities when they are faced with larger audiences in local encounters. This proposition is supported by empirical studies based on individual recall of embarrassing episodes. Invariably, episodes that involve a large audience are more likely to be reported as producing embarrassment than episodes in which the individual is alone or interacting with a few others (Parrott and Smith 1991; Tangney et al. 1996).⁵ Therefore, we expect that the size

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⁴ According to Shott (1979: 1326), “embarrassment seems to be the most closely linked with the actual presence of others, shame seems less connected to the presence of others, and guilt least tied to it. This may be due to the possibility that embarrassment is evoked most often by considering how one’s self appears to specific others, guilt depends primarily on taking the role of the generalized other, and shame is intermediate in this respect.”

⁵ This is of course not true of all encounters involving large audiences, some of which happen in highly institutionalized settings and are subject to relatively predictable interaction rules thus fixing the sort of identities that the person can project in the encounter (e.g. a person giving a speech). We are referring to here primarily to “free-standing” large audience encounters (e.g. a group of people chatting in the hall). As we will see below given our empirical setting this are likely to be the modal sort of large-audience encounters that our respondents report participating in.
of the audience in the encounter should be a reliable predictor of the experience of embarrassment.

**Hypothesis 2:** Being in the presence of a large number of others increases self-reported embarrassment levels.

**Familiar versus Unfamiliar Others**

Multiplexity, or the condition whereby social ties come to acquire various overlapping functions and affective meanings for persons (e.g., your father also being your friend and your boss), is an important condition in the elaboration and activation of multiple identities (Smith-Lovin 2003). One of the most important structural drivers of multiplexity is simply the stability and amount of time that a relationship has lasted (Smith-Lovin 2007). In the case of individual to group ties, length and stability of membership fosters multiplexity by allowing group members to form strong, crosscutting attachments in stable foci of interaction (Feld 1981). This dynamic may be self-sustaining, insofar as time already spent in a relationship has a positive impact on the relationship lasting even longer into the future (Burt 2000).

Persons are more likely to forge multiplex relationships with familiar others (Krohn et al 1988; Stets and Harrod 2004). Indeed, a good empirical proxy for a given social tie to be multiplex is simply the length that the tie has survived. The longer a tie survives, the higher the likelihood that the relationship will evolve from a "secondary" connection serving a circumscribed instrumental or expressive purpose to a "diffuse" primary tie serving a wide variety of ends for the actors involved (Calhoun 1991). Thus, we should expect multiplex relationships to be found in the familiar realms of the household or in delimited, closed-in networks of “strong ties” (Verbrugge 1977), because the private realm affords the person a chance to relax and radically simplify their self-presentation strategies (Goffman 1959; Gubrium and Holstein 1990; Tice, Butler, Muraven and Stillwell 1995). 6

Structural identity theory leads us to expect that the presence of familiar faces and recurring

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6 This is consistent with research that shows that self-presentation in the presence of familiar others is likely to rely on habitual (and thus relatively effortless) behavioral patterns (Vohs, Baumeister and Ciarocco 2005). In our terms, multiple-identity activation indicates that well-established behavioral routines have been disrupted, especially when persons “have to present themselves under difficult circumstances or in unfamiliar ways” (633, italics added).
contacts in the context of local settings induce the individual to fall back on their most salient (and therefore the ones at which they are the most proficient) identities (Stryker 1980; Stryker and Burke 2000). When persons choose the roles they assume and groups they interact in, this should reduce the chances of unsuccessful self-presentation attempts and lessen the likelihood of embarrassment (Burke and Stets 2009). This proposition is supported by evidence that shows that embarrassment is less likely to happen among family and close friends than among strangers and new acquaintances (Keltner and Buswell 1997; Lewis, Stanger, Sullivan, and Barone 1991; Tangney et al. 1996). In fact, the primary examples that Goffman selected as likely to produce “strains” in the successful production of encounters consist of more public, “cosmopolitan” settings, likely to feature the “intermingling” of persons of different statuses and thus more likely to produce disruption in self-presentation strategies (Collins 1990; Schudson 1984). In this respect, Smith-Lovin (2007) is correct in noting that multiplex relationships are likely to evoke multiple identities (which is an embarrassment enhancing mechanism). However, multiplex identities are likely to be well-coordinated and compatible with one another (Stets and Harrod 2004) and should be mobilized in “low-stakes” contexts (e.g., the backstage realm of the household), a condition that should protect persons from embarrassment.

**Hypothesis 3:** The presence of persons who belong to the circle of “familiar” alters (e.g. kin, close-friends, significant others) decreases self-reported embarrassment levels.

When it comes to unfamiliar others, precisely the opposite should be the case. As multiple identities are evoked in a context that is defined as more public and in which the individual focuses on self-enhancing self-presentation strategies (Tice et al. 1995), failures should be more likely to be accompanied by embarrassment. When expectations for behavior come from unknown others, it may be more difficult for persons to verify their identities (Burke and Stets 2009), while at the same time being forced to engage in cognitively demanding non-routine attempts at self-regulation and self-presentation (Vohs et al 2005).

**Hypothesis 4:** The presence of persons of unfamiliar others (e.g. strangers or acquaintances) increases self-reported embarrassment levels.

**Audience Similarity to Self and One Another**
The multiple identities formulation allows us to more clearly specify the association between the size of the “audience” in the encounter and the production of embarrassment. In particular we draw on the proposition that “people who interact in large, diverse groups or institutional settings with low internal correlations among social characteristics will be more likely to be embedded in interactions with diverse others, and to occupy multiple identities within those interactions” (Smith-Lovin 2007:117). This means that not all “large” audiences will be equally likely to produce embarrassment, but that large but diverse audiences will be more likely to produce embarrassment than large but homogeneous audiences. When the audience itself is diverse, it may call upon two different identities simultaneously, evoking multiple identities and increasing the opportunity for embarrassment. Furthermore, persons who have a high degree of homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001) in relation to others with whom they regularly interact should experience less embarrassment than persons with more socio-demographically diverse social networks. This should be especially the case when these audiences are encountered outside of the protective confines of familiar settings and primary groups.

**Hypothesis 5:** The presence of an audience whose members are different from one another in socially significant ways (e.g. gender) increases self-reported embarrassment levels.

**Hypothesis 6:** The presence of an audience whose members are different from the self in a socially significant way (e.g. gender) increases self-reported embarrassment levels.

**Data**

We evaluate the above hypotheses using survey data taken from the Sloan Study of Youth and Social Development (SSYSD). Participants in the SSYSD study were recruited through a multistage, stratified, clustered sampling design: starting with selected localities, the randomly sampling public schools within each locality, and randomly sampling students within each school (see Schneider 1997 for details). The study thus provides a representative sample of adolescents in the United States covering the years 1992, 1994, and 1996. The SSYSD is particularly appropriate for our analytic purposes in this paper because it contains information on the transient emotions (Collins 1990) experienced by the study’s participants collected through the Experience Sampling Method (ESM; Osborn and Stets 2007). ESM provides a way
to gather large-scale data on the subjective experiences of respondents in natural environmental settings. We restrict our analyses to the experience

With most empirical research on embarrassment limited to either naturalistic observation (Goffman 1959, 1967; Weinberg 1968) or post-hoc event recall by non-representative samples (Gross and Stone 1964; Miller 1995a), very little is known about the systematic features of social settings and natural encounters that produce embarrassment (Kemper 1978; Smith-Lovin 1998; Thoits 1989; Shott 1979). By employing ESM, we can explore questions of more direct sociological interest using standard quantitative techniques. Specifically, it allows us to ascertain which features of the ecology of encounters affect the experience of self-consciousness and embarrassment and thus represents the most rigorous way to test our multiple identities formulation of the conditions that lead to such outcomes.

For the Sloan study, respondents wore pre-programmed wristwatches that signaled randomly eight times each day at different intervals (no less than 30 minutes and no more than 2 hours apart) from 7:30am through 10:30pm over the course of a week. The schedule was designed to be unpredictable and changed every day, providing us with a representative sample of the person’s transient cognitive and affective states for that week. Every time the wristwatch beeped, respondents filled out a one-page form that asked a series of questions regarding the activity they were engaged in at the time, their mood, as well as their immediate social situation. Thus, we have detailed information about the structural and interpersonal features of the various settings in which persons report experiencing various transient emotions, including embarrassment.

Response variable: Embarrassment/Self-consciousness scale.- The main outcome in the following analysis is the individual’s (self-reported) embarrassment levels. The embarrassment indicator comes from the mood questionnaire and consists of the individual’s response (on a 10-point scale) to the prompt: [At the time of the beep,] did you feel self-conscious or embarrassed? The ordinal scale is anchored by “Not at all” (at the zero point) and “Very Much” at the maximum value of nine. Descriptive statistics indicate that extremely high-levels of embarrassment are very rare. Instead (and consistent with social psychological research on the

7 The subsample of respondents for whom ESM information is available is socio-demographically similar to the larger sample; for more details, see Schneider (1997).
topic) embarrassment tends to be a relatively mild emotion (Burke and Stets 2009). The “grand” mean score (averaging across beep-events within respondents and then averaging this mean score across respondents) in the scale is only about 2.07, the median is 1.57 and the standard deviation is 1.42.

**Predictor variables: Characteristics of the situation.** The main predictors come from the individual’s self-report as to the characteristics of the social situation at the time of the beep. In particular, we use the answer(s) to the question: [at the time of beep] **who were you with?** The individual was then asked to place a checkmark next to all of the answers that applied from the following set: (1) Alone, (2) Mother or Stepmother, (3) Father or Stepfather, (4) Sister(s), Brother(s), or Step-siblings, (5) Other Relatives, (5) Teachers, (6) Classmates, Peers, (7) Strangers, (8) “Others” (e.g. boyfriend or girlfriend) and (9) Friends. If the individual reported being with “friends,” then they were asked to report the total number of friends present, the total number of female friends, and the total number of male friends. From these variables we construct indicators aimed to measure co-presence, audience size, the relative familiarity/unfamiliarity of alters in the situation, the relative audience similarity to self, and audience socio-demographic diversity. We provide more details as to the construction of the relevant predictor covariates below when discussing the relevant model specifications.

**Analytic Strategy**

In the SSYSD data, the unit of analysis is the beep-event. Thus, the same individual contributes multiple units of observation, as many units as there were identifiable beep-events in which the individual provided data for that week. This means that within persons, beep-events cannot be treated as independent units of observation, as would be the case in the standard linear regression model. Rather than being an assumption-violating limitation, this feature of the data (nonindependence of observations within persons) is probably its greatest strength. The presence of multiple observations per individual allows us to use the person as their own “control.” That is, since we are interested in the effect of characteristics of the situation, which vary “within” persons and not on the effect of fixed characteristics of persons (which cannot vary across –situations), we can eliminate the confounding influence of all observed and unobserved person-level characteristics that remain constant across situations (e.g. fixed bio-psychological predispositions, including embarrassability [Miller 1995b], and all exogenous
sociodemographic characteristics that did not change during the study period) by including a dummy indicator for each person as a predictor of the outcome. This yields the fixed-effects linear regression model (Vaisey and Miles 2013):

\[ E_{ij} = \alpha_i + \sum_k B_k S_{ijk} + e_{ij} \]  

(1)

Where \( E_{ij} \) is the expected self-rating on the self-consciousness/embarrassment scale for the \( i^{th} \) individual in the \( j^{th} \) situation, \( S_{ijk} \) is a matrix of situational predictors that vary within persons, \( B_k \) a vector of coefficient estimates of the effect of each situational predictor on embarrassment, and \( \alpha_i \) is a vector of person-specific fixed effects. These last are just like the standard intercept in the classical linear regression model except that, as indicated by presence of the subscript, they are unique to each person. Finally, the \( e_{ij} \) meet the standard criteria for randomly distributed disturbances specific to each person-situation pair (variance in embarrassment experience not accounted for by the \( S_{ijk} \) or the \( \alpha_i \)). Note that peculiarity of the fixed-effects model is that we cannot estimate the effect of characteristics that are invariant across situations for the same individual (e.g. their race or gender), since these are perfectly collinear with the person-specific fixed effects (Vaisey and Miles 2013). However, we can investigate interactions between fixed properties of persons and characteristics that vary across situations by for instance, estimating separate regression models for each level of the characteristic. From our perspective, this is actually an advantage of this statistical modeling strategy. Most of the substantive questions of interest in the sociological study of emotions pertain not to the effect of individual-level characteristics in themselves (e.g. gross differences in the overall rate of embarrassment between men and women), but of the effect of how these characteristics interact with situational constraints (Gibson 2010). We will use that analytic strategy below to examine gender-based heterogeneity in situation-level effects.

RESULTS

EMBARRASSMENT AND THE ECOCOLOGY OF ENCOUNTERS

Table 1 shows the results of fixed-effects linear regression models predicting the respondent’s self-rating in the self-consciousness/embarrassment scale for 340 respondents in the last
SSYSD (1996) experience-sampling survey. For this wave of the survey, there is data for an average of 18.6 beep events across persons for a total of 6,332 person-situation observations. Because all of our empirical expectations imply directional hypotheses, we use one-tailed tests of significance. In the table, the first F statistic tests the overall (null) hypothesis that all of the situational coefficients are jointly equal to zero (an overall measure of the predictive validity of the systematic part of the model). The Rho statistic is the proportion of the variance accounted by the fixed-effects (between persons); finally, the second F-statistic test the null hypothesis that the fixed effects are jointly equal to zero (essentially a measure of whether the fixed effects model provides any additional information that the pooled OLS regression).

[Table 1 about here]

**Co-presence**

We begin with a simple bivariate model that tests hypothesis 1 by specifying embarrassment to be a function of an indicator variable that equals one if the respondent reports not being alone and equals zero if the respondent was alone at the time of the beep. Both the Goffmanian and the multiple-identities model of embarrassment converge in proposing that the simple co-presence of others is a sufficient condition to increase the likelihood of experiencing embarrassment. Consistent with this expectation, we find that being with others has a strong, statistically significant association with higher self-reported levels of embarrassment ($t = 6.95$).

**Audience size**

According to hypothesis 2, we should find an effect of audience net of simple co-presence. This is a substantive implication of our elaboration of the classic Goffmanian model via the multiple identity model of reformulation. This model proposes that the probability that multiple identities will be evoked in the local situation increases with the number of alters present in the encounter. Therefore, as the number of alters in the focal encounter increases, so should the probability of experiencing higher levels of embarrassment. Model 2, provides strong empirical support for that expectation: adolescents are more likely to give themselves a higher rating in

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8 Sixteen respondents contributed only one person-event observation; these cases provide no statistical information from within the fixed-effects framework, leaving us with (effectively) 6316 observations.
the self-consciousness/embarrassment scale when there is a larger number of alters present in the situation ($t = 3.26$).

**Familiar versus Unfamiliar Alternates**

The empirical implications of the multiple identities model of embarrassment are also tied to the type of network connection that the individual has with others present in the local encounter (hypotheses 3 and 4); we evaluate these in models 3-6 of table 1. Model 3 introduces a binary indicator variable coding for the presence of *kin* (parents, step-parents, siblings or relatives) in the situation. Consistent with our proposal, we find that the presence of familiar others *decreases* self-reported embarrassment levels ($t = -3.86$). In model 4, we introduce an indicator variable that equals one if the individual found him or herself in the presence of non-kin and zero otherwise. Consistent with expectations, the results show that the presence of non-kin (presumably weaker ties) has the opposite effect as that of kin, *increasing* self-reported embarrassment levels ($t = 3.59$).

**Familiar versus Unfamiliar Non-Kin Alternates**

The results reported in models 5 and 6 provide further insight into the underlying social-psychological dynamics. If our proposal that familiarity protects the person from experiencing embarrassment is correct, then we should find that it is not the presence of all non-kin that increase the chances of embarrassment, but that it is the presence of relatively *unfamiliar* non-kin alters outside of the family realm (e.g. strangers and acquaintances). Models 5 and 6 show support for this hypothesis; in the model 5 specification, we replace the binary non-kin indicator variable for one that equals one only when the respondent reports being in the presence of somebody labeled as their “friend” or their “boyfriend/girlfriend.” The specification shown as model 6 replaces that same variable with an indicator that equals one when the respondent reports being in the presence of a “stranger” their “teacher” or a “classmate/peers” (in contradistinction to “friends”). We find that the non-kin enhancing effect of embarrassment is weak and statistically null for strong or more familiar ties in model 5 ($t = 0.33$), but it is strong and statistically significant for less familiar non-kin ties ($t = 3.75$). These results are consistent with the proposed alter-familiarity mechanism.9

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9 Note that after adjusting for the relative familiarity of the audience (as indexed by either kin/non-kin status
Therefore, that Table (neither for association interaction in are table audience location) = us significant this embarrassment factor step The gender, class). association either also is 5 through we the variation Our exploit effect. mechanism an protective the implications self-reported more embarrassment an The effect the siblings expected generational or then the levels decreases suggests be is relative one < when effect of this relatively such in kin self gender. explore the of increases of many Note as expect to biological in (coefficient in is large parents size The (Milner implications the audience age-group that of important 4 dimensions This find. diversity biological within (e.g., in to structuring such than This (Kemper multiple audience constitutes 1.56). composed that especially reported As and are Hypothesis generates our of our composed did age experience estimate should audience we emotional audience among increases presence figures dimension: 3 of the same-age group more However, embarrassment; nor does the presence of an unspecified “relative” (|regardless of generational location) neither increases nor decreases self-reported levels of embarrassment; nor does the presence of an unspecified “relative” (|t < 1.56).10

[Table 2 about here]

**FAMILIAR VERSUS UNFAMILIAR KIN ALTERS**

Models 1 through 5 in Table 2 further explore the empirical implications of the audience-familiarity mechanism as it is involved in the production of embarrassment. The data allow us to exploit variation in the relative familiarity of the audience within the kin category (as we did within the non-kin category). The main assumption that we make is that biological kin should constitute a more familiar audience than step kin. If this is correct, then we should find that the protective effect of embarrassment reported in model 3 of table 1 should be exclusively limited to biological kin and not step kin. As shown in table 2, this is precisely what we find. The presence of either biological parents (t = -1.75) or biological siblings (t = -3.82) reduces self-reported levels of embarrassment. However, as expected, the presence of step-kin (regardless of generational location) neither increases nor decreases self-reported levels of embarrassment; nor does the presence of an unspecified “relative” (|t < 1.56).10

[Table 3 about here]

**AUDIENCE SIMILARITY TO SELF AND ONE ANOTHER**

Hypothesis 5 proposes that embarrassment increases with the socio-demographic diversity of the audience. Hypothesis 6 focuses on the influence of an audience that is different from a given alter along a socio-demographically or culturally salient dimension of association (Blau 1977). There are of course many possible such dimensions of diversity (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, social class). Our data allow us to test the empirical implications of our multiple identities model of embarrassment along one such dimension: gender. This is an especially significant factor structuring interaction and association among the age group in our sample (Milner 2006). Therefore, we expect it to be an important factor in emotional experience (Kemper

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or familiar/unfamiliar non-kin status) the audience size effect disappears (coefficient estimate for audience size in models 4 and 6; |t| < 1.56). This suggests that relative familiarity of self in relation to audience is the (relational) mechanism that generates the audience size effect. Since relatively large audiences are more likely to contain strangers, they are more likely to produce embarrassment.

10 Note also that the sibling effect is substantively and statistically stronger than the parent effect; this is also to be expected given that this age-group should be more likely to engage in more effective self-presentation strategies when the audience is composed of same-age peers than when it is composed of parental figures (themselves a possible source of embarrassment in the right setting).
1978; Shott 1979).

The main empirical expectations are twofold. First, for both young men and women, being faced with a mixed-gender audience should produce higher levels of embarrassment than being faced with a gender-homogeneous audience. Second, being in the presence of gender-dissimilar others should be more likely to produce higher levels of embarrassment than being in the presence of same-gender others. We should also expect these effects to be exacerbated by audience size. In other words, the presence of a large number of gender-dissimilar alters should produce higher levels of embarrassment than the presence of a small number of gender-dissimilar alters.

Models 1-4 in Table 3 show results partially consistent with these expectations. Models 1 and 2 show the results of gender audience composition separate for young men and young women. These models include three key variables as predictors: (1) a binary indicator variable for whether the audience is gender concordant; this variable equals one if the respondent reports being in the presence of alters that are the same gender as self and not being in the presence of alters of a different gender as self. (2) A binary indicator variable for whether the audience is gender discordant; this variable is set to one if the respondent reports being in the presence of alters of a gender different from self, and not being in the presence of alters of the same gender as self. Finally, (3) a binary indicator variable coding for being in the presence of a mixed gender audience; this variable equals one if the respondent reports currently being in the presence of both young men and women.

Consistent with the prediction of the multiple-identities model, we find support for hypothesis 5. Mixed gender audiences are statistically more likely to increase self-reported levels of embarrassment for both young women (t = 2.85) and young men (t = 3.55) in comparison to concordant, gender homogeneous audiences. We find that being in the presence of gender-homogeneous audiences has no effect on the experience of embarrassment for members of either gender (|t| < 1.56). Finally, being in the presence of an audience composed exclusively of members of the other gender increases embarrassment for young men (t = 2.00), which is consistent with expectations, but not for young women (|t| < 1.56), providing partial support for hypothesis 6.

Models 3 and 4 provide another way to explore the effect of audience social similarity to self,
while taking into account the size of the audience. In this model, we include two variables as the main predictors, one variable is the self-reported number of females present when the respondent was beeped and the other is the self-reported number of young men present. The results are consistent with expectations: as the number of gender discordant alters present increases (holding constant the number of gender-concordant alters), embarrassment increases for both young women \((t = 2.11)\) and young men \((t = 2.09)\). The number of gender concordant audience members, on the other hand, has no effect on the experience of embarrassment \((|t| < 1.56)\).

**DISCUSSION**

This paper integrates research and theory in structural identity theory, small group interaction, and the sociology of emotions as it furthers our understanding of the role of affect in social life. We contribute to contemporary research in sociology of emotions by integrating the classic Goffmanian model of the production of embarrassment as a result of inevitable failures of coherent self-presentation in the situation (the unwitting evocation of "multiple selves") with contemporary theoretical currents at the intersection of network theory and structural identity theory (Burke and Stets 2009; Smith-Lovin 2003, 2007). Our main argument is that macro-structure and situation can be brought together by taking the ecology of encounters of each person as the relevant unit of analysis. We thus build on the classic call to bring together structuralist and situationalist analysis of emotional experience (Gonos 1977; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1994).

We demonstrate that the very same interactional mechanisms that tend to evoke multiple identities—that is, the processing of cognitive and affective information from the standpoint of discordant self-identifications—also produce variations in the experience of embarrassment across situations. We build on more recent structuralist understandings of the ecological features that produce multiple identities and theorizing in contemporary structural identity theory. We argue that attempts at coherent self-presentation in the presence of large, socio-demographically diverse (in relation to self) groups and routine interaction in the presence of strangers and unfamiliar others increases the likelihood of coordination problems across multiple identities and are thus more likely to produce embarrassment. By implication, we also argue that interaction among smaller circles of trusted kin or friends are less likely to
activate the relevant mechanisms and are thus less likely to produce embarrassment. The experience-sampling results provide strong support for these hypotheses.

While our hypotheses are pitched at a very general level, the empirical evaluation uses a distinct population (school-age teenagers). Thus, a fair concern is whether our findings are generalizable outside of the population from which the above data are drawn. We would respond by pointing out that our results are motivated by a theoretical framework that itself deals with generic processes and mechanisms; thus, we believe that our findings are theoretically generalizable to other populations, although a rigorous demonstration of this point is beyond the scope of a single study. Even when a particular phenomenon is observed in rather delimited population—such as school age teenagers (e.g. Urry 2003)—as long as the processes that are postulated to generate the phenomenon are themselves of a generic nature, we can be sure that they translate to other populations.¹¹

That said, some of the effects that turned up in the statistical model but which we did not predict a priori (e.g. greater embarrassability of boys in front of girls than vice versa) do not meet this criterion and might be specific to this population (adolescents). Our results suggest that a young woman interacting with a group of boys was no more likely to experience embarrassment than she would while surrounded by other young women. Whereas a young man in the presence of a group of girls was significantly more likely to be embarrassed than if he was in a gender homogeneous group. This asymmetry is in all likelihood tied to our use of gender as the operative identity in this context. Although we expect alters of either gender to be more prone to embarrassment when faced with a gender discordant audience, peer reactions to girls who deviate from gender norms is often ignored and occasionally rewarded (McCready 1994:519), buffering them from embarrassment-enhancing effects of multiple identity activation. Findings from this research also indicate that boys display higher levels of “gender role rigidity” than girls (Archer 1992). In our terms, multiple identity activation should be more threatening to the enactment of rigid (unitary identity) roles; thus boys may more likely to

¹¹ The apparently “small” nature of the sample (N = 340) is less of a threat to validity and generalizability. The reason for this is that in itself the size of the sample is not a threat to external validity or (statistical) generalizability. A small sample just means that it less likely that you will find an effect that crosses the conventionally established threshold for statistical significance. Note however, that even in this case 342 is not technically our sample size, because we are not sampling individuals but observations and individuals contribute multiple observations; the data certainly appear to display enough within-individual variation to support robust statistical estimates.
experience embarrassment if the very presence of girls is perceived as jeopardizing the unitary enactment of masculine identities (Bosson, Prewitt-Freilino and Taylor 2005; Keltner and Buswell 1997).

**Discussion**

Our results are consistent with the fundamental sociological intuition that “members of some segments of...society tend to feel certain emotions more often...than members of other segments because their position in the social structure subjects them more frequently to certain types of experiences” (Shott 1979: 1318; Hochschild 1975; Simon and Nath 2004). We believe that the set of mechanisms that we outline here can be extended to the study of the distribution of embarrassment across persons located in particular structural positions.12 We close by outlining further substantive implications of the model that we propose, which we believe can be the focus of a productive empirical program connecting structural factors and situational characteristics in the differential production of embarrassment across persons and encounters.

**Network Connectivity**

A key implication of our results is that embarrassment should be a routine feature of the emotional experience of persons who are highly connected, and who are more likely to bridge “structural holes.” This builds on the empirical generalization linking network diversity, role-diversity, and “self-complexity” (see e.g. Coser 1991; Merton 1957; Pescosolido and Rubin 2000; Simmel 1971). We should expect persons who are induced to interact in the presence of larger and diverse audiences to be more likely to suffer the consequences of failure to project unitary identities in the situation and thus be more likely to experience embarrassment. Given the well-known correlation between socioeconomic status, role-diversity and network heterogeneity (Lin 1999), we should find that as socioeconomic status increases and as persons find themselves in situations requiring multiple-identity activation, the chances of experience

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12 While we focus on the activation of multiple identities (via multiple audiences) the intensity of embarrassment may depend on the salience of the identities activated in the situation (Stryker 1980). In addition, whether embarrassment (as opposed to guilt, or shame) is the relevant affective outcome may depend on the type of identities activated in the encounter (e.g., role, person, and social; Stets 2006). We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these as important issues that should be taken up in future research on the topic.
embarrassment should also increase. In fact, any mechanism associated with the maintenance and creation of diverse networks (and concomitantly the evocation of multiple identities in interaction), should in its turn be connected to generation of embarrassment. For example, an individual is more likely to experience embarrassment in a situation that brings diverse audiences together (e.g., Facebook and other social media) than in a setting that involves a more homogenous audience or set of audiences.

**Social Mobility**

Following the same line of reason presented in this paper, we should expect that persons who have experienced sudden changes in status location or who combine multiple and “inconsistent” statuses—in Hughes’s (1945) terms—are prone to embarrassment. For instance, one important source of relational heterogeneity for persons in contemporary societies is intergenerational socio-economic mobility (Blau 1956). When persons move upward across class locations, they form new connections along the way (especially new ones that are associated with their contemporary higher status) at the same time that they are also likely to stay tied—by way of sociocultural and kinship connections—to alters of lower SES. We should thus find socio-economically mobile persons to be structurally induced to experience embarrassment, especially when attempting to project a self in front an audience consisting of status-heterogeneous alters.

**Racial/Ethnic Minority Status**

The same goes for expectations regarding the emotional experiences of members of racial or ethnic minority groups embedded in contexts that are numerically dominated by the majority; so-called “token” groups (Kanter 1977). These persons are structurally induced to interact in the presence of audiences that are socio-demographically distinct from the self in consequential ways and, thus, according to our model, are more likely to experience embarrassment. A similar set of considerations—going in the opposite direction—goes for minority groups whose primary interaction experiences occur in a context in which the minority group constitutes the local majority. These include poor Blacks and Hispanics in racially segregated settings (Massey, Gross and Shibuya 1994) or minority youth in increasingly segregated schooling districts (Orfield and Eaton 1997). Because interaction among similar
others decreases the chances of multiple identities being evoked and thus the chances of experiencing embarrassment, we should expect the emotional experiences of this group of persons to be sharply distinct from that of the first. Note that—consistent with the modeling approach advocated above—the “effect” of racial and ethnic status on the experience of embarrassment here has to do with the interactional context in which racial and ethnic identities are activated, not with cross-situational attributes of the racial and ethnic status (e.g. race-based stigma or exclusion). In one context (tokenism) being a member of the minority race enhances the probability of experience embarrassment but in another context (segregation) it protects the person from experiencing embarrassment.

**Social Mobility and Racial-Ethnic Status**

Combining the propositions regarding race, socioeconomic status, and social mobility, we expect that dynamics outlined above should be especially salient for status-mobile persons who come from economically disadvantaged minority racial and ethnic groups. The reason for this is that the probability of any one individual who comes from an economically disadvantaged ethnic or racial category to be upwardly mobile is lower in the first place (Oliver and Shapiro 1995). This results in a structurally inducement towards more frequent interaction across the economic status divide for middle-class Blacks and Hispanics in comparison to whites of the same SES (Cole and Omari 2003; Heflin and Patillo 2002). It has been noted that upwardly mobile persons who belong to minority groups are induced to interact in front of audiences composed of members of the majority group in such contexts as the workplace, restaurants, and neighborhoods.

Research also finds that these sort of interactions lead persons who belong to certain minority groups to experience the phenomenon dubbed by Dubois (1903) as “double consciousness,” especially when other members of the minority (potentially less privileged counterparts) are also present in the setting. But note that double consciousness can be readily understood in the terms of the model proposed above, since it consists in the simultaneous—or “parallel”—processing of perceptual and affective information from the standpoint of divergent identities, which is precisely the mechanism that we propose is implicated in the production of embarrassment. We should thus expect the emotional life of upwardly mobile ethnic and racial minorities to be more likely to be colored by embarrassment than lives of their middle-class
White counterparts.

Goffman viewed embarrassment as ubiquitous and the threat of it as instrumental in maintaining the social order. Although embarrassment was a quintessentially social emotion for Goffman, empirical research to date is largely rooted in individual psychology (Scheff 2006). In this paper, we bring embarrassment back into a social interactional context by drawing on Goffman's original ideas on the situational sources of embarrassment while incorporating insight from contemporary sociological social psychology on the ecology of encounters and multiple identities. We formulate and test theory that not only contributes to structural identity theory and the sociology of emotions, but that we hope stimulates future research at the intersections of structure, situation, and self.
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