TAKING COGNITIVE DUALISM SERIOUSLY: REVISITING THE DURKHEIM-SPENCER DEBATE ON THE RISE OF INDIVIDUALISM

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ABSTRACT: The question of the extent to which Durkheim's argument in Division of Labor in Society is continuous with or radically departs from the work of Herbert Spencer has been the subject of a long-standing debate. In this article, the author revisits this issue in light of recent scholarship that points to the pervasive role of the notions of "representation" and "dualism" in Durkheim's overall thought. The analysis shows that Durkheim's conception of the rise of individualism is significantly different from that of Spencer, precisely because it is based on idiosyncratic concepts with no analogue in Spencer's system. Because of this difference, Durkheim's critique of Spencer largely misses the mark and in fact requires an ambiguous projection of Durkheim's own theory-laden notion of individualism toward Spencer, in order to suggest that Spencer begs the question. The author concludes that Durkheim and Spencer had largely incommensurable ideas as to the primary consequence of the division of labor: the rise of "individualism." This necessitates the analytical distinction between the two conceptions of "the individual," which I label the "bio-psychological" and the "sociological."

Keywords: Durkheim; Spencer; division of labor; individualism; dualism; cognition; collective representations

INTRODUCTION

The question of the degree of compatibility between Durkheim’s (1893/1964) argument in Division of Labor in Society and the previous work of Herbert Spencer on the same subject has been the site of a lively discussion in work on the sociological classics (Corning 1982; Jones 1974, 1975, 1986; Perrin 1975, 1995; Turner 1984, 1990). Some commentators see Durkheim’s argument as diverging in significant ways from that offered by Spencer, a thesis that Durkheim himself was the first to propagate. This is the thesis of a Durkheim-Spencer discontinuity (Jones 1974, 1975, 1986). Others argue that, pace his own claims, Durkheim’s argument does not
differ in significant respects from that offered by Spencer. From this perspective, the claim that Durkheim’s model of the social differentiation in *Division* represents a significant departure from Spencer’s thought is exaggerated. This is the thesis for the continuity of Durkheim’s and Spencer’s thought (Perrin 1975, 1995; Turner 1981, 1984, 1990).

In this article, I revisit the issue of the relationship between Durkheim’s theoretical propositions in *Division* and the ideas of Herbert Spencer. I draw on recent scholarship in Durkheimian studies that points to the pervasive and continuous role of the notion that social reality is primarily constituted by representations and the central place that the idea of the dualism of human nature occupied in Durkheim’s overall thought (Pickering 2000a, 2000b; Schmaus 1994; Stedman-Jones 2000a, 2000b, 2002). These theoretical concepts have been shown to play a key role even in such an “early” work as *Division* and even as early as the recently uncovered “Sens Lectures” at Bordeaux (Schmaus 2000). More specifically, I argue that without properly considering the important role that the representational dualism thesis plays in the argument in *Division*, the question of the exact relationship between Durkheim and Spencer cannot be satisfactorily settled. I show that neither the extant continuity nor discontinuity approaches to the Durkheim-Spencer intellectual linkage have provided a satisfactory reconstruction of the issue.

The basis of the forthcoming argument is the following: I argue that, consistent with the Durkheim-Spencer discontinuity thesis (and with Durkheim’s own assessment), Durkheim’s model of the rise of individualism with the development of a complex division of labor in industrial societies is of a qualitatively different order as that offered by Spencer. The crux of this discontinuity lies precisely in Durkheim’s idiosyncratic deployment of the eclectic-spiritualist notion of “representation” and his innovative use of the idea of the “dualism” of human nature (Rawls 2004:105–6; Schmaus 1994:185–86), neither of which has an even remote analogue in Spencer’s thought. This allows Durkheim to develop a theory of the rise of “sociological individualism” with modernity, which is original in its implications and in its conceptual foundations, but which differs from Spencer’s account in crucial respects.

In addition, I show that because Spencer’s understanding of the notion of “individualism” was of such a qualitatively different order than that of Durkheim, the latter’s critique of Spencer’s largely misses the mark (a point consistent with the argument of those who support the thesis of a Durkheim-Spencer continuity) and in fact requires an ambiguous usage of the notion of individualism in order to suggest that Spencer’s model is misleading and ultimately begs the question. I demonstrate that, in essence, the Durkheimian critique of Spencer boils down to castigating the latter for not being able to conceive of the development of a process that could not possibly have been properly theorized without the use of a set of concepts and notions that were unique to Durkheim and the neo-Kantian French philosophical tradition. As opposed to other widespread nineteenth-century social theory notions—for example, the metaphor of society as “organism” (Levine 1995; Maryanski and Turner 1979)—these concepts (e.g., the idea of “collective representations” and the notion of cognitive or representational dualism) were
so distinctive of the “French” tradition in general and to Durkheim’s thinking in particular that Spencer could not possibly have been able to deploy them to explain the rise of individualism. I conclude by noting that it is correct to suggest, as have Durkheim-Spencer continuity theorists, that they both shared similar understanding of the causes of the division of labor (although Durkheim’s view of causation was more “symmetrical” than that used by Spencer; Schmaus 1994). However, they had completely incompatible ideas as to its consequences, because they conceived of the primary consequence of the division of labor—that is, the rise of “individualism”—in non-comparable (and in fact incommensurable in the Kuhnian sense) ways. This means that when the two very different ways in which Durkheim and Spencer conceived of the notion of “individuality” are disambiguated, we can see that Durkheim’s critique of Spencer was largely unnecessary and that the processes that they are talking about are compatible and do not exclude one another.

The Argument for Dualism in Division of Labor

While Durkheim’s (1914/2005) important essay on the “Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions” was written towards the end of his life, Durkheim’s basic position on the “dual constitution” of the human mind is not a product of any late shift in his thinking but can be found in its entirety in Division of Labor (Durkheim 1893/1964:105, 129–30). For instance at the beginning of the fourth section of the “Mechanical Solidarity” chapter (chapter II), Durkheim notes that there are in us two consciences: one contains states which are personal to each of us and which characterize us, while the states which comprehend the other are common to all society. The first represent only our individual personality and constitute it; the second represent the collective type, consequently, society, without which it would not exist. When it is one of the elements of this latter which determines our conduct, it is not in view of our personal interest that we act, but we pursue collective ends. Although distinct these two [systems of cognition and action] are linked one to the other, since in sum, they are only one, having one and the same organic substratum. They are thus solidarity.

Four things deserve mention here. First, it is clear that when Durkheim says that “there are in us two consciences,” he is clearly referring to two aspects of the human mind or more accurately two cognitive systems that are in charge of storing and activating two different kinds of mental states (Schmaus 2000:30). In terms of his later essay (Durkheim 1898/1953), he is talking about two types of repositories of mental representations (Pickering 2000a; Schmaus 2000), some “individual” and some “collective.” The first set of cognitive functions and associated states “represent only our individual personality” and the second “represent the collective type” (emphasis added). Second, these mental states are not purely cognitive in the symbolic sense (i.e., “representational” in the restrictive sense that this term is understood in certain schools of contemporary cognitive science [e.g., Fodor 1975:34]), but they are also motivational and, under some circumstances, control actions directly. As Turner (2007a:10) notes, Durkheim understood these mental
contents to be both “casual and representational . . . both collective and individual consciousness had the same type of content and shared the mind, which was thus duplex, partly social and partly individual. . . .” When cognizing the world according to one set of mental states (the “collective”), our actions are not “self-serving” when we process information according to the other set—the “individual”—they are egoistic in a biological, organismic sense; hence, it is best to characterize these as systems of cognition and (practical) action (Rawls 2004). Third, the mental systems in charge of storing and “implementing” these two different types of representational content are not sealed off—“cognitively impenetrable”—from one another but are in direct communication and clearly are conceived to be two different components of the same psychological system. Durkheim conceives both systems as sharing “the same organic substratum” (presumably the human brain). In terms of late-twentieth century cognitive science, Durkheim can be safely interpreted as proposing a rudimentary “cognitive architecture” composed of two distinct mental systems that are reciprocally linked so that the output of one system can serve as the input over which the other one operates and vice versa.

Finally, it is important to note that Durkheim goes on to base the distinction between the two types of solidarity that is the centerpiece of the argument in Division of Labor, largely through the lens of the (representational) dualism thesis. In Durkheim’s view, the solidarity based on resemblances (mechanical solidarity) is distinctive because when individuals connect to one another in this manner the majority of their mental states are of the collective type. That is, the mind of an individual under a mechanical solidarity regime stores and regularly activates an inordinate number of collective representations and a relatively small number of individual representations. Under an organic solidarity regime, on the other hand, two things happen: mental states of the individual type become more frequent and come to predominate in frequency of activation and in influencing action over mental states of the collective type. Second, the collective representations that remain change in character—becoming more abstract (Durkheim 1893/1964:287)—and lose intensity. They also change in content (or “object”), with collective representations of an “individual” type (e.g., representing the individual as an abstract category) coming to predominate and collective of the representations of the collective type (representing symbols of the collectivity). These last become fewer in number and fade in intensity and frequency of activation.

Thus, with the advent of organic solidarity, mental functioning in the “collective consciousness” mode does not disappear. It simply changes in character and relative salience (Giddens 1972:5–6; Jones 1986), in addition to being composed of a distinct set of conceptual and cognitive-emotive representations that come to take the general category of the individual (or the person) as their object. It is true that Durkheim also proposed that with the increasing extent of the division of labor persons begin to more frequently operate and experience the social and natural world through their individual mental system in comparison to the relative frequency of “anthropological cognition” (Bloch 1986) that we are likely to observe in mechanical-solidarity societies. But this “rise” in cognitive individualism (the relative extent to which the “individual” mental system is activated in relation to the “collective” one) must be kept distinct from the contemporaneous replacement
of the type of mental representations likely to be stored in the collective mental system. Durkheim thought that the generalized concept of the individual (as a type of collective representation) became the primary content of the collective mental system in organic-solidarity societies. This is in contrast to the usual content of the collective mental system in mechanical solidarity societies, which usually consisted of collective representations associated with the group (e.g., obligatory rules of conduct; shared beliefs about the existence of certain entities or the operation of certain extra-natural processes [Levy-Bruhl 1928]) or with collective symbols representative of it. Thus, it is not correct to characterize the argument put forth in “Individualism and the Intellectuals” (Durkheim 1898/1969)—that “the modern drive toward individualism, which began by apparently setting us apart, would end by constituting the principal shared value”—as a “paradoxical inversion” of the argument put forth in Division, a position that has been suggested by Traugott (1978:14). Instead, this later argument can be seen to be perfectly continuous with the original statement in Division (Giddens 1972), especially when we clarify the difference between the two forms of individualism that Durkheim has in mind.

Representational Dualism and Solidarity

Durkheim explicitly reintroduces his notion of cognitive dualism in the fourth section of the chapter on “Organic Solidarity” (chapter III) of Division. According to Durkheim, only two kinds of “positive solidarity” can be recognized as being capable of producing social integration. The first kind “binds the individual directly to society without intermediary.” In the second type, on the other hand, the individual “depends upon society, because he depends upon the parts of which it is composed” (Durkheim 1893/1964:129). In Durkheim’s view, these two types of social integration are experienced in very different ways from the first-person perspective. In the first type of integration, “what we call society” is experienced as a “more or less organized totality of beliefs and sentiments common to all the members of the group.” In the second type of solidarity, the society to which the person is connected is experienced as a “system of different, special functions which definite relations unite.” Durkheim is careful to point out that this differentiation between two types of individual/society linkage is simply an analytical distinction of what is in fact an undivided and empirically complex reality, since “these two societies really make up only one. They are two aspects of one and the same reality, but none the less they must be distinguished.”

After establishing the cognitive-dualism thesis, Durkheim goes on to put forward what is the key social-scientific proposition of Division of Labor (Turner 1981), the hypothesis that these two types of solidarities are found to be inversely correlated with one another in empirically observable human collectivities, such that one grows only at the expense of the other one. The important thing to notice here—and something that has not been the subject of much commentary—is that Durkheim sees the proposition of the growth of organic solidarity at the expense of mechanical solidarity as inherently depending on the validity of the dualism argument. This is why after stating the social mechanism that explains why we should find a negative correlation between the two types of solidarity, he introduces the
dualism hypothesis: “There are in each of us, as we have said, two... [types of consciousness]: one which is common to our group in its entirety, which, consequently, is not ourself [sic], but society living and acting within us; the other, on the contrary, represents that in us which is personal and distinct, that which makes us an individual” (pp. 105–6).

It is important to note that this last is not the individual as a “collective representation” but simply the mental system that stores individual representations; for Durkheim (and this is the key point) “the individual” is not an individual but a collective representation! Precisely because Durkheim (and current interpreters of Durkheim) did not keep this distinction between the two meanings of the terms “individual” clear but fudged it, he ended up misrepresenting Spencer’s argument. This is the reason why the “historical transition from one form of solidarity to another” argument does not work without the dualism argument: the solidarity based on differences requires a replacement of the content of the collective consciousness from symbols of the collective to the abstract notion of the “individual.” This is at the same time as the collective consciousness itself weakens in intensity and thus “individualistic” cognition becomes more frequent. The failure to realize this has served as a persistent source of misunderstanding of the argument laid out by Durkheim in Division. For Durkheim, both mechanical and organic-solidarity were produced and implemented by the collective consciousness; it was the nature, content, intensity, and extent of operation of this collective consciousness that changed (Giddens 1972).

This means that the individual consciousness (and thus the mental system that corresponds to it) remains constant during this epochal transformation. Persons in organic-solidarity societies are as much subject to cognitive dualism as are persons in mechanical-solidarity societies. Cognitive dualism is a constant for the human species (Durkheim 1914/2005); it is not ameliorated under modern conditions. The difference is that moderns are torn between allegiance to “the individual” as a collective representation and allegiance to their own “individual” perceptions, desires, and conceptualizations. The argument in Division concerns the transition from the dominance of one set of collective representations in “early” societies to a different set of equally collective ones in “higher” ones. The source and structure of individual representations (for Durkheim, empirical sensations and “pragmatic” individual concepts with little durability and generalizability) remains the same. In this respect, there is no transition from a collective state to an “individualized state” at the level of individual representations only at the level of collective representations.

Bio-Psychological Individualism, Sociological Individualism, and Durkheim’s Critique of Spencer

In section IV of chapter VI of Division of Labor, Durkheim establishes his main conclusion: as organic solidarity increases within a given social type, mechanical solidarity necessarily declines. According to Durkheim’s “law,” “as the solidarities develop in inverse ratio to each other, of the corresponding social types [mechanical and organic societies], one regresses while the other progresses, and the latter
is that fixed by the division of labor” (Durkheim 1893/1964:192). After reaching this conclusion, Durkheim immediately attempts to preempt the objection that his argument can be thought of as a simple recapitulation of Spencer’s earlier—and influential—proposal regarding the progressive development of “individuality” with increasing social and economic development. Durkheim (1893/1964:193, italics added) is quick to point out that “the law we have established in the last two chapters has been able by a quality, but by a quality only, to recall to use the dominating tendency in Spencer’s sociology.”

What is this “quality”? In attempting to disabuse the reader of the impression that his argument for the progressive development of individuality in organic solidarity societies is not a recapitulation of Spencer’s, Durkheim engages in a confusing—and ultimately uncharitable vis a vis Spencer’s original argument—set of terminological countermoves. When the terminological confusion is cleared up, we can see that both Spencer’s and Durkheim’s arguments are on the right track, since they were referring to completely different things by the same term. Furthermore, Durkheim’s argument against Spencer’s fails as a critique of the latter precisely because Durkheim refuses to consistently maintain his own analytical distinction between the two kinds of individualism that he had introduced early in the book, and which he had made the centerpiece of his much-neglected later essay on cognitive dualism (Durkheim 1914/2005).

What Durkheim does is instead to use (and sometimes ignore) the very distinction between what I will refer to from now on as sociological individualism (Durkheim 1898/1969) and bio-psychological individuality (this is similar to—but more precise than—Giddens’ [1972:6] original distinction between “individualism” and “individuation”).

**Bio-Psychological Individuality.** This refers to the status of persons as “individuated,” embodied organisms, endowed with egoistic needs and desires (for survival, reproduction, etc.) constrained by human biological and psychological potentials and developmental trajectories. For Durkheim, the basis of bio-psychological individualism is our “individuality, and more especially our body that is its foundation” (Durkheim 1914/2005:37). Individual representations are thus a natural outgrowth of bio-psychological individualism. These representations take as their object states of the natural and social environment relevant for the survival and well-being of the organism. They are thus linked directly to current experience but have little capacity to survive beyond the immediate situation (Durkheim 1914/2005).

**Sociological Individualism.** In contrast to bio-psychological individualism, which is a basic consequence of the status of persons as biological entities, sociological individualism is an institutional, collective accomplishment. It exists mainly as a set of (recurrently activated) collective representations, and thus a special collection of empirically distinct mental states produced within the context of social interaction in organic solidarity societies. These collective representations take the abstract category of “the individual” as their object (which is the source of the semantic slippage). Lukes (1969:15) renders Durkheim’s notion of sociological individualism as “… a set of operative ideals, moral beliefs and practices,
indeed . . . a religion (‘a system of collective beliefs and practices that have a special authority’), which . . . [Durkheim] treats as a ‘social product, like all moralities and all religions’ and sees as peculiarly adapted and functional to his own society. . . .” It is thus possible for instance that moral commitment to “the individual” as a collective representation be strictly opposed to “individualism” in the bio-psycho-logical sense (Durkheim 1898/1969, 1914/2005). For instance, we may sacrifice individual well-being and organismic pleasures for the sake of fighting for “individualism” as a political cause.

Durkheim ambiguously deploys this distinction between two different senses of the notion of “the individual” in a manner that makes Spencer look as if he failed to offer a coherent argument—by begging the question—for the emergence of sociological individualism, when in fact Spencer was clearly working with a notion of individuality closer to the bio-psychological individuality (which allows him to beg the sociological question without being tendentious, since he is not offering an “origins of sociological individuality” argument). Durkheim presumably did this in order to deflate any impression of commonality between his and Spencer’s argument. Yet I hope to show that ultimately both Spencer’s and Durkheim’s positions are not as incompatible as the latter portrayed them to be.

**Durkheim versus Spencer on the Individual**

Durkheim correctly adduces that the fundamental proposition of Spencer’s sociology is that “the place of the individual in society . . . becomes greater with [the growth of] civilization” (Durkheim 1893/1964:193). However, Durkheim rejects the validity of taking this “incontestable fact” as a sound point of departure to explain the emergence of the division of labor. Accordingly, Durkheim reassures the reader that “ultimately, our conclusions are opposed to his more than they are in agreement.” What are the sources of this apparent opposition between the views of Durkheim and Spencer? Durkheim goes on to raise one primary objection against Spencer’s proposition. According to Durkheim, Spencer errs in thinking that in primitive societies the only cause of the individual’s “absorption” into the group is military force on the part of a despotic leader.8

Durkheim (1893/1964:193) notes that according to Spencer “it is an organized despotism which would annihilate individuals, and since this organization is essentially military, it is through militarism that Spencer defines these types of society.”9 Durkheim notes, however, that his own theory of the absorption of the individual into the group does not require the mechanism of coercive “caging” (Mann 1986). Durkheim notes that his alternative explanation does not need the hypothesis of the gradual weakening of this politico-military caging apparatus as the mechanism that releases a naturally individualistic human animal from its clutches to explain the rise of individualism. Instead he notes that in his model of mechanical solidarity by way of the predominance of resemblances in cognition and affect, the “effacement of the individual has as its place of origin a social type which is characterized by a complete absence of all centralization.” Thus, collectivism and not individualism is the distinctive trait of the earliest social groups. In addition, according to Durkheim, Spencer misses the actual mechanism that leads to a reduction of individuality in
“simple” societies, because he makes an unwarranted empirical assumption. As Durkheim went to great pains to establish early in the book, the historical record available to him showed that the “segmental” societies—or the hypothetical primordial “horde”—characterized by mechanical solidarity actually did not have much of a coercive apparatus. Therefore, the lack of individuality in these societies cannot possibly be due to the exercise of extreme coercion by a central authority.

Durkheim goes on to strategically introduce the notion of cognitive dualism in order to counter Spencer’s “deindividuation through caging” hypothesis. For Durkheim (1893/1964:194, italics added), in the “simplest” societies, “if the individual is not distinct from the group, it is because the individual conscience is hardly at all distinguishable from the collective conscience.” Durkheim (1893/1964:194) proceeds to accuse “Spencer and other sociologists with him” of anachronism in this regard, since they seem to have gotten things backwards and have . . . interpreted these distant facts in terms of very modern ideas. The very pronounced contemporary sentiment that each of us has of his own individuality has led them to believe that personal rights cannot be restrained to this point except by a coercive organization. We cling to them so firmly that they find it inconceivable for man to have willingly abandoned them. In fact, if in lower societies so small a place is given to individual personality that is not because it has been restrained or artificially suppressed. It is simply because, at that moment of history, it did not exist.

Durkheim thus reasons that individualism as he has described it could not have existed in the earliest human social groups, for “if . . . individualism was at this point congenital with humanity, we cannot see how primitive peoples could so easily subject themselves to the despotic authority of a chief, wherever necessary” (Durkheim 1893/1964:195).

Which Individual?

It is apparent at this point that Durkheim is using the term individualism in an inconsistent way. In essence, he forgets the important distinction between biopsychological and sociological individualism. Accordingly, his argument against Spencer is only superficially effective precisely because he is charging Spencer with having presumed the existence of sociological individualism since the beginning of time. But because the previous argument for the increasing preponderance of organic solidarity in complex societies clearly shows that it would be impossible for simple societies to have the capacity to develop these forms of “individualist” collective representation, he charges Spencer with incoherence.

First, and quite unrelated to the above point, it is outright incorrect to claim that for Spencer the militarized state in which individuals are subjugated to the authority of the despotic chief is the earliest social form. Spencer (1916:469, 593–95) was clear in noting that the very earliest stage of human social life was not militaristic, but probably consisted of small, low density, low social solidarity groupings, with very little rank distinction and high homogeneity in behavior and life-station; in essence hardly a “society” to speak of (Spencer 1916:761). Thus, according to Spencer
Among the lowest types the groups are small, and the bonds holding their units together are relatively feeble. Instead of being an inherent characteristic of the earliest human groupings militarism evolves due to inter-societal interaction out of small, homogenous, “primitive headless groups” with “very little subordination.” However, as these groups begin to interact with one another in violent ways, the need for militaristic coordination and defense within the surviving (or aggressor) groups increases, and “societies in which there is little subordination disappear, and leave outstanding those in which subordination is great; and so there are produced, societies in which the habit fostered by way and surviving in peace, brings about permanent submission to a government” (Spencer 1916:595, italics added). Notice that Spencer is not engaging in any form of specious (i.e., teleological) functionalist reasoning here. Instead, he utilizes a perfectly legitimate logic of Darwinian selection, in which fitness for military competition and success serves as the mechanism that produces the differential survival of militaristic societies over peace-loving ones (on selection as a mechanism, see Darden and Cain 1989).

This fact notwithstanding, we may charitably grant Durkheim’s point that Spencer’s argument for the subjugation of individualism in the “earliest” societies with the emergence of a “big man” despot cannot hold—because the coercive apparatus of these societies is not capable of “caging” persons in a robust enough way, and thus the option of “exit” always remain viable (Maryanski and Turner 1992). However, Spencer’s argument that ancient despots in the earliest civilizations became capable of doing this with the emergence and development of technical and political technologies of domination, and that therefore in these early civilized societies the capacity for the full development of bio-psychological individuality could be significantly effaced—resulting in a “fatalistic” and “alienated” disposition towards the social and natural worlds—is consistent with the historical evidence (Collins 1986; Mann 1986; Maryanski and Turner 1992).

In this respect, it becomes obvious that Spencer is not a theorist of sociological individualism but a theorist of bio-psychological individualism (i.e., concern with such things as physical survival, avoidance of pain, reproduction, organismic well-being, etc.) and it is the existence of this type of individualism—which in Durkheim’s cognitive dualism scheme is associated with the individual consciousness—which he takes as being universal and as thus having existed even in the earliest human social groupings (Turner 2000). Given this acknowledgment, it becomes clear how exactly it is that Durkheim engages in a sociological “inversion” of Spencer’s original argument (Jones 1974): For Spencer, as Jones (1974:347, italics added) observes,

> ... [T]he individual exists prior to any form of social organization, although his submission may occasionally be required by political exigencies. During warfare, for example, individuals must grant extraordinary powers to some centralized authority in the interest of their own survival. Despite this necessary ‘effacement’ of the individual, however, the military form of social organization was viewed as the ‘product’ of individual minds.

This is the reason why Spencer did not think that individualism needed a “sociological” explanation (although he thought he could explain the evolutionary
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origins of “sociability” and “cooperation”). For Spencer (and for anybody else as what follows is a logical not a substantive point), “explaining” bio-psychological individuality using a “sociological” explanation would be absurd. Bio-psychological individuality is a species-specific fact that puts constraints on sociological explanation (Turner 2000); it cannot be explained sociologically. What can be explained sociologically, as Durkheim was very well aware, is the historical development of sociological individualism as a set of shared collective representations in organic-solidarity societies. That is the project that Durkheim sets for himself in *The Division of Labor*. The very coherence of the explanatory project, however, rests on a previous commitment to the thesis of representational dualism, which would have been utterly incomprehensible to Spencer. Durkheim by using the term “individualism” without any qualifiers (thus violating the very presuppositions of his dualism argument) ends up not doing full justice to either his or Spencer’s arguments. Durkheim also ends up falling into a host of terminological inconsistencies, which actually obfuscate exactly how his argument is different from that put forth by Spencer. Finally, Durkheim fails to notice that taking up sociological individualism as the object of an explanatory project presupposes the thesis of cognitive individualism (and thus the existence of two qualitatively different kinds of mental representations). For a theorist who does not share Durkheim’s “dual architecture” model of the human mind, the project of explaining the rise of individualism as a special sort of collective representation is simply not conceivable or even meaningful.

TURNING SPENCER BACK ON HIS FEET

It should be clear by now how exactly it was that Durkheim managed to “turn Spencer on his head” (Corning 1982:363). To perform this interpretative inversion, Durkheim engages in a series of key argumentative countermoves. First, it is obvious that when Durkheim says that in “early” societies the “individual personality . . . did not exist,” he is talking not about bio-psychological individuality but about sociological individuality. Durkheim, as we will see below, was well aware (and thus in agreement with Spencer!) that bio-psychological individuality is an obdurate fact that has always existed (otherwise cognitive dualism would also not exist) and that this fact is not “society-dependent.” Durkheim very well understood that it would be preposterous to suggest that it could not have existed at some point in human history (although one may suggest—with Spencer—that it is underdeveloped due to externally imposed physical and behavioral constraints on individual freedom or other abusive social practices). In this regard, the best (and most charitable) way to interpret Spencer’s argument for the restriction of individualism in early social systems is as implying the suggestion that coercive social cages violate and restrict bio-psychological individuality—with something like slavery being an empirical extreme—and that with the weakening of the social cage with the “progress” of civilization, bio-psychological individuality is released and liberated (Maryanski and Turner 1992). Fatalism and alienation, due to being placed in a social cage, decrease with the locus of control moving from the external world inward towards the person as a bio-psychological entity (Collins 1986).
Plainly put, Spencer simply had no explicit theory at the same level of sophistication as that put forth by Durkheim in Division of Labor of the development of sociological individuality with the advent of modernity—nor did he have the conceptual apparatus; that is, a dualist theory of the mind—to even begin to develop one. This is the reason why the argument of the Division of Labor continues to be relevant for social theory today, and why there is no reason to have to “choose” between Durkheim and Spencer, regardless of Durkheim’s vociferous (but unsuccessful) attempt to force readers of Division of Labor to make this choice. Durkheim is therefore inconsistent—and overly anxious to assure the reader that his theory is original (it certainly is!)—in criticizing Spencer for not achieving something that he did not set out to do in the first place, and which his theoretical assumptions did not require him to do (Perrin 1995). These inconsistencies in Durkheim’s treatment of Spencer result, as we have seen, in many of the “inversions” of the latter’s positions in Division of Labor first noted by Jones (1974) and Corning (1982).

Second, by not acknowledging the fact that Spencer had a very original theory of social constraint, Durkheim ends up impoverishing his own exposition of the theory of individualism laid out in Division (for instance, by failing to clearly delineate its empirical scope and by glossing over historical phenomena that it could not explain very well). Spencer’s theory of individualism specifies which types of social systems—that is, militarized coercion—can react on bio-psychological individuality, possibly weakening it; it thus accounts for certain forms of fatalism and organismic suppression of individuality that do not depend on collective representations or integration through cognitive-representational resemblance (i.e., “mechanical solidarity”), but on the sheer centralized deployment of political technologies of domination and oppression. This is a theory that Durkheim could not accept as valid (but which does not in the least clash with Durkheim’s theoretical project of explaining the origins of sociological individualism) from within the paradigmatic limits of his conceptual system. Durkheim dismissed constraint by external force as an important explanatory factor in producing differences in habits, affect, and cognition among persons in favor of cognitive and emotive constraints produced by shared cognitive and emotive mental states (Pickering 2000b). Yet it is clear that the environmental, physical, and social ecology in which the person develops can produce durable differences in the “individual” system of cognition as much as they can affect the collective one (Bernstein 1958; Coser 1991).

It is therefore quite incorrect to conclude—as does Perrin (1995:800)—that both Durkheim and Spencer had comparable theories of the emergence of sociological individualism—their theories might have been “complementary” but are certainly not “comparable.” They are in fact incommensurable in the sense that the term has acquired in post-positivist Philosophy of Science since Kuhn. Instead, according to Perrin (1995:800):

Durkheim and Spencer both agree and disagree on the important question of the place or status of the individual (qua individual) in industrial society. For both thinkers, the modern individual is a discrete entity or personality who is literally created as an effect of the advancing division of labor and who becomes the key element in the constitution of the new industrial order. Although in quite different ways, each thinker saw individualism as a centripetal force.
It is clear that here Perrin conflates Spencer’s bio-psychic individual (which clearly cannot be “literally crated as an effect of the advancing division of labor”) with Durkheim’s sociological individual and ends up projecting toward Spencer a “Durkheimian” theory of individuality as a collective representation, which obviously cannot be found in his work.

This is not to deny that for Spencer, human cognitive, emotive, and moral faculties “co-evolved” with social development (Corning 1982:361). In Spencer’s (sometimes Lamarckian, sometimes Darwinian) view of social evolution, there was no “universal” human mind in independence from the social and bio-physical environment. Cataloguing differences in emotion, cognition, memory, perception, conceptualization, and so forth between “higher” and “primitive” societies in fact takes up the bulk of the first part of Principles. For Spencer, the development of specific cognitive abilities (i.e., the capacity to engage in abstract thought) was inherently dependent on the growth of complex social and ecological environments. In the same manner, the development of affective and moral capacities, which facilitated “sociability” and “cooperation,” required the emergence of differentiated societies. Thus, it is undeniable that the “social environment” in Spencer’s view had a direct and substantial effect on the organization and ultimate development to full potentiality of the human mind.

Yet this argument for the emergence of mental capacities that facilitate seemingly altruistic sociability and modern “individuality” with the creation of complex, industrial orders based on cooperative coordination was not an argument for the emergence of sociological individuality in Durkheim’s sense. Instead, for Spencer, there was no division of the human cognitive system into two separate faculties, nor were there two types of mental states corresponding to them. There was a single individual mind, capable of individual perception, abstract thinking, and moral reasoning. It was this single “individual” mind, which developed with civilization and cooperation. It was this bio-psychic “individual” in addition, which was allowed to flourish in industrial regimes and which was crushed in militaristic ones. However, this individual was entirely organismic and self-centered in Durkheim’s sense (Corning 1982:360). It cooperated out of self-interest; it extended positive feelings towards others, because he or she began to see these others as ineluctably tied to his or her own physical and emotional well-being. In Spencer’s view, “The industrial type of society, with its decentralized structures, is the highest, because it is the one which most subserves that happiness of the units which is to be achieved by social organization” (Spencer 1916:600; see also Spencer 1883:247).

These differences between Durkheim and Spencer come out clearly in the divergence between their respective educational philosophies (Jones 1974:349). While for Spencer the goal of education was “to be the perfection, in each individual, of the attributes of human nature in general,” for Durkheim “human nature” was quintessentially a social product, and the pedagogical system appropriate for the development of its attributes had to be determined by each society in its turn . . . it is not human nature which determines the appropriate system of education but the educational system (itself a ‘social product’) which determines ‘human nature’” (Jones 1974:349). While Jones is correct in this regard, it is more accurate to say
that for Durkheim—following the dualism thesis—education should not be overly linked to a bio-psychic human nature (an individualist set of competencies)—which he held to be too general and situation-specific in any case to be adequately specified (Durkheim 1914/2005)—but should strive to create and reinforce a set of distinct, specific collective representation of a shared human “essence,” which in organic solidarity-societies was the sociological “individual.”

For Spencer, industrial societies with an advanced division of labor were ethically superior to other social types because they actualized and maximized natural human mental capacities and affective propensities, not because they created these from whole-cloth as Perrin (1995) suggests. In this manner, modern societies could be judged to be preferable to ancient despotism because they are in accord with a set of pre-existent human bio-psychological potentials that were not manufactured by this very same society. It is true that modern forms of socialization and education served to endow the pre-social individual with a set of habits, capacities, and dispositions that facilitated cooperation and contractual solidarity in industrial societies. Socialization into modern industrial orders operates on a set of durable extra-social cognitive and emotive dispositions that were part of the human phylogenetic heritage. These natural dispositions and potentialities substantively constrain the extent to which external, man-made, “super-organic” social forms can be made compatible with them. Educational technologies can be used to facilitate the development of natural “individualist” dispositions. By the same token, these super-organic forms could be judged to be desirable or not to the extent that they facilitated the ontogenetic emergence of this psychological “individualism.” This does not come even close to constituting a theory of the emergence of the sociological individual (which is precisely the reason why Durkheim took Spencer to task in Division of Labor).

USING DURKHEIM’S TOOLS TO REBUILD DURKHEIM’S HOUSE

The argument for the importance of differentiating between bio-psychic and sociological individualism is bolstered when we look more closely at Durkheim’s more detailed critique of Spencer. For instance, Durkheim (1893/1964:195) notes that in contrast to Spencer, we must not date “the effacement of the individual from the institution of a despotic authority, we must, on the contrary, see in this institution the first step made toward individualism.” This statement condenses the tendentiousness of Durkheim’s attempt to distance his argument from Spencer. First, Durkheim is correct—and once again extremely perceptive—in noting that the institutionalization of the coercive authority of the despot becomes the first collective model—notice the reference to “this institution”—of sociological (i.e., institutionalized) individualism, and that therefore it would be counterproductive to think of “ancient despotism” as necessarily antithetical to the development of (sociological) individuality as a collective representation (see also Jones 1974, 1986). But notice that there is nothing illogical and inconsistent in arguing (with Spencer and Mann 1986) that the ancient despot’s coercive oppression is antithetical to the bio-psychological individuality of his subjects while at the same time agreeing with Durkheim that the despot is probably the primordial collective “mental model”
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By making the analytic distinction between the two forms of individualism—a distinction that was clearly endorsed by Durkheim!—we can see that there is nothing incompatible between Spencer’s and Durkheim’s accounts of the development of individuality since the former is talking about the release of our shared (and universal) bio-psychological individuality—as well as a strengthening and efflorescence (but not creation) of these sets of natural dispositions in the context of market-dominated societies—from the oppression of the social cage, while the latter is talking about the development of a specific, collective (and thus culturally relative), sociological phenomenon particular to post-traditional societies with a complex division of labor, which clearly could not possibly exist “fully formed” in early societies.

Surprisingly, Durkheim goes on to bring up the important distinction between the two different forms of individuality just as he is finishing laying out his case against Spencer (chapter 6, at the end of Section III) but does not appear to be aware of the consequences of consistently applying it for his overall critique:

Scientifically, conduct is egotistical in the measure that it is determined by sentiments and representations which are exclusively personal. If, then, we remember to what extent in lower societies the conscience of the individual is wrapped in the collective conscience, we may even be led to believe that it is a thing totally different from the individual himself, that it is completely altruistic. . . . This conclusion, however, would be exaggerated, for there is a sphere of psychic life which, however developed the collective type may be, varies from one to another and remains peculiar to each. It is that which is formed by representations, by sentiments and tendencies which related to the organism and to the state of the organism. It is the world of internal and external sensations and the movements which are directly linked to them. This first foundation of all individuality is inalienable and does not depend upon any social state. (Durkheim 1893/1964:197–98)

This passage is somewhat remarkable, not because Durkheim is consistent in qualifying his earlier dictum that individuality “does not exist” in “lower societies” by noting which kind of individuality he was talking about (the sociological kind) and rightly suggesting that bio-psychic individuality exists in mechanical-solidarity societies, but simply because he does not realize how the acknowledgement that a form of bio-psychological individuality which exists in all societies (“lower” or not) and which is not dependent on society for its origins, makes his previous argument against Spencer begging the individuality question moot. In Durkheim’s last formulation of the dualism thesis, “these two sides of conduct [the individual and the collective] are found present from the beginning in all human consciences, for there cannot be things which do not reflect both of these aspects, the one relating to the individual alone and the other relating to the things which are not personal to him.”

It is important to note that once the existence of a non-sociological type of individualism is granted to be operative—that is, “a sphere of psychic life which, however developed the collective type may be, varies from one to another and remains peculiar to each”—even in the earliest human societies, then Spencer’s point clearly becomes
valid. This is especially important when Durkheim reaches the logical conclusion that if bio-psychological individual is an extra-social fact, then this individuality “is inalienable and does not depend upon any social state.” This does not mean, in agreement with Spencer, that certain social arrangements, such as despotism or slavery, cannot react to oppress, weaken, and crush it or allow it to flourish (Collins 1986:21).

Moreover, if this is the type of bio-psychic individuality that Spencer is talking about, then—contra Durkheim—there is nothing wrong with his “cage-release” argument to explain the rise of “individuality” with the development of “civilization.” There is also nothing substantively wrong with the assertion that given a set of non-reducible human propensities towards organismic “self-centeredness” that we can imagine certain macro-social arrangements that will work to elaborate and foster them, and others that will work toward suppressing them. Finally, there is nothing wrong with the conclusion that in fact the development of bio-psychological individuality is highest in the earliest and the most modern societies and is lowest in despotic societies (the “U-shaped” effect of social development on individualism as noted by Maryanski and Turner). A hypothesis that Durkheim derisively—and unnecessarily—dismisses by asking the rhetorical question that if we were to accept it, “[w]ould not the movement of history then be circular and would progress in anything but a return to the past?” This is precisely what is suggested by Spencer’s hypothesis and precisely what the historical record shows is in fact the case (Mann 1986; Maryanski and Turner 1992). The development of sociological individuality, on the other hand, clearly increases linearly not curvilinearly in the Judeo-Christian West with social development (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1994).

I hope that it has become apparent why both these hypotheses can be correct at the same time. Durkheim (1893/1964:198, italics added) even acknowledges that members of “lower societies” are more “individualistic” than moderns in the bio-psychological sense because “this inferior part of ourselves represents a more considerable fraction of total life, because this total of the psychic life are less developed there. It thus has greater relative importance and, accordingly greater sway over the will,” which puts him in strong agreement with Spencer in this regard. Acknowledging this fact is once again not inconsistent with Durkheim’s (1893/1964:198) ultimate point that sociological individuality—or individuality as a collective representation—is virtually nil among “primitives” because when it comes to those things that go beyond mere physical survival, “the primitive conscience, to use a strong expression of Espinas, is completely outside itself.”

CONCLUSION

Summary of the Argument

In this article, I have argued that the relationship between Durkheim and Spencer—and the basis for Durkheim’s rejection of Spencer’s theory of the development of individualism with the “progress” of civilization—has not been properly understood. Drawing on recent scholarship, which points to the distinctive—within the nineteenth-century French philosophical tradition—but crucial roles that
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the concepts of “representation” and the idea of a “dualism” of human nature played in Durkheim’s entire line of thinking (preceding and including Division), I hope to have established that Durkheim’s argument against Spencer—and his claim that he was presenting a theory of the development of individuality that was distinct from Spencer in a “qualitative” way—can only be appropriately comprehended when the notion of representational dualism is brought to the fore.

The analysis shows that, consistent with the discontinuity thesis, Durkheim had a distinctive notion of individualism as a “collective representation.” For Durkheim this type of “individualism” was not “repressed” in ancient societies and “released” with modernity as Spencer argued, but was literally an institutional “creation” of modern industrial, organic-solidarity orders (and thus mediated through collective representations). In this respect, this type of individualism is impossible to develop outside of the social context provided by a complex division of labor. I noted that Durkheim’s critique of Spencer required an ambiguous use of the notion of individualism so that it referred to both sides of the dualism (bio-psychological and sociological) that Durkheim thought to be a constant of human nature.

This means, at a minimum, that Durkheim and Spencer were speaking of distinct phenomena using the same term. I show that if this claim is accepted (and I believe the preponderance of the evidence points to its validity), then Durkheim’s argument against Spencer in Division dissolves. This is because the former’s argument depends on the presumption that it was this “sociological” version of individualism that the latter had in mind, an individualism that Durkheim thought Spencer had illicitly imputed to simpler social forms. This is supported by the fact that Durkheim himself equivocated when attempting to show that “individualism” was “non-existent” in mechanical-solidarity societies and tried to clarify the confusion by suggesting that there is an “organo-psychic” individualism that is a constant across social types and that therefore is “society-independent.” I showed that Spencer could not have possibly conceived of individualism in Durkheim’s way. Spencer instead relied on a more (anthropological) evolutionist conception of “bio-psychic” individuality, a notion that Durkheim also held to be important (given the argument for representational dualism), but which he subordinated to the notion of sociological individualism in modernity in the very same way that he subordinated the causal efficacy of the individual cognitive system to that of the cognitive system that stores collective representations.

This also means that when Durkheim and Spencer spoke of the “suppression” of individualism in despotic societies, they were also speaking past one another, one referring to a set of universal bio-psychological capacities, the other referring to a set of culturally specific collective representations symbolizing the abstract notion of the “the individual” residing in the mental system in charge of storing collective representations (which Durkheim still referred to as the “collective conscience” when he wrote Division). This allows us to appreciate the joint validity of the distinct arguments for the “rise” of “individuality” in modern industrial societies: Spencer’s argument comes closest to a “cage-release” argument for the emancipation and cultivation of bio-psychic individuality in modern industrial orders, while Durkheim’s is a more “cultural constitution” followed by “institutionalization”
argument of “individualism” as a set of shared beliefs, rites, and collective representations (a “secular religion” in Lukes’ terms). Durkheim argues (correctly) that this institutionalization of individualism as a set of collective representations is only possible within the context of organic-solidarity produced by the division of labor.

**Contributions and Broader Implications**

The argument offered above has important implications—both theoretical and practical—for our current understandings of the importance and current relevance of both Durkheim’s and Spencer’s arguments. It is important to remember in this respect that classical theory is not just a “dead letter” but as it has become institutionalized in the discipline at the level of both graduate and undergraduate instruction, it plays the role of an integrative cultural system in sociology as a whole (Warner 1976, 1985:20). Textbook formulations of Durkheim’s critique of Spencer, for instance, may be more reflective of the subsequent reputational career of these two respective figures than of the merits and substance of Durkheim’s argument (leading to the neglect of Spencer as an important theoretical source [Perrin 1995; Turner 1990]). Because of this, reconsiderations of the classics have important ramifications for the way that the theoretical legacy of sociology is reproduced and transmitted. A better understanding of signal conceptual differences among the classical authors (especially ones in which they directly took part as opposed to artificially staged “confrontations” such as the “Marx-Weber debate”) are of crucial importance in clarifying the way in which the “classics” themselves are used today to establish contemporary intellectual positions and to add legitimacy to current lines of scholarship that attempt to build on their legacy.

Second, as noted above, incommensurable Durkheimian and Spencerian conceptions of individualism are not just mere theoretical matters, as they lead each theorist to draw very different applied implications in the realm of educational practice. These two conceptions of individualism also have divergent socio-political implications as Durkheim (1898/1969) himself recognized (see also Rawls 2004). For instance, the removal of institutional constraints on individual action—dissolution of traditional fetters on economic and political activity for instance—is a sufficient condition for the development of Spencerian individuation but not enough for the realization of Durkheimian sociological individualism. Sociological individualism is a collective institutional accomplishment and requires the cultivation of specific technologies of ritualization and commemoration (which help to periodically activate collective representations, thus temporarily suspending individualistic cognition) for its establishment and perpetuation (Bellah 1973; Durkheim 1898/1969). In that respect, while many societies today are technically “individuated” in the minimal Spencerian sense, very few are individualized in the stronger Durkhemian sense (but see Meyer et al. 1994). Understanding the different institutional, social-psychological, and ultimately socio-cognitive pre-conditions of both individuation and “individualism” is thus crucial for crafting knowledge-political guidelines that may be used to form adequate judgments of which contemporary (or future) socio-political systems in fact lead to “progress”
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in furthering values and practices consistent with our moral intuitions concerning human freedom and well-being (Maryanski and Turner 1992; Sirianni 1982). This may help in bringing some conceptual clarity into sociologists’ inevitable interventions into the public realm (in the very same way that Durkheim (1898/1969) applied his theory of sociological individualism in his own foray into “public sociology” during the thick of the Dreyfus affair).

Third, the issue of “representational dualism” in Durkheimian scholarship is an important one simply in terms of understanding the conceptual point of departure of Durkheim and in establishing how far away we may have moved from his original theoretical proposals. This statement is not made in the spirit of a “purist” approach to classical exegesis, but in the interest of pointing to the possibility of having left behind an important conceptual resource, one that can be used to shed light on current theoretical and empirical matters (as such my claim for the importance of representational dualism is unabashedly “presentist” [Turner 1984:22]). It is clear, for instance, that recent recoveries of Durkheim as a “micro-interactionist”—Durkheim read through the lens of Goffman—(Collins 2004) or as the forerunner of a specific form of “cultural sociology” (Alexander 1988)—Durkheim read through the lens of Saussure—leave a lot to be desired, since they occlude (or outright jettison) what was for Durkheim the key to understanding contemporary social formations, especially in the crucial way in which they differed from small-scale societies. Each of these lines of thinking accentuate partial elements of Durkheim’s overall conceptualization of the functioning of collective representations (e.g., the “cult of the individual” in the micro-rituals of everyday life; the perennial sacred-profane classificatory structure in the constitution of cultural systems) but render them from their place in Durkheim’s overall model of cognition, and thus obfuscate his insistence on representational and cognitive dualism. Thus, the Durkheimian emphasis on the interplay between individual and collective representations (and the conflicts between these two modes of experiencing the world) is lost, and what are left are unidimensional, “oversocialized” renderings of the overall process. While usually thought of as the champion of the “oversocialized” model of the social actor, it is clear that Durkheim is actually closer to the line of “dialectical” theorists—in Wrong’s (1961:186) original sense—who understood that it was the conflict between both the socialized and those aspects of the person that are resistant to absorption into the collectivity, which is the key to effective sociological analysis. In this respect, the contemporary post-functionalist reception of Durkheim in current sociological theory—the “systematics”—has thus yet to seriously catch up to a series of recent signal discoveries regarding the conceptual bases of Durkheim’s thought produced by scholars working in Durkheimian studies (e.g., Pickering 2000a, 2000b; Rawls 2004; Schmaus 1994, 2004; Stedman-Jones 2000a, 2000b, 2002).

Finally, Durkheim’s own approach in developing the representational dualism thesis, as well as Spencer’s own earlier attempt in developing his socio-historical account of cognitive individuation both negate the validity, propriety, and usefulness of the “sociologically greedy” microinteractionist or “culturalist” strategies that ignore the cognitive-scientific foundations of social theory. Durkheim’s representational dualism as well as Spencer’s conception of the co-evolution of social
and mental capacities stand as a prime example of how classical social theory is in fact an early, rudimentary, but nonetheless important form of “cognitive (neuro) science” (Turner 2007b). In the case of Durkheim, a proper contemporary digestion of his bold thesis would not only entail an acknowledgement of the systematic operation of the cognitive state that I have referred to as representational dualism (which for Durkheim was “species-specific” fact), but also (a) the manner in which it has been collectively managed throughout history as well as (b) the way in which the constant experience of cognitive dualism predisposes persons to accept as intuitive certain (dualistic!) belief systems and metaphysical positions (Durkheim 1914/2005). As contemporary sociological theory continues to struggle with its own set of dualisms (micro versus macro, structure versus agency, etc.), I would suggest that Durkheim’s insightful but neglected explanation for this perennial state of affairs—ultimately rooted in our conscious intuition of the operation of unconscious socio-mental processes—deserves a serious reconsideration.

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NOTES

1. In fact, the primary transformation in recent thinking regarding intellectual development of Durkheim is the almost total discrediting of the previously dominant notion of the existence of “two Durkheims,” one the “early Durkheim” and the other “the late Durkheim,” only for the latter of whom the notion of representation and dualism were salient (e.g., Alexander 1982).

2. The only thing that appears to be novel in the late “Dualism” essay is the “sociology of knowledge” argument connecting the dual constitution of the human mind and the prevalence of dualist systems of thought and metaphysics in human history.


4. While I have kept the term “conscience” (which in English carries a purely moralistic meaning, while in Durkheim’s French usage [as in all Latinate languages] it is closer to “mind” or “consciousness”) here, it would be more accurate to substitute with the prolix but I think more adequate phrase “system of action and cognition.”

5. Durkheim thought that “solidarity” based on protection of rights (to life and property) was simply a-moral “negative solidarity” and thus incapable of serving as a cognitive-affective source of bonding for persons.

6. According to Durkheim (Durkheim 1914/2005:36) “[o]ur sensory appetites are necessarily egoistic; they are concerned with our individuality and with it alone. When we satisfy our hunger, thirst, etc . . . it is ourselves that we satisfy.”

7. The importance of this hypothesis for Spencer’s overall theoretical system is well established. As Jones (1974:348, italics added) notes, in Spencer’s view, “evolution has witnessed a steady reduction in the sphere of social (i.e., governmental) activity, thus emancipating the individual from collective influence.”

8. Spencer’s views in this respect are closer to more contemporary developments in post-functionalist macro-sociology, in particular to that of Mann (1986) and Maryanski and
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Turner (1992). The latter of whom speak of a “naturally” individualistic human animal being forced to belong to coercive societies through a process of “social caging.” Post-functionalist macro-sociology can thus be seen to have partially returned to Spencer by way of a rejection of (an admittedly “Parsonified”) Durkheim.

9. Ultimately Durkheim’s main objection to Spencer is that the latter is not theory of the development of individuality but simply assumes it to have existed all along. Spencer’s theory is instead (and correctly) according to Durkheim, a theory of the release of a durable, previously existing (and therefore not “created” by society) individual human nature with modernity, not a theory of the sociological development of the collective representation of “the individual.”

10. As Spencer (1916:64) notes, “Induction thus sufficiently verifies the deduction that primitive men, who, before any arts of life were developed, necessarily lived on wild food, implying wide dispersion of small numbers, were, on the one hand, not much habituated to associated life, and were, on other hand, habituated to that uncontrolled following of immediate desires which goes along with separateness.”

11. This is a noteworthy (if usually not noticed) acknowledgment of the (necessary) limits of sociological explanation by the most “socio-centric” of the classical theorists.

12. Durkheim is thus correct to conclude that he and Spencer are simply talking about different processes and thus his version of individualism, “...the fruit of an historical development is not at all that which Spencer described” (Durkheim 1893/1964:199, italics added).

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