

These are just a few highly schematic examples of how von Hildebrand's work can be valuable to thinkers working in a variety of philosophical traditions. Many others could be produced, although it should be admitted that von Hildebrand can sometimes seem overzealous in distancing his work from other philosophical treatments of love. For instance, his hostility to what he labels "eudaemonism" seems to us to be somewhat overstated. Von Hildebrand is concerned that the typical Aristotelian-Thomistic emphasis on understanding the good as flourishing will serve to overly immanentize the good, and fail to recognize properly the importance of external value. This is not a trivial concern, but the differences between von Hildebrand and the followers of Thomas need not be so stark as he seems to think. For example, Josef Pieper's great essay on charity deftly acknowledges the genuinely other-focused nature of love while also incorporating it into a teleological account of the human being

as lover. Indeed, properly understood, true human flourishing in the teleological sense precisely includes the kind of affective sensibility that is only possible in one who manifests the virtues. This suggests the direction a fruitful synthesis might take.

In short, *The Nature of Love* is a highly valuable contribution to the ongoing tradition, the fruit of a lifetime of finely honed phenomenological reflection. What von Hildebrand has accomplished here is an example of the best sort of phenomenology—with acute observation and precise analysis he opens the eyes of anyone willing to see the reality of value in creation, and ultimately the source of value in its Creator. This is an unjustly neglected work, and we can hope that this new translation will serve to bring von Hildebrand's great insights about love to a new generation of philosophers.

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WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM?: ON JOHN RAWLS'S POLITICAL TURN.
By Paul Weithman. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. xii + 379. Hard Cover \$65.00, ISBN: 978-0-19-539303-3.

John Rawls's work has captured the attention of many, including committed Christians. Indeed, the relationship between Rawls and faith has been a consistent topic of interest, even more so after the recent publication of Rawls's undergraduate thesis, *A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith* (Harvard University Press, 2009). Though Rawls would become decidedly less religious after his experiences in World War II, his interest in faith is pervasive in his writing, particularly after his so-called political turn.

Among the virtues of Paul Weithman's book is his explanation of the role of faith in Rawls's work, though this comes at the end of what is a rather dense treatise explicitly devoted to an exegetical study of the late-thinker's reasons for recasting his theory of justice into a more narrowly defined political liberalism. For anyone interested in the complexities of the Rawlsian *corpus*, Weithman provides detailed and thorough arguments that attempt to clarify several of Rawls's positions and show how they are related

to one another. Weithman argues that Rawls turned to political liberalism not to better justify the two principles that would emerge from the original position, as the common account goes, but to correct his initial account of stability. On the whole, Weithman's account has much to offer and has the added benefit of drawing attention to themes in Rawls's work too often overlooked, such as the roles of institutions and political philosophy. This comes, however, at the cost of a forest of detailed steps, often given labels that require great effort on the part of the reader to keep in mind.

Even a brief overview of Weithman's book should dispel any illusions that the intended audience is anything but familial. The author begins by describing what amounts to an in-house argument among students of Rawls's thought. When it comes to explaining why Rawls narrowed his theory of justice as fairness to the political realm, many have held that he did so because he was dissatisfied with the basis for the two principles of justice given in Part I of *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard University Press, 1971; 1999). A generalized version of this argument is spelled out in great detail by the author. Those who hold this view focus on the public justification that citizens are necessarily to accept if they are to maintain confidence in one another's willingness to abide by the terms of justice. The problem is that this justification requires a common acceptance of certain metaphysical assumptions about the human person and the purpose of political life, to say nothing of life in general. Thus citizens of the Rawlsian "well-ordered society" are denied the freedom to differ on the most important questions of human existence. The later Rawls thus devises the overlapping

consensus as a means of avoiding this problem by allowing citizens to form commitments to the principles of justice independently.

As popular as this account is, Weithman reminds his readers that it does not square with what Rawls says in the introduction to *Political Liberalism* (Columbia University Press, 1996). There Rawls explicitly points to Part III of *Theory* as the subject of correction. His intention is not to change the argument for the principles of justice, but to recast his account of stability, a move that brings with it other changes including the idea of the overlapping consensus. Weithman describes Rawls's concern with stability as very ambitious, and rightly so. Stability has long been a theme of political philosophy but never before has a theorist endeavored to lay the groundwork for a system that generates its own stability, an inherent stability. Weithman points to Hobbes as the classic example of state enforced stability that pays no, or relatively little, heed to the justness of the regime's laws and policies. Rather than being dependent upon a mighty Leviathan to keep the peace and prevent revolution, Rawls proposes the idea of a governing structure that will be accepted and in turn supported because of the confidence those under its rule have in its ability to govern according to a commonly accepted view of justice. Weithman tells us that Rawls sets out to accomplish this task in two stages. The first requires citizens to acquire—and to know that others likewise acquire—a sense of justice. The second aims to show that citizens' adherence to their sense of justice is in congruence with their good. According to Weithman, it is this second stage that Rawls tries to correct in his move to political liberalism.

Much of the book therefore delves deeply into the issue of congruence between the right and the good. In *Theory*, Rawls works under the assumption that a common acceptance of the good could be embraced upon a shared notion of what it means to be human. He therefore taught that we naturally desire to express or realize our nature to live as free and rational beings, to avoid hypocrisy and deception, to develop natural ties of friendship, and to participate in forms of social life according to our talents. Weithman shows various arguments offered by the early Rawls in favor of abiding by the principles of justice in order to fully fulfill this desire. These reasons may be convincing for those who share Rawls's Kantian conception of the person and the good. But what of those who do not? Can the system remain inherently stable in the face of pluralism? The recognition of differing conceptions of the good life comes with a real challenge to the idea of congruence, which Rawls believes is an essential part of an inherently stable order.

Thus the task of political liberalism is paradoxically more ambitious in its quest for stability than the earlier account of justice as fairness. The later Rawls casts his net wider, hoping to persuade those not initially inclined to agree with him, particularly those whose conception of the good is rooted in religious faith.

Weithman helpfully regards Rawls as being concerned with theodicy—the question of why bad things happen in a world that God created good. From this perspective the attempt to provide a theoretical backdrop for a well-ordered society can be seen as an attempt to recognize and cultivate our moral nature and to finally live up to the standard of God's creation. Weithman's book thus ends with a very interesting and compelling description of Rawls's work. And that work is unmistakably ambitious, far more so than even Weithman indicates; for if he is right, Rawls is offering those within the Judeo-Christian tradition a political means of correcting the Fall.

In addition to the argument about congruence, the book makes an important case in favor of reading Rawls carefully and comprehensively. The argument is thorough, though the labeling of steps in the argument does more to distract than clarify. That said, the case for taking more seriously Part III of *Theory* is an important one. The role of political philosophy and the tasks of political institutions are themes too often neglected by readers of Rawls's thought. Weithman offers a helpful contribution in bringing these themes to the forefront of our attention.

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