Lecture 06 - Social Psych

Groups

 

I. Group polarization. (Adapted from Meyers, Vander Zanden, Mayo and LaFrance)

A. It long has been thought that a group tends to be more conservative than its individual members - that groups have a dampening effect on boldness, creativity, innovation and daring. This was thought to occur partly because groups have to compromise to make everybody happy, and because the group has to appeal to the lowest common denominator. William H. Whyte suggested in his best-selling book, The organization Man, that the administrator who wants conservative advice should ask a committee rather than an individual for recommendations.

Stoner wanted to test the commonly held belief that groups are more cautious than individuals. Subjects were given a questionnaire describing various hypothetical situations calling for a choice between two courses of action - one riskier but potentially more rewarding, and one less risky but also less promising.

EX: Mr. A has a secure job with a modest, though adequate, salary. He is offered a job with a new company which has a highly uncertain future. The new job would pay more to start and could eventually lead to a share in the ownership - IF the firm survives. Please check the lowest probability that you would consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. A to take the new job. (Options range from: (1) the chances are 1 in 10 that the company will prove financially sound, to (2) Mr. A. should not take the job no matter what the probabilities.

Subjects first gave their own individual ratings. Then, they got together in groups, and arrived at a joint decision. Subjects then made their own individual ratings again.

Much to Stoner's surprise, he found group decisions were more risky. Both the group discussions, and the post-discussion individual decisions, showed a shift toward risk. That is, both covert acceptance and overt compliance were affected in the same manner by the discussion process. Stoner called this the risky shift phenomenon.

Numerous studies supported this. Followup research suggested effects persisted across time, and held for both men and women.

b. Later studies found this was not always the case - a cautious shift sometimes occurs. For example, when experiments involve the alternative to divorce as a solution to marital discord, a cautious shift occurs.

The belief now is that groups enhance the dominant point of view, leading to group polarization - The tendency of group members to shift toward the already preferred pole is enhanced. Numerous experimental studies have supported this. People were paired with others they tended to agree with - this was shown to magnify differences between groups.

Further, the polarization effect is not just limited to caution and risk - it applies to other types of attitudes as well.

EX: Conservatives and Liberals were placed in separate groups. Differences were even more extreme afterwards.

EX: Educators refer to the accentuation phenomena: Initial differences between college-student groups are accentuated with time in college.

EX: Coleman found during community conflict, like-minded people increasingly associate with each other, amplifying shared tendencies.

c. APPARENTLY FALSE EXPLANATIONS

1. Diffusion of responsibility hypothesis. It was suggested that decision making gives rise to anxiety, and that anxiety is alleviated by sharing the responsibility with others. To make a risky decision alone is to invoke the fear of failure; sharing that decision with others reduces fear. However, this does not explain shifts to caution, which also occur.

2. Culture-value hypothesis. This rests on the assumptions that risk is a value and most people think of themselves as riskier than others. The group enhances a tendency already in the individual. Moderate risk-taking is a social value; high risk-takers are admired. Those who find their views are more cautious are discomfited, and change their ratings to fit their self-image.

If this hypothesis were true, the mere knowledge that others hold riskier views should produce the shift. However, studies show that discussion and group interaction produce much stronger shifts, so there must be something about the group process that produces change.

D. MORE VIABLE EXPLANATIONS

1. Informational influence. Group discussion pools ideas, most of which favor the dominant viewpoint. These may include persuasive arguments members had not previously considered. Also, active verbal participation sharpens attitudes.

EX: A feminist who attends a NOW meeting will hear lots of new arguments that tend to reinforce her earlier beliefs - and won't hear many arguments that undermine them. Likewise for somebody who attends a College Republicans meeting.

2. Normative influence. (a) People typically guess others' opinions to be less supportive of the socially preferred tendency than their own. Once they realize others support them, they are liberated, give stronger expression of preferences. (b) Further, we tend to admire those persons who are on our side of an issue but more extreme. (c) People want to make a good impression on others

II. Groupthink. (Adapted from Meyers, Janis, Vander Zanden)

a. Janis wondered whether some of the social-psychological phenomena we have been examining might account for good and bad decisions made by recent american presidents and their advisers. he analyzed several major fiascos:

1. Pearl Harbor. In the weeks preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, military commanders were fed a steady stream of information about Japan's preparations for attack - somewhere. Then military intelligence lost contact with Japanese fleet. Air reconnaissance could have spotted the carriers, but the complacent commanders decided against such precautions.

2. Bay of Pigs. In 1961, some of the most respected leaders in America's history unanimously undertook a disastrous policy. These men decided to send 1,400 CIA-trained Cuban exiles to Cuba with the intent of overthrowing the Castro regime. Within 3 days, Castro's forces, crushed the attack, capturing 1,200 of the exiles and killing most of the others. (Two years later, the U.S. ransomed the hostages for $53 million in food and medicine). Kennedy asked, "How could we have been so stupid." Among the mistakes:

(a) assumed no one would find out the U.S. was involved. Overlooked the fact that 1,400 rebels knew, lots of foreign countries knew. Stories about a possible invasion appeared in newspapers a week in advance!

(b) Thought that, if worst came to worst, rebels could retreat to the mountains and join the guerrillas there. If anyone had bothered to look at a map, they'd have seen the mountains were 80 miles away, with lots of swamp in between.

(c) Assumed Cuban military forces were too weak - even though Castro had 200,000 men to the U.S.'s 1,400.

3. Vietnam. From 1964 to 1967 Johnson escalated the Vietnam war on the assumption that U.S. aerial bombardment was likely to bring N. Vietnam to the peace table. This was done despite warnings from gov. intelligence experts as well as from leaders of nearly all US allies

b. Janis believes these blunders were bred by the tendency of these decisionmaking groups to suppress dissent in the interests of group harmony. Tends to occur when: (Antecedent conditions for groupthink)

1. Groups are amiable, cohesive

2. There is relative isolation of the group from contrary viewpoints

3. Directive leader who signals what decision he or she favors.

EX: When planning Bay of Pigs, Kennedy and advisers enjoyed a strong esprit de corps; arguments critical of the plan were suppressed or excluded; President himself soon indicated his approval of the invasion.

c. Symptoms of groupthink. Janis suggests that Groupthink is the likely cause of these defects when the following symptoms are present:

Type I: Overestimations of the group - its power and morality

1. Illusion of vulnerability. Groups Janis studied all developed an excessive optimism that blinded them to the warnings of danger.

EX: Chief naval officer joked about the possibility Japanese were about to round Honolulu's Diamond Head.

EX: Arthur Schlesinger wrote that everything had gone right for Kennedy since 1956. He had won the nomination and the election, beating all the odds. Everyone around him thought he had the midas touch and could not lose.

2. Unquestioned belief in the group's morality. Group members assume the inherent morality of their group, ignoring ethical and moral issues.

EX: Kennedy thought he was battling against the evil of Communism.

Type II: Closed-mindedness

3. Rationalization. Groups discounted challenges to their past decisions by collectively justifying them.

EX: Johnson's group spent far more time rationalizing their decisions than they did rethinking them.

EX: Kennedy thought the invasion was the will of the Cuban people, who would rise up in support of the invaders. Yet U.S. government surveys were available showing that Castro had considerable popular support.

4. Stereotyped view of opponent. Enemies are considered too evil to deal with, or so weak and unintelligent that they could not possibly defend themselves against the planned initiative.

EX: Kennedy's group thought the Communists were so stupid, incompetent, and weak that their air force and army (the paltry 200,000 of them) would be ineffective against the highly trained CIA exiles.

Type III: Pressures toward uniformity

5. Self-censorship. Since disagreements were often discomforting and the groups seemed in consensus, members tended to withhold or even discount their own misgivings.

6. Illusion of unanimity. Self-censorship can lead to an illusion of unanimity. The apparent consensus appears to validate the group's decision.

EX: Although some advisers had doubts about the Bay of Pigs, not one expressed them. Schlesinger said "Our meetings were taking place in a curious atmosphere of assumed consensus. Had one senior adviser opposed the adventure, I believe that Kennedy would have cancelled it. Not one spoke against it."

7. Conformity pressure. Dissent was not appreciated. Group members who raised doubts were readily refuted, at times not by argument but by personal sarcasm.

EX: Bill Moyers was labeled "Mr. stop the bombing." Most people fall into line when faced with such ridicule.

8. Mindguards. Some members protect the group from information that would dispute the morality or effectiveness of its actions.

EX: Bob Kennedy told Schlesinger "You may be right or you may be wrong, but the President has made his mind up. Don't push it any further. Now is the time for everyone to help him all they can."

EX: Dean Rusk withheld diplomatic and intelligence experts warnings against the invasion. (Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles was against the operation; a few weeks afterwards, he was fired, while Rusk kept his job!)

By so doing they served the President as what we might call "mindguards", parallel to bodyguards but protecting him from disagreeable facts rather than from physical harm.

c. Major defects in decision-making contribute to failures to solve problems adequately. (Consequences of Groupthink)

1. The group's decisions are limited to a few alternative courses of action, without a survey of the full range of alternatives.

2. The group does not survey the objectives to be fulfilled and the values implicated by the choice.

3. The group fails to re-examine the course of action initially favored by the majority, to look for non-obvious risks and drawbacks that had not been initially considered.

4. Members neglect courses of action initially evaluated as unsatisfactory by the majority of the group. They spend little or no time discussing whether they have overlooked non-obvious gains or whether there are ways of reducing the costs that initially made the alternative undesirable.

5. The members make little or no attempt to obtain information from experts who can supply sound estimates of losses and gains to be expected from alternative courses of action.

6. Selective bias - members show interest in the facts and opinions that support their initially preferred policy and take up time in their meetings to discuss them, but they tend to ignore facts and opinions that do not support their initially preferred policy.

7. Members spend little time deliberating about how the chosen policy might be hindered by bureaucratic inertia, sabotaged by political opponents, or temporarily derailed by common accidents. Hence, they fail to work out contingency plans to cope with foreseeable setbacks that could endanger the overall success of the chosen course of action.

d. The imperfect link between groupthink and fiascoes. Each of these defects could arise from causes other than groupthink. Erroneous intelligence, information overload, fatigue, and blinding prejudice are other possible causes. Whatever causes these defects, decisions suffering from most of these defects have little chance of success. Every bad decision does not have to be the result of groupthink, nor is it necessarily the case that every defective decision will produce a fiasco. Sometimes bad decisions have successful outcomes - you get lucky, or the enemy is even stupider than you are!

f. Preventing groupthink

1. The leader should be impartial, and should not state preferences at the outset. This makes it possible for others to explore a broad range of policy alternatives.

2. Leader should encourage objections and doubts. The leader must also be willing to accept criticism of his or her judgments, so that criticisms are not soft-pedaled.

3. One or more members should be assigned the role of "devil's advocate". You have to be careful though, since this can delude you into thinking all sides of an issue have been considered.

4. Outside experts should sometimes attend, challenge the groups views. This should be done long before a consensus is reached. Their objections should be freely discussed.

5. Survey warning signals, identify possible actions by a rival. Construct alternative scenarios of a rival's intentions. At least one of these scenarios should attribute benign intentions to the enemy, to avoid overreactions.

6. After reaching a preliminary decision, have a "second-chance" meeting to express remaining doubts. Let everyone rethink their choice. It has been suggested that this might be done in a relaxed setting, such as over drinks. During Roman times, it is said that the Germans arrived at each decision twice, once sober, and once drunk.

III. Leadership (Handbook of Social Psych; The Small Group; Fiedler's "The Contingency Model and the dynamics of the leadership process"; Michener et al)

1. Trait perspective.

A. "great man of history" - says some people are born leaders. To discover which people are born leaders, we can examine past and present leaders to see what traits they have in common. However, their is little consistent evidence to support this.

B. Leaders do tend to be superior to the average group member on skills that are crucial to the groups survival and progress

C. Leaders tend to be higher on average in ambition and desire for leadership.

D. Leaders are often taller on average, as if people literally expected to look up to them. People tend to overestimate the height of those in important positions.

E. Leaders tend to be more intelligent than followers - though not markedly so. Nonleaders often don't like to be led by those who are much more intelligent - characteristics of the situation may keep intelligence from being important.

F. Males have traditionally dominated positions of leadership in the United States, but it is not clear that "maleness" is a trait of leadership. Women have a more difficult time being recognized as leaders. Porter et al found that women seated at the head of the table were perceived as leaders only in all-female groups, whereas males seated in such positions were perceived as leaders regardless of the sex composition. Rice et al examined the effectiveness of senior cadets at West point - found no difference between males and females in leadership effectiveness, and leadership methods were quite similar.

2. Leadership style - Democratic, authoritarian, Laissez-faire

A. Characteristics of each

1. Authoritarian -

a. All determination of policy by the leader

b. Techniques and procedures dictated by the leader

c. Leader dictates the work tasks of each member, and who they will work with

d. Leader remains aloof from active group participation

2. Democratic

a. All policies are a matter of group discussion, encouraged and assisted by the leader

b. When advice is needed, leader suggests two or more alternative procedures from which to make a choice

c. Members can work with whomever they choose

d. Leader tries to be a regular group member in spirit without doing too much of the work

3. Laissez-Faire

a. Complete freedom of individual or group decision, with a minimum of leader participation

b. Leader supplies materials, and information when asked; no other participation in the group discussion

c. No attempt to regulate the course of events

B. Classic study done by Lewin et al. Groups of 10 year old boys met after school for 3 six-week periods. Adult leaders supervised. Authoritarian leaders exercised a great deal of control - determined all policies, administered praise and criticism without giving reasons. Democratic leader encouraged members to discuss policy issues, and he collaborated with them. Group members chose own tasks and workmates. Laissez-faire leader adopted a hands-off approach - friendly but passive, made no attempt to evaluate or regulate groups activities. Results? Leadership style had a very strong effect on productivity and interpersonal relations.

1. Laissez-faire had lowest productivity. Not goal oriented, poor quality work, but liked the leader. Actually became more productive when the leader left, because one of the boys would take over the leadership role!

2. Authoritarian had the highest quantity of output. But had high hostility, negative feelings. Did not internalize the motivation to work - when leader was gone, they stopped producing.

3. Demo had slightly lower quantity but higher quality. Work motivation was high. Members were friendly with each other. When leader left, productivity stayed about the same.

C. Several other studies have pursued this idea. In general, they find:

1. members of groups under demo leadership express more satisfaction with their group and its leaders than members of groups under authoritarian leadership.

2. Authoritarian leadership is sometimes preferred, but primarily in military or bureaucratic settings where there is no expectation of sharing in decision-making.

3. Neither authoritarian nor democratic leadership is consistently associated with higher levels of group performance. For example, authoritarian leadership is more effective among a group of sailors on shipboard.

3. Fiedler's Contingency Model of Leadership

A. Fiedler assumes that every leader has a personal style of leadership that cannot easily be changed. To secure the most effective performance from a group, the leaders style should be suited to the needs of the group and its tasks. For instance, a democratic supervisor might be replaced by a more authoritarian supervisor during times of crisis. Trying to change the leadership style of leaders is useless - it is better to change the situation, or even to change the actual leaders. Hence, leadership is contingent on situational factors.

B. First thing Fiedler says you should look at is leadership style.

1. Leaders are either relationship-oriented or task-oriented. Task oriented people are oriented toward achieving successful task performance, those who are relationship-oriented are primarily concerned with establishing congenial interpersonal relations with others.

2. Leadership style is measured by "least preferred co-worker" index. A leader is first asked to recall all the people with whom he has ever worked in a group setting, and to select the one who was most difficult to get along with. This person is designated the least preferred coworker (LPC). Next, the leader is asked to rate this person on dimensions such as pleasant-unpleasant, helpful-frustrating, efficient-inefficient.

3. An individual who describes the LPC in very negative, rejecting terms is considered task-motivated. The completion of the task is of such overriding importance that it completely colors the perception of all other personality traits attributed to the LPC. "If I can't get along with you,then you can't be good in any other respects." Those with high LPC scores are relationship motivated. They say "even though I can't work with you, you may still be friendly, interesting, etc."

C. Second thing to consider is situational control. A leader's effectiveness depends not only on leadership style, but on characteristics of the situation. When a leader has high control, s/he can be fairly certain his decisions will have predictable results and that they will achieve the desired goals.

1. Leader-member relations (good or bad). A leader whom the other members like, trust, and respect is in a more favorable situation, and will usually have the support of group members. This is the most important factor in determining the leader's influence in the group.

NOTE: Just because a leader is relationship oriented, that does not mean he has good relationships!!! Also, task-oriented leaders can have good relationships.

2. Task structure - refers to how clearly defined the task requirements of a group are. Are goals clearly defined? Is there a single path by which goals can be achieved? Can the accuracy of the decision be measured? The more these things are true, the greater the degree to which the task is structured, and the more favorable the situation is to the leader. Production supervisors and military commanders have relatively structured tasks. Committees, boards, or organizations which require creative efforts tend to have unstructured tasks.

3. Leader position power - is the intrinsic authority that is attached to a position is strong or weak? The degree to which leaders are able to reward or punish, to recommend sanctions, or otherwise to enforce compliance by subordinates.

4. Others - Fielder focuses on the above three, but notes other factors can also affect situational control, and must be examined further. These include stress, experience, cultural differences between leader and followers.

C. From leaders standpoint, it is best to have good relations, a highly structured task, and strong leader power. Poor relations, an unstructured task, and weak leader power is very unfavorable.

D. What kind of leader is most effective under different kinds of conditions? Model says task-oriented (low-LPC) leaders are most effective in highly favorable or unfavorable conditions, and ineffective in other situations. High-LPC are best in moderately favorable conditions, ineffective elsewhere.

1. Under unfavorable conditions, you need strong task-leadership, low-LPC provides this. Low-LPC is willing to overlook interpersonal conflicts in order to concentrate on the groups task. He is effective because he is committed to the task regardless of the consequences this may have with subordinates.

High-LPC focuses too much on smoothing out interpersonal problems and not on the task. Tend to become non-directive, and withdraw from the leadership role.

EX: This is well-illustrated by company trouble-shooters and "start-up men" who are sent to new or ailing offices and plants, or to organizations which are in a state of crisis. These individuals enjoy the challenge of a new job and perform well under stress, but rarely remain effective after the organization has settled into a comfortable routine. Under these situations, which are likely to provide moderate situational control, the organization is likely to call on a manager who has the ability to keep people working together in harmony - a high-LPC leader.

NOTE: Again, keep in mind leader-member relations are bad in this situation.

NOTE: If you can think of counter-examples - try to think whether they really fit into this situation (For example, maybe John Kennedy was a good leader and maybe he was relationship-oriented - but he also had good relations with the members, and had a lot of power).

2. Intermediate conditions - High LPC can smooth out the interpersonal problems. These kinds of situations often require the leader to reconcile conflicting viewpoints.

EX: Committee work, or policy-making. Leader must be tactful. Low-LPC tend to focus on the task to the neglect of group members, hence they have an unwilling and uncooperative work team.

EX: Another case that falls in here is when the leader has high task structure and high power, but bad relations with the members. Here, subtlety and tact are called for - otherwise you leave yourself open to sabotage.

3. Highly favorable. Leader has the group's support as well as a highly structured task and high power. The group knows what the task requires and wants to perform it. The low-LPC leader provides minimal guidance. The task is being performed, so now he can focus on the secondary goal of good interpersonal relationships.

The high LPC leader, whose primary goal of securing group support is satisfied, now turns to the task. He provides strong leadership when none is needed. His behavior becomes maladaptive. High-LPC start acting like "underemployed mothers" - look for things to do, become bossy and unconcerned.

NOTE: Realize that, for both, their primary need has been fulfilled - task and interpersonal relations are ok - so now they can turn to their secondary goal.

E. Hundreds of studies have tended to confirm the model. Studies have been done on West Point Cadets, College Students, naval personnel.

F. Some other implications:

1. One leader is not necessarily right for all times. As the situation changes, the leader may cease to be effective. EX: Billy Martin improves a team for a while, and then the team falls back and he gets fired.

2. Leadership training can be of questionable value. Results of training have been mixed. There is no one ideal leadership style.

3. Some leaders do better with less situational control. Task is more interesting and challenging, less power better suits their leadership style.

4. Transactional view of leadership

A. Examines what a person must do to perform successfully as a leader and to obtain continuing support from members

B. By fulfilling the planning, organizing and controlling functions of a group, leaders help members obtain objectives. In return leaders receive support for continued control and special privileges - transactional view of leadership.

C. Leaders are expected to (1) formulate a clear conception of goals, objectives (2) develop specific strategies (3) specify role assignments (4) establish and maintain channels of communication (5) train members (6) interact to maintain good relations (7) resolve conflicts among members (8) represent the group

D. In return, leaders get endorsement - an attitude held by a group member indicating the extent to which he or she supports the leader. Note that endorsement can be gained and lost (e.g. Nixon)

E. Factors affecting endorsement

1. Extent to which group meets its objectives. However, initial failure may lead to a rallying of support, although repeated failure will lead to a decline of endorsement. Failure leads to perception of incompetence

2. Level of consideration. Equitable treatment leads to high endorsement. selfish leader suffers reduced endorsement.

5. When leadership breaks down - Revolutionary and conservative coalitions

a. When group members agree on their relative status, and especially on that of their leaders, a condition of status consensus is said to exist. Consensus may collapse though. For example, if a group experiences unexpected difficulty in attaining its goals, some members may continue to endorse the existing leadership, whereas others may prefer to change leaders.

b. Lack of status consensus poses serious problems for an established leader. Under certain conditions, a lack of consensus may lead to the formation of a revolutionary coalition, which is a union of some medium- and low-status members who oppose the existing leader.

c. Revolutionary coalitions are difficult to mobilize. Members must first have a reason to end their allegiance to the established order, and then agree to take action to overthrow that order.

d. Nevertheless, various factors increase the likelihood that a revolutionary coalition will form and take action.

1. Repeated failure to achieve goals

2. Inequitable treatment of group members by high-status persons

3. Similarity of interests and opinions. SHaring common interests heightens members expectation s of support from other members.

e. Reactions to revolutionary coalitions. Established leaders have a lot to lose by the emergence of a revolutionary coalition, and they seldom sit idly by during the upheaval. A leader will typically engage in various counterstrategies to thwart the coalition.

1. Can threaten to punish insurgent members.

2. Can mobilize a conservative coalition - a union of medium- and low-status members who support the existing status order against revolutionaries.

3. Co-optation - can single out one or several low-status members for favored treatment - for example, could offer the possibility of future promotion. This will increase their investment in the existing status order, making it more difficult for a revolutionary coalition to recruit them as members.

6. Homan's Rules for Leadership

a. The leader will maintain his own position. Leader can do nothing until he establishes himself as a person from whom authoritative orders will come. Have to achieve and maintain high social rank.

b. The leader will live up to the norms of his group. The leader must set an example.

c. The leader will lead. If a leader is supposed to originate interactions or make decisions for the group members, any failure to do so will make him that much less of a leader. People welcome orders in any situation in which they consider them appropriate, and are confused without them. Especially in an emergency, members expect the leader to take charge. [Note how important characteristics of the situation are here.]

d. The leader will not give orders that will not be obeyed. When leaders give orders that are not obeyed, they undermine their rank. This also confuses the followers and causes them to question the leader's competence.

e. In giving orders, the leader will use established channels. The leader must maintain the social rank of his lieutenants. Leader must not pull rank unnecessarily if he wants the orders of his lieutenants to be followed.

f. The leader will not thrust himself on his followers on social occasions. When a leader interacts frequently with a typical group member, the leader is lowering his social rank. If his orders are to be obeyed, the leader cannot afford to do this. Also, members may expect the leader to originate interaction in "social" settings, just as the leader does elsewhere, and if he begins doing this, he will destroy the relaxed and casual nature of usual association among equals.

g. The leader will neither blame nor, in general, praise a member of his group before other members. When leaders blame a follower in public, they are only humiliating the follower; they also may be casting some doubt on their own reputation for justice. Occasional public praise of a group member may be admirable, but frequent praise may cause embarrassment by putting undue pressure on the rest of the group to accept an evaluation they may not be ready to accept.

h. The leader will take into consideration the total situation. The leader will take into account the needs and goals of the whole group and its relations with its environment.

i. In maintaining discipline, the leader will be less concerned with inflicting punishment than with creating the conditions in which the group will discipline itself. When something has gone wrong in the group the leader should ask for an explanation of the mistake from the apparently responsible person and ask how it might be avoided in the future, rather than to bawl this person out without any questions. Via this approach, the leader (1) will avoid punishing an innocent person, (2) the leader will avoid humiliating the guilty party and lowering their rank, (3) the leader may begin to recognize the underlying cause of the problem, (4) by asking for an explanation, the leader may be taking the most effective way for avoiding the problem in the future. Hence, instead of punishing mistakes, the leader should concentrate more on the conditions in the whole causing a breakdown of authority and try to correct them. This does not mean the leader should never use punishment or sanctions. It is fully justified when the offense is important, when it is a clear case of disobedience, and when responsibility has been clearly established.

j. The leader will listen. Leaders must be well-informed about their groups if they are to make appropriate and beneficial decisions; and becoming well-informed will involve trying to know their followers as well as possible.

k. The leader will know himself. If a leader must know his men well, he must know himself still better.

IV. Groups and Productivity (Adapted from Nixon's The Small Group; Myers; Michener et al)

1. Group size.

a. Larger groups have advantages of greater resources. On the other hand, large groups require extensive organization and coordination among members, which may inhibit performance.

b. Hence, it has been argued that group size will increase directly with group size when the task is disjunctive, and decrease when the task is conjunctive.

1. additive tasks - require parallel but coordinated actions by two or more persons. EX: Shoveling snow, tug of war. Each member should do as much as he can while maintaining needed coordination with colleagues.

Total productivity will increase with group size but productivity per member may decline - "Social loafing" (will discuss later).

2. disjunctive - Whenever a choice must be made between distinctly different options, tasks are disjunctive, because they have an either-or quality. The group must select someone's solution and reject all others. Group's potential performance depends entirely on its strongest or fastest member. Potential may not be realized because group doesn't know who the most competent person is. Group size should increase productivity on disjunctive tasks, because of the higher probability someone competent will be included.

EX: Solving math problem, high score on team wins. A solution by one = a solution by all.

3. conjunctive - groups performance depends entirely on its weakest member. Group can do no better than the least competent person permits them to. Members must move in unison. EX: climbing a mountain. Bigger groups are less effective.

4. Divisible - Group tasks typically involve the simultaneous performance of several different kinds of activities. These can be divided into smaller parts. No single person is required to perform all phases of the job, and one person's strengths can complement another's weaknesses. To some extent, bigger groups can therefore be more productive.

2. Group cohesiveness.

a. Effect of cohesiveness depends on group norms. Homans found that workers in cohesive groups established norms for performance, and discouraged any group member who exceeded the group's predetermined performance level. This tendency of groups to establish and maintain a kind of "lowest common denominator" seems especially true for highly cohesive groups. Put another way, "rate busters" aren't appreciated.

b. Also, type of task is important. Important when cooperation and coordination are required, but low cohesiveness may increase competitiveness in other situations.

EX: Members of a ski team or tennis team can compete against each other.

3. Reward Structure.

a. In a cooperative reward structure, members have to rely on one another's efforts to accomplish the overriding goal. Further, each person can get a reward if, and only if, the others also get rewards. A cooperative reward structure induces open communication, mutual trust, and a readiness on the part of each person to consider the suggestions of his fellows.

EX: Four men are hired to load and unload office equipment. If they finish the job in one day or less, they each get a $25 bonus; otherwise nobody gets a bonus.

b. In a competitive reward structure, group members are pitted against one another in an attempt to gain scarce rewards for themselves. A competitive structure involves a low level of interdependence and a high level of differential reward - the best performers get the greatest rewards.

EX: A competitive situation occurs in university classes when the professor grades on the curve. If only the top 10% get A's, successful action by one student will obstruct goal attainment by others.

c. What type of reward structure assures the best possible group performance? On the one hand, a competitive structure with a group often produces a breakdown of coordination and lack of trust among members. On the other hand, a competitive structure may heighten members' motivation and cause them to try harder in hopes of attaining superior rewards. In fact, research findings have been ambiguous.

d. Some theorists have suggested that what affects group performance is not cooperation or competition per se, but the degree of underlying task interdependence and differential rewarding. Studies showed that, under conditions of high task interdependence and no differential rewarding, group productivity was higher. However, with high interdependence and high differential rewarding, members tended to hinder one another, and overall group productivity was lower. When there was low interdependence, differential rewarding made little difference.

4. Communication Structure. (From Michener et al)

a. The term communication network refers to the pattern of communication opportunities within a group. (See Michener, p. 419, for a diagram).

1. The comcon (or completely connected) network allows each member to talk freely to all the others.

2. In the Wheel network, one person is at the hub, and all communication must pass through him or her.

3. In a chain network, all information transmitted from the person at either end must pass through a number of others to get to the other end.

b. Studies of comcon networks show that members adopt a decentralized organization. The other formats tend to lead to a centralized organization.

c. Centrality of organization in turn affects a groups problem-solving efficiency. For simple problems, centralized communication networks lead to superior performance. Groups with centralized networks solved simple problems faster, sent fewer messages, and made fewer errors than groups with decentralized networks. For complex problems, however, the results are reversed. Groups with decentralized networks are more efficient. Even though they sent more messages, they were faster and tended to make fewer errors than groups with centralized networks.

d. Saturation is one possible explanation. Saturation = degree of communication overload experienced by group members occupying the central positions within communication networks. The level of saturation depends not only on the communication requirements imposed by the network, but also on such factors as the decisions required by the task. In general, the greater the level of saturation, the less efficient a group is at solving problems. For example, in a wheel network, the hub position is central. For simple tasks, communication requirements are not very demanding, and the hub position does not become saturated. For more complex problems, the communication requirements placed on the hub are very demanding, and the hub may become saturated and over-burdened. Decentralized networks do not have this problem because no position in the network is subject to extreme saturation.

e. Real world example: A group of division representatives within an aerospace firm tried out several different communication networks. This group consisted of an administrative officer and representatives from several divisions such as manufacturing, quality control, and engineering. At first this group was organized in a comcon network. This permitted virtually unrestricted communication among all members. Satisfaction was very high, but only a modest amount of work was accomplished because members wasted a great deal of time in useless discussion and debate.

Top management grew dissatisfied with the group's performance and restructured it into a wheel network with the administrative officer in a position of authority at the hub. This restriction in communication reduced worker satisfaction and motivation. It also lowered productivity because the hub position became saturated, which caused many errors in relaying complex information.

Finally, the group was again reorganized in a modified comcon network, which permitted each member to communicate only with persons who were directly involved in the task at hand. This reduced the communication overload on the administrative officer and also protected the time of members who did not need to be consulted. As a result, the group experienced high levels of satisfaction and performance.

5. Social loafing. (Hunt's Profiles of Social Research, Myers).

a. Group members may be less motivated when performing additive tasks.

EX: In Russia, the average collective farm produces only 1/2 to 3/4 as much food as private one-acre plots that peasants can tend for themselves.

EX: American factories may not be as productive as they could be.

b. Research has examined "social loafing"

1. Tug of war study found group effort was only half as great as the sum of the individual efforts. This can't just be attributed to inefficiency.

2. Latane looked at clapping and shouting. Subjects were told the aim of the experiment was to see how well people can estimate the magnitude of the noise produced by social clapping and cheering. Subjects were blindfolded, and then told to clap and cheer with the other members of the group. In reality, subjects heard tapes of others clapping and cheering; each subject actually clapped and cheered alone. The researchers found that subjects made 1/3 less noise when they did it with the group. People themselves did not realize there was a difference. No one believed that he himself had loafed, though each was ready to believe others might have.

Incidentally, they did another study, where they asked students to predict how subjects would respond in the clapping experiments. People guessed that subjects had clapped louder in the pseudogroups than when performing alone.

b. Causes and cures for social loafing.

1. Evaluation apprehension may be relevant here; in a group, individuals are not accountable, responsibility is diffused. Making people individually identifiable increases performance. In the Latane studies, researchers found that there was little social loafing when people thought they could be individually identified. Hence, identifiability was an effective deterrent to social loafing.

2. Reward structure may also explain - when rewards are divided equally, any individual gets more reward per unit of effort by free riding on the group.

3. Taking-it-easy vs. allocation strategies. Latane et al formed two contrasting hypotheses of human beings. One hypothesis is that humans had a natural tendency to exert themselves as little as possible - to "take it easy." An alternative hypothesis is that people want to exert themselves as fruitfully as possible, and that social loafing is their effort to do the best they can with their resources. Since their supply of energy is limited, there may be a tendency to allocate more of it to those times when their efforts will be identified and rewarded. They termed this the "allocation strategy." They thought this might explain why those in Israeli collective farms, which have no private plots, might work so much harder at communal activities than those on Russian collective farms, where there are private plots. Their experiments tended to support the "taking it easy" strategy.

4. Sometimes, group identity can overcome social loafing and increase productivity. Israel's communal kibbutz farms have outproduced their non-communal farms. Rather than serving as a means of diffusing responsibility, the group seems to intensify it.

6. Social facilitation

a. In 1897, Triplett charted the times of cyclists racing alone vs. cyclists racing in competition. He found that the times for cyclists competing together were the fastest. He also did an experiment with fishing reels. Half the subjects reeled by themselves, half competed against another. People reeled faster when another person was competing.

b. In 1924, Gordon Allport coined the term social facilitation. Allport theorized that "the sight and sound of others doing the same thing" are stimuli that not only trigger a reaction that a person is prepared to give, but also intensify that reaction.

c. However, research results were inconsistent. Besides the Triplett work, studies found that presence of others improves speed with which people do simple multiplication problems, improves accuracy with which people perform simple motor tasks. However, the presence of others was found to diminish the efficiency with which people learn nonsense syllables, complete mazes, perform complex multiplication problems.

Because of these conflicts, research fizzled after 1940.

d. The general rule. Zajonc drew on a well-established principle in psychology: Arousal enhances whatever response tendency is dominant. Zajonc hypothesized that the mere presence of others as spectators or as co-actors causes arousal, and hence increases the likelihood of people's most common responses (or so-called dominant response tendencies) occurring. If dominant responses are correct, either because the task is well-learned or instinctive, then co-action or the presence of an audience can improve individual performance; but if the dominant responses are mostly incorrect, as when a skill is being learned or when tasks are complex, then the presence of others hampers individual performance.

Studies confirm. Good pool players do better with an audience, poor players do worse.

e. There are some apparent exceptions. Researchers looked at the world series and professional basketball playoffs. They found that there was a "home-court" advantage in early playoff games, but in later games the home teams actually lost more games and made more errors than the visitors did. For example, i n World Series games between 1924-1982, the home team won 60% of games 1 and 2, but only 40% of games 5, 6, and 7. Shlenker argued that the presence of a friendly audience may make performers too self-conscious - so self-aware that they think about what they are doing when they should simply be doing their own thing.

e. Why are we aroused by the presence of others?

1. Cottrell questioned whether the mere presence of others was responsible for these effects. He placed subjects in 3 different conditions: alone; in an "audience" with two observers nearby; and in a "mere presence" situation with two observers who were wearing blindfolds. Social facilitation took place only in the audience condition. Cottrell concluded that anticipated evaluation by others led to the effect.