THE PHILOSOPHY OF DUNS SCOTUS
PHIL 83245 Spring 2006

TIME: Malloy 320 TTh 5:00-6:15
INSTRUCTOR: Stephen D. Dumont (www.nd.edu/~ndphilo/faculty/sdu.htm)
CONTACT: Malloy 301 /1-3757/ dumont.2@nd.edu
OFFICE HOURS: By appointment.

This course will examine some of Scotus’s important and influential philosophical contributions in metaphysics, epistemology, and moral theory. Scotus’s positions and arguments will be analyzed against their historical background, particularly Henry of Ghent, whose was both Scotus’s most important source and opponent. Lecture and discussion on the following themes will be accompanied by full class notes, bibliographies, and in some cases original translations.

Metaphysics
- Univocity of the Transcendental Concepts
- Proofs for the Existence of God
- Universals, Individuation, and the Formal Distinction

Epistemology
- The Object of the Intellect
- Rejection of Illumination
- Intuitive and Abstructive Cognition

Moral Theory
- Freedom of the Will and Synchronic Contingency
- The Will as the Primary Rational Power
- The Two Affections of Will
- Natural Law and the Coherence of Scotus’s Ethics
- Virtues

REQUIRED TEXTS

COURSE REQUIREMENTS
50% = Research Term paper (10 pages undergraduate/ 20 pages graduate). DUE APRIL 27.
50% = Take-home, final examination to be distributed on last day of class.
BIBLIOGRAPHY: DUNS SCOTUS

OPERA OMNIA

   [Known as the Wadding edition after its editor, Luke Wadding. Contains many spurious works. For which works are certainly authentic see, Charles Balic, *John Duns Scotus. Some Reflections on the Occasion of the Seventh Centenary of his Birth* (Rome, 1966), pp. 29-44. Since the critical Vatican edition is far from complete, this is still the standard text for many of Scotus’s writings. Even for those texts which have been critically edited, the Wadding edition remains valuable for the scholia, parallel citations and commentaries by 16th century Scotists contained in it.]

   [Reprint of the above edition and thus is known as the Wadding-Vivès text or just Vivès edition. Adds the spurious *Tractatus de perfectione statum*.]

   [Commonly termed the Vatican edition, this is the planned critical edition of the whole of Scotus’s theological and philosophical writings which was originally expected to run to some 50 volumes. The task of editing Scotus’s philosophical works, however, was transferred from Grottaferrata (Rome) to the United States (See below). Published in the Vatican edition to date:

   Vols. 1-8: *Ordinatio* I-II
   Vols. 16-21: *Lectura* I-III

   [Edition of Scotus’s philosophical works. The task of editing the philosophical works was taken over by an American editing team after very slow pace of the Vatican edition. In addition to the works listed below. Giorgio Pini, has discovered two further commentaries that seem to be by Scotus but are not included in these volumes: an exposition on the *Metaphysics* called the *Notabilia* and a commentary on the *Topics*. If these attributions hold up, it would make Scotus one of the major Aristotle commentators in the later middle ages.]

   Vols. 1-2: Commentaries on Aristotle’s *Organon*. Vol. 2 also contains a treatise called the *Theoremata*, whose authenticity has historically been disputed.
   Vols. 3-4: Commentary on the *Metaphysics*
   Vol. 5: Commentary on *De anima* (at press)
EDITIONS OF INDIVIDUAL WORKS
(See also translations by Wolter, many of which contain corrected Latin texts.)

De primo principio
5. *Ioannis Duns Scoti Tractatus de Primo Principio*. Ed. Marianus Muller. Friburgi Brisgoviae-Herder, 1941. [Based on Madrid, Palacial Nacional MS 411 which contains some seven additions, perhaps authentic. Additions are recorded in an appendix.]


Quodlibetal Questions

Opera varia
11. Harris, C. R. S. *Duns Scotus*. 2 vols. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1927. [The appendix to vol. 2 contains the following material not included in the Wadding-Vivès edition: *Collationes* qq. 5 (pp. 361-78) and *Q. de cogntione Dei* (pp. 379-98). The book itself relies heavily on the spurious *De rerum principio* of Vital du Four, not to be confused with the authentic *De primo principio*.]

12. Balic, C. *Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les Quarte Livres de Sentences*. Louvain-Bureaux de la Revue, 1927. [pp. 264-301 contain an unedited question on the will from Bk.2 dist. 25 of Scotus’s commentary on the Sentences. According to Balic, this version of the question is a *reportatio* made by William of Alnwick at Paris (para. 1-35; 59-91) and later at Oxford (para. 36-58).]

13. "De *Collationibus* Ioannis Duns Scoti" *Bogoslovni vestnik* 9 (1929) 185-219. [Contains a critical study of the *Collationes* attributed to Scotus and an edition of qq. 18, 19, and 24.]

14. "*Ioannis Duns Scoti Theologiae Mariana Elementa*. Sibenik, Jugoslavia: Ex typographia Kacic, 1933. [Contains questions from *Ordinatio* and *reportata* on predestination of Christ and the Immaculate Conception.]


TRANSLATIONS

Complete Works

extensive commentary. The 1966 edition also contains a translation of Lectura or early version of Scotus’s proofs for the existence of God. Dropped from the 1983 edition, it was printed in Wippel-Wolter, Medieval Philosophy (see translations below).


Selections and Anthologies


27. Tweedale, Martin and Richard Bosley. *Basic Issues in Medieval Philosophy*. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 1997. [Contains translations of several texts of Scotus not found elsewhere, including all of Scotus’s important question on foreknowledge from the *Ordinatio*. Cf. Vos above for corresponding Lectura text.]


32. Wolter, Allan. “Duns Scotus on the Necessity of Revealed Knowledge.” *Franciscan Studies* 11 (1951) 231-71. [Translation of the prologue to the *Ordinatio*.]


37. ---------. *John Duns Scotus: Questions on the Metaphysics, Book IX: Act and Potency*. St. Bonaventure, NY : Franciscan Institute, 2000. [A translation and introduction to of all of Bk. IX of Scotus’s *Questions on the Metaphysics*, which are important for the problems of self-motion (q. 14) and free will (q. 15).]


**INDICES**

40. de Varesio, Carolus Franciscus. *Promptuarium Scoticum*. 2 vols. Venetiis: Typis et expensis Andreea Poleti, 1690. [Index of the *Ordinatio* and *Quodlibetal Questions* only, but pretty good for technical expressions. References are keyed to paragraph numbers of the Wadding edition.]

41. Fernandez-Garcia, Marianus. *Lexicon-scholasticum philosophico-theologicum*. Ad Claras Aquas: Ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1910. [Despite its title, an index and dictionary of Scotus. It is not as extensive as the above for the *Ordinatio* and *Quodlibet*, but contains references to other works of Scotus, most notably the *QQ in Metaphysicam* and the logical writings. Must be used with caution since it often refers to inauthentic works, including *De rerum principio* (Vital du Four), *Expositio in Metaphysicam Aristotelis*]

**BIBLIOGRAPHIES**


45. *Medioevo latino*. Spolento. 1980-. Very complete annotated annual bibliography on all major medieval figures.

**COLLECTIONS OF ARTICLES**


Papers delivered at meetings of the International Scotistic Congress (*Congressus Scotisticus Internationalis*) have been published in a series called *Studia Scholastica-Scotistica*.


MAJOR STUDIES

58. Gilson, Étienne. Jean Duns Scot. Introduction à ses positions fondamentales. Paris: Vrin, 1952. [Still the most comprehensive book on Scotus’s philosophy, which was written by Gilson as comparison with Aquinas’s thought. Gilson finished it just prior to the publication of the first volumes of the critical edition of Scotus’s Ordinatio, which showed that Henry of Ghent was more important than Aquinas for an understanding of Scotus. This led Gilson to all but repudiate his own book in its preface. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 respectively were reprinted from the following articles: “L’object de la métaphysique selon Duns Scot,” Mediaeval Studies 10 (1948) 21-92; “L’existence de Dieu selon Duns Scot,” Mediaeval Studies 11 (1949) 23-61; “Nature and portée des preuves scotistes de l’existence de Dieu,” in Mélanges Joseph Maréchal, 2 vols. (Paris, 1950) 1.378-95; “Simplicité divine et attributs divins selon Duns Scot,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 17 (1949) 9-43. For a list of reviews, see Margaret McGrath, Étienne Gilson: A Bibliography (Toronto, 1982), p. 14]


65. Wolter, Allan. The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus. The St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1946. [Despite its age, a study still regarded as one of the best on Scotus’s metaphysics.]


BIBLIOGRAPHY: HENRY OF GHENT

EDITIONS


3. *Henrici de Gandavo Opera omnia*. Gen. Raymond Macken. Leuven: University Press, 1979-. [The planned critical edition of the works of Henry of Ghent coordinated by Raymond Macken. It is expected to run to some 40 volumes including several volumes on the manuscripts of Henry’s works, his life, and doctrine. The critical editions are based upon research published in two volumes by Macken which catalogue and describe all known extant manuscripts and editions of Henry’s works. They appeared as the first two volumes of the critical opera: *Biblioteca manuscripta Henrici de Gandavo*, 2 vols. (Leuven: University Press, 1979). The critical editions are especially valuable for what appear to be Henry’s own corrections and modifications. To date the following works have appeared:


   Macken has also edited a set of scriptural lectures attributed to Henry: *Lectura ordinaria super S. Scripturam* (Leuven, 1980).]

TRANSLATIONS


MAJOR STUDIES

A very thorough bibliography of Henry arranged chronologically can be found in:


COLLECTIONS OF ARTICLES


I. UNIVOCITY OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL CONCEPTS

Background in Aristotle, Commentators, and Thirteenth Century

Primary:
Aristotle, Categories 1-5 [Definition of univocal]; Metaphysics 4.1-2 [Object and unity of metaphysics. Being is analogous.]


Secondary:


Henry of Ghent’s Concept of Analogy

Primary:
Henry of Ghent, SQO a. 21 q. 2; a. 24 q. 6; a. 24 q. 9 and related texts. [Texts and translations provided but see also Teske [8] above.]


Secondary:


Duns Scotus on Univocity

Primary:
I Ordinatio d. 3 p. 1 q. 1 translated in Wolter, DS, 17-36.

Secondary:

I. UNIVOCITY

BACKGROUND TEXTS ON UNIVOCITY AND ANALOGY

Aristotle, *Categories* 1a6-1a15

Things are said to be named ‘equivocally’ when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name ‘animal’; yet these are equivalently so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only.

On the other hand, things are said to be named ‘univocally’ which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both ‘animal’, and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other.

Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa; si enim quis assignet quid est utrique eorum quo sint animalia, propriam assignabit utriusque rationem. Univoca vero dicuntur quorum et nomen commune est et secundum nomen eadem substantiae ratio, ut animal homo atque bos. Communi enim nomine utriusque animalia nuncupantur, et est ratio substantiae eadem; si quis enim assignet utriusque rationem, quid utrique sit quo sint animalia, eandem assignabit rationem.


1 · There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others deals generally with being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attributes of this part--this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do. Now since we are seeking the first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be some thing to which these belong in virtue of its own nature. If then our predecessors who sought the elements of existing things were seeking these same principles, it is necessary that the elements must be elements of being not by accident but just because it is being. Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp the first causes.

2 · There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but they are related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and are not homonymous. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing in the sense that it possesses it, another in the sense that it is naturally adapted to it, another in the sense that it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of some of these things or of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is non-being. As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the
I. UNIVOCITY

investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study all things that are, qua being.--

Est autem scientia quaedam quae speculatur ens inquantum ens et quae huius insunt secundum se.

Haec autem nulli est in parte dictarum eadem. Aliarum enim nulla intendit universaliter de ente in quantum est ens, verum partem eius abscindentes aliquam, circa quidem hanc speculuntur ipsum accidens: veluti scientiarum mathematicae.

Quontiam autem principia et extremas quaerimus causas, palam, quia cuiusdam eas naturae secundum se esse necesse est. Si ergo et entium elementa quaerentes, ea quaeque sint principia, necesse et entis elementa esse non secundum accidens, sed inquantum sunt entia. Unde et nobis entis inquantum est ens, primae causae sunt accipiendae.

En
dae

aequivoce. Sed quemadmodum salubre omne ad sanitatem, hoc quidem ad conservationem, id vero in actione, aliud quia et signum (ut urina) sanitatis, hoc autem quia illius est susceptibile. Et medicinale a medicina. Hoc enim habendo medicinas dicitur medicinale, illud vero susceptibile ad eam, aliud vero per actus existentium medicinae. Similiter autem alia sumemus his dicta. Ita vero et ens multipliciter dicitur quidem, sed omne ad primum principium. Haec enim quia substantiae entia dicuntur, illa vero quia passions substantiae dicuntur, alia quia via ad substantiam aut corruptiones, aut qualificationes, aut effective, aut generativa substantiae, aut ad substantiam dictorum, aut quorumdam horum negationes, aut substantiae. Quare et non ens esse non ens dicimus.

Quemadmodum ergo salubrium omnium una est scientia, ita hoc etiam et in aliis. Non enim solum circa unum dictorum unius est scientiae speculari, sed ad unam dictorum naturam. Etenim ea modo quodam circa unum dicuntur.

Aristotle, Physics 7.4 249a26-249b18

So we have now to consider how motion is differentiated: and this discussion serves to show that the genus is not a unity but contains a plurality latent in it and distinct from it, and that in the case of equivocal terms sometimes the different senses in which they are used are far removed from one another, while sometimes there is a certain likeness between them, and sometimes again they are nearly related either generically or analogically, with the result that they seem not to be equivocal though they really are.

Et significat ratio haec quod genus non unum aliquid est. Sed iuxta hoc latent multa; suntque aequivocationum aliae quidem multum distantes, aliae vero habentes quandam similitudinem, aliae vero proximae aut genere aut similitudine. Unde non videntur aequivocationes esse, cum sint.

Boethius, Commentary on the Categories PL 64.166B-C

I. UNIVOCITY

Avicenna, *Metaphysics I.1*

Thus, it has been shown to you from these considerations that being insofar as it is being (*ens inquantum ens*) is common to all these things and that it must be posited as the subject of this discipline. ... Therefore, the first subject of this science is being insofar as it is being, and those things which this science investigates are the attributes of being insofar as it is being without qualification.

Igitur ostensum est tibi ex his omnibus quod ens inquantum est ens est commune omnibus his et quodispusm debet poni subiectum huius magistrii. ... Ideo primum subiectum huius scientiae est ens, inquantum est ens; et ea quae inquirit sunt consequentia ens, inquantum est ens, sine condicione.

Avicenna, *Metaphysics I.5*

We say: the ideas of “the existent,” “the thing,” and “the necessary” are impressed in the soul in a primary way, this impression not requiring better known things to bring it about.

Dicemus igitur quod res et ens et necesse talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se.

Al-Ghazali, *Logic*


Aquinas, *ST I.13.5*

Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?

It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. ...

On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.

Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.

I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is
applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for
instance, by the term “wise” applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man’s
essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we
apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or
existence. Thus also this term “wise” applied to man in some degree circumscribes and
comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it
leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name.
Hence it is evident that this term “wise” is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The
same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.

Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as
some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or
demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of
equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and
also against what the Apostle says: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen being
understood by the things that are made” (Rm. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names
are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.

Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one,
thus for example “healthy” predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to
health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one
thing is proportionate to another, thus “healthy” is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is
the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures
analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God
only from creatures (A[1]). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the
relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist
excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and
simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it
is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies
various proportions to some one thing; thus “healthy” applied to urine signifies the sign of animal
health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health. ...

The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated
univocally of God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.
dictum est, omnes rerum perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, in Deo praexsistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis, puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis significacionem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur.

Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; sed semper incideret fallacia aequivoctionis. Et hoc est tam contra philosophos, qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, “invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur”. Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturarum ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praexsistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivoctionem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dicitur, significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dicitur, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis. ...

Aquinas,
*Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics* Bk 7 Lec 8

The reason for this is that species is taken from the ultimate form, which in the nature of things is simply one. Genus, however, is not taken from a form which is one in the nature of things, but only from reason [ratio]. For man is not an animal through a form other than that by which man is man. Therefore all men, who are of one species, agree in the form which constitutes the species, because each of them has a rational soul. But there is not in man, or a horse, or an ass some common soul which constitutes animal beyond that soul which constitutes man, or horse, or ass (for if there were, then genus would be one and comparable, as is species). Rather the form of a genus is received only in the understanding by the abstraction of the intellect from differences.

Therefore, a species is a unity which derives from one form existing in the nature of things. But a genus is not a unity because the diverse species of a genus receive predication according to the diverse forms existing in the nature of things. Thus a genus is one logically, but not physically.

Therefore, a genus is in some way one, but not simply. Rather genera hide many joined things, that is, because of the similarity and nearness to unity of a genus, the equivocation of many things is latent in it.
There are some equivocal terms so disparate that only the name is common. For example, a dog is said to be a celestial constellation and a barking animal.

There are others which have some similarity. For example, the name ‘man’ is said of a real man and a picture of a man insofar as the latter has some similarity to a real man.

Other equivocal terms are very close because of a conformity in genus (for example, when ‘body’ is said of a celestial body and a corruptible body, the term is used equivocally, speaking naturally, because their matter is not one. Nevertheless, they agree in logical genus, and because of this agreement in genus they seem to be not completely equivocal.) Or else they are very close in respect to some similarity, for example, he who teaches school is called a master, and likewise he who heads a house is called the master of the house, but equivocally. But this is a very close equivocation because of the similarity. For each is a director, one of learning, the other of a house. Because of this closeness either of genus or of similarity, they do not seem to be equivocal, but they are.

In Physic., lib. 7 l. 8 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit: et significat ratio haec etc., elicit ex praemissis quoddam consideratione dignum, scilicet quod genus non est aliquid unum simpliciter, species autem est aliquid unum simpliciter. Et hoc significatur ex ratione praecedenti, qua ostensum est quod ea quae sunt unius generis, non sunt comparabilia; quae vero sunt unius speciei, comparabilia sunt; cum tamen supra dictum sit, quod eadem natura comparabilia est: ex quo videtur quod genus non sit una natura, sed species sit una natura. Et huius ratio est, quia species sumitur a forma ultima, quae simpliciter una est in rerum natura: genus autem non sumitur a forma aliqua quae sit una in rerum natura, sed secundum rationem tantum; non est enim aliqua forma ex qua homo sit animal, praeter illam ex qua homo est homo. Omnes igitur homines, qui sunt unius speciei, conveniunt in forma quae constituit speciem, quia quilibet habet animam rationalem: sed non est in homine, equo aut aino aliqua anima communis, quae constituit animal, praeter illam animam quae constituit hominem vel equum aut asinum (quod si esset, tunc genus esset unum et comparabile, sicut et species); sed in sola consideratione accipitur forma generis, per abstractionem intellectus a differentiis. Sic igitur species est unum quid in rerum natura existente: genus autem non est unum; quia secundum diversas formas in rerum natura existentes, diversas species generis praedicationem suscipiunt. Et sic genus est unum logice, sed non physice. Quia ergo genus quodammodo est unum, et non simpliciter, iuxta genera latent multa: idest, per similitudinem et propinquitatem ad unitatem generis, multorum aequivocatio latet. Sunt autem quaedam aequivocationum multum distantes, in quibus sola communitas nomen attenditur; sicut si canis dicatur caeleste sidus, et animal latrabile. Quaedam vero sunt quae habent quaedam similitudinem; sicut si hoc nomen homo dicatur de vero homine et de homine picto, inquantum habet similitudinem quamandam veri hominis. Quaedam vero aequivocationes sunt proximae: aut propter convenientiam in genere (sicut si corpus dicatur de corpore caelesti et de corpore corruptibili, aequivoce dicitur, naturaliter loquendo, quia eorum non est materia una. Conveniunt tamen in genere logico: et propter hanc generis convenientiam videtur nonino non aequivoce esse): aut etiam sunt propinquae secundum aliquid similitudinem: sicut ille qui docet in scholis dicitur magister, et similiter ille qui praest domui dicitur magister domus, aequivoce, et tamen propinquae aequivoctione propter similitudinem; uterque enim est rector, hic quidem scholarum, ille vero domus. Unde propter hanc propinquitatem vel generis vel simillitudinis, non videntur esse aequivoctiones, cum tamen sint.
HENRY OF GHENT ON UNIVOCITY AND ANALOGY

HENRICI DE GANDAVO

SUMMAE QUAESTIONUM ORDINARIARUM A. 21 Q. 2:

UTRUM DEUS IN ESSE COMMUNICET CUM CREATURIS, ID EST,
UTRUM ESSE SIT ALIQUID COMMUNE DEO ET CREATURAE

<Quod sic>

Circa secundum quod Deus in esse communicet cum creaturis, id est, quod esse sit aliquid commune Deo et creaturis arguitur primo sic:

Illud quo aliqua differunt ab alio et non inter se commune et idem est illis, quia si non esset eis commune, illo different inter se non communiter a terto. Sed Deus et creatura entitate sua simpliciter different committere secundum rationem intelligendi ab eo quod non est, quod dicit puram privationem esse. Ergo etc.

Secundo sic: cum idem et diversum dividunt totum ens, si Deus et creatura non essent idem neque communicarent in ente, different in ente, et diversa essent ab invicem in eo quod entia sunt. Quare cum idem et diversum secundum Philosophum reducuntur ad unum et multum, Deus igitur et creatura essent multa in ente. Quare cum omnem multitudinem oportet reduci ad unitatem, super ens in quo different Deus et creatura, et in quo sunt multa, esset aliquid in quo convenirent et essent unum. Hoc autem est impossibile, quia ratio illius esset prior ratione entis, quae prima est secundum Avicennam. Ergo etc.

Tertio sic: Dictum de pluribus quod habet per se intellectum praeter intellectus illorum est aliquid reale commune ad illos, quia omnis conceptus fundatur in re aliqua. Ens est huiusmodi, quia secundum Avicennam ens imprimitur impressione prima, etiam antequam in ipsa imprimitur intellectus aut creaturae aut Dei. Ergo etc.

<Sed contra>

In contrarium arguitur primo sic:

Quoniam quaecumque sunt diversa inter se et in aliquo communi conveniunt necessario secundum esse differunt in illo communii, ut homo et asinus sub animali. Si ergo esset esse aliquid commune Deo et creaturae, sub illo communii esse different. Erit ergo duplex esse Deo: unum in quo cum creatura convenit sive communicat; aliud in quo a creatura differt. Hoc autem est impossible, quia tunc non esset in Deo esse omnino simplex nec esset esse purum, cuius contrarium infra patebit. Ergo etc.

Secundo sic: Accidens, quia distat a natura substantiae cui convenit esse simpliciter, non dicitur simpliciter ens. Quia autem aliquo modo appropriquat ipsi ut dispositio ipsius, aliquo modo nomen entis communicat cum substantia, ut dicatur ens quia est dispositio entis quod est substantia, ut dicit Philosophus in VII Metaphysicae, ita quod si non appropriquaret hoc modo accidens substantiae, non communichet cum eo in esse ut dicetur ens, quia est entis quod est substantia. Sed esse creaturae non appropriquat in aliquo naturae creatoris, quia inter eos est infinita distantia. Creatura ergo in nullo communicat esse cum creatore per aliquam attributionem ad ipsum.

<Responsio auctoris>

Dicendum ad hoc, cum ens ut infra dictur non significat aliquam unam intentionem communem substantiae et accidenti, sed significat significacione prima unumquodque decem praedicamentorum, nulla communitate reali ipsum ens potest esse commune substantiae et
accidenti. Quare cum multo minus in aliquo uno reali conveniunt creator et creatura quam duae
creatura, substantia scilicet et accidens, immo multo plus distat ratio essendi creatoris a ratione
essendi creaturarum quam differat ratio essendi unius creaturarum a ratione essendi alterius, nullo
modo ens potest esse aliquo commune reale Deo et creaturarum. Et ideo absolute dicendum quod
esse non est aliquo commune reale in quo Deus communicit cum creaturis, et ita si ens aut esse
praedicatur de Deo et creaturis, hoc est sola nominis communitate, nulla rei. Et ita non univoce
per definitionem univocorum, nec tamen pure aequivoce, secundum definitionem aequivocorum
casu, sed medio modo ut analogice.

Ad cuius intellectum notandum quod convenientia rei ad rem maxime in forma attenditur, et
hoc dupliciter secundum quod duplex est modus communicandi aliquo in forma: una secundum
eandem rationem quae dicitur convenientia similitudinis, et est eorum qua una forma participant
secundum rem, ut albedine duo alba, et humanitate duo homines, quae facit convenientia
univocationis, qualis ut dictum est, non est Dei et creaturarum in esse. Alia vero est convenientia in
forma secundum aliam et aliam rationem, quae dicitur convenientia imitationis et est universaliter
in efficientibus et factis, causis et causatis. Cum enim omne agens etiam quantumcumque
contrarium secundum Philosophum agit in finem inquantum simile. Agens autem inquantum
simile non producit nisi simile. Agit etiam omne agens per suam formam et producit causatum in
aliqo esse formali. Necesse est ergo in omnibus talibus ut semper in causato et effectu sit
similidudo formae agentis, et si non secundum eandem rationem speciei sit similitudo inter ipso,
sicut est hominis generantis ad generatum, erit tamen secundum quandam imitationem, sicut
aliquod generatum a sole. Etsi non accedat ad similitudinem speciei cum sole, ut recipiat formam
solis, accedat tamen ad aliquam imitacionem speciei cum sole, ut recipiat formam aliquo modo
proportionabilem et correspondentem formae solis. Et universaliter quanto agens est propinquius
et immediatus producto, tanto maior est convenientia imitationis producebatur et producebatur, et
tanto minor quanto agens est mediatius et remotius. Et ideo cum Deus sit causa effectiva omnium
creaturarum, licet quorumdam mediocrum etiam causarum alii causis, quorum quo ad hoc est primum
principium remotissimum, necessario omnis creatura cum Deo secundum formam aliquam habet
convenientiam, saltem secundum imitationem formae ad formam. Quare cum forma divina sit
ipsum esse, ut infra videbitur, a quo omnis creatura mutuat nomen essendi inquantum est causa
eius, ut infra dicetur, necesse est dicere quod saltem in esse convenientia imitationis communicat
creatura cum creatore. Et ita quamvis in nulla convenientia realis similitudinis in aliqua forma
significata nomine entis communicat, conveniunt tamen in ente convenientia imitationis formae
ad formam, quarum unam significat ens inquantum convenit Deo, alia vero inquantum convenit
creaturae. Non ergo esse convenit Deo et creaturis univoce, quia non secundum eandem formam
ad quam nomen entis ad significandum imponitur. Nec tamen pure aequivoce, cum non aequum
primo et principaliter significet formam divinam, sicut aequi voca casu aequo primo et
principaliter significet ambo significata sua, ut hoc nomen Ajax Telamonium et Oilei filium, sed
medio modo, scilicet analogice, quia significat unum suorum significationis primo et
principaliter, alterum vero in ordine et respectu sive proportione ad illud, ut primo et principaliter
formam qua habet esse Dei; in ordine autem ad illam, formam qua habet esse creatura, sicut
contingit in substantia et accidente, in quibus ens primo et principaliter significat substantiam,
accidens vero quia ordinem habet et respectum ad substantiam. Et secundum hoc substantia
dicitur ens primo et accidens dicitur ens sub ordine ad substantiam, ita quod ens primo significat
substantiam et ex ordine quem habet accidens ad substantiam mutuat nomen entis a substantia,
secundum quod dicitur VII Metaphysicae, “Ens dicitur multis modis et primum istorum est quod
significat substantiam et alia dicuntur entia quia sunt entis quod est huismodi.” Et IV eiusdem,
“Ens dicitur multiplicher non aequivoce, sed omnes modi attribuuntur uni rei et uni naturae.”

Et secundum hunc modum ens communissime ditum primo significat Deum, secundario
creaturam, sicut ens creatum primo significat substantia, secundario accidens, sed alio et alio
modo attributionis, quia alia entia attribuuntur substantiae ut uni subjecto, omnes vero creaturae
attribuuntur Deo ut uni fini, et uni formae, et uni efficienti: ut fini, a quo perficiuntur quo ad bene esse; ut formae, a qua participant quod dicantur habere esse essentiae; ut efficienti, a quo habent quod eis conveniunt simpliciter esse actualis existentiae.

Cum enim res ut dicitur a reor reris nomen est indifferens ad ens et non ens, ex hoc quod conceptum hoc nomine quod est res, habet rationem exemplaris in primo agente, ad quam nata est per eius effectivam potentiam produci in esse actuali, attribueri ei esse essentiae, a quo res ipsa concepta dicitur esse ens aut essentia aliqua. Quod enim in primo rationem exemplarem non habet purum non ens est. Haec enim res quae est ens sive natura et essentia aliqua ex eo quod ei attribueri esse propter rationem exemplarem quam habet in primo, adhuc est indifferentis ad ens et non ens in existentia actuali, cui ex hoc quod facta est a Deo et eius effectus, attribueri esse actualis existentiae a quo res ipsa dicitur esse existentia in actu. Quod enim non est effectus Dei vel immediate vel mediantibus alii causis, nullo modo exsit in actu, quia omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil, ut dicitur Ioannis primo. Utrumque ergo esse convenit creaturae non nisi per aliquam attributionem ad ens primum.

Refert adhuc et in alio, quia ordine rei et nostrae cognitionis substantia prior est accidente, quia est causa accidentium et cadit in eorum definitione, et ita utroque modo, et quantum est ex parte rei et quantum est ex parte nostrae cognitionis, ens primo significat substantialium et impositum est ad significandum eam, secundario vero accidens. In Deo vero et creatura, alius est ordo rei, alius vero nostrae cognitionis. Deus enim ordine rei et naturae prior est creatura, ordine vero cognitionis nostrae secundum statum vitae huius in naturali cognitione pura et distincta, e contrario prior est creatura Deo, quia ex creaturis devenimus in cognitionem Dei. Et ideo contingit quod ordine rerum esse prius dicitur de Deo quam de creaturis, quia tamen ordo impositonis nominis sequitur ordinem nostrae cognitionis, quia nemo nomen imponit qui rem non novit, ordine cognitionis et impositonis nominis esse primo dicitur de creaturis, secundario de Deo, quia sic est in hoc nomine ens sicut et in aliis nominibus quae Deo attribuimus acceptis a creaturis, ut infra videbitur. Et hoc contingit in pluribus, scilicet quod illud quod est prius et dignius simpliciter non est prius secundum fomositatem nominis.

<Ad principalia>

Ad primum in oppositum, quod Deus et creatura in esse differunt a non ente non inter se, ergo conveniunt in ipso, dicendum quod verum est convenientia imitationis formae creaturae ad speciem Dei hincinde significatarum nomine entis, non autem convenientia reali aliquius similitudinis, ut dictum est.

Ad secundum quod si Deus et creatura sunt diversa in ente, reducitur multitudo illorum ad unitatem, dicendum quod verum est convenientia imitationis formae creaturae ad speciem Dei hincinde significatarum nomine entis, non autem convenientia reali aliquius similitudinis, ut dictum est.

Ad tertium, quod ens simpliciter concepitur ante conceptum entis quod est Deus aut creatura, dicendum quod non est verum, numquam enim potest concipi aliquis intellectus entis simpliciter absque quod homo concepit aliquem intellectum Dei aut creaturarum, ut concipiat aliquem unicum intellectum simplicem communem ad Deum et creaturarum alium praeter intellectum Dei aut creaturarum, quia nullus potest esse talis. Sed si aliquid concipit homo, illud est aut quod pertinet ad esse Dei tantum aut quod pertinet ad esse creaturarum tantum, sed utrumque eorum indifferentes et aceque simul quantum est ex parte vocis natum praesentari in significato eiusmod quod est esse. Et ideo ubicumque ponitur in enunciatione sive exterius expressa sive in mente concepta, semper facit enunciationem esse multiplicem et distinguendam, secundum quod istam enunciationem qua dicitur ens est distinguat Philosophus I Physicorum contra Parmenidem et Melissum, quod aut
I. UNIVOCITY

significat ens quod est substantia aut ens accidens. Omnis ergo conceptus realis quo alicuius rei concipitur concipiendae esse simpliciter, aut est conceptus rei quae Deus est, aut quae creatura est, non alicuius communis ad utramque.

Videtur tamen hoc non potentibus distinguere multiplicitatem entis et esse creatoriae, sicut nec potuit Plato ponens ens esse genus, tanquam sit nominis entis unum alicuius commune conceptum, quod non videtur subtilioribus potentibus distinguere ens et eius significata discernere, qualis erat Aristoteles. Quod nomine entis videatur concipi alicuius commune est quia sive concipiatur alicuius quod est res divina sive quod est creatura, tamen cum concipiatur esse absque eo quod determinate et distincte concipitur esse Dei vel creaturae, illud non concipitur nisi indeterminate, scilicet non determinando intellectum ad esse Dei vel esse creaturae. Et habendo respectum ad distinctum intellectum Dei aut creaturae intellexit Avicenna, si bene intellexit, quod intellectus entis prior est intellectu Dei aut creaturae.

Intelligentem tamen quod illa indeterminatio alia est respectu esse Dei et alia respectu esse creaturae, quia duplex est indeterminatio: una negative altera vero privativa dicta. Est enim negativa indeterminatio quando indeterminatum non est naturum determinari, ad modum Deus dicitur esse infinitus, quia non est natura finiri. Est autem privativa indeterminatio quando indeterminatum naturum est determinari, ad modum quod punctus dicitur infinitus cum non est determinatus lineis quibus natura est determinari. Secundum istam autem duplicem indeterminationem oportet intelligere quod concipiendae esse simpliciter et indeterminate quod est Dei, tunc est indeterminatione negativa, quia esse Dei nullus est naturum determinari, ut si postquam intelligeris in creaturis hoc esse et illud esse, si intelligeris esse simpliciter per abnegationem quod sit neque huius vel alicuius alterius determinati, intelligis esse Dei, secundum quod dicit Augustinus VIII De Trinitate, "Intelligis bonum hoc bonum illud, intellige bonum simpliciter et Deum intellegeris." Similiter si intelligeris hoc esse et illud esse, si intelligeris ens simpliciter, Deum intelligis, et hoc concipiendae esse simpliciter et indeterminatione negationis, ut dicitur est. Conципiendo autem ipsum esse indeterminate indeterminatione privationis illorum quibus natura est determinari, concipitur esse quod creaturae est, quia esse creaturae per proprias naturas quibus invicem differunt, naturum est determinari. Quod enim dicitur esse simpliciter ex eo quod habet rationem exemplaris in primo, ut iam dicitur, duplici natura habet determinari quia non dicitur esse simpliciter sed esse alicuius, cuiusmodi est natura substantiae et accidentis. Nomen enim substantiae dicit alicuius quod est ens non existens in alio ut in subjecto. Nomen vero accidentis dicit ens quod est existens in alio ut in subjecto. Et secundum hoc substantia et accidentes constituunt diversa genera prae dicamentorum, ut infra videbitur, ut alio et alio conveniat omni creaturae ex eo quod est res prae dicamenti: quod habet esse, et quod habet esse alicuius. Esse enim convenit ei ex participacione per attributionem ad ens primum inquantum est ens, ut dicitur est. Esse vero alicuius convenit ei ex determinatione propriae naturae, secundum quod dicit Boethius De Hebdomadibus, "omne quod est participat eo quod est esse ut sit; alio vero participat ut alicuius sit." Unde Commentator [viz. Gilbert of Poitiers] exponens illud Boethii De Trinitate, "Deus est forma quae est ipsum esse et ex qua esse est," dicit, "Id est, est forma quae non ab alio mutuat hanc dictionem 'est' et quae caeteris omnibus quadam extrinsecus participatione communicat." "Cum enim," dicit in princiis expositionis Hebdomadibus, "dicimus 'homo est', vel 'corpus est', vel huiusmodi, theologae hoc dicit esse dictum intelligunt quadam extrinsecus denominatione ab esse sui principii. Non enim dicitur corporeitate corpus esse, sed esse alicuius, nec humanitate hominem esse, sed esse alicuius." Et ad eundem modum quicquid operante summo principio est, eadem principali et increata essentia dicitur esse; suo vero quolibet genere esse alicuius, quod tamen, ut infra videbitur, non dicitur nisi aliqua participatione divini esse, inquantum omnium entium perfectiones in se continet.

Per hunc ergo modum esse indeterminationum per abnegationem convenit Deo et per privationem creaturae. Et quia indeterminatione per abnegationem et per privationem proprinqua sunt, quia
ambae tollunt determinationem, una tantum secundum actum, alia secundum actum simul et potentiam, ideo non potentes distinguere inter huiusmodi diversa per eodem concipiunt esse simpliciter et esse indeterminatum, sive uno modo sive altero, sive sit Dei sive creaturarum. Natura enim est intellectus non potentis distinguere ea quae propinqua sunt, concipere ipsa ut unum, quae tamen in rei veritate non faciunt unum conceptum. Et ideo est error in illius conceptu. Verus enim conceptus primo conci piendo esse simpliciter indeterminatum quod ratione suae indeterminacionis nihil ponit omnio neque determinat, ut ex hoc nihil sit re commune Deo et creaturae positivum, sed negativum sol um, et si aliquid sit positivum substratum negationi, illud est alterius et alterius rationis, sicut quod est per essentiam et quod est per participationem, quae consequenter rectus intellectus bene distinguuit concipiendo esse indeterminatum vel negative vel privative.

Et secundum hoc bene processit primum argumentum in oppositum.

Ad secundum vero quod videtur ostendere quod Deus et creatura nullo modo in esse communicant neque participatione neque imitatione, quia in infinitum distat creatura a creatore, dicendum ad hoc quod licet creatura non appropinquat creatori, ut sit aliquid naturae eius vel dispositio eius, sicut accidens appropinquat substantiae ut procedit obiectio, appropinquat tamen ei inquantum est aliquid eius ut exemplatum vel effectus habens aliquam eius imitationem, propter quam in esse communicat cum ipso, sicut accidens cum subjecto, non quod aliquid commune ambobus ab ipsis abstractum per intellectum significetur ncmiae entis, ut intelligendo hoc ens quod est Deus, et hoc ens quod est creatura, dimittam hoc et hoc, et intelligam ens commune ipsis, sicut cum intelli gillo hunc hominem Sortem et hunc Platonem, dimitto hunc et hunc, et intelli gillo hominem simpliciter. Hoc enim potest fieri hic non ibi, quia hic est secundum speciem una forma naturalis humanitatis existens in ambo bus partita et determinata per materias. Propter quod dimittendo materias et determinationes formae per ipsas, potest intelligi ipsa forma simpliciter ut est universalis facta per intellectum et essentialis similitudo suppositorum Sortis et Platonis. Non autem potest hoc fieri ibi, quia non est ibi una forma naturalis existens in creatura et creatore in ambus partita et determinata. Et ideo dimitto hoc et hoc, nunquam intelligo unum aliquid commune eis factum per intellectum quod est eorum similitudo, sed intelligo quodam determinatum ad unum et ad alterum, non unica indeterminatione, sed dupli cii, ut dictum est. Sed quia natura qua habet esse creatura, imitatio est naturae qua habet esse Deus, non dico similitudo sicut humanitas in Sorte est proprie similitudo humanitatis in Platone vel simile ei, ideo esse creaturarum etiam imitatio et conformitas quae est ad esse creatoris, et ista eorum conformitas est illa eorum communitas quam habent in esse creator et creatura, non communitas realis in aliqua re una quae significetur nomine entis. Unde et si talis imitatio non esset esse creaturarum ad esse creatoris, nulla diceretur esse inter eos communitas in ente nisi vocis solum, et esset ens pure aequivocum ad creatorem et creaturam, cum modo sit analogum, ut dictum est. Secundum etiam quod et accidens quia participat esse per substantiam, quia est dispositio eius, ideo est aliqua communicatio analogiae eorum in ente, quae quidem non esset si accidens non haberet esse per substantiam, sed per esse non existendo in substantia. Tunc enim pure aequivoce diceretur ens de substantialia et accidente, sicut dicitur de qualitate et quantitate, nisi forte qualitas habeat esse in subjecto mediante quantitate. Et secundum hoc ens per prius dicitur de uno quam de altero, et de uno per alterum, et ita quodam modo analogice.
Concerning the second [matter to be investigated in this question,] it is argued first that God communicates in being with creatures, that is, that being is something common to God and creatures:

That by which two things differ from third and not among themselves is common and identical to those two things, because if it were not common to them, they would differ by that among themselves and not commonly from some third thing. But God and creature by their entity absolutely differ commonly according to their intelligibility (secundum rationem intelligendi) from what is not, which is pure privation of being. Therefore, [being is something common to God and creature.]

A second argument: Since identity and diversity divide the whole of being, if God and creature were not identical in being nor were to communicate in being, they would differ in being and be diverse from one another in so far as they are beings. Whence since according to Aristotle identity and diversity are reduced to one and many, God and creature would be many in being. Thus, since every multitude must be reduced to a unity, beyond the being in which God and creature differ and are many there would be something in which they would agree and be one. This, however, is impossible because the intelligible nature (ratio) of that [in which God and creature would be one] would be prior to the intelligible nature of being. As Avicenna points out, however, being is the first [intelligible].

Thirdly, whatever is said of several things and has an essential concept (intellecutum) different from the concepts of those things of which it is said is some real thing common to those things, for every concept is based in some real thing. Being is this sort of [common thing] because according to Avicenna, “Being is impressed [upon the intellect] by a first impression,” even before the concept of God or creature.

<Arguments to the contrary>

It is argued to the contrary first as follows, for whatever are diverse among themselves and yet agree in something common, necessarily differ according to being in that common thing, as for example, man and donkey [differ in being] under animal. If therefore being were something common to God and creature they would differ in being under it. Thus, there would be a twofold being in God: one in which He agrees or communicates with a creature and another in which He differs from a creature. This, however, is impossible because then being would not be wholly simple or pure in God, the contrary of which is demonstrated below.

Secondly, an accident, because it is distant from the nature of a substance to which to be belongs absolutely, is not absolutely called a being. Because, however, an accident approaches a substance as its modification (dispositio), the term being [as applied to accidents] communicates with substance to the extent that [an accident] is called a being because it is a modification of a being that is a substance, as Aristotle says in VIII Metaphysics, so that if an accident were not to approach a substance in this way, it would not communicate in being with it so that it could be called a being because it is a modification of a being that is a substance. But the being of a creature does not approach the nature of the creator in anything, because between creature and
creator there is an infinite distance. A creature then does not communicate in any being with the creator by means of any attribution to Him.

Reply of the Author

It should be replied to this that since being, as will be shown below, does not signify a single concept (intentio) common to substance and accident, but signifies in a primary way each one of the ten categories, being cannot be common to substance and accident by any real community. Whence, since creator and creature agree much less in any one real thing than any two creatures, namely, substance and accident - but rather the nature of being (ratio essendi) of the creator is much more distant from the nature of being of a creature than the nature of being of one creature differs from another - being can in no way be some real thing common to God and creature. And therefore it should be said without qualification that being is not some real common thing in which God communicates with creatures, and so if being or to be is predicated of God and creatures, this is by community of name alone and by no community of something real. And so by the definition of univocates being [is not predicated univocally of God and creatures], nor purely equivocally, according to the definition of equivocates in casu, but [it is predicated] in a middle way, namely, analogously.

In order to understand this, it should be noted that the agreement of one thing with another is especially found in the form, and this is twofold insofar as there is a twofold mode of communicating in some form: one according to the same nature (ratio) which is called an agreement of similitude. This is found in those things which participate in one form in reality (secundum rem), as when two white things participate in whiteness or two men in humanity. This constitutes an agreement of univocity, which, as has been said, is not found in God and creature with respect to being. The other is an agreement in form according to diverse natures (ratio), which is called an agreement of imitation. It is found universally in efficient agents and their effects and in causes and the things they cause. For according to Aristotle, every agent to the extent it is a contrary acts for an end to the extent it is similar. But an agent to the extent it is similar only produces something similar. What is more every agent acts through its form and produces an effect in some formal being. It is necessary therefore that in all such things there always be a similitude of the form of the agent in the thing caused or the effect, and if there is not a similitude between them according to the same specific nature (ratio speciei), as is the case when one man generates another, there nevertheless will be one according to some kind of imitation, as when something is generated by the sun. Although [something generated by the sun] does not approach a similitude of species with the sun such that it would receive the form of the sun, nevertheless it approaches a certain imitation of the species of the sun so that it receives a form in some way comparable and corresponding to the form of the sun. And generally the closer and more immediate and agent is to its effect, the greater the agreement of imitation of agent and effect, and the less the agreement the more mediate and remote the agent. Therefore since God is the efficient cause of all creatures, although He is the cause of some creatures by intermediate causes, of which He is the most remote first principle, every creature must have some agreement in form with God, at least according to an imitation of form to form. Thus since the divine form is being itself (ipsum esse), as will be seen below, from which every creature borrows the name of being, insofar as the [divine form] is its cause, as will be explained later, it is necessary to say that at least in being a creature communicates with the creator by an agreement of imitation. And so although [God and creature] communicate in no agreement of real similitude in any form signified by the term ‘being’, they nevertheless agree in being by an agreement of imitation of one form to another, one of which signifies being insofar as it belongs to God and the other insofar as it belongs to the creature. Therefore being does not belong to God and creatures univocally, because the term ‘being’ is not used to signify the same form. Nor, however, [does being belong to God and creatures] in a purely equivocal way, since it does not signify the form
of God and the form of creature in an equally primary and principal way, just as chance equivocates signify both their significates -in an equally primary and principal fashion. For example, the name Ajax [signifies both the son of Telamon and of Oileus. But rather [being belongs to God and creatures] in a middle way, namely, analogously because it signifies one of its significates primarily and principally, the other in an order, relation, or proportion to that primary significant. Primarily and principally [being] signifies the form by which God has being; in order to that form [it signifies] the form by which the creature has being. the case is similar in substance and accident in which being primarily and principally signifies substance, but signifies an accident because it has an order and relation to substance. And accordingly substance is called a being primarily and an accident is called a being under an order to substance, so that being primarily signifies substance and from the order which an accident has to substance it borrows the name of being from substance, according to what VII Metaphysics says: “Being is said in many ways and first among them is what signifies substance. All other things are called beings because they belong to a being that is a substance.” And IV of the same: “Being is said in many ways, not equivocally, but all modes are attributed to one thing and one nature.”

And in this way being taken most commonly primarily signifies God and secondarily creatures, just as created being primarily signifies substance and secondarily accidents. But the mode of attribution in each case is different, because other beings are attributed to substance as to a single subject, but all creatures are attributed to God as to one end, form, and agent: to one end by which creatures are perfected as to their well being (bene esse); to one form in which they participate in order to have essential being (esse essentiae); to one efficient cause by which they have the unqualified being of actual existence (esse existentiae).

For since the term ‘thing’ (res) as it is derived from the verb reor reris is indifferent to being and non-being, from the fact that something conceived by the term ‘thing’ (res) possesses an exemplar in the first agent, according to which it can be produced into actual existence by the efficient power of the first agent, essential being (esse essentiae) is attributed to it, from which essential being the conceived thing is said to be a being or a certain essence. For what does not possess and exemplar in the first agent is a pure non-being. Now thing in this sense, which is a being or nature or essence because a being is attributed to it on account of the exemplar it has in the first agent, is still indifferent to the being and non being of actual existence (esse existentiae). Actual existence, by which a thing is said to be something existing in act, is attributed to a thing as a result of being made by God and being His effect, for what is not an effect of God, whether immediately or by intermediate causes, in no way exists in act, because, “All things were made through Him and without Him nothing was made,” as is said in the beginning of John. Therefore being in both senses [namely esse essentiae and esse existentiae] belongs to a creature only by attribution to the first being.

To the Initial Arguments

To the third objection which argues that unqualified being is conceived before any concept of being which is that of God or creature, it is replied that this is not true, for never can any concept of absolute being be conceived without man conceiving some concept of either God or creature, as if man were to conceive some single simple concept common to God and creature different from the concept of either, because there is no such concept. But if man conceives something, it is either what pertains to the being of God alone or to the being of creatures alone, but either sense of being can be present together indifferently and equally in what is signified by being insofar as it taken simply as a term. And therefore wherever being is used in a statement, whether externally expressed or conceived in the mind, it always forms a statement that has many meanings which are to be distinguished. Accordingly, Aristotle in I Physics distinguishes against Parmenides and Melissus that this statement “Being is” either signifies the being which is a substance or the being which is an accident. Therefore every real concept by which something of reality is conceived
I. UNIVOCITY

when being taken absolutely is conceived either is a concept of a reality which is God or of a
creature, not of anything common to both.

It seems, however, to those who are unable to distinguish the multiplicity of being and the
being of the creator from that of creatures [that there is some common concept of being], as was
the case with Plato, who posited being as a genus as though there were some one common thing
conceived by the term being. This does not seem to be the case to those more subtle thinkers,
such as Aristotle, who were able to distinguish being and discern its signifcates. Something
common seems to be conceived by the term being because, whether the reality which is
conceived is divine or created, when being is conceived without distinctly and determinately
conceiving the being of God or creature, that being is only conceived indeterminately, that is,
without determining the concept to either the being of God or creature. And when Avicenna said
that the concept of being is prior to the concept of God and creature, he meant, if he understood
correctly, that it has a relation to a distinct concept of either God or creature.

Nevertheless, it should be understood that indetermination is different in the case of God and
creature, for there is a twofold indetermination: one negative the other privative. There is negative
indetermination when what is undetermined cannot be determined, in the way in which God is
said to be infinite because he cannot be limited. There is privative indetermination when what is
undetermined can be determined, in the way in which a point is said to be infinite since it is not
determined to the lines which by nature determine it. According to this twofold indetermination,
however, it is necessary to understand that when the being which is God is conceived absolutely
and indeterminately there is a negative indetermination, because the being of God is in no way
apt to be determined, so that if after you have understood in creatures this and that [determinate]
being, if you understand being absolutely through negation of this or some other determined
thing, you will understand the being of God. This is what Augustine means when he says in VIII
De Trinitate, “You understand this good and that good. Understand good absolutely and you will
understand God.” Similarly, if you understand this being and that being, if you understand being
absolutely, you will understand God, and this by conceiving being absolutely and undetermined
by the indetermination of negation, as was said.

However, by conceiving being indeterminately by an indetermination of privation of those
things to which it is by nature determined, the being of a creature is conceived, because the being
of a creature is by nature determined by those proper natures by which they differ from one
another. For what is called a being absolutely from the fact that is has an exemplar in the first
cause, as was already said, is determined by a twofold nature, by which nature it is not said to be
absolutely but to be something (esse aliquid), of which sort is the nature of substance and
accident. For the term substance indicates something which is a being not existing in another as in
a subject. The term accident, however, indicates a being which exists in another as in a subject.
And accordingly substance and accident constitute the diverse genera of the categories, as we
shall see, so that from the fact that a creature belongs to one of the categories [being] belongs to it
in two different ways: that it has being [absolutely] and that it has the [determinate] being of
something (esse aliquid). For being [absolutely] belongs to a creature from its participation by
attribution to the being insofar as it is being. To be something [determinate] belongs to it
from the determination of its proper nature, according to what Boethius says in his De
hebdomadibus, “Everything which is participates in being in order to be; it participates in
something else in order to be something."

Therefore in this way undetermined being belongs to God by negation and to creatures
through privation. And because indetermination through negation and privation are so close, for
they both remove determination, one in act alone, one in potency and act, those who are unable to
distinguish between diverse things of this sort conceive absolute and undetermined being,
whether that of God or creature, through the same concept. For it is the nature of an intellect
unable to distinguish those things which are similar to conceive them as one, which nevertheless do not in reality make one concept. Therefore, there is an error in his concept. For a true concept [is had] by first conceiving being as absolutely undetermined, which by reason of its indetermination posits nor determines at all anything. Consequently, there is nothing in reality common to God and creature, but negative alone, and if there is something positive underlying that negation, that is [really] two diverse natures, as for example what is through its essence and what is through participation, which two natures the right thinking intellect can distinguish well enough by conceiving being as undetermined negatively or privatively.
HENRY OF GHENT ON NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE NATURE

Reading:


HENRY OF GHENT

SQO 24.6 (I.14Z S-143 Z)

WHETHER THE *QUID EST* OF GOD CAN BE KNOWN FROM CREATURES?

It ought to be conceded therefore that the quid est of God can be known from creatures only when speaking about the way of knowing God in His general attributes. To better understand this it ought to be known that there is a twofold abstraction of a form from a supposit participating in the form: in one way as the form is related to the supposit, in another way as it is considered as absolute from the supposit. In the first way there is abstraction of the universal from the particular, as good abstracted from this and that good, because according to Aristotle, the universal is one in many. In the second way there is abstraction of the form considered as subsistent in itself wholly apart from matter, as good abstracted from everything which participates in good, which is good substantially and subsistent in itself. In the first way the form is understood as it is participated in by a creature, in the second way as it is existing in the creator and indivisible. The good itself is said to these two modes according to a community of analogy. Thus once we have known through the senses this particular good in a sensible substance, by abstracting through the intellect ‘good’ from ‘this’ we consider the good absolutely as it is a certain common and universal good, not as this or that, but nevertheless as participated and existing in this and that, so by first knowing through the intellect the good itself as universal and abstract, afterwards by abstracting the good through the intellect from everything else whatsoever, and by considering it as good absolutely, not as this or that good, nor even as the good of this or that, but of nothing, but as the good of nothing whatsoever, which is the good of the creator alone subsistent in itself, we know in a second way next to the good of the creature the essential good of the creator Himself, not only by the way of excellence, but also by the way of negation. And just as this can be done with the divine attribute of goodness, so with all the other divine attributes that commonly belong to creature and creator, which through this aforesaid method can be known to belong to the creator from creatures.

And so in these attributes we can know the quid est of God through creaturis, and this in a threefold grade: first generally, secondly more generally, and lastly most generally. In order to begin with the more confused and so more known relative to us, we understand the quiddity of God in the most general and confused way in His attributes by understanding what is of worth and excellence in creatures. And this is the mode of knowing the quid est of the divine essence about which Augustine speaks in *De Trinitate* VIII when he says, “When you hear ‘this good’ and ‘that good’, which can otherwise even be called non-goods, if you are able, perceive, without those goods which are good by participation, the good itself by whose participation they are good. For when you hear ‘this good’ or ‘that good’ you also understand the good itself. If therefore you are able by leaving aside [this and that good] to perceive the good itself, you will perceive God.” Notice therefore from these words of Augustine that the good is understood in a threefold way, so that this first [most general mode of knowing the divine attributes] contains three grades in itself, and by anyone of them God is understood.

In one way by understanding ‘this good’, and in this way God is known as least distinct from a creature, for by saying ‘this good’ I say two things, because I say ‘good’ and ‘this’. The ‘this’
I. UNIVOCITY

belongs to the creature, the ‘good’ is something common to God and creature, from which if you were to take away ‘this’ and ‘that’, there is a second mode of understanding the good, namely, as less contracted to the creature than before. And [the good in this second grade] is something common analogously to God and creature, and is one of the first intentions which the intellect primarily and essentially conceives about things, as are one and being. And although in themselves the good of the creature and the good of the creator form two diverse and distinct notions, just as does the being of God and creature, nevertheless because these two notions are so similar, our intellect conceives in a confused way both as one, and so in this way the goodness of God which is His quiddity is still understood in a way confused and indistinct from the good of the creature. But if you were able to distinguish one from the other by understanding good as subsistent and not existing in another, not as a participated good, but as something different from the goods which are good by participation and as that by whose participation all other things are good, this is the third mode of understanding the good, namely, as wholly abstracted from the good of creature, which is the good of the creator alone, which if viewed, you are closer to viewing God, as Augustine says. And just as it is with the notion of the good, so is it with the notions of being, true, beauty, just, and all the other intentions which indicate something of worth and excellence in creator and creatures, for in all of these notions, the nature (ratio) of the primary true, beauty, just, and things of this type are understood. And so this is the first way by which we understand most generally the quid est of God, in his primary and simple attributes which are absolutely speaking primarily and naturally known.... So the intellect in a confused being conceives together the nature of the first good and the good of creatures, although it judges alone concerning the good of the creature, or at least before the good of the creator.

In a second way, namely, more generally but not most generally, man knows what God is by understanding God in His general attributes, not absolutely taken, as in the previous way, but under a certain pre-eminence, namely, as God is a certain most excellent nature.... By understanding such a nature, however, we do not just understand the quiddity of God under that aspect in which it is able to communicate with creatures, as in the previous mode, but under the aspect according to which it belongs to God alone, and this in His most general attribute without ever contracting it to some singular supposit, to which it alone belongs. In this mode the divine quiddity is understood as a certain form considered in itself and in universal, and not as in some determined supposit.

In a third way, namely, generally, man knows what God is not only in His general attributes by reducing whatever is of worth and excellence in creatures to God absolutely, as in the first mode, nor under a certain excellence by reducing whatever is of worth and excellence in creatures to God in the highest, as in the second mode, but by knowing what God is in His first most simple attribute, namely, by reducing all attributes of worth and excellence into one most simple attribute, namely, by understanding that whatever is in God is His essence, and that His essence is totally identical in reality and intention with His being or existence. And this can be known about God from creatures only by way of negation.
HENRY OF GHENT ON THE PRIMARY OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT

Readings:

Pegis, Anton. See the series of articles published in *Mediaeval Studies* listed in previous reading. Most helpful for this topic is Pegis’s second in the series.

**SUMMA OF ORDINARY QUESTIONS**

SQO A.24 Q.7 (ed. 1520 I.142 E-143 K)

**WHETHER THE QUID EST OF GOD IS THE FIRST THING KNOWN FROM CREATURES**

In response to this question it ought to be said that there is a twofold cognition of God from creatures: one natural and one rational. The first is the cognition of God conceived immediately and naturally with the primary intentions of being. The second is cognition by way of rational deduction. When speaking of cognition in this second way, the quid est of God is not the first thing man knows from creatures but rather the last. Rather, the quid est of the creature is known first, and through that the quid est of God is known by the way of eminence and removal. For when abstracting from this singular good, and even from the absolutely universal good participated in by creatures, [in order to know] the good itself absolutely which is not a participated good but subsistent good, it is necessary first to understand the singular good from which there is made the first abstraction of the universal good, and then even the universal participated good, from which the separated and non-participated good is further abstracted through eminence and removal, before that which is abstracted from it. And so it is necessary, as was said, to understand the good of the creature before understanding the good of the creator as the subsistent and absolute good, which is the third grade of understanding God in the most general mode of knowing the quid est of God set out above. Eus, much more necessary is it to know first the good of a creature in said fashion before the good of the creator under more full eminence and abstraction, namely, by understanding Him as the best and highest good, which pertains to the mode of understanding God in the more general way. And still much more must the creature be understood before God is understood as such a highest good that He is nothing other than the good itself, but pure goodness which is God’s simple entity itself, which pertains to the mode of understanding the quid est of God in the general way.

When speaking, however, of understanding the quid est of God naturally, namely, in the first intentions understood of a being, which are being, one, true, and good, which pertain to the mode of understanding what God is in the first and second grade of the most general mode, it ought to be said that the quid est of God is the first thing comprehensible through the intellect. The reason for this is that the nature of our cognition taken from sense is such that it always begins with the indeterminate, just as the sense itself always by nature perceives (concipit) sensible things under indeterminate being before determinate being, although sometimes it perceives the indeterminate and the determinate at the same time, which is clear when determinate and indeterminate cognition are distinguished. For just as sense knows of someone approaching at a distance that he is a body before it knows he is an animal, and that he is an animal before a man, and a man before Socrates, so the intellect always understands of anything by a priority of nature, although not always of time, that it is a being before it knows it is this being, and that it is a good before this good, and that it is a being before substance, and so with all the other levels of understanding, always understanding the more confused universals before the particular and determinate things. And so universally, the more indeterminate an intelligible is, the more naturally prior our intellect understands it.
Indetermination, however, is twofold: privative and negative. When one says 'this good' or 'that good', it is understood as most determinate, both through matter and its supposit. Privative indetermination is that whereby the good as universal is understood, namely, as one in and said of many, as the good of this or that, although not this or that good, which by nature is determined through this or that good since it is participated good. Negative indetermination, however, is that whereby the good is understood absolutely as subsistent good, not as this or that, nor of this or that, because it is not a participated good or determinable, and negative indetermination is greater than privative indetermination.

Therefore, since our intellect always conceives by a natural priority the indeterminate before the determinate, whether as something distinct from the determinate or not, our intellect conveys when it understands anything good, also understands in it by a natural priority the negatively indeterminate good, and this is the good which is God. And as it is with the good, so it is with all the other things understood about God from creatures.

Absolutely, then, it ought to be said that in the most general mode of understanding the quid est of God in the first and second grade, the quid est of God is the first object from creatures which has to be understood by the human intellect, so that nothing can be understood in and from creatures that is a determinate true, good, beautiful, just, being, one, or something of this sort existing through matter or supposit, unless by a natural priority, although sometimes together in duration, what is absolutely and an indeterminate true, good, beautiful, being, one, and things of this sort, are known. ... For nothing is known or understood in the creature unless by first knowing or understanding it under the intention of being and one and all the other first intentions, as that it is a being or one, which are necessarily the first thing conceived about anything, at least by a priority of nature, before it is conceived as white or man. By conceiving being, however, the first and absolute being is necessarily conceived. For just as when this good is conceived, the good absolutely is conceived, and in that the good which belongs to God, or rather is God Himself, so when this which is white or man is conceived, I conceive being absolutely, and in that the first being which is God. Therefore, absolutely is should be said according to the position of Augustine that in every cognition by which something is truly known in a creature, something is known which belongs to God...as entity, truth, goodness, or something of this sort, and this according to the most general mode.
HENRY OF GHENT'S ACCOUNT OF CONCEPTUALIZING GOD
SQO 24.6

I. GENERALISSIME

GRADUS PRIMUS = Hoc singulare bonum

Abstractio prima

GRADUS SECUNDUS = Bonum universale et participatum

Abstractio secunda

GRADUS TERTIUS = Bonum per essentiam at subsistens

Prae-eminentia
(Eminentia et remotio)

II. GENERALIUS = Natura excellentissima

Remotio

III. GENERALITER = Natura simplicissima

Dionysian Way to God

Cf., Aquinas: Sent., 1 d. 3 q. 1 pr. Harum autem diversitas sumitur secundum vias deveniendi ex creaturis in Deum, quas Dionysius ponit. Dicit enim quod ex creaturis tribus modis devenimus in Deum: scilicet per causalitatem, per remotionem, per eminentiam.

Sent., 1 d. 3 q. 1 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum creatura exemplariter procedat a Deo sicut a causa quodammodo simili secundum analogiam, eo scilicet quod quaelibet creatura eum imitatur secundum possibilitatem naturae suae, ex creaturis potest in Deum deveniri tribus illis modis quibus dictum est, scilicet per causalitatem, remotionem, eminentiam.
UNITY OF ANALOGY AND UNITY OF UNIVOCITY

Unity of Attribution = Common Opinion
Here being is seen to have two distinct rationes, one proper to God and one to creatures, which have only a secundum quid unity by virtue of reference or relation, such that the concept of being as proper to God is primary and that proper to creatures secundary. This is the common opinion.

Unity of Confusion = Henry of Ghent
Here the two proper concepts of being are thought to be a single notion of being as absolutely undetermined, even though no such absolutely common notion exists. Both proper notions are conceived together without distinction. This was Henry’s adjustment to the common opinion.

Unity of Univocity = Scotus
Scotus replaces Henry’s unity of confusion with a truly univocity notion of being which is irreducibly simple and distinctly conceived.
I. UNIVOCITY

DUNS SCOTUS ON UNIVOCITY

The chart below shows the main texts from Scotus’s *Ordinatio* that we will be discussing. They are found in distinction 3 and 8 of the first book. D. 3, q. 1 contains Scotus’s refutation of Henry’s theory of analogy (Wolter, *DS*, pp. 14-33). Qq. 2-3 contain Scotus’s position agreeing with Avicenna that being is the first object of the mind, rejecting positions of Henry and Aquinas. This is mostly translated in Hyman and Walsh, which I have included below, together with the missing portions translated by me. (A partial translation also in Wolter, *DS*, pp. 4-9). Q. 4 contains Scotus’s rejection of Henry’s illumination, which we will consider later (Wolter, *DS*, pp. 97-132). In d. 8, q. 3 Scotus returns to show that univocity upheld in d. 3 above does not entail God is in a genus. My translation appended.

Scotus’s *Ordinatio* Texts on Univocity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book I, Distinctio 3</th>
<th>Book I, Distinction 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pars prima: De cognoscibilitate Dei.</strong></td>
<td><strong>First Part: On the simplicity of God</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| q. 1: *Utrum deus sit naturaliter cognoscibilis ab intellectu viatoris* | q. 1: *Is God naturally knowable by the intellect of the wayfarer?*
| q. 2: *Utrum Deus sit primum cognitum a nobis naturaliter pro statu isto* | q. 2: *Is God the first thing known naturally by us in our present state?*
| q. 3: *Utrum Deus sit primum objectum naturale aedaequatum respectu intellectus viatoris* | q. 3: *Is God the first natural object commensurate with intellect of the wayfarer?*
| q. 4: *Utrum aliqua veritas certa et sincera possit naturaliter cognosciri ab intellectu viatoris absque lucis increatae speciali illustratione* | q. 4: *Can the intellect of the wayfarer naturally know any certain and pure truth without a special illumination of a divine light?*
| *Pars secunda: De vestigio* | **Second Part: On the vestige.** |
| q. unica: *Utrum in qualibet creatura sit vestigium Trinitatis* | **Single question: Is there a vestige of the Trinity in every creature?** |
| *Pars tertia: De imagine* | **Part Three: On the image.** |
| q. 1: *Utrum in parte intellectiva propriam summam sit memoria habens speciem intelligibilem priorem naturaliter actu intelligendi* | q. 1: *Does the memory in the properly intellective part of the soul have an intelligible species naturally prior to the act of understanding?*
| q. 2: *Utrum pars intellectiva propriam summa vel aliquid eius sit causa totalis gignens actum autem notitiam vel ratio gignendi* | q. 2: *Is the properly intellective part or something belonging to it the total cause or the basis of begetting actual knowledge?*
| q. 3: *Utrum principalius causa notitiae genitae sit obiectum in se vel in specie praeens vel ipsa pars intellectiva animae.* | q. 3: *Is the more principal cause of begetting knowledge the object, whether present in itself or in a species, or the intellective part itself of the soul?*
| q. 4: *Utrum in mente sit distincte imago Trinitatis* | q. 4: *Does the mind contain an image of the Trinity in a distinct way?*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Book I, Distinctio 8</th>
<th><strong>Second Part: On the immutability of God</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pars prima: De simplicitate Dei</strong></td>
<td>q. 1 Is God most simple?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. 1: <em>Utrum Deus sit summe simplex</em></td>
<td>q. 2 Is any creature simple?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. 2: <em>Utrum aliqua creatura sit simplex</em></td>
<td>q. 3 Is it compatible with divine simplicity that God or anything formally said of God fall under a genus?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. 3: <em>Utrum cum simplicitate divina stet quod Deus vel aliquid formaliter dictum de Deo sit in genere</em></td>
<td>q. 4 Is an extra-mental distinction in God of essential perfections compatible with divine simplicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. 4: <em>Utrum cum simplicitate divina possit stare distinctio perfectionum essentialium praecedens actum intellectus</em></td>
<td><strong>Second Part: On the immutability of God</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Pars secunda: De immutabilitate Dei</em></td>
<td><strong>Single question: Is God alone immutable?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. unica: <em>Utrum solus Deus sit immutabilis</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WHETHER GOD IS THE FIRST ADEQUATE OBJECT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT

ORDINATIO I D. 3 P. 1 Q. 3

Vat. ed.

110-12 [HW 614] In this question there is one opinion which says that the primary object of our intellect is the quiddity of a material thing. The reason presented for this is that a power is proportioned to the object. The cognitive power, however, is three-fold: one is altogether separate from matter, both in being and in operation, as is a separate intellect; another is conjoined to matter both in being and in operation, as is an organic power which perfects matter and only operates by means of an organ from which it is separated neither in operation nor in being; another is conjoined to matter in being, but does not make use of a material organ in operation, as is our intellect. To these there correspond proportionate objects, for to altogether separate powers, such as the first, there ought to correspond a quiddity altogether separate from matter. To the second, an altogether material singular. To the third, therefore, there corresponds the quiddity of a material thing which, even though it exists in matter, is nonetheless known not as in singular matter.

113 But this cannot be sustained by a theologian, since the intellect, existing as the very same power, knows the quiddity of an immaterial substance, as is obvious for a beatified soul, according to the faith. But a power remaining the same cannot have an act concerning anything which is not contained under its primary object.

114 But if you say that it will be elevated through the light of glory, so that it may know those immaterial substances, I object that the primary object of a habit is contained under the primary object of the power, or at least does not exceed it. For if a habit is ordered with respect to some object which is not contained under the primary object of the power, but exceeds it, then that would not be the habit of that power, but would constitute it a different power.

The argument is confirmed, since when a power, as a first sign of the nature in which it is a power, has such a primary object, nothing posterior to the nature, [HW 615] and thus presupposing the character of that power, can make it have a different primary object; but every habit naturally presupposes a power.

115 You might say that this opinion is held by the Philosopher also—for instance, if he should maintain that our intellect, because of its weakness among intellects, and because of its joining with the imagining power in the knowing subject, is ordered directly to images, just as the imagination has a direct order to the common sense. And hence, just as the imaging power is only moved by what is an object of the common sense, even though it may know that same object in a different way, so he might say that our intellect, not merely because of some special condition, but from the very nature of the power, could not understand anything unless it could be abstracted from an image.

116 There are three arguments against this. The first is that in an intellect knowing an effect there is a natural desire to know the cause, and in one knowing a cause in a universal, there is a natural desire to know it in a particular, and distinctly. But a natural desire is not for what is impossible, from the very nature of desiring, since then it would be for nothing. It is not impossible, therefore, from the fact that the intellect knows the material effect, for the intellect just as intellect to know immaterial substance in particular. And so the primary object of the intellect does not exclude that immaterial substance.

117 The second argument is that no power can know any object under a characteristic more general than that of its own primary object. This is obvious, first of all, through the characteristic, since then that characteristic

---

1 What follows is the translation of this question in Hyman and Walsh, pp. 614-22. I have kept their paragraphing but added in the left margin the paragraph numbers of the Vatican edition. Walsh, however, who made his translation did not use the Vatican text, but the older Wadding edition. Therefore, the translation is inaccurate at places and does not include Scotus own, personal modifications to the text, found only in the Vatican version. I have indicated where Scotus’s additions are found. A partial but superior translation of nn. 137-151 is also found in Wolter, Philosophical Writings, pp. 4-8. Finally, this translation leaves out a long section (nn. 152-166) in which Scotus replies to objections against univocity based on Aristotle. I have translated this section myself and appended it to the end.

2 This is the view of Aquinas; cf. ST 1.84.7
of its primary object would not be adequate to it. It is also obvious through an example. Sight does not know anything under a characteristic more general than color or light, nor does the imagination know anything under one more general than the imaginable, which is its primary object. But the intellect knows something under a characteristic more general than that of a material being, since it knows some-thing under the characteristic of being in general; otherwise, metaphysics would not be a science for our intellect.

Besides, thirdly, and this comes almost to the same as the second, whatever is intrinsically known by a cognitive power is either its primary object or is contained under that object. But being, which is more general than what is sensible, is intrinsically understood by our intellect. Otherwise, metaphysics would not be a more transcending science than physics. Nothing, therefore, can be the primary object of our intellect which is more particular than being, because then being in itself would in no way be understood by us. It seems, then, that there is a false supposition in the said opinion about the primary object, and this is speaking about the power from its very nature as a power...

Also, the congruence which is adduced in support of that opinion is nothing. For power and object do not have to be alike in manner of being; they are disposed to one another as mover and moveable, and since this is as act and potency, they are disposed as dissimilars. Still, they are proportionate, since this proportion requires the dissimilarity of what is proportionate, as is commonly said about every proportion and as is obvious about matter and form, part and whole, cause and effect and other proportionals. Therefore, from the manner of being of such a power, a similar manner of being in the object cannot be concluded.

Against this it is objected that although a producing agent can be unlike the object which is passive to it, what is operative in the cognitive operation [HW 616] ought still to be like its object, for that is not a passive object, but is more an agent and assimilator. For all the ancients agree that cognition is accomplished through assimilation. Nor does Aristotle contradict them in this. Thus what is required is not merely proportion, but similarity.

I reply that it is one thing to talk about the manner of being of the power in itself, and another to talk of it in act or in proximate disposition to act, which is different from the very nature of the power. Now it is true that the cognitive power is assimilated to the known object through its act of knowing, which is some kind of likeness to the object, or through the species putting it in proximate readiness for knowing; but to conclude from this that the intellect in itself naturally has a way of being which is similar to that of the object, or vice versa, is to commit the fallacy of accident, and of figure of speech. Thus it does not follow that because bronze is made like Caesar in having a shape imposed on it, the bronze has in itself a manner of being similar to that of Caesar. Or, more to the point, because a seeing eye is assimilated to an object through the species of the object, it does not follow that sight has a manner of being similar to that of the object. And further, just as certain visible things have matter, which is the cause of decay and incoherence, and certain others such as the celestial bodies lack such matter, so there would be one kind of sight in such matter and another without it, or one such kind of an organ and another not that way. Or, still more to the point: an Idea in the divine mind, which is a likeness of the object, is immaterial; therefore, stone, of which it is the Idea, would also be immaterial. Thus it does not seem suitable merely because of that congruence to restrict the intellect, from the very nature of the power, to a sensible object, so that it would only exceed sense in its way of knowing.  

There is another opinion, which holds that God is the primary object of the intellect. Its fundamental arguments were adduced for the principal position in the first part of the question. Because of them, it maintains that God is the primary object of the will, since He is the reason for willing everything else. And the authority of Augustine is adduced, from Book VIII of On the Trinity: “Why, therefore, do we love another, etc.” And there follows, “whom we believe to be righteous, and do not love that form itself wherein we see what is a righteous mind, that we also may be able to be righteous? Is it that unless we loved that also, we should not love him at all, whom through it we love?”

Against this opinion there is the following argument: The primary natural object of any power has a natural order to that power. God does not have a natural order to our intellect as a mover, unless perhaps under the characteristic of some general attribute as that opinion maintains. Thus He is not the primary object except
under the characteristic of that attribute; or, according to the opinion previously maintained (that God is not understood except under the characteristic of being), He will not have a natural order except under such a universal concept. But a particular which is not understood except in something general is not the primary object of the intellect, which is rather, that general. Therefore, etc.

Besides, God certainly does not have the primacy of adequation because of commonness, such that He is predicated of every object intrinsically intelligible to us. Thus if He has any primacy of adequation it will be because of virtuality, since He contains virtually in Himself everything intrinsically intelligible. But He will not be the primary object adequate to our intellect just because of this, since other beings move our intellect by their own power. It is not that the divine essence moves our intellect first of all to itself and then secondly to knowledge of everything else knowable. But as was said in the Question on the subject of theology, the divine essence is the primary object of the divine intellect, since it alone moves the divine intellect both to know itself and everything else knowable by that intellect. By the same kind of argument it is proved that substance in general cannot be maintained to be the primary object of our intellect merely on the ground of the attribution of all accidents to substance. For accidents have their own power to move the intellect. Thus substance does not move the intellect to itself and to everything else knowable as well.

I reply to the question, therefore, that no natural primary object of our intellect can be given on the ground of such virtual adequation, because of the argument touched upon against the virtual primacy of the object in the case of God or of substance. Either, therefore, no primary object is to be given, or a primary adequate object must be maintained on the ground of commonness. But if being is taken to be equivocal with regard to created and uncreated, substance and accident, then, since all these are intrinsically intelligible to us, it does not seem possible to posit a primary object of our intellect, neither on the ground of virtuality nor of commonness. But in maintaining the position I took in the first Question of this Distinction concerning the univocity of being, the view that something is the primary object of our intellect can be preserved in some way. So that this can be understood, I first of all clarify what the univocity of being is and to what, and from this I go to the proposed position.

As to the first, I say that being is not univocally predicated definitionally of everything intrinsically intelligible, since it is not so of ultimate differentiae, nor of the proper attributes of being itself.

The first, concerning ultimate differentiae, I prove in two ways. First: If differentiae include being univocally predicated of them, and they are not altogether the same, then, with something (remaining) the same, they are diverse beings. Therefore, those ultimate differentiae will be different. Therefore, they will differ through other differentiae. Because those others include being definitionally, the argument will be repeated for them as for the prior ones; and so there will be an infinite regress in differentiae, or else it will come to a halt for some completely excluding being definitionally. This is the proposed position, since only those will be ultimate.

Second: just as a being composite in reality is composed of act and potency in reality, so a composite concept intrinsically one is composed from a potential and actual concept, or from a determinable and determining concept. Thus just as the resolution of composite beings comes ultimately to a halt in what is unqualifiedly simple, namely, in an ultimate act and potency which are primarily diverse in that nothing of the one includes anything of the other (lest the one not be primarily act nor the other primarily potency—for what includes any potentiality is not primarily an act), so in concepts. Every concept not unqualifiedly simple, but still intrinsically one, is resolved into a determinable and a determining concept, so that this resolution comes to a halt in unqualifiedly simple concepts, namely, in a still determinable concept including nothing determining, and a determining concept not including any determinable concept. The still determinable concept is the concept of being, and the determining is the concept of the ultimate differentia. These, therefore, are primarily diverse, so that one includes nothing of the other.

The second way is this: considering what includes it definitionally, being is sufficiently divided into uncreated being, the ten genera, and the essential parts of the ten genera. Whatever belongs to these does not seem to have more definitional divisions not among these. Thus if “one” as “one” should include being definitionally, it would be contained under some of these. But it is not any of the ten genera, nor is it of itself uncreated being, since it pertains to created beings. Therefore, it should be a species in some genus, or
the essential principle of some genus. But this is false, since any essential part in any genus whatsoever, and any species of any genus whatsoever, includes limitation; and so any transcendental would be finite of itself, and consequently would be repugnant to infinite being. Nor could it be predicated of infinite being, which is false, since all transcendental are termed unqualified perfections and belong to God in the highest degree...

As to the second principal article, I say that from these four arguments, and since nothing can be more common than being, and being cannot be predicated univocally, in common, and definitionally of everything intrinsically intelligible since it is not so predicated of ultimate differentiae nor of its own attributes, it follows that nothing is the primary object of our intellect on the ground of the definitional commonness of it to everything intrinsically intelligible. And yet, despite this, I say that being is the primary object of our intellect, since a two-fold primacy concurs in it, namely, the primacies of commonness and virtuality. For everything intrinsically intelligible either essentially includes the characteristic of being or includes it virtually. For all genera and species, as well as individuals, and all the essential parts of genera, and uncreated being, include being definitionally. All ultimate differentiae are included in some of these essentially or definitionally. All attributes of being are included in being, and are included virtually in what is inferior to it. Therefore, those to which being is not definitionally univocal are included in those to which it is thus univocal. And so it is obvious that being has the primacy of commonness to the primary intelligibles, that is, to the definitional concepts of genera, species, individuals, and the essential parts of all these, as well as to uncreated being. And it has the primacy of virtuality to intelligibles included in these primary intelligibles, that is, to the qualificative concepts of the ultimate differentiae and its own attributes.

But what I have supposed concerning the commonness of being definitionally to all the aforesaid definitionial concepts is proved for all those by the two arguments offered in the second Question of this Distinction, for proving the commonness of being to created and uncreated being, because, as should be obvious, I treat them equally.

First: concerning any of the aforesaid definitionial concepts it happens that the intellect is certain that it is being, while doubting whether the differentia contracting being to such a concept is such a being or not. And so the concept of being, as it belongs to that concept, is different from those lower concepts about which the intellect is doubtful, and is included in each lower concept; for those differentiae presuppose the same common concept of being which they contract.

The second argument I treat so: Just as it is argued that God is not naturally knowable by us unless being is univocal to created and uncreated, so it can be argued concerning substance and accident. For, since substance does not immediately stimulate our intellect to some understanding of it, but rather a sensible accident does so, it follows that we can have no definitional concept of it except such as can be abstracted from the concept of an accident; but no such definitional concept is abstractible from the concept of an accident unless it is the concept of a being. Therefore, etc. The supposition that substance does not immediately stimulate our intellect to an act concerning itself is proved thus: Whatever in its presence stimulates the intellect can be naturally known by the intellect in its absence, when the intellect is not stimulated. So, it appears from Book II of the De Anima that sight is perceptive of darkness, when light is not present, and hence when sight is not stimulated by substance. Therefore, let the intellect naturally be immediately stimulated by substance to the act concerning it; it would follow that when substance is not present, it could naturally be known not to be present. And so it could naturally be known that the substance of bread is not in the consecrated host on the altar, which is manifestly false. Therefore, no definitional concept of substance is naturally had by being immediately caused by substance, but only one caused by or abstracted first from an accident; and that requires the concept of being.

The proposed position concerning the essential parts of substance is concluded along the same lines. For if matter does not stimulate the intellect to an act concerning it, and if neither does substantial form, I ask what simple concept is had in the intellect of matter or form? If you say, some relational concept, for instance, that of a part, or an accidental concept, for instance of some property of matter or form, I ask what

---

5 Vatican paragraphs nn. 137-151 are found in a better translation in Wolter, Philosophical Writings, pp. 4-8.
6 Here Vatican edition contains addition by Scotus = n. 141-144.
is the definitional concept to which this accidental or relational concept is attributed? And if no definitional concept is had, there will be nothing to which this accidental concept is attributed. But no definitional concept can be had unless it is impressed by or abstracted from that which moves the intellect, for instance, from an accident; and that will be the concept of being. And so nothing would be known of the essential parts of sub-stance if being were not univocally common to them and to accidents.

These arguments do not establish the univocity of being definitionally to ultimate differentiae and to its attributes....

In a third way it can be replied to the first argument that that concept concerning which there is certainty is different from those concerning which there is doubt; and if that certain concept is preserved in either of those doubtful ones, it truly is univocal, as it is conceived with either of them. But it is not required that it be in each of them definitionally; but it is either that way, or it is univocal to them as determinable to determining, or as denominable and denominating. And so, briefly, being is univocal to all, but to concepts not unqualifiedly simple it is univocal definitionally when said of them; but to unqualifiedly simple ones it is univocal as determinable or as denominable, but not as predicated of them definitionally, since this includes a contradiction.

From these it appears how the two-fold primacy concurs in being, namely, the primacy of definitional commonness to all concepts not unqualifiedly simple, [HW 620] and the primacy of virtuality in itself or in its inferiors to all unqualifiedly simple. And that concurring two-fold primacy suffices for it to be the primary object of the intellect, although it has neither one alone for everything intrinsically intelligible....

These having been seen concerning being, there remains a further doubt, whether any other transcendental could be given as the primary object of our intellect because it seems to have commonness equal to that of being. And it seems so, and that truth is the adequate and primary object of our intellect, and not being. This is proved in three ways.

First: distinct powers have distinct formal objects, from Book II of the De Anima. But the intellect and the will are distinct powers. Therefore, they have distinct formal objects; and it seems that this cannot be sustained if being is given as the primary object of the intellect. But if truth is given, the distinct formal objects can be assigned... .

But against this conclusion about truth I argue thus: The primary, that is, the adequate object, is adequate according to commonness or according to virtuality or according to this two-fold concurring primacy. But truth is adequate to the intellect in none of these ways, whereas being is, as was made obvious. Therefore, etc. The proof of the first part of the minor is this: Truth is not predicated definitionally of everything intrinsically intelligible, since it is not predicated definitionally of being, nor of anything intrinsically inferior to being. The second part of the minor is proved together with the third, since those that are inferior to truth, although they include it essentially, still do ‘not include every-thing else intelligible, either virtually or essentially. For this truth which is in stone does not include stone essentially or virtually; but, just the reverse, the being which is in stone includes truth, and so for any other beings and their truths.

Again, truth is an attribute of being and of whatever is inferior to being. Therefore, in understanding being and whatever is inferior to it, precisely under the characteristic of truth, the understanding is only according to an accident and not according to a definitional characteristic. But the knowledge of any-thing according to a definitional characteristic is the primary and more perfect knowledge of it, from chapter 1, Book VII of the Metaphysics. Therefore, no knowledge of anything precisely under the characteristic of truth is the primary knowledge of the object, and so neither is truth the primary characteristic precisely for knowing the object....

I reply to the opposing arguments by turning them in the opposite direction. The first, thus: Just as the will cannot have an act concerning what is unknown, so it cannot have an act concerning an object under a completely unknown formal characteristic. Therefore, every characteristic according to which any-thing is an object of the will is knowable by the intellect. And so it cannot be that the characteristic of being the primary object of the intellect is distinguished over against the characteristic of being capable of being willed if it is by that that it is such... .

---

7 Here Hyman and Walsh skip nn. 152-166. There paragraphs contain replies by Scotus to objections by Aristotle to univocity. I have translated them and appended them at the end of this section.
I. UNIVOCITY

177-80 To the view which is accepted in the argument about the distinction of objects, I reply that disparate powers are disposed to one another in three ways: either they are altogether disparate or they are subordinated one to another—and then they are either in the same genus, as superior and inferior cognitive powers, or they belong to different genera, as a cognitive to its appetitive power.

[HW 621] In the first way, the disparate powers have altogether disparate objects, since none of them, from the very fact that they are disparate, is intrinsically operative concerning an object about which another is. Such are the exterior senses among themselves, such as sight, hearing, etc.

In the second way, disparate powers have subordinate primary objects, so that the primary object of a superior power contains under itself the primary object of an inferior power. Otherwise, that object would not be adequate to the superior power. Whence the primary object of sight is contained according to its commonness, as an inferior, under the primary object of the common sense.

In the third way, powers are so disposed that if the appetitive were made adequate to the cognitive in operating with regard to any object, there would be the same primary object for each, and under the same formal characteristic of the object. But if the appetitive power had an act with regard to something knowable and also something not, then the object of the appetitive power would be inferior to that of the cognitive power.

181 In connection with the proposed position, the intellect and will fall under the third heading; and if the will is held to have an act with regard to every-things intelligible, both will and intellect are held to have the same object, and under the same formal characteristic. But if the will only has an act with regard to those intelligibles which are ends or beings ordered to an end, and not with regard to what can merely be contemplated, then the object of the will is held to be somewhat more particular than the object of the intellect, but being remains the object of the intellect.

184 It is thus obvious from what has been said that nothing can be so suitably held to be the primary object of the intellect as being, neither anything virtually primary nor any other transcendental, since the same argument applies to them as to truth.

185 But one doubt remains: If being according to its most common characteristic is the primary object of the intellect, why cannot whatever is contained under being move the intellect naturally, as was argued in the first argument to the first Question in the Prologue? And then it seems that God could be known naturally by us, and all immaterial substances could likewise, which was denied. Rather, it was denied for all substances and all essential parts of substances, since it was said that they are not conceived in any definitional concept unless in the concept of being.

186 I reply that the primary object of a power is assigned as what is adequate to the power in its characteristic as a power, but not as what is adequate to a power in some special condition. For instance, the primary object of sight is not given as precisely that which is adequate to sight existing in a medium illuminated by the light of a candle, but as what is inherently adequate to sight insofar as it exists from its own nature. But now, as was proved against the first opinion on the Question concerning the primary, that is, the adequate, object of the intellect—which opinion maintained the quiddity of the material thing to be the primary object—nothing can be adequate as a primary object to our intellect from the very nature of the power unless it is most common. But still, in this present condition, the quiddity of a sensible thing is adequate to it in the character of its mover; and hence, in this present condition it does not naturally know anything which is not contained under that primary mover.

187 If it is asked, what is the reason for this condition, I reply that a condition [HW 622] does not seem to exist except as made fast through the stable permanence of the laws of the divine wisdom. But it is established in those laws of wisdom that our intellect should only understand in this present condition those things of which the species are reflected in a phantasm. And whether this is because of the punishment of original sin or because of the natural concordance of the powers of the soul in operating, according to which we see that the superior power operates with regard to the same as does the inferior if each has a perfect operation, as a matter of fact this is the way it is with us, that whatever we understand universally, we have had a singular phantasm of it. But still, this concord, which belongs as a matter of fact to this present condition, does not come from the nature of our intellect, from which it is an intellect, nor even from its being in a body, for then it would necessarily have a similar concord in the glorious body, which is false. Therefore, whatever is the reason for this condition, whether from the mere will of God or from punitive justice or
from weakness—which is the cause that Augustine intimates in the last chapter of Book XV of *On the Trinity*: "What is the cause why you cannot see that light with a fixed gaze except weakness? And what makes you be that way except iniquity?"—whether, I say, this is the entire cause or some other, at least the quiddity of a material thing is not the primary object of the intellect as a power; but it is something common to everything intelligible, although the primary object adequate in moving the intellect in this present condition may be the quiddity of a sensible thing.

Schema of Scotus’s Solution to Being as the Objection of the Intellect
152 Against the univocity of being it is argued:

Through the Philosopher III *Metaphysics*, because according to him in that text being is not a genus, because in that case according to Aristotle, difference would not be a per se being. If, however, being were said *in quid* of several things differing in species, it would seem to be a genus.

153 Again in the beginning of IV *Metaphysics* Aristotle means to say that being is said of beings just as health is said of healthy things, and that metaphysics is one science not because all those things which it concerns are not said ‘according to something one’ [*secundum unum*] but ‘to something one’ [*ad unum*], that is, not univocally but analogously. Therefore, the subject of metaphysics is not something univocal but analogous.

158 To the first argument [152]. Although it is not necessary to hold that the arguments of III *Metaphysics* are valid, because Aristotle intends there to argue to opposite parts of the questions which he is discussing, just as he himself says in the prologue--two opposite conclusions, however, cannot be reached unless one of the arguments is sophistical, and thus Averroes says in the first argument to the first question there disputed that there is a fallacy of the consequent: ‘If contraries pertain to the same science, then non contraries do not pertain to the same science’--and although it is not necessary to hold that this particular argument at issue is valid, for Aristotle infers there, ‘If one or being is a genus, then no difference will be one or a being,’--I ask either Aristotle intends to infer that difference will not be being or one per se primo modo, and then the conclusion is not inconvenient regarding one, or he intends to infer a unqualified negative conclusion, and then the consequence is not valid, for if rational is a difference with respect to animal, it does not follow to that ‘rational is not animal’ but that ‘rational is not per se primo modo animal’--nevertheless by holding that this argument is valid, it concludes to the opposite more than the proposed [result of the objection]. For Aristotle does not remove the nature of a genus from being because of equivocation [i.e., analogy]--rather if being were analogous to the ten genera, it would be ten genera, because to each concept [of being], by whatever name it would be signified, corresponds the nature of a genus--but rather Aristotle removes the nature of a genus from being because being has to much community, that is, because being is predicated per se primo modo of difference, and for this reason it can be concluded that being is not a genus.

159 And to see how this is true--although nevertheless it was said before that being is not predicated per se primo modo of ultimate difference--I distinguish that some differences can be taken from an ultimate essential part which is a thing and nature different from that from which the concept of the genus is taken, as for example if a plurality of [substantial] forms were maintained, then the genus would be said to be taken from the prior essential part and the difference from the ultimate form. Then just as being is said *in quid* of such a difference in the abstract, so that this is *in quid*, ‘The intellective soul is a being,’ ... so this is *in quid*, ‘Rationality is a being,’ if rationality is such a difference [i.e., one taken from an essential part]. But no such difference is ultimate, because in such are contained several realities in same way distinct, either by the sort of distinction or non identity I said in the first question of the second

---

8 This paragraphs are missing from the above translation of q. 3 in Hyman and Walsh. I add them here, as indicated above.
distinction to have existed between the divine essence and its personal property [i.e., by a formal distinction or non identity], or by an even greater distinction, as will be explained later. And then such a nature can be conceived according to one thing, that is, according to same reality or perfection, and not conceived according to another, and therefore the concept of such a nature is not simply simple.

160 On this account I said before that no absolutely ultimate difference includes being quidditatively because it is simply simple. But any difference taken from an essential part, which part is a nature in reality different from the nature from which the genus is taken, that difference is not simply simple and includes being in quid. And from this that such a difference is a being in quid, it follows that being is not a genus because of its excessive community. For no genus is said in quid of any inferior difference, neither of that difference which is taken from the form nor of that which is taken from the ultimate reality of the form, as will be clear in distinction 8.

162 To the second objection which is taken from IV Metaphysics, I respond that Aristotle concedes in X Metaphysics that there is an essential order among the species of the same genus, because there his meaning is that in a genus there is one ‘first’ which is the measure of all others in that genus. The things which are measured, however, have an essential order to the measure, and nevertheless, not withstanding such attribution, anyone would concede that there is one concept of the genus, otherwise the genus would not be predicated in quid of several things different in species. For if there were not one concept of a genus different from the concepts of the species, then no concept would be said to several things in quid, but any concept would just be said of itself, and then nothing would be predicated as a genus of a species, but as the same thing of itself.

163 Similarly, Aristotle in VII Physics says that, ‘Equivocations hide in the genera,’ on account of which equivocations there can be no comparison among the genera. Now there is not equivocation with respect to the logician who posits diverse concepts, but there is equivocation with respect to the real philosopher, because there is no unity of nature in reality. And so all these citations from the Metaphysics and the Physics on this point can be explained because of the real diversity of those things in which there is attribution[i.e., analogy] which is nevertheless consistent with the unity of a concept abstractible from them, as is clear from the example [in 162]. I concede then that accident has an essential attribution to substance, and nevertheless there can be an common concept abstracted from them.
There are two extreme replies to this question. One is negative which says that some concept common to God and creature is not compatible with the divine simplicity, which opinion was treated above in question 1 of distinction 3. [This is the opinion of Henry of Ghent].

Certain arguments not mentioned before are advanced in favor of this opinion.

Again, where there is alone the unity of attribution, there cannot be the unity of univocity. But it is necessary to hold the unity of attribution of creature to God in the nature of being. Therefore in being there is not univocity.

To that argument concerning attribution, I say that attribution alone does not posit the unity, because the unity of attribution is less than the unity of univocity, and the lesser does not entail the greater. Nevertheless, the lesser unity is compatible with the greater unity, just as certain things which are one generically are also one specifically, although the unity of the genus is less than the unity of the species. So here I concede that the unity of attribution does not posit the unity of univocity, and nevertheless the unity of univocity is compatible with the unity of attribution, although the one is not formally the other. For example, the species of one and the same genus have an essential attribution to the first of that genus (X Metaphysics), and nevertheless with this is compatible the unity of the univocity of the nature of the genus in those species. And so much more so is it necessary in the discussion at hand that in the nature of being, in which there is a unity of attribution, the things attributed have a unity of univocity, because never are things compared as measured to measure or exceeded to exceeding unless they agree in some one thing. For just as there is an absolute comparison in something absolutely univocal, so every comparison must be in something univocal in some way. For when it is said, “m is more perfect than that,” if it were asked, “A more perfect what?” it is necessary to assign something common to both, so that the determinable thing of every comparison is common to either term of the comparison. For a man is not a more perfect man than an ass, but a more perfect animal. And so if things are compared in entity in which there is an attribution of one to another (“m is more perfect than that. A more perfect what? A more perfect being.”), it is necessary that there be a unity in some way common to either term [of the comparison].

The other opinion is affirmative in the other extreme which holds that God is in a genus. And they cite as their authority the Elements of Damascene.

I hold the middle opinion that some concept common to God and creature is compatible with the divine simplicity, but not a concept common as a genus, because no concept predicated of God in quid or by any sort of formal predication is essentially in any genus.}

I now show the proposed [namely that a concept common to God and creature does not violate divine simplicity] through two middle [terms] and these are taken from those things proper to God. First from the nature of infinity and secondly from the nature of necessary being.

From the first [the nature of infinity] I argue in two ways. First: A concept which is indifferent to things to which the concept of a genus cannot be indifferent cannot be the concept of a genus. But whatever is commonly predicated of God and creature is indifferent to the finite and the infinite when speaking about essential things [in God], or at least indifferent to the finite
and the non finite, when speaking about anything at all [in God], for a divine relation is not finite. But no genus can be indifferent to the finite and the infinite. Therefore, etc.

102 The first part of the minor is clear because whatever is an essential perfection in God is formally infinite, in creatures finite.

103 I prove the second part of the minor, because a genus is taken from some reality which in itself is potential to the reality from which the difference is taken. Nothing infinite is potential to anything, as is clear from what was said in the previous question. [(This proof is taken from the composition of the species and the potentiality of the genus, but either [i.e., composition and potentiality] are removed from God because of His infinity.)]

104 The assumption that, “a genus is taken from same reality which in itself is potential to the reality from which the difference is taken,” is clear from the authority of Aristotle VIII Metaphysics: “It is necessary that the term, that is the definition, be a long rigmarole because it predicates one thing of another, so that it is necessary that one part of the definition be as matter and the other as form.”

105 [This assumption] is also clear from argument, because if that reality from which the genus is taken were the whole quiddity of the thing, the genus alone would define [the thing], and what is more the genus and difference would not define [the thing], because the definition [ratio] composed from these things would not be in a primary way identical to the thing defined. For any one thing is always itself, and therefore that definition which would express it twice would not indicate in a primary way that which is identical with the quiddity of the thing itself.

106 By explaining a little further the above argument, I understand it as follows, that in some creatures the genus and difference are taken from two different realities (realitas), just as when there are posited several substantial forms in man, animal is taken from the sensitive form and rational from the intellecitive form, and then that thing (res) from which the genus is taken is truly potential and perfectible by that thing (res) from which the difference is taken. Sometimes, when two different things are not there, as in the case of accidents, there is at least in one thing some proper reality (realitas) from which the genus is taken and another reality from which the difference is taken. Let the first be called ‘a’ and the second ‘b’. ‘A’ in itself is potential to ‘b’, so that by understanding ‘a’ with precision and ‘b’ with precision, ‘a’ as understood in that first moment of nature, in which it is precisely itself, is perfectible by ‘b’ just as if it were a real thing (res) [other than ‘b’]. That ‘a’ is not really perfected by ‘b’ stems from the identity of ‘a’ and ‘b’ to some whole to which they are really and primarily identical. Indeed, the whole is what is primarily produced and both of these realities are produced in this whole. If, however, one of these realities could be produced without the other, the one would be truly potential to the other and imperfect without it.

107 This composition of realities, the one potential the other actual, is the least required for the nature of genus and difference, and this composition is incompatible with any reality in something being infinite. For if the reality were of itself infinite, however precisely it be taken, it would not be in potency to any [further] reality. Since therefore every essential reality in God is formally infinite, there is none from which the nature of a genus can be taken formally.

108 Secondly I argue from the nature of infinity thus: the concept of a species is not just the concept of a reality and the intrinsic mode of that same reality, because then whiteness could be a genus and the intrinsic grades of whiteness could be specific differences. Those things, however, through which something common is contracted to God and creature are ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’, which indicate intrinsic grades of that which is common [i.e., being]. Therefore, these contracting elements [i.e., finite and infinite] cannot be differences, nor do they constitute with the contracted a concept as composite as the concept of the species must be, but the concept of the contracted
I. UNIVOCITY

[i.e., being] and the contracting [i.e., infinity] is more simple than is possible for the concept of the species.

136 To the first principal argument [39] I concede that the concept predicated of God and creature in quid is contracted by contracting concepts which indicate ‘quale’, but neither is that concept which is predicated in quid the concept of a genus, nor are those concepts which indicate ‘quale’ the concepts of differences, because that quidditative concept is common to the finite and the infinite, which community the concept of a genus cannot contain, and those contracting concepts indicate the intrinsic mode of the contracted, and not some reality perfecting it. Differences, however, do not indicate the intrinsic reality of some genus, because in whatever grade animality is understood, not for this reason is rationality or irrationality understood to be an intrinsic mode of animality, but animality is understood in such a grade as still perfectible by rationality or irrationality. [[Note how there can be some first intention indifferently of ‘a’ and ‘b’, and nothing of one nature (ratio) corresponds to it in reality, but formal objects primarily diverse are understood in one first intention, although either imperfectly.]]

137 But here there is a doubt how the concept common to God and creature can be real unless taken from some reality of the same genus, and then it seems that it would be potential to that reality from which the distinguishing concept is taken, just as was argued previously from the concept of genus and difference [39]. In that case the argument made above for the first opinion stands, that if there were some reality in a thing which distinguishes, and some other distinct [reality which is distinguished], it seems that [such a] thing would be composite, because it has one thing by which it agrees and another by which it differs.

138 I respond that when some reality is understood with its intrinsic mode, that concept is not so absolutely simple that reality cannot be understood without that mode, but in that case there is an imperfect concept of thing itself. It can also be conceived under that mode, and then there is a perfect concept of the thing itself. For example, if there were a whiteness in the tenth grade of intensity, however much it would be in reality a simple thing in every way, nevertheless it could be conceived under the aspect of such a whiteness, and then it would be conceived in a perfect way by a concept adequate to the thing itself. Or it could be conceived with precision under the aspect of whiteness, and then it would be conceived by an imperfect concept and one not adequate to the perfection of the thing itself. An imperfect concept, however, could be common to this and that whiteness, and the perfect concept would be proper.

139 Therefore a distinction is required between that from which the common concept is taken and that from which the proper concept is taken—not a distinction of reality and reality but of reality and the proper and intrinsic mode of the same thing. This distinction is sufficient for a perfect and imperfect concept of the same thing, of which the imperfect concept is common and the perfect proper. But the concept of genus and difference require a distinction of realities, not just [a distinction] of one and the same reality conceived perfectly and imperfectly.

140 This can be proven. If we were to hold that color moves same intellect to understand the reality of the color and the reality of the difference, however much the intellect would have a perfect concept adequate to the concept of the first reality [i.e., the genus of color], it does not have in this the concept of the reality from which the difference is taken, nor eonverso, but it has there two formal objects which by nature terminate distinct proper concepts. If, however, there were in the thing only a distinction of a reality and its intrinsic mode, the intellect could not have a proper concept of that reality without having a concept of the intrinsic mode of the thing itself--[(at least of the mode under which it would be conceived, although this mode is not conceived, just as is said elsewhere about singularity conceived and the mode under which it is conceived)]--but in that perfect concept it would have one object adequate to the thing under its mode.
141 But if you object that the common concept is at least indeterminate and potential to the special concept, and therefore one reality is potential to another, or at least that common concept will not be infinite, because nothing infinite is potential to anything, I concede that the concept common to Cod and creature is finite, that is, not of itself infinite, because if it were infinite, it would not be of itself common to the finite and the infinite. Nor of itself is it finite positively, so that it includes of itself finitude, because then it would not pertain to the infinite, but of itself it is indifferent to the finite and the infinite, and therefore it is finite negatively, that is, it does not posit infinity and by such a finitude it is determinable by same concept.

142 But if you argue, “Therefore the reality from which it is taken is finite,” this does not follow. For [the concept] is not taken from some reality as a concept adequate to that reality or as a perfect concept adequate to that reality, but as diminished and imperfect concept, so that if that reality from which it is taken were seen perfectly and intuitively, the one intuiting would not have there distinct formal objects, namely, the reality and its mode, but the same formal object, nevertheless, someone understanding by abstractive intellection, because of the imperfection of that type of intellection, can have the reality for a formal object without the mode.
II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

BACKGROUND IN AVICENNA AND AVERROES


AVICENNA

**METAPHYSICS PROVES THE EXISTENCE OF GOD**


It is known that every science has its own proper subject. Let us investigate what the subject of this science [i.e., Metaphysics] is and let us consider whether it is God Himself, may He be exalted. But it is not God because God is one of the things investigated in this science. I say therefore that is impossible for God to be the subject of this science since in every science the subject is something whose being is conceded; the science itself only investigates the properties of that subject, as we have shown elsewhere. But that God exists cannot be conceded in this science as its subject. Rather, it is demonstrated here. For if this is not the case, then either (A) God is conceded in this science and demonstrated in another science or (B) God is conceded in this science and not demonstrated in another science.

But either alternative is false. (A) For it is impossible that God be demonstrated in some other science, because the other sciences are either ethical, political, physical, mathematical, or logical. There are no other philosophical sciences aside from these. In none of these sciences, however, can the existence of God be demonstrated, because God cannot be an object of investigation in any of them. After a little reflection, you will understand this from what has been repeatedly taught.

Nor (B) is it possible that God is not demonstrated in some science other than these, for then God would not be demonstrated in any science whatsoever. Therefore, either (1) God is self-evident or (2) it is impossible to know God by any reasoning at all. But (1) God is not self-evident, nor (2) is it impossible to demonstrate God since we have signs of God’s existence. Furthermore, how can one concede the existence of what cannot be demonstrated? It remains, therefore, that only this science can demonstrate God. Since, however, this science investigates whether God is, God cannot here be the subject. For no science establishes the being of its own subject.

**BEING IS THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS**

*Prima philosophia* I.2 (Avicenna Latinus, 1.12-13)

Thus, it has been shown to you from these considerations that being insofar as it is being (*ens inquantum ens*) is common to all these things and that it must be posited as the subject of this discipline. Therefore, the first subject of this science is being insofar as it is being, and those things which this science investigates are the attributes of being insofar as it is being without qualification.
Debes etiam scire quod in ipsis rebus est via qua ostenditur quod intentio huius scientiae non est ponere aliquid esse principium nisi postquam probatum fuerit in alia scientia. Postea vero manifestabitur tibi innuendo quod nos habemus via ad stabiliendum primum principium, non ex via testificationis sensibilium, sed ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium per se notarum, quae facit necessarium quod ens habet principium quod est necesse esse, et prohibit illud esse variabile et multiplex ullo modo. et facit debere illud esse principium totius, et quod totum debet esse per illud secundum ordinem totius. Sed nos propter infirmitatem nostrarum animarum non possimus incedere per ipsum viam demonstrativam, quae est progressus ex principiis ad sequentia et ex causa ad causatum, nisi in aliqibus ordinibus universitatis eorum quae sunt, sine discretione. Igitur ex merito huius scientiae in se est, ut ipsa sit altior omnibus scientiis: quantum vero ad nos posterioratur post omnes scientias. Iam igitur locuti sumus de ordine huius scientiae inter omnes scientias.

It will become clear to you anon through an intimation that we have a way for proving the First Principle, not by way of inference from sensible things, but through universal rational premises that make it necessary that there must be for existence a principle that is necessary in its existence, that make it impossible for [this principle] to be in any respect multiple, and that make it necessary that it must be the principle of the whole [of existence] and that the whole proceeds from God according to the order possessed by the whole. Due to our incapacity, however, we are unable to adopt this demonstrative method which is the method of arriving at the secondary existents from the primary and at the effect from the cause. except with reference to certain groupings of the order of existing things, not in detail.

AVERROES AGAINST AVICENNA

Cum notificavit principia esse tria, duo per se, scilicet materia et forma, et unum per accidens, scilicet, privatio, et iam declaravit primam materiam esse de principiis, dicit, “Considerare autem de principio secundum formam etc.,” id est, considerare autem de primo principio formali utrum sit unum aut plura, et quae est substantia eius, est proprium primae philosophiae. Formarum enim aliae sunt in materiis, aliae non in materiis, ut declaratum est in hac scientia. Et ideo consideratio de formis est duarum scientiarum, quarum una, scilicet naturalis considerat de formis materialibus, secunda autem de formis simplicibus abstractis a materia, et est illa scientia, quae considerat de ente simpliciter. Sed notandum est, quod istud genus entium, esse scilicet separatum a materia, non declaratur nisi in hac scientia naturali. Et qui dicit quod prima philosophia nititur declarare entia separabilia esse, peccat. Haec enim entia sunt subjecta primae philosophiae et declaratum est in Posterioribus analyticae quod impossibile est aliqum scientiam declarare suum subjectum esse, sed concedit ipsum esse, aut quia manifestum per se, aut quia est demonstratum in alia scientia. Unde Avicenna peccavit maxime, cum dicit quod primus philosophus demonstrat primum principium esse, et processit in hoc in suo libro de scienta divina per viam quam existimavit esse necessariam et essentialem in illa scientia, et peccavit peccato manifesto. Certior enim illorum sermonum, quibus usus est in hoc, non pertransit ordinem sermonum probabilium. Et iam causam innuimus huius alibi.

Since he has shown that there are three principles, two which are essential, namely, matter and form, and one which is incidental, namely, privation, and he has already shown that prime
II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

matter is one of the principles, he says “But to consider the principle in the sense of form, etc.” that is, to investigate whether the first formal principle is one or several, and what its nature is, is proper to First Philosophy. As has been shown in this science, some forms are in matter, others are not in matter. Therefore, the study of forms pertains to two sciences. One, namely, physics, investigates material forms, while the second investigates the simple forms separate from matter, and that is the science which investigates being as such. But note that it is only established in this science of physics that there is this class of beings, namely, separate from matter, and he errs who says that First Philosophy [i.e., metaphysics] endeavors to prove that there are beings separate [from matter], for these beings are the subjects of first philosophy. It has been shown in the *Posterior Analytics* that no science can prove that its own subject is, but concedes that it is, either because it is self-evident or because it has been demonstrated in another science. Thus, Avicenna committed the greatest error when he said that First Philosophy demonstrates that there is a first principle. He proceeded in this in his *Book on Divine Science* by a way which he thought was necessary and essential in that science [i.e., metaphysics]. And he erred by an evident error, for the more certain of the arguments which he used in this did not go beyond the order of the probable. The reason for this we have indicated elsewhere.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AVICENNA</th>
<th>AVERROES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No science demonstrates the existence of its own subject.</td>
<td>No science demonstrates the existence of its own subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphysics alone demonstrates the existence of God.</td>
<td>God is the subject of metaphysics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>∴ God is not the subject of metaphysics.</td>
<td>∴ Metaphysics does not demonstrate the existence of God.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Aquinas**


Aquinas *Summa Theologiae* I.2.3 – The ‘Five Ways’

**Does God Exist?**

It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word “God” means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.

Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human
II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God’s existence.

On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: “I am Who am.” (Ex. 3:14)

I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some
more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

Reply OBJ 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): “Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.” This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

Reply OBJ 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.

HENRY OF GHENT

II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

OUTLINE OF AQUINAS’S ARGUMENTS FROM ST I.2.3

1. Aristotle, *Physics* VIII (motion)
5. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II (final causality)

OUTLINE OF HENRY OF GHENT’S *A POSTERIORI* PROOFS FROM SUMMA 22.4

I. Demonstrative Arguments

CAUSALITY

Efficient
- Aristotle, *Physics* VIII (motion)
- Aristotle, *De caelo* I (possibility/necessity)
- Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II (efficient cause)

Formal
- Being
  - Augustine, *On True Religion* (degrees of excellence)
- Knowledge
  - Augustine, *On Free Choice* (illumination)

Final
- Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II

EMINENCE

**Same as Formal Causality**
- Richard of St. Victor, Anselm, Augustine

**Absolute Perfection versus More and Less**
- Anselm, *Monologium*

II. Persuasive Arguments

Efficient
- Richard of St. Victor, *On the Trinity*
- Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith*

Final
- Aristotle, *Physics* III

Truth
- Anselm and Augustine
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Philosopher</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1230’s</td>
<td>AVICENNA AND AVERROES</td>
<td>Debate enters the west with Michael the Scot’s translations of Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1248-50</td>
<td>ALBERT THE GREAT (Ph. 1 tr. 3 ch. 18, ed. Cologne, IV.75-76).</td>
<td>Reports the debate over the subject of metaphysics but ignores Avicenna’s purely metaphysical proof and Averroes’s criticism of it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1254-74</td>
<td>THOMAS AQUINAS</td>
<td>Despite writing commentaries on both Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, never explicitly mentions debate over which science proves the existence of God.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1270-76</td>
<td>SIGER OF BRABANT (Metaph. 1.1, ed. A. Maurer, pp. 23-25.)</td>
<td>Explicitly raises the debate over which science demonstrates the existence of God. Resolves the disagreement by claiming that one and the same argument of Metaphysics 12 is both physical and metaphysical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MUNICH PHYSICS (Ph. 8.8, ed. P. Delhaye, pp. 191-92).</td>
<td>Physics and metaphysics each assigned their own separate argument for the existence of God on the basis of different middle terms, physics from motion, which is more evident to sense, and metaphysics from possibility, which is more evident to the intellect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PETER OF AUVERGNE (Metaph. 1.1, ed. A. Monahan in Nine Mediaeval Thinkers, p. 154).</td>
<td>Metaphysical proof explicitly ranked as superior (verius) to physical proof from motion because its middle term is more universal and thus more commensurate with the conclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HENRY OF GHENT (Summa 22.5, ed. 1518, fols. 134A-135V1).</td>
<td>First mention of the debate in theological literature on the existence of God. First discussion of Avicenna’s claim for a purely metaphysical demonstration that is not based on the evidence of sensible things (non ex testificatione sensibilium).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1300</td>
<td>DUNS SCOTUS (Lectura 1 d.2 [Vat. 16.11-45])</td>
<td>Physical argument discarded.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HENRY OF GHENT  
*SUMMA OF ORDINARY QUESTIONS, A. 22 Q.4*

Can Creatures Be Used to Demonstrate God’s Existence to Us?

**[ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST]**

The arguments that creatures cannot be used to demonstrate to us that God exists are these:

**First:** Any proposition known immediately and in a most self-evident way cannot be demonstrated by means of other things, because every demonstration makes use of something which is intermediate and better known. But “God exists” is such a proposition, since it predicates the same thing of itself, as is clear from what has been settled so far. Therefore, etc.

**Second:** In God, the “what-it-is” [or essence] and the “that-it-is” [or existence] are identical. But what God is cannot be demonstrated to man from creatures, as will be shown shortly. But what God is can-not be demonstrated to man from creatures, as will be shown shortly. Therefore, etc.

**Third:** According to Book I of the *Posterior Analytics* [chap. 2 71b 17], a demonstration is “a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge.” But that God exists is not something that can be known in this way, since it is one of the articles of faith, and “faith is . . . of things that are not seen”, as the Apostle tells the Hebrews, chap. 11 [v. 20]. And Gregory declares: “Faith, for which human reason provides proof, has no merit. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary is the Apostle to the *Romans*, chap. is “For since the creation of the world his invisible attributes are clearly seen—his everlasting power also and divinity—being understood through the things that are made.” Here the *Glossa* adds: “God who by nature was invisible, fashioned a work which by its visibility would show forth its maker.”

**[BODY OF THE QUESTION]**

In reply to this question it must be pointed out that those who assume that God’s existence is completely self-evident [WW 379] would have to deny that God can be demonstrated to exist. But, as has been established earlier, this is not the case, for a great many are able to doubt God’s existence. This is not because of any imperfection or uncertainty about God’s existence itself, however, since from his being itself, this is most evident. It stems rather from the weakness of our intellect, unable as it is to intuit him as he is in himself. That it should draw its certainty, then, that God is from what it knows about creatures, thus demonstrating that God exists, is appropriate. As the *Glossa* points out: “That God, who by nature is invisible, might also be known from what is visible, he fashioned a work which by its visibility showed forth its maker, so that the uncertain might be known from what is certain, and that he might be believed to be the God of all”; this in view of what was said of this above.

A distinction is in order, however, as to what can be demonstrated. The nature of the thing itself may be such as to be simply demonstrable, or it may be demonstrable to us owing to the way our intellect is set up. With this distinction in mind the question is to be answered in this fashion. If one considers the nature of God in itself, then God’s existence cannot be demonstrated to man, because there is no medium through which it could be known, for the simple reason that nothing intervenes between his existence and his essence, since they are completely identical as was indicated above. His existence, then, has nothing prior to, or more knowable than itself. Considered thus, God’s existence seen face to face can be viewed immediately by man only in the future life, and when it is so seen, no longer will man be able to doubt the impossibility of God’s being nonexistent. Neither will it be possible to conceive of him not being, but he will be the reason for demonstrating and knowing all else. That is why Avicenna says in Book VIII of his
II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Metaphysics: “Because it is highest and most glorious, the First One has no definition and cannot be demonstrated by means of one, but he himself is the demonstration of every thing which exists.”

But if we consider the way in which our intellect is set up, then indeed this can be demonstrated to it; not—I say—the existence God has in himself, but the “is” [esse] which is the sign of an affirmative judgment of the intellect, so that this statement asserting: “God is,” is true. And this is what can be demonstrated to the intellect beginning with the creatures that are better known to it. Because they are essentially dependent upon God as their cause and source, creatures can be used to establish an irrefutable proof that he exists, as Augustine says in Series II, Super Ioannem: “Philosophers seek the creator through creatures because he can be found through creatures; and that especially is why the natures of creatures are to be investigated.” And in his work On True Religion he says: “Not in vain or to no purpose ought one to view the beauty of the heavens and the order of the stars in virtue of which every kind of thing preserves its own proper nature and manner of being. In considering such, one should not indulge vain and perishable curiosity, but should take a step forward to what is immortal and endures forever,” in order that from what we see, we may understand through a reasoning process those things which we do not see. For as the Apostle says, “since the creation of the world the invisible attributes of God are clearly seen through those things that are made” [Romans, I:20]. This is first demonstrated and secondly shown dialectically.

[I. Demonstrative Arguments]

All demonstrative proofs are to be reduced to one of two ways, that of causality and that of eminence. For, as Dionysius says in his work On the Divine Names: In any ordering of existing things if one abstracts from [what is imperfect and asserts what is perfect] in an eminent degree or [analyzes] any cause, one must of necessity be led back to that which is the highest of all. The method of removing [what is imperfect], however, does not help us to know that God exists. For it is the negative approach whereby we remove from God all creatural existence. But from even the greatest number of pure negations nothing affirmative can be inferred. Only by the ways of causality or eminence, then, if we begin with creatures, is it possible to know that God is. Of these two ways, that of causality is the more cogent.

[1. THE WAY OF CAUSALITY]

There is a threefold way of causality relating God to creatures which corresponds to the three ways in which he is their cause, namely as their efficient, formal, and final cause. And from each of the three arguments proving that God exists can be drawn. [WW 381]

[a. The Way of Efficiency]

Three arguments use the efficient cause as their basis. Of these the first and more manifest way is that which makes use of motion. The Philosopher [Aristotle] in the Physics, Book VIII [chap. 5] employs this way, proceeding in this fashion: We have the highest certitude based on the senses that some things are moved. To contradict this would be idiotic, since the senses attest to it. Everything moved, however, is moved by another. What he [Aristotle] says there is most effective in persuading one of this point. Now either there is an infinite progression, so that this is moved by that, and the latter by another, and so ad infinitum, or the process terminates with something unmoved by any other, and consequently, not moved at all. Were this not the case, then it would follow necessarily that nothing would move or be moved, since secondary movers move only in virtue of some primary motion. Since an infinite regress is impossible and yet it is clear that many things are moved, it is absolutely obvious that some first immovable mover must be postulated; and this is what we understand God to be. Therefore, etc.

A second argument drawn from the same way and which runs along similar lines is that based on
II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

what must be a necessary feature of that form of existence which is acquired by being moved, namely, that it is such that it can also not be. In Book I of *De coelo et mundo* [chap. 12] the Philosopher makes use of this way as follows: Since it is certain that things exist which can both be and not be and that nothing of this kind exists of itself (for the existence it actually has is from potency and nothing goes from potency to act save by virtue of some-thing actually existing, because—as we have said in the previous argument—everything which is moved and transmuted is moved and transmuted by another), it is necessary then to postulate something else which cannot be nonexistent. For otherwise there would be an infinite regress, as is evident. Wherefore there must needs be such a thing as possesses existence necessarily and which is such that it has the cause of its necessity either from another or of itself. If from another then we have to ask again: Does this other have the cause of its necessity in still another or is it necessary of itself? Either there will be an infinite regress or we end up with something which has the cause of its necessity in itself. But since it is impossible to go on [WW 382] *ad infinitum*, what must be postulated is some necessary being which derives its necessity not from another but is such of itself. But, as the Commentator [Averroes] explains in the chapter on the necessary in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, this first cause of all things is what we call God. Therefore, etc.

The third argument, which pertains to the same way and proceeds in similar fashion, is that which makes use of the conditions of cause and caused. The former of itself has necessary existence and moves [other things]; the latter is moved and has its existence by reason of another. In Book II of the *Metaphysics* the Philosopher uses this way in proving there is an ultimate among efficient causes. What is certain and what we see before our very eyes in such sensible things as can begin to be and perish is that there is something whose existence is caused. Every such thing however must needs be caused and have its existence from another. For there is nothing which gives itself existence so that it would be its own cause, for then one and the same thing would be both prior and posterior to itself, which is impossible. Therefore, either there will be an infinite regress or we shall end up with something which has the cause of its necessity in itself. But since it is impossible to go on [WW 382] *ad infinitum*, what must be postulated is some necessary being which derives its necessity not from another but is such of itself. But, as the Commentator [Averroes] explains in the chapter on the necessary in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, this first cause of all things is what we call God. Therefore, etc.

[b. The Way of Formal Causality]

The argument by way of formal causality is twofold, since the form is a principle both of being and being known. The one begins with the being things possess by reason of their form; the second is based upon the knowledge whose source is the form. Both proceed in the same manner as the argumentation [WW 383] of the previous way. The first is that for which Augustine searches in *On True Religion*. If there is one thing that we can be sure of, one thing which is there before our very eyes, it is the delightful beauty and decor possessed by every bodily nature, beginning with the very lowest of inanimate things, increasing with insensate organisms, becoming even greater in that which is sensate, and still greater in that nature endowed with reason which evaluates all the rest. For what judges is always of greater excellence than what is judged. Since in all this, beauty and agreeability is to be found, we are pleased. But since none of these possesses the ultimate in beauty, each suffers in comparison with what is better and is judged to possess so much beauty and to depart so much from perfect pulchritude. Now either there will be an infinite regress or we shall end up with something so beautiful and lovely that all else is judged by its beauty and decor and suffers in comparison. This immutable nature excelling
II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

every existing rational creature, since creatures are changeable, is undoubtedly what we call God. But since an infinite regress is impossible, we must needs postulate that there is a terminus which is God.

The second proof is that for which Augustine looks so long in his work On Free Choice of the Will, Book II [chaps. 3ff]. It is certain from our own experience that while we judge about the proper sensibles by reason of a particular sense, e.g. about colors by reason of sight, or about sounds by hearing, we are unable by these senses to determine what they have or do not have in common—for this latter we do by means of a kind of common internal sense. But even by this we cannot discern - not only what they have in common but also what is proper to each. For we do this only in virtue of a higher power called reason. Since in all such, what judges is better and more noble than what is judged, it follows that there will be either an infinite regress or a termination in something so excellent that it is judged by none but is that in virtue of which all else is judged. But this immutable wisdom is without a doubt some-thing above rational minds and above every mutable thing, since to pass judgment on what is mutable is the prerogative only of what is immutable. This immutable wisdom we call God. Since an infinite regress, however, is impossible, we are forced to postulate a termination in what can only be God. [WW 384]

c. The Way of Final Causality

So far as the way of final causality is concerned there is but one argument and it resembles the previous ones. The Philosopher [Aristotle] in Book II of the Metaphysics uses it in the following way. We see that one thing is ordered to another as to its end. The latter is ordered to something else as its end, and this is the case with all things (for what is per se and by nature the good of anything is its end and for the sake of which it exists, as we read in Book III of the Metaphysics). This being so, either there will be an infinite regress or this hierarchy of ends will culminate in something ultimate, which is the good and end of all that precedes and has nothing beyond it as its good or end. But since this process cannot go on ad infinitum, as we said above, if no such thing exists, there will be nothing that comes to be for the sake of something, and thus the nature of the good will be destroyed and everything will occur by happenstance and without any purpose. It is necessary therefore to assume a terminal point in some ultimate good which is the end of all else. But this is just what we say God is, since he is the best of all beings. Therefore God exists.

[2. THE WAY OF EMINENCE]

After the way of causality, the more cogent way of proving God exists is that of eminence and it proceeds according to a twofold argumentation. One is along the lines of the formal cause argument of the first way, namely since all that is good and praiseworthy about a creature is still small and deficient, we trace it back to what is good and praiseworthy in a perfect and consummate sense, lest there be an infinite regress. Richard [of St. Victor] speaks of this in his work On the Trinity. What is most certain so that none can doubt it is that among such a variety of things there must be a highest, exceeded or excelled by nothing. This is the true entity and goodness, as it were, from which all else has its goodness and entity. And as Anselm puts it in the Monologium, chapter three, since there is no denying that some natures are better than others, reason persuades us that one of them is of such excellence that it neither has nor can have anything superior to it. And Augustine in On Christian Doctrine, Book I [chap. 7] says that those who by their intelligence go on to see what God is, prefer him to all other natures not only visible and bodily but also intelligible [WW 386] and spiritual—to all that is mutable. All certainly suffer in comparison with God’s excellence. Neither can anyone be found who believes that God is excelled by anything. As is fitting; then, all agree that he is God whom they esteem above all things.

Another way of arguing by way of eminence proceeds by comparing what is to be approved of in
creatures and the creator either simply or in terms of more or less. This is the argument Anselm uses in the beginning of the Monologium. Wherever we find something existing in varying degrees, there is something to be found which is simply such. Now among things we find both what is good and what is better, what is beautiful and what is more lovely, what delights and what is more delightful. Something is to be found then which is simply good, simply beautiful, simply delightful. In comparison to this, all else has only more or less. But where there is pure goodness as well as pure beauty, delightfulness, and so on, there is God. Hence God exists.

The Philosopher in the Metaphysics, Book IV, uses a similar argument against those who insist that every opinion is only an estimate and there is nothing scientifically certain. For they still say that estimates differ from one another by reason of their greater or lesser degree of truth. The Commentator [Averroes] develops the argument even more clearly than the text as follows: If anything is to have more of the truth and less of falsity, then something must be simply true and in reference to this other things are said to be more or less true. For what has more of the truth and less of falsity, since it is an admixture of contraries, must have something above it which is more true. But if this other is not simply true but has an element of falsity in it, then it too has something greater above it. Now there is either an infinite regress or a termination in what is true without qualification. The latter is that which is the truest of all and is the cause of the truth of whatever is below it, as we read in the Metaphysics, Book II, where the Commentator says that this is the proper cause of all things and is God. Therefore, etc.

[II. Probable Arguments]

Fragmentary and probable arguments are also used to [WW 386] argue the same point. These however are reducible to the above demonstrative proofs in the way that every probable reason is reducible to one that is necessary. Such an argument by way of efficient causality is that of Richard in his work On the Trinity [PL 196, col. 893ff]. He presupposes two self-evident divisions. The first is that whatever is or can be thought of either exists eternally or begins to be in time. The second is that whatever exists has its existence of itself or by reason of another. These being presupposed, he argues in terms of a fourfold division. Every being either exists eternally and of itself or neither eternally nor of itself, or in one of two intermediary ways: viz. either eternally and not of itself, or of itself but not eternally. It is this last alternative that he rules out first as being wholly impossible, for whatever does not exist eternally begins to be in accordance to the first division proposed. Hence it has its existence from another and not of itself, according to the second division proposed. Then, using the second and third members of his fourfold classification, he argues to the existence of the first in this fashion. If some-thing does not exist of itself, whether it exists eternally (as the third member says) or not (as the second says), it must needs have its existence from another (according to the second division proposed). There is then the question of whether this other exists by reason of some further thing. Either we admit an infinite regress, which is impossible, or we shall come to some-thing which does not have its existence from another. This then will be something which is both eternal and of itself and this we call God. Therefore, etc.

Damascene argues in the same way in Book I [of The Orthodox Faith] thus: Everything which is or can be thought of is creatable or not. If creatable, then it is variable and has gone from nonexistence to being. But this is not in virtue of some other creatable, lest there be an infinite series of questions about this other from which it proceeded to be. Therefore, it is by reason of something uncreatable. This however is what we assume God to be. Therefore, etc.

The same form of argument with a slightly different subject matter is this. All that is or can be, is either a cause or caused or both. Everything caused, however, has existence from a cause other than itself since nothing causes itself to be. Either there will be an infinite regress or there will be some cause which is not itself caused and this is what we call God. Hence, God exists. [WW 387]
In chapter three of Book I, Damascene argues to the same conclusion using the notion of conservation. Everything composed that can be dissolved into something simple and indissoluble is conserved in existence, since of itself it will fall into nothingness. Every mundane thing is of this sort. Therefore, etc.

Some argue to the same conclusion from the governance of the world by way of final causality in this fashion. All natural things act for the sake of an end according to the Philosopher in Book II of the Physics. But they do so without any knowledge of it, for they possess no knowledge. However, what lacks knowledge is not directed toward a definite end unless it be guided by one who knows of it, even as the arrow is aimed by the archer. There is then some knower by whom all natural things are governed in regard to their end and this is what we assume God to be. Therefore, etc.

Anselm in the Monologium and Augustine in On True Religion, Soliloquies, and On Free Choice of the Will reach the same conclusion on the basis of the nature of truth as follows: Truth cannot be nonexistent, but is eternal and immutable, as is argued persuasively in the aforesaid works frequently and prolixly. But eternal truth is nothing else but God. Therefore it is necessary that God exist. This argument proceeds by the way of final causality. And so it becomes irrefutably clear that if we assume that any being exists, we must postulate that God exists.

[REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING]

Against the first argument (that every demonstration proceeds by way of some prior and better known middle term), it must be said that this is true either simply or so far as we are concerned. Now while there is no medium for proving God exists which is prior or better known purely and simply, there is nevertheless one which is such so far as we are concerned, as has been said. For just as we may doubt about God’s existence by grasping something with our mind which is the divine essence confusedly signified by the name, so too can we be convinced of his existence by means of a creature which is known to us. But this is something which has to do with the mind’s knowledge and is not in the nature of things themselves. To the second argument, that in God the “what-it-is” [WW 388] [or essence] is the same as the “that-it-is” [or existence], while it must be admitted that this is true of the being [esse] by which he subsists in himself, it is not true of the “is” [esse] which signifies an affirmation of the intellect. Therefore, even though the former “that-it-is” cannot be known if the “what-it-is” is not known, as shall be made clear later on, the latter can be, as has been asserted above and will be brought up again later.

As for the third, viz. that since the existence of God is an article of faith, it is not demonstrable, this must be pointed out. Of the things that can be believed, some are simply such, those which are a matter of belief for all since they simply exceed natural reason’s powers of investigation, e.g., that God is triune. This kind of truth is in no way demonstrable from creatures, although we may find certain features about creatures with which such a truth fits in and which can be used to lead the mind to believe such a truth more firmly. But it is only through the light of faith and God revealing it that we believe such a truth and it is by the merit of faith that what we at first believed, we come to understand by reason of a light infused from above. The reason, then, that probable arguments should be adduced is to clarify such a truth and not to convince those who are opposed to it, for there are no reasons in the nature of things that can do such, since the notion of the Trinity is not something which can be revealed in creatures, a point we shall take up later. The type of truth which can be believed by some, however, is of a different kind. It does not completely transcend the understanding of natural reason. Such is the truth that God exists or that there is but one God. For those who have not a mature mind, such truths cannot be proved from what they know of creatures, but are matters of pure belief. For others, however, who are of a more subtle mind, such truths are probable, and for these individuals such truths are to some extent knowable and to some extent a matter of belief, viz. insofar as any arguments drawn from
creatures do not prove them to a man in this life with the same clarity as he hopes to have about them through vision in the life to come. In such as these faith and scientific knowledge (or understanding) stand side by side, as we said before. As for what is added from Gregory (viz, that faith would be without merit, and so on) one should reply that there is one type of reason which serves as a prelude to faith by proving what must be believed and causing faith. This holds, however, only for such truths as are matters of belief for some but not for all. But in such a case there is no merit, if a truth of this kind is held only because of what is known by reason. But if by reason we come to have faith in other things that are to be believed, or if it follows upon faith, reason does not destroy merit. That is why philosophers who come to have faith believe meritoriously many things about God which they knew before or know afterwards by reason. That is why Augustine says in *On the Trinity*, Book VIII, chap. 9: “Faith helps us in our knowledge and love of God, not as though he were completely unknown or unloved, but in such a way that he may be known more clearly and loved more steadfastly.” A reason of this kind rather augments than destroys merit.

HENRY OF GHENT

*SUMMA OF ORDINARY QUESTIONS*, A. 22 Q.5

Circa quintum arguitur quod deum esse potest fieri notum homini alia via quam ex creaturis.

Dicendum ad hoc secundum iam diu superius determinata quod homo naturaliter oridnatur ad duplicem cognitionem intellectualem, quarum una est ad quam ex puris naturalibus studio et investigatione potest attingere, et talis cognitione procedit de deo et de creaturis, quantum philosophia se potest extendere. Alia vero est ad quam non potest attingere nisi dono luminiis alicuius supernaturalis gratieae vel gloriae adiuta. Et utraque via potest fieri homini notum deum esse, et hoc est quod solet dici, quod deum esse potest dupliciter homini esse notum: uno modo via naturalis rationis; alio modo via supernaturalis revelationis.

In via cognoscendi Deum esse primo modo erat opinio Avicennae (si tamen locutus est ut purus philosophus) quod praeter notitiam quam habemus de deo ex sensibilibus a posteriori, possibilis est alia a priori, secundum quod promittit modum illum in primo Metaphysicae suae, dicens “Postea manifestabitur tibi quod nos habemus viam ad stabiliendum primum principium non ex via testificationis sensibilium, sed ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium, quae faciunt necessarium quod ens habet princicipium, etiam quod est necessesse esse, et quod totum debet esse per illud, secundum ordinem totius. Sed nos propter infirmitatem nostrarum animarum non possimus incidere per ipsam viam demonstrativam, quae est progressus a principiis ad sequentia, et ex causa ad causatum, nisi aliquibus ordinibus universitatis eorum quae sunt.” In quo reprehendit eum Commentator super finem primi Physicorum dicens quod Avicenna maxime peccavit cum dixit quod primus philosophus debet demonstrare primum esse. Revera valde bene in hoc reprehendit eum, si intellexit notitiam illarum propositionum universalium non haberi ex sensibilibus creaturis, quoniam non est nobis omnino via ad probandum ipsum esse nisi ex sensibilibus, neque etiam ad cognoscendum ipsius naturam et essentiam, neque aliqua alia circa intelligibilia, sive sint naturalia, sive supernaturalia, multo tamen minus circa supernatualia, et maxime circa divina, dico notitia naturali et ex puris naturalibus acquisita.

Ad cuius intellectum sciemund quod tripliciter contingit scire de re aliqua an sit in actu existiens. Uno modo ex praesentia eius, ad modum quo scitur ignis esse praensens oculis. Alio modo ex cognitionem naturae et essentiae ipsius rei, sicut homo cognoscit naturam ignis, absque eo quod videt eam in praesenti. Tertio modo ex collatione et dependentia existentiae aliorum ad existentiam eius quod cognoscendum est esse.

Primo modo non cognoscitur deus esse nisi videndo eius nudam essentiam, sicut vident eam sancti in patria, scientes per hoc deum esse, sicut videns ignem praeculis, per hoc scit ignem esse. Et hac via cognoscendi scire deum esse impossibile est homini ex puris naturalibus in
II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

quocunque statu, quia omnino impossibile est eum ex puris naturalibus pervenire ad videndum nudam dei essentiam, quia talis modus cognoscendi deum excedit omnino naturam hominis, ut homo est simpliciter, ita quod hominem videre nude divinam essentiam ex puris naturalibus, sicut vident eam beati per gloriam, omnino est impossibile, de quo aliquando debet esse quaestio difficilis in se.

Secundo modo nullam rem contingit scire esse in effectu, nisi quiditas sua includat suum esse existentiae, quod contingit in solo deo, quia in solo deo idem sunt essentia et esse, non solum essentiae, sed etiam actualis existentiae, ut dictum est supra. Igitur isto modo cognoscendinulla creatura potest sciri esse. Contingit enim scire et cognoscere essentiam cuiuslibet creaturae non sciendo eam esse, immo cointelligendo eam non esse. Sed solum deum possibile est scire esse, sciendo eius quiditatem et essentiam, quod scilicet talis sit quod in eo idem sint essentia et esse, et per hoc scire ex eius essentia quod sit necessaria existentia, ita quod non sit possibile intelligere eius essentia, intelligendo cum hoc ipsam non existere in effectu, ut infra videbitur, et hoc possibile est hominem scire et cognoscere de deo ex puris naturalibus, ut infra videbitur. Unde patet quod per hunc modum deus cognoscitur esse cognoscendo eius essentiam quod ad hoc quod eius essentia includit ipsum esse. In ipso enim non differunt existentia et essentia, quod in visione nuda ipsius essentiae manifestissime contemplatur.

Hoc ut credo intellexit Avicenna cum dixit quod possit homo scire deum esse “ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium, non ex via testificationis sensibilium.” Sunt autem propositiones illae universales de ente uno et bono et primis rerum intentionibus, quae prim concipiuntur ab intellectu, in quibus potest homo percipere ens simpliciter, bonum aut verum simpliciter. Tale autem est necessario subsistens quid in se, non in alio participatum, et quod tale est, ipsum esse est, ipsum bonum est, ipsa veritas est, ipse deus est, secundum quod dicit Augustinus 8 De trinitate, “Deus veritas est, cum audis veritas, noli quaerere qui sit veritas. Statim enim se opponunt caligines imaginum corporalium et nebula phantasmatum, et perturbant serenitatem, quae primo ictu diluxit tibi, cum dicerem veritas est. Ecce in ipso primo ictu qua velut coruscatione perstringeris cum dicitur veritas, mane si potes. Si non potes, relaberis in ista solita terrena. Ecce iterum bonum hoc bonum illud, et vide ipsum bonum si potes, ita deum videbis non alio bono, sed bonum omnis boni.” Et quia boni sic simpliciter concepti, conceptus quidem boni universalis est et primus conceptus boni, post quem sequuntur alii, subdit Augustinus ibidem, “Non diceremus aliud alió melius cum vere iudicamus, nisi nobis esset impressa notio ipsius boni et non est quo se convertat animus ut fiat bonus animus, nisi maneret in se illud bonum. Unde si se avertit, non est quo iterum si voluerit se emendare convertat.” Et ita cum secundum Avicennam et secundum rei veritatem conceptus quanto sunt simpliciores tante priores, et ideo unum res et talia statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex alis notioribus se, et secundum Augustinum intelligendo ens omnis entis et bonum simpliciter omnis boni, intelligitur deus, ideo ex talibus conceptibus propositionum universalium contingit secundum Avicennam et Augustinum intelligere et scire deum esse, non ex via testificationis sensibilium, quod procul dubio verum est, est enim iste modus alius a via cognoscendi deum esse testificatione sensibilium qua esse creaturae testificatur esse dei, secundum quod apparuit in quaestione praeecedenti.

Non tamen non est omnino iste alius modus a via cognoscendi deum esse per creaturas, quia ite modus ortum sumit a cognitione essentiae creaturae. Ex veritate enim et bonitatem creaturae intelligimus verum et bonum simpliciter, si enim abstrahendo ab hoc bono et illo possimus intelligere ipsum bonum et verum simpliciter, non ut in hoc et in illo, sed ut stans, deum in hoc intelligimus. Sed hoc vel non possimus vel vix possimus propter debilitatem animarum nostrarum, non ob aliud (ut dicit Augustinus libri 2 De ordine) nisi quia in istorum sensibilium negotia mentem nostram progressam redire in semetipsam difficile est. Iste ergo modus cognoscendi deum esse, licet non sit testificationis creaturarum, quod elegantur dicit Avicenna, ortum tamen sumit a creaturis, in quo quasi hoc non consensisset Avicenna eum reprehendit Averroes et male. Illud enim bene insinuavit Avicenna cum adiunxit quod “propter infirmitatem
II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

animarum nostrarum non possumus per illam viam incidere, nisi aliquibus ordinibus universitatis eorum quae sunt.” Unde addit ibidem, “Ex merito huius scientiae est ut sit excellenterior super omnes, quantum vero ad nos posterioratur post omnes.” Unde et quod ista via orum sumit a creaturis, bene docet Augustinus 8 De trinitate dicens, “Cum audis hoc bonum et illud bonum, quae possunt alias dici non bona, si poteris sine illis quae participazione bona sunt perspicere ipsum bonum cuius participacione bona sunt, simul enim et ipsum intelligis cum audis hoc aut illud bonum. Si ergo potueris illis detractis per seipsum perspicere bonum, perspicere bonum, perspexeris deum.” Istum autem modum probandi deum esse ex propositionibus universalium aliter quam supra dictum est ex testificatione sensibilium videbimus infra loquendo de dei unitate.

Et est ista via sciendi deum esse, multo perfectior quam secunda, licet ambae sint ex creaturis, quia in illa potest sciri deus esse absque eo quod cognoscatur praedicatum esse de ratione subiecti, quod necessario scitur in ista. Et ideo in ista cognoscitur divina essentia et quid sit deus magis in particulari et distincte quam in illa. In illa enim scitur solum quod est aliqua natura superior et prior omni creatura, absque eo quod sciatur quia in ipso est summa simplicitas et identitas esse et essentiae, quod scitur in ista.

Aut ergo Avicenna ignoravit quid dixit et mentitus est dicendo quod est nobis alia via ad cognoscendum deum esse quam ex creaturis, quia in illa potest sciri deus esse absque eo quod cognoscatur praedicatum esse de ratione subiecti, quod necessario scitur in ista. Et ideo in ista cognoscitur divina essentia et quid sit deus magis in particulari et distincte quam in illa. In illa enim scitur solum quod est aliqua natura superior et prior omni creatura, absque eo quod sciatur quia in ipso est summa simplicitas et identitas esse et essentiae, quod scitur in ista.

HENRY OF GHENT
SUMMA OF ORDINARY QUESTIONS, A. 22 Q.5

Concerning the fifth matter it is argued that God exists can be made known to us by a way other than from creatures . . .

It should be said to this according to what has been determined above that we are naturally ordered to a twofold intellectual cognition, one of which we can attain from natural things alone by study and investigation, and there is such cognition about both God and creatures as far as philosophy can extend. But there is another which we can only attain by the gift of some supernatural grace with the aid of beatitude. In either way that God exists can be made known to us. And this is usually said, that God exists can be made known to us in two manners: in one manner by the way of natural reason and the other by the way of supernatural revelation.

In the way of knowing that God exists in the first manner, it was the opinion of Avicenna, if indeed he spoke as a pure philosopher, that outside the knowledge which we have of God from sensible things a posteriori, another way is possible a priori, inasmuch as he sets forth that way in the first book of his Metaphysics when he says,

“Later it will be clear to you that we have a way of proving the first principle, not from the way of the evidence of sensible things, but from the way of universal, intelligible propositions, which make it necessary that being have a principle, which is necessary being, and that the universe must be from it according to the order of the universe. But because of the weakness of our intellects we cannot proceed by means of that demonstrative way, which is a progression from cause to effect and principles to what follows them, except in certain orders of the totality of beings.”

In his last comment on the first book of the Physics Averroes criticizes Avicenna in this matter, saying that

“Avicenna made the worst error when he said that the first philosopher must demonstrate that the first being exists.”
Indeed, Averroes was quite correct to criticize Avicenna if Avicenna meant that the knowledge of those universal propositions did not come from sensible creatures, since there is no other way for us to prove the existence of God except from sensible things, nor of knowing the divine nature or essence, nor anything else about intelligible things, whether natural or supernatural, much less concerning supernatural things, and especially divine things, I mean by natural knowledge acquired from natural things alone.

To understand this, it should be known that to know whether some thing actually exists happens in three ways. In one way from its presence, in the way a fire present to the eyes is known to exist. In a second way from a knowledge of the nature and essence of the thing itself, as when one knows the nature of fire without seeing it in something present. Thirdly, from the existence of other things which have a connection with or dependence on the existence of that which is to be known to exist.

Now in the first way, God is not known to exist except by seeing his essence immediately, just as the saints see it in heaven, who know through this that God exists, just as someone who sees fire before his eyes, knows that the fire exists. And this way of knowing that God exists is impossible for us from natural things alone in any state whatever . . .

Nothing is known to actually exist in the second way unless its quiddity includes its actual existence, which occurs in God alone, because in God alone are essence and being identical, not just essential being, but even the being of actual existence, as said above. Therefore, in this way of knowing no creature can be known to exist. For it is possible to know the essence of any creature without knowing that it exists, indeed, while understanding at the same time that it does not exist. But it only is possible to know that God exists while knowing his quiddity and essence, that is, that God is such that in him essence and existence are the same, and through this to know from his essence that he is necessary existence, so that it is not possible to understand his essence and to understand at the same time that it does not actually exist, as will be seen below. And this is possible for man to know on the basis of natural things alone, as will be seen below. Thus it is clear that through this way God is known to exist by knowing his essence because his essence includit being itself. For in God existence and essence do not differ, which in the pure vision of that essence itself is most evidently is contemplated.

I believe Avicenna had this in mind when he said that man can know that God exists “by a way of universal intelligible propositions, non from the way of evidence of sensible things.” Those “universal propositions,” however, concern being, one and good and the other first concepts of things, which are conceived first by the intellect, in which man can perceive being absolutely and good or true absolutely. Such, however, is necessarily something subsisting in itself not participating in something else, and what is such is being itself, good itself, truth itself and God Himself, just as Augustine says in 8 De trinitate . . .

And so since according to Avicenna, and according to the truth of the matter, the more simple concepts are the more prior, and therefore “one, thing, and such are immediately impressed on the mind by a primary impression, which are not acquired from anything better known than them,” and since according to Augustine when we understand the unqualified being of every being and the unqualified good of every good, we understand God, therefore from such concepts of universal propositions it is possible according to Avicenna and Augustine to understand and know that God exists, not from the way of the evidence of sensible things, which no doubt is true, for there is a way other than the way of knowing God exists by the evidence of sensible things, by which the existence of the creature gives proves the existence of God, which is apparent in the proceeding question.

Nor is this a totally different way of knowing that exists from creatures, because it takes its start from a knowledge of the essence of a creature. For from the truth and goodness of a creature we understand the true and good absolutely, for if we abstract from this good and that good, we are able to understand the good itself and the true absolutely, not as it is in this or that, but as it is
standing in itself, then we understand God. But we are not able or scarcely able to do this because of the weakness of our intellects, as Augustine says in 2 De ordine . . . .

Therefore, this way of knowing that God exists, although it is not a way of the evidence of creatures, which Avicenna elegantly says, nevertheless it takes it start from creatures, in which matter, as though Avicenna did not think this, Averroes criticized Avicenna and wrongly. For Avicenna indeed implied this when he added that “on account of the weakness of our intellects we cannot follow that way except in certain orders of the totality of beings.” Whence he added in the same text, “In worth this science is more excellect than all others, but with respect to us it is posterior to all others.” Thus, that this way begins from creatures, Augustine indeed taught in 8 De trinitate when he said “When you hear ‘this good’ and ‘that good’, which can in another way be called not good, if you are able to see without those things which are good by participation the good itself by whose participation those things are good -- for you understand it when you hear ‘this good’ or ‘that good’ --therefore, if you are able to see the good itself with those things removed, you will see God.” This way of proving that God exists from universal propositions other than, as said above, the way from the evidence of sensible things, we will see below when speaking of the unity of God.

And this way of knowing that God exists is much more prefect than the second, although both are from creatures, because in the second way God can be known to exist with knowing that the predicate is of the nature of the subject, which is necessarily known in this way. And therefore in this way the divine essence and what God is is known more particularly and more distinctly that in that one. For in that way is is only known that God is some nature higher and prior to every creature, without knowing that in God there is the highest simplicity and identity of existence and essence, which is known in this way.

Either therefore Avicenna did not know what he said and lied by saying that we have a way of knowing that God exists other than the way from the evidence of sensible things, or he understood it as has been already explained, or he did not speak philosophically, but dreamt a way of faith and supernatural knowledge by the way of revelation, concering which he says some things beyond other philosophers by treating philosophical revelations at the end of his Metaphysics. But if he understood this way, he spoke well and in accord with the catholic faith. For there is by the way of faith and supernatural revelation another way possible to knowing that God exists, which is different from the way of natural reason from creatures.
II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

DUNS SCOTUS ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

English Translations of Scotus’s Proofs for the Existence of God


Bibliography


VERSIONS OF SCOTUS’S PROOF OF GOD

Scotus’s proofs exist in four versions, all of which have been translated. They are listed here in presumed chronological order:


Reportatio: (Items [5] and [6], pp. 115-140 above). Contains some features not in Ordinatio, such as the addition to the triple primacy of a separate proof from exemplarity.

De primo principio: (Item [1] above.) While much of the proof proper is copied from the Ordinatio – thus indicating he did not finish the work himself – the first two chapters set out in a systematic way Scotus’s concept of essential order as a transcendental feature of being.

OUTLINE OF SCOTUS’S ORDINATIO PROOF

Part One: Relative Properties

1) Triple Primacy
   
   A) Causality
      1) Efficiency
         (i) Metaphysical not physical efficiency (Lectura; text reproduced below.)
         (ii) Formal (i.e., Exemplar) cause not distinct genus of cause from efficient (Contra Henry)

   2) Finality

   B) Eminence

   C) Main Steps of Proof for the ‘Triple Primacy’.
      1) There actually exists something primary in each of these three orders of efficiency, finality and eminence. This step involves three sub-steps for each of the three orders:
         (i) Something is first.
         (ii) That first is uncausable.
         (iii) That first actually exists.
      2) What is primary in one of these orders is also primary in the others
      3) There is only one nature primary in each of these order.

   D) Proof of I.C.1.i for Efficiency: Some efficient cause is absolutely first, so that it neither can be caused nor causes in virtue of something else.
      1) Main argument
      2) Two objections
         (i) Assumes no infinite regress (i.e., begs the question)
            (a) Argument: philosophers admitted infinite regress in generation of individuals.
         (ii) Begins with contingent premisses (i.e., not a true demonstration)
            (a) Argument: demonstration requires necessary premisses.
      3) Reply to D.2.i (infinite regress)
(i) Distinction between essential versus accidental causes, on the one hand, and essentially ordered versus accidentally ordered causes, on the other. The former indicate a relation of a cause to its effect; the latter indicate a relation of two (or more) causes to each in producing a joint effect. Three features of essentially ordered causes, all of which show that the infinite regress admitted by the philosophers is of accidentally ordered causes:

(a) The second depends upon the first insofar as it is a cause (i.e., to exercise its causal power). In accidentally ordered causes there is dependency only in existence, not causation. Children can produce offspring whether or not their parents are still alive.

(b) From (a) it follows that essentially ordered causes must be of different nature and order, for no two causes of the same nature depend on each other for their very ability to cause. Accidentally ordered causes, e.g., two men pulling a boat, can be of the same order and nature.

(c) From (b) it follows that essentially ordered causes must be simultaneously present to cause an effect. Accidentally ordered causes can be successive.

(ii) Given these precisions, five arguments against infinite regress of essentially ordered causes:

(a) From the first property it follows that some cause must be outside the whole order of dependent causes, otherwise it would be the cause of itself.

(b) From third property, implies actually existing infinite, which philosophers deny.

(c) If infinite regress, then no priority and posteriority.

(d) From second property, if assume infinite regress, still have a first cause in sense of one independent.

(e) Efficient causality is a pure perfection, i.e., does not of itself imply imperfection. Therefore, it can exist without imperfection, i.e., not depending on another for its being or causal power. But if infinite regress, then such a cause is never found without imperfection. As Scotus says, he will exploit this seemingly weaker result to deduce the actual existence of the first cause.

4) Reply to D.2.ii (from contingent premisses)

(i) Proof could be formulated from evident but contingent premisses, namely, from the evidence of some actually existing effect or change. Or can be formulated from its essential or possible being, and then the proof proceeds from necessary premisses. This will show only the possibility of the first efficient cause – as evident from fifth proof against infinite regress – the actual existence of which will be shown in the third main step.

E) Proof of I.C.1.ii: This first efficient cause is that it is absolutely incapable of being caused.

1) This follows directly from above, because it is were in any way caused, would not be first in the sense of independent as shown above.

F) Proof of I.C.1.iii: Such a first cause actually exists.

1) That to which it is contradictory to exist from another, if it can exist, it can exist from itself. But to exist from another is contradictory to the first efficient cause, from the second article (E above). Furthermore, it can exist, from the last proof of infinite regress. Therefore, the first efficient cause can exist from itself. But then it actually
II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

does exist, for what does not actually exist from itself, cannot exist from itself, since it cannot be caused.

II) Identity of Triple Primacy

III) Triple Primacy in One Nature

A) From Efficiency

1) Note that as a preliminary result, Scotus here establishes that the first efficient cause is a necessary being. From this, he uses Avicenna’s arguments that there cannot be more that one necessary being, and thus not more than one first efficient cause.

B) From Eminence

C) From Finality

Part Two: Absolute Properties

This involved second part of the proof itself has two main sections: (I) a preliminary section that demonstrates various properties of the above nature in which coincides the triple primacy, most notably that it has an intellect and will. The second section (II) then demonstrates infinity of the triple primacy.

I) Preliminary Conclusions to the Infinity of the Primary Nature

A) The Primary Nature as an Intellect and Will

Among these arguments, the most characteristic of Scotus is the following:

Something causes contingently.
Therefore, God causes contingently.
Therefore, God causes by willing.

There are three objections, the first two to the first inference (i.e., God must be the source of contingency) and one to the second (a contingent cause must be a will):

1. Contingency can be brought about our will.
2. Contingency can be brought about by defectibility in secondary causes.
3. Natural causes can be impeded, and hence contingency arises.

B) Its Self-Intellection and Volition are Identical with its Essence

C) Its Acts of Understanding Other Things is not an Accident of its Nature

D) It Knows Everything that Can Be Known Eternally, Distinctly, Actually, Necessarily and Naturally Prior to them Existing.

II) The Primary Nature is Actually Infinite

A) From Efficiency

1) Proof from Motion.

(i) Scotus engages in a long attempt to rehabilitate Aristotle’s argument from Physics VIII, that the first cause is infinite in power because it produces an eternal motion, which had been endorsed by Henry of Ghent in Summa 35.6

(ii) Scotus then rejects the standard argument from creation, again as found in Henry of Ghent Summa 35.6, that God is infinite power because the distance from nothing to being spanned in creation is infinite.

2) Proof from Knowledge, i.e., Exemplar Cause.

B) From Finality

C) From Eminence

1) Strengthening (coloratio) of Anselm’s Argument.
II. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

SCOTUS, LECTURA I D. 2
Rejection of the Proof from Motion

[1. The Argument from Efficiency]
40. Now efficiency can be considered either as a metaphysical or as a physical property. The metaphysical property is more extensive than the physical for “to give existence to another” is of broader scope than “to give existence by way of movement or change.” And even if all existence were given in the latter fashion, the notion of the one is still not that of the other.

It is not efficiency as a physical attribute, however, but efficiency as the metaphysician considers it that provides a more effective way of proving God’s existence, for there are more attributes in metaphysics than in physics whereby the existence of God can be established. It can be shown, for example, from “composition and simplicity,” from “act and potency,” from “one and many,” from those features which are properties of being. Wherefore, if you find one extreme of the disjunction imperfectly realized in a creature, you conclude that the alternate, the perfect extreme exists in God.

Averroes, therefore, in attacking Avicenna at the end of Bk. I of the Physics,14 is incorrect when he claims that to prove that God exists is the job of the physicist alone, because this can be established only by way of motion, and in no other way—as if metaphysics began with a conclusion which was not evident in itself, but needed to be proved in physics (For Averroes asserts this falsehood at the end of the first book of the Physics). In point of fact, however, [God’s existence] can be shown more truly and in a greater variety of ways by means of those metaphysical attributes which characterize being. The proof lies in this that the first efficient cause imparts not merely this fluid existence [called motion] but existence in an unqualified sense, which is still more perfect and widespread. Now the existence of a primacy in the higher class does not follow logically from the existence of a primary in a lower [or more specific] class, unless that member is the most noble. For example, this does not follow: “The most noble donkey exists, therefore the most noble animal exists.” Consequently, from the property of being the most noble being, one can argue better to a primacy among beings than from the primacy characteristic of a prime mover.

41. Hence, we omit the physical argument by which a prime mover is shown to exist and, using the efficiency characteristic of beings, we argue that among beings there is one which is a first efficient cause. And this is Richard’s argument in Bk. I, chapter eight On the Trinity.
III. UNIVERSALS AND INDIVIDUATION 70

UNIVERSALS AND INDIVIDUATION

BACKGROUND IN AVICENNA

Bibliography

Texts
Avicenna, al-Shifa’: al-Madkhal (Isagoge) I.2, p. 15 in Arabic (trans. Marmura, pp. 44-45);

The quiddities of things may exist in the real instances of things or in conception. They will thus have three aspects: [a] as consideration of the quiddity inasmuch as it is that quiddity, without being related to either of the two [kinds] of existence, and what attaches to it inasmuch as it is such; [b] a consideration thereof inasmuch as it is in external reality, where there will then attach to it accidents proper to this existence it has; and [c] a consideration thereof inasmuch as it is in conception, where there will then attach to it accidents proper to this existence, for example, being a subject, predication, universality and particularity in predication, essentiality and accidentality in predication, and other things that you will learn [in this book].


Animal in itself is a meaning, regardless of whether it exists in external reality or is conceived in the soul. In itself it is neither general nor particular. If it were in itself general, so that animality by reason of being animality is general, it would follow necessarily that there would be no individual animal; rather, every animal would be general. If, moreover, animal by virtue of being animal were [65.15] individual, it would then be impossible for it to be anything but one individual, that individual required by animality, and it would be impossible for any other individual to be an animal. Rather, animal in itself is something conceived in the mind as animal and in accordance with its conception as animal it is simply animal. If with this it is [also] conceived as general, particular and the like, then an idea additional to its being animal, occurring accidentally to animality, is conceived with it.

Latin of above from Avicenna, Logica (Venice, 1508), f. 12va

... animal est in se quoddam, et idem est utrum sit sensibile aut sit intellectum in anima. In se autem hujus nec est universale nec est singulare. Si enim in se esset universale, ita quod animalitas, ex hoc quod est animalitas, est universale, oporteret nullum animal esse singulare, sed omne animal esset universale. Si autem animal ex hoc quod est animal esset singulare, impossible esset esse plus quam unum singulare, scilicet ipsum singulare cui debetur animalitas, et esset impossible aliud singulare esse animal. ’Animal autem in se est quoddam intellectum in mente quod sit animal, et secundum hoc quod intelligitur esse animal non est nisi animal tantum. Si autem praeter hoc intelligitur esse universale aut singulare aut aliquid aliud, jam intelligitur praeter hoc quoddam, scilicet id quod est animal, quod accidit animalitat.i.

Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing
Book I, Chapter [One]

On general things and the manner of their existence
(1) It behooves us now to discuss the universal and the particular. For this is also properly related to what we have finished [discussing]. [These] are among the accidents specifically belonging to existence. We say:
III. UNIVERSALS AND INDIVIDUATION

(2) The universal is spoken of in three ways: “Universal” is said of the meaning by way of its being actually predicated of many—as, for example, the human being. Universal is [also] predicated of a meaning if it is permissible for it to be predicated of many, even if it is not a condition that these should exist in actuality—as, for example, the heptagonal house. For it is a universal inasmuch as it is in its nature to be predicatable of many. But it does not follow necessarily that these many must exist—nay, not even one of them. “The universal” is [also] said of the meaning whose very conception does not prevent its being predicated of many. It is only prevented if some cause prevents it and proof indicates [such prevention]. An example of this is [the case of] the sun and the earth. For, inasmuch as these are intellectually apprehended as sun and earth, there [149] is nothing to prevent the mind from allowing their meaning to exist in many, unless a proof or an argument makes it known that this is impossible. This, then, would be impossible because of an external cause, not by reason of its very conception.

(3) It is possible to combine all this [in saying] that this universal is that whose very conception does not prevent its being predicated of many. The universal used in logic and what is akin to it must be this. As for the particular that is singled out, this is [the thing] whose very conception prevents its meaning from being predicated of many, as with the essence of this Zayd to whom one points. For [the essence] cannot be imagined except as belonging to him alone.

(4) The universal, then, inasmuch as it is a universal, is one thing; and, inasmuch as it is something to which universality attaches, it is [another] thing. The universal inasmuch as it is a universal is that which is denoted by one of [the above] definitions. If that [indicated thing] happens to be “human” or “horse,” then there is another meaning other than the meaning of universality—namely [to take the latter example] “horseness.” For the definition of “horseness” is not the definition of universality, nor is universality included in the definition of “horseness.” For “horseness” has a definition that is not in need of the definition of universality, but is [something] to which universality accidentally occurs. For, in itself, it is nothing at all except “horseness”; for, in itself, it is neither one nor many and exists neither in concrete things nor in the soul, existing in none of these things either in potency or in act, such that [these] are included in “horseness.” Rather, in terms of itself, it is only “horseness.” Rather, oneness is an attribute that conjoins with “horseness,” whereby “horseness” with this attribute becomes one. Similarly, in addition to this attribute, “horseness” has many other attributes that enter it. Thus, “horseness”—on the condition that, in its definition, it corresponds to, many things—becomes general; and, because it is taken with properties and accidents to which one points, it is specific. “Horseness,” however, is in itself only “horseness.”

(5) If we are asked about “horseness” [in connection with] the two terms of what is contradictory (for example, “Is ‘horseness’ A, or is it not A?”) the answer would only be negation for whatever thing there is - not [however] that the negation comes after “inasmuch as;” but [rather] [150] before “inasmuch as.” In other words, it must not be said, “‘Horseness’ inasmuch as it is ‘horseness’ is not A,” but “Inasmuch as it is ‘horseness,’ it is neither A nor anything else.”

(6) If the two [opposed] terms of the question [arise] from two affirmative [alternative] statements that exclude anything else,2 there is no necessity at all to give an answer to [these] two. In this [lies] the differ_ence [between] the rule governing [these two] and [that governing] the affirmative and negative [statements] and the two affirmative statements that have the potentiality of two contradictories. This is because the affir - mative of the [latter] two, which is the necessary concomitant of the negative [of the other], means that, if the thing is not described by that other affirmative statement, then it is described by this one. It is not the case, however, that, if [the thing] is described by it, [the description] refers to its quiddity. For it does not follow that, if a human is one or white, the haecceity of humanity is identical with the haecceity of unity or whiteness, or that the haecceity of humanity is the haecceity of the one and the white.

(7) If, in the question, we render the subject the haecceity of humanity inasmuch as it is humanity as one thing, and if it is asked about the two contradictory terms and it is said, “Is it one or many?” it is not necessary to give an answer. [This is] because, inasmuch as it is the haecceity of humanity, it is something other than either, there existing in the definition of that thing nothing but humanity.

(8) As for [the question of] whether it is one or many insofar as this is a description that attaches to it from the outside, it is inevitable that it should be described as such. But it would not be that [thing] which is described, inasmuch as it is only humanity [for example]. Hence, it would not be many inasmuch as it is humanity; rather, it would be as though [multiplicity] is a thing that attaches to it from the outside.

(9) Hence, if our perception of it is inasmuch as it is only humanity, we must not mar it by considering some external thing that would render our consideration two: a consideration of it inasmuch as it is the thing that it is, and a consideration of the things that attach to it. [Now.] with respect to the one first
III. UNIVERSALS AND INDIVIDUATION

consideration, it would not be anything except only humanity. For this reason, if someone were to say, “Is
the humanity of Zayd, inasmuch as it is humanity, [something] other than the one in `Amr?” he must
answer, “No.” From his conceding this, it does not follow [151] that he should say, “That [humanity] and
this [humanity] are numerically the same,” because this has been an absolute negation. By this negation we
meant that this humanity inasmuch as it is humanity is simply humanity. Its being other than the one in
`Amr is something extraneous. For, if it were not something extraneous to humanity, then it would
necessarily follow that humanity inasmuch as it is humanity is either A or not A—and this we have shown
to be false. We have taken humanity only inasmuch as it is humanity.

(10) It may, however, be said: “We have made for humanity inasmuch as it is humanity a consideration
where [the fact] that it is in Zayd, or the one that is in Zayd, is removed from it. Otherwise, it would be the
case that we have taken humanity as being in Zayd. For we have abstracted it and discussed [it] on
condition that we pay it attention [only] when it is humanity.” [But then,] either [(a)] we refer the allusion
“that it is” to the humanity in Zayd—which would be an impossible assertion, since a humanity in Zayd
[and a humanity] considered to be only humanity do not combine; [or else, (b)] if it refers to humanity only,
then the mention of Zayd would be superfluous talk, unless we mean [by this] that the humanity which
happens to be in Zayd is an extraneous occurrence from which we have detached its being in Zayd. Is this,
then, the case [with humanity]? But, then, this would also include a consideration other than humanity.

(11) If [after this] someone asks, saying, “Do you not answer, saying, ‘It is not such and such [a thing];
and its not being such and such [a thing] is other than its being humanity inasmuch as it is humanity’?” we
say, “We do not answer by saying that inasmuch as it is humanity, it is not such [and such a thing], but we
answer that it is not, inasmuch as it is humanity, such [and such a thing].” The difference between these
two [statements] is known from logic.

(12) There is here, moreover, something else—namely, that the subject in questions [of this kind] is
almost [always] due to indefiniteness when no determinate quantification is attached to them and [hence]
will yield no answer unless one renders that humanity [of which we are speaking] [152] as though it is
[something that is] being pointed to or that does not include plurality. In this case, then, our utterance
“inasmuch as it is humanity” would not form part of the subject. [This is] because it would only be correct
to speak of “humanity, the one which is [taken] inasmuch as it is humanity,” when [such an expression]
reverts to being indefinite. [For,] if it is said [without indefiniteness] “that humanity, the one which is
[taken] inasmuch as it is humanity,” reference to it would have occurred; it thus adds [something to its
being] humanity [pure and simple].

(13) Moreover, if we are tolerant in this, whereby [we allow] both terms of the question to be negative
and where it does not necessarily follow that [the subject] is one or many, [or that it refers to] itself or [to]
an other—except in the sense that it is inevitable for it to [refer] either to itself or [to] an other’—we would
then say:

(14) It is inevitable that [humanity] should become an other through the accidents that are with it, since
it does not exist at all except with accidents (in which case it is not taken inasmuch as it is only humanity).
Since [for example] it is not the humanity of `Amr, it is not his humanity in terms of accidents. These
accidents would thus have an influence [(a)] on the individual Zayd [for example] in that he would consist
of thf: aggregate of man or of humanity and necessary concomitant accidents that stand as though they are
parts of him, and an influence [(b)] on man or humanity in that these are attributed to [Zayd].

(15) We will now return to the beginning and sum all this up, expressing it in another way as a
reminder of our discussion that has transpired. We say:

(16) There is here something perceived by the senses—namely, animal or man, together with matter
and accidents. This is natural man. There is [also] here something which is animal or human—viewed in
itself in terms of it itself, without taking with it what has mingled with it and without its having the
condition that it is either general or specific, one or many, whether in actuality or also through the
consideration of potency, inasmuch as it is in potency. For animal inasmuch as it is animal, and [153] man
inasmuch as it is man—that is, with respect to its definition and meaning, without any attention being paid
to other matters conjoining it—is nothing but animal or human.

(17) As for animal—in the general [sense], particular animal, animal with respect to its being
considered in potency as either general or specific, animal considered as existing in the concrete or
intellectually apprehended in the soul—it is animal and a thing. But it is not animal viewed alone. It is
known that, if it is animal and a thing, then “animal” is in the latter two as though a part of both. The same
is the case with respect to man.
(18) Considering animal in itself would be permissible even though it exists with another, because [it] itself with another is [still] itself. Its essence, then, belongs to itself, and its being with another is either an accidental matter that occurs to it or some necessary concomitant to its nature—as [is the case with] animality and humanity. Considered in this way, it is prior in existence to the animal, which is either particular or [reason of] its accidents or universal, existing [in the concrete] or [in the mind]$ in the way that the simple is prior to the complex and the part to the whole. In this [mode of] existence,’ it is neither genus nor species, neither individual, nor one, nor many. But, in this [mode of] existence, it is only animal and only human.

(19) However, it necessarily adheres to [animal or man] that it should be either one or many, since no existing10 thing is devoid of this, except that these necessarily adhere to it extrinsically. [Now,] this animal with this condition, even though existing in every individual [instance], is not [rendered] by this condition a certain animal—[this] even though it becomes necessary for it to become a certain animal because, through this consideration, it is, in its reality and nature, a certain animal.

Latin of above from Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Philosophia Prima,
ed. Simone van Reit, (Louvain, 1980), II.227-34

Oportet nunc ut loquamur de universali et particulari. Convenientius enim est ei a quo iam expediti sumus et hoc est de accidentibus propriis esse.

Dico igitur quod universale dicitur tribus modis : dicitur enim universale secundum hoc quod praedicatur in actu de multis, sicut homo ; et dicitur universale intentio quam possibile est praedicari de multis, etsi nullum eorum habeat esse in effectu, sicut intenito domus heptangulae, quae universalis est eo quod natura eius est posse praedicari de multis, sed non est necesse esse illus multa; immo nec etiam aliquod illorum; dicitur etiam universale intentio quam nihil prohibet opinari quin praedicetur de multis, quod tamen, si aliquid prohibet, prohibebit causa qua hoc probatur, sicut sol et terra: hoc enim, ex hoc quod intelliguntur sol et terra, non est prohibitum quantum ad intellectum posse intentionem eorum inveniri in multis, nisi inducatur ratio qua sciatur hoc esse [228] impossible; et hoc erit impossibile ex causa extrinseca, non ex ipsorum imaginatione. Possunt autem haec omnia convenire in hoc quod universale est id quod in intellectu non est possibile praedicari de multis; et oportet ut universale logicum et quicquid est similis illi sit hoc. Individuum vero est hoc quod non potest intelligi posse praedicari de multis, sicut substantia Platonis huius designati : impossible est enim intelligi hoc esse nisi ipsius tantum. Ergo universale ex hoc quod est universale est quiddam, et ex hoc quod est quiddam cui accidit universalitas est quiddam aliud; ergo de universali, ex hoc quod est universale constitutum, significatur unus praecipuorum terminorum, quia, cum ipsum fuerit homo vel equus, erit hic intentio alia praeter intentionem universalitatis, quae est humanitas vel equinitas. Definitio enim equinitatis est praeter definitionem universalitatis nec universalitas continetur in definitione equinitatis. Equinitas etenim habet definitionem quae non eget universalitatem, sed est cui accidit universalitatem. Unde ipsa equinitas non est aliud nisi equinitas tantum; enim in se nec est multa nec unum, nec est existens in his sensibilibus nec in anima, nec est aliud homin potestia vel effectu, ita ut hoc continetur intra essentiam equinitatis, sed ex hoc quod est equinitas tantum. Unitas autem est [229] proprietas quae, cum adiungitur equinitati, fit equinitas propter ipsam proprietatem unum. Similiter etiam equinitas habet praeter hanc multas alias proprietates accidentes sibi. Equinitas ergo, ex hoc quod in definitione eius conveniunt multa, est communis, sed ex hoc quod accipitur cum proprietatis et accidentibus signatis, est singularis. Equinitas ergo in se est equinitas tantum.

Si quis autem interrogaverit nos de equinitate secundum contradictionem, scilicet an equinitas, ex hoc quod est equinitas, sit a vel non <a>, non erit responsio nisi secundum negationem, quicquid illud fuerit, non autem secundum negationem eius quod est, sed eius quod dicitur de ea, videlicet quoniam non debet dici quod equinitas ex hoc quod est equinitas non est <a>, sed, ex hoc quod est equinitas, non est equinitas a nec aliquid aliurum.

Si autem partes quaestionis fuerint duae affirmativae immediate, tunc non erit necesses respondere aliquam illarum ullo modo, quoniam [230] alterius earum, scilicet affirmativae, quae comitatur negationem, intellectus est quod, cum res non fuerit proprieta altera affirmativa, appropriabitur hac altera affirmativa. Cum autem fuerit proprieta hac, eius essentia non erit ipsa proprietatem : homo enim cum est unus vel albus, tunc essentia humanitatis non erit ipsa essentia unitatis vel albedinis, nec essentia hominis erit essentia unius vel albi.

Cum ergo subjectum quaestionis posita fuerit ipsa humanitas secundum quod est humanitas veluti aliquid unum, et interrogaverint nos secundum aliquod contrarium dicentes quod aut est unum aut multa,
tunc non erit necesse respondere aliquod illorum: ipsa enim humanitas, ex hoc quod est ipsa humanitas, est quiddam praeter aliquod illorum in cuius definitione non accipitur nisi humanitas tantum. Sed si proprietas eius est esse unum vel multa, sicut proprietas quae earn sequitur, tunc sine dubio appropriabitur per hoc, sed tamen ipsa non erit ipsum appropriatum, ex hoc quod est humanitas; ergo, ex hoc quod ipsa est humanitas, non est ipsum unum vel multum, sed est alius quiddam cui illud accidit extrinsecus. Cum ergo ipsa consideratur secundum hoc quod est humanitas tantum, non erit tunc necesse considerari cum hoc id quod accidit ei extrinsecus.

Ponamus ergo in hoc duas considerationes, unam considerationem de ipsa secundum quod est ipsa, et aliam considerationem de [231] consequentibus ipsam. Secundum autem primam considerationem, non est nisi humanitas tantum. Unde, si quis interrogaverit an humanitas quae est in Platone, ex hoc quod est humanitas, sit alia ab illa quae est in Socrate et necessario dixerimus non, non oportebit consentire ei ut dicat: «ergo haec et illa sunt una numero», quoniam negatio illis absoluta fuit et intelleximus in ea quod illis humanitas, non est hoc quod est humanitas, est humanitas tantum, sed ex hoc quod ipsa est alia ab humanitate quae est in Socrate quiddam extrinsecum est. Ipsa vero non interrogavit de humanitate nisi ex hoc quod est humanitas. Cum autem dixit: «humanitas quae est in Platone, ex hoc quod est humanitas», iam posuit ei respectum ex hoc quod est humanitas; attribuit ergo ei respectum extraneum ab ea, cum dixit: «quae est in Platone», aut «quae est in Platone». Nam si non, tunc iam accepissemus humanitatem ex hoc quod est in Platone. Cum enim exspoliaverimus considerantes illam per se secundum hoc quod est humanitas, non potest esse quin haec dicitio, scilicet quae est, vel referatur ad humanitatem quae est in Platone, et tunc hoc erit absurdum: non enim cohaeret ut humanitas sit in Platone ex respectu quo ipsa est humanitas tantum; vel referatur ad humanitatem, et tunc nominatio Platonis frustra fuit, nisi intelligatur quia hoc quod humanitati accidit esse in Platone extrinsecum fuit; iam autem [232] destruximus earn sic esse in Platone; sed si potest ita esse, sic etiam habet respectum praeter humanitatem.

Si quis autem interrogaverit dicens: «nonne respondistis dicentes quod ipsa non est ita, cum ipsa non sit ita praeter suum esse humanitatis quo ipsa est humanitas», dicemus nos non respondisse quod ipsa, ex hoc quod est humanitas, non est ita, sed respondisse quod ipsa, non ex hoc quod est humanitas, est ita. Iam autem nota est in logica horum differentia.

Amplius. Subiectum huiusmodi quaestionum plerumque videtur indefinitum cum non determinatur signo, et tunc non fiet ad illam responsio nisi ponatur ipsa humanitas quasi aliquia designata absque omni multitudine, et tunc nostra dictio, scilicet ex hoc quod ipsa est humanitas non est pars subjecti, eo quod non congrue dicitur humanitas quae est ex hoc quod est humanitas, alienum, fieret indefinitum. Si autem dicitur ipsa humanitas quae est ex hoc quod est ipsa humanitas, iam ecidit in earn designatio quae addita est supra humanitatem. Si autem nos consenserimus in hoc, utraque partes quaestionis removebantur ab ea; et tunc non oportebit esse unum vel multa nec ipsa nec aliud, nisi secundum intentionem quam necesse est esse ipsam vel aliam. Et tunc dicetur quod necesse est esse aliam propter accidentia quae sunt cum illa, quoniam numquam inventur sine accidentibus, et tunc non accipietur secundum hoc quod est humanitas tantum. Postquam autem humanitas [233] Platonis autem non est sua nisi propter accidentia, tum haec accidentia habent actions in individuo Platonis, eo quod ipsum compositum est ex nomine vel ex humanitate et accidentibus quae comitantur illud tamquam partes eius, et habent actionem in nomine vel in humanitate, eo quod referuntur ad hominem.

Repetemus autem ea a capite et recolligemus ad declarandum ea alio modo tamquam rememorantes quae praedicta sunt.Dicemus ergo quod hic est quiddam sensibile quod est animal vel homo cum materia et accidentibus, et hoc est homo naturalis. Et hic est quiddam quod est animal vel homo, consideratum in seipso secundum hoc quod est ipsum, non accepto cum eo hoc quod est sibi admixtum, sine condicione communis aut proprii aut unius aut multi nec in effectu nec in respectu etiam potentiae secundum quod est aliquid in potentia: animal enim ex hoc quod est animal et homo ex hoc quod est homo, scilicet quantum ad definitionem suam et intellectum suum absque consideratione omnium aliorum quae comitantur illud, non est nisi animal vel homo. Sed animal commune et animal individuum, et animal secundum respectum quo in potentia est commune vel proprium, et animal secundum respectum quo est in his sensibilibus vel intellectum in anima, est animal et aliud, non animal consideratum in se tantum. Manifestum est autem quod, cum fuerit animal et aliud quod non est animal, animal tunc erit in hoc quasi pars eius; similiter et homo.

Poterit autem animal per se considerari, quamvis sit cum alio a se; essentia enim eis est cum alio a se; ergo essentia eius est ipsi per se; ipsum vero esse cum alio a se est quiddam quod accidit’ ei vel aliquid quod comitantur naturalis suam, sicut haec animalitas et humanitas; igitur haec consideratio praecedet in esse et animal quod est individuum propter [234] accidentia sua et universale quod est in his sensibilibus et
intelligibile, sicut simplex praeceedit compositum et sicut pars totum: ex hoc enim esse nec est genus nec species nec individuum nec unum nec multa, sed ex hoc esse est tantum animal et tantum homo. Sed comitatur illud sine dubio esse unum vel multa, cum impossible sit aliquid esse et non esse alterum istorum, quamvis sit comitans ipsum extrinsecus; hoc autem animal, secundum hanc condicionem, quamvis habeat esse in omni individuo, non tamen ex hac condicione est animal perfectum, quamvis sequatur ut fiat aliquod animal, non quod in veritate suae essentiae ex hac condicione sit aliquod animal. Hoc enim quod ipsum animal in individuo est aliquod animal non prohibit ipsum esse animal ex hoc quod est animal, sed non hac condicione ut sit animal ex hoc quod est in illo : cum enim hoc individuum fuerit aliquod animal, tunc aliquod animal habet esse. Ergo animal quod est pars alciuis animalis habet esse, sicut albedo; quae, quamvis sit inseparabilis a materia, in se tamen haec habet esse albedo, sic in materia alii est considerata in se et habet veritatem essendi per se, quamvis veritati sui esse accidat adiungi alii in esse.

 Avicenna Latinus: Prima Philosophia I.5 (I.34-35)

. . . unaquaeque enim res habet certitudinem qua est id quod est, sicut triangulus habet certitudinem qua est triangulus... Et hoc est quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium.... Redeamus igitur et dicamus quod...untaquaeque res habet certitudinem propriam quae est eius quidditas.

 SCOTUS

 Bibliography


IV. FORMAL DISTINCTION

Bibliography


Readings

1. Hyman and Walsh, pp. 622-24. [Short excerpt from a main text, *Ord.* 1 d. 2, where Scotus argues for a formal distinction within the Trinity.]
IV. FORMAL DISTINCTION

Outline

1. Background of Formal Distinction
   a. Aquinas: fundamentum in re
   b. Henry of Ghent: intentional distinction

2. Applications
   a. Trinity
   b. Divine Attributes
   c. Genus and Difference
   d. Species and Individual Difference
   e. Transcendental

3. Development
   a. Realist vocabulary in the Lectura and Ordinatio: realitas, entitas, formalitas, rationes formales
   b. Less realist in Paris Reports

Definition of the Formal Distinction

From Adams [2] above, p. 415:

x and y are formally distinct or not formally the same, if and only if (a) x and y are or are in what is really one and the same thing (res); and (b) if x and y are capable of definition (in the strict Aristotelian sense, in terms of genus and differentia), the definition of x does not include y and the definition of y does not include x; and (c) if x and y are not capable of definition, then if they were capable of definition, the definition of x would not include y and the definition of y would not include x.

(1 Lect. d. 2 n. 275)

Item, tertio hoc manifestatur sic. Multiplex est unitas in rebus. Primo est unitas aggregationis, post quam est unitas unius per accidens, ut ‘hominis albi’, post quam est unitas compositi, post quam est unitas simplicitatis. Et in unitate simplici secundum rem adhuc potest esse differentia formalis: sicut unitas generis et differentiae, licet sit secundum rem in re simplici, tamen non sunt formaliter idem, quia idem formaliter sunt quae sic se habent quod in definitione unius cadit alterum; nunc autem si genus et differentia definirentur, in definitione unius non caderet aliud. Sic etiam si definiretur deitas, in eius definitione non caderet paternitas. Igitur post unitatem realem est unitas formalis, qua aliqua sunt idem formaliter et non solum realiter. Licet igitur aliqua sint idem realiter, tamen possunt differre secundum suas rationes formales, fundatas et ortas in re, et non per operationem intellectus.

Et ideo vocant aliqui istam differentiam ‘differentiam secundum rationem’, non quia sit facta a ratione, sed quia est differentia secundum rationem quiditativam ante operationem intellectus considerantis. Unde ante operationem intellectus considerantis est rea- litas paternitatis et realitas deitatis, ita quod est ibi realitas et realitas, et haec non est formaliter illa, licet per identitatem sint idem; igitur de necessitate sequitur diversitas ante operationem intellectus. Et haec differentia potest dici ‘virtualis’, quia deitas virtualiter continet paternitatem, et tamen ratio formalis unius non est ratio formalis alterius ante omnem operationem intellectus. Qui igitur potest capere, capiat, quia sic esse intellectus meus non dubitat.
V. DIVINE ILLUMINATION

Readings


Bibliography


5. -----. *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*. Cambridge, MA, 1985. [A study of the role of illumination in Henry’s thought. Marrone’s thesis is that Henry started out as an Augustinian but became increasingly an Aristotelian in his epistemology as he career progressed.]


HENRY OF GHENT

As in many other areas, Scotus’s precise target was Henry of Ghent, who had mounted an elaborate defense of illumination in the wake of Aquinas’s reduction of it to a general influence present in the Aristotelian agent intellect. As Scotus reports in detail, Henry argued against Aquinas that the Aristotelian apparatus of abstraction was insufficient to achieve infallible knowledge of truth and needed to be supplemented by a special illumination. Appealing to the accepted Aristotelian distinction between simple apprehension (i.e., conceptualization) and composition and division (i.e., judgment), Henry says that by the former we know ‘that which is true’ (*verum*). That is, in simple apprehension we conceive a real thing outside the mind. For this no special illumination is needed, as there is no error in simple apprehension, and abstraction suffices. But to know a thing that is ‘true’ or real is not to know its ‘truth’ (*veritas*), for truth is conformity to an exemplar or model, and this can only be seen in a judgment involving a comparison of one thing to another. As even Plato realized, a thing has two exemplars against which it can be compared or measured: a created exemplar, which is its form existing in the soul as the result of abstraction, and an uncreated exemplar, which is its form existing eternally and immutably in the divine mind. But Henry argues that no comparison of a thing to a created exemplar acquired through abstraction by the human mind will yield infallible knowledge of truth. First, the created exemplar cannot be immutable, since the object from which it is abstracted is itself constantly changing. Second, the intellect itself in which the created exemplar exists is mutable. Given the mutability of both the knowing subject and object, Henry concludes that no matter how much we universalize a sensible form by abstraction, it can never be a basis for infallible knowledge of truth. Since the dignity of the human being demands such knowledge, some access to the uncreated exemplar in the divine mind is therefore required. (Henry, like all illuminationists, goes to lengths to explain how this does not involve a direct intuition of God in the present life.) In rough terms, Henry was attempting to integrate Augustinian illumination with Aristotelian abstraction by having the former operate at the level of judgment and the latter at the level of conceptualization.
V. DIVINE ILLUMINATION

Concerning the second point, it is argued that we do not know anything by our natural effort alone without a special, divine illumination:

First: In 2 Cor. 3 Paul says, “We are not sufficient to know something of ourselves as if it were from us, but our sufficiency is from God.” There is, however, no perception of the truth without knowledge; therefore, we possess no sufficiency to perceive the truth except from God. But this is only from a special illumination of some divine light, since everything that is perceived is perceived in a light.

Second: In his comment on the text of 1 Cor. 12, “No one can say Lord Jesus except in the Holy Spirit,” Ambrose says, “What is true spoken by anyone comes from the Holy Spirit. But whoever knows something true speaks it with the word of his mind. Therefore, by means of the Holy Spirit he both knows and says what is true.” This, however, does not happen without a special illumination.

Third: In I Soliloquies Augustine says, “God is intelligible and the objects of human learning are intelligible, nevertheless the two differ a great deal. For both the earth and light are visible, but the earth cannot be seen unless illumined by light. Therefore, it is also to be believed that those things treated in the disciplines, which everyone conceives without hesitation to be most true, cannot be understood by someone unless they are illumined by their own sun, as it were.” This other sun, as it were, is nothing other than a divine light, according to what Augustine says in the same place: “One may note how in this sun there are three things, what is, what is illumined, and what illumines, so also in the most hidden God there are three such things, what is, what understands, and what causes all other things to be understood. Therefore, etc.

Fourth: Augustine says in his II Sermon on the Mount, “When any rational soul thinks or reasons, even one blinded by desire, nothing of what is true in its thinking ought to be attributed to it, but to the light itself of truth by which it is touched even weakly.” But that is only the light of a special, divine illumination.

Fifth: Augustine says in XII Confessions, “If we both see something which you say is true, and we both see something which I say is true, I ask where do we see it? I do not see it anywhere in you nor you in me, but we both see it in the immutable truth itself which is above our minds.” But we see nothing in that truth except by a special, divine illumination, because that truth exceeds the limits of our nature.

It is argued to the contrary.

First: Augustine says in I Against the Academics, “There is no better way to find what leads to the truth than a careful inquiry of the truth.” But the inquiry would be in vain if we could not attain the truth through it without a special, divine illumination. Therefore, etc.

Second: Aristotle says in the beginning of the Metaphysics, “All men by nature desire to know.” But they would not desire by nature unless by nature they could know. Therefore, men by nature can know. For such, however, a special illumination is not required.

It should be said that, if the intellect, by purely natural means and without any special, divine illumination, can attain knowledge of the first in a series of knowable things, all of which are ordered so that by nature the last is always known through what precedes, then similarly a knowledge of all posterior things can be attained in the same way. For if we can attain by purely natural means without any special divine illumination a knowledge of the first theoretical principles, then similarly we will be able to attain a knowledge of all conclusions following after the principles. Although a knowledge of principles is a certain kind of illumination with respect to the conclusions, nevertheless if we can attain a knowledge of the principles, it is not called a special, divine illumination when we know the conclusions through them. If, on the other hand, we cannot attain the first in some series of knowable things by purely natural means,
but only by a special, divine illumination, then similarly neither can we attain any of those things which are after the first, for the posterior things in the series are only known by reason of the first. Now it is doubtful true that the first in some knowable things cannot be known by purely natural means but only by a special, divine illumination, as in those things that are essentially and absolutely objects of faith. Consequently, in such things it is to be granted absolutely and without qualification that we do not know anything from purely natural means but only from a special, divine illumination.

Some, however, want to extend this type of knowing to every object of knowledge, saying that we can know nothing true without some special, divine light over and above any natural, infused light. They believe that this is Augustine’s meaning in all his works wherever he says that whoever sees something true sees it in the first truth, or in the eternal rules or in the eternal light, according to what he says in The City of God IX c. 10, “It is not inappropriate to say that just as a body is illumined by the corporeal light of air, so the soul is illumined by the incorporeal light of wisdom of the simple God.”

Those who say this detract greatly from the dignity and perfection of the created intellect, since some action or proper natural operation is required for any natural thing whose form is complete, through which operation it can attain by purely natural means the good natural to it, as is clear in all other natural things. Accordingly, Damascene says in I Sentences, “Where there are different natures, there are different operations, for it is impossible that a substance lack a natural operation,” and in On the Twofold Nature and Will of Christ, c. 3: “It is impossible that a nature be established without those properties which are natural to it, such as living, rational and voluntary. For he who does not reason is not human, for no human has been made who does not reason, whether rightly or wrongly.” Since therefore to know and understand is the most proper operation of the intellect, as is said in I De anima, if we cannot know from purely natural means, then neither is there any operation whatever, and so in this respect the created intellect would be inferior to all creatures, which is absurd. For according to what Aristotle says in II De caelo et mundo, “That which is completely good does not require any operation whereby it becomes good, and it is the cause from which every other thing receives its goodness. Everything else, therefore, needs its own operation through which it moves toward the complete good, so that it can share its eternal being as far as it is able. For all things desire it, and for the sake of it they do whatever they do according to nature.”

Perhaps it will be replied here in favor of this opinion: it is indeed true that to know and understand what is true is the proper and natural operation of the intellect and human soul, through which it acquires its goodness, but for that operation it requires a special illumination because of the pre-eminence and nobility of that act, while nonetheless all other things perform their actions by purely natural means because of the imperfection those acts. Therefore, it is not absurd that one thing requires more to do a more perfect act while another requires less to do a less perfect one.

To say this is totally absurd and greatly detracts from the dignity of the rational soul. For if other things inferior to the rational soul can attain some operation corresponding to and commensurate with their nature, it is inappropriate to deny this to the rational soul, so that although it cannot attain an excellent operation exceeding its nature by purely natural means, it can attain an operation appropriate to and commensurate with its nature. For it is very absurd that among natural things God should have made the human soul and not equipped it with the natural tools with which it could attain some due natural operation, since he had so equipped other lesser things. For God even less than nature does anything in vain or fails anything in what is necessary for it. The proper and natural operation of the human soul is none other than to know and understand. Therefore, it is to be conceded without qualification that we can know something through our soul without any special, divine illumination, and this by purely natural means. To say the contrary detracts much from the dignity of the soul and human nature.

I say “from purely natural means” without excluding the general influence of the first intelligence, which is the first agent in every intellectual and cognitive act, just as the first mover moves in every motion of every natural thing. Nor does that general influence which aids in knowing prevent that knowledge from being said to occur from purely natural means. For since we, in knowing whatever we naturally know, have that influence assisting us, it ought therefore to be said that we attain by purely natural means a knowledge of all other things posterior to what we attain through that influence.

If therefore we take “to know” in the wide sense of any certain knowledge of a thing, including even sensitive cognition, as stated in the previous question, inasmuch as it is from the side sense and sensitive cognition, it is clear that absolutely and without qualification it is to be said that we know something by a certain sensitive cognition, as was shown in the previous question, and this from purely natural means, which pertains to the present question. And this because the objects of the senses change the senses with a
type of pure, natural necessity, and through those sensible objects all posterior sensibles also change both the interior and exterior senses by a natural necessity.

Inasmuch, however, as it is from the side of intellect and intellectual cognition, whose cognition is properly called knowing, a distinction must be made. For although, according to Augustine in 83 Questions, “Nothing is known except what is true,” it is nonetheless one to know about a creature that which is true in it (id quod verum est in ea) and another to know its truth (eius veritas), so that there is one cognition whereby a thing is known and another whereby its truth is known. Every cognitive power which, through its own knowledge, apprehends a thing just as it has being in itself outside the knower apprehends what is true in the thing, but this is not to apprehend its truth. Indeed, even the sense in a brute animal correctly apprehends what is true in a thing, such as a true man, a true stick, a true rock, and above all the proper object about which the sense is of necessity true. It does not, however, apprehend or know the truth of anything, on account of which it cannot judge about anything what it truly is in reality, as about a man that he is a true man, or about color that it is a true color.

Therefore, a twofold cognition can be had from the intellectual apprehension of the created thing: one whereby that which the thing is is known by a simple intelligence, the other whereby the truth of the thing itself is known by the intelligence composing and dividing. In the first cognition, out intellect totally follows sense nor is there anything conceived in the intellect that was not first in sense. Therefore, such an intellect insofar as it is such can indeed be true by conceiving or knowing a thing as it is, in the manner of the sense which it follows, even though it does not conceive or understand with a certain judgment the truth itself of thing by perceiving its essence (quid sit), for example, that it is a true man or a true color.

The reason for this is twofold, one from the side of the intellect itself, the other from the intelligible object. From the side of the intellect the reason is that the intellect does not conceive truth by a simple intelligence, but alone through composition and division, as Aristotle intends in VI Metaphysics, and as will be shown below. Thus, just as sense is called true when it comprehends a thing just as it is, without however comprehending the truth of that thing, so also the simple intelligence following a true sense is called true when it comprehends a thing just as it is, without however comprehending its truth.

From the side of the intelligible object the reason is that there is one intention of a thing by which it is what it is and another by which it is called true, although these intentions are together in everything and are mutually convertible, for every being is true and vice-versa. For since, as the first proposition of the Liber de causis says, “Being is the first of created things,” the first intention comprehensible by the intellect is the nature of being (ratio entis), which the intellect understands without understanding any other intention concerning being, because being includes no other intention but it is included in all others. For although the intention of being is only understood under the aspect of the true, which is the essential object of the intellect, nevertheless the true is not, insofar as it is the aspect by which a being is understood (ratio intelligendi ens), an object of the intellect just as a being is. The true is the aspect of intelligibility in anything, but the object is a true being, or a true good, and so with all the other intentions of things. Thus, because the intention of being is included in all the other intentions of things, both universal and particular, the Commentator on the first proposition of the De causis says that, “Being is more strongly united with the thing than the other intentions which are in it.”

After the intention of being, the universal intentions of one, true and good come next in the thing, and this in different ways and according to an order, since any thing existing under the intention of being can be considered in three ways. First, insofar as it has a determinate being in its nature by which it is undivided in itself and divided from everything else through its form, and then the intention of unity belongs to it. A thing is one because it is undivided formally in itself and is divided from everything else. As Aristotle says in III Metaphysics, “Something is one that exists of itself apart.” Second, insofar as it has in its being what the exemplar to which it is related represents, and the intention of the true belongs to it. For anything is true to the extent that it contains in itself what its exemplar represents. Third, insofar as it has an end toward which it tends, and then the intention of the good belongs to it, for every thing is good to the extent that it has an end in view which is good. Because therefore the true is an intention of a thing in relation to its exemplar, which intention is not primary but secondary, for being is the first and absolute intention of a thing, the intellect can well apprehend what in reality is a being and true without apprehending its truth. For the intention of truth in a thing can only be apprehended by apprehending its agreement with its

---

9The Latin term *intentio*, which I have simply left as “intention” is a prominent technical term in Henry’s epistemology and metaphysics. Roughly speaking, *intentiones* here are the real features in a thing corresponding to our concepts of it.
exemplar. The absolute intention of being, on the other hand, is apprehended in an thing without any real
relation.

In the second cognition, by which it is known the truth of the thing itself, without which we do not
possess complete knowledge of the thing, the cognition and judgment of the intellect altogether exceed the
cognition and judgment of sense, because, as was said, the intellect does not know the truth of a thing
except by composing and dividing, which the sense cannot do. Therefore, such an intellect can know about
a thing what the sense cannot known, nor even the intellect which is the simple intelligence (simplicium
intelligentia), which is to apprehend about a thing in a certain judgment that truly in reality it is such and
such, e.g., that it is a true man or true color, and things of this sort. Therefore, about this manner of
knowing something through the intellect whereby its truth is known, there still remains a doubt whether we
know anything by purely natural means without any special, divine illumination.

It should be replied that since, as has already been said, the truth of a thing can only be known from a
knowledge of the agreement (conformitas) of the thing known with its exemplar, because, as Augustine
says in On True Religion, “Things are true to the extent that they are similar to the one Principle,” and as
Anselm says in On Truth, “Truth is agreement of the thing with its exemplar which is most true,” and
“What is, truly is, insofar as it is what is there [i.e., in the divine exemplar],” according as a thing has a
double exemplar, we know the truth of a thing in two ways with respect to the double exemplar. For,
according to Plato’s meaning in the Timaeus, there are two types of exemplar, one that has been made and
fashioned and one that is perpetual and immutable. The first exemplar of the thing is its universal species
existing in the soul, through which species it acquires a knowledge of all its individual instances
(supposita), and this species is caused by the thing. The second exemplar is the divine art, which contains
the ideas (ideales rationes) of all things, according to which Plato says that God constructed the world, just
as an artist makes a house according to the exemplar of the art in his mind, although not according to the
first exemplar.

Looking to the first exemplar, it is to be noted that we can look upon it in two ways. In one way, as the
object known which is drawn outside the knower, as when we look to the image of a man painted on a wall
in order to know a man. In a second way, we can look upon it as a means of knowing which is drawn in the
knower, according to which the species of sensible things are drawn in sense and the species of intelligible
things in the intellect. In the first way, it is impossible to know the truth of the thing by looking at its
exemplar, but one only has an imaginary apprehension of it, the sort of which that, by luck, the power of
imagination on its own could have formed for itself. Thus, a man would marvel if the one of whom he had
an image and whom he had never seen were to meet him, as Augustine says in VIII De Trinitate c. 2.
Through that apprehension in the imagination taken from painted image -- if a name were given to the one
whose image it was -- he could even arrive at an estimative judgment about the one whose image it was, if
he were to meet him, and then, from the thing itself seen in its own form, know its truth for the first time
and through it judge about the image of the man, whether it was a true image corresponding to him. One
reads that in this way the queen of Ethiopia had a painted image of Alexander next to her before she had
ever seen him, and that she recognized him immediately when she saw him, even though he pretended to be
someone else.

Therefore, by looking at the exemplar taken from the thing in the second way, as the means of knowing
in the knower himself, the truth of the thing can indeed be known in some way by forming a mental
concept about the thing which agrees with that exemplar. In this way, Aristotle held the knowledge of
things and the cognition of truth to be acquired by us from purely natural means and about natural,
changeable things, and that this kind of exemplar is acquired from sense as the first principle of art and
science, according to what he says in the beginning of the Metaphysics: “Art comes about when from many
things understood by experience one universal judgment is made about similar things,” and in II Posterior
Analytics, “From sense comes memory and from a memory made many times experience, and from the one
universal experience existing in the soul outside the many things is the beginning of art and science.” What
Augustine says in XI De Trinitate c. 3 agrees with this: “After the species of a body which is sensed with
the body has been left behind, a similitude of it remains in the memory, where the will turns the gaze of the
mind again, so that it may be formed from within, just as from the body as sensible object it was formed
from without,” as he says in VIII c. 5: “According to both general and specific knowledge of things,
whether instilled by nature or gathered through experience, we know about things that we have not seen.
Thus, through the universal knowledge which we have in us acquired from different species of animals, we
know about anything we encounter whether it is an animal or not, and through the specific knowledge of
the ass, we know about anything we encounter, whether or not it is an ass.”
But that we should have wholly certain and infallible knowledge of the truth through such an acquired exemplar is altogether impossible for three reasons. The first is taken from the side of the thing from which such an exemplar is abstracted, the second from the side of the soul in which such an exemplar is received and the third from the exemplar itself that is received in the soul from the thing.

The first reason is that such an exemplar, because it is abstracted from a changeable thing, necessarily is changeable to some extent (habet aliquam rationem transmutabilis). Thus, because natural things are more changeable than mathematical ones, Aristotle held the certitude of science had about mathematical things is greater than about natural things by means of their universal species, and this for no reason other than the changeability of the species themselves when they exist in the soul. Augustine, explaining this reason for the lack of certitude of the science of natural things taken from sensible objects, says in 83 Questions that one should not seek pure truth from the senses of the body and that we should be well advised to turn away from this world and quickly turn towards God, that is, towards the truth which is understood and seized in the inner mind, which truth always remains and is the same nature.

The second reason is that the human soul, because it is changeable and subject to error, cannot be corrected by anything as changeable or more changeable than it, so that it not be corrupted by error and persist in the correctness of truth. Thus, since every exemplar which the soul receives from natural things is of a lower grade of nature than the soul itself, every such exemplar is as changeable or more changeable than the soul. Therefore, it cannot correct the soul so that it remains in the infallible truth. This is the argument of Augustine in On True Religion, who proves through this that the immutable truth through which the soul has certain knowledge is above the soul, when he says, “Since the law of the arts is wholly immutable, but the human mind to which it has been granted to see such a law can suffer the mutability of error, it is sufficiently clear that the law called truth is above our mind. This truth alone suffices to correct the changeable and fallible mind in the infallible knowledge about which the mind does not judge but through which it judges everything else. For whatever is below the mind the mind judges rather than judges other things by means of it, as Augustine says in the same place.

The third reason is that since an exemplar of this sort is an intention and species of a sensible thing abstracted from the imagination, it has a similarity to the false as well as to the true, so that it is impossible to tell the difference solely from the exemplar itself. For by means of the same images of sensible things in sleep or madness we judge the images to be the things themselves, and in a dream we who are healthy judge about the things themselves. The pure truth, however, is only perceived if it is distinguished it from the false. Therefore, it is impossible to have certain science and certain knowledge of the truth through such an exemplar. Consequently, if certain knowledge is required, it is necessary for the mind to turn from the senses and sensible things and from every intention, however universal and abstracted from creatures, toward the immutable truth existing above the mind, which has no image of the false from which the truth cannot be distinguished, as Augustine says in 83 Questions q. 9, where he thoroughly treats this argument.

It is thus clear that truth is twofold and that there is a twofold way of knowing the truth, which Augustine indicates when revising his statement in the Soliloquies, “God, you who willed that only the pure know what is true,” saying “It could be replied that many who are impure know many true things, for neither has it been defined what the true is that only the pure know nor what it is to know.

It is also clear that if we have certain knowledge or know infallible truth, this does not happen by viewing the exemplar abstracted from a thing through the senses, however much it be purified and made abstract.

<Tony’s account of the Academics taken from Augustine omitted.>

Therefore, pure truth cannot be seen except in relation to the eternal exemplar. It is to be noted that pure truth can be known by looking at this exemplar in two ways: in one way by looking to it as the object known, that is, by seeing in it the thing exemplified. “For he knows the image who sees the model,” as Augustine says in Against the Academic III c. 30; in second way by looking to that exemplar solely as a means of knowing (ratio cognoscendi).

In the first way, we know that the image of Hercules is a true image of him by seeing Hercules, and in this way by noticing the agreement of the image to the exemplar, we know that the image of it is true. In this way, the truth of anything fashioned according to an exemplar is most perfectly known by seeing its exemplar. Accordingly, since every creature is a certain image of the divine exemplar, the truth of any creature, insofar as it is a nature (in eo quod quid est), is most perfectly and truly known by directly seeing the divine essence, as Augustine says in The City of God XI. “The blessed angels by the presence of the
unchanging truth there know the creature better in the art by which it was made than in the creature itself.”

Thus, not only because the image can be known *a priori* by the exemplar, but also conversely the exemplar *a posteriori* by the image, Augustine instructs us by means of creatures to know what kind of art the divine exemplar is, when he says in II On Job, “We dwell on a wondrous work of art and wonder at the plan of the artist. For we are amazed at what we see and love what we do not see. If therefore the plan of men is praised from some great work of art, do you wish to see what kind of plan belongs to God, that is, the word of God? Dwell on the plan of the world. See what has been made through the word and know what its nature is.” Thus, by an exaggerated knowledge of all creatures, as though by one perfect image of the divine art, to the extent that it was in creatures as perfectly as possible, the philosophers held that through this world there could be perfect knowledge of God to the extent that it could be had from purely natural means.

To such knowledge of the divine exemplar, however, we cannot attain by purely natural means without a special illumination, nor even in this life by the light of common grace, according to what Augustine in *On the Catholic Faith* when speaking to God: “Your essence,” he says, “can be called species and form and is that which is; no other things are that which they are. This essence alone can say, ‘I am who am.’ It is so great and such a kind that the human mind does not dare acquire any vision of it in this life, which reward for your chosen ones you keep in a reward to follow, according to what is said on that verse, ‘You dwell in light inaccessible that no man sees,’ that is, no man can see it in this life, but afterwards it will be seen.” It is true that in this life it cannot be seen save by a gift of special grace by which a man leaves his senses through rapture, in the way in which Moses and Paul saw in this life the essence of God, as Augustine says in his letter to Pauline on seeing God, and blessed Benedict saw the whole world in a single ray of light, as Gregory says in IV *Dialogues*. Since we cannot attain to seeing the exemplar of the divine nature by purely natural means without a special, divine illumination, neither can we attain to knowing any truth in creatures by looking to it.

But if pure truth be known by looking to the divine exemplar as a means of knowing, in this way Plato held that every truth is known by looking to an eternal exemplar, according to what Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus, bringing in the authority of Cicero in this matter: “Consider this,” he says, “that Plato is shown by Cicero clearly and in many ways to have established the final good, the causes of things and the trust of reasoning in a wisdom that is not human but divine, from whence human wisdom is in a certain way illumined, in a wisdom wholly immutable and always related in the same way to truth; that the followers of Plato opposed those who, in the name of the Stoics and Epicureans, placed in either the nature of the body or soul the final end, the causes of things and the trust of reasoning; that nevertheless errors, whether concerning morals, the nature of things or rational investigation of the truth, persisted up until the Christian times, which errors we now see are silenced. From this it is understood that these philosophers, even of a Platonic sort, after having changed the few things which Christian learning refutes, must pay homage to Christ, the one king almighty, who has commanded, and it has been believed, what they fear to profess.”

Augustine followed this opinion of Plato, according to what he says at the end of *Against the Academics*, “No one doubts that we are impelled to learn by the twofold weight of authority and reason. I am certain that there is never a departing from the authority of Christ, for I find none more reliable. What ought to be followed by most accurate reason-- for now I am so moved that I desire to apprehend what is true not just by believing but also by understanding -- I firmly believe that I shall discover in Plato what does not conflict with our sacred books.” And this is the opinion that Augustine holds in all his works, which opinion we ought to hold with him by saying that no certain and infallible knowledge of pure truth can be had by anyone except by looking to the exemplar of uncreated light and truth. Thus, “Those alone are able to know certain truth who are able to see it in that exemplar which not everyone can see,” as Augustine says in *De Trinititate* VIII c. 8, but “few are able to transcend all mutable things with the eye of the mind and to judge about changeable things with the unchangeable laws, about which no one judges, and without which no one judges,” as he says in *On Free Choice* II c. 6 . . . .

<Further quotations of Augustine omitted.>

The reason for this at present, which will be explained more in the next question, is that in order for some concept in us concerning the truth of a thing outside the mind to be true by a pure truth, it is necessary

---

10 Reading *accenderetur* with Augustine rather than *attenditur*.
that the soul, insofar as it is informed by that concept, be similar to the truth of the thing outside the mind, for truth is an agreement (\textit{adaequatio}) of the thing and the intellect. Thus, since, as Augustine says in II \textit{On Free Choice}, “The soul of itself is changeable from truth to falsehood,” it is not taken in itself informed with the truth of any thing, but is capable of being informed. But no thing can form itself, because no thing can give what it does not have. Therefore, it must be informed with the pure truth of the thing by something else. This cannot come about through the exemplar taken from the thing itself, as was shown. Therefore, it must be informed by the exemplar of unchangeable truth, as Augustine says in the same place . . . . Therefore it is necessary that the uncreated truth imprint itself in our concept and change our concept to its own character. In this way, it will inform our mind with the truth of a thing expressed by that similitude which the thing itself has to the first truth, according to what Augustine says in IX \textit{De Trinitate} . . . . Therefore, as was said, a perfect informing of the truth is only had from the similitude of the truth impressed on the mind concerning the knowable thing by the first and exemplar truth itself. Every other truth impressed by any other exemplar abstracted from the thing itself, is imperfect, obscure and cloudy, so that through it certain judgment about the truth of a thing is impossible . . . .

It should be known that manner of knowing the truth applies to both knowledge of principles, as had above in the third argument of this question, and to knowledge of conclusions, as it clear in all the other arguments already adduced. Consequently, through this way of acquiring knowledge of truth the habits of the true disciplines are generated in us, which habits are stored up in the memory so that from them we form similar concepts again, and this with respect to habits of both principles and conclusions . . . .

This way of acquiring science and knowledge of the truth is more true than the way which Aristotle held from experience of the senses alone, if nevertheless this was Aristotle’s mind and he disagreed with Plato on the same thing. Rather, which is more credible, even if Aristotle verbally objected to Plato by hiding the divine doctrine of his teacher, just as did the early Academics, nevertheless he had the same view of Plato concerning the knowledge of the truth. Aristotle implies this when speaking about knowledge of the truth he says in II \textit{Metaphysics}, “That is most true which is the cause of the truth of the things after it, and therefore just as a thing has being so it has truth.”

Therefore, from purely natural means omitting all divine illumination, we do not in any way know the pure truth. The question still remains, however, whether from purely natural means it is possible to know it. For if from purely natural means we can reach the illumination of divine light,\textsuperscript{11} and through that in turn know pure truth, then from purely natural means it should be said that it is possible to know the pure truth. In the same way, if it is possible from purely natural means to reach the first principles of the sciences, and through them to know other things, one is said to know those things from purely natural means, even though it is not possible to know them without the first principles. If, however, it is not possible to reach that illumination by purely natural means, then neither ought it be said that through that light one knows the pure truth by purely natural means, as was said in the beginning of the answer to the question.

It is not now the case, however, that we can reach the rules of eternal light by purely natural means, so that we see in them the pure truth. For although purely natural things do reach those rules, which is certainly true, for as was said, the rational soul is created so that it is immediately informed by the first truth, nevertheless these natural things cannot by their own action reach them. Rather, God shows them to whomever he wants and takes them away from whomever he wants. For these rules do not present themselves by any natural necessity so that we see the truth in them. Thus, God sometimes shows the eternal rules to evil persons so that they see in them many truths that the good cannot, because a foreknowledge of the eternal rules is not shown to them, according to Augustine IV \textit{De Trinitate} . . . .

Therefore it should be said without qualification that one cannot have pure truth of anything by acquiring a knowledge of it from purely natural things but only by an illumination of the divine light, so that one established in purely natural things does reach that light, nevertheless he cannot reach it naturally from purely natural things. Rather, that light presents itself by free will to whomever it wants.

\textsuperscript{11}Translation not exact here, but this is Henry’s sense.
DUNS SCOTUS

I. Henry’s position leads to skepticism:

According to Scotus, far from ensuring certitude, Henry’s theory of illumination actually led to a deep and irremediable skepticism. Thus, even granting Henry that the thing itself from which the created exemplar is abstracted is constantly changing – a position Scotus regards as false and tantamount to the error of Heraclitus – then no amount of illumination can give us certitude about it. On Henry’s reasoning the apparent function of illumination is to allow us to see the wholly mutable thing itself as immutable. In that case, illumination results in no knowledge at all, for then the thing would be apprehended contrary to the way it really is. Similarly, if the human mind itself is so mutable that it makes the created exemplar subject to change, then for the same reason no illumination can prevent the mind from erring. Since illumination itself must somehow exist in the mind, it would be no less subject to change. Furthermore, according to Henry, illumination is supposed to occur by means of cooperation between the changeable, created exemplar and the unchanging, created exemplar. But if there are two causes cooperating in the production of knowledge, certitude can never be greater than the weaker of the two causes. For example, when one premise is necessary and the other contingent, only a contingent conclusion can follow. For Scotus, then, unless the human cognitive apparatus and the object are of their nature so constituted as to be capable of producing certitude, no intervention of illumination could render them such. Scotus was in fact following a caution issued as early as Bonaventure – that if illumination is given too large a role and made the total cause of certitude, then skepticism results – but pushed it to exclude any role whatever for illumination in natural certitude.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HENRY</th>
<th>SCOTUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THING IS CHANGEABLE: The thing itself from</td>
<td>If the thing itself is constantly changing, then no light can give us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which the exemplar is taken is changeable.</td>
<td>any certitude about it, for to know it not as it is in itself (i.e.,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therefore, the exemplar is changeable.</td>
<td>as not changeable) is not certain knowledge. What is more, it is also</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>clear that the assumption – that things in themselves are constantly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>changing is false.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIND IS CHANGEABLE: The mind into which</td>
<td>If the nature of the human mind is so changeable that it makes the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the exemplar is received is changeable.</td>
<td>created exemplar subject to change, then nothing prevent the mind from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Therefore, requires some thing unchangeable</td>
<td>erring, for what exists in a changeable subject – in this case the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to correct it.</td>
<td>mind – will be subject to change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Furthermore, this acc. to H. is supposed to occur by means of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cooperation between or the changeable created exemplar and the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>unchanging created exemplar. But of two factors productive of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>knowledge, the knowledge can never be more certain than the weakest of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the two factors. E.g., a necessary and a contingent premise can never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>result in anything but a contingent conclusion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXEMPLAR ITSELF: From the created exemplar</td>
<td>If the created exemplar in itself deceptive, then nothing which concurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>itself we cannot be certain, since the same</td>
<td>with it will make it certain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>form is found in both dreams and waking.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

...
II. How is Certitude Apart from Special Illumination is Possible.

We can have infallible knowledge of (1) first principles and thus all things deduced from them (2) of induction from experience (3) of our own acts (4) sense knowledge

1. The terms of self-evident propositions are so identical that it is evident from them alone that one necessarily includes the other. Therefore, when the intellect unites and grasps these terms it has infallible certitude that the proposition is true, i.e., that what is asserted in the proposition conforms to the nature of the terms. As Henry said, knowledge of truth is to see a conformity. From the certitude of the principles, the certitude of the conclusions follows, for the certitude of the highest form of syllogism depends solely on the certitude fo the principles and reasoning form.

Objection: will not the intellect be deceived about the meaning of the terms if the senses are deceived? No, the meaning of the terms alone would indicate the truth or falsity of the propositions, whether they were obtained from deceived senses or not. Senses are not the cause of the truth of proposition, but only occasion for it. We do not assent because we see terms united in reality by sense, but only from the meaning of the terms.

2. But of course not all universal propositions are known to be true as either self-evident from their terms or as necessarily deduced from them. Some are known from experience which reveals regular connections between things, such as that a type of herb cures a certain disease or that a certain positioning of the planets results in an eclipse. Thus, Scotus maintains secondly that we can infallible knowledge of what is regularly observed by the senses. Even though we do not observe all cases of some occurrence, and even though we do not observe that it obtains in every single case, but only in most, we can have infallible knowledge that it obtains universally from the following principle: “Whatever occurs frequently from a non-free cause (i.e., not from the will) is the natural effect of that cause.” This principle itself is not known by extrapolation from sense experience, but is self-evident from its terms, for by definition a cause that is non-free cannot frequently produce an effect contrary to what it is apt to produce. In this way, Scotus sought to underwrite the standard understanding of Aristotle’s conception of scientific demonstration, according to which experience (empeiria; experientia) reveals the fact of a connection and analysis its cause.

3. Thirdly, Scotus argues that there is infallible certitude of our own acts, such as understanding, sensing, etc., maintaining that we are as certain as these as we are of self-evident, necessary propositions. That such acts are contingent is not an impediment to certitude about them, for Scotus argues that even among contingent propositions there must be some that are immediately evident, otherwise there would either be an infinite regress in the ordering of such propositions or a contingent proposition would follow from a necessary one, both of which are impossible.

4. Finally, Scotus argues that the senses are reliable, so that external objects are as we perceive them to be. He does so by applying the above principle that whatever occurs frequently from a non-free cause is the natural effect of that cause. Thus, where the senses agree in their perceptions of an object and where such repeated perceptions yield the same results, we can conclude from this principle that the perception has the object as its natural cause and hence the object is as it appears. If the senses disagree, as when sight indicates that the stick in the water is broken, Scotus says that this error can be detected by other senses in cooperation with some proposition which is true from its terms (or one deduced from it). In this case, the sense of touch together with the self-evident proposition, “A hard object is not broken by contact with a softer object,” yields certain knowledge that the stick is not broken.

To summarize, Scotus replaces the corrective function previously assigned to illumination by Henry and Bonaventure with self-evident propositions whose certitude is immune from the variability of sense knowledge.
VI. INTUITIVE AND ABSTRACTIVE COGNITION

Bibliography


Despite the importance of his rejection of illumination, Scotus’s most significant epistemological innovation was the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. As defined by Scotus, intuitive cognition is knowledge of an object insofar as it is actually existing and present to the intellect. Abstractive cognition is knowledge of the object insofar as it abstracts from actual existence or non-existence. It is important to stress, first of all, that both intuitive and abstractive cognition are acts of the intellect proper. They do not differ in that the senses grasp the particular by intuition and the intellect the universal by abstraction; ‘astractive’ does not here refer to Aristotelian abstraction of the universal. Rather, both types of cognition have as their object the essence or quiddity as opposed to the sense particular. The difference is that in intuition, it is evident to the intellect that object itself as existing and present is the cause of knowledge, while in abstractive cognition the intelligible species goes surrogate for the existing object. Second, Scotus is specific that ‘intuitive’ is not here equated with ‘non-discursive’. Some abstractive knowledge can be ‘intuitive’ in this sense, since it can be non-discursive.

Scotus argues that the intellect must capable of intuitive cognition on the grounds that a perfection found in a lower power must be found in a higher power of the same type. But the particular senses have intuitive, sensible cognition of the particular as present and existing, while the imagination knows the same object abstractively by means of the sensible species, which can remain in the absence of the sensible thing itself. The same twofold cognitive capacity must, by parity, be found in the intellect. (Despite this argument, it has long been a matter of dispute to what extent Scotus admitted intuitive cognition in the present life, in part owing to conflicting statements by Scotus himself.)

For Scotus, then, the intellect has a direct apprehension of an intelligible object insofar as it is the actually existing and present cause of its cognitive act. The chief philosophical use to which Scotus puts intuitive cognition is to supply certitude for contingent propositions. For example, as just indicated, Scotus claims that by means of intuitive cognition we are as certain about our own acts as we are about necessary, self-evident propositions. After Scotus, the entire fourteenth century preoccupation with certitude was regularly cast in terms of intuitive cognition, most famously in the question of whether God could cause an intuitive cognition of a non-existent object.

Scotus’s standard definition of and argument for intuitive and abstractive cognition occurs in his *Oxford Sentences*. The context is the degree of *natural*, that is, non-beatific, knowledge angels (i.e., spiritual entities) have of God. Scotus rejects the view that spiritual substances know God by knowing their own nature as the image of God and instead holds that they could have a distinct apprehension of the divine nature short of beatitude by means of abstractive cognition. Translation follows.
VI. INTUITIVE AND ABSTRACTIVE COGNITION

Ordinatio II d. 3 p. 2 q. 2 (Vat. VII.552-554)

Does an Angel Have Distinct Knowledge of the Divine Essence by Its Natural Powers

I answer question differently [than Aquinas and Henry]. First, I distinguish a twofold intelllection, for there can be a cognition of an object insofar as it abstracts from all actual existence, and one of it insofar as it is present in some actual existence.

This distinction can be established by argument and by an analogy. The first member of the distinction is evident from the fact that we can have scientific knowledge about some essences. Scientific knowledge, however, concerns of the object insofar as it abstracts from actual existence, otherwise there could be science at one time and not at another, and so science would not be eternal, but once the thing was destroyed, the science about it would be destroyed, which is false.

The second member is proven because what pertains to the perfection of a lower power is found to a greater degree in a higher power of the same genus. In the senses, however, which are a cognitive powers [i.e., of the same genus as the intellect] it pertains to their perfection to be cognitive of a thing insofar as it exists in itself [i.e., as opposed to merely in a species in the organ] and insofar as it is present according to its existence. This is therefore possible in the intellect, which is the highest cognitive power. Therefore, the intellect can have such an intelllection of a thing insofar as it is present.

For the sake of brevity, I call the first type of intelllection ‘abstractive’, which is of the essence itself insofar as it abstracts from actual existence or non-existence. The second type, which concerns the essence of a thing insofar as it actually exists, or insofar as it is present according to such existence, I call ‘intuitive cognition’, not taking ‘intuitive’ as contrasted with ‘discursive’, for in this sense some abstractive cognition is intuitive, but absolutely, in the way in which we are said to ‘see’ (intueri) a thing just as it is in itself.

The second member can also be proven because we do not await [in the afterlife] a cognition of God of the sort that would be of him – per impossibile – if he did not exist or were not present in his essence, but we await an intuitive cognition, which [by Paul] is called ‘face to face’, because just as cognition in the sense is of a think ‘face to face’ insofar as it exists in actual existence, so too is that cognition we await [of God].

A second proof of this distinction is by analogy with the sensitive powers. The particular senses know an object in one manner, the imagination in another. The particular sense concerns an object insofar as it exists through itself and in itself. The imagination knows the same object insofar as it present in a species, which species of the object can exist even though the object is not existing or present, so that cognition in the imagination is abstractive with respect to the particular sense. Because what are divided in inferior things are sometimes united in superior ones, so these two types of sensation [i.e., particular senses and imagination], which are divided in the sensitive powers on account of the organ (for the same organ is not properly receptive of the object of a particular sense and the object of the imagination) are united in the intellect, to which as to a single power both acts can belong.

More developed accounts are found in Scotus’s Parisian Quodlibetal questions, where he argues for the distinction twice, in question 6 and at length in question 13. Noteworthy in these passages is Scotus’s elaborate analysis in question 13 of abstractive and intuitive cognition from the point of view of the different relations the mind has to the object in each case.

VI. INTUITIVE AND ABSTRACTIVE COGNITION

Duns Scotus, *Quod.* q. 6
(Trans. Alluntis-Wolter, pp. 135-37)

6.18 [Proof of the major based on the distinction between intuitive and abstract cognition] Proof of the major is found in the perfection of the beatific act. To understand better what is involved, it is helpful to distinguish two acts of the intellect at the level of simple apprehension or intellection of a simple object. One is indifferent as to whether the object is existing or not, and also whether it is present in reality or not. We often experience this act in ourselves, for universals and the essences of things we grasp equally well whether they exist extramentially in some subject or not, or whether we have an instance of them actually present or not. We also have an empirical or *a posteriori* proof of this, for scientific knowledge of a conclusion or understanding of a principle can be equally present to the intellect whether what they are about is existing or not, or is present or absent. In either case, one can have an equal understanding of that term on which an understanding of the principle or conclusion depends. This act of understanding, which can be called “scientific,” because it is a prerequisite condition for knowing the conclusion and understanding the principle, can very appropriately be called “abstractive” because it “abstracts” the object from existence or non-existence, from presence or absence.

6.19 But there is another act of understanding, though we do not experience it in ourselves as certainly, but it is possible. It is knowledge precisely of a present object as present and of an existing object as existing. Proof of this: Every perfection which is a perfection of cognition absolutely and which can be present in a faculty of sense knowledge can pertain eminently to an intellective cognitional faculty. But it is a matter of perfection in the act of knowing *qua* knowledge that what is first known be attained perfectly, and this is so when it is attained in itself and not just in some diminished or derivative likeness of itself. On the other hand, a sense power has such perfection in its knowledge, because it can attain an object in itself as existing and present in its real existence, and not just diminutively in a kind of imperfect likeness of itself. Therefore this perfection also pertains to an intellective power in the act of knowing. It could not pertain to it however unless it could know an existing thing and know it as present either in its own existence or in some intelligible object that contains the thing in question in an eminent* way, which we are not concerned with at present.

Such knowledge of the existent *qua* existent and present is something an angel has about himself. For Michael does not know himself in the way he would know Gabriel if Gabriel were annihilated, viz., by abstractive cognition, but he knows himself as existing and as existing in a way that is identical with himself. He also is aware of his intellection in this way if he reflects upon it, considering it not just as any object in which one has abstracted from existence or non-existence in the way he would think of another angel’s knowledge, if such did not actually exist; rather he knows himself to be knowing, that is to say, he knows his knowledge as something existing in himself. This knowledge possible for an angel, therefore, is also simply possible for our intellective power, because we have the promise that we shall be like the angels. Now this sort of intellection can properly be called “intuitive,” because it is an intuition of a thing as existing and present.

Duns Scotus, *Quod.* q. 13
(Trans. Alluntis-Wolter, pp. 290-96)

13.27 [A distinction between operations] As for the second point [of 13.17] in this article, I make a distinction in regard to operations that is more manifest in regard to the act of knowing, but can be assumed to be present, perhaps, also in the act of appetition.

There is some knowledge of the existent as such, such as that which grasps the object in its actual existence, e.g., the sight of color and in general of any sense perception involving the external senses. There is also knowledge of the object, but not as existing as such, either because the object does not exist or at least the knowledge is not of the object as actually existing. One can imagine color, for example, both when it exists and when it does not.

13.28 A similar distinction can be shown to obtain in intellectual knowledge.

This is proved, first, since it is clear that there can be some intellection of the nonexistent. But there can also be intellectual knowledge of the existent *qua* existent, for the blessed will have such knowledge of the beatific object [God]. Otherwise someone could be beatified by the object even if, to assume the
impossible, it did not exist. And yet there is admittedly a clear face-to-face vision of this object, since the act of knowing it tends to this object as present in itself with its own actual existence.

13.29 A second proof of the same is this: Everything that is part of the perfection of knowledge can pertain to intellectual knowledge with greater right than to sense knowledge. Now the possibility of grasping the object in its reality is a part of perfection, whenever this would not be prejudicial to the power of attaining the object because of its imperfection. Therefore, the intellect can have an act whereby the object is grasped in its real existence, at least that object which is more noble or on a par with the intellect. And if one concedes that our intellect can grasp some existing object in this way, then with equal reason we could admit it is possible for any object, since our intellect has the capacity for receiving the knowledge of anything intelligible.

13.30 [Two objections against this distinction] Against this distinction it is argued first that in knowing our intellect abstracts from the here-and-now and by the same token from anything concerned with the existent qua existent. Therefore, knowledge of anything as existing does not pertain to it per se.

13.31 Furthermore, if two such intellections were possible for our intellect, then it should be possible, on like grounds, to have both of these as regards the same object. And then, I ask, how would they possibly be distinguished, not only numerically (since two accidents of the same species cannot coexist at once in the same subject) but even specifically (for whether the act is specified in terms of the faculty or the object, since here the potency and object are the same for both types of knowledge, what specific difference could we claim was there)?

13.32 [Reply to these objections] To the first of these [in 13.30] one could say that the common distinction made between intellectual and sensitive knowledge, namely, that we understand the universal, but we sense the singular, must not be understood as referring to disparate but equal powers such as obtain between sight in seeing colors and hearing in perceiving sounds. Rather the distinction is one between a higher cognitive faculty and one subordinate to it, and hence the superior power can know some object or aspect thereof that the inferior cannot know, but not vice versa in the sense that the inferior could know some object or aspect of it without the [292] superior faculty being able to know that object even more perfectly or under the same aspect of knowability [e.g., as existing]. And thus one could admit that the intellect does not know the object as here-and-now because it grasps it in its absolute quidditive form, where-as the senses cannot know the object in this fashion because the power of each is limited to knowing it under the aspect of existing. But this does not mean the intellect is so determined that it has to know the object only in some different way than as existing, for it is not limited to knowing it in only one way.

13.33 To the second objection [in 13.31], one could admit that there are two kinds of knowledge of the same object at once, because the object of one is not distinguished from the other as essence from existence. For even if there were some distinction on the part of the object between essence and existence, it does not suffice for our purpose, because existence itself can be conceived abstracly, just as we can understand essence so can we conceive of existence even when it is not confronting us extramentally. Hence we may say that the two kinds of knowledge are distinct, and this, specifically, because the formal grounds that move the mind to each type of knowledge are not the same, in the case of intuitive knowledge it is the thing in its own existence that is the per se motive factor objectively, whereas in the case of abstractive knowledge what moves the intellect per se is something in which the thing has “knowable being” [esse cognoscibile], whether this be the cause that virtually contains the thing as knowable or whether it be an effect such as the [intelligible] species* or likeness that contains the thing of which it is the likeness representationally.

13.34 [The first type of knowledge involves a twofold real relationship] Given the distinction [in 13.27] between the two acts of knowing, one could say that the first, viz., of the thing as existing, must include in itself a real and actual relation to the object itself. The reason is that there can be no knowledge of this sort unless the knower has to the object an actual relationship that is such that the relata actually exist and are really distinct and given the nature of the relata the relationship arises necessarily.

13.35 But more specifically there seems to be a double actual relationship to the object in this act. One could be called the relationship of the measured or, more accurately, of the measurable to its measure. The other can be called the relationship of becoming one with the term to which one is united, which has the formal character of being something in between the two. And this relation of [293] the uniting medium can be given the special name of reaching out and coming in contact with the other term [relatio attingentiae alterius ut termini] or a stretching out or extending into the other as term [relatio tendentiae in alterum ut terminum].
13.36 But this distinction between the two relationships, namely, of the measurable to its measure and of contact with the term, seems to be sufficiently evident, for each can be separated from the other, as is the case with essences where the superior has the character of a measure with respect to the inferior, yet the inferior does not always have this relationship of contact with the superior of which we are speaking. Also, in the case where the intellect or the will is totally causing its object, there seems to be the relationship of extending into the term of the intellection or volition, whether this relationship be real or at least conceptual, and yet intellection or volition of this sort does not have the relationship of being measurable by this object but rather that of being its measure.

13.37 As for the first relationship, that of the measurable, Aristotle in the Metaphysics declares it pertains properly to the third type of the “relative.” Here it should be noted that for “something to be measured” means that it is made certain of the specific quantity by the other [i.e., the measure], so that it implies a relationship both to the intellect that gets the certitude and to the measure which imparts it. The first of these is not real, just as the relationship of the knowable to the knowledge is not real. The second relationship is of the caused, not in being, but being known, to the cause of its being known, and this relationship is real insofar as the dependence of the caused upon the cause is concerned, which dependence arises from the character of the relata and not just because of an act of the mind referring one to the other. Nevertheless, because this relationship of dependence (not indeed of the knowledge itself upon the cause of that knowledge, which is quite real, but of the object as known to the object as that by which it is known) is between the relata insofar as they have this characteristic of “being known” [esse cognitum], it follows that this relationship is not, simply speaking, real. But neither is it a purely conceptual relation, like that of the universal to the singular or of one contradictory to another, for Aristotle does not say that a “relative” of the third type is of the measured to the measure, but of the measurable (i.e., that which is suited by nature to be measured) to the measure (i.e., that which is designed by nature to measure). [294]

13.38 One could understand this as follows. Just as “to be measured” is to depend for being known actually (as is clear from what has been said), so “to be measurable” implies an aptitudinal or potential dependence for being known, which is to assert a dependence as to knowability. But everything is related to entity as it is to knowability. Consequently, the measurable refers to that underlying being which is the reason why this is measurable, and this entity is caused or “participated,” so that when something in the third class of “relatives” is said to be “as the measurable to its measure,” this is understood to mean that it is dependent in entity upon that in whose entity it participates, so that there does exist a relationship of the third type on the part of the measurable that is simply real, for it is understood to be a being by participation or imitation in relation to something else.

13.39 One could say further in favor of our proposal that since something could participate in the perfection of another in many ways, so the act of knowing is also related to the object participatively in the way a likeness is to that of which it is the likeness. I am not referring here to the sort of likeness that involves a communication of the same form, as in the case of the likeness between two white objects, but rather the likeness peculiar to imitation which is the likeness of the ideate* to the idea.

13.40 [Abstractive cognition has only a potentially real relation together with another conceptual relationship] The second act of knowledge, viz., that which does not have to be of the existent qua existent, does not require an actual real relationship to the object, since this sort of relation requires real and actual terms. Still, this second act of knowledge can have a relationship to its object as some-thing potentially real, where “real” would refer to the first relation mentioned in the preceding section [13.35], viz., that of the measurable or dependent, but would not refer to the second, viz., that of union or contact. In addition, abstractive knowledge can also have an actual conceptual relationship to the object, but for the knowledge to be of the object itself this is not required.

13.41 [Four points to be clarified] There are, then, four points to be explained here: First, that abstractive knowledge has a real potential or aptitudinal relation, viz., of the measurable with reference to the object, even if this is not existent. Proof: Whatever has an actual relationship to an existent term and for its part always relates to that term in the same way, will have an aptitudinal relationship to that term when it is not existing. But an operation is this sort of thing be-cause it is something measurable by the object, i.e., it is apt by nature to depend as to its entity upon the object, with that special sort of dependence that characterizes a likeness that imitates or participates in [the perfection of] that of which it is a likeness. But all these conditions would exist as actualized so far as the foundation goes, if the term actually existed.

13.42 Second, namely, that so far as the relationship of reaching out and contacting the term goes, one can say that neither a real nor an aptitudinal relationship of this sort is characteristic of abstractive
knowledge. Proof: Such a relation does not pertain to the foundation on its part, and it would not actually pertain to abstractive knowledge actually even if the term did exist in reality, for the latter is not designed by nature to contact the term in its actual existence.

13.43 Third, namely, that so far as the conceptual relation present in abstractive cognition is concerned, one can understand it in two ways:

One is this: When a term does not exist extramentally but has being only in the intellect, any relationship to it must be one of reason, i.e., conceptual, since a relation can have no truer being than does the term to which it relates. Now the object that is the term of abstractive knowledge needs only to be in the intellect. Therefore [any relationship to it can only be conceptual].

13.44 The other way to understand the conceptual relation is this: The act of knowing an object abstractively can itself be grasped in a reflex act. For since this intellection by reason of the object known is a natural likeness of the object, it can be known by reflection, and the intellect that grasps this intellection in this way can relate it to the object. But this intellection which is related in this fashion through the act of the intellect is being related by means of a conceptual relation.

13.45 There is a difference between these two conceptual relations, for just as the second can be a relationship to a nonexistent object, so also it can be a relation of a nonexistent cognition, just as long as this cognition remains known through reflection or is related by the intellect. But the first relation can only hold for an existing act, and not just for it as an object known through some reflex act or as the \textit{relatum} in the relating mind.

And from this difference follows the other, viz., that the second relation is one of reason on the part of both extremes, whereas the first conceptual relation is one of reason only on the part of the object, but on the part of the act it is real, because it is seen to follow from the nature of the act, and does not pertain to it only insofar as it is an object of the intellect or is related.

13.46 Against this it is argued that a real being does not require that anything not real follow or accompany its nature. Hence the real act of knowing has no relation of reason that follows from its nature.

I reply: Through the act of knowing the object has “known being” \textit{esse cognitum}. Therefore, some relation which refers to the object as having such “being” can follow the nature of the act.

13.47 From this the \textit{fourth} point becomes clear, namely, how the conceptual relation is a necessary concomitant, because this is true of the first relation of reason [mentioned in 13.43], for abstractive knowledge could exist without the second relation [in 13.44], viz., as a direct act without the following reflex act. And \textit{a fortiori} the object could be the term of such an act without having to have the conceptual relation to the act. The second relation is caused contingently after the direct act of intellection. Therefore there was no necessary ground in the object for it having to be the term of this reflex act.
VII. WILL AND ETHICAL THEORY

The defining feature of Scotus’s ethical theory, if not a defining feature of his philosophy, is the central role given to the will. Indeed, it is fair to say that the medieval conception of the will culminated with Scotus and that he drew out more explicitly than anyone had before its fundamental inconsistencies with the Aristotelian account of morality and action. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in Scotus’s separation of morality from eudaimonism, but clear as well in his denials of the connection of prudence and moral virtue and of the necessity of the natural law, at least as it comprised precepts governing relationships between created beings. The topics we will consider are:

1. Intellect and Will
2. Synchronic Contingency
3. The Will as Rational Power
4. The Two Affections of Will
5. Natural Law and the Coherence of Scotus’s Ethics
6. Virtues in the Will
7. Connection of the Virtues

Bibliography on Later Medieval Ethical Theory


42. ———. “John Duns Scotus and the Concept of Human Freedom.” *Deus et homo*, pp. 317-25.


53. ———. “Native Freedom of the Will as the Key to the Ethics of Scotus.” In *Philosophical Theology*, pp. 148-62.


VII.1 INTELLECT AND WILL

Background in Aristotle, Aquinas, Henry of Ghent and the Condemnations of 1277

Aristotle, On the Soul 3.10 (433a9-433b26)

These two at all events appear to be sources of movement: appetite and thought (if one may venture to regard imagination as a kind of thinking; for many men follow their imaginations contrary to knowledge, and in all animals other than man there is no thinking or calculation but only imagination).

Both of these then are capable of originating local movement, thought and appetite: thought, that is, which calculates means to an end, i.e. practical thought (it differs from speculative thought in the character of its end); while appetite is in every form of it relative to an end; for that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of practical thought; and that which is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of the action. It follows that there is a justification for regarding these two as the sources of movement, i.e. appetite and practical thought; for the object of appetite starts a movement and as a result of that thought gives rise to movement, the object of appetite being to it a source of stimulation. So too when imagination originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite.

That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of appetite; for if there had been two sources of movement—thought and appetite—they would have produced movement in virtue of some common character. As it is, thought is never found producing movement without appetite (for wish is a form of appetite; and when movement is produced according to calculation it is also according to wish), but appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation, for desire is a form of appetite. Now thought is always right, but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong. That is why, though in any case it is the object of appetite which originates movement, this object may be either the real or the apparent good. To produce movement the object must be more than this: it must be good that can be brought into being by action; and only what can be otherwise than as it is can thus be brought into being. That then such a power in the soul as has been described, i.e. that called appetite, originates movement is clear. Those who distinguish parts in the soul, if they distinguish and divide in accordance with differences of power, find themselves with a very large number of parts, a nutritive, a sensitive, an intellective, a deliberative, and now an appetitive part; for these are more different from one another than the faculties of desire and passion.

Since appetites run counter to one another, which happens when a principle of reason and a desire are contrary and is possible only in beings with a sense of time (for while thought bids us hold back because of what is future, desire is influenced by what is just at hand: a pleasant object which is just at hand presents itself as both pleasant and good, without condition in either case, because of want of foresight into what is farther away in time), it follows that while that which originates movement must be specifically one, viz. the faculty of appetite as such (or rather farthest back of all the object of that faculty; for it is it that itself remaining unmoved originates the movement by being apprehended in thought or imagination), the things that originate movement are numerically many.

All movement involves three factors, (1) that which originates the movement, (2) that by means of which it originates it, and (3) that which is moved. The expression ‘that which originates the movement’ is ambiguous: it may mean either something which itself is unmoved or that which at once moves and is moved. Here that which moves without itself being moved is the realizable good, that which at once moves and is moved is the faculty of appetite (for that which is moved is moved insofar as it desires, and appetite in the sense of actual appetite is a kind of movement), while that which is in motion is the animal.

Movement of Animals c. 7 (701a6-701b1)

But how is it that thought is sometimes followed by action, sometimes not; sometimes by movement, sometimes not? What happens seems parallel to the case of thinking and inferring about the immovable objects. There the end is the truth seen (for, when one thinks the two propositions, one thinks and puts together the conclusion), but here the two propositions result in a conclusion which is an action—for example, whenever one thinks that every man ought to walk, and that one is a man oneself, straightaway one walks; or that, in this case, no man should walk, one is a man: straightaway one remains at rest. And one so acts in the two cases provided that there is nothing to compel or to prevent. Again, I ought to create
VII.1 INTELLECT AND WILL

Aquinas, ST I-II.9.1

Whether the will is moved by the intellect?

OBJ 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: “My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us not.” But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect: because movement of the movable results from motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.

OBJ 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.

OBJ 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that “the appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved.”

I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.

The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above (Q[1]. A[2]), the principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the “art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding” (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good—i.e. the order of the whole army—by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.

On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal “being” and “truth,” which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.

Reply OBJ 1: The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
Reply OBJ 2: Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).

Reply OBJ 3: The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect.

ST I-II.9.3
Whether the Will Moves Itself?

OBJ 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above (A[1]). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.

Reply OBJ 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.


Taken from Lerner, R. and Mushin, M. (eds.) Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook (Cornell, 1963), pp. 350-51. Note that the numbers in parentheses are the original numbers of the condemned articles. The initial numbers are those given later by late nineteenth-century scholar Pierre Mandonnet, who attempted to arrange the condemned articles by topic.

150. That that which by its nature is not determined to being or non-being is not determined except by something that is necessary with respect to itself. (128)
151. That the soul wills nothing unless it is moved by another. Hence the following proposition is false: the soul wills by itself.—This is erroneous if what is meant is that the soul is moved by another, namely, by something desirable or an object in such a way that the desirable thing or object is the whole reason for the movement of the will itself. (194)
152. That all voluntary movements are reduced to the first mover.—This is erroneous unless one is speaking of the simply first, uncreated mover and of movement according to its substance, not according to its deformity. (209)
153. That the will and the intellect are not moved in act by themselves but by an eternal cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. (133)
154. That our will is subject to the power of the heavenly bodies. (162)
155. That a sphere is the cause of a doctor’s willing to cure. (132)
156. That the effects of the stars upon free choice are hidden. (161)
157. That when two goods are proposed, the stronger moves more strongly.—This is erroneous unless one is speaking from the standpoint of the good that moves. (208)
158. That in all his actions man follows his appetite and always the greater appetite.—This is erroneous if what is meant is the greater in moving power. (164)
159. That the appetite is necessarily moved by a desirable object if all obstacles are removed.—This is erroneous in the case of the intellectual appetite. (134)
160. That it is impossible for the will not to will when it is in the disposition in which it is natural for it to be moved and when that which by nature moves remains so disposed. (131)
161. That in itself the will is undetermined to opposites, like matter, but it is determined by a desirable object as matter is determined by an agent. (135)
162. That the science of contraries alone is the cause for which the rational soul is in potency to opposites, and that a power that is simply one is not in potency to opposites except accidentally and by reason of something else. (173)
163. That the will necessarily pursues what is firmly held by reason, and that it cannot abstain from that which reason dictates. This necessitation, however, is not compulsion but the nature of the will.
VII.1 INTELLECT AND WILL

164. That man’s will is necessitated by his knowledge, like the appetite of a brute. (159)
165. That after a conclusion has been reached about something to be done, the will does not remain free, and that punishments are provided by law only for the correction of ignorance and in order that the correction may be a source of knowledge for others. (158)
166. That if reason is rectified, the will is also rectified. — This is erroneous because contrary to Augustine’s gloss on this verse from the Psalms: My soul hath coveted to long, and so on [Ps. 118:20], and because according to this, grace would not be necessary for the rectitude of the will but only science, which is the error of Pelagius. (130)
167. That there can be no sin in the higher powers of the soul. And thus sin comes from passion and not from the will. (165)
168. That a man acting from passion acts by compulsion. (136)
169. That as long as passion and particular science are present in act, the will cannot go against them. (129)

Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet IX.5 (1285)


Hence, others say that the act of the will, which is to will, can be “considered in two ways: in one way with regard to the determination of the act, in the other way with regard to the exercise of it.” It is the same way in a craftsman. If he has only the form of one house in his mind, he cannot will to make another house of another form. But in the second way the will is determined by the end, just as the craftsman who has only one form of a house can still be indifferent with regard to making or not making that house. In the first way they say that the will is moved by the intellect, because the good as known is the form specifying the act of willing and it determines that, if the will wills anything, it is necessary that it will that good. But this is not the case with the second way, because in that way its object is the good as good and, hence, the end which it can indifferently either pursue or not will. Thus it is proper to the will to move itself and all other potencies to their actions or to draw them back from their actions.

But if the intellect were the moving principle of the will with regard to any specification of the act so that the known good is said to move the will, then I ask about the specification by which the will is said to be moved. For, either the good is merely shown or offered to the will by the intellect, which receives its impression from the intelligible object, just as a proper passive potency receives its impression from its proper active cause by natural necessity. Then there is no freedom of the intellect not to receive it, except in the sense that matter can receive or not receive a form insofar as there can or cannot be an agent imprinting it. But this is not due to any freedom. Or there is some inclination produced in the will.

If in the first way, the will is moved neither by the known good nor by the intellect, because nothing is moved by something else unless some impression is produced in it by the other. Thus, if the will is moved, it is moved by itself, and this is the case whether it is moved in determining for itself its act and its object, or by doing or carrying out its act. Thus, in both ways there remains full freedom of the will with respect to its act. Nor does the intellect do anything to bring the will into its act, except to show or offer the object, and it does this only as an accidental cause and necessary condition. On this account, if there is present any determination, it is the determination by which the intellect is passively determined by the intelligible object that acts upon and determines it. By this passive determination in the intellect, an object is presented to the will, and by it the will is in no way itself passively determined by the active intellect to its act of willing.

If in the second way, namely, there is some inclination produced in the will, then, either that inclination is not a volition, but some impression inclining it to will, like a weight, as a habit existing in it inclines it, or it is a volition or act of willing.

If it happens in the first way, then, despite that impression inclining it, the will remains in its full freedom of acting and not acting in accord with that impression, just as if it did not have it, although it cannot so easily will its contrary. Thus, if it is moved to will something, it is moved by itself, and this is the case both with regard to the determination of the act and of the object and with regard to the exercise of the act, as we said before.

But if it happens in the second way, that inclination is a volition so that such an inclination is nothing but a certain willing, as Augustine says in commenting on the verse of the Psalm: “Incline my heart toward your testimonies.” “What does it mean to have the heart inclined toward something but to will it?”
when the will wills something, it carries it out unless it is impeded, and if there is not some external action to be carried out, the exercise of the act is nothing other than willing. Thus, it is not possible to claim that the intellect moves the will in the way mentioned with respect to the determination of the act and not with respect to the exercise of the act. Indeed, if it is necessitated in this way with regard to the determination, it is likewise necessitated with regard to the exercise, because it cannot not will to carry it out, “For the appetition is the activity,” as the Philosopher say in On the Motion of Animals 71 This will now be explained according to him.

... As had been said, if the will were naturally moved by something else, it would be determined to its act without any freedom, and it could not pull back from it. Thus it would not be “the master of its own acts,” nor would the appetite which is the will “have the power to restrain the appetite” in those matters which fall short of the vision of the last end. Damascene states the opposite of this in the twenty-ninth chapter that we already mentioned.’ One must say, then, without qualification that the will is moved to its act of willing by nothing else, but is moved by itself alone.

Thomas of Sutton, *Qq. ord.* q. 7

‘Utrum voluntas moveat seipsam’ [ed. Schneider, 192:177-89]

I reply to the question [of whether the will moves itself.]. All universally agree that the will moves itself in some way. But regarding the way in which the will moves itself to willing there are two main but opposed positions of the masters. One says that the will moves itself with respect to the exercise of the act alone, so that it does not move itself with regard to the determination of the act, but it is so moved by the object or the intellect apprehending the object. The other position says that the will moves itself to willing not only with regard to the exercise of the act but also with regard to the determination of the act, and that the object or intellect apprehending the object moves the will only incidentally as something removing an impediment, and alone in the manner of a *sine qua non* cause and metaphorically.
Concerning the freedom of the will, the question is posed whether the act of the will is caused in the will by the object moving the will or by the will moving itself.

2. It seems that it is caused by the object, because Aristotle in III De anima posits an order of movers and moved in the animal, and he says that ‘appetite is moved by the appetible object, which moves but is not moved.’ Therefore, the appetible object causes motion in the appetite. (And Aristotle takes appetite there in a broad sense.) Therefore, the appetible object will cause the act in the appetite called the will.

3. It is replied that the appetible object only moves the appetite in a metaphorical sense.

4. Against this reply: the final thing which is moved [i.e., the animal] is moved in a true sense. So if the first mover were to move the second merely in a metaphorical way, this is not to posit an order of movers and things moved in the animal, but the order would vary and be equivocal.

5. Furthermore, since the will is not an active power, therefore it is not active with respect to eliciting its own act. The antecedent is shown because the definition of a power active with respect to its object does not pertain to the will, for the will is not a ‘principle of changing another (i.e., its object) insofar as it is other.’

6. Furthermore, if the will were to cause the act of willing in itself, then it would be in potency and act with respect to the same thing, for the patient is in potency in the same way as the agent is in act, from III Physics. Therefore, if the will were to cause the act of will and it were received in the will, the will would be in potency and act with respect to the same thing, which is absurd.

7. Again, if the will were active with respect to its own act, the same thing would be referred to itself by a real relation, because the relation of mover to moved is real, as is clear from V Metaphysics. But if the will were to move itself to a real act of willing, the same thing would be really moving and moved. But it is absurd for the same thing to have opposite relations.

8. Furthermore, an accidental accident does not arise from the essential principles of its subject, for this is what distinguishes an accidental accident from a essential accident, because what arises from the essential principles of a subject is a necessary attribute (passio), and so an essential accident. But the act of willing is an accidental act of the will, for it is not a necessary attribute. Therefore, it does not arise from the essential principles of the will. Therefore, it is caused by something other than the will.

9. Again, what is in a potency of contradiction to opposites does not cause one of them unless it is determined. But the will is not determined to willing or willing against, or to willing or not willing. Therefore it is not determined to willing of itself, and so by something impressed upon it by the apprehended object.

10. The major premise is proved in two ways. First by Aristotle in IX Metaphysics, who argues: “Because knowledge concerns opposites, it is not of itself determined to one of them. Thus, it will not issue in act unless it is determined [by something else], for if it were to determine itself, it would produce opposites [at once].”

11. The same thing is proved differently in this way: no effect is produced by a cause which is equally related to the being or non-being of that effect. But a cause that is equally related to opposites is non more determined to the being than to the non-being of its effect. Therefore, such a cause does not produce an effect of itself.

---

12 Reading opposita for alia.
22. In response to the question some say that the total cause of the actuality in the act of the will is from the side of the will’s object, so that the total power is in the object known with respect to the act of will. They have arguments for their view, which were given in the initial objections.

23. Those who hold this view, however, disagree among themselves.

24. For some say that the object known moves the will to the act of willing, which they prove by Averroes’s comment 35 on Metaphysics XII concerning how a bath can move, for insofar as it exists in the intellect it moves the will as an efficient cause, but insofar as it exists outside the mind as an end it moves the will metaphorically.

25. Others say that not only is it impossible for mover and moved to be the same, but they must be distinct according to subject. And therefore no power, whether it have an organ or not, can move itself, nor can the agent intellect move the possible intellect, so that a power without an organ cannot move another power without an organ, nor does a power without an organ move one with an organ, because none of these are distinct according to subject. But the same thing causes the act both in the intellect and in the will, and this is the moving object which exists in the sense image.

26. But how can the sense image move the intellect, since the intellect is not distinct in subject from the imagination?

27. This doctor says that although a power without an organ cannot move itself, nor does it even move a power with an organ, nevertheless a power in an organ can move another power in an organ, because they are distinct in subject, and so a power in an organ can move not in an organ, because although the soul is everywhere in the body, nevertheless the soul extends beyond a power in an organ, and for this reason a power in an organ can move one not in an organ. According to him, therefore, the sense image alone causes volition.

[Against the First Opinion]
[Common Arguments against both versions]

28. Against this view: [First Main Argument] First, being affected is not within the power of the patient, for the patient is not master of its affection. If therefore willing is related to the will as its affection, it follows that the act of willing will not be in the power of the will, and then all praise and blame, reward and punishment vanishes. This seems to be the meaning of Augustine in III De libero arbitrio where he says that unless willing is in our power there would be no merit or punishment. From this is also follows, which the philosophers reject, that we would not be masters of our own acts.

29. Because of this argument and to salvage freedom of the will, they reply that although the will is determined to practical principles, it is not determined with respect to practical conclusions, for the will can turn the intellect to consent to one conclusion and not the other.

30. Furthermore, whenever an agent sufficient [to bring about an effect] acts [on a patient], the corresponding patient is affected, because if the patient is not affected, then the agent does not act sufficiently [to bring about the effect], but another agent is required. Therefore, if it is not in the power of something that the agent act, then it is not in its power that the patient be affected, for if the prior is not in something’s power, then neither is the posterior, because the posterior necessarily follows the prior. But the action of a sufficient agent is not in the power of the patient when the agent is something natural – and this is especially the case here – since the action of a natural agent precedes every volition and action of the intellect. Therefore, the first volition is not in the power of the will, but a reflexive volition is within its power. Thus, the volition from the
VII.1 INTELLECT AND WILL

object is not within the power of the will, but it is within its power to make the intellect understand or not in acting.

31. Against this view: I ask how can the will move or command the intellect to understand or not understand? The will, according to this opinion, cannot move unless it has been moved. Cognition [of the object] preceded that motion of the will. Either therefore that cognition is in the power of the will, or else it is not, because it is prior to the volition, and the object moves [the intellect] to it. If that cognition is not in the power of the will, then the will cannot move the intellect to understand or not. Either therefore the will be an infinite regress, or else there will be no motion in the power of the will.

32. Furthermore, according to Augustine in Retractiones I.9, “Nothing is so in the power of the will as the will itself.” But, according to you, some act of the intellect is in the power of the will, which act the will can command. Therefore, its own act is in its power.

33. Furthermore, there is not freedom in the will because reason can know and discern diverse things and the will not, because according to Anselm in De casu diaboli ch. 12, if there were an angel who had the will as instrument together with an affection for the advantageous, it could reason, but there would not be freedom or sin in it, according to Anselm. There would only be an inclination in the same way as the sensitive appetite is inclined, and yet the intellect would be indifferent to knowing other things. Therefore, through this indifference – by which indifference freedom is not preserved in the will, nor is it a sensitive appetite, because it would be alone inclined to intelligibles, yet it would be as naturally as inclined to intelligibles as the sensitive appetite is to sensibles – such an angel would still not be free.

34. Again, this indifference can be in the sensitive appetite regarding diverse objects, because it can desire one thing now and its opposite at another time owing to the disposition of the organ. (The same holds for the power of sense apprehension.) Therefore, if such indifference were sufficient for freedom, there would be freedom in the sense appetite.

35. Finally, reason can only give a demonstrative syllogisms about one of a pair of opposed conclusions, but of the other it does so either sophistically or in a defective way. Therefore, if there were freedom in the will because of such an indifference in the intellect arising from its ability to judge about opposites, it would follow that there was freedom in the will because the intellect has defective cognition. This would be a lowly freedom!

36. [Second Main Argument] The second main argument against the above opinion is this: a natural agent, remaining the same and not impeded, cannot cause opposites in the same patient which is disposed toward the agent in the same way, for this is the meaning of a natural agent. Thus, in II De generatione Aristotle says that “The same thing insofar as it is the same is apt to produce the same thing,” and this is particularly understood of the natural agent. But the object is a purely natural agent. Therefore, in the same patient the same object cannot cause opposites. Thus, if an object known causes willing-against in the will, it cannot cause willing-for or the converse. But to hold this is to remove all freedom from the will and contingency in human acts within our power. Nor can evil be posited as the cause of willing-against or hating, because it is a privation [i.e., and hence not a true cause.] This seems to be Augustine’s argument in XII De Trinitate ch. 6 concerning “two persons equally affected”, where the object is the same and the will equally affected, but one person falls and the other does not. Therefore, the object is not the cause of volition.

37. [Third Main Argument] Furthermore, this opinion is contrary not only to many sayings of the saints (as noted above, it is contrary to Augustine’s 83 Quaestiones q. 8, and many others elsewhere), but it is also contrary to Aristotle, Metaphysics IX.4, who says that a rational does not issue in act of itself, because it is a power for opposites. If therefore it were to issue in act of itself, it would issue in opposites. (Thus, knowledge is no more determined to one of a pair of opposites that to the other.) This consequence holds because a rational power concerns opposites.
naturally, and so if it could actualize itself, it would issue in opposites, just like the sun has a
nature which causes opposites in diverse patients [e.g., causes mud to congeal but ice to melt], and
thus of itself, if it is not impeded, causes opposites in diverse patients proximate to it. The case is
the same with knowledge or an intellect possessing knowledge, for whatever possesses knowledge
possesses it in the manner of a nature, and so knowledge is a principle of acting in such a manner.
Therefore it is necessary according to Aristotle that knowledge or the intellect having knowledge
be determined, and this by appetite or choice, according to him. But it is not determined by
appetite insofar as appetite is determined by knowledge, because if appetite were determined by
knowledge, since knowledge itself is equally related to opposites, it follows that it would be
determined to opposites. Therefore, the will determines a rational power, so that the will takes
none of its determination from knowledge or from anything else.

[Against Each Opinion in Particular]

38. Against the first version of the first opinion] Against the position that the end as it exists in the
intelllect, or the object as it is actually known, moves the will to the act of willing: the end, insofar
as it is the end, is a cause other than the efficient cause and has a different causal nature. For the
causal nature of the end is to move the efficient cause to cause. Thus, the causal nature of the
efficient cause will be different [than that of the end]. Therefore, the end does not move the
efficient cause in the manner of an efficient cause.

39. Furthermore, every per se agent acts for the sake of an end. But if the end is held to move
efficiently and to be an agent, it will be a per se agent, because it will not act by means of another,
for then there would be some other moving cause prior to the end. But then the end would move
per accidens, since every per accidens cause is reduced to a per se cause. But the first motion is
from the end. Therefore, if the end were to move efficiently, it would move per se, and
consequently the end would move because of an end. Now either this end moves for the sake of
itself or for the sake of another. If for the sake of itself, then the end will be cause of itself. If for
the sake of another, there will be an infinite regress.

40. [Against the second version of the first opinion] Contrary to the other way of holding this opinion
in particular: Against the view that the sense image causes every act in the will because the mover
and moved must be distinct in subject: according to this opinion it would have to be said that the
angel could have no new act of willing or knowing, because in the angel the mover and moved are
not distinct in subject. Rather, God would have to cause a miracle in every new volition of the
angel by creating it. And then it follows that God created the act by which the angel sinned, or if
the act of will is in the angel from other things, then that act will not be in its power.

41. He who holds this view replies that it is alone a matter of belief that the angel could have a new
act of knowing, and this is had neither from Aristotle nor from natural reason.

42. I reply that it can be shown by natural reason at least that the rational soul can have a new volition.
Thus, the opinion that the sense image is the total cause of volition and intellection, denigrates too
much the human soul, because it holds that we possess our acts no more than cows.

43. Again, an angel understands itself. Thus, whether that intellection be from the object or the
intellect, the same thing moves itself. And be that Aristotle denied intellection to be an accident,
he never would have denied that something immaterial understood itself, if he held intellection to
be an accident.

44. Furthermore, an effect is not more prefect than its total, equivocal cause. Therefore, since the
sense image is such a cause with respect to volition and intellection, there will not be any
intellection or volition more perfect than the sense image. From this it follows further that since a
cow can have a sense image more perfectly than we can, our act of willing or intellection will be
less perfect than the imagination or sense image in a cow.
45. Nor is it valid to say that the agent intellect concurs [i.e., as a cause in intellection with the sense image], because it causes nothing in the imagination or possible intellect, since, according to this view, these are indistinct in subject. And assuming that the agent intellect were to cause in the imagination, still that would be less perfect than intellection, and so it would follow that the happiness of the philosophers [i.e., contemplation, which is an act of the intellect] would be much less perfect than the sense image.

46. Furthermore, the principle upon which those who hold this view depend, that ‘the mover and moved are distinct in subject’ is false. For this is false in many cases and contrary to Aristotle, for a subject is not only a material cause with respect to its proper attribute, but an efficient cause. An attribute would not otherwise necessarily inhere in its subject unless it were caused necessarily by it, because a passive potency, which of itself is a potency for contradiction, is never a cause of necessity of something inhering in it, but rather of the opposite [i.e., inhering in it]. Against this principle is also the counterexample of heavy and light things, which move themselves efficiently, as said above.

[Some arguments and a third version of the above opinion and its refutation omitted.]

[A Second Opinion]

54. A second extreme opinion, that of Henry of Ghent, is that the will alone is the efficient cause with respect to the act of willing, and the object known is alone a cause ‘sine qua non’, and the intellect when it understands the ‘removal of an impediment’. And on this account they say that the object known is ‘sine qua non’ and the intellect which understands like something removing an impediment, for if the object does not have cognitional being in the intellect, there will not be volition, and also if the intellect does not understand, the will cannot will, because it is at that time impeded.

[Against this Opinion]

55. Against this view it is argued: Aristotle in II De anima proves that sense is not an active power, because then it would always sense, just as if that which is combustible were to have the active power of burning, it would always burn itself. And this is proved because action depends only upon the agent and the patient which is proximate and disposed, so that if action is natural, it follows necessarily from these, while if it is free, it can follow from them. If therefore, the will alone is the sufficient cause of the act of willing, and it is itself a sufficient patient for receiving that act, then the will always can will, just as something combustible always does burn itself, if it has an active power of burning. This is to argue as follows: if the will were an active power sufficient for causing the act of willing, then it would be in ‘accidental potency’ [i.e., immediate potency] to willing; but what is in ‘accidental potency’ is of itself able to go into act; therefore, the will is always able of itself to go into act.

56. Henry responds that the will is impeded as long as the intellect does not understand [i.e., the will is not always capable of self-willing]. Thus, a requirement for the will to will is that it have that without which it cannot will [i.e., the object in the intellect]. [Therefore, it does not follow that the will has the capacity at all times to will of itself].

57. There is an argument against this made by those holding the opposite view that then it can be said that anything changes itself, so that a stick burns itself when fire is present, because then it does not follow according to Henry’s view that ‘if fire is present, the stick burns and if the fire has been removed, it does not burn, therefore the fire causes the stick to burn’ but it remains according to his view that ‘the fire causes the stick to burn itself’ and that ‘the fire is the sine qua non’, just as it does not follow according to Henry ‘if the object known by the intellect is posited, volition is posited and if it is removed, volition is removed, therefore the object is the cause of volition’ but it remains that the object is the ‘sine qua non’.

58. Furthermore, it would be necessary to posit another cause in addition to the four genera of causes or to reduce the sine qua non cause to one of them, because positing all causes, it is necessary to posit the
effect. Thus the sine qua non cause either pertains to that which removes an impediment, just as something removing a beam is the sine qua non cause that a heavy thing is moved, or is reduced to the bringing into proximity of the patient. Therefore, it is necessary to say that the object known is a cause of volition or that there is a second cause.

59. Furthermore, you Henry hold that the will is the superior power [to the intellect]. Now a superior power is not impeded by the inferior power. Therefore the will is not impeded by the fact that the intellect does not understand, for in that case the cause does not act. For something is said to be impeded by the action of a contrary agent, as if the sun intended to cause an effect that was hot, but when it causes, Saturn cold in power, impedes the sun by contrary action. Similarly, if something heavy is placed upon a beam, and its heaviness does not overcome that holding it up, it is impeded from its motion. Therefore, by non consideration alone the will cannot be said to be impeded.

60. [Second main argument] There is a second argument against this opinion: if the object known is alone a sine qua non cause of volition, then volitions [i.e., acts of willing] would not be formally distinct by their objects.

61. But this seems absurd, first because then it follows that habits in the will would not be distinguished by objects, for habits are generated from acts in the manner of a nature. For because an act is such, it generates a habit. Thus, someone who errs about temperance is able to generate in himself a habit by acts. Later, after leaving aside that error, he can tend to correct acts of temperance. Thus, a habit is generated from acts inssofar as it is a certain nature. The first consequence is clear, because you hold that the will is a sufficient cause of volition [i.e., the act of willing] and the object a sine quo non. Therefore, [acts of willing] will not be distinguished by their objects, because they are only distinguished by what is their essential, active cause.

62. A second absurdity that follows is that an act or habit regarding a more perfect object would not be absolutely more perfect, and so there could be as much happiness loving a fly as loving God, for according to this view ‘an act of willing is not more perfect because it concerns a more perfect object, but because it is from the will as a total cause with greater or lesser intensity.’ Thus, it would follow that willing and loving a fly would be more perfect if it were more intense.

63. Again, it would follow that all volitions, and thus all habits, would belong to the same species. But this is false, because species have an essential order in the universe, and willing God is more noble than willing anything else. Therefore, volitions are distinguished in species by their object. Perfection requires an essential order, and so if volitions are related so that one is more perfect than the other, it follows that they have an essential order and thus are distinct in species.

64. You will respond that the will is undetermined so that it causes many specifically distinct volitions, just as the sun causes things diverse in species.

65. Against this response, it would follow that the will would have an infinite power of causing, or that something could be an object of the will which is impossible for the will to will. Proof: if the will is a power limited and determined with respect to diverse volitions, since there can be some other species beyond a determinate number of species [i.e., God could always make a new species], it would follow that the will could not will it. If it is held that the will has the power to will infinite volitions diverse in species, the it follows that it is infinite in power, for it is more perfect to have two volitions diverse in species than one, and to have three rather than two, and the first volition is not equal to the second volition in willing, because it requires some other power it did not have. But the will is the total cause of all these specifically different volitions, and it has that entire power all at once. Therefore, there will in itself will have infinite power, if it is the total cause of all these volitions, but not if it is a partial cause, because then the other infinite partial causes which are specifically diverse concur with the will.

13 Reading diversarum for determinarum.
14 Reading quia for qui.
66. [Third main argument.] Furthermore, it is argued against this view as follows: the act of willing has an essential relationship to the object as that which is measured to that which measures and not the reverse, for from the fact that the stone is willed, it does not depend upon the will. But the measured depends upon the measure either as a posterior effect depends upon a prior effect or as an effect upon a cause (leaving aside the priority according to which human nature depends upon the divine person of Christ in the incarnation and an accident upon a subject, as will be discussed below in III q.1). But the act of willing does not depend upon the object known as a prior effect. Therefore it depends upon the object as a prior cause, and this is only to give the object as an efficient cause, as is clear from running though the four causes.

67. [Fourth Main Argument]. A fourth argument is this: if the will is the total active cause of the act of willing and the object known is alone a sine quo non, then perfection in the act of willing will not come from the object as an efficient cause but totally from the will. Thus, when the will wills with greater force, the act of willing will be more perfect. But the will can love with equal intensity an object known imperfectly and one known with complete clarity (because if Henry were to claim that in the clear knowledge that will exist in the next life, the object [i.e., God] will cause our act of love [i.e., and that is why our love for God is more perfect in beatitude than in the present state], then he would recede from this prior view [i.e., which denied any causality to the object]). Therefore, the perfect love [of God] can follow upon the [imperfect] knowledge [of God] in faith as well as the clear knowledge [of God in the next life], and so we could have beatitude in the present state! Or if it is replied that God can cause a more perfect love by a miracle [i.e., in the next life], it at least follows that the will can have as perfect as love for a pleasurable good that is absent as for one that is present and actually existing if it is drawn to it with greater force. This is false, because a pleasurable good can be loved more perfectly when it is present than when it is absent.

68. [Fifth Main Argument]. A final argument is this: to act freely is to act knowingly. Thus, one who wills freely, insofar as he wills freely, is not blind. From this therefore, that one wills freely, it follows that he wills that by knowing, so that cognition is included in freedom. Therefore, the known object or knowledge of the object is not required for an act of will as a 'sine quo non' alone, but as a cause included in freedom and in the power of free choice.

[Opinion of Duns Scotus]

69. I reply to the question therefore that the efficient cause of the act of willing is not only the object or sense image as the first view holds, for this does not preserve freedom in any way, nor is the efficient cause of the act of willing even the will alone, just as the second extreme view holds, because then all the conditions consequent upon the act of will cannot be preserved, as was shown. Therefore, I hold a middle view, that both the will and object concur in causing the act of willing, so that that act has the will and object known as an efficient cause.

70. But how is this possible concerning the object? For the object has an abstract being in the intellect, but an agent must be an individual and actually exist. For this reason, I say that the intellect which actually understands the object concurs with the will as an efficient cause to cause the act of willing, so to be brief, ‘a nature which actually understands the object and which is free’ is the cause of willing and willing against. In this consists free choice, whether in us or angels.

71. But how can several things concur as a single total cause of the act of willing is clear. Sometimes many things cooperate to cause one effect, which only have an incidental order. In that case, those things concur [not essentially but only] accidentally, because if the whole power were in one, it would cause the entire effect, such as many men pulling a boat. But this does not apply to the case at hand, because there is here an essential order [i.e., between the intellect and will] and one partial cause [i.e., the will] presupposes the other.

72. Several things sometimes concur in a second way to cause a single effect, so that one takes its it very power of causing an effect from the other, like a heavenly body and a particular agent, such as an
VII.1 INTELLECT AND WILL

109

element or a mixture of elements, with respect to the act of causing. Neither does this apply to the case at hand, because the object actually known by the intellect does not have its power of causing from the will, nor the reverse, with respect to a first act.

73. In a third way, several agents sometimes concur in causing so that they are of a different order or nature, contrary to the first type of concurrence, and neither takes its active power from the other [contrary to the second type of concurrence], but each has its own proper causal nature complete in its own class. Nevertheless one is the more principal agent and the other the less principal, as the father and mother in the production of offspring, the nib and the pen in writing, and the man and woman in running of the household. This applies to the present case: the will has the nature of one partial cause of the act of willing, and the nature actually understanding the object the nature of a second partial cause, and both together are one total cause of the act of willing. Nevertheless, the will is the more principal cause and ‘the nature understanding’ the less principal, because the will freely moves, upon whose motion something else moves (hence it determines another to act). But the ‘nature knowing the object’ is a natural agent, which, taken in itself, always acts. It can never be sufficient, however, to elicit an act unless the will concurs. Therefore, the will is the more principal cause. This is always evident from what was said in distinction 3 of the first book, namely, that the intellect is a more principal cause than the object in the act of understanding.

74. From this it is clear how there is liberty in the will. For I am said to ‘freely see’ because I can freely use the power of sight to see. So in the proposed, for however much some cause is natural and always acting in the same way – taken in itself – because nevertheless it does not determine or necessitate the will to will, but the will from its own freedom can concur with it to will or not will, and so is able to freely use it, on that account to will or not will freely is said to be in our power.

[Replies to arguments pro and con omitted.]
Did Scotus Change His Mind on the Causality of the Will

1. [C. Balic], *Les commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences: étude historique et critique*, Louvain 1927 (Bibliothèque de la Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique, 1).

1. VERSIONS OF SCOTUS’S DISCUSSION ON CAUSALITY OF THE WILL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMENTARY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lectura</td>
<td>The <em>Lectura</em> are Scotus’s early Oxford lectures on the <em>Sentences</em>. They were unknown until about 1929 when they were discovered by Balic in manuscript 1449 of the Austrian National Library of Vienna. They only began to appear in print in 1960. Initially, considerable confusion surrounded the second book, which contained the question on the will. Balic edited this question in Balic (1931) but at that time thought it came not from the earlier <em>Lectura</em> but from what he believed to be a later work, the <em>Additiones secundae</em>, referred to by Adam Wodeham. This turned out to be mistaken, an error not corrected by the editors of Scotus until more than sixty years later after Balic had died.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinatio</td>
<td>The <em>Ordinatio</em> is a considerable expansion of the <em>Lectura</em> and generally considered Scotus’s <em>magnum opus</em>. Much of the second book is missing, however, most notably all of distinctions 15-25, which contained Scotus’s presumably planned discussion on the will. The material printed in the Wadding-Vivès edition for these distinctions and several other questions in Bk. II is an inauthentic version of the Paris commentary inserted to make the <em>Ordinatio</em> look complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reportata parisiensia</td>
<td>A <em>reportatio</em> version of Scotus’s Paris lectures on the <em>Sentences</em>. (It should be noted that what is printed in Wadding-Vivès as Book I of the <em>Parisian Reports</em> is instead Alnwick’s <em>Additiones magnae</em> below). The Parisian commentary differs significantly at places from the Oxford ones, and perhaps most notoriously on the issue of the will in II.25 where Scotus appears to countenance a view very close to Henry of Ghent’s, a view he rejected at Oxford.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additiones magnae</td>
<td>The ‘Long Additions’ are a posthumous compilation made by William of Alnwick (Scotus’s secretary and a prominent theologian) that includes material from both Scotus’s Oxford and Paris lectures, but principally the latter. Also includes valuable occasional remarks by Alnwick, the most famous of which concerns Scotus’s position on the will in II.25 where Alnwick says that “Scotus replied differently to the question at Oxford”, implying that Scotus had changed his mind on the will. These are unedited for the second book except for the question on the will published in Balic (1927).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additiones secundae secundi libri</td>
<td>The <em>Second Additions to the Second Book of the Sentences</em> are mysterious work cited by the Ockhamist Adam Wodeham. Balic thought he found these in the second book of the Vienna codex above and hypothesized them to be later. In fact, these turned out to be the second book of the <em>Lectura</em> and were thus earlier.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. TWO ANNOTATIONS BY ALNWICK IN ADDITIONES MAGNAE II. D. 25
(Ed. Balic, Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot, pp. 276-77, 282)

(SCOTUS PARISIUS add. in marg. G) Notandum quod secundum hanc opinionem, quae ponit voluntatem esse totam causam activam volitionis et objectum non esse activum ... sed quod objectum requiritur sicut causa sine qua non ... hanc inquam opinionem Oxoniae multipliciter [sc. Scotus] improbavit. Et primo sic ... .

Ideo et aliter [sc. Scotus] dixit Oxoniae ad quaestionem, quod volitio est per se a voluntate, ut a causa activa, et ab objecto intellecto ut ab alia causa partiali, ita quod totalis causa volitionis includit intellectum ... et ... voluntatem ... et objectum.

(In the margin: Scotus at Paris) Note that on this view, which holds the will to be the total, active cause of volition and the object not to be an active... but only a *sine qua non* cause ... this view, I say, Scotus disproved with many arguments at Oxford. And the first is ...

And account of these arguments Scotus replied differently to the question [on the will] at Oxford, that volition is caused essentially by the will as one partial cause and by the object in the intellect as the other partial cause, so that the total cause of volition includes together the intellect, will, and object.

3. CITATION OF ADDITIONES SECUNDAE BY ADAM WODEHAM
(Adam Wodeham, Lectura Oxoniesis, I d. 17 q. 4 [Vat. lat. 955, fol. 156v]).

Secundus modus mixtionis, non utique verae, elementorum in mixto, qui etiam multum placet mihi, et plus illi assentio quam praecedenti, est iste quem ponit Scotus in secundo libro in *Secundis additionibus* secundi, distinctione 15, et secum concordat Ockham. Quaere ibi.

4. FINDINGS OF THE EDITORS OF SCOTUS IN PROLEGOMENA 1993 (VAT. 19.38*-40*)

1. What Balic identified and published as the *Additiones secundae secundi libri* in Vienna 1449 are in fact the second book of the *Lectura*.
2. The *Additiones secundae* referred to by Adam Wodeham do not exist as a separate work but are simply the *Additiones magnae* of William Alnwick.
3. Balic misinterpreted Alnwick’s remarks about Scotus’s teaching on the will. In *hanc opinionem Oxoniae multipliciter improbavit*, the *opinio* at issue is not Scotus’s own view at Paris, but rather that of Henry of Ghent. Similarly, in *alter dixit Oxoniae ad quaestionem*, the *alter* means other than Henry of Ghent’s opinion, not other than Scotus’s own view at Paris.
4. Balic’s misinterpretation in (3) was caused by his mistakes regarding (1-2).

∴ Scotus did not change his mind on the will at Oxford, as Balic thought, but his view remained constant at both Oxford and Paris,namely, the will and object are partial, co-efficient causes of volition (*actus volendi*):

*Ceterum, Duns Scotus nec retractavit nec umquam substantialiter mutavit suam opinionem de causa actus voluntatis ... Uti igitur patet, Duns Scotus suam de actu voluntatis doctrinam nec retractavit nec immutavit, sed eandem constanter docuit.* (*Prolegomena*, Vat. ed. 19.40*, 41*)
## 5. SCOTUS’S OXFORD AND PARIS STATEMENTS ON THE WILL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OXFORD (ante 1300)</th>
<th>PARIS (post 1302)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lectura II d. 25</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rep. par. II d. 25</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sic in proposito <em>voluntas</em> habet rationem unius causae, scilicet <em>causae partialis</em>, respectu actus volendi, et ... objectivum rationem alius causae partialis, et <em>utraque simul est una causa totalis respectu actus volendi</em>. [n. 73 (Vat. 19.254)]</td>
<td>Dico igitur ad quaestionem, quod <em>nihil creatum alid a voluntate est causa totalis actus volendi</em> in voluntate . . . [n. 20 (Vivès 22.127b)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nihil igitur est creatum praeter voluntatem, quae potest se determinare ex se, et per consequens <em>nihil aliid creatum a se potest esse causa totalis volitionis</em>. [n.21 (Vivès 22.228b)]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Rep. par. II d. 25

78 [Opinio propria] - Dico igitur ad quaestionem, quod nihil creatum aliiu a voluntate est causa totalis actus volendi in voluntate, quia aliquid evenit conlinegenter in rebus, hoc est, evitabiliter (sic loquitur Aristoteles in I *Perihermeneias* cap. ultimo: «Necessario evenire, hoc est inevitabiliter»); illud igitur quod contingenter evenit, ita evenit, quod tunc posset non evenire in sensu diviso. Quaero igitur a qua causa contingenter evenit; vel a causa determinata\(^1\) potente se determinare, vel non potente? Si a non potente, oportet quod per alid determinetur ad unum; vel si exeat in actum, ut indeterminata, simul faceret utrumque vel neutrum; igitur oportet quod in illo instanti, in quo evenit, eveniat a causa indeterminata potente se determinare.

79 [Obiectio] - Dicit, ista determinatio est ex parte intellectus sic repraesentantis obiectum voluntati.

80 [Solutio] - Contra, intellectus indeterminate se habens ad hoc fore et non fore, non potest determinare se, nisi ad unum istorum nisi sophistice. Si enim determinet se ad unum per rationem necessariam, ad oppositum non potest determinare se, nisi paralogizetur. Si igitur determinatio esset ad unum illorum, ad quae se habet contingenter, solum ab intellectu, hoc non posset nisi in quantum paralogizabilis; igitur a voluntate nihil posset immediate contingenter evenire, et probatur est in primo [cf supra Reportatio I, d. 8, q. 5, et d. 39], quod tunc nihil contingenter eveniret, cum in voluntate divina sit ponenda prima ratio contingentiae.

81 Item, intellectus non est causa contingens, cum talis actio sit per modum naturae, ideo dicitur Filius procedere per modum naturae.

82 [Obiectio] - Dices, Philosophus dividit naturam contra intellectum et agens a proposito; non igitur intelligit quod intellectus sit causa per modum naturae.

83 [Responsio] - Dico, quod intellectus potest accipi secundum quod est quaedam potentia operativa, vel secundum quod intellectus et voluntas sunt principium concurrentia respectu practicabilium, quae extrinsecus producuntur per intellectum et voluntatem.

84 Primo modo parum loquitur Philosophus de intellectu, sed secundo modo multum frequenter fere per totum librum *Ethicorum*, et IX *Metaphysicae* et III *De anima*, et II *Physicorum* de potentia rationali; et isto modo agens per intellectum distinguat contra agens per naturam.

85 Praeter hoc, sine contradicione posset esse appetitus intellectivus non potens se determinare, sed appetens per modum naturae, sicut Anselmus *De casu diaboli*, cap. 12, quod primo esset unus Angelus, qui haberet intellectum vel appetitum tantum, ita quod posset habere affectionem commodi, et non daretur sibi affectio iusti. Iste Angelus cum non possit appetere nisi tantum intelligibilis, et hoc per modum naturae, sicut nunc appetitus sensitivus appetit per modum naturae conveniuntia secundum sensum, nec\(^1\) appetet ille conveniuntia secundum intellectum. Nihil igitur est creatum praeter voluntatem, quae potest se determinare ex se, et per consequens nihil aliid creatum a se potest esse causa totalis volitionis.

\(^{15}\) Here *indeterminata* seems required instead of *determinata*.

\(^{16}\) Here it is necessary to read *sic* instead of *nec*, a common paleographical blunder.
VII.1 INTELLECT AND WILL

78 [Scotus’s Reply to the Question] I respond to the question that nothing created except the will is the total cause of the act of willing in the will. The reason is that something actually occurs contingently, that is, avoidably, as Aristotle says in the last chapter of I Perihermeneias: “To occur necessarily, that is, unavoidably.” Consequently, that which occurs contingently occurs in such a way that at that time [i.e., at which it occurs] it could not occur in the divided sense [i.e., not in the sense that there is a possibility for both alternatives to occur at the same time.] I therefore ask from what cause does this occur contingently? Either from a cause that undetermined [i.e., to one of the alternatives] but is capable of determining itself or not so capable. If from a cause capable of determining itself, then it must be determined to one of the alternatives by something else [and then the same question applies]. Or if the cause issues in an act as undetermined, then it will either cause both alternatives or neither. Therefore, it is necessary that at the instant at which the contingent comes about, it comes about from a cause that is undetermined but capable of determining itself.

79 [Objection to Scotus] The determination [i.e., to one of the alternatives] comes from the side of the intellect, which then presents this alternative an object to the will.

80 [Reply to the objection] Against this objection: An intellect not determinately related to ‘this will be and this will not be’ cannot determine itself to one of these except by reasoning sophistically, for if it were to determine itself to one by a necessary argument, then it is not able to determine itself to the opposite alternative except by reasoning fallaciously. If therefore the determination to one of the alternatives to which [sc. the will] is contingently related came from the intellect alone, then this would only be possible to the extent that the intellect was capable of reasoning fallaciously. Therefore, nothing could immediately arise from the will in a contingent way, and it has been proven in the first book that then nothing at all would occur contingently, since the primary basis of contingency is to be placed in the divine will.

81 Again, the intellect is not a contingent cause, since it acts in the manner of a nature. On this account, the second person of the Trinity is said to proceed [from the first] in the manner of a nature.

82 [Against the second reply] You will object that Aristotle distinguishes nature, on the one side, against intellect and an intentional agent, on the other. Therefore, he does not understand the intellect to be a natural cause.

83 [Reponse] I say that the intellect can be taken insofar as it is a power capable of operation [i.e., active rather than passive] or insofar as it and the will together concur as a single principle with respect to things that can be done that are externally produced by the intellect and will [i.e., artifacts and actions].

84 Now Aristotle speaks little of intellect in the first sense, but very often in the second sense of a rational power– practically throughout the whole of the Ethics, and in Metaphysics IX, De anima III, and Physics II. In this latter sense, an intellectual agent is distinguished from a natural agent.

85 Moreover, there could be without contradiction an intellectual appetite that does not determine itself but desires in the manner of a nature, just as Anselm imagined in The Fall of the Devil, chapter 12, that first there could be an angel who had an intellect or appetite alone, so that it could have an affection for the advantageous, and the affection for the just would not be given to it. This angel, since it could desire only intelligible objects, and this in the manner of a nature, just as our sensitive appetite desires in a natural way those things agreeable to sense, so it would desire those things agreeable to the intellect. Therefore, there is nothing created besides the will, which can determine itself, and consequently, nothing created other than the will that can be the total cause of the act of will.
Regardless of the degree to which Scotus may have endorsed the concept of the will as a total cause of its act, it is clear that he did not regard the will’s relation to the intellect as the fundamental issue in its freedom. Scotus would have admitted the will to be free to act against a practical judgment of the intellect no matter how correct -- a point unequivocally asserted in the condemnations of 1277 -- whether a causal role was assigned to the intellect or not. Rather, the critical issue was not the ability of the will to choose the opposite of what the intellect dictated but the manner in which the will itself was capable of eliciting opposite acts.

The standard view, contained in the question on free choice Peter Lombard’s Sentences, maintained that choice was free only with respect something in the future, not in the past or the present. On Lombard’s account, what is in the present is already determined, nor is it in our power, when something actually is, to make it be or not be. This may be possible at some future moment, but it is impossible for anything not to be while it is, or to be something else while it is what it is. This standard view is based on what has been called Aristotle’s ‘statistical’ notion of contingency, a term coined by Hintikka. This statistical modal theory is typified by Aristotle’s resolution in Sophistical Refutations (166a22-30) of ambiguous, modal propositions into composed and divided senses, the standard analysis adopted by the scholastics. For example, the proposition, “A sitting man can stand,” is false in the composed sense, since it is impossible for the opposed properties of sitting and standing to belong to the same subject at the same time. It is true, however, in the divided sense, since it is possible for a man to sit at one time and stand at another. That is, the statistical theory of modality construes contingency in terms of the possibility for opposed states at different times, rather than in terms of a state and the possibility of its opposite at the same time. Aristotle’s view can be found expressed very strongly in Henry of Ghent’s discussion of the eternity of the world, an indication that Henry had not yet moved to as strong a voluntarism as Scotus.

Scotus broke with this statistical view, holding that at the very instant of willing the will remains a real, active cause for the opposite. That is, at the very instant at which the will acts, there is a real and not merely logical potency for the opposite, a so-called sychronic contingency. Before Scotus, however, another noted voluntarist, Peter John Olivi, had recognized that the standard view was simply an application of Aristotle’s dictum in the Perihermenias that “Everything that is, when it is, necessarily is,” to free choice and that it spelled determination for the will. As Olivi argued, deferring the capacity of free choice to do otherwise to some future moment did nothing to preserve freedom, since when that future moment arrived and became the present, the will would be as incapable of doing otherwise at that future moment as it was before. Thus, unless the will was capable of doing otherwise at the very moment at which it willed, it never would be so capable. Scotus, however, extended Olivi’s analysis considerably. Among recent literature, Scotus’s synchronic theory of contingency is viewed at one of his most important contributions, breaking with ancient theories of modality that opened the way to possible worlds and anticipating Leibniz.

Bibliography

5. ------. Modalities in Medieval Philosophy, (London/New York, 1993).
Peter Lombard on Free Choice (*liberum arbitrium*)

2 Sent. d. 25 c.1 [ed. Quaracchi, 1.461]

“Hoc autem sciendum est, quoniam libertum arbitrium ad praesens vel ad praeteritum non refertur, sed ad futura contingentia. Quod enim in prae senti est, determinatum est; nec in potestate nostra est ut tunc sit vel non sit, quando est. Potest enim non esse, vel aliud esse postea; sed non potest non esse dum est, vel aliud esse dum id est quod est. Sed in futuro, an hoc sit vel aliud, ad potestatem liberi arbitrii spectat.”

One should know that free choice does not refer to the present or past but to future things that are contingent. For what is in the present is something determined, and it is not in our power that at the time when it is, it be or not be. It is possible for it not to be or to be something else afterwards, but it is impossible for it not to be while it is, or to be something else while it is what it is. But whether it be one thing or another in the future pertains to the power of free choice.

Time and Contingency: Aquinas and Henry of Ghent on the Eternity of the World

*De aeternitate mundi* (ed. Leon. 43.86, 87-88)

Videndum est ergo utrum in his duobus repugnantia sit intellectuum, quod aliquid sit creatum a Deo et tamen semper fuerit . . . . Si enim repugnant, hoc non est nisi propter alterum duorum, vel propter utrunque: aut quia oportet ut causa praecedat duratione, aut quia oportet quod non-esse praecedat duratione propter hoc quod dicitur creatum a Deo ex nihilo fieri.

[Therefore, we must determine whether there is an incompatibility of concepts in these two things: that something is created by God and yet has always existed. … If they are incompatible, this is only because of one, or both, of two reasons: either because an efficient cause must precede [its effect], or because non-being must precede [being] in duration in order for it to be said that something created by God is made from nothing.

Nunc restat videre an repugnet intellectui aliquod factum numquam non fuisse, propter quod necessarium sit non esse eius duratone praecedere, propter hoc quod dicitur ex nihilo factum esse. … Sed ordo multiplex est, scilicet durationis et naturae; si igitur ex communi et universali non sequitur proprium et particulare, non esset necessarium ut, propter hoc quod creatura dicitur esse post nihil, prius duratione fuerit nihil et postea fuerit aliquid, sed sufficit si prius natura sit nihil quam ens. Prius enim naturaliter inest unicique quod convenit sibi in se, quam quod solum ex alio habetur; esse autem non habet creatura nisi a alio, sibi autem relictia in se considerata nihil est: unde prius naturaliter est sibi nihil quam esse. (ibid.)

[Now it remains to see whether it is inconsistent for something which has been made never to have not existed, on account of which it is necessary that its non-being precede [its being] in duration, and for this reason is said to have been made from nothing. … But order has different senses, namely, of duration and nature. If therefore the proper and particular do not follow from the common and universal, it would not be necessary that, in order to say that a creature exists ‘after nothing’, it was first nothing and afterwards something by a priority of duration, but it suffices for it to be nothing before a being by a priority of nature. For what belongs to something in itself belongs to it by a natural priority to what it has only from something else. A creature has being, however, only from another, for considered in itself, as left to itself, it is nothing. Thus, nothing pertains to a creature naturally prior to being.]

Article 99 of the Condemnation at Paris in 1277:

Quod mundus, licet sit factus de nihilo, non tamen est factus de novo; et quamvis de non-esse exierit in esse, tamen non-esse non praecessit esse duratione, sed natura tantum. (Denifle-Chatelain, *Cartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (1.549))

[<It is condemned> That the world, although made from nothing, was nevertheless not made with a beginning, and although it issued from non-being to being, nevertheless its non-being did not precede its being in duration, but in nature alone.]
Et in hoc variatur sententia quorundam philosophorum et fidelium. Habere enim de se non esse contingit intelligere dupliciter: uno modo apud intellectum tantum, ut essentia creaturae prius intelligatur in non esse quam in esse; alio modo ut in se realiter prius duratione sit non ens, quam ab alio accipiat esse. Primo modo philosophi quidam ponebant creaturam habere non esse ante esse, ita tamen quod nullo modo in re ipsa, sed solum in intellectu non esse eius posset praecedere esse suum. Et hoc modo habere esse ab alio post non esse vocabat Avicenna creationem, secundum quod dicit in VI Metaphysicae suae: ‘… Omne igitur esse caussatum est ens post non ens posteritate essentiae.’ (ed. Macken, 33-34)

[Sed contra: secundum Philosophum omne [ = esse ed.!] quod est, quando est, necessario est, ita quod pro tempore quo est, non est potentia ut non sit, neque parte ipsius entis neque parte aliquidii efficientis, quia super hoc nulla est potentia, quia esset ad contradictoria facere simul esse. Et similiter de eo quod fuit: pro tempore quo fuit, necessarium est fuisse. Et de eo quod erit: pro tempore quo erit, necessarium est fore. Ita quod in nullo istorum modorum potestia ad contrarium pro eodem tempore quo ponitur actus, sed si sit potentia ad contrarium, hoc est per potestiam positam in esse pro alio tempore in quo potest actus impediri, quia contingens est. Hoc enim modo, licet quod est, quando est, necessario est, non tamen absolute necessario est, quia erat potentia in tempore praecedentium per quam actus iste potuit impediti, et per hoc potuit absolute non esse pro tempore quo est. … Si ergo aliquid aliquando fuit nec umquam erat potentia praecedens per quam actus essendi eius pro tempore quo fuit, potuit impediti, absolute necessario fuit, quia non erat omnino potentia, neque rei existentis neque causae efficientis, per quam potuit impediti ne tunc fuisse. Sed si aliquid semper haberit esse et ab aeterno, numquam erat potentia praecedens per quam actus essendi eius posset impediti pro aliquo instanti in ante assumendo, neque rei existentis neque aliquidii causae efficientis. Ergo absoluto necessario est illud semper fuisse. (ed. Macken, 40-41)
Peter John Olivi on the Ability to Will Opposites: Precursor to Scotus

Bibliography

Primary:

Secondary:

Sent.II q. 57

Item, omnis causa, dum operatur seu dum est in hora qua operatur, non potest non operari, quoniam res, dum est, non potest non esse et, dum fit, non potest non fieri et, dum facit, non potest non facere; dum autem causa operatur, tunc non solum ipsa est actum operans, sed etiam suus effectus tunc est actu et fit actu; si igitur tune posset non operari ilium effectum, tunc simul possept contradictoria esse vera, scilicet, ipsum effectum esse et non esse et simul fieri et non fieri et ipsum causam simul facere et non facere; sed si non potest non operari, dum operatur, semper quando agit, necessario agit; ergo et cetera.

Ad decimum dicendum quod dum voluntas, prout est libera, operatur, licet eius actus sit tempore simul seu in eodem nunc cum ea: tamen ipsa est prius natura potens ipsum producere quam producat. Et respectu eiusdem nunc et secundum illam prioritatem naturalem in ipso eodem nunc fuit prius naturaliter potens ad exeundum in actum oppositum seu ad cessandum ab ipso quam fuerit ponendus in actu ipse effectus.

Quod igitur dicitur quod res, dum fit, non potest non fieri et res, dum facit, non potest non facere et consimilia: scendum quod impossibile et necesse possunt sumi simpliciter vel secundum quid, sicut distinguuit Aristoteles in Periamenias. Vel ut clarus loquamur , secundum verba Anselmi quaedam est necessitas quae praeceedit rei positionem et quae facit rem esse, sicut dicimus necessario motum sequi ad impulsum motoris perfecti et non impediti; et hoc potest

<Tenth argument against free choice in the human being>: Again, every cause, while it is in operation or as long as it is in that time in which it operates, cannot not operate, since a thing, while it is, cannot not be and, while it becomes, cannot be becoming and, while it acts, cannot not act. While a cause operates, however, at that time not only is it actually operating, but its effect is then also in act and actually becoming. If therefore it could then not bring about that effect, then at that time contradictions could both be true, namely, that the effect itself is and is not and that it is at once becoming and not becoming and that the cause is at once causing the effect and not causing the effect. But if it is impossible for the cause not to operate while it operates, then when it acts it necessarily acts. Therefore <there is no free choice in the human being.>

To the tenth objection, it should be replied that while the will, as it is free, operates, although its act is together in time or in the same instant (nunc) with it, nevertheless the will is prior in nature able to produce that act before it produces it. And with respect to the same instant of time and according to that natural priority in that very same temporal instant the will was able by a natural priority to go to an opposite act or to cease from it before that effect was posited in act.

What is said -- that a thing while it is becoming cannot not become, and a thing, while it acts, cannot not act, and other such things -- know that ‘impossible’ and ‘necessary’ can be taken absolutely (simpliciter) or in a qualified sense (secundum quid), just as Aristotle distinguishes in the Perihermenias. Or to speak more clearly, according to the words of Anselm, there is a necessity which precedes the positing of the thing and causes the thing to be, just as we say ‘motion necessarily
dici necessitas simpliciter, quae et potest dici necessitas consequentis. Est et alia necessitas quae sequitur rei positionem, ita quod per earn non intendimus alium significare quam quod cum rei positione non potest oppositum ipsius positionis stare; et hoc potest dici necessitas secundum quid et necessitas consequentiae. Et hoc solum est in proposito. Cum enim dicitur quod rem, dum fit, necesse est fieri vel impossibile est non fieri, si per hoc intendimus significare quod positio ipsius rei seu sui fieri non potest simul stare cum sua negatione: sic est verum; si autem per hoc intendimus significare quod causa, dum operatur ipsum effectual, est necessario determinata et inclinata ad ipsum producendum, et sic quod effectus ab illa necessaria determinatione ipsius causae accipit necessitatem essendi: sic simpliciter est falsa, per hoc enim tolleretur libertas non solum nobis, sed etiam Deo.

Advertendum est autem hic quod quidam respondent dicendo quod potentia non est ad opposita respectu praesentis, sed solum respectu futuri. Unde Hugo, De sacramentis libro I, parte V, capitulo 21, dicit quod liberum arbitrium ad praesens tempus non referatur, sed ad futurum contingens. Et hac de causa dicit quod angelus non potuit peccare nec aliquid eligere in primo nunc, sicut in quaestione illa habet tangi.

Sed istud expresse destruct liberum arbitrium et omnia supra dicta; constat enim quod liberum arbitrium actum futurum non potest de facto agere in nunc quod praecedit illud futurum. Ergo pro illo nunc sic praecedenti, dum est in eo, non potest actu in opposita, nec pro nunc futuro, quia nondum est ibi, et quando erit ibi, tunc respectu eius hoc minus poterit, quia potestas oppositorum dicitur esse respectu futuri et non respectu praesentis. Ergo pro omni nunc praesenti et futuro est impotens in opposita.

Omnes ergo moderni in hoc consentiunt quod angelus non peccavit nec etiam peccare potuit in primo nunc suae creationis, attamen in reddendo causam vel factionem quare non potuit multum diversificantur. Et tido primo tangam septum rationes defectivas et arum improbationes et ultimo subdam veram, ut vera ratio clarius secernatur a falsis et ne veram conclusionem in falsa ratione fundemus.

Secunda ratio quae Hugoni de Sancto Victore adscribitur est: quia potestas non est libera seu potens in}

follows upon the push of a complete and unimpeded mover'. This can be called absolute necessity, which can also be called necessity of the consequent (necessitas consequentis). There is a second necessity which follows the positing of the thing, so that we do not mean by this necessity anything other than that together with the positing of the thing the opposite of that positing cannot stand. And this can be called qualified necessity and necessity of the consequence (necessitas consequentiae). Only this latter necessity is in the case at hand. For when it is said that ‘a thing, while it is becoming, must become or it is impossible for it not to become’, if we mean by this that the positing of the thing or its becoming cannot stand together with its negation, then it is true. If, however, we mean by this that a cause, while it is producing its effect, is necessarily determined and inclined to producing it, so that the effect receives a necessity of being from that necessary determination of the cause <to produce that effect>, then it is absolutely false, since liberty would be removed not only from us but even from God.

Note, however, that here some reply by saying that there is not potency to opposites with respect to the present, but only with respect to the future. Thus, Hugh of Saint Victory in his De sacramentis I.5 chapter 21 says that free choice does not refer to present time but to a future contingent. And for this reason they say that angels were not able to sin or to elect something in the first instant <of their creation>, just as had to be discussed in that question on the topic.

But this position explicitly destroys free choice and all things said previously. For it is clear that free choice cannot perform a future act in the ‘now’ that precedes that future act. Therefore, for that ‘now’ which so precedes <the future act>, as long as it is in that ‘now’, it does not actually have power for opposites nor for that future ‘now’, because it has not yet arrived, and when it does arrive, <free choice> will no less be able to do opposites at that time with respect to that ‘now’, because <by assumption> the power for opposites is said with respect to the future and not the present. Therefore, for every ‘now’ - present and future -- <free choice> has no power for opposites.

Therefore, all recent thinkers agree that an angel did not sin and could not have sinned in the first ‘now’ of its creation, but disagree widely when giving the reason why it could not <have sinned>. Therefore, I first touch upon seven defective arguments and their refutations, and finally I give the true reason so that it may be clear separated from the false ones and so that we do not base a true conclusion on a false reason. …

The second reason, which is attributed to Hugh of Saint Victor, is that a power is free or capable of
opposita nisi respectu actuum futurorum seu nondum factorum, quia actus, dum fit vel est factus, non potest non fieri; ergo potestas qua angelus potuit peccare fuit tantum respectu futuri ad primum nunc suae potestatis.

Haec autem ratio fallit, quia prima propositio eius est falsa, nisi futurum sumatur ibi communiter tam ad posterius natura et non duratione quam ad posterius duratione; unde millies dicitur quod potestas talis est respectu fiendi, et hoc sive sit fiendum in eodem nunc praesenti sive in alio nunc futuro. Quod autem sub hoc secundo modo fiendi sit prima propositio falsa, probatum est sufficienter in quaestionem an in nobis sit liberum arbitrium; nam si in eodem nunc et respectu eiusdem nunc non potest nostra voluntas disiunctive in opposita, ita quod in eodem nunc est prius naturaliter potens hoc velle vel nolle quam illud in eodem nunc velit vel nolit, et ita quod in eodem nunc in quo illud voluit potuit illud nolle: impossibile est ipsam esse liberam in opposita, sicut ibi est probatum. Constat enim quod nihil possumus agere in futuro nunc, usquequo illud futurum nunc advenerit; unde nulla potentia nostra est plene et ultimate potens exire in actum fiendum in futuro nunc, usquequo illud futurum nunc sit praesens. Si ergo in nullo nunc, dum est praesens, potest disiunctive agere in ipsa opposita: tunc in quolibet praesenti est necessitata et necessario determinata ad alterum oppositorum; ex quo sequitur quod nunquam sit plene potens in opposita.

This argument is fallacious, because its first proposition is false unless ‘future’ is taken there commonly both with respect to prior by nature and not in duration and to posterior in duration as well. Thus it is said repeatedly that there is such a power with respect to becoming, and this whether something is to become in the same present ‘now’ or in another future ‘now’. That, however, in this second way of becoming the first proposition is false has been sufficiently demonstrated in the question ‘Is there free will in us?’ For if in the same now and with respect to the same now our will does not have power for opposites disjunctively, so that in the same now the will has the power to will this or not to will this prior by nature to willing or not willing this in the same ‘now’, so that in the same ‘now’ in which it will this it was able not to will this, it is impossible for it to be free with respect to opposites, just as was proven there. For it is granted that we are able to do nothing in a future now until that future now will have arrived. Thus, no power of ours is able to issue in some act to be done in some future ‘now’ until that future ‘now’ is present. If therefore our <will> has no power for opposites disjunctively in any ‘now’ while it is present, then in any present it is necessitated and necessarily determined to one of the two opposites, from which it follows that there is never in us any power for opposites.
Duns Scotus on Contingency

Scotus’s main discussion of contingency and free will is contained in this treatment of divine foreknowledge. Unfortunately, as usual, the state of Scotus’s texts on divine foreknowledge is confused. The Vatican edition places the Ordinatio discussion of divine foreknowledge in an appendix on the basis of an annotation in Codex A (=Assisi, Biblioteca comunale MS 137), which notes that a space was left for 1 d. 39 in Scotus’s own copy of the Ordinatio. To explain the presence of 1 d. 39 in every other manuscript of the Ordinatio and references to it as Scotus’s own by early fourteenth-century thinkers, Balic hypothesized that it was an ‘apograph’ finished by Scotus’s students and later inserted by them. Consequently, according to the Vatican editors, only the Lectura version of Scotus’s treatment can be taken as truly authentic. For our purposes, it is enough to use the ‘apograph’ version of 1 d. 39, because its organization is more clear. In any event, there is no doctrinal conflict between this ‘apograph’ and the Lectura. The translation that follows is that of Martin Tweedale in Bosley-Tweedale [1] below. Our interest will be principally in paragraphs 5-5.1. I have added section headings from the Latin edition. Among the many studies on on Scotus’s position on foreknowledge, see:

Bibliography


Duns Scotus on Divine Foreknowledge

Ordinatio I dd. 38-39, qq. 1-5 (Vat. VI.401-444) (Translation by Martin Tweedale from [1] above.)

[1] In the second part of the thirty-eighth distinction the Master treats of the infallibility of divine knowledge, and in the thirty-ninth distinction he treats of the immutability of divine knowledge. Therefore, in respect of this subject matter in so far as divine knowledge relates simply to the existences of things, I ask five questions:

[1.1] First, does God have determinate knowledge of everything in respect of all their conditions of existence?
[1.2] Second, does He have certain and infallible knowledge of everything in respect of all their conditions of existence?
[1.3] Third, does He have immutable knowledge of everything in respect of every condition of existence?
[1.4] Fourth, does He necessarily know every condition of the existence of everything?
[1.5] Fifth, can some contingency on the side of the things in existence co-exist with the determinacy and certitude of His knowledge?
[2 Initial arguments]

[2.1] To the first question I argue no:

[2.1.1] Because, according to the Philosopher in his *Perihermenias* II, in future contingents there is no determinate truth, – therefore neither is there determinate knowability. Therefore, neither does the intellect have determinate knowledge of them.

This argument is reinforced by his own proof in that same text: Because then neither deliberation nor taking trouble would be needed. It seems this is so. If there is some determinate knowledge of some future contingent, neither taking trouble nor deliberation is needed because whether we deliberate or not, this thing will occur.

[2.1.2] Besides, if God’s power were limited to one member [of a contradictory pair] it would be imperfect, because if God were able to do this in such a way that he was not able to do the opposite, His power would be limited and he would not be omnipotent. Therefore, in like fashion, if he knew one member in such a way that he did not know the other, he would be limited in respect of knowledge and not omniscient.

[2.2] To the second question I argue that no:

[2.2.1] Because this inference holds: God knows that I am going to sit tomorrow. I will not sit tomorrow. Therefore, God is deceived. Therefore, by like reasoning, this inference holds: God knows that I am going to sit tomorrow. I can not-sit tomorrow. Therefore, God can be deceived.

That the first holds is obvious, because he who believes what is not the case in reality is deceived. From this I prove that [the second] consequence holds, because just as from two *de inesse* premisses follows a *de inesse* conclusion, so from one *de inesse* premiss and one *de possibili* follows a conclusion *de possibili*.

[2.2.2] Besides, if God knows that I am going to sit tomorrow, and it is possible for me not to sit tomorrow, assume it is a fact that I will not sit tomorrow; it follows that God is deceived. But from assuming that what is possible is a fact, the impossible does not follow. Therefore, it will not be impossible for God to be deceived.

[2.3] To the third question I argue that no:

[2.3.1] There can be no transition from a contradictory to a contradictory without some change, because if there is no change there does not seem to be any way by which what was first true is now false. Therefore, if God when He knows A is able not to know A, this would seem to be the case in virtue of some possible change, and a change in that very A as it is known by God, since nothing has being if not in God’s knowledge. Consequently, a change in A cannot occur without a change in God’s knowledge – which is what we proposed.

[2.3.2] Besides, whatever is not A but can be A can begin to be A, because it seems unintelligible that the affirmation opposed to a negation which is the case can be the case without beginning to be the case. Therefore if God does not know A but can know A, He can begin to know A; therefore He can be changed into knowing A.

[2.3.3] Besides, there is this third argument: If God does not know A but can know A, I ask what is this power? Either it is passive, and then it is in respect of a form and it follows that there is change; or it is active, and it is clear that it is natural because the intellect *qua* intellect is not free but rather something that acts naturally. Such a power can act after not acting only if it is changed. Therefore, as before, it follows that there is change.

[2.4] To the fourth question I argue that yes: [2.4.1] Because God immutably knows A, therefore necessarily. (By A understand ‘the Antichrist is going to exist.’) Proof of this consequence: First, because the only necessity posited in God is the necessity of immutability. Therefore whatever is in Him immutably
VII. 2 CONTINGENCY AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL

is in Him necessarily.

Second, because everything immutable seems to be formally necessary, just as everything possible – in the sense opposed to ‘necessary’ – seems to be mutable, for everything possible in this sense does not exist in virtue of itself and can exist in virtue of something else. But for it to exist after not existing (either in the order of duration or in the order of nature), does not seem to be possible without some mutability; therefore etc.

[2.4.2] Besides, whatever can exist in God, can be the same as God, and consequently can be God. But whatever can be God, of necessity is God, because God is immutable; therefore whatever can be in God, of necessity is God. But to know A, can be in God; therefore of necessity it is God, and consequently He knows A necessarily without qualification.

[2.4.3] Besides, every unqualified, i.e. absolute, perfection of necessity belongs to God. To know A is an unqualified perfection, since otherwise God would not be imperfect if He did not know A formally, because He is imperfect only by lacking some unqualified perfection.

<Fifth Question>

[2.5] To the fifth question I argue no:

[2.5.1] Because this inference holds: God knows A. Therefore, A will necessarily be the case. The antecedent is necessary. Proof of the consequence: A rational act is not lessened by the subject matter it relates to, just as saying is not lessened if it relates to this, ‘that I say nothing,’ for this inference holds: I say that I say nothing. Therefore, I say

something. Therefore, by similar reasoning, since God’s knowing is necessary without qualification, it is not lessened in that necessity by the fact that it relates to something contingent.

[2.5.2] Besides, everything known by God to be going to be will necessarily be; A is known by God to be going to be; therefore, etc. The major premiss is true in as much as it is de necessario, ‘because the predicate of necessity belongs to the subject. The minor is without qualification de finesse, because it is true for eternity. Therefore, there follows a conclusion de necessario.

<To the Contrary>

[3 In opposition to the above]

[3.1] Hebrews 4: “All things are bare and open to His eyes.” Also the gloss on this. (Seek it out.) Therefore, He has determinate and certain knowledge of everything in respect of everything know-able in them. Also He has immutable knowledge, as is obvious, since nothing in Him is mutable.

[3.2] In opposition on the fourth question: If God necessarily knew A, then A would be necessarily known; and if necessarily known, then necessarily true. The consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is.

[3.3] In opposition on the fifth question: Being is divided into the necessary and the contingent; therefore, the intellect, when it apprehends beings in respect of their own peculiar aspects, apprehends this one as necessary and that one as contingent (otherwise it would not apprehend them as being those sorts of beings), and consequently that knowledge does not do away with the contingency of what is known.

<Opinions of Others.

<First Opinion>

[4 Others’ opinions]

[4.1] As regards these questions, the certitude of divine knowledge, of everything in respect of all conditions of existence, is posited on account of ideas which are posited in the divine intellect, and this on account of their perfection in representing, because they represent the things of which they are not just in respect of themselves but in respect of every aspect and relationship. Thus they are in the divine intellect sufficient reason not just for simply apprehending the ideated items but also for apprehending every union of them and every mode of those ideated items that pertains to their existence.

<Against the First Opinion>

Against [this opinion]: The concepts involved in apprehending the terms of some complex are not sufficient to cause knowledge of that complex unless it is apt to be known in virtue of its terms. A contingent complex is not apt to be known in virtue of its terms, because if it were it would be not only necessary but also primary and immediate.’ Therefore, the concepts involved in apprehending the terms,
however perfectly they represent those terms, are insufficient to cause knowledge of the contingent complex. Besides, ideas only naturally represent what they represent, and they represent it under the aspect by which they represent something. This is proved by the fact that ideas are in the divine intellect before every act of the divine will, in such a way that they exist there in no way through an act of that will; but whatever naturally precedes an act of the will is purely natural. I take, then, two ideas of terms which are represented in them, ideas of human and of white, for example. I ask: Do those ideas of themselves represent the composition of those extremes, or the division, or both? If only the composition, then God knows that composition (and in a necessary way), and as a consequence He in no way knows the division. Argue in the same way if they represent only the division. If they represent both, then God knows nothing through them, because to know contradictories to be simultaneously true is to know nothing.

Besides, there are ideas of possible items in the same way there are ideas of future items, because between possibles that are not going to be and those that are going to be a difference exists only by an act of the divine will. Therefore, an idea of a future item no more represents it as necessarily going to be than does the idea of a possible item.

Besides, an idea of a future item will not represent something as existing any more at this instant than at some other.

<Second Opinion>

[4.2] Another opinion is that God has certain knowledge of future contingents through the fact that the whole flow of time and all things which are in time is present to eternity. [4.2.1] This is shown through the fact that eternity is limitless and infinite, and as a consequence just as what is limitless is present to every place all at once, so the eternal is present to the whole of time all at once.

This is explained by the example of a stick fixed in water: Even if the whole of the river flows past the stick and thus the stick is present successively to every part of the river, still the stick is not limitless in respect of the river, since it is not present to the whole all at once. Therefore, by the same reasoning, if eternity were something standing still (as was the stick) past which time flowed in such a way that only one instant of time would ever be present to it all at once (just as only one part of the river was present to the stick all at once), eternity would not be limitless in respect of time.

[4.2.2] This point is reinforced by the following consideration: The “now” of eternity when it is present to the “now” of time is not co-equal to it; therefore, when it is present to that now it goes beyond it. But it would go beyond it, when it is pre-sent to that “now,” only if it were all at once pre-sent to another “now” [4.2.3] It is also reinforced by this: If the whole of time could exist in external reality all at once, the “now” of eternity would be present to the whole of time all at once. But even though on account of its succession time is opposed to existing all at once, this detracts not at all from the perfection of eternity. Therefore now eternity itself is equally present to the whole of time and to anything existing in time.

This is reinforced by another example, that of the center of a circle. If we let flowing time be the circumference of a circle and the “now” of eternity be the center, no matter how much flow there was in time the whole flow and any part of it would always be present to the center. In this way, then, all things, no matter what part of time they exist in (whether they are in this “now” of time or are past or future), are all present in respect of the “now” of eternity. In this way what is in eternity on account of such a co-existence sees those things presently, just as I can see presently what in this very instant I see.

<Against the Second Opinion>

I argue against this opinion: First, I turn back against them what they claimed about limitlessness. Given that a place can increase continuously ad infinitum (and this occurs in such a way that just as time is in continuous flux so God increases and increases the place in a process of becoming), still God’s limitlessness would be to Him a ground for co-existing with some place (in some “now”) only if it were an existing place. For God by His limitlessness co-exists only with what is in Him, even though he could cause a place outside the universe and then by His limitlessness He would co-exist with it. If, then, limitlessness is a ground for co-existing only with an actual place and not with a potential one (because it does not exist), by like reasoning eternity will be a ground for co-existing only with something existent. This is what is argued for when we say, “What is not can co-exist with nothing,” because ‘co-exist’
indicates a real relation, but a relation whose basis is not real is itself not real.

Again, if an effect has being in itself in relation to a primary cause, it unqualifiedly is in itself, because there is nothing in relation to which it has truer being. Thus what is said to be something in relation to the primary cause can unqualifiedly be said to be such. Therefore, if something future is actual in relation to God, it is unqualifiedly actual. Therefore it is impossible for it to be later posited in actuality.

Besides, if my future sitting is now present to eternity (not just in respect of the entity it has in knowable being but also that which it has in the being of existence), then it is now produced in that being by God, for only that has being from God in the flow of time which is produced by God with that being. But God will produce this sitting [of mine] (or the Antichrist’s soul— it is all the same); therefore, that which is already produced by Him will again be produced in existence, and thus twice it will be produced in existence.

Besides, this position does not seem to help with the problem it was supposed to solve, viz. having certain knowledge of the future. First, because this sitting, besides the fact that it is present to eternity as being in some part of time, is itself future in itself in virtue of the fact that it is future and is going to be produced by God. I ask: Does He have certain knowledge of it? If yes, then this is not because it is already existent, but rather in virtue of the fact that it is future. And we must say that this certitude is through something else, something that suffices for every certain apprehension of the existence of this thing. If he did not know it with certitude as future, then he produces it without previously apprehending it. But he will apprehend it with certitude when he has produced it. Therefore, he knows things done, in a different way than he knows things going to be done, which is counter to what Augustine says in *Super Genesim, 7*.

Secondly, because the divine intellect obtains no certitude from any object other than its own essence, for otherwise it would be cheapened. Hence even now the divine intellect does not have certitude about my action which has actually occurred in such a way that that action of itself causes certitude in the divine intellect, for it does not move His intellect. Therefore, in the same way all temporal things, given they are in their existence present to eternity in virtue of those existences they have, do not cause in the divine intellect certitude of themselves. Rather certain knowledge of the existence of these must be obtained through some-thing else, and this something else suffices for us.

Besides, these people propose that the eternal life of an angel is completely simple and co-exists with the whole of time; therefore an angel, which is in eternal life, is present to the whole flow of time and to all the parts of time. Therefore, it seems, according to this account of theirs, that an angel can naturally know future contingents.

<Third Opinion>

[4.3] A third position says that although some things are necessary in relation to divine knowledge, it, nevertheless, does not follow that they are not able to be contingent in relation to their proximate causes.

[4.3.1] This derives some support from Boethius in the last chapter of book in of his *Consolation,* where he says the following: “If you were to say that what God sees is going to occur cannot not occur, and that what cannot not occur happens from necessity, and so bind me to this word ‘necessity’ I shall say in answer that the same future event, when it is related to divine knowledge, is necessary, but when it is considered in its own nature it seems to be utterly and absolutely free” etc.

[4.3.2] In favor of this it is also argued that it is possible for imperfection to exist in an effect on account of its proximate cause but not on account of its remote or prior cause, – for example there is deformity in an act on account of the created will but not in as much as it is due to the divine will. Consequently, sin is not traced back to God as its cause, but rather is only imputed to the created will. Therefore, even though necessity would belong to things to the extent that it is from God’s side – who is the remote cause – , it is nevertheless possible for contingency to be in them on account of their proximate causes.

<Against the Third Opinion>

Against this: We argued in dist. and showed there through the contingency of things that God thinks and wills, because there can be no contingency in some cause’s causation of its effect unless the first cause relates contingently to the cause next to it or to its effect.

In brief, this is shown from the fact that where we have a cause which in so far as it is in motion produces motion, if it is necessarily in motion it will necessarily produce motion. Consequently, where we have a secondary cause which produces some-thing in so far as it is moved by a primary cause, if it is necessarily
moved by the primary cause it will necessarily move the cause next to it or produce its effect. Therefore the whole hierarchy of causes, right down to the final effect, will produce the effect necessarily if the relationship of the primary cause to the cause next to it is necessary.

Further, a prior cause naturally relates to its effect before a posterior cause; consequently in the case of the prior cause if it has a necessary relationship to the effect, it will give it necessary being. But in the second instant of natures’ the proximate cause cannot give it contingent being, since it is already supposed to have from the primary cause a being that rejects contingency. Neither can you say that in the same instant of nature these two causes give caused being, because on that being cannot be based the necessary relationship to the cause that perfectly gives being as well as a contingent relationship to some other cause.

Further, whatever is produced by posterior causes could be immediately produced by the primary cause; and in that case it would have the same entity it now has, and then would be contingent just as it is now contingent. Therefore, even now it has its contingency from the primary cause and not just from a proximate cause.

Further, God has produced many things immediately – for example he created the world and now creates souls – and yet all these he produced contingently.

<Scotus’s Response to the Questions>

[5] In answering these questions we must proceed as follows: First, we must see how there is contingency in things, and, secondly, how the certitude and immutability of God’s knowledge of these things is compatible with their contingency.

<How is Contingency in Things>

<Contingency in Things is Evident and Manifest>

[5.1] In regard to the first I say that this disjunction, necessary or possible, is an attribute of being,” where I mean a convertible attribute in the way many such items are unlimited in respect of beings. But convertible attributes of being – are immediately said of being, because being has an unqualifiedly simple concept and, therefore, there cannot be a middle between it and its attribute, because there is no definition of either that could serve as a middle.

Also if it is a non-primary attribute of being, it is difficult to see what might be prior to it and serve as a middle whereby the attribute could be proved of being, since neither is it easy to see a ranking in the attributes of being. And even if we did apprehend such a ranking, the propositions taken from the attributes as premisses would not seem to be much more evident than the conclusions.

But in disjunct attributes once we suppose that the less noble one belongs to some being, we can conclude that the more noble one belongs to some being, even though the whole disjunction cannot be proved of being. For example, this follows: ‘If some being is finite, then some being is infinite’ and ‘if some being is contingent, then some being is necessary,’ because in these cases the more imperfect one cannot belong to some particular being unless the more perfect one, on which the less perfect depends, belongs to some being.

But it does not seem possible in this way for the more imperfect member of such a disjunction to be shown. For it is not the case that, if the more perfect is in some being, necessarily the more imperfect is in some being (unless the disjunct members are correlative, like cause and caused). Consequently the disjunction ‘necessary or contingent’ cannot be proved of being by some prior middle. Also the part of the disjunction which is ‘contingent’ cannot be shown of anything from the assumption that ‘necessary’ belongs to something. Thus it seems that ‘Some being is contingent’ is primarily true and not demonstrable propter quid.

Thus The Philosopher, when he argues against the necessity of future events, reasons not to something that is more impossible than the hypothesis, but to something more obviously impossible to us, namely that there is no need either to deliberate or take trouble.

Therefore, those who deny such obvious facts need either punishment or sense perception, because, according to Avicenna in Metaphysics I, those who deny a first principle should be either flogged or burned until they allow that being burned is not the same as not being burned, being flogged not the same as not being flogged. So also those who deny that some being is contingent ought to be tortured until they allow that it is possible for them not to be tortured.
VII. 2 CONTINGENCY AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL

[5.3] Assuming then that it is obviously true that some being is contingent, we must inquire how contingency can be preserved in beings. I say (on account of the first argument that was made against the third opinion [4.3], which is further explicated in dist. 2 in the question “Concerning God’s being”) that we can maintain the contingency of some cause only if we propose that the first cause immediately causes in a contingent way, and if we do this by positing in the first cause a perfect causality, just as the catholics propose.

The Divine Will is the Cause of Contingency in Things

The primary being causes through its intellect and will; and if a third executive power other than those is proposed, this will not help answer the question, because if it ideates and wills necessarily, it produces necessarily. Therefore, we must seek this contingency in the divine intellect or in the divine will.

But not in the intellect as it has its first act before every act of the will, because whatever the intellect ideates in this way it ideates merely naturally and by a natural necessity, and thus there can be no contingency in its knowing something which it knows or in ideating something which it ideates by such a primary ideation.

Consequently we must seek contingency in the divine will. In order to see how it is to be posited there we must first see how it is in our will, and there three questions arise: (1) In respect of what does our will have freedom? (2) How does possibility or contingency follow from this freedom? (3) Concerning the logical distinction of propositions, how is possibility in respect of opposites expressed?

How Contingency Follows from the Freedom of Our Will

[5.4.1] As to the first question I say that the will, in so far as it is a first actuality, is free in respect of opposite acts. Also it is free, when those opposite acts mediate, in respect of opposite objects toward which it tends, and further in respect of opposite effects which it produces.

The first freedom necessarily has some imperfection attached to it, because of the passive potentiality and mutability of the will. The third freedom is not the second, because even if per impossibile it brought about nothing outside, still, in so far as it is will, it can freely tend toward objects. But the middle character of freedom has no imperfection, but rather is necessary for perfection, because every perfect power can tend toward everything which is apt to be an object of such a power. Therefore, a perfect will can tend toward every-thing which is apt to be willable. Therefore, the freedom that has no imperfection, in so far as it is freedom, is in respect of opposite objects toward which it tends, to which, as such, it happens that it produces opposite effects.

How Our Will Can Causes Contingency in Things

[5.4.2] As regards the second [question] I say that along with that freedom goes an obvious potential for opposites. For although this is not a potential for at the same time willing and not willing (since that is nothing), still it is a potential for willing after not willing, or for a series of opposite acts.

In all mutable things it is obvious that there is this potential for a series of opposites in them. Nevertheless there is another not so obvious potential that involves no temporal series. For if we sup-pose that a created will exists for just one instant, and in that instant has this willing, it does not then necessarily have it.

Proof: If in that instant it had it necessarily, since it is a cause only in that instant when it causes it, it is unqualifiedly the case that the will, when it causes, necessarily causes. For in this case it is not a contingent cause because it pre-existed before that instant in which it causes (and then as pre-existing it was able to cause or not to cause). Just as this being, when it is, is necessary or contingent, so a cause, when it causes, causes necessarily or contingently. Therefore, from the fact that in that instant it non-necessarily causes this willing it follows that it causes it contingently. There is, then, without any temporal series this potential of the cause for the opposite of that which it causes. There is then this potential which is real and, as a first actuality, naturally prior to the opposites which as second actualities are naturally posterior. For a first actuality, considered in that instant in which it is naturally prior to its second actuality, so posits that second actuality in existence, as its contingent effect, that, as naturally prior, it can equally posit some other opposite in existence.

Along with this real active potential, which is naturally prior to that which it produces, goes a logical
potential amounting to a non-repellency of terms. For to the will as a first actuality, even when it is producing this willing, the opposite willing is not repellent. This is both because it is a contingent cause in respect of its effect and consequently the opposite sort of effect is not repellent to it, and because in as much as it is a subject, it relates contingently to the act in as much as that act informs it, since to a subject the opposite of its per accidens accident is not repellent.

Therefore, along with the freedom of our will, in so far as it tends toward opposite acts, goes a potential both for opposites in a temporal series and for opposites at the same instant. I.e., either one can be in existence without the other, and the second potential is a real cause of the act in such a way that it is naturally prior to the logical potential. But the fourth potential, viz. for simultaneous opposites does not go along with that [real potential]; for that [fourth one] is nothing.

<Concerning the Logical Distinction of Propositions>

[5.4.3] From the answer to that second question [5.4.2] the third is clear, i.e. the disambiguation to be made in respect of the proposition, ‘A will that is willing A is able not to will A.’ In composite sense it is false, since then it signifies the possibility of this complex: ‘A will that is willing A does not will A.’ In the divided sense it is true since then it signifies the possibility for opposites in temporal series, since a will that is willing at time A is able not to will at time B.

But if we interpret the proposition as uniting de possibili the terms at the same instant, for example as this proposition: ‘A will that is not willing some-thing at A is able to will it at A,’ again it should be disambiguated in respect of composition and division: in the composite sense it is false, i.e. it is false that there is a possibility that it is at the same time willing at A and not willing at A; the divided sense is true, i.e. it is true that to the will to which willing at A belongs not willing at A is able to belong – but the not willing does not exist at the same time [as the willing], rather the not willing [belongs to the will] because then the willing does not belong to it.

In order to understand this second distinction, which is the more obscure, I say that the composite sense there is a single categorical proposition whose subject is ‘A will that is not willing A and whose predicate is ‘willing at A,’ and then this predicate is attributed possibly to this subject to which it is repellent. Consequently, to it belongs impossibly what is denoted to belong to it possibly. In the divided sense there are two categorical propositions ascribing to the will two predicates; in one of these propositions, which is de inesse, the predicate ‘not willing A’ is ascribed to the will (this categorical proposition is understood as being there through an implicit composition); in the other categorical proposition, which is de possibili, willing A is possibly ascribed [to the will]. These two propositions are found to be true because they signify their predicates to be attributed to the subject at the same instant, and clearly it is true that not willing A belongs to that will at the same instant as possibility for the opposite of A, just as though inesse were signified along with the proposition de possibili.

Here is an example of this sort of disambiguation: ‘Every man who is white is running.’ Given that every white man (and not black or in-between) is running, it is true in the composite sense, false in the divided sense. In the composite sense there is a single proposition with a single subject determined by ‘white’: in the divided sense there are two propositions attributing two predicates to the same subject. Similarly this proposition, ‘A man who is white is necessarily an animal,’ in the composite sense is false, because the predicate does not necessarily belong to that whole subject, while in the divided sense it is true because two predicates are asserted to be said of the same subject, one necessarily and the other absolutely and without necessity, and both do belong and both of those categorical propositions are true.

<Objections to This Distinction>

But against this second disambiguation it is argued in three ways that it is not logical and that there is at some instant no potential for the opposite of what is the case at that instant.

First, through the proposition asserted in Perihermenias II: ‘Everything which is, when it is, necessarily is.’

Secondly by the following rule governing the “obligatory” art: ‘If something false and contingent is supposed about the present moment, it must be denied to be the case.’ He proves this rule as follows: “What is supposed must be sustained as true; therefore it must be sustained for some instant at which it is possible. But it is not a possible truth for the instant at which it is supposed because if it were possible for that instant, then it could be true through motion or through change. But in neither way could it be true, because motion does not occur in
an instant, because then change and its terminal state would exist at the same time.”

Further, and thirdly: If at some instant there is a potential for something whose opposite is in fact the case, either that potential exists with its act or before its act. Obviously, not with the act. But not before the act either, because then that potential would be for an act at an instant other than the one at which that potential is a fact.

<Replies to these Objections>

[Responses to these objections]

To the first [5.1] I answer that that proposition of Aristotle’s can be either categorical or hypothetical just as also this one: ‘For an animal to run if a man runs is necessary.’ Taken as a conditional this obviously has to be disambiguated according as ‘necessary’ can mean the necessity of the consequence or the necessity of the consequent. In the first sense it is true; in the second, false. In its sense as a categorical proposition this whole ‘to run if a man runs’ is predicat of animal with the mode of necessity, and this categorical proposition is true, because the predicate so determined necessarily belongs to the subject, although not the predicate absolutely. Consequently, to argue from the predicate taken absolutely is to commit the fallacy of “qualifiedly and unqualifiedly.”

So I say here that if this proposition is interpreted as a temporal hypothetical, necessarily either it denotes the necessity of concomitance or the necessity of the concomitant. In the former case it is true; in the latter, false. But if it is interpreted as categorical, then -when it is’ does not determine the composition implicit in ‘which is’ but rather the principal composition signified by the final ‘is.’ And then it declares that this predicate ‘is when it is’ is said of the subject ‘which is’ with the mode of necessity, and so the proposition is true, but it does not follow that therefore it necessarily is. Such an inference would commit the fallacy of “qualifiedly and unqualifiedly” in some other part. Therefore, no true sense of this proposition declares that for something to be, in the instant in which it is, is necessary, but only that it is necessary with the qualification ‘when it is.’ This is compatible with its being unqualifiedly contingent in that instant in which it is, and consequently with its opposite being able to be the case in that instant.

To the second [5.2]: The rule is false and the proof invalid, because, although what is supposed should be sustained as true, still it can be sustained for that instant while not denying that instant to be one for which it is false, because (contrary to what the proof intimates) this inference does not hold: ‘This is false for this instant; therefore it is impossible.’ And when the opponent says, “If it can be true at the moment at which it is false, either it can be found true at that instant [or could be true through motion or change],” I say that neither alternative is the case, because that possibility for its truth is not a possibility for a temporal series (where one occurs after the other), but is a potential for the opposite of what in fact belongs to something, in so far as it is naturally prior to that act.

To the third [5.3] I say that the potential is before the act, not temporally “before” but “before” by the ordering of nature, since what naturally preceeds that act, as it naturally precedes the act, could exist with the opposite of that act. Then we must deny that every potential is “with its act or before its act” where ‘before’ indicates temporal priority. It is true where ‘before’ indicates priority of nature.

<A Further Objection to the Distinction>

There is a fourth objection to this. This inference holds: If it is possible to will A at this instant, and not will A at this instant, then it is possible not to will A at this instant. [The reason is that] from a proposition de inesse follows that proposition de possibili. And then it seems to follow that it is possible to will A and not to will A at the same time for the same instant.

To this I answer, following the Philosopher in Metaphysics IX, that what has a potential for opposites so acts as it has the potential for acting, but it is not the case that a mode is applied to the potential’s term, rather than to the potential itself, as it has the potential for acting. This is because I have at the same time a potential for opposites but I do not have a potential for opposites at the same time.

Then I say that this inference does not hold: It is possible to will this at A and it is possible to nill this at A; therefore, it is possible to will and to nill [this] at A. [The reason is that] it is possible for there to be a potential for each of two opposites disjunctively at some instant, even if not for them both at once. This is because as there is a possibility for one of them so there is for the not-being of the other, and, conversely, just as there is a possibility for the other so there is for the not-being of the first. Therefore, there is not a possibility at the same time for this and that opposite, because a possibility for simultaneity exists only
where there is a possibility for both to occur at the same instant, which is not implied by the fact that for that instant there is a potential for both divisively. An example of this shows up in persisting things: This does not follow: This body can be in this place at instant A, and that body can be in the same place at instant A; therefore, those two bodies can be in the same place at instant A. For the first body can be there in such a way that the second body cannot be there, and vice-versa. Thus this does not follow: If there is a potential for each at the same instant or place, then there is a potential for both. This fails every time each of the two excludes the other. Thus also this does not follow: I can carry this stone for the whole day (i.e., it is something that is carryable by my strength), and I can carry that stone for the whole day; therefore I can carry both stones at once. [The reason is that] here each of the items for which there is divisively a potential excludes the other. Moreover, simultaneity can never be inferred from just the sameness of that one instant or place; rather it is required to have besides this the conjunction of the two which are said to be at the same time, in respect of a third item.

<How the Divine Will Causes Contingency in Things>
<That with respect to which the Divine Will is Free>

[5.5] Following what has been said about our will we must look into some matters concerning the divine will. First, in respect of what does it have freedom? Secondly, what is contingency in the willed items? (As for the logical disambiguation, it is the same in this case as in the former.)

[5.5.1] As for the first, I say that the divine will is not indifferent to different acts of willing and nilling, because this did not exist in our will apart from imperfection of the will. Also our will was free for opposite acts, in order to be free for opposite objects, because of the limitation of each act in respect of its object. Consequently, given the absence of limitation on one and the same willing of diverse objects, it is not necessary in order to have freedom in respect of opposite objects to posit freedom in respect of opposite acts. Also the divine will itself is free in respect of opposite effects, but this is not its primary freedom, just as also it is not in us. Therefore, there remains that freedom which is of itself a perfection and possesses no imperfection, namely a freedom in respect of opposite objects, so that just as our will can by different willings tend toward different willed items, so the divine will can by a single, simple, unlimited willing tend toward any willed items whatsoever. This is so in such a way that if the will or that willing were of just one willable item, and not able to be of the opposite even though it is of itself willable, this would constitute an imperfection in the will, just as was argued earlier as regards our will.

And even though in us the will can be distinguished as it is receptive and operative and productive (for it is productive of acts, and it is that by which what has it operates formally by willing, and it is receptive of its own willing), freedom seems to belong to it in so far as it is operative, i.e. in so far as what has it formally can through it tend toward an object. Therefore, in this way freedom is posited in the divine will per se et primo in so far as it is an operative power, even though it is neither receptive nor productive of its willing. Nevertheless, some freedom can be saved in it in so far as it is productive, for although production into existence does not necessarily accompany its operation (since the operation is in eternity while production of existence is in time), still its operation is necessarily accompanied by production into willed being. In that case this power of the divine will does not produce primarily as it is productive but rather qualifiedly, i.e. into willed being, and this production goes along with it as it is operative.

<What is the Contingency of the Things Willed by God>

[5.5.2] As to the second article I say that the divine will takes for its object necessarily only its own essence. Thus to anything else it relates contingently in such a way that it can be of the opposite, and this when we consider it as it is naturally prior to the tendency toward that opposite. Not only is it naturally prior to its own act (as a willing) but also [it is prior] in so far as it is willing, because just as our will, as naturally prior to its own act, elicits that act in such a way that it can in the same instant elicit the opposite, so the divine will, in so far as it is naturally prior to its one sole willing, tends toward the object contingently by such a tendency that in the same instant it can tend toward the opposite object.

And this is the case both by a logical potential, which amounts to a non-repellency of terms (as we said of our will), and by a real potential, which is naturally prior to its act.

<How is the Certitude of Divine Knowledge Compatible with the Contingency of Things>

[5.6] Now that we have looked into the contingency of things so far as their existence is concerned, and this by considering it in respect of the divine will, it remains to look into the second principal question, how the certitude of knowledge is compatible with this. This can be explained in two ways: In one way by the
fact that the divine intellect, in seeing the determination of the divine will, sees that this will be the case at time A, because that will determines that it is going to be at that time; for the intellect knows that the will is immutable and unthwartable. Or in another way: Since the above way seems to posit a process of inference in the divine intellect (although it infers that this is going to be from the intuition of the will's determination and immutability), it can be explained in a different way that the divine intellect presents simples of which the union in reality is contingent, or, if it presents a complex, it presents it as neutral to it. The will, in choosing one part, namely the conjunction of these for some "now" in reality, makes to be determinately true this complex, 'This will be at time A.' Given this exists as determinately true, the essence is the reason by which the divine intellect apprehends that truth, and this occurs naturally, in as much as it is on the side of the essence, in such a way that just as it naturally apprehends all necessary principles as though before the act of the divine will (because their truth does not depend on the act and they would be known by the divine intellect if per impossibile there was no willing), so the divine essence is the reason for knowing them in that prior moment, because then they are true. Certainly those truths, nor even their terms, do not move the divine intellect to apprehending such a truth, because otherwise the divine intellect would be cheapened, since it would receive its evidence from something other than its own essence. Rather the divine essence is the reason for knowing simples and complexes alike. But at that point there are no contingent truths because at that point there is nothing by which they might have determinate truth. But once the determination of the divine will is given, then they are true in that second instant and the reason for the intellect's apprehending those which are now true in the second instant, and would have been known in the first if they had been true in the first instant, is the same as it was in the first. An example: Just as if in my power of vision a single act that always exists were the reason for seeing an object, and if, by something else being present, now this color is present, and now that, my eye would see now this, now that and yet by that same act of sight there will only be a difference in the priority and posteriority of seeing on account of the object being presented earlier or later; so also, if one color were naturally made to be present and another freely, there would not be formally in my vision some difference so that on its side the eye would not naturally see both, and yet it would be able to see one contingently and the other necessarily, in as much as one is present to it contingently and the other necessarily.

By both of these ways the divine intellect is asserted to know the existence of things, and it is clear on both that there is a determination of the divine intellect to the existent to which the divine will is determined, and there is the certitude of infallibility because the divine will can be determined only if the intellect determinately apprehends what the will determines, and there is immutability, because both the will and the intellect are immutable.

This responds to the first three questions [1.1, 1.2, and 1.3]. Nevertheless, the contingency of the object known is compatible with all these, because the will that determinately wills this wills it contingently (see the first article [5.4]).

As for the fourth question [1.4], it seems perhaps that we should disambiguate this proposition, 'God necessarily knows A,' in respect of composition and division. In the sense of a composition the proposition indicates the necessity of the knowledge as it holds of that object [A]; in the sense of a division it indicates the necessity of the knowledge taken absolutely [i.e. without any relation to anything], a knowledge which, nevertheless, does hold of that object. In the first sense the proposition is true; in the second, false.

Nevertheless, such a disambiguation does not seem logical. For when an act holds of an object, there does not seem to be a need to distinguish between the act taken absolutely and the act as it holds of the object. For example, if I were to say that 'I see Socrates' it is to be disambiguated into a sense which is about the seeing as it holds of Socrates and a sense which is about the seeing taken absolutely. And just as there is no distinction needed in this case of an assertoric [i.e. non-modal] proposition, so neither does there seem to be a need for a distinction in the case of the modal proposition. Rather it just seems to be necessary if the act holds of the object necessarily. Consequently, it seems we should unqualifiedly deny 'God necessarily knows A,' on the grounds that the predicate determined in that way does not necessarily belong to that subject, although without a determination does belong [necessarily].

It is objected against this that a rational act is not diminished by the material it holds of. For there is just as much an unqualified saying when it holds of my saying nothing as when it holds of my saying something. Consequently 'I am saying' follows just as much from 'I am saying that I am saying nothing' as it does from 'I am saying that I am sitting.' Therefore in the case of God knowing is not diminished by the material it holds of so that there is not an equal necessity.
Reply to this: Even though it is not so diminished that it has only a qualified existence, still it may not have its necessity as it is signified to hold of the matter (even though in itself it has necessity). This is the case if the act is in itself especially powerful in respect of diverse objects. For example, if I had an act of speaking that was the same as its motive power and that act was able to relate contingently to different objects, then, even if I necessarily had the act just as I necessarily had the power, still I would not necessarily have the act as it relates to such an object; rather there can be necessity of the saying by itself with contingency in respect of its object, and yet the saying of that object would exist unqualifiedly and would not be a qualified saying.

<Replies to the Initial Arguments>

[6] To the principal arguments in order:

[6.1.1] To the first in respect of the first question [2.1.1], I say that truth in future matters is not similar to truth in present or past matters. In present and past matters truth is determinate in such a way that one of the terms is posited. In this sense of “posited” it is not in the power of the cause that it be posited or not posited, because, although it is in the power of a cause as it is naturally prior to its effect to posit or not to posit the effect, it is not as the effect is now understood to be posited in being. But for the future determination is not of this sort, because, although for some intellect one part is determinately true, and one part is even true in itself, determinately, even though no intellect apprehends it, still it is determinate in such a way that it is in the power of the cause to posit the opposite for that instant. This indeterminacy suffices for deliberation and taking trouble. If neither part were future it would not be necessary either to take trouble or to deliberate. Therefore, that one part is future while the other can come about does not prevent deliberation and taking trouble.

[6.1.2] To the second [2.1.2], I say that for knowledge to be of one part in such a way that it cannot be of the other does posit imperfection in that knowledge. Likewise in the will positing it to be of one in such a way that it cannot be of the other willable object attributes imperfection to it. But for knowledge to be of one in such a way that it is of the other (and likewise for the will) posits no imperfection, just as a power is in determinate actuality for one opposite, the one it produces, and not for the other. But there is this dissimilarity between a power, on the one hand, and knowledge and will on the other: A power seems to be said to be for just one opposite since it can only be directed toward that, while knowledge and will [are of one opposite] in such a way that they merely know or will that. But if we treat these in a similar way, the determination is equal in both cases, because any of them is actually of one opposite and not both. Also any of them can be directed to either, but for the power to be for something seems to signify a potential relationship of it to that something, while for knowledge or will to be of something seems to signify an actual relationship to that same item. Nevertheless, nothing wrong follows if we treat the cases similarly, because then just as knowing relates to knowledge and willing to will, so producing (but not being able to produce) relates to power, and just as being able to produce relates to power so being able to know to knowledge and being able to will to will.

[6.2.1] To the first argument regarding the second question [2.2.1], I say that, although from two premisses de inesse follows a conclusion de inesse (not syllogistically, though, since what we have here is a non-syllogistic string of expressions that can be analysed into several syllogisms), still from one premiss de inesse and one de possibili a conclusion de possibili does not follow either syllogistically or necessarily. The reason is that to be deceived is to think that a thing is in a way different from what it is at that time for which it is believed to be. All this is included in the two premisses de inesse, one of which signifies that he believes this and the other of which denies that this [i.e. what is believed] is the case, and for the same instant; consequently the conclusion about being deceived follows. But in the other case it is different, since the premiss de inesse affirms one opposite for that instant, while the pre-miss de possibili affirms a potential for the other opposite, and not for the same instant conjunctively but rather disjunctively. Therefore, it does not follow that at some instant there can be conjoined in reality the opposite of what is believed [and the belief]; and, therefore, the possibility of deception, which includes that conjunction, does not follow. For a like reason the conclusion in a syllogism that mixes the de contingenti with the de inesse follows only where the major premiss is unqualifiedly de inesse.

This response is evidenced by the fact that if we argue from the opposite of the conclusion and the premiss de possibili, we do not infer the opposite [of the premiss de inesse] but of this premiss taken de necessario. Thus in order to infer the conclusion the major premiss must be really the same as that proposition de necessario. For this does not follow: God cannot be deceived, and A can not be going to be;
therefore God does not know that A is going to be. Rather this follows: Therefore, he does not necessarily know that A is going to be.

This is evident because, if my intellect always kept up with change in things so that while you are sitting I think that you are sitting and when you stand up I think that you are standing up, I cannot be deceived, and yet from these propositions: “You could be standing at time A, and I cannot be deceived” there follows only this: “Therefore, I do not necessarily know that you are sitting at time A.”

So in the matter under discussion: Although the divine intellect does not follow reality as an effect follows its cause, there is still a concomitance there, since as the thing is able not to be so the divine intellect is able not to know, and thus it never follows that the divine intellect apprehends a thing otherwise than it is. Consequently, the things required for deception can never exist at the same time; rather just as the known thing is able not to be, so God is able not to know it, and if it will not be, he will not know it.

[6.2.2] To the second [2.2.2] regarding the positing of the possible in being, I say that from such a positing by itself there never follows something impossible. Nevertheless the proposition de inesse, to the extent that some proposition de possibili is posited, can be repellent to something to which the de possibili proposition when posited in being is not repellent, since an antecedent can be repellent to something to which the consequent is not repellent. Then from the antecedent and what it is repellent to it there can follow something impossible, which does not follow from the consequent plus that same proposition, which is not incompatible with it. It is no wonder if an impossible proposition follows from incompatible ones, because, according to the Philosopher in Prior Analytics II, in a syllogism composed of opposites an impossible conclusion follows.

I say then that given this proposition ‘It is possible for me not to sit’ is posited in being, from it alone nothing impossible follows. But from it and this other proposition, viz. ‘God knows that I will sit’ there follows something impossible, viz. that God is deceived. This impossibility does not follow from the impossibility of what is posited in being, nor even from some incompatibility which is in it absolutely, but rather from it and something else at the same time, which is impossible.

Neither is it absurd that what is impossible follows from something de inesse in as much as some-thing de possibili is posited as something de inesse, because, although ‘It is possible for me to stand’ is compatible with ‘I am sitting,’ still the former taken de inesse, in as much as it is posited, is repellent to the latter de inesse, and from those two taken de inesse something incompatible follows, viz. ‘What is standing is sitting.’ Nor does this follow: ‘Therefore, the de possibili proposition that was posited in being was false.’ Rather either it was false, or some other, along with which its de inesse form was taken, is incompatible with its de inesse form.

[6.3.1] To the first argument regarding the third question [2.3.1], I concede the major premiss, that there is no transition without change. But in the minor I say that there is no transition, nor can there be any, because transition implies a temporal series so that one opposite comes after the other. No such can exist in this case; for just as he cannot both know and not know at the same time, so also that he sometimes knows and sometimes does not know are not able to co-exist at the same time. But with-out this transition from opposite to opposite there is no change.

And if you ask: “At least if he is able not to know B, which he knows, something would be different – what is that?,” I say that it is B in esse cognito. But it would not exist differently than it did earlier, but rather differently than it exists now, so that ‘differently’ would not indicate a temporal succession of one opposite after the other opposite but rather that the one opposite can be present in the same instant in which the other is present. This is not sufficient for mutation.

[6.3.2] To the second [2.3.2]: This consequence is not valid: ‘What does not know A can know A; therefore, it can begin to know A.’ This is the case when there is a potential in something naturally prior for the opposite of the posterior at that same instant at which and in which the posterior contingently exists, just as is the case in what we are discussing. In creatures, where there is potentiality for opposites in temporal succession, the consequence holds only on account of matter. [In the divine case] although this would not be, still there would be the possibility for each of them at one instant.

[6.3.3] To the third [2.3.3], it can be conceded, so far as this argument is concerned, that this power for opposites is an active power, for example, that the divine intellect, in so far as it is actual by its essence and infinite by its actual ideation, is an active power in respect of any objects whatsoever which it produces in esse intellecto.
And when the argument says, “Therefore it can act with respect to something in respect of which it was not acting before only if it is changed,” I say that the consequence is not valid when the thing acting requires an object in respect of which it acts. For example, in created agents it is not required that an agent which acts for the first time be changed, if for the first time the receptor on which it acts comes near to it. Thus it is in what we are discussing. The divine will, when it determines that some object shown to it by the intellect is going to be, makes such a complex be true and thus intelligible by the fact that it is present to the intellect as an object. And just as the will can make this willed item and not make it, so that item can be true and not true and thus is able to be known and not known by that natural intellect. This is not because of some contingency which is prior in that natural agent, but rather because of the contingency on the side of the will, which is contingently true by the act of the will that makes it true.

If you object that this cannot be without change at least in the ideated object (just as the coming close of a natural receptor to a natural agent can only occur by change in the receptor, and perhaps in the agent itself as it comes close), — I answer that that object is not changed in that being because it cannot be under opposites in temporal succession. Nevertheless it is contingently in that being and this contingency is on the side of the will that produces it in such being. And this contingency of the will can exist without change in the will, as was explained in the first article of the solution [5.4].

[6.4] To the arguments concerning the fourth question: [2.4]

[6.4.1] In response to the first [2.4.1] I deny the consequence. To the first proof I say that even if there is in God no necessity other than the necessity of immutability (i.e. it is none other than the fourth of those modes of necessity assigned by the Philosopher, according to which it means that “it does not happen to exist differently,” since the other modes of necessity involve imperfection, for example the necessity of compulsion, etc.) still there we do not have just the necessity of immutability in the sense that immutability is of itself necessity, because immutability eliminates only a possible temporal succession of opposite on opposite, but unqualified necessity eliminates absolutely the possibility of the opposite and not just the temporal succeeding of that opposite. And this does not follow: ‘An opposite cannot succeed its opposite; therefore, the opposite cannot occur.’

To the second proof I say that although every-thing with being of existence which it is possible to be going to be is mutable, where we treat creation, as does Avicenna, to be a mutation, even from the eternal, nevertheless in esse intellecto or volito (which is qualified being) it is not necessary that every possibility which is repellent to necessity of itself formally implies mutability. This is because this being is not real being, but is reduced to the real being of something necessary of itself. On account of the necessity of this other item there can be no mutability here, and yet the of-itself necessity attaching to this other does not belong to it formally, and so it is not of itself formally necessary, because it does not have the being of that term to which it really relates. Nevertheless, it is not mutable either, because in virtue of this diminished being it relates to an immutable term, and mutation in something that occurs in virtue of its relation to something else cannot occur without mutation in that something else.

[6.4.2] To the second argument [2.4], I say that something can be in God in two ways, either formally, or subjectively in the way logically any predicate is said to be in its subject. In the first way, I concede the major that everything of that sort is God and necessarily the same as God. In the second way I do not concede the major, since, for example, a relative appellation can be in God in as much as God is said to be “Lord” in virtue of time, and yet that appellation does not signify something the same as God (so that necessarily it is the same as God or is God Himself), because then it would not be in virtue of time.

Now, I say that for God to know B is, in as much as it is knowing absolutely, for him to know formally, but in as much as it is of this term B it is in God only in the second way. For the knowing is of this term since that known item has a relation to divine knowledge, and because of this some relative appellation is in God as a predicate in a subject.

[6.4.3] To the third, I say that no unqualified perfection in God depends on a creature, nor does it even with unqualified necessity require a creature in any sort of being. Consequently, for God to know B, where we understand the knowing not just absolutely but also as it relates to B, is not an unqualified perfection. Then I say that the major premiss of this argument is true for the perfection of that knowledge taken absolutely, but then the minor is false and the proof of it proves only that unqualified perfection necessarily implies that there is [knowing] of such an object, since it necessarily follows that it has such a relation to such an unqualified perfection. Nevertheless, unqualified perfection is not in him either in virtue of such a relation something else bears to him nor from the relative appellation that belongs to him.
[6.5] To the arguments concerning the fifth question:

[6.5.1] To the first, I say that the antecedent is not unqualifiedly necessary. And when it is argued that “a rational act is not lessened by its subject matter,” my reply is the one given in response to the argument put up against the solution of this question.

[6.5.2] To the second: That mixed syllogism is valid only if the minor is unqualifiedly de inesse, and this means that it is not just true for all time but that it is necessarily true. Perhaps we have to think of ‘per se’ as being implicit in the middle term (it is sufficient for what is proposed that it be required to be necessarily true). That this is required is clear in this case: ‘Everything at rest necessarily is not in motion. A stone at the center of the earth is at rest. Therefore, necessarily the stone is not in motion.’ The conclusion does not follow even though the minor is always true – and yet not necessarily true. So it is in what we are considering. For although the minor de inesse is always true, it is not necessarily true; for God is able not to know A just as he is able not to will A, because of contingency, which primarily is in the will and then in the object secondarily, and in virtue of this it is concomitantly in the intellect, as was explained before.

<Replies to the Arguments for the Second Opinion>

[7] To the arguments for the second opinion: [4.2]

[7.1] To the first [4.2.1] I allow that the limitless is present to every place, but not to every actual and potential place (as was argued in the first argument against this opinion), and thus neither will eternity on account of its infinity be present to some non-existent time. From this it is clear what to say about the example of the stick and the river. Since the stick does not have that whereby it could be present to all parts of the water, it is not unlimited in respect of them. But the “now” of eternity does have, in so far as it is considered on its own, that whereby it would be present to all parts of time if they were. The other example about the center and the circumference similarly argues the opposite. If we imagine a straight line with two terminal points, A and B, and let A be held fixed while B is moved around (just as with a compass one point is held fixed and the other moved), B as it is moved around causes a circumference according to the geometers’ imagination, who imagine the flowing point to cause a line. Given this, if nothing were to remain of the circumference by B’s flow, but rather in the circumference there is only that point (in such a way that whenever that point ceases to be some-where nothing of that circumference is then there), then the circumference is never present at the same time to the center, but rather only some point of the circumference is present to the center. Nevertheless, if that whole circumference were there at the same time, the whole would be present to the center. So it is here. Since time is not a static circumference but a flowing whose circumference is only an actual instant, nothing of it will be present to eternity (which is like the center) except that instant which is like the point. Nevertheless, if per impossibile it were proposed that the whole of time was in existence at once, that whole would be at the same time present to eternity as at a center.

[7.2] Through the above it is clear what to say to the other argument [4.2.2]. When it is said that the “now” of eternity as co-existing with the “now” of time is not equal to it, that is true, because the “now” of eternity is formally infinite and thus formally goes beyond the “now” of time. But it does not do this by co-existing with another “now.” For example, the limitlessness of God, though present to this universe, is not equal to this universe, and thus formally goes beyond it; nevertheless He is somewhere only in this universe.

[7.3] Through this same point it is clear what to say to the remaining argument [4.2.3]. If the whole of time existed all at once, eternity would encompass it, and so I concede that eternity as it is of itself has an infinity sufficient to encompass the whole of time if that whole existed all at once. But no matter how much limitlessness is posited on the side of one term, on account of which it can co-exist with no matter how much is posited in the other term, since co-existence indicates a relation between two terms (and thus requires both), from the limitlessness of one term we can infer co-existence only with that in the other term which exists.

[7.4] Thus all these arguments rely on something that is insufficient, namely the limitlessness of eternity. From that the co-existence which indicates a relation to something else follows only if we are given something in the other term which can be a term of co-existence with that basis. A non-being cannot be such, yet all of time save the present is a non-being.

<To the Authorities for the Second Opinion>

All the authoritative texts of the saints, which seem to signify that all things are present to eternity, must
be interpreted as about presence in the sense of knowable. And here ‘knowable’ refers not just to abstractive knowledge (as a non-existent rose is present to my intellect by a species), but to true intuitive knowledge, because God does not know what has occurred in a different way than what is going to occur, and thus what is going to occur is just as perfectly known presently by the divine intellect as what has occurred.[8] Replies to the arguments for the third opinion [4.3]

>To the Arguments of the Third Opinion>

[8.1] To the first argument for the third opinion [4.3.1]: Boethius immediately explains himself in that place, for he immediately disambiguates there in respect of the necessity of the consequent and the necessity of the consequence. Using this I concede that contingents that are related to divine knowledge are necessary by a necessity of the consequence (i.e. this consequence is necessary: ‘If God knows this is going to be, this will be’), nevertheless they are not necessary by an absolute necessity nor by a contingent necessity.

[8.2] To the other for the third opinion [4.3.2], I say that contingency is not just a lack or defect of entity (as is the deformity of a sinful act); rather contingency is a positive mode of being (just as necessity is another mode), and a positive being which is in an effect comes more principally from the prior cause. Thus this does not follow: ‘Just as deformity comes to the act itself from a secondary cause and not from the primary cause, so also contingency.’ Rather contingency is from the first cause before it is from a second cause. On account of this no caused item would be formally contingent unless it were caused contingently by the first cause, just as we showed above [4.3.2, reply].