Some of Tim's Papers

Technical Papers

1. Multi-Cardinal Phenomena in Stable Theories. A copy of my mathematics dissertation. Not for the notationally faint of heart.
2. Some Two-Cardinal Results for O-Minimal Theories. (JSL 63: 543-548.) This paper proves some admitting cardinals theorems and some Chang's Conjecture-style theorems for o-minimal structures.
3. Partitioning Subsets of Stable Models. (JSL 66: 1899-1908.) This paper proves some combinatorial results relating to Chang's Conjectures for stable models.

Philosophical Papers

1. Reflections on Skolem's Paradox. An abstract of my philosophy dissertation. The full dissertation is available here.
2. On Putnam and His Models. (JPhil XCVIII: 331-50.) I show that (one version of) Putnam's model-theoretic argument rests on an outright mathematical mistake, and I discuss some of the philosophical ramifications of this mistake. I also argue that, even if Putnam could get his mathematics to work, his argument would still fail on purely philosophical grounds.
3. On Tarski on Models. (JSL 66: 1701-1726.) My take on the great "logical consequence" debate. I argue that Tarski employed a fixed-domain conception of models in his 1936 paper on logical consequence, but that this non-standard conception of models causes fewer problems than most commentators have supposed. I also make a few comments concerning Tarski's discussion of omega-inferences in the 1936 paper.
4. The Fruits of Logicism. (NDJFL 41.4: 415-421) Some remarks I read at the end of our Logicism and the Paradoxes conference (March, 2001). They concern the history of logicism in the 20th century and the prospects for neo-logicism in the 21st.
5. On Floyd and Putnam on Wittgenstein on Godel. (JPhil CI.4: 197-210) Recently, Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam have tried to rehabilitate Wittgenstein's remarks on Godel's first incompleteness theorem. I don't think their rehabilitation works, and this paper explains why.
6. The Mathematics of Skolem's Paradox. (In Dale Jacquette (ed), Philosophy of Logic: 485-518) A brief tour through some of the mathematical issues involved in Skolem's Paradox. I pay particular attention to the role quantifiers can and cannot play in explaining this paradox.
7. More on Putnam's Models: A Response to Bellotti. (Erkenntnis 67.1: 119-135) Recently, Luca Bellotti has taken issue with some of the mathematical arguments in 2 above. This paper responds to Bellotti's concerns, and makes a few, somewhat more general, remarks about the mathematical side of Putnam's model-theoretic argument.
8. The Problem with Charlie: Some Remarks on Putnam, Lewis and Williams. (Phil Review 116.3: 401-425) Some remarks on Robbie Williams' nice new paper, Eligibility and Inscrutibility.
9. Two Arguments Against Realism. (Phil Quarterly 58: 193-213) Another paper on the model-theoretic argument. I explain why several recent defenses of this argument fail, and I issue some challenges for Putnam's future defenders.
10. Skolem's Paradox. An entry on Skolem's Paradox in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
11. Beth's Theorem and Deflationism. (Mind 118: 1043-1059) Argues, contrary to claims by Jeffrey Ketland, that there's no problem with viewing the T-schema as an "implicit definition" of the truth predicate.
12. Floyd, Putnam, Bays, Steiner, Wittgenstein, Godel, Etc. In a recent issue of JPhil, Juliet Floyd and Hilary Putnam criticize the arguments given in 5 above. This paper responds to their criticisms.

Notes and Reviews

1. Hudson on Receptacles. (AJP 81: 569-572) Some brief comments on the mathematics in Hud Hudson's paper "The Liberal view of Receptacles."
2. Review of David Corfield's Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics. (NDPR: January 2004).
3. Review of Michael Potter's Set Theory and It's Philosophy: a Critical Introduction. (NDPR: March 2005).
4. Review of John Burgess' Fixing Frege. (NDPR: June 2006).