What do philosophers mean by “idealism”? Of the various definitions which our dictionaries might supply for this term, perhaps one taking account of the notion of immaterialism would be the most serviceable. In its turn, immaterialism might be defined as the doctrine that matter either does not exist or exists strictly in dependence on mind. The concept of “idealism” has many senses, senses that evolved and gathered new meanings in the course of several hundred years.\(^1\) In Latin, the term appears in 1734 in Christian Wolff’s *Psychologia Rationalis* §36, where it is characterized as the doctrine that nothing exists outside of God and other spirits, clearly a reference to the Irish philosopher George Berkeley, who did not himself use the term. The term also appears in Diderot’s *Encyclopédie* in the 1750s.

Historians of philosophy are accustomed to charting the course of idealism from one viewpoint as a derivative of empiricism (cf. Berkeley) and from another viewpoint as a derivative of rationalism (cf. Leibniz), seeing it reformulated in the reaction against both these tendencies of Kant’s “transcendental” idealism, in the reaction against Kant of the Hegelian “absolute” idealism, and in the various developments of these viewpoints which continued into the twentieth century. It is worth briefly reviewing these developments here.

Plato was the first author to bring the term “idea” into philosophical currency. It is probable that this Idea, by simply representing one of the
contents of the higher of Plato’s two fundamental levels of Being, originally lacked the connotation of subjectivity. However, the latter gained emphasis during a complex evolution in the late ancient period when the Idea was reformulated in terms of Neoplatonic and Christian theism. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), in his essay, Reponse aux reflexions contenues dans la seconde Edition du Dictionnaire Critique de M. Bayle, article Rorarius, sur le systeme d’Harmonie préétablie, written some time after 1702, speaks of “the greatest materialists and Idealists” (des plus grands Materialistes et des plus grand Idealistes), among which latter he includes both Plato and the followers of Descartes. This is early testimony to the fact that the term “idealism” was specifically applied to Platonism.

George Berkeley’s claim, announced in his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) that esse est percipi, that the being of any object (other than a mind) is its being perceived by a mind (either the divine or the human mind), is usually seen as both inaugurating modern idealism and formulating it in a paradigmatic manner. This idealism, or more accurately, to use Berkeley’s own formulation, “immaterialism,” arises from post-Cartesian epistemological considerations and the need to address skeptical worries concerning the mind’s access to an “external world” thought of as having an “absolute existence” of its own. On the other hand, the fact that the term “idealism” itself first emerged in modernity does not mean that the notion did not occur earlier, nor indeed that the term itself cannot usefully be applied to diagnose analogous tendencies in earlier philosophies.

In fact, idealisms of quite different kinds have been motivated by other considerations, chiefly, religious or theological motivations. The Kant scholar Norman Kemp Smith, for instance, has argued that idealism may be used in a broad sense to cover “all those philosophies which agree in maintaining that spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe.” To recognize the source of all things in a divine immaterial principle that is also primarily understood as being at least mind, is undoubtedly central to the Western Christian theological tradition. In this sense, every Christian theist ought to be an idealist. No Christian theist can assent to the claim that somehow the source, ground, and cause of the created world is a material principle.

The Neoplatonism of late antiquity, inspired by Philo Judaeus and systematized by Plotinus and Porphyry, followed this line of thought to its logical conclusion by absorbing the Platonic forms into the intellectual principle (nous) which itself emanated from the One. In this move, not only is all material and sensible reality subordinate to the intelligible realm, but
the intelligible realm is itself located in Intellect or Mind. Thus, a Christian Neoplatonist such as Augustine could later hold that all things depend on the Ideas in the divine mind, while the ninth-century Irish philosopher Johannes Scottus Eriugena maintained that the being of all things is their being in the divine mind. It was undoubtedly because of the historical assimilation between Neoplatonism and Plato’s own thought, especially in the version of this synthesis propagated by Marsilio Ficino in the Renaissance, that Leibniz was prepared to characterize Platonism in the manner indicated by the quotation above.

Responding to the challenge of Berkeley, Immanuel Kant proposed a new form of idealism—transcendental idealism—which held that objectivity and subjectivity were correlative terms and that both traditional realism (which thinks of reality as mind-independent) and subjective idealism (which thinks of reality as mind-dependent) were one-sided and ignored the correlation between mind and world. To employ Hilary Putnam’s formulation, for transcendental idealists, what is known “is never the thing in itself, but always the thing as represented,” or as he also puts it: “The mind and the world jointly make up mind and world.”

In seeking to differentiate his idealism from other versions, Kant offers a taxonomy of idealism in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and subsequently in *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. In the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), in the Fourth Paralogism of the ideality of the “outer relation”: that is, that the cause of a perception can only be inferred and not proven, the term “idealist” is introduced precisely in terms of the existence of an external world:

By an *idealist*, therefore, one must understand not someone who denies the existence of external objects of sense, but rather someone who only does not admit that it is cognized through immediate perception and infers from this that we can never be fully certain of their reality from any possible experience (A368–69).

In the Refutation of Idealism section of the second edition (1787) of the *Critique*, Kant opposes what he calls “psychological” or “material” idealism:

Idealism (I mean *material* idealism) is the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be either merely doubtful and *indemonstrable*, or else false and impossible (B274).
Kant classifies both Descartes and Berkeley as material idealists, and thus the modern “way of ideas” is judged by Kant to involve a “psychological idealism” which makes the existence of the external world problematic. In the Preface to the second edition, Kant therefore identifies the great “scandal of philosophy” as the assumption that the existence of the external world should be in need of proof (Bxxxix). In contrast with this “dogmatic” or “material” idealism Kant defends transcendental idealism:

I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves. (A369)

Later Kant proposed the term “critical idealism” as less misleading. But central to this doctrine is the distinction between objects as appearances (to subjects) and as “things in themselves.”

Post-Kantian German idealism, in Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, sought to overcome the residual dualism in Kant and especially worries about the notorious unknown thing in itself. The absolute idealism of Hegel regards the infinite realization of the identity of subjectivity and objectivity as the self-realization of absolute spirit. Schelling especially regarded transcendental philosophy, the attempt to explain how knowledge is possible, as a way of identifying and seeking the grounds for the “prejudice” that there are things outside us. Indeed, he regards as one of the great achievements of modern philosophy that it has succeeded in uncoupling the conviction that objects exist outside us from the conviction that I exist. According to Schelling, idealism results from thinking of the self as the fundamental principle of all knowledge, whereas realism consists of thinking of the object without the self. His claim is that it is necessary to think the two together, leading to what he calls “ideal-realism” or “transcendental idealism.”

Both Schelling and Hegel, reacting to Kant’s continuing dualism of subject and thing in itself, understood idealism as involving the resolution of all things into an infinite consciousness which is at the same time self-consciousness. Being that has come to knowledge of itself in self-consciousness and is at one with itself is at the very heart of Hegelian idealism. Thus, for Hegel in the Science of Logic, idealism means that finite reality requires the infinite for its intelligibility and completion. Such an idealism maintains that there is an
inner relatedness among all things, and that all things emerge through a kind of dynamic unfolding which must be understood as Spirit coming to self-consciousness and self-actualization.

One can, therefore, distinguish several kinds of idealism: first, Platonic or Neoplatonic idealism; second, Berkeleian immaterialism or mind-dependence of physical objects; third, Kantian and neo-Kantian transcendental idealism, with its a priori correlation of objectivity with subjectivity (e.g. in Edmund Husserl) and its claim that space and time are conditions of sensibility rather than intrinsic properties of mind-external objects (Kant); and, finally, Hegelian absolute idealism, with its conception of the cosmos as the self-evolution and coming to self-awareness of absolute spirit (versions of which can also be found in Bradley and the British Idealists generally). It is clear that although there is both continuity and discontinuity among these versions of idealism, the degree of continuity is sufficient to justify a reexamination of the entire question in some kind of unified program.

It was therefore decided to organize an international philosophical conference devoted to the question of idealism, structuring our approach in terms of these four historico-conceptual categories (together with other and perhaps better categories which might emerge in the course of discussion). Since Iohannes Scottus Eriugena, the Carolingian philosopher and educationalist and George Berkeley, the eighteenth-century bishop of Cloyne—figures of seminal importance in the ancient-medieval and early modern phases of the idealist tradition respectively—were both Irishmen, there were reasons of both a practical and a symbolic nature for holding the meeting in Ireland. The conference entitled Eriugena, Berkeley, and the Idealist Tradition took place in Dublin, in March 2002. We were fortunate to have obtained financial assistance for the project from the University of Notre Dame—through its Henkels Lecture Series—and from Trinity College, Dublin (of which Berkeley was a Fellow in 1707). We were also grateful for the opportunity of holding our discussions in the University of Notre Dame’s Irish Studies Centre at Newman House, St. Stephen’s Green, Dublin.

In the resulting volume of conference proceedings here presented, three of the papers deal with Plato and his interpreters either definitely in the idealist domain or on its borders. The first essay, “Non-Subjective Idealism in Plato (Sophist 248e–249d),” by Vasilis Politis, argues that while Plato is not a subjective idealist and rejects this kind of idealism, there is reason to think that he defends non-subjective idealism. This conclusion is based on a close reading of Sophist 248e–249d, where Plato establishes the two most
fundamental kinds of being, and in particular of true, real, and perfect being: change (kinēsis) and changelessness (stasis). Politis’ interpretation of this most central argument in Plato establishes that change stands not for material or physical change but for rational change, and in particular for the change distinctive of the human, rationally cognizing soul; changelessness, on the other hand, stands for the changelessness distinctive of the forms, which are characterized as the objects of cognition. But the striking thing is that both of these most fundamental kinds of being—change and changelessness—are derived by Plato from a single source: namely, reason (nous), while reason is characterized in conspicuously cognitive terms and associated with intelligence (phronēsis), rational knowledge (epistēmē), and knowledge in general (gnōsis). Politis submits that this amounts to a defense, on Plato’s part, of non-subjective idealism. The fundamental nature of knowledge straddles the distinction between the cognizing subject and the cognized or cognizable object; for the fundamental nature of knowledge is the source of the derivation of the fundamental nature of both the subject—that is, the human, rationally cognizing soul whose distinctive characteristic is change—and the object—that is, the forms which are the objects of cognition and whose distinctive characteristic is changelessness (hence non-subjective idealism).

John Dillon’s paper “The Platonic Forms as Gesetze: Could Paul Natorp Have Been Right?” invites us to consider the interpretation of Plato set out by the neo-Kantian philosopher Paul Natorp in his Platonos Ideenlehre as possibly reflecting the Greek author’s own position. Whereas it is usually maintained by modern scholars that Plato’s forms are “things”—purely independent, immutable, and eternal objects of knowledge—Natorp understood the forms as something like “laws”—structuring principles of knowledge, still immutable and eternal, and possessing objective reality, but nonetheless acquiring their full realization through the activity of the human mind. After following Natorp’s readings of the Charmides, Meno, and Theaetetus in an open-minded and sympathetic manner, Dillon concludes that there is support for a view of the Natorpian kind in a “demythologized” reading of the Demiurge’s productive activity in the Timaeus, and that a similar line of interpretation had already been pursued in antiquity by Xenocrates’ pupil Polemon, by Zeno of Citium the founder of Stoicism, and by Antiochus of Ascalon.

Vittorio Hösle’s essay “Platonism and Its Interpretations: The Three Paradigms and Their Place in the History of Hermeneutics” analyzes the hermeneutic presuppositions of the three major paradigms in the interpretation of Plato: that of Middle and Neoplatonism, that of Schleiermacher, and that of
the Tübingen school. It confutes the legend that the third paradigm returns to the first even if it is somehow a synthesis of the first and second. According to Hösle, this interpretation holds only for the content of Plato’s philosophy and not for the method used in reconstructing Plato. In much of Hösle’s paper, the concrete problem of the right interpretation of Plato is developed on the basis of some general reflections on the task of hermeneutics.

With Gretchen Reydams-Schils’ contribution, “The Roman Stoics on Divine Thinking and Human Knowledge,” we turn to the Hellenistic period and the question of the Stoics’ possible relation to what we term “idealism.” This paper deals with the Roman Stoics’ appropriation—Seneca and Epictetus, specifically—of the notion of the thoughts of God. As a counterpoint to Platonic usages, this notion for the Stoics expresses both the rationale embedded in the order of the universe and the rational thought of the providential and immanent divine principle. Unlike human beings, the divine principle does not need sense-perception, lekta, or concepts in its thinking, which constitutes reality rather than derives from it. There is hence an epistemological limit to the isomorphy between human and divine reason, although in ethics this limit is overcome.

The next two essays deal with idealism of the late ancient period. In “The Object of Perception in Plotinus,” Andrew Smith considers idealism in relation to the sensory world and in a pagan writer, taking as his starting point some recent discussions about whether Plotinus is an idealist. More specifically, the question relates to Plotinus’ theory of intellection on the one hand and to his theory of sense-perception on the other, with a concentration on some very specific issues associated with the latter. Two texts (Enneads 5.5.1 and 1.1.7) are subjected to detailed analysis, and Smith rejects the interpretation of Emilsson according to which the gap between subject and object of sense-perception is overcome not least because Plotinus is concerned with the contrast between sense-perception and intellection, while there is a cleavage between subject and object in the latter case. After reviewing other passages which confirm his interpretation, Smith concludes that Plotinus is more interested in the nature of the process of sense-perception than in the status of the object, and that it is necessary to take account of changing emphases which explain seemingly different conclusions in Plotinus’ writing.

In “Saint Augustine and the Indwelling of the Ideas in God,” Jean Pépin considers idealism in relation to the intelligible world and in a Christian author, examining Augustine’s celebrated “Quaestio de Ideis” as a doxography of Platonism. He notes how the role of Antiochus of Ascalon as
insiprer of Latin Platonism had been brought to public notice in the 1930s by W. Theiler—who, however, had not paid attention to the importance of the Question 46 of Augustine's De Quaestionibus Diversis LXXXIII—and also studied more recently by J. Mansfeld. Pépin's aim is therefore to study this text as a document of Antiochus' influence exercised through the intermediate channels of Cicero and Varro.

At this point, we turn to three papers on Eriugena: one a general study placing the ninth-century Irish writer in the broad context of European idealism and two dealing with more specific aspects of his idealism in the areas of the categorial and the exegetical.

Dermot Moran in his contribution “Spiritualis Incrassatio: Eriugena's Intellectualist Immaterialism: Is It an Idealism?” begins by recognizing that there is a “family of idealisms” within Western philosophical thought. He distinguishes the ancient Christian Neoplatonic theory of ideas contained in the mind of God, which is theological in motivation; the Berkeleian doctrine that the being of any object consists of its being perceived by the divine or human mind, which was developed as a response to post-Cartesian skepticism; the Kantian transcendental idealism based on the distinction between objects on the one hand as appearances and on the other as “things in themselves”; and absolute idealism (found in Hegel and his followers), which sees everything as some aspect of or participation in “absolute spirit,” taken to be a kind of collective mind. Moran's purpose is to refute some recent views which, by looking towards the Berkeleian model exclusively, have attempted to argue that idealism does not exist in the pre-modern period, and to prepare the ground for the assessment of Eriugena's contribution by distinguishing the two primary features of intellectualism and immaterialism. In the latter part of this essay a broad description of the Eriugenian philosophical system and its foundations in Latin and Greek patristic teachings is unfolded along these lines.

Stephen Gersh’s essay “Eriugena's Fourfold Contemplation: Idealism and Arithmetic” turns to the famous fourfold division of Nature which constitutes the foundation of Eriugena's philosophical system and of his treatise Periphyseon. According to Gersh, one can distinguish here a logical aspect in which, following the Latin tradition of commentary on Aristotle's Categories, the division is complemented by an analysis to form the double process of organizing concepts utilized by dialecticians: an arithmetical aspect in which, in accordance with the Latin tradition of Pythagorean mathematics, the derivation of the four species from the universal nature parallels the derivation
of the number-series from the monad and the character of particular species from the character of particular numbers; and an idealistic aspect indicated by the association of the division with terms like “contemplation” (contemplatio, theòria). Since the connection between the logical and the idealistic elements in Eriugena’s thought has been studied in earlier literature, Gersh devotes the main part of his essay to considering the connection between the arithmetical and the idealistic elements. Here, the main issues are Eriugena’s understanding of ideas, numbers, and the relations between them, and the tension between what one might call the “cognitive” and “interpretative” aspects respectively of this idealism.

Agnieszka Kijewska’s “Eriugena’s Idealist Interpretation of Paradise” attempts to understand the precise nature of Eriugena’s idealism by looking at his discussion of the biblical account of Paradise in the book of Genesis. After a detailed review of the relevant passages in Periphyseon and some remarks on the general theory of exegesis which these passages reveal, the author summarizes the Eriugenian “idealistic” notion of Paradise. According to Kijewska, Paradise corresponds to perfect human nature made in the likeness of God, this state of perfection being not only a description of the human condition in the past but also an account of the future condition to which it can aspire. Given that God has created all corporeal things as ideas in the human mind and that human sin represents a deviation of the cognitive faculty, then the fall of humanity is equivalent to the fall of the corporeal world as such. It is in the reversal of this state of affairs that the author finds “the deepest meaning of John the Scot’s Cogito.”

With Peter Adamson’s study “Immanence and Transcendence: Intellect and Forms in al-Kindī and the Liber de Causis,” we turn to the Arabic philosophy of the Middle Ages. The study begins with an introductory section in which the author suggests a reconstruction of the development of idealism in ancient philosophy whereby late ancient thinkers (and especially the Neoplatonists) would combine Aristotle and Plato in order to reconcile their theories of form. The result, he suggests, was a view according to which immaterial mind is the seat of ideas, and via those ideas causes things in the material world. In the focus of the paper, Adamson examines texts produced in the circle of al-Kindī in ninth-century Baghdad. He concentrates especially on the Liber de Causis, first arguing that it espouses the sort of idealism outlined in his introductory section. He then points out three ways in which this idealism is qualified in Kindī circle texts: first, God is the cause of the world and does not seem to cause the world in an idealist fashion; second, matter is not
accounted for by the idealist interpretation; third, the texts also accept non-idealist causation between physical things. The author concludes by suggesting that the de Causis can still be called “idealist” if we specify an appropriate meaning for the term “idealism.”

We next turn to three papers on Berkeley. The first two deal with Berkeley per se from the contrasting viewpoints of his early work and his late treatise Siris, the third with one of Berkeley’s most important areas of influence in Immanuel Kant.

In “The Scientific Background of George Berkeley’s Idealism,” Bertil Belfrage examines Berkeley’s early work An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709) in order to show how the young philosopher’s approach to certain problems in natural science eventually led him towards the idealist position. In the course of correcting some interpretations of Berkeley’s views in this area which, although accepted for many years, are shown to be mistaken, Belfrage emphasizes two points: (1) Berkeley holds that there are three autonomous fields of discourse which should be distinguished in evaluating his statements. These are the descriptive part of science, the theoretical part of science, and metaphysics. (2) Berkeley’s theory of optics is more complicated than it is usually taken to be, involving the stimulus of light-rays on the retina, the unconditioned response of the perceiver (awareness of a fuzzy-looking object), the perceiver’s background knowledge, and the conditioned response of the perceiver (the object as seeming near to one individual and far to another). The next section of Belfrage’s essay lays out the foundations of Berkeley’s psychology as a whole by looking at the physiological principles on which perception is based, and by considering what is given to perception in the worlds of tactuals and visuals, respectively. Finally, the author draws our attention to certain details of Berkeley’s early theory which can be seen as suggestively pointing to the later idealist hypothesis.

Timo Airaksinen’s essay “The Chain and the Animal: Idealism in Berkeley’s Siris” analyzes Berkeley’s mysterious last work, Siris, trying to present a clear interpretation of its basic argumentative structure. According to Airaksinen, this structure is based on two metaphors: the chain and the animal. The chain connects tar (a panacea) to God, and the animal signifies the organic unity of the created universe. Moreover, Berkeley uses a wide array of ancient sources, as well as contemporary results from botany, chemistry, physics, and medicine in order to reinforce his thesis. In examining Berkeley’s argument, Airaksinen pays particular attention to the notion of the purity of tar compared to wine, and to Berkeley’s criticism of Newton’s theory of aether. Berkeley turns out
to be an idealist because he argues that all matter is dependent on the Spirit. The Spirit is represented in the material world by light and by pure, celestial fire.

Karl Ameriks’ “Idealism from Kant to Berkeley” reflects on a common tendency, found in both the German and the English-speaking worlds, to interpret Kant’s critical idealism in Berkeleian terms. Because of the representative and influential nature of their perspectives, he focuses on interpretations of Kant by the eighteenth-century figure F. H. Jacobi and the twentieth-century analytic philosopher James van Cleve. He argues that the Berkeleian interpretation of Kant is rooted in a tempting but improper ascription to Kant of an equation of being with representation. He examines how this tendency results in a common misunderstanding of Kant’s argument for his transcendental idealism, a misunderstanding that construes it as a “short argument” for the ideality of representation in general, rather than as an argument based on a series of steps that start essentially with a more limited demonstration of the ideality of space and time.

Finally, we turn to nineteenth-century German idealism. In “Idealism and Realism in Classical German Philosophy,” Walter Jaeschke begins by emphasizing the necessity of a hermeneutically sophisticated approach to the term “idealism” and especially to the term “German idealism.” If one can avoid the kind of conceptualization driven by the use of simplistic terminology, it becomes clear that the classical period of German philosophy is not an epoch of idealism but rather an epoch in which the confrontation between idealism and realism was raised to unparalleled heights. This era of German thought can be characterized by a debate which is for the first time explicitly headed by the title “idealism and realism,” which is liberated from its earlier association with problems of philosophical theology, and which is eventually superseded by a comprehensive system of which “idealism and realism” are moments. Although originating in the Kantian critique, it is really Jacobi who sets the debate in motion, and Jaeschke studies in succession the evolution of Kant’s program, Jacobi’s attempt to establish realism as superior to idealism, Fichte’s (and Schelling’s) attempt at a balancing act between idealism and realism, Jacobi’s further defense of realism on theological grounds, and finally Hegel’s solution to the problem through the “proper thematization of consciousness.”

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NOTES


13. For reasons of space, we cannot here discuss more recent versions of idealism, for example the British and American neo-Hegelian idealists, such as McTaggart, Bradley, et al.