Introduction

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Philip Quinn was the John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame from 1985 until his death in November 2004. The present volume collects some of the papers presented at a memorial conference for Professor Quinn held at Notre Dame in December 2005. The papers in the collection are by some friends of Phil’s whose work he regarded highly. The contributors also thought quite highly of Phil—as evidenced by the quality of papers they produced for the memorial conference. The conference papers brought together here have been supplemented by papers written by Robert Audi and myself, who were departmental colleagues of Phil’s at the time of his death, and by Richard Foley. Foley, who is now dean of the Faculty of Arts and Science at New York University, was the chair of the Philosophy Department at Notre Dame who lured Phil away from Brown.

Commemorative volumes are not just supposed to recall those whom they commemorate. Those who contribute to a volume like this
are supposed to honor Phil by putting their talents to work advancing discussion of a representative sample of the questions he cared about. Those who know Phil’s work know that no one set of papers would be adequate to this task. Phil had so wide a range of philosophical interests, and his knowledge of philosophy was so broad, that it would be virtually impossible to identify any one set of questions and issues as representative of those that engaged his attention.

In the years after he left Brown for Notre Dame, Phil was most prominently associated with the philosophy of religion. In the last years of his career, he developed an interest in some questions within political philosophy—especially questions about human rights and about the place of religious argument in political life—the latter of which became the subject of his American Philosophical Association presidential address. Phil also retained a lively interest in the core areas of analytic philosophy, including epistemology, as Richard Foley notes in his acknowledgments. Questions in the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, political philosophy, and epistemology are all taken up in the papers of this volume.

Phil’s own positions on many of the religious and practical questions that interested him grew out of what I have referred to in the title of this volume as a “liberal faith.” Liberal faith is more a sensibility than a set of creedal commitments. It takes its cue from liberal political thought, which began as a family of theories about how to cope, ethically and politically, with the religious pluralism of post-Reformation Europe. Adherents of liberal faith continue to recognize enduring pluralism as one of the salient features of the world in which they live and move and have their being. They instinctively favor certain characteristic responses to it. Thus Phil accepted the inevitability of religious and cultural pluralism in the modern world. He was acutely aware of the challenges it poses and the possibilities it opens in education, in religion, and in politics. In response to pluralism and disagreement, he invariably favored the liberal values of tolerance, autonomy, and free discussion.

The catholicity of Phil’s intellectual interests, which included history, literature, and the visual arts as well as philosophy, reflected an abiding faith in liberal education. He believed that such an education, supplemented by cross-cultural studies, could liberate students from prejudice and parochialism. But he remained steadfastly committed to the kind of disciplined intellectual inquiry that philosophy exempli-
Phil's religion was also that of a liberal. The rituals of his childhood faith had a vestigial hold on him that became apparent to his friends at the end of his life. Throughout his career, he seemed to hold liberal positions in ecclesiology and in matters of observance and dogma. Interestingly, the one Christian doctrine on which Phil did a good deal of serious work was the Atonement, which is not dogmatically defined. Though his work in the philosophy of religion would have been identified as Christian, his was not an insular Christianity. He was deeply interested in comparative religious studies and in the problems posed by pluralism for religious faith. His interest in comparative religious studies is what led, I believe, to his deeper involvement with the American Academy of Religion in his last years.

Phil's was not the religious faith of the utopian Christian, who thinks that the Kingdom can someday be realized or approached here on earth. The fulfillment of such utopian yearnings would require a perfection of humankind that Phil would have thought it unrealistic to expect. That he would have thought it unrealistic is suggested by some of his most compelling work on religion and literature, which—as we shall see—bespeaks a preoccupation with the darker themes of human life. The most moving of these essays, on Shusako Endo's book *Silence*, laments God's reticence and distance in the face of terrible dilemmas that can arise within the Christian life. Another of Phil's essays on literature—one on Albert Camus's *The Fall*—showed that, far from hoping for a Christian utopia, Phil was troubled by the possibility that humanity would bring about a sort of hell on earth.

As he hints at the end of his essay on Camus, Phil did repose a certain faith in liberal political arrangements. But as he was not a utopian in religion, so he was not a utopian in politics either. He believed in the value of free political discussion, and he believed that religion had something to contribute to that discussion. But he also recognized that religion could be manipulated for political ends and that terrible things could be done in its name. He recognized the vulnerability of human beings to evil wrought by those in power. And he concluded that a regime of scrupulously observed human rights is necessary to protect the vulnerable. Liberal political arrangements that protect human rights, prize discussion, and eschew hierarchy—these arrangements are
the best hope for governing and protecting human beings under conditions of pluralism. But the best we can realistically hope for, Phil thought, may be only a slight improvement over what we already have.

If a single commemorative volume cannot represent all of Phil’s interests, a collection that touches on some of the epistemological, religious, and political questions that were of greatest interest to him in the last years of his working life seems an appropriate tribute. This volume gets its unity because Phil’s interest in those questions grew naturally out of liberal faith as I have described it. In the remainder of this introduction, I shall try to display that unity by asking questions about and drawing connections among various of the essays that Phil’s friends and colleagues have so generously contributed.

**Epistemology**

The first paper in this volume, Linda Zagzebski’s “Self-Trust and the Diversity of Religions,” opens by broaching the concerns raised by religious pluralism. “The diversity of religions,” Zagzebski writes, “is widely regarded as one of the most serious problems for conscientious belief in a particular religion, both among ordinary people and among professional philosophers.” The task Zagzebski takes on is that of spelling out this problem and addressing it.

Zagzebski contrasts her own formulation of the problem posed by religious diversity with what she calls the “Enlightenment worry.” That worry takes root, she says, because disagreement over religious belief seems to be irresolvable. She observes immediately that irresolvable disagreement does not pose a serious problem for conscientious belief in a particular religion all by itself. The claim that religious disagreements are irresolvable would pose a problem, however, if it were conjoined with two other claims: the claim that at least some parties to religious disagreements are normal human beings and the claim that Zagzebski calls “epistemic egalitarianism.” Epistemic egalitarianism is the thesis—which Zagzebski associates with Locke and which she says “govern[ed] much of Enlightenment philosophy”—that “all normal human beings are roughly equal in the capacity to get knowledge.”

Zagzebski argues that what we find troubling about religious pluralism cannot be the Enlightenment worry because, to be troubled by that worry, we would have to be epistemic egalitarians. But, she says,
epistemic egalitarianism is not a position most of us hold. Instead she
thinks our conscientious belief in a particular religion is threatened by
religious disagreements among admirable people and by the fact that
we sometimes find ourselves in religious disagreement with those we
admire. But, Zagzebski observes, we are right to worry about disaggre-
ment in these cases only if we ought to “trust” our emotion of admira-
tion. She adds immediately that she thinks that we must and should
trust it. She develops her view of trust in one’s own emotions in di-
alogue with some work of Richard Foley’s on self-trust.

In brief, Zagzebski thinks that the admirable is “something like the
imitably attractive.” She continues, “We feel a positive emotion toward
the person we admire that would lead to imitating the person given the
right practical conditions.” To trust our emotion of admiration is “to
have confidence that it is appropriate to feel the kind of attraction
and desire to imitate that is intrinsic to admiration.” Since Zagzebski
thinks we must trust our emotion of admiration, we must—at least
sometimes—think the attraction and desire to imitate is appropriate. It
is appropriate, she thinks, even if we lack evidence that the person
whom we admire is epistemically reliable.

Having argued that we must trust our emotion of admiration even
in these cases, Zagzebski is in a position to recast the problem posed by
religious diversity. Suppose I encounter someone with whom I disagree
about religious questions but whom I greatly admire. I may admire
how she has arrived at her religious beliefs or the way she holds her be-
iefs. If I must trust my admiration in these cases, then I must think it
appropriate to want to imitate that person, even in the absence of evi-
dence that she—or the ways she arrives at her beliefs—is epistemically
reliable. But imitation of that person would require affirming her reli-
gious beliefs and practices instead of my own. If I also continue to trust
“the aspects of myself from which I gain my beliefs and the traditions
that support them,” then I face “a genuine problem of religious diver-
sity”: trust in my own beliefs conflicts with my appropriate desire to
imitate someone whose beliefs are different.

“The problem of [Zagzebski’s paper]”—the problem posed by irre-
solvable religious disagreement—is not a conflict that arises because I
have evidence for my own beliefs and evidence of the reliability of
someone with whom I disagree. Rather, Zagzebski thinks, it arises be-
cause I trust my own beliefs and trust my emotion of admiration of the
person with whom I disagree. This conflict is therefore, she says, “a con-

flict that arises within self-trust.”
The claim that we sometimes cannot help admiring those of other faiths is bound to appeal to the person of liberal faith, who cherishes diversity as he appreciates its challenges. The conclusions Zagzebski draws from this claim obviously raise a number of questions. There are two it may be useful to discuss briefly.

First, while a “genuine problem of religious diversity” may arise because I disagree with someone whose ways of forming or holding beliefs I admire, it is by no means clear that this is the only or the primary problem religious diversity poses for conscientious belief. Many religious faiths are, in various ways, exclusivist: they make truth claims that are incompatible with claims made by other religions, including the claim to offer the sole route to salvation. Imagine an adherent of an exclusivist religion who sees in those of a different faith the decency or justice or benevolence that she thinks her own faith is supposed to inspire. Imagine that she does not in the least admire the way they have arrived at their religious beliefs. Nor does she admire—or desire to imitate—their religious rituals, their devotions, or their spirituality. But she may admire their behavior toward others. She may find it hard to believe that God would condemn such people. Then she faces a conflict between the admiration she has for those of the other faith and the trust she has in the exclusivist pretensions of her tradition. She may choose to resolve the tension by reaffirming her admiration for some of the qualities she sees in others while being more selective in her trust of her religious tradition. In particular, she may decide that she can no longer trust its exclusivist claims. The conflict to which I have drawn attention differs from the problem of religious diversity on which Zagzebski focuses. And so the first question raised by Zagzebski’s conclusion is whether there is a single problem raised by religious diversity, which she has correctly identified.

The problem I have tried to point to is one that, like the one Zagzebski points to, “arises within self-trust.” For the adherent of the exclusivist faith has some evidence that those with whom she disagrees about religion are epistemically reliable when it comes to interpersonal morality: they observe a code of interpersonal morality that she thinks is correct, even if they do so for what she thinks are the wrong reasons. This brings us to a second question raised by Zagzebski’s paper, the question of what it means for a problem to arise within self-trust. One can usefully develop this question by turning to the second paper in this volume.
That paper, “An Epistemology That Matters,” is by Richard Foley, on whose work Zagzebski drew in her opening essay. Like Zagzebski, Foley begins by criticizing an assumption of John Locke’s. That assumption is not the one Zagzebski criticized, the assumption of epistemic egalitarianism. It is, rather, the assumption that there is a necessary connection between someone’s being justified in believing a claim and her “meeting the higher standard of knowing that a claim is true.” Foley proposes that “epistemologists should resist the temptation to assume any kind of necessary tie between justified belief and knowledge.” The temptation Foley wants epistemologists to resist is one to which much of traditional epistemology has acceded, since knowledge has traditionally been defined as justified true belief. Foley therefore proposes to “reorient” the discipline of epistemology.

An epistemology thus reoriented promises to be, as Foley suggests, “an epistemology that matters.” One of the things to which it will matter is our everyday evaluation of people’s beliefs. Everyday evaluations, Foley notes, more often turn on whether people “have been appropriately careful and responsible in regulating their opinions” than on whether they have met a standard for knowledge. Everyday evaluations therefore presuppose a standard of belief assessment that bears no necessary connection to knowledge. Foley suggests that the standard our everyday evaluations presuppose is that of justification as he understands it.

As we shall see, Foley thinks that justification is a species of rationality. Severing the connection between justified belief and knowledge severs the connection between rational belief and knowledge. To ask whether a belief is rationally held can therefore be quite different from asking whether the belief is held in such a way that, if it is true, it would constitute knowledge. Once that distinction is drawn, philosophers are free to propose an account of rational belief that treats the rationality of believing in the same way as the rationality of acting, deciding, or adopting strategies and plans. Thus a reoriented epistemology also matters, Foley thinks, to our ability to treat the rationality of believing as part of an account of the rationality of other actions.

Foley does not discuss problems in the philosophy of religion or problems posed by religious diversity. But once these problems are in view, as they are bound to be after Zagzebski’s paper, we can see another way in which a reoriented epistemology may matter.
Suppose that we come upon or read about persons whose views about religion are arrived at very differently from our own. Perhaps they read sacred texts literally, ignoring hermeneutical strictures and techniques that we think are critically important. Or perhaps they attribute natural phenomena to divine beings who animate the physical world. Or perhaps they accept on faith various accounts of the history of the world that we think have been disproven by science. Or perhaps they think God speaks directly to them in private revelations.

Our encounters with such people or our acquaintance with them raises the question of what to say about how their beliefs are held. We may not admire the way such people arrive at their religious beliefs, at least as Zagzebski defines admire. Our reasons for not admiring them may make us very reluctant to say that their beliefs are held in such a way that, if they were true, they would constitute knowledge. On the other hand, we may be very reluctant to dismiss their beliefs as irrationally or unjustifiably held. The dismissal may seem too harsh to be plausible to the person of liberal faith, especially if they are—as it were—just people who are doing their epistemic best by their own lights. Foley's proposal may seem to open just the evaluative space that needs to be available for handling such cases. For it may allow us to affirm that such people hold their religious views rationally and justifiedly, while allowing us to deny that they have arrived at their beliefs admirably or in ways that produce knowledge.

Of course, whether it does depends upon the conditions under which a belief is rationally or justifiedly held. Foley proposes what he calls a “template” for rationality that elucidates those conditions. He says: "An action A (or decision, plan, intention, etc.) is rational in sense X for S just in case it is epistemically rational for S to believe that A will do an acceptably good job of satisfying goals of kind X." The template avoids circularity because the notion of epistemic rationality on the right side of the biconditional is, Foley says, to be explained without reference to "any other notion of rationality or any of its close cognates." The template accommodates justified belief, Foley says, because "S justifiably believes P if it is epistemically rational for S to believe that her procedures with respect to P have been acceptable: that is, acceptable given the limitations on her time and capacities and given all of her goals."2 If Foley’s template is correct, then whether the religious believers I discussed a moment ago hold their beliefs rationally—in some sense of rationally—depends upon what goals they
have and what goals it is rational for them to adopt. These questions raise difficulties that go beyond the scope of this introduction. Instead of pursuing them, I want to return to the implications of Foley’s essay for Zagzebski’s piece.

Trust in others is sensitive to and responsive to reasons. Someone’s possession of the traits that make her trustworthy is a reason to trust her. Someone’s duplicity and unreliability are reasons to distrust her. Trust in our own faculties and affections is also responsive to reasons. That someone’s infatuations regularly lead him into unhappy relationships is a reason for him to distrust his romantic judgments. If he finds himself irresistibly drawn to someone else, he can ask whether it is rational for him to trust his infatuation with her. Similarly, a person who finds herself admiring another can ask herself whether it is rational for her to trust her admiration. She may find that she must trust her own admiration, at least in some cases, just as Zagzebski says. But this finding does not imply that she cannot ask about the rationality of her admiration for others. It may show instead that she simply cannot escape the conclusion that her admiration is rational.

Since Foley’s template for rationality is supposed to be generally applicable, it must apply to the rationality of admiration. If that template is right, and if it is in some way rational for me to trust my admiration of someone of a different faith, then it is epistemically rational for me to believe that trusting my own admiration of that person would acceptably satisfy some of my goals. If it is also in some way rational for me to trust my own religious tradition, then—again assuming Foley’s template is right—it is epistemically rational for me to believe that trusting my own tradition would acceptably advance some of my goals.

So if Foley’s template is right, then the problem that Zagzebski thinks is posed by religious disagreement with those we admire seems ultimately to be a problem about what it is epistemically rational for me to believe about what acceptably advances some of my goals. If I face a conflict posed by religious diversity, I could resolve the conflict by rationally changing my goals.

To see this, let us return to the example I provided earlier, that of a conflict that arises when the adherent of an exclusivist religion encounters someone of a different faith whose justice toward others she admires. I said that she could resolve the conflict she faces by rationally...
changing what she trusts her own tradition to do. She might continue to trust it to provide familiar spiritual comforts while no longer trusting it to provide exclusive access to the means of salvation. This resolution of the conflict is achieved by a refinement of her goals. She still trusts her tradition and trusts her admiration of others. She resolves the conflict by deciding that it is acceptable for her admiration of others to track their justice and decency; she decides that she wants her trust in religious traditions to track something other than the credence she gives to their exclusivist claims.

The question of what goals may rationally be adopted in the face of conflicts may be questions about self-trust. Perhaps the Foley template can be used to show that, as Zagzebski suggests, they also arise within self-trust. For it may be that we cannot but trust ourselves about some of the goals we should pursue. Perhaps, for example, some people cannot but trust their inclinations to admire those who are just toward others, and to modify their trust in exclusivist religions accordingly.

These questions are too large to be pursued here. Their great interest suggests that the conversation between Foley and Zagzebski, evident in Zagzebski’s paper, is bound to continue.

Philosophy of Religion

The next two papers in the volume are in the philosophy of religion. As we shall see, they touch on concerns that animated the two papers Phil wrote in philosophy and literature that I referred to earlier: the papers on Endo and Camus.

Eleonore Stump’s "Presence and Omnipresence" explores the claim that love includes a desire for union with the beloved. What, Stump asks, is the desire for union with the beloved a desire for? In particular, she asks, what is it that adult human beings who are friends but not lovers desire when they desire union with one another? The answer to this question, Stump thinks, “sheds light on the general nature of the union desired in love, and it also highlights a neglected side of the standard divine attribute of omnipresence.”

In Stump’s view, “Union between friends requires mutual closeness and personal presence.” The kind of presence that is required is what Stump calls “significant personal presence.” Such presence, she argues here, requires “direct and unmediated causal and cognitive contact,” second-person experience of the other, and shared attention.
Moreover, significant presence requires closeness to the person to whom one is significantly present. Stump discusses several conditions of closeness, of which I shall mention just two. First, A is close to B only if A shares his thoughts and feelings with B. Furthermore, B has to receive A’s revelations. She has to understand what A is revealing to her. “If she is willing enough but uncomprehending, she will not be close to him.” Second, closeness requires “psychic integration and wholeheartedness.” If someone has desires with which he does not identify, or that he wishes he did not have, he is “alienated from himself.” “A person alienated from himself,” Stump says “cannot have someone else close to him.” “Even God cannot be close to a human person alienated from himself.”

As is hinted by the last remark, Stump thinks her analysis of union between friends applies to the union between persons and God: “On the account of presence and omnipresence I have given here, the only thing decisive for the kind of personal presence, significant or minimal, that an omnipresent God has to a human person is thus the state and condition of the human person himself.” From this claim, Stump draws a strong conclusion: “Whether omnipresent God is present to Jerome with significant personal presence is dependent not on God but on Jerome.” She reiterates this conclusion at the end of her paper: “If Paula wants God to be significantly present to her, the establishment of the relationship she wants depends only on her, on her single-mindedly and wholeheartedly wanting that relationship. . . . If she does, then the presence that the omnipresent God has to her will be significant personal presence.” And since significant personal presence entails the other condition on union—closeness—then it follows that if someone wholeheartedly loves God and wholeheartedly wants union with him, she can have it.

Stump’s claim that significant personal presence requires causal and cognitive contact that is “direct and unmediated” raises a number of fascinating questions about how God can be present to us through religious texts, which might seem to make God present in a significant way but through the medium of a holy book. It also raises questions about how God can be made present through representations of himself and representations of holy persons, such as icons. If Stump’s account of significant personal presence is correct, and if God is significantly present through icons, then this has implications for the vexed question of how icons represent. For they would have to represent without mediating.
This is, I think, an implication that would have intrigued Phil, for he was a voracious consumer of art books and had an extensive knowledge of painting. But what is most interesting and challenging about Stump’s paper is its bearing on some work of Phil’s, which can be brought out by reading it in conjunction with his paper on the novel *Silence* by Shusaku Endo.5

The first half of Phil’s paper on *Silence* is a synopsis of the novel that I shall not recapitulate here. In brief, the novel tells of Sebastian Rodriguez, a Jesuit who undertakes a clandestine mission to the persecuted Catholics of seventeenth-century Japan. I mention just three pivotal points in the novel as Phil retells it.

First, Rodriguez is deeply troubled by what he takes to be God’s silence in the face of terrible torture and death visited on the persecuted. As Phil recounts a critical episode in the novel: “‘Why have you abandoned us so completely?’ Rodriguez prays in a weak voice. ‘Have you just remained silent like the darkness that surrounds me? Why? At least tell me why?’ But the sea remains cold, and the darkness stays stubbornly silent.6

Second, when Rodriguez himself is betrayed and captured, he is faced with a terrible dilemma in which—as Phil tells it—he is forced to choose between love of God and love of neighbor. For Rodriguez is told that if he will trample on a bronze representation of the face of Christ, then some of the persecuted prisoners will be released from torture. At that point, Phil says, “Rodriguez fights a battle with Christianity in his own heart.”7 He does not want to trample on the face of Christ, but he wants to relieve the sufferings of the persecuted Christians. He is therefore deeply divided. Yet at just this point God seems to Rodriguez finally to break his silence. Again in the words of Phil’s essay: “And then the Christ in bronze speaks to him. ‘Trample! Trample! I more than anyone know the pain in your foot. Trample! It was to be trampled on by men that I was born into this world. It was to share men’s pain that I carried my cross!’”8

Finally, Phil says that when the moment of Rodriguez’s trial has passed, the priest realizes “he has come to love Christ in a new way. And, more important, everything he had been through had been necessary to bring him to this new love. Moreover, it seems that he is not self-deceived on this point, for his new love bears good fruit. He is able to love his neighbor in a new way too.”9 A couple of pages later, Phil says of Rodriguez:
Because his new love is a suffering love just as Christ's love for him is a suffering love, he is in some ways closer to Christ than he has ever been before. . . . Astonishingly, Rodriguez is even able to affirm that his whole life, including his dilemma and its tragic consequences, was necessary to bring him to this new love. And since his deepest desire had always been to draw close to Christ in love, his life's most important thread is not cut off at the point of his tragic dilemma. . . . His life's project continues beyond that point, transformed in ways he could not have anticipated.10

How does Phil's treatment of these three pivotal points bear on Stump's account of union with God?

Consider first Rodriguez's frustration with the silence of God. Much later in his life, as Rodriguez recalls the trial that changed his life forever, he seems to hear Christ saying, "I was not silent. I suffered beside you."11 Thus Christ asserts that he was intimately present to Rodriguez and to the persecuted Christians, sharing their suffering. Yet Rodriguez did not recognize his presence at the time or understand why God allowed the suffering to continue. Because Rodriguez did not then understand God's intentions and desires, it follows from Stump's account that he was not close to God. Further, since significant personal presence requires closeness, it follows that Rodriguez was not significantly personally present to God and that God was not significantly personally present to him. But we may wonder whether this is so or whether an account of closeness and presence that implies it can be correct. For we may think that God can be present to us in significant ways, perhaps even sustaining us, at times when we are tried most severely, when his intentions are hidden from us and when we do not know why we must endure what life subjects us to.

Stump also insists that God cannot be close—hence significantly personally present—to someone who is alienated from himself, who lacks psychic integration and has a divided will. Even if the division is momentary, she may think, it poses an obstacle to closeness and presence that is not removed so long as the division lasts. Yet it is at the moment in his life when Rodriguez is most deeply divided, the moment when "he fights a battle with Christianity in his own heart," that Christ seems to speak to him at last. Indeed, it is at that moment that Christ satisfies the rest of Stump's conditions on significant personal presence. For Christ has direct and unmediated contact with Rodriguez, addresses
him in the second person, shares attention with him, and reveals his deepest thoughts to him. The example seems to drive home the point that Christ can make himself present to us when we are most troubled and in doubt.

Stump may grant that God’s presence to Rodriguez in these instances was significant and personal but deny that it tells against her account. For, she may say, what she is interested in is the kind of presence that is desired by someone who loves God and wants union with God. Neither of these cases exemplifies that kind of presence, even if the presence they exemplify is in some ways significant and personal.

But now consider Phil’s claim that Rodriguez’s deepest desire had always been to draw close to Christ in love. Rodriguez, it seems, had always desired union with Christ above all else. Yet if Phil is right, he could achieve it only after facing the most tragic dilemma of his life and reconciling himself with the action he took when he faced it. The reconciliation brought about a change in Rodriguez that he needed to make before he could be united with Christ in the way that he had always wanted. This reading of the novel may bear out Stump’s point that a person’s union with God depends upon “the state and condition of the person himself.” It does, however, call into question Stump’s claim that if someone “wants God to be significantly present to her, the establishment of the relationship she wants depends only on her, on her single-mindedly and wholeheartedly wanting that relationship.” For Rodriguez single-mindedly wanted union with Christ all his life. But for much of his life he was not ready for it. Moreover, nothing he would or could have chosen for himself could have effected the changes in his “state and condition” that had to take place before he could be united with Christ in suffering love.

The story of Rodriguez, we may think, illustrates important truths. Attaining union with God is a project that unfolds over the course of a life. Since God knows our hearts and minds even if we do not choose to reveal them to him, he knows us better than we know ourselves. He guides us in that project, helping us to make use of events that seem the most formidable obstacles to union with him. Thus Phil might point out that the execution of the project depends, not just upon our wanting it single-mindedly and wholeheartedly, but also upon God’s providential care for each of us.

Perhaps Stump would agree with these claims. Certainly the questions I have raised about her paper by drawing on Phil’s essay are not intended to show that Stump’s account of presence is wrong, for the
paper in this volume provides just a glimpse of the deeper and more extensive work she has done on presence and closeness. Rather, those questions are meant to show the continuing interest of some of Phil’s writings and to continue a philosophical conversation to which Phil himself can no longer contribute. For her part, Stump has carried on that conversation, elaborating and ramifying her account of presence in some forthcoming work—work that Phil’s essay on Endo suggests he would greatly have appreciated.

The project that Stump considers, the project of attaining union with God, is at odds with another project in which all of us are engaged—what Paul Griffiths in his paper calls “the project of sin.” That, according to Griffiths, is the project of extricating ourselves from participation in the God who created and sustains us. What of those who succeed in this project? What of those who do not want union with God but instead will single-mindedly to be separated from God?

The most developed answer in the Christian tradition is that after death and the Last Judgment they will suffer eternal damnation. In his “Self-Annihilation or Damnation?” Griffiths explores the possibility that success at the project of sin could instead result in the annihilation of the sinner. If self-annihilation is possible, then, Griffiths thinks, it is possible that the soul is not immortal. Since the immortality of the soul seems so central to the tradition, Griffiths tries to defend the compatibility of self-annihilation with orthodoxy.

The subtitle of Griffiths’s paper is “A Disputable Question in Christian Eschatology.” As an exercise in eschatological thinking, I believe the paper would have been of considerable interest to Phil. For some of Phil’s own work in the philosophy of religion concerned questions raised by the doctrine of the Atonement, according to which Christ’s suffering and death reconciled fallen humanity to God. Questions about the Atonement, like the question explored by Griffiths, are eschatological. In Phil’s hands, it became clear that they, too, are disputable—and deeply puzzling—questions in Christian eschatology.

But Phil would have been interested in Griffiths’s paper for another reason as well. At the beginning of his paper, Griffiths writes: “Depicting what happens when we die is always at least an extrapolation from what we take ourselves to be while alive; it is also among the more important tools we have for focusing and elaborating our self-understanding and for meditating discursively and visually upon what we take ourselves to be. Disputes in eschatology are always also
disputes in anthropology.” So we should expect that when we explore neglected possibilities in Christian eschatology we will expand the possibilities of Christian thought about what human beings are. But are anthropologies developed in response to Christian concerns—especially to Christian eschatological concerns—detachable from distinctively Christian commitments? Can newly elaborated Christian anthropologies also enrich secular thought about what human beings are? Can the eschatologies that go along with those anthropologies tell us something new about what the future may hold in this world? Or are the presuppositions of any Christian anthropology so firmly at odds with secular views of the human person that any Christian anthropology, whether traditional or novel, is bound to seem utterly alien to nonbelievers?

We should hope that the alienation is not complete. For believers and nonbelievers, Christians and non-Christians, cohabit contemporary societies. The political arrangements of those societies have to be premised on some assumptions about what human beings are like, what sorts of well-being politics should aim at, and what threats to human well-being most urgently need to be averted. So if contemporary societies are to be regulated by arrangements that all can support, there will have to be some agreement on those assumptions and hence some overlap on the anthropological questions that are relevant to politics. Is such an overlap possible? This is, in effect, a question Phil took up in another of his papers on philosophy and literature—this one on Camus’s novel The Fall.14

According to the dominant tradition in Christian anthropology, human beings are driven to engage in what Griffiths calls “the project of sin” by their pride. It is pride that drives us to try to emancipate ourselves from participation in and subjection to God. According to the dominant tradition in Christian eschatology, the fate of those of us who succeed in the project is hell. In Camus’s novel, the pride is that of the narrator, the “judge-penitent,” who describes his own descent into hell. In Camus’s portrayal of hell, the damned person is painfully aware of his own guilt. He is damned because awareness of guilt does not lead—as it does in the case of Rodriguez—to repentance or to pity for others who have fallen. Rather, the wills of the damned are “everlasting fixed on evil.”15 Their awareness of their own guilt makes them merciless rather than pitiful toward one another.

But the hell Camus describes is not torment in another world that awaits some after death. It is instead the hell that our world might be-
come. The hellishness of the world does not depend upon any specifically Christian assumptions, such as the assumption that distance from God is itself a torment. Nor does the possibility that our world might become such a hell depend upon any such assumptions. That possibility is predicated on certain assumptions about the vice of pride and its consequences for our collective life. But those assumptions are not distinctively Christian. For the pride Camus describes is what Phil, following Judith Shklar, calls an “ordinary vice”: a vice of the sort Shklar—and Phil—thought liberals like themselves should be most concerned with, one directed against other human beings rather than God.16

At the conclusion of his essay, Phil writes, “I consider pride an ordinary vice. So it seems to me that the hellish world Jean-Baptiste Clamence prophesies is not just a figment of an existentialist’s overheated imagination, but a real possibility for a post-Christian culture. The popularity of nihilism in our century leads me to believe that there is some positive probability . . . that such a world lies in our future.”17 Thus the question The Fall forces upon us, according to Phil, is how a pluralistic world can avert the future Camus depicts. It poses that question so powerfully and insistently precisely because it reaches to the depths of collective memory, deploying the conceptual resources of traditional Christian anthropology and eschatology in ways that chill even those who reject traditional Christian doctrines.

Griffiths’s essay explores a nontraditional but Christian anthropology and eschatology. Reading it in conjunction with Phil’s piece on Camus raises a number of very interesting questions. How might the consequences of nihilism be depicted using the conceptual resources of the nontraditional frames of thought Griffiths urges us to consider? In particular, how might they be represented by an artist who takes seriously the alternative Griffiths explores? Would the artistic representations of those consequences chill and horrify in the way that Camus’s novel does? Griffiths’s quotation of Philip Larkin’s poetry gives just some indication of the answers. But a good deal remains to be said about how a nontraditional Christian eschatology could help us understand the deadening possibilities of a “post-Christian” future.

Political Philosophy

Phil’s own hope for averting the possibility lay in what he called in his essay “secular faith.” This is not, he hastens to add, faith in the
possibility of some earthly utopia: “I am instead thinking of the modest beliefs that human pride can be humbled, or at least kept in check, without divine chastisement and that acknowledging guilt in ourselves need not render us merciless toward others. If a post-Christian culture can mobilize such resources as these, it may well prove strong enough to resist the seductions of the false prophets of nihilism.”

I once argued that pride is an ordinary vice and that liberal political culture and political arrangements can keep it in check.19 I believe Phil agreed. If Phil and I were right, then the secular faith he confesses here is the political manifestation of that underlying and unifying sensibility that I called his “liberal faith.” And if Phil is making a veiled profession of faith in liberal political arrangements at the close of his essay on Camus, then—given the interesting connections between that essay and Griffiths’s essay on eschatology—it is natural to move from Griffiths’s piece to the third set of essays in this volume, those on liberal political theory. Though Phil was best known for his work in the philosophy of religion and, earlier, the philosophy of science, the papers on political philosophy are those that engage his interests and his work most obviously and are therefore those that call for the briefest introductions.

It is possible that liberal democracy is justified simply on the grounds that liberal democratic institutions are the best check on the ordinary vices. This is a line of argument pursued by Judith Shklar in her later work.20 But a long tradition of political thought has, of course, sought more ambitious arguments in favor of liberal democracy. Robert Audi’s contribution to this volume falls squarely within that tradition. The bulk of Audi’s essay “present[s] one plausible way in which liberal democracy can be morally grounded.”

Audi’s attempt to provide an intuitionist grounding of liberal democracy is bold and provocative. What most interested Phil about this work, I believe, were the corollaries that Audi draws from his foundational work.

Liberalism began as a response to the religious wars that racked Europe in the early modern period. Questions about how liberal regimes should accommodate religious institutions and citizens remain pressing. Equally pressing are questions about what demands religious institutions and citizens can legitimately make of liberal institutions. Audi argues for what he calls “appropriate neutrality” of government toward religion. He also argues that there is a sort of “appropriate religious
neutrality” that applies to citizens. Citizens, he says, are prima facie obligated to obey what he calls the principle of secular rationale: “In liberal democracies, citizens have a prima facie obligation not to advocate or support any law or public policy that restricts human conduct, unless they have, and are willing to offer, adequate secular reason for this adequacy or support.”

By defending the principle of secular rationale, Audi enters a lively debate in contemporary political philosophy, one that concerns the appropriate grounds for political action and advocacy. This is a debate to which Phil also contributed, using the occasion of his APA presidential address to do so. In that address, Phil criticizes the stronger principle of secular motivation that Audi defends in other writings. He also criticizes the principle of secular rationale on the grounds that it is unfair to religious believers.

In brief, Phil’s argument is that the principle is most plausibly defended on the ground that “in a religiously pluralistic society religious reasons cannot justify laws or policies that restrict conduct in terms of considerations all citizens can share or cannot reasonably reject.” But, he points out, “if the fact that religious reasons cannot be shared by all in a religiously pluralistic society suffices to warrant any exclusion of religious reasons for advocating or supporting restrictive laws or policies, then much else ought in fairness also to be excluded on the same grounds.” Since Audi does not defend comparable exclusions on those secular reasons that “are no better off than . . . religious reasons in terms of being shared or not being reasonably rejected,” Phil concludes that Audi’s principle is unfair.

Phil attempted to rebut this argument as well. Since Audi continues to defend the principle of secular rationale, it would be interesting to know whether Phil thought that Audi’s later writings contain adequate responses to his criticisms.

As Phil notes in his presidential address, John Rawls defended principles of public reasoning that seem to evade these criticisms. His strictures apply to what he called “comprehensive doctrines” of all kinds—both religious, such as Christianity, and secular, such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Rawls allowed that citizens may appeal to
their comprehensive doctrines in public debate at any time, provided they are willing to supply public reasons to support whatever policy their appeal to comprehensive doctrine is said to support. Phil goes on to criticize Rawls’s view as well and to defend instead what he calls an “inclusivist ideal” of political discourse. The closing sentences of his presidential address are a nice summary of the political side of his own liberal faith.

If we look away from the debates about liberal theory in the academy, we will notice that, in the rough and tumble of American politics, liberalism has recently suffered serious reverses. If they are to overcome these setbacks, liberals need new allies. They might find some in America’s religious communities if their ideals were more inclusive. Thus it may be important for the future of American liberalism that something like the inclusivist ideal should prevail in practice, even if it remains disputed in the theory, of liberalism for our time and place. I hope it will prevail.

The last two papers in the volume are by authors who share some of Phil’s hopes for liberalism. The one immediately following Audi’s is my own “Egalitarianism without Equality?” It asks, not about the moral grounds of liberal democracy, but about the moral grounds for the egalitarian distributions to which some liberals—especially Rawlsian liberals—are committed.

If one believes in human equality, it is natural to think that this claim has some fundamental importance in justifying political arrangements. In particular, it is natural to think that it has some fundamental importance in justifying the distribution of basic, socially generated benefits. In a very provocative essay, T. M. Scanlon challenged this view, arguing that the value of equality, as such, is not of fundamental importance in political philosophy.

I argue that, while Scanlon may be correct about what is and is not important in the theory of domestic justice, the correct account of justice across borders does require a fundamental appeal to human equality. If I am right about that—and of course I leave it to the reader to determine whether I am—then the conclusion may have implications for Rawls’s account of public reason. For fundamental appeals to human equality may require fundamental appeals to comprehensive
doctrines. If they do, then the account of public reason that Rawls put forward for deliberation about domestic justice may hold only in some qualified form for deliberation about justice across borders.

This is not a question I take up in the paper, but it is—I think—a question that would have interested Phil; surely the interest would have been a natural outgrowth of the interests he pursued in his presidential address. Perhaps Phil was so taken with “Egalitarianism without Equality?” because it touched on this interest. Be that as it may, I was pleased that he liked the paper, and I am even more pleased to return the favor by including it in a volume that is a tribute to him.

The last paper in the volume is by Sumner Twiss. Twiss is also concerned with the moral foundations of certain liberal commitments. In his case, the concern is not with egalitarianism but with human rights and an absolute proscription on torture. This is the paper in the volume that bears most explicitly on Phil’s work, for Twiss explicitly considers a paper of Phil’s: “Relativism about Torture: Religious and Secular Responses.”

In that paper, Phil pointed out that the prima facie wrongness of torture is part of our society’s common morality. But, according to Twiss, he also acknowledged that “there might be certain hard cases where some in our society might view torture as justifiable.” He also expressed skepticism that the claim that torture is always wrong “is part of a common morality of humanity as a whole.” And he argued that that claim cannot be “justified to [all] members of any other societies” by any one argument, since any argument that purports to support an absolute prohibition will rest on one or more premises that can be reasonably contested. How, then, to gain acceptance for the absolute prohibition Phil favored?

Phil thought that artistic and other representations of the evils of torture might go some way toward cultivating a shared, pretheoretical abhorrence of any use of torture. And he thought that arguing piecemeal—offering different arguments to different groups and societies—might build consensus on some specific moral judgments about the categorical wrongness of torture.

Twiss boldly takes up the challenge issued in Phil’s paper, attempting to show that an absolute proscription on torture can be grounded without reliance on “essentially contestable premises that undermine its ability to be convincing now to all people of goodwill, whatever their social or cultural location.” The “now,” which Twiss emphasizes
in his own paper, is essential. For Twiss believes that the decades since adoption of the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights have deepened our understanding of torture and its consequences for victims, perpetrators, and communities. Twiss’s argument for an absolute prohibition can be “more firmly grounded than [Phil] may have thought” on these consequentialist grounds, conjoined with “full comprehension of the nature of torture” that is now available.

Philosophers will find the consequentialist strands of Twiss’s paper the most vexing. They will be tempted to concoct counterexamples in which torture does not have the bad consequences on which Twiss’s argument relies—for example, “ticking bomb” scenarios in which, immediately after the torture, both torturer and tortured are given drugs that blot the incident from their memories—or in which the gains from torture seem to outweigh those consequences. Anticipating such responses, the “epilogue” of Twiss’s paper is an extended argument against the use of unrealistic counterexamples “to inform our moral intuitions about bedrock proscriptions.” As with Twiss’s paper, so with Audi’s, readers will wonder what Phil would have made of this response to his earlier work. Unfortunately, because of Phil’s death at age sixty-four, it is impossible for us to find out.

The papers collected in this volume all touch, in many and diverse ways, on the philosophical work of Philip Quinn, and they all raise many questions that would have interested him deeply. I have tried to show some of the directions in which further discussion of those questions might be carried. That these papers raise questions that can be the subjects of much further discussion is itself a tribute to the authors, as the volume is their tribute to Phil. For commemorative volumes should not honor by standing like monuments of polished stone, revisited with quiet reverence but untouched by the passage of time. Rather, they should confer honor by keeping alive the ideas and arguments of those whom they commemorate, inviting further engagement with their ideas and interests. I hope I have brought out just how completely the contributors to this volume have succeeded in their attempt to confer such honor on Phil. The continued vitality of one’s ideas is not, I think, the only form of life after death in which Phil believed. But I think it is one that would have had its own special appeal to a philosopher of liberal faith.
Notes

2. Note that where the template had the biconditional formulation “just in case,” this instance is in the form of a conditional.
3. Relying on the biconditional formulation.
4. The English-language literature on icons with which I am familiar is fascinating for its treatment of historical and religious questions but generally lacking in sophisticated philosophical discussion of representation. An exception is some recent unpublished work on icons by Nicholas Wolterstorff.
6. Ibid., p. 158.
7. Ibid., p. 166.
8. Ibid., p. 165.
9. Ibid., p. 176.
11. Ibid., p. 166.
13. See, for example, Quinn, "Christian Atonement."
15. Ibid., p. 102.
17. Quinn, "Hell in Amsterdam," p. 103.
18. Ibid.
24. See the closing remarks of Audi, "Separation."
28. Ibid., p. 160.