NEW DIRECTIONS IN
DEVELOPMENT ETHICS

Essays in Honor of Denis Goulet

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University of Notre Dame Press
Notre Dame, Indiana

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Introduction

Development Ethics and Development Economics

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The essays in this volume concern development ethics, which can be defined as the subject dealing with the moral assessment of the ends, means, and processes of development. The field is a small one in terms of the number of people who have worked in it, but it is attracting a growing number of adherents both among academics and development practitioners from all over the world. The authors of the following chapters are among the leading contributors to the study of development ethics and economic development more generally. This book was put together in honor of Denis Goulet, who passed away after it was well under way. Goulet was arguably the leading scholar and a pioneer in the field of development ethics; as Crocker wrote—quoting the words Goulet used to describe his own mentor, Louis-Joseph Lebret—Goulet “stand[s] as a giant in an infant discipline (Crocker 2006, xiv). Goulet wrote extensively on development ethics and had a major impact on virtually all scholars in the field. Although festschrifts often contain a disparate collection of essays loosely connected to the work of the scholar they are honoring, this volume is a coherent collection that traverses the entire range of issues related to the field and systematically examines new
directions in development ethics. The contributors build on the work pioneered by Denis Goulet to present new research in this growing field. Therefore, this collection should be of interest to scholars in development ethics; development practitioners around the world working in governments, international institutions, nongovernment organizations, and private firms; scholars of the development process in general; scholars in development economics specifically; and graduate and undergraduate students studying development and development policy.

In this introduction we attempt to bring the field of development ethics closer to the broader study of development and, in particular, to development economics. This integration, it is hoped, will make the field more accessible and relevant for a wider group of scholars than has been the case previously. We begin with a brief introduction to the life and work of Denis Goulet. The second section provides a broad overview of development economics, focusing on the meaning of development; the third section relates development economics to the study of the ethics of development and, especially, to the contributions of Goulet. The fourth section briefly introduces each of the following chapters and shows how they draw on the work of Goulet and, when taken together, constitute a coherent whole.

Denis Goulet: The Development Ethicist and the Man

Denis Goulet was a pioneer in the interdisciplinary study of development ethics; in fact, he is considered by many to be its founding father. Goulet came to the study and practice of development ethics in a roundabout way. Following initial university studies (1948–50) centered on business administration, he turned to the philosophy of religion, in which he earned a B.A. in 1954 and a master’s degree in 1956, writing a thesis critically comparing Thomistic natural law ethics and Kierkegaard’s distinctive religious existentialism.

By the time he completed his master’s thesis, however, Goulet had become disenchanted with the purely academic study of philosophical and religious questions, and he searched for a way of doing philosophy and practicing religion in a hands-on fashion. The example set by the French philosopher Simone Weil (1909–43) and the “worker priests,” who shared the hardships and economic vulnerabilities of poor workers
so as to give concrete embodied expression to human solidarity, fired his imagination. Equally appealing to him, as one searching for "what to do with his life," was the story of Charles de Foucauld (1858–1916), a French nobleman who became, successively, a military officer, geographical explorer, Trappist monk, and religious hermit. De Foucauld lived for years in the Sahara, where he refrained from proselytizing and cultural conquest and simply shared the life of native Muslim populations as a sign of God's love for all human creatures. Goulet lived and worked (in 1957–58) in France, Spain, and Algeria with small fraternities inspired by de Foucauld's life and writings, both as a participant observer and a potential candidate to this innovative Catholic religious order.

Goulet then enrolled (in 1959) in the recently opened Paris-based graduate school for development planning in order to begin a new education as a “philosopher of development,” earning a master's degree in social planning. There Fr. Louis-Joseph Lebret (1897–1966) took Goulet under his wing and served as his personal guide in France (in 1959), Lebanon (in 1960), and Brazil (in 1961). Lebret urged him, and assisted in many practical ways, to define his life's work and become a development ethicist operating in its several arenas—theory, analysis, pedagogy, planning, and field practice. In 1963 Goulet received a Ph.D. in political science from University of São Paulo, Brazil.

From January 1964 to September 1965 Goulet was under contract as a development adviser to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Recife, Brazil. There he met and wooed (under the watchful eye of a chaperone) a beautiful, vivacious Brazilian woman who became the anchor of his life. Shortly thereafter the couple moved from Recife to the University of Saskatchewan, Canada, testing a love that lasted over forty years. Stops in Bloomington, Indiana; Santa Barbara; San Diego; Cambridge, Massachusetts; and Washington, D.C., finally led, in 1979, to Goulet taking a position at the University of Notre Dame at the invitation of Fr. Theodore Hesburgh, C.S.C., then president of the university. At Notre Dame, the Department of Economics, the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, and the Kellogg Institute for International Studies were immeasurably enriched by his presence.

Goulet often reflected on how useful it was to have lived with communities of struggle and communities of need, for various periods, in France, Spain, Algeria, Lebanon, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, India, and elsewhere. Especially instructive to him were periods spent sharing
the life of two nomadic tribes in the northern Sahara (in 1958), of indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon (in 1961), and of Spanish Gypsies in Andalusia (in 1968). Simply living and working, without doing formal research, was essential for the development ethics field he was creating.

Goulet explained his approach to development ethics in the preface to the final collection of his work:

One distinctive feature of “development ethics” is that, at the conceptual level, it operates as “disciplined eclecticism.” It is eclectic in its selection of topics, yet “disciplined” in its mode of studying them. Four attributes characterize any intellectual discipline: it is study which should be systematic, cumulative, communicable and testable. Development ethics aspires to be faithful to these canons. Moreover, as an intrinsically interdisciplinary effort, it seeks to integrate the findings of analytical, policy, and normative sciences as these bear on the multi-faceted development problematic. And at the practical level, whether they conduct field research, engage in policy planning, project management or evaluation, development ethicists assign high priority to the demands of “ethical rationality” alongside the technical and political rationality habitually exercised in these arenas by expert specialists and political authorities. Such considerations as equity, human rights, protection of vulnerable cultures and environments need to be factored into benefit-cost analyses no less than concerns of financial cost, administrative feasibility, and technical efficiency. Accordingly, many values previously regarded as “externalities” are now “internalized” in these analyses. Internalization is best achieved by the explicit integration of qualitative research findings with quantitative data. (2006, xxxii)

Goulet’s determination to emphasize justice in development, to put people at the center of decision making, to insist on respect for cultural differences, and to challenge us to ethical commitment that recognizes the equality of all peoples’ rights everywhere formed the basis for the new field of development ethics.

Development Economics and the Meaning of Development

Although earlier economists did think and write about problems that later came to be known as “development issues,” it was not until the end
of World War II that the systematic and specialized study of the entire range of economic problems of less-developed countries (LDCs) began. The field of development economics was born as a result of a number of factors, including the political independence of several former colonies and the consequent desire of—and pressures on—new nationalist governments to prove their capabilities, the creation of international agencies fostering development, and the specter of communism.

The subsequent history of development economics went through a number of twists and turns, which can be divided into four slightly overlapping phases. The first phase, from 1945 to the mid-1950s, emphasized that underdevelopment is caused by low savings and investment, which created underdevelopment traps because of scale economies; characterized the LDC as having a dual economy with a backward sector and a capitalist sector; and proposed government intervention to overcome underdevelopment. The second phase, from the early 1950s to the late 1960s, emphasized the role of structural rigidities that prevent markets from operating smoothly; argued that trade cannot be seen as an engine of growth; and stressed (although there were a few dissenters) the importance of import-substituting industrialization and dirigiste economic policies. The third phase, from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, found faults with the earlier approaches; some scholars criticized the excessive role of the state and import-substituting strategies, instead advocating more market-oriented strategies along neoclassical lines. Others argued that the focus on growth through capital accumulation and industrialization should be changed to stress human development, poverty, and the fulfillment of basic needs; and yet others emphasized the problem of dependency of the poor South on the rich North. These challenges were interpreted by some scholars as reflecting a decline in the discipline of development economics (Hirschman 1981).

The fourth phase, beginning in the mid-to-late 1980s, has witnessed a revival of interest in development economics and a flowering in different directions. New neoclassical approaches emphasize the importance of information problems and game theoretic interactions between agents and imply a greater role for the government and for improvements in income and wealth distribution in increasing efficiency. The application of new growth theories and related growth empirics to development issues has resulted in a renewed interest in growth in LDCs, especially development traps, but focus has shifted to technological change.
and institutions rather than on capital accumulation. The application of short-run macroeconomics to development addresses issues such as inflation targeting, international capital flows, and financial crises. The development and application of heterodox macroeconomic theories in a neostructuralist direction have led to the introduction of aggregate demand issues; the integration of short- and long-run issues, which reveals the long-term problems that can be created by contractionary stabilization policy; and a new focus on the relation between income distribution and growth. Finally, a more institutionalist literature has carefully examined the actual experiences of successful LDCs, especially the newly industrialized countries of East Asia; stressed the role of the state in guiding development with the help of markets; promoted technological change; and emphasized the synergistic relation of the state and markets in the development process.

This cursory overview of the history of the field suggests that a number of alternative approaches to development economics have coexisted, although the fortunes of these approaches have changed over time. Some discussions distinguish between neoclassical, structuralist, and Marxian approaches (see Chenery 1975; Bardhan 1988). The later dominance of the field by neoclassical theory—both in terms of neoliberal policies and in terms of optimizing methodology—has resulted in some loss of pluralism, but the continued interest in neostructuralist and institutionalist approaches indicates that considerable heterogeneity still remains.

The nature of these approaches to development economics can be understood better if it is recognized that alternatives exist in several different dimensions: (1) methods of analysis, (2) analytical views of the economy, (3) the relation between analytical views and the “real” world, (4) strategies and policies of development, and (5) the meaning of development. These dimensions can be clarified by examining how particular (possibly different) interpretations of mainstream neoclassical economics relate to them. Methods of analysis refer to protocols about how explanation is organized, an example of which is the use of individual optimizing behavior. Analytical views of the economy refer to views on the key characteristics of the economy and how the economy as a whole functions, an example of which is smoothly functioning, competitive markets and the full employment of all resources. The relation between analytic views and the real world refers to how—if at all—analytical views are constructed from information about the real world and how
they are validated in terms of how they correspond to that world. An example of this relation is that the constructs are developed from some theory-driven axioms, but only the implications of the theory—and not the assumptions—are tested against real-world data using econometric methods. Policies and strategies refer to whether, and what kind of, government policies are recommended—for example, the government should restrict itself to national defense and law enforcement. Finally, “development” can be defined in several different ways; for example, it could be understood as the growth of per capita income. Although some of these dimensions are in principle analytically independent of each other—for instance, one may define development as referring to growth with improving income distribution (and not just growth) without changing any of the other dimensions—in practice there may well be important relations between these choices because of sociological affinities or ideological proclivities.

Having distinguished between different dimensions of alternative approaches to development economics, we may note that the big debates and swings in development economics have taken place with regard to views of the economy (from structuralist to the neoclassical, smooth-functioning-of-markets approaches and back again to information failures and coordination problems and structural rigidities); strategies and policies for development (from government intervention and import substitution, to government withdrawal and export promotion, to a view espousing market and state synergy); methods of analysis, to some extent (from macrostructuralist methods, class struggle in Marxian terms, and center-periphery distinctions to individual optimization); and how analytical views of the economy are related to the real world (swings between an appeal to stylized facts, case study and institutional methods, econometrics, and survey methods).

Arguably, debates about the meaning of development have been less dramatic. Early development economics generally equated economic development with economic growth—that is, growth in per capita income and gross domestic product (GDP). Ellsworth wrote that “essentially the problem of economic development is that of raising the level of national income through increased per capita output so that each individual will be able to consume more” (1950, 796). Arndt states that from around 1950 to 1970, “economic development was often virtually equated with economic growth, although the former tended to be used mainly
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for poor, the latter for rich countries” (1987, 51). He also notes that the first comprehensive book on economic development, by W. Arthur Lewis (1955), was entitled The Theory of Economic Growth. Nevertheless, it was recognized that this focus on economic growth was an incomplete and partial one. First, it was understood that economic development should refer to distributional issues, not just growth (see Viner 1952, 187). Second, standard measures of economic growth omitted important elements that should be considered when determining growth, especially those relating to questions of nonmarketability and externality. The nature of externalities—such as, for example, changes to the environment due to pollution and depletion of natural resources—do not figure into calculations of GDP as negative impacts. Third, economic development was conceived of more broadly to include sociocultural changes and invoked the idea of “modernization.” Lewis argued that “[p]rogress occurs only when people believe that man can, by conscious effort, master nature . . . Even when people know that a greater abundance of goods and services is possible, they may not consider it worth the effort. Lack of interest in material things may be due to the prevalence of an other-worldly philosophy which discourages material wants” (qtd. in Arndt 1987, 53). Myrdal (1968, 59) stated that the objective of economic development is more than just raising material living standards; rather, it is to create “new,” “modern” people. Finally, economic growth was often regarded as a means to something else, not just an end.

The major change that has occurred in development economics regarding the meaning of development is the shift from the emphasis on growth to a focus on income distribution and poverty and on the fulfillment of basic needs. There has also been a shift in emphasis regarding the importance of environmental issues. These changes, however, do not really shift the focus of the meaning of development in a fundamental way. The focus on distribution and poverty in recent years maintains the earlier emphasis on measuring material means of development, although the focus has changed from average per capita income growth to how income is distributed among people and to the circumstances of people at the lower end of the income scale. The focus on nonmarket production and externalities such as the environment and the role of household production improves on the measurement of material production and takes into account the depletion of resources due to production.
The focus on issues such as modernization—which has occurred mostly outside economics—draws attention to changes beyond increases in the material means of development to ways in which these material means can be increased and the process of making people more inclined to value material means. Thus, modernization is a somewhat expansive process, but it enlarges the meaning of development only in a certain direction: namely, the imposition of certain kinds of Western values on other cultures in a way that is instrumental to growth. These observations imply that the field has not focused on the meaning or objective of development as ends but primarily on the material means of development—that is, the means of achieving such ends.

A more fundamental change in the approach to the meaning of development came with the basic needs fulfillment and “quality of life” approaches (see Morris 1979; Streeten et al. 1981). Sen (1988), a major proponent of the change in emphasis away from material well-being, or “opulence,” notes that GDP and GDP per capita, even after overcoming the problems of income and wealth distribution and nonmarket production and externalities, only relate to the means of achieving high levels of well-being during a certain period of time. At least four problems arise from this. First, GDP and its variants examine only a certain period of time and do not take what Sen calls a more integral view of a person’s life, which includes interdependencies over time and the length of life. These issues can be taken into account by including measures of how long people live and by emphasizing factors that are related to interdependencies over time, such as education. Second, GDP and its variants consider only the material means of development and leave out nonmaterial means, such as political and social ones. He argues that many of these nonmaterial means are also ends. Third, Sen argues that the ends of development refer to the achievement of a better life for people, which, in addition to its length, also encompasses the nature that life. He points out that “[p]eople value their ability to do certain things and to achieve certain types of 'be-ings’” (such as being well-nourished, being free from avoidable morbidity, being able to move about as desired, and so on). These “doings” and “beings” may be generically called “functionings” of a person” (Sen 1988, 15). Finally, one needs to go beyond what people achieve to emphasize the process by which choices are made—not just in the negative sense of the absence of restraints on individual choices but
in the positive sense of people being free to choose. Thus, Sen focuses on choices open to individuals in terms of functionings, or what he calls “capabilities.” According to this view, well-being depends not on what is actually chosen by individuals but on the set of options from which they are free (capable) to choose (thereby distinguishing between people who cannot buy enough food to maintain their weight and people who choose to fast or go on a diet).

Despite the enormous contribution that it makes to clarification of the meaning of development, there are some problems with the functionings and capabilities approach. For instance, people can disagree about what list of functionings should be included and what weight should be given to each one in evaluating overall well-being; moreover, these lists and weights may change depending on what is actually achieved by people, issues that Sen calls “value heterogeneity” and “value endogeneity.” Sen’s “solutions” to these problems are generally of a technical nature; he advocates examining well-being in terms of partial orderings, on which there is general agreement across people, as well as in terms of valuations before and after a change in functionings.

Development Ethics

Development ethics is closely connected with all of the themes of the literature on the meaning of development discussed above, but it also goes well beyond them. This section briefly examines the main themes of the literature on development ethics, drawing in particular on the work of Denis Goulet. This section also examines how these themes are related to the other dimensions of development economics discussed in the previous section and comments on how the broad range of development ethics implies that it involves various levels of analysis.

First, development ethics is concerned not so much with overall growth as with the increase in the material well-being of the poor. It goes beyond these considerations in several respects, however. For instance, development ethics enters into an ethical discussion about why one should care about the poor. Goulet argued that individuals, groups, and nations who are better off have obligations to those who are worse off, calling this “solidarity.” One can provide religious and philosophical justifications of absolute respect for the dignity of the human person, re-
regardless of gender, ethnic group, social class, religion, age, or nationality. Goulet contended, however, that such obligations follow from some empirical realities as well—namely, the fact that the rich and poor are involved in one socioeconomic unity and that the activities of one group have important effects on the other. For this reason all groups have a responsibility toward others, and since the rich arguably have a larger influence, they may be held to be especially responsible for the poor. These concerns are relevant not only within countries but also between countries, especially in the context of globalization (see Goulet 2002).

Second, development ethics emphasizes the role of the environment, not only because of the contribution that it makes to material well-being—an issue that is often stressed by mainstream economists—but mainly because of its intrinsic importance. Development ethics recognizes the relationship between human beings and nature, particularly the importance of facilitating use of natural resources that is responsible, respectful of biological cycles and the equilibrium of ecosystems—especially those of tropical forests—and in solidarity with future generations.

Third, development is much more than material well-being; it incorporates other changes, including, in particular, that of values. Goulet (2006) argued forcefully that development is fundamentally a question of human values and attitudes, goals defined by societies for themselves, and criteria for determining what are tolerable costs to be borne, and by whom, in the course of change. Modernization is not the goal if it is imposed from outside, especially if it destroys values that are of central importance to those who are experiencing development. Goulet also examined the implications of material well-being for development as a whole, stressing the problems that come with overconsumption. He accepted that a certain amount of material goods—of food, housing, medicine, and for security—is important because it contributes something essential to human well-being. He stated that “there is no care for the soul when the body perishes” (2006, 34). But Goulet also argued against ever-increasing consumption of material goods and consumerism where the focus is on “having” and not “being” (2006, 28). While for many people this view of materialism and consumerism has religious overtones, recent research on subjective well-being also points out that beyond a certain level of income and consumption, further increases do not add significantly, or sometimes not at all, to a person’s happiness.
Fourth, if development is recognized as a means to an end, what is it a means to and how do we find out these ends? To some extent Goulet anticipated the writings of Sen and others on functionings and capabilities and on the fulfillment of basic needs by recognizing early on deprivations such as poor health, lack of education, and lack of self-respect. He and other development ethicists go well beyond the technical focus of much of the literature on the meaning of development by proposing ways in which one can select and weight different ends so they can be included in the concept of development. Goulet focused on religious traditions because of the strong hold they have on many societies, but he advocated an enlightened and critical borrowing of these traditions, such as that espoused by Mahatma Gandhi, rather than a fundamentalist one (Goulet 2005). More importantly, he recommended that development scholars and practitioners examine what people in developing societies, especially the poor who are not trapped by vested interests, want. According to Goulet, authentic development occurs only when people themselves decide what they mean by development (Goulet 1989).

If the opinions of people who are affected by development policies are to be taken into account when we consider the goals and meaning of development, how should one do so? Goulet stressed the importance of nonelite participation in development decision making, and he strongly supported Paulo Freire’s ideal of participation: “For Freire, the touchstone of development is whether people previously treated as mere objects, known and acted upon, can now actively know and act upon, thereby becoming subjects of their own social destiny” (1989, 165). As outside experts, development practitioners and scholars must take care not to impose their ethics on the subjects of development, and they should take pains to involve the poor in decision making in a fundamental way at different levels, including local, provincial, national, and global ones. Goulet examined empirical cases in which nonelite participation has been an important aspect of development projects and those in which it had not in order to show not only how the former had been effective in terms of traditional development indicators but to examine under what conditions they successfully gave voice to the poor. For examples of his writings in this vein see his work on Guinea-Bissau (Goulet 1978) and Mexico (Goulet 1983).

These and other aspects of development ethics would have enormous relevance for development economics even if they only had im-
plications for the meaning of development. But given the relationship between the meaning of development and the other dimensions of development economics, development ethics has even broader implications. Most directly, it has important implications for development strategies and policies. In societies in which the government is expected to play a major role through direct activity and by indirectly affecting private decision making, government officials have to make choices among different strategies and policies. This involves judgments about the objectives of development, which not only has a bearing on the effects of growth; income distribution, poverty, inequality across social classes, ethnic groups, and genders; the environment; and meeting basic needs, but also on the design of policies that take into account nonelite involvement. These decisions, in turn, have important implications for decentralization and popular involvement, not only in terms of making policies effective for standard development goals such as growth and distribution but also because of their intrinsic importance. Even in societies in which people prefer a smaller role for the government in economic activity, the government will need to take action to provide the sociopolitical framework necessary for the operation of markets, and this will require the discussion of development ethics. Moreover, development ethics may also be important for the strategies of nongovernment institutions and profit-making firms and how the government reacts to these strategies.

Development ethics also has a major role in terms of one's view of the economy—that is, whether one considers income distribution, poverty, and the environment as important elements in the analysis of the economy and whether one takes into account ethical and religious values as major factors affecting individual and group behavior. Whether or not (and how) one introduces these considerations as important elements of the analysis depends on their empirical importance rather than on whether one thinks that these issues are intrinsically important. But if one does think that they are intrinsically important, the development economist is more likely to start from the position that they are important and then make an effort to empirically examine their importance rather than just assume that they are unimportant. For instance, it may be argued that the focus on the relationship between poverty and growth came to be examined and incorporated into views of the economy only after poverty was considered to be an intrinsically important issue. Early
development economists merely assumed that growth was a means to
reducing poverty but did not explicitly incorporate it into their view of
the economy, focusing instead on saving, investment, technological
change, and growth.

Development ethics also has important implications for the method
of analysis and on how one views the relation between analytical views
of the economy and the real world. Since development ethics is con-
cerned with a number of value issues that are normally studied outside
economics, it is implied that development economics is multidisciplinary
by its very nature. Denis Goulet spearheaded the interdisciplinary study
of development ethics, writing that “in development ethics no hard and
fast lines separate theory from practice, and no impassable barriers im-
pede the crossing of disciplinary boundaries. . . . Development ethicists
are, of necessity, selective consumers of findings from other disciplines,
including the discipline known in Spanish as *la vivencia*—the living of
life” (2006, xxxiii). Moreover, the focus on values may require a critical
perspective regarding the mainstream method of the optimizing agent,
which typically ignores values and norms. Of course, these issues can
be incorporated into the optimizing model—anything can be! But the
bounded rationality of the analyst makes him or her focus too much on
the technical aspects of optimization and ignore arguably more impor-
tant aspects of behavior involving values, norms, and institutions. The
analyst should give more attention to carefully examining how people
actually behave rather than simply making up optimizing models of
their behavior (although there is no harm in using optimizing behavior
to increase one’s understanding of this behavior). In doing such empiri-
cal work, it may be necessary for analysts to immerse themselves in so-
cieties they wish to understand—rather than relying only on secondary
data—while taking care not to see only what they want to in terms of
their preconceived “scientific” notions and change reality in their own
image. Goulet discussed this issue mostly for outside, foreign develop-
ment experts in LDCs, to whom he gave the name “one-eyed giants”
(Goulet 1980), but such comments may also apply to indigenous re-
searchers who are likely to be affected by international demonstration
effects and educational systems still intellectually dominated by foreign
scholarship.

This discussion of the major themes of development ethics suggests
that the subject involves various levels of analysis. The International De-
Development Ethics Association distinguishes between different, though complementary, levels of inquiry in development ethics:

- **Reflection**: Philosophical thinking can clarify what development is; it can defend normative positions by critical and rational thinking about ethical alternatives; it can identify the complexities involved in the rational choice of means. Philosophical and theological reflection can provide a basic understanding of the human condition and of morally relevant facts.

- **Application**: The social scientist, technologist, economist, medical expert, or agriculturalist can integrate their expertise with properly articulated values to make their prescriptions and policies more ethically authoritative.

- **Practice**: The committed development worker or policy maker engaged with concrete problems can gain from more abstract thinking and at the same time keep such reflection firmly rooted in and informed by development practice.

Denis Goulet himself contributed to all these levels of analysis, weaving them together in many of his contributions.

### Contents of the Volume

The essays contained in this volume can be conveniently divided into three parts that deal with the three levels of inquiry listed above, although several of the essays relate to more than one level.

**Reflection**

The first part contains essays that reflect on the nature of development ethics by drawing on philosophical and religious traditions. Nigel Dower, in “Development and the Ethics of the Means,” explores in a parallel and complementary way the various ethical issues that arise when one looks at the way development is pursued and the relationship between its end and its means. Ethical values can act as side constraints on development goals; or they may be seen as conducive to development goals; or they may be seen as constitutive of development—for example, among the