Preface and Acknowledgments

We celebrate Alfred Stepan’s career with these essays from among those presented at a conference in his honor at Columbia University in 2007. Many colleagues came from all parts of the world to discuss his work and demonstrate the fecundity of his contributions. These essays represent a sample, a window on the manifold influences of his work. Yet this is not a fulsome treatment. We aim to advance scholarship on some of the debates that Stepan launched and advanced about major challenges facing contemporary democracies.

Stepan is one of the few individuals who are members of both the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the British Academy. He was one of fifteen outstanding comparative political scientists interviewed in Munck and Snyder (2007: 392–455). In 2002 the Brazilian government awarded Stepan the Ordem do Rio Branco, which recognizes honorable accomplishments and civic virtues. In 2009 he received the Kalman Silvert Award for lifetime contributions to Latin American studies, and he was on a 2007 list of the four hundred most cited political scientists who teach in the United States.

Anyone who knows Al Stepan is aware of the vortex of energy he represents, generating his own ideas and organizing research projects but also freely sharing his insights, intellectual challenges, skills, and energy. He challenges colleagues and students alike; he sets forth tasks and puts new perspectives on facts and trends. He confronts conventional wisdom and forces people to reconceptualize problems in researchable ways. He makes an art form of collaboration, working with many scholars worldwide. He draws many students into his projects, often giving them an indispensable start on their own careers.
Stepan is one of a select company of social scientists who combine the tools of social science with a constant concern for central contemporary political issues and challenges. As he makes clear in the introduction to his book *Arguing Comparative Politics* (2001: 1–4), significant issues should drive the choice of research tools; the tools should not set the agenda. (see also Munck and Snyder 2007: 454–55).

The consequence of this approach is not only the political relevance of Stepan’s ideas, as Brazil’s former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2003) demonstrates in his essay in this volume, but also the range of major topics he has tackled in the course of his career. As the rich array of topics covered in this volume attests—all owing substantially to Stepan’s insights and, often, prodding—he has moved seamlessly from one challenging problem to another, continually expanding the geographic range of his interests.

The conference in 2007 at Columbia University to honor Stepan demonstrated the substantive, geographic, and methodological range of his work with papers that built on many of his major scholarly contributions. These themes include authoritarianism, the breakdown of democratic regimes, transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, democratic consolidation, the role of the military in politics, and ways—including the varieties of federalism—to manage conflict democratically in societies that are divided by religious, ethnic, and national cleavages. His recent work analyzes the relationship between world religions and democracy. Most of these themes are represented here.

For the first two decades of his scholarly career, Stepan’s writings focused on Latin America, with a foundation in comparative knowledge and insights that went well beyond this region. His experiences as founding president of the Central European University in Budapest (1993–96) and as Gladstone Professor of Government at Oxford (1996–99) catapulted Stepan onto new stages with new actors and new issues. Beginning about 1990, his work has also dealt with Eastern and Southern Europe. His 1996 book, coauthored with Juan Linz, analyzed democratic transition and consolidation in these two regions and in Latin America. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* was translated into Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Croatian, and Chinese. More recently, his theoretical interests in the relationship between world religions and
democracy and in nationalism, federalism, and democracy have led him to study Russia, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Burma, and Sri Lanka, among several other countries in Asia, Iran and other countries in the Middle East, and Senegal. We believe that no other political scientist has conducted serious fieldwork in so many parts of the world. Reflecting the geographic diversity of Stepan’s work, this volume includes contributions on Latin America, the post-Soviet region, Iran, China, Turkey, Israel, Spain and Portugal, and the United States.

Given the huge range of Stepan’s theoretical and geographic interests, a volume to honor him would have been very dispersed and lacking in cohesion if we as editors had not established some clear guidelines for intellectual cohesion and for inclusion of chapters. To counter this pitfall, the volume is centered on work that explicitly addresses Stepan’s own contributions and on challenges to contemporary democracies.

We gratefully acknowledge the other participants at what we called the “AlFest” at Columbia in October 2007 and who made those days special. They included Lisa Anderson, Ana María Bejarano, Nancy Bermeo, Jo-Marie Burt, Miguel Carter, Margaret Crahan, Consuelo Cruz, Larry Diamond, Susan Eckstein, Albert Fishlow, Katherine Hite, Evelyn Huber, Margaret Keck, Anthony Marx, Al Montero, María Victoria Murillo, Enrique Ochoa, Graeme Robertson, Hector Schamis, Cindy Skach, and Richard Snyder. We are also grateful to the School of International and Public Affairs and the Institute of Latin American Studies, both of Columbia University, for the support necessary to make the celebration possible.

Chad Kiewet de Jonge and Emily Wauford skillfully edited several chapters. Sheila Berg and Brittany Holom very capably prepared the volume for publication. Finally, we thank Rebecca DeBoer and Stephen Little at the University of Notre Dame Press for their assistance and support.

Douglas Chalmers
Scott Mainwaring
Notes

1. This lengthy interview provides a fascinating introduction to Stepan’s career and his perspectives on comparative politics.
2. His recognition speech (Stepan 2009a) gives additional information about Stepan’s career and intellectual orientations.
3. This list was published in PS 40, no. 1 (January 2007).
4. See Stepan 2009b for his reflections on the experience of creating a new university in the post-Communist world.

References

Introduction

Alfred Stepan and the Study of Democratic Regimes

Scott Mainwaring with Douglas Chalmers

We have two primary goals and a secondary one with this book. We hope to advance understanding of some of the most pressing problems facing democracies across the world. And we wish to honor Alfred Stepan, who did pioneering work on the issues analyzed here. Finally, by highlighting the contributions of one of the most prominent comparative political scientists of the past four decades and illuminating some of the debates he sparked, we hope to make a modest contribution to the intellectual history of comparative politics.

This volume is organized as a critical dialogue with Stepan’s work around five themes to which he has been a major contributor: (1) the armed forces, police, and democracy; (2) the state and democracy; (3) democratic transitions and democratic regimes; (4) federalism and democracy; and (5) religion, toleration, and democracy. On all five themes, our volume underscores some of the challenges facing contemporary democracies.

In this introduction, we briefly discuss Stepan’s major contributions to these themes and how his contributions frame this volume. We do not address all of Stepan’s significant scholarly contributions but instead focus on the works that are central to the debates raised in this volume. Our objective is to highlight his contributions on the subjects of this volume so as to frame the analyses that follow.
The Armed Forces, Police, and Democracy

Part I of our volume discusses the relationship between the military, the police, and democracy in contemporary Latin America, the region that was the focus of Stepan’s work from the 1960s through the late 1980s. Even though the threat of military coups has receded and civilians have established control over the armed forces in most of Latin America, the military and the police remain important actors. All three chapters in Part I illuminate issues in the relationship between the armed forces (chapters 1 and 2) or the police (chapter 3) and democracy.

Stepan’s first book was *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (1971). Very few books published on Latin American politics during the 1970s have held up so well. It remains one of the best books ever written on the military and politics, and it was a seminal work on the breakdown of democracy in Brazil in 1964. Stepan argued that existing theoretical approaches to understanding the relationship between civilian governments and the military were not fruitful for understanding Brazil or many Latin American cases (57–66). Prior scholarship assumed that growing military professionalism would lead to reduced military involvement in politics. In contrast, Stepan showed that a new kind of professionalism that emerged in Brazil fostered expanding military involvement in politics and helped lead to long-term military rule from 1964 to 1985.1 He described a “moderating” pattern by which the armed forces historically intervened to thwart perceived political threats but then quickly returned power to civilians. He analyzed the changes that led to a different kind of military coup in 1964, one that installed the regime that governed Brazil for the next twenty-one years.

Stepan analyzed the armed forces as an institution with its own identity and interests but in a specific political context. He argued against sociological reductionism, that is, analyzing the military’s political behavior as a product of class or other social forces beyond the armed forces. He asserted that it is essential to understand the military’s institutional interests, concerns, and ideas (153–87, 253–66), and he rejected understanding the military as an expression of class interests (46–48, 52–55). On the other hand, he forcefully argued for understanding the military in relation to other political actors and against an insular conception of the military; he cautioned against an exclusive focus on in-
ternal military characteristics. For example, civilian politicians in Brazil had a long history of inviting military involvement in politics, and successful military coups had consistently enjoyed significant civilian support (67–84). An exclusive focus on internal characteristics of the armed forces would miss these crucial interactions between the military and civilians. Stepan’s second single-authored book, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (1978b: 127–44), developed many of these same themes on the military in politics, this time focused on the Peruvian military regime.

In chapter 1, J. Samuel Fitch underscores some understudied new challenges to Latin American militaries in the contemporary period. He inverts Stepan’s concern with challenges the military poses to democratization and focuses instead on challenges democratization and expanding social and cultural opportunities have created for the military. While analyzing new issues in the study of the armed forces, Fitch has long carried the torch as a leading analyst of the military and politics. He follows Stepan’s careful analysis in *The Military in Politics* (30–56) of the socioeconomic background of military officers.

Stepan emphasized the limits of what social scientists and historians can infer by analyzing the recruitment patterns of military officers. He rejected the idea that this information enables scholars to conclude without further evidence that the military represents certain class interests. Yet he also highlighted the utility of studying recruitment patterns, and Fitch picks up on this point. Following Stepan’s injunction against reductionism, Fitch uses new data to raise questions about the potential importance of the military’s links with society based on the milieu they come from, not simply their class origin.

Fitch argues that with the panoply of employment choices in today’s world, and with reduced military budgets and salaries in much of Latin America, the military today faces difficult challenges of recruiting and retaining talent. These challenges have helped “civilianize” the armed forces. Fitch rejects the idea that the military is insular and instead builds on Stepan’s insistence that we understand the military both as an institution with its own interests and as one increasingly embedded in society. While building on Stepan’s theoretical insights, Fitch emphasizes important changes in the military, in society, and in the relationship between the two since Stepan wrote his classic book.
Stepan returned to the analysis of the military in a 1986 book published in Brazil, *Os militares: Da abertura à Nova República*, about the armed forces during the late stages of military rule and the beginning of the new democratic period (1985). His 1988 book, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, extended this analysis to Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Both books analyzed a central conundrum for politicians in new democracies that follow on the aftermaths of military regimes: how to achieve the civilian control of the military that is an essential part of a robust democracy without alienating the armed forces and risking a backlash.

In both books, Stepan conceptualized the transition to democracy in Brazil as the result of a dynamic interaction between the regime and the opposition. He underscored the powerful prerogatives the Brazilian military retained during the first years of democratic rule, 1985–87. He argued they were so sweeping that it was questionable whether Brazil should be considered a democracy at that time, and he underscored some of the difficulties of moving away from such powerful prerogatives. He also highlighted the paucity of expertise regarding military affairs in civil society, the legislature, and the executive and argued that this paucity helped create a veritable carte blanche for the armed forces. In democracies, some civilian leaders need military expertise so as to know how to handle military affairs.

In chapter 2, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil’s former president (1995–2003) and a highly renowned sociologist, reflects on Stepan’s cautionary analysis in *Rethinking Military Politics*. Drawing on his own academic work and his experience as the president of recently democratized Brazil, Cardoso embraces Stepan’s insights concerning the transition from military rule in the country. He agrees with Stepan’s arguments concerning the dialectic between regime concessions and societal conquest, the interaction between civil and political society in reestablishing the rule of law, and the role of internal military tensions in fostering democratization. He further argues that Stepan’s analysis of military prerogatives was insightful with regard to the first democratic administrations, but subsequent administrations made great progress in establishing civilian control of the military. On this detail, he argues that Stepan understated the potential for positive change. Cardoso’s chapter is an important contribution to the analysis of the transition to democ-
racy in Brazil and of the subsequent capacity of civilian governments to rein in the military.

In Latin America and some other parts of the world, one of the primary challenges for contemporary democracies is how to achieve citizen security. In a majority of Latin American countries today, public security is the most salient concern that citizens voice in public opinion surveys. In chapter 3, Mark Ungar analyzes this pressing contemporary problem through theoretical lenses developed by Stepan. He adds to our understanding of one of the central challenges to democratic governance in contemporary Latin America.

Ungar argues that a role expansion that bears some similarities to the “new professionalism” that Stepan (1971, 1973) observed in Latin American militaries several decades ago has occurred within the region’s police forces. The pressing demands of citizen insecurity have often enhanced the power of police forces, which have perpetuated pre-democratic institutional prerogatives and stood in the way of more democratic and effective policing strategies. Ungar ties greater decentralization in the region to increased policing challenges, echoing Stepan’s (1999; 2001: 315–61) contention that decentralization can lead to negative outcomes. Reaffirming Linz and Stepan’s (1996) concern for the principle of accountability, Ungar argues that police forces in the region have remained largely unaccountable for abuses and poor security outcomes. Legislatures and courts have proven unwilling or incapable of exercising control over the police. Finally, he suggests that whereas civil society was often a key actor in pushing democratization under authoritarian regimes, it has been ambivalent about and sometimes even detrimental to effective police reforms and has more often than not pushed for short-term mano dura (repressive) policies. Stepan’s contributions on these subjects help us understand how rising crime can undermine the behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996: 5–6).

The State, Democracy, and Market Reforms

As Guillermo O’Donnell (1993, 2010) and others have underscored, building state capacity is one of the central challenges in many post-1978
democracies. Weak states do not effectively enforce or protect rights; they are not good at providing services; they do not even effectively provide public security, which is, according to Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber, the state’s primordial responsibility. But how to effectively build states and how best to sequence state building, democracy building, and economic reforms remain understudied and contentious issues.

Since the 1970s, Stepan has been a pioneer in analyses of the state. His *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* initiated his long-standing concern with the state. At the time, most scholarly traditions assigned little or no weight to the state to explain political outcomes. In contrast to the prevalent societal-centric explanations of politics, Stepan argued that states are partly autonomous actors that shape politics and can reshape civil society.2

Linz and Stepan (1996: 11–15, 435–54) returned to the theme of the state. Arguing against the market-oriented perspectives that were then in vogue, they emphasized that state capacity was crucial for democracy and for effective market reform.3 Against the conventional wisdom of that era, they argued that democracy facilitated rather than obstructed effective market reform (439–54). The dominant perspective then was that market reform would hurt most voters, who would therefore use elections to support parties that would limit or oppose economic liberalization. Linz and Stepan asserted that functioning market economies required strong regulatory states, that the construction of such strong states required a democratic regime, and that democratic state building must precede market reforms in order for the positive impacts of such reforms to take root.

In chapter 4, László Bruszt evaluates Linz and Stepan’s theoretical arguments on the interaction among the processes of state building, market reform, and democratization. Bruszt’s empirical evidence based on the former Communist countries supports their arguments. Only those former Communist countries that built strong regulatory states under democratic conditions were able to improve their positions in the world economy, increase social equality, and enhance their citizens’ standards of living. These findings support Linz and Stepan’s contention that market reforms are not inimical to democracy and that democracy is a necessary condition for successful economic transformation.
Democratic Transitions, Democratic Oppositions, and Democratic Regimes

The study of political regimes has always been central to Stepan’s work. His 1971 book on Brazil was the first of several major contributions on the breakdown of democratic regimes and on authoritarian regimes. Seven years later, Juan J. Linz and Stepan published The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, which remains an enormously influential contribution. In the 1980s, as authoritarian regimes were falling by the wayside in Latin America, Stepan contributed to the equally prominent collection edited by O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986) on transitions to democracy.

Stepan’s chapter in that volume, “Paths toward Redemocratization” (1986b) focused on the ways in which different paths toward democratization durably shape the challenges facing new democracies. He developed a typology of ten different paths toward democracy based on the role played by different political actors in given historical contexts. Underpinning the analysis is his conviction that each of these ten paths “entails a predictable set of possibilities, problems, and constraints” for the subsequent democratic regimes (64). The chapter touches on the strengths and weaknesses each kind of transition creates for a new democratic regime.

In his contribution to our volume, Robert Fishman builds on this 1986 essay and argues that different paths to democracy had long-term consequences in Portugal and Spain. Fishman explores the long-term political effects of a partly revolutionary path toward democracy in Portugal and a consensus-oriented transition in Spain. Portugal’s revolutionary path led to democratic practices in which traditionally powerless actors gained access to formal political institutions. In contrast, Spain’s consensus-oriented transition led to a democracy less accommodating of social and political protest. Following Stepan, Fishman argues that the mode of transition influenced later outcomes in enduring ways without determining them. He shows that Stepan and Linz have “elucidated choices and limits, possibilities and dangers, that emerge in the context of regime change.” Fishman adds to the debate about the ways in which paths to democracy condition subsequent outcomes. He emphasizes the
importance of weaving together institutional, cultural, and sociostructural analysis. He builds on Stepan’s concern with “underreaching” (i.e., excessive caution on the agenda of democratic change) and argues for certain distinctive advantages of democracy born in social revolutionary processes where that pathway is historically open.

**The Tasks of Democratic Oppositions**

Stepan’s work (1990, 1997) on the tasks of democratic oppositions under authoritarian regimes inspired Mirjam Künkler’s chapter. Stepan (1990) argued that the dynamics of authoritarian regimes and the prospects for regime change depend not only on the regime leadership and supporters but also on the relationship between the regime and democratic opposition. He argued that we can understand regime dynamics on the basis of the interactions among the core regime supporters, the coercive apparatus, passive supporters, passive opponents, and active opponents. He outlined five critical tasks for the opposition in roughly ascending order of complexity: “(1) resisting integration into the regime; (2) guarding zones of autonomy against it; (3) disputing its legitimacy; (4) raising the costs of authoritarian rule; and (5) creating a credible democratic alternative.”

Künkler analyzes regime dynamics in the Islamic Republic of Iran during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005). She describes the unprecedented rise of reformist political movements during this time and asks why, despite broad popular support for reform, the hardline authoritarians thoroughly defeated those who advocated political liberalization. She argues that the failure of the reform movement stemmed from its inability to guard Stepan’s “zones of autonomy” against the regime. Although Khatami pushed liberalization and tried to increase the enforcement of the rule of law, his efforts were constantly undermined by conservative unelected elements of the regime, including the Supreme Leader, the judiciary, the Guardian Council, and the security forces. Instead of leading to a democratic transition, the years under the reformist administration resulted in the consolidation of authoritarian rule and mass disenchantment with reformist politicians.
Presidentialism and Democracy

In the 1990s, Stepan and Linz inspired a new debate about the merits and shortcomings of presidentialism. Along with Linz and Cindy Skach, Stepan argued that differing institutional arrangements affect the likelihood of democratic consolidation and breakdown. For Stepan and Skach (1993), presidential regimes create more perverse incentives for political actors than do parliamentary systems. Given the mutual independence of the executive and the legislature in presidential systems, incentives for coalitions are weaker and executive rule by decree is more appealing. Together, these outcomes often give way to deadlock and political crises that threaten democratic regimes (Linz and Stepan 1996: 141–42, 181–83; Stepan and Skach 1993).4

In their chapter in this volume, Ryan E. Carlin, Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo, and Jonathan Hartlyn examine the contrasts between presidentialism and parliamentarism from a different angle. They explore differences in democratic accountability afforded by presidentialism and parliamentarism from the perspective of citizens. Using an original data set, they find support for several hypotheses concerning the effects of presidentialism and parliamentarism on executive approval ratings over the course of democratic administrations in thirty countries. Because executive approval serves as an interelectoral indication of democratic accountability, the fact that institutional variables help to explain approval variation over time gives credence to Stepan and Skach’s (1993) contention that accountability operates differently under presidential and parliamentary systems (see also Samuels and Shugart 2010). The authors find inspiration in Stepan’s focus on institutions and his argument that presidential systems are less accountable because presidents are harder to remove.

Federalism, Multinationalism, and Democracy

Part IV analyzes the relationship between federalism, multinationalism, and democracy. Federalism has advantages in large and medium-sized countries with considerable ethnic and national diversity. Yet as
Stepan has shown, and as Part IV of our volume demonstrates, federalism presents challenges as well as opportunities for democracy.

Stepan’s abiding interest in Brazil and his fascination with post-1989 processes of democratization in the post-Communist world led him to study the relationship between federalism and democracy in several prominent works (1999; 2001: 315–61; 2004). Rather than view federalism as intrinsically desirable or undesirable, Stepan emphasized both its positives and negatives. Some variants of federalism constitutionally give small minorities veto power over much of the policy agenda and make it more difficult to pass innovative legislation (Stepan 2001: 331–57; 2004).

Stepan called attention to some important yet insufficiently emphasized facts about federalism. First, most people in the world living under democracy resided in federal systems, and yet the most famous previous work on federalism, William H. Riker’s Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (1964) was deeply flawed. Riker failed to distinguish between federalism under democracy and nondemocratic regimes. Yet as Stepan observed, without competitive subnational elections, federalism does not really have the territorial division of authority that is its defining feature. Riker also argued that federalism did not influence policy outcomes. Stepan (2001: 315–61; 2004) showed quite the contrary: even relatively weak democratic federalism influences policy outcomes.

Much of Stepan’s recent work focuses on building democracy in multinational societies. He called attention to some “inconvenient facts,” focusing on the challenge of creating democracy in multinational countries (Linz and Stepan 1996: 24–33; Stepan 2000, 2005; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011): “Under modern circumstances, very few states that are nondemocratic will begin a possible democratic transition with a very high degree of nation-state homogeneity. This inconvenient fact for nation-state proponents is insufficiently recognized . . . and tends to exacerbate problems of stateness” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 25). Linz and Stepan (1996: 30–33; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011) persuasively argued that in today’s world, a new democracy that is multinational and multi-ethnic is unlikely to remain democratic if it insists on becoming a nation-state in which nation and state are coterminous. Stepan (2005, 2008; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011) advocates in such circumstances building a
state-nation, which supports more than one national identity in the same state and nurtures multiple and complementary identities.

By allowing for different national identities within one sovereign state, federalism has advantages for multinational, multiethnic countries that attempt to build democracy (Stepan 2001: 323–33; Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011). Stepan (2001: 360) noted that “all democracies that are strongly multinational are federal and asymmetrical.” Federalism can grant nationalities governing capacity within a given subcountry circumscription, thereby potentially increasing the likelihood that they would support democracy and identify both as members of a nationality and as members of a state-nation.

Ashley Esarey’s chapter follows Stepan’s analysis on the need for careful institutional crafting in new multinational democracies. He poses the hypothetical situation of a democratic China and asks what institutional arrangements would be most likely to nurture democracy given the country’s multinationalism and many ethnic groups. Esarey argues that the most advantageous institutional arrangement would entail a mixture of asymmetrical federalism and federacies, which are characterized by a constitutionally guaranteed division of powers between the central government and a local government of a culturally or ethnically distinct region (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011: 204–10). This combination would help sustain state-nation unity while at the same time ensuring democratic rights at the individual level. Similar to arrangements in India and Spain, asymmetrical federalism would ensure adherence to the principle of “one person, one vote” while providing special policy prerogatives—particularly over education, religion, and cultural affairs—for separatist-leaning regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang. Given the higher institutional autonomy currently enjoyed by Hong Kong and Taiwan, they could become federacies. Similar to Greenland’s arrangement with Denmark, these federacies would cede foreign policy authority to the federal government while retaining autonomy over most domestic affairs. Esarey concludes that the combination of asymmetrical federalism and federacies with strong consociational practices to maintain nationwide political parties and access to national bureaucracies across regions could facilitate what Stepan has termed “demos enabling” federalism and could help sustain a young democracy.
In chapter 10, Edward L. Gibson responds to Stepan’s call for greater theoretical attention to the relationship between federalism and democracy, and in particular to how conflicts among political actors in the central government profoundly affect conflicts in the states. Whereas Stepan (2004) focused on how federalism can constrain the will of national majorities, Gibson asks how federalism can impede democratization in subnational units. He argues that struggles over the design of the territorial regime—that is, the rules and norms that regulate interactions and power across subnational units and determine the division of authority among different levels of government—are inextricably linked to larger-scale battles over democratization. By following the conflicts over the territorial regime in the United States during Reconstruction and its aftermath, Gibson demonstrates that federalism can be used not only as a “sword” for further democratization in subnational units, as Stepan argued with respect to the cases of Brazil and Mexico, but also as a “shield” for subnational authoritarianism. Gibson’s work enhances understanding of the nexus between federalism and subnational authoritarianism.

In his critique of Riker’s view of federalism, Stepan (2000, 2004) pointed to Russia to illustrate the profound effect that strong federal structures can produce with regard not only to policy but also to the very existence of the state. He argued that Russia’s complicated asymmetric federal structure, in combination with extraconstitutional “bilateral treaties” between the national and subnational governments and open disregard for federal law by some subunits, threatened to interrupt the country’s economic and political transition during the 1990s.

In chapter 11, Shamil Midkhatovich Yenikeyeff analyzes the extent to which center-periphery bargaining during the Yeltsin and Putin administrations affected system stability, erosion, and change. Corporate actors, particularly within the energy industry, played key roles in the changing dynamics of center-periphery bargaining. During the Yeltsin administration (1991–99), regionally based oil companies and their local elite sponsors enjoyed significant power in many regions. This power enabled them to exercise substantial autonomy from Moscow based on bilateral, extraconstitutional agreements. After federal corporate actors became institutionalized and Putin assumed the presidency in 1999, the power
dynamics shifted strongly away from regional governments and oil companies and toward federal corporate and governmental actors. Yenikeyeff argues that the actions of these federal corporate actors, rather than those of political parties, are integral to explaining the reintegration of the Russian state following the tumultuous Yeltsin years.

Religion, Tolerance, and Democracy

Part V examines the challenges that religion can pose for democracy, and vice versa, and the ways in which religion and democracy can mutually flourish and support each other. Stepan studied religion early in his career, and after a long hiatus he returned to this issue in a seminal work that has spawned considerable debate and scholarship on the relationship of world religions to democracy and authoritarianism. His “The World’s Religious Systems and Democracy: ‘Crafting the Twin Tolera-
tions,’” in Arguing Comparative Politics (2001: 213–53), argued against the conventional wisdom, famously exemplified by Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Modern World (1996), that world religions have an essentialist nature that fosters or impedes democracy. Whereas Huntington saw Islam as intrinsically and implacably hostile to democracy, Stepan argued that all major world reli-
gions are “multivocal”; that is, they all contain some democratic and some authoritarian proclivities. For example, against Huntington’s argument that Islam was inimical to democracy, Stepan showed that many interpretations of Islam were compatible with democracy and that some Islamic countries had somewhat democratic political regimes (see also Stepan with Robertson 2003; Stepan and Robertson 2004).

Stepan challenged the notion that under democracies religion must be totally separated from the state (Rawls 1993) and points out that complete disestablishment is not the norm in most long-standing dem-
cracies. Strong religious institutions can help maintain a vibrant civil society necessary for democratic consolidation. Rather than disestablishment, democracy requires a system of “twin tolerations” that allows for the flourishing of both religion and the state while at the same time establishing boundaries for both. Elected governments must have
freedom from religious groups, and religious groups must have the freedom to worship (Stepan 2001: 216–17).

The final three chapters in this volume build directly on Stepan’s contribution on the twin tolerations and advance our knowledge about the dilemmas involved in a mutual flourishing of religion and democracy. In chapter 12, Brian H. Smith agrees with Stepan that all major world religions are potentially compatible with democracy. As opposed to Rawls’s (1993) insistence on the separation of religion and politics, Smith avers that the two spheres are inherently inseparable. Religion’s moral and ethical concerns almost invariably nudge it into the political sphere. Smith develops Stepan’s claim that separation of church and state is not the norm in democratic politics. He further asserts that the three classical religion-state models other than disestablishment—that is, theocracy, caesaropapism, and establishment—continue to exist to this day and that partial forms of such models can be crafted over time to attain Stepan’s “twin tolerations.”

In chapter 13, Murat Akan evaluates Stepan’s argument on twin tolerations and writing on nation-state conflicts in light of the recent unprecedented success of Turkey’s pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party. Akan traces laicism in modern Turkey from the early Kemalist administrations to the present day and argues that Turkey has not achieved Stepan’s “twin tolerations,” before or after the rise of modern political Islam. Instead, the Turkish state’s relationship with religion is better encapsulated in another of Stepan’s concepts, “organic-statism,” which Stepan (1978: 3–45) developed to describe the normative foundation of corporatist regimes in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. The prevailing laical policy—largely unchanged even with the rise of political Islam, according to Akan—has focused on state mobilization of religion in efforts to create the “third way” harmonious national identity envisioned in the organic-statist approach. These efforts have consistently placed nation-state policy ahead of the rights of minorities guaranteed under liberal democracy, creating a problematic conflict aptly described by Linz and Stepan (1996: 16–37).

In chapter 14, Hanna Lerner utilizes Stepan’s “twin tolerations” framework to evaluate Israeli religion-state relations, with particular attention to a recent law that sanctions civil marriage for nonreligious
couples outside of the current system dominated by religious authorities. While some proponents heralded the proposed reform as revolutionary, Lerner argues that the reform fails to meet the standards set forth by Stepan’s twin tolerations. The law’s narrow applicability—only nonreligious citizens, rather than all citizens, may register as couples—demonstrates the inflexibility of the consociational religion-state status quo. Because religious leaders still retain control over the concept of marriage and its authorization for the vast majority of citizens who consider themselves religious, equal rights for all citizens are still infringed by religious authorities in a clear violation of Stepan’s twin tolerations. Lerner argues that these consociational arrangements have tended to ingrain group identification, which has perpetuated the same religion-state relationship since the creation of the Israeli state even as the political struggle over Jewish identity has deepened over time.

**Seven Characteristic Stepan Trademarks**

Despite the changing set of problems and regions, Stepan’s scholarship has had important continuities. Because a secondary goal of this volume is to contribute to the intellectual history of comparative politics by highlighting some of the debates spawned by a pioneering figure in the field, in this concluding section of the introduction we discuss seven characteristic Stepan trademarks, which are visible throughout the volume.

First, throughout his career Stepan has focused on issues of great importance in the real world and in scholarship. He does not study minor issues, nor does he seek to make minor incremental contributions to arcane debates. Critics sometimes lampoon the academic world because a lot of scholarship seemingly focuses on the arcane or trivial. In contrast, Stepan has always studied issues of obvious real-world relevance.

Second, throughout his career Stepan has generated paradigm-shifting research and insights and has defied conventional wisdom. His first book, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (1971), and a subsequent article (1973) altered prevailing understandings of the political consequences of military professionalism. *The Military in
Politics also shattered the notion that all military dictatorships are so impermeable as to make social science research impossible. One of its enduring contributions is to show the feasibility of studying what Stepan called a semiclosed institution.7

The landmark work with Juan J. Linz, Breakdowns of Democratic Regimes (1978), changed thinking about why democracies break down. As opposed to analyses suggesting that regime breakdowns were inevitable or that they were the consequence of powerful antidemocratic oppositions, Linz (1978) and Stepan (1978a) argued that they were often avoidable and that mistakes by supposedly democratic leaders often sealed their fate. All four volumes of The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes remain in print thirty-four years later.

In The State and Society (1978), Stepan called attention to a remarkable lacuna in U.S. political science: the lack of serious theoretical and analytic attention to the state. Eighteen years later, breaking with the market-oriented orthodoxy of the 1990s, Linz and Stepan (1996) argued that a solid state is essential for democracy and that democracy facilitates rather than obstructs successful market-oriented economic reform. His work on religion, toleration, and democracy (Stepan 2001: 213–53; Stepan with Robertson 2003; Stepan and Robertson 2004) shattered the essentialist conception that some religions are inimical to democracy while others are supportive of it (Huntington 1996). His work on federalism (2001: 315–61; 2004) provided a devastating critique of Riker’s (1964) influential analysis, and it pointed the way to a more insightful understanding.

Third, Stepan has exhibited a career-long commitment to high-quality fieldwork. Few senior political scientists undertake extended fieldwork trips, but Stepan remains committed to and a forceful advocate for them (Munck and Snyder 2007: 451, 453–54). Fieldwork generates new ideas that can challenge existing paradigms, and it serves as a check on abstruse theory divorced from reality. He has few peers in obtaining interviews with prominent leaders and in making good use of those interviews. This commitment to fieldwork infuses many chapters in this volume.

Fourth, Stepan has consistently called attention to the importance of organizations and formal institutions. The “new institutionalism”
made a big splash in sociology and political science in the 1980s and early 1990s, and it continues to have influence today (March and Olsen 1984; Thelen and Stenmo 1992). In the 1970s, before the term new institutionalism existed, Stepan was one of the most prominent practitioners of this theoretical approach. His work on militaries, states, religion, presidentialism and constitutional frameworks, and federalism contributed greatly to empirical knowledge and to theorizing about institutions. Stepan’s interest in formal institutions is echoed in most of the chapters here.

Fifth, Stepan has contributed richly throughout his career to understanding the impact of ideas on political outcomes. In this respect, his contributions have been less recognized, yet they have been profound. At a time when behavioralism reigned supreme in U.S. political science, Stepan (1971, 1973, 1978b: 127–44) was an early advocate for understanding institutional ideas and sense of mission. He argued that changing military conceptions of its mission led to the development of a new military ideology that fostered role expansion in the 1960s (1971: 123–24, 153–87). The military’s new confidence that it had the capacity and legitimacy to govern was key in its decision to break with the moderating pattern and to rule Brazil directly for more than two decades.

Stepan’s first book (1971) was published during the last great wave of dictatorships in Latin America. At that time, class analysis and dependency theory were ascendant in scholarship on Latin American politics. His emphasis on institutions and ideas represented a contrast to the common concern with class and economic interests. Dependency theory, which had considerable influence at the time, emphasized the impact of international economic structures on political regimes in Latin America. Stepan instead analyzed the ways in which the Cold War in general and U.S. military policy in particular fostered ideational change in the Brazilian military. This change in the Brazilian military’s understanding of professionalism and of its own mission helps explain its willingness to take power in 1964 and rule for twenty-one years. This early work on the impact of ideas—not taken in isolation, but in an institutional and broader political context—is an exemplar of a kind of work that later gained currency especially in international relations,
with his former student Kathryn Sikkink (e.g., 1991) serving as a leading representative. His subsequent work on the Peruvian military’s changing understanding of its mission (1978b: 127–44) and, more recently, on the impact of religion on democracy (Stepan 2001: 213–53; Stepan with Robertson 2003; Stepan and Robertson 2004) also exemplifies his attention to how ideas and belief systems shape political outcomes. In our volume, the chapters by Lerner, Smith, and Akan embody this aspect of Stepan’s work.

Sixth, Stepan has evinced an ongoing concern with the conditions of successful democratic regimes. This concern cuts across most chapters of this volume. Stepan’s work displays a continuing effort to see how real institutions are anchored in social reality. His scholarship is consistently concerned with building concepts that are checked against the reality of laws, opinions, and cultural values.

Seventh, cutting across much of Stepan’s work is a concern with the relationship between path dependence and historically open possibilities. The term path dependence (Pierson 2004; Thelen 1999) was not in vogue when Stepan began his career, nor does he invoke this concept frequently, yet he was a leading precursor to this variant of historical institutionalism. As Fishman notes in his chapter in this volume, this thread in Stepan’s work is clear in his analysis of how different paths to democracy affect subsequent outcomes (Stepan 1986) and also in his analysis of how different kinds of nondemocratic regimes pose distinctive challenges for successor democracies (Linz and Stepan 1996: 38–65). More than most leading theorists of path dependence (e.g., Pierson 2004; Thelen 1999), Stepan emphasized both the imprint of previous historical paths and the possibilities for subsequent change from that historical path. Stepan’s emphasis on the combination of path dependence and historical openness is a useful corrective to the contributions that emphasize only the former.

As an example, Stepan’s (1971, 1978a) analysis of the breakdown of democracy in Brazil emphasized the interaction between structure and agency. He argued that the possibilities for rescuing democracy narrowed dramatically because of bad presidential decisions that triggered the breakdown. We agree with Stepan, as does Figueiredo (1993) in her excellent book on the 1964 democratic breakdown in Brazil, that it was not an inevitable outcome determined by a long prior chain of
events. An exclusive focus on path dependence might see the democratic breakdown as determined by Brazil’s historical path.

Stepan’s work has inspired generations of students and colleagues, including those whose work is represented in this volume. The chapters that follow honor him by advancing scholarship on five themes to which he has been a leading contributor for more than four decades.

Notes

We are grateful to Robert Fishman, Juan Linz, and Richard Snyder for helpful comments and to Chad Kiewet de Jonge for research assistance.

1. On this theme, also see Stepan 1973; Stepan 1978b: 127–44.
2. Along converging lines, see Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Schmitter 1971, 1974; Skocpol 1979. Stepan’s chapter in Evans et al. (1985) analyzes the relationship between state power and the strength of civil society under the military dictatorships in the southern cone of Latin America.
4. For works that challenged the thesis that presidentialism is more vulnerable to regime breakdown because of intrinsic weaknesses, see Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997; Cheibub 2007.
5. Stepan follows Dahl’s (1986: 114) definition of federalism as a “system in which some matters are exclusively within the competence of certain local units—cantons, states, provinces—and are constitutionally beyond the scope of the authority of the national government; and where certain other matters are constitutionally outside the scope of the authority of the smaller units.”
6. Asymmetrical federalism refers to “constitutionally embedded differences between the legal status and prerogatives of different subunits within the same federation” (Stepan 2001: 326).
7. See the Appendix to The Military in Politics (273–76) for his discussion of how to study a semiclosed institution.

References


Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


