On Privacy vs Cooperation in Multi-agent Systems

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This paper considers distributed systems arising when multiple agents cooperatively solve a quadratic optimization problem. To maintain privacy of their states over time, agents implement a noise-adding mechanism according to the classic differential privacy framework. We characterize how the noise due to the privacy mechanism degrades the performance of the multi-agent system. Interestingly, we show that depending on the desired level of privacy (and thus noise), the system performance is optimized by reducing the level of cooperation among the agents. The notion of cooperation level, which is formally introduced and defined in the paper, models the trust of an agent towards the information received from neighboring agents. For the prototypical examples of consensus and centroidal Voronoi tessellations, we are able to characterize the optimum cooperation level that maximizes the system performance while ensuring a desired privacy level. Our results suggest that for the class of problems we study, and in fact for a broad class of multi-agent systems, it is always beneficial for the agents to reduce their cooperation level when the privacy level increases.

Keywords: Distributed optimization, Differential Privacy, Optimal cooperation level, Privacy vs cooperation tradeoff, Multi-agent systems

1. Introduction

Several problems in control theory, optimization and robotics require cooperation among multiple agents. Prototypical examples include consensus (H. Du, Wen, Cheng, He, & Jia, 2016; Olfati-Saber, Fax, & Murray, 2007), flocking (Olfati-Saber, 2006), formation control (Raffard, Tomlin, & Boyd, 2004), coverage control (Cortes, Martinez, Karatas, & Bullo, 2004), and distributed optimization (Nedic & Ozdaglar, 2009; Terelius, Topcu, & Murray, 2011). Typically, cooperation requires information exchange, which may lead to leakage of private information with undesirable consequences. For example, in smart metering systems where users send their energy consumption data for power network optimization, the data can reveal information about their personal lives, such as daily schedules etc. (McDaniel & McLaughlin, 2009), (United States, 2010). In autonomous vehicle scenarios where the vehicles communicate and share their position/velocity data, it can reveal their past or future travel plans. Even if the agents are trustworthy, a possibility exists for an intruder to eavesdrop on the messages exchanged among the agents and gather their private information. Privacy concerns have recently been addressed by introducing dedicated mechanisms as part of the cooperation protocol (Hale & Egerstedt, 2015; Han, Topcu, & Pappas, 2014, 2016; Hsu, Roth, Roughgarden, & Ullman, 2014; Huang, Mitra, & Dullerud, 2012; Huang, Mitra, & Vaidya, 2015; Le Ny & Pappas, 2014). In most of these privacy mechanisms, each agent deliberately adds noise to the data communicated to other agents, thereby preventing them (or an eavesdropper) from

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recovering the sensitive data of individual agents by accurately processing the distorted messages.

Most of the recently proposed privacy mechanisms are based on techniques originally developed to protect static databases and usually degrade the performance when applied to dynamical systems. For instance, in applications involving wide area control of power grids, adding noise to the data may result in loss of stability. In distributed systems, if agents use noisy information from other agents to update their own state, the resulting behavior differs from the desired one. Furthermore, both due to the dynamical nature of the system and the fact that information originating from one agent may traverse to another agent through multiple paths in distributed systems, the noise introduced by the agents at one time step can adversely affect the state evolution of a multi-agent system multiple times in the future. Notice that the second reason arises because of the cooperative nature of the system where one agent uses information from other agents. Thus, intuitively, there should be a tradeoff between the ‘cooperation level’ and performance in a distributed system when the agents are trying to keep their information private. If the noise level introduced to maintain privacy is too high, then cooperation might even impede the system functionality. On the other hand, if the agents do not transmit any information to each other, perfect privacy is achieved, at the expense of the benefits of cooperation. In this paper, we address an outstanding and important question whether cooperation leads to improved performance in the presence of a privacy mechanism, and whether a fundamental tradeoff exists between the two.

We consider a scenario where the objective of the agents is to cooperatively minimize a common quadratic cost function of their states by sharing their state information among each other. Several problems such as consensus and formation control fall into this class. In addition, the agents wish to keep their states private during this process. We propose a noise adding privacy mechanism for the agents to keep their states private over time. Note that we focus on privacy of the agents’ state trajectory, rather than the state at any specific time (as in Hale and Egerstedt (2015)). We adopt the Differential Privacy (DP) framework originally proposed by Dwork (2006), and later extended to dynamical systems in Le Ny and Pappas (2014). We characterize the noise level ensuring a desired level of privacy.

Next, we introduce a method for the agents to adapt their cooperation level in response to the privacy noise. In many scenarios, in addition to optimizing a global cost, the agents also have individual goals that do not require cooperation. For example, in intelligent transport systems, vehicles cooperate to reduce road congestion while each of them also wants to reduce its own travel time (ex. congestion game in Rosenthal (1973)). Individual objectives also exist in multi-objective optimization problems, wherein multiple conflicting goals are considered and in optimization problems with separable cost functions. When the agents wish to remain private (by sharing noisy data), it is intuitive that they should cooperate less and focus more on their individual goals. Thus, the cooperation level can be characterized based on whether the agents are willing to cooperatively minimize the global cost, or they want to selfishly minimize their individual costs. We formalize this notion by defining a new cost that is a convex combination of the global and individual costs, wherein the weighing factor represents the cooperation level. We then characterize the combined effect of cooperation level and privacy noise on the system performance.

Related work Several secure multi-party computation schemes exist in literature which compute a function of agents’ variables while keeping them private (Lindell & Pinkas, 2009; Orlandi, 2011). However, in these schemes, there always exists a possibility that some agent(s) obtain auxiliary information and use it to infer other agents’ private variables. Moreover, majority of agents can collude to infer the remaining agents’ sensitive information. To address these issues, we use the differential privacy framework in this work. DP abstracts away from any auxiliary information that the agents might have and it is also resilient to post processing of data (Dwork, 2011; Le Ny & Pappas, 2014).

Many recent studies have proposed privacy mechanisms for multi-agent systems. In Huang et al. (2012), the authors present a differentially private consensus algorithm that protects the initial state of the agents, and illustrate privacy vs accuracy tradeoff. In Mo and Murray (2016), a private
consensus algorithm is developed using correlated noises, that achieves perfect accuracy. We also study the consensus algorithm as an example and our DP mechanism is similar to Huang et al. (2012). However, we have a different goal of analyzing the cooperation vs privacy tradeoff. Some papers have addressed privacy issues in optimization problems. In Huang et al. (2015) and Han et al. (2014), the authors study distributed convex optimization and optimization with piecewise affine objectives respectively, and develop DP mechanisms to keep the agents’ cost functions private. In Han et al. (2016) and Hsu et al. (2014), the authors develop DP mechanisms to keep constraints of the agents private in optimization problems with convex and linear objectives, respectively. In contrast, our goal is to keep private the entire state trajectories of the agents in a quadratic optimization problem. In Hale and Egerstedt (2015), the authors develop DP mechanisms to keep the agents’ state trajectories private in a convex optimization problem with non-linear constraints.

All of these works develop privacy mechanisms and analyze their effect of the on the system performance in terms of sub-optimality, accuracy, convergence etc. Thus, they are primarily concerned with the privacy vs performance tradeoff. In contrast, we study a privacy vs cooperation tradeoff by simultaneously characterizing the effect of cooperation and privacy noise on the system performance. We develop a privacy mechanism similar to these papers, but we address fundamentally different questions such as: (i) How does the system performance change if the agents vary the amount of cooperation among each other? (ii) for a higher privacy level, is it beneficial for the agents to reduce cooperation? We answer these questions by developing a framework through which the agents can vary their cooperation level. To the best of our knowledge, our analysis is novel, and it highlights an important but previously unidentified tradeoff in multi-agent systems.

The cooperation level in our framework can be viewed as a weighting factor for the noisy state information received from the neighbors and used to update the agents states. Related works include Rajagopal and Wainwright (2011), in which the authors analyze consensus in the presence of noise, and show that almost sure convergence can be guaranteed by using time decaying weighing factor in the updates. In Xiao, Boyd, and Kim (2007), the authors find the optimal edge weights for the consensus problem that minimize the expected deviation among the agents. These works are specifically developed for the consensus algorithm, and may not work for other problems. In contrast, to elucidate the relation between the cooperation and privacy levels in multi-agent systems, we develop techniques that are applicable to more general quadratic optimization problems and not only limited to consensus.

**Contributions** The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we consider a general class of multi-agent systems arising from the solution of quadratic optimization problems via distributed computation. We propose a noise-adding privacy mechanism for the agents to solve the optimization problem while maintaining privacy of their states over time. We analytically quantify the effect of the privacy noise on the system performance. Second, we present a novel method to introduce the notion of ‘cooperation level’ in cooperative multi-agent systems, as a weighting factor by which the agents weigh the system cost vs. their individual costs. We show that, due to the privacy noise, the performance of the distributed system may improve when reducing the cooperation level among the agents. In fact, we simultaneously characterize the effect of cooperation and privacy levels on the system performance, and show that a fundamental tradeoff exists between the two in multi-agent systems. Third and finally, we illustrate our results through the problems of consensus and one-dimensional Voronoi tessellation. In both cases, we analytically characterize the effect of privacy and cooperation levels on the system cost, and show (by simulation) that an optimal cooperation level exists to maximize the system performance for a desired privacy level. Our results mathematically support the intuition that the optimal cooperation level should decrease if the privacy level increases.

**Paper organization** The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the quadratic optimization setup, the privacy mechanism and its effect on the system performance. Section 3 presents a framework to include a cooperation parameter in the problem and quantifies the performance as a function of privacy noise and agents’ cooperation level. Section 4 illustrates our
findings by studying the consensus and centroidal Voronoi tessellation problems. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.

**Mathematical Notation** The following notation will be adopted throughout the paper. \( \| . \| \) denotes the euclidean norm of a vector, or the induced 2-norm of a matrix. \( y[0 : \infty] \) denotes an infinite sequence/trajectory. The truncated version of \( y \) up to time \( T \in \mathbb{N} \) is denoted by \( y[0 : T] \). Without loss of generality, we also treat a truncated sequence as a vector of appropriate dimension. For an \( N \times N \) Hermitian matrix \( Q \), the ordered real eigenvalues are \( \lambda_1(Q) \geq \lambda_2(Q) \geq \cdots \geq \lambda_N(Q) \). Further, \( Q \geq 0 \) (respectively \( Q > 0 \)) denotes that \( Q \) is positive semi-definite (respectively definite).

2. **Problem formulation**

In this section we present our multi-agent cooperative optimization problem and characterize its solution. Additionally, we describe a noise adding mechanism that preserves the privacy of the agents’ states over time.

2.1 **Problem setup**

Consider a distributed system with a set of \( N \geq 2 \) agents denoted by \( \mathcal{N} = \{1, 2, \cdots, N\} \). The agents collectively aim to minimize a common objective that is given by

\[
\mathbf{P} : \min_x J_{co}(x) = \frac{1}{2} x^T Q x + r^T x + s, \tag{1}
\]

where the vector \( x = [x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_N]^T \in \mathbb{R}^N \) denotes the states of all agents. Further, \( Q \) is a non-zero \( N \times N \) real matrix, \( r \in \mathbb{R}^N \) and \( s \in \mathbb{R} \). Let \( q_{ij} \) and \( r_i \) denote the entries of \( Q \) and \( r \), respectively. Note that the states of the agents are coupled with each other via the quadratic term \( \frac{1}{2} x^T Q x \) in the cost function. Specifically, we say that the agents \( i \) and \( j \) are uncoupled if both \( q_{ij} \) and \( q_{ji} \) are zero, and that they are coupled otherwise. Let \( \mathcal{N}_i \) denote the *neighbor set* or the set of agents whose states are coupled to the state of agent \( i \), and let \( \mathcal{N}_i = |\mathcal{N}_i| \). We place the following assumptions on the cost function \( J_{co}(x) \):

**A.1** \( Q \) is symmetric and positive semi-definite. Further, if 0 is an eigenvalue of \( Q \), then: (i) its algebraic multiplicity is 1, and (ii) \( r = 0_N \) in (1).

**A.2** Each row(or column) of \( Q - \text{diag}(Q) \) has at least one non-zero entry.

Assumption **A.2** implies that there is no uncoupled agent in the system, that is, \( \mathcal{N}_i \neq \emptyset \) for each \( i \in \mathcal{N} \). This assumption is not restrictive because a system with \( n \) uncoupled agents can be studied via a reduced system with \( N - n \) coupled agents. Assumption **A.1** implies that the minimization problem \( \mathbf{P} \) is convex and admits a finite (but not necessarily unique) optimum. Let the set of all the optimum solutions of \( \mathbf{P} \) be denoted by \( \mathcal{X}^* \). An optimum \( x^* \in \mathcal{X}^* \) can be achieved by the agents with a distributed, iterative gradient descent algorithm. In such an algorithm, the update rule of
agent $i$ is
\[
x_i(k + 1) = x_i(k) - \gamma_1 \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} J_{co}(x(k)) = x_i(k) - \gamma_1 \left( q_i x_i(k) + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}_i} q_{ij} x_j(k) + r_i \right),
\]
where $\gamma_1 > 0$ is the step size and $x_i(0)$ is the initial state of agent $i$. As evident from the above iteration, agent $i$ requires state information $x_N$ from all its neighbors for its own state update. We assume that the agents can communicate their state information to each other without any distortion. The gradient descent algorithm for all agents can be collectively represented as
\[
\mathbf{S}_1 : \quad x(k + 1) = x(k) - \gamma_1 (Q x(k) + r) = (I_N - \gamma_1 Q) x(k) - \gamma_1 r \triangleq A_1 x(k) + b_1,
\]
where $A_1 = I_N - \gamma_1 Q$, $b_1 = -\gamma_1 r$ and initial state $x(0) = [x_1(0), x_2(0), \ldots, x_N(0)]^T$. Since the cost gradient is linear, algorithm $\mathbf{S}_1$ can be represented as a discrete time invariant linear system. The optimum of problem $\mathbf{P}$ is given by the steady state solution of $\mathbf{S}_1$. Next, we state the condition under which the steady state solution exists.

**Lemma 1:** (Convergence of algorithm $\mathbf{S}_1$) Let $\gamma_1 < 2 \rho(Q)^{-1}$. Then, the algorithm $\mathbf{S}_1$ in (3) converges asymptotically, that is $\lim_{k \to \infty} x(k) = x^*$ for an $x^* \in X^*$.

**Proof.** First, assume $Q > 0$. For $i = 1, 2, \ldots, N$ we have $0 < \gamma_1 \lambda_i(Q) \leq \gamma_1 \lambda_1(Q) < 2$. Since $\lambda_i(A_1) = 1 - \gamma_1 \lambda_i(Q)$, the above condition is equivalent to $-1 < \lambda_i(A_1) < 1$. Thus, all eigenvalues of $A_1$ lie inside the unit circle and a steady state solution of (3) is achieved. Assume now that $Q$ has a 0 eigenvalue. Then, by assumption A.1, $b_1 = 0$ and $A_1$ has a single eigenvalue at 1 and all other eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. Thus, the linear system in (3) is marginally stable and a finite steady state solution is achieved. $\square$

Let the steady state of (3) be denoted by $m_1$. Then,
\[
m_1 = A_1 m_1 + b_1,
\]
and the optimum cost achieved by the agents is given by
\[
J_{co}^* = \frac{1}{2} m_1^T Q m_1 + r^T m_1 + s.
\]

**Remark 1:** (Examples) A number of problems fit into our quadratic cost framework, including consensus and formation control. We will discuss the consensus example in detail in Section 4. We also study the 1D centroidal Voronoi tessellation problem in which the agents implement a linear algorithm to minimize a convex cubic cost. This shows that our framework can be extended to problems involving convex non-quadratic costs that can be optimized by a linear algorithm. $\square$

### 2.2 Privacy mechanism

In the cooperative algorithm $\mathbf{S}_1$, the agents update their state upon communicating the state information with their neighbors. Thus, algorithm $\mathbf{S}_1$ is not private and in fact, an intruder may reconstruct the state trajectories of the agents with access to only a few messages communicated by the agents. To ensure privacy, we consider the Differential Privacy (DP) mechanism that protects the state of the agents over time, where each agent adds an artificial random noise to its state before communicating it with other agents. The noise ensures that “any two different instances”
of the communicated state trajectories are “statistically not very different”, which prevents the intruder from accurately obtaining the actual state information of the agents; thus, maintaining their privacy. For the motivation and more information on DP, interested readers are referred to Dwork (2006) and Dwork (2011).

Remark 2: (Privacy of state trajectory) Note that different instances of the state trajectory arise from different initial states \(x(0)\). However, in addition to the initial state, agents wish to keep their positions/velocities private at all times because accurate state information at any time instant can potentially reveal the complete future state trajectory.

The noisy DP mechanism can be written as

\[
M : \tilde{x}_i(k) = x_i(k) + n_i(k),
\]

where \(\tilde{x}_i(k)\) denotes the state communicated to the neighbors of agent \(i\) and \(n_i(k)\) is the random privacy noise. Let \(n(k) = [n_1(k), n_2(k), \ldots, n_N(k)]^T\). We adopt the differential privacy framework developed in Le Ny and Pappas (2014) to design the noise that ensures privacy of the state trajectories. We begin with the definition of adjacency.

Definition 1: (Adjacency) Given a finite \(\beta \geq 0\), two state trajectories \(x[0 : \infty]\) and \(x'[0 : \infty]\) are \(\beta\)-adjacent (denoted by \(\text{adj}(\beta)\)) if

\[
\|x[0 : \infty] - x'[0 : \infty]\| \leq \beta.
\]

Remark 3: (Common steady state value) The adjacency definition in (7) implicitly requires that the two instances of the state trajectories (resulting from two different initial conditions) vary only for transient periods and have a common steady state value. This holds true if \(Q > 0\), since it is easy to observe (see (4)) that the steady state value does not depend on the initial condition \(x(0)\). However, when \(Q \geq 0\) with a single eigenvalue at 0 (see A.1), then the steady state value might depend on the initial condition. Let \(\chi^m_0\) denote the set of all initial conditions that result in a steady state value of \(m\). Then, the privacy mechanism guarantees DP only among those trajectories that result from initial conditions contained in the set \(\chi^m_0\).

\[
\tilde{x}[0 : T] \in \mathbb{R}^{N(T+1)} \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{x}'[0 : T] \in \mathbb{R}^{N(T+1)}
\]

Next, we provide the definition of differential privacy.

Definition 2: (Differential privacy) The mechanism \(M\) in (6) is \((\epsilon, \delta)\)-differentially private if for any two \(\beta\)-adjacent trajectories \(x[0 : \infty]\) and \(x'[0 : \infty]\) and for all \(S \in \mathbb{R}^{N(T+1)}\) and for all \(T \geq 0\) it holds

\[
P[\tilde{x}[0 : T] \in S] \leq e^\epsilon P[\tilde{x}'[0 : T] \in S] + \delta,
\]

where \(\epsilon > 0\) and \(0 < \delta < 0.5\) are privacy parameters.

Definition 2 implies that for any two beta adjacent trajectories, the statistics of the corresponding noisy communicated state trajectories differ only within a multiplicative factor of \(e^\epsilon\) and an additive factor of \(\delta\). A standard way to guarantee DP is to choose an i.i.d. Gaussian noise and scale its
variance according to the adjacency parameter $\beta$, as stated in the next lemma.

**Lemma 2:** *(Ensuring differential privacy)* The mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ in (6) is $(\epsilon, \delta)$-differentially private if $n(k)$ is white Gaussian noise with distribution $n(k) \sim N(0, \sigma^2 I_N)$, where

$$\sigma \geq \frac{\beta}{2\epsilon}(K + \sqrt{K^2 + 2\epsilon}), \text{ and } K = Q^{-1}(\delta).$$

**Proof.** See Theorem 3 in Le Ny and Pappas (2014). Since the quantity that needs to be protected and that is communicated is same (i.e. the state trajectory), the sensitivity is trivially upper bounded by the adjacency parameter $\beta$. 

In Lemma 2, the relation between $\sigma$ and the privacy parameters ($\epsilon, \delta$) implies that the noise variance is a monotonically decreasing function of $\epsilon$ and $\delta$. Also, note from the definition of DP in (8) that a smaller value of $\epsilon$ and $\delta$ implies larger privacy of the agents. Thus, the noise variance $\sigma$ can be treated as synonymous to the privacy level of the system, and for the ease of presentation, we present our results directly in terms of noise level $\sigma$ (instead of the privacy parameters $\epsilon$ and $\delta$).

In the presence of privacy noise, the evolution of the algorithm $S_1$ in (3) is modified as

$$S_1^{\text{priv}}: \quad x(k+1) = A_1 x(k) + b_1 + H_1 n(k),$$

where $H_1 \triangleq A_1 - \text{diag}(A_1)$ is obtained by replacing the diagonal elements of $A_1$ with zero entries, since only non-diagonal entries in $A_1$ represent coupling between the agents. Note that $H_1 = -\gamma_1 \hat{Q}$ where $\hat{Q} = Q - \text{diag}(Q)$.

### 2.3 Performance degradation due to the privacy mechanism

The noise introduced by the privacy mechanism makes the states of the agents private. However, it also adversely affects the system performance. Due to the stochastic nature of algorithm $S_1^{\text{priv}}$, we analyze the system performance by calculating the expected cost achieved by the agents in the presence of noise. The algorithm $S_1^{\text{priv}}$ in (9) can be viewed as a linear system driven by a constant input and Gaussian privacy noise. Thus, the state of the agents at each time instant has a normal distribution, denoted by $x(k) \sim N(m_1(k), P_1(k))$. The evolution of the mean and the covariance of the states of the agents is given by

$$m_1(k+1) = A_1 m_1(k) + b_1, \quad \text{and}$$

$$P_1(k+1) = A_1 P_1(k) A_1^T + \sigma^2 H_1 H_1^T,$$

with $m_1(0) = x(0)$ and $P_1(0) = 0$. If $A_1$ is stable (i.e. $Q > 0$ in (1)), then the mean and covariance reach a finite steady state value, denoted by $m_1$ and $P_1$, respectively. Note that we have overloaded the notation of $m_1$ with the noiseless case presented in section 2.1 since the steady state solution of (3) and (10) are the same. Thus, the mean $m_1$ satisfies (4) and the covariance $P_1$ satisfies the following Lyapunov equation:

$$P_1 = A_1 P_1 A_1^T + \sigma^2 H_1 H_1^T.$$  

If $A_1$ is marginally stable (that is, $Q$ in (1) has a single eigenvalue at 0, see assumption $\text{A.1}$), then $m_1$ exists and is finite. Yet, the covariance $P_1$ may become unbounded, and the system becomes unstable in the stochastic sense. We now present the performance result.
Theorem 1: *(Performance in the presence of privacy noise)* Assume $Q > 0$. At steady state, the expected cost achieved by the agents implementing the algorithm $S_1^{\text{priv}}$ in (9) is given by

$$J^*_{\text{co}}(\sigma) \triangleq \mathbb{E}[J_{\text{co}}(x)] = \frac{1}{2} \text{tr}(QP_1) + \frac{1}{2} m_1^T Qm_1 + r^T m_1 + s,$$

where the expectation $\mathbb{E}[\cdot]$ is taken w.r.t the privacy noise and $P_1$ depends on $\sigma$.

**Proof.** Since $Q > 0$, its Cholesky decomposition exists, denoted by $Q = L^T L$. Further, let $x$ denote the random steady state and let $y = Lx$. If $x \sim \mathcal{N}(m_1, P_1)$, then $y \sim \mathcal{N}(Lm_1, LP_1 L^T)$. We have,

$$\mathbb{E}[J_{\text{co}}(x)] = \mathbb{E}[\frac{1}{2} x^T Qx + r^T x + s]$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}[y^T y] + r^T m_1 + s$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \text{tr}(\mathbb{E}[yy^T]) + r^T m_1 + s$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \text{tr}(LP_1 L^T + Lm_1 (Lm_1)^T) + r^T m_1 + s$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} (\text{tr}(QP_1) + m_1^T Qm_1) + r^T m_1 + s,$$

where we have used the fact that $\text{tr}(\cdot)$ is a linear and invariant under cyclic permutations. \hfill \qed

The performance degradation due to the privacy noise is obtained by comparing (5) and (13), and is given by

$$J^*_{\text{co}}(\sigma) - J^*_{\text{co}} = \frac{1}{2} \text{tr}(QP_1),$$

which increases with the noise level $\sigma$. Because the agents share noisy state information, full cooperation and use of the distorted information for the algorithm updates affect the agents performance. In the other extreme case, if the agents forgo cooperation, then they will be completely private, since no state information will be exchanged among them, but will probably not achieve the optimum of problem $P$. Thus, a mechanism is needed for the agents to adapt their level of cooperation to maximize their performance in the presence of privacy noise. In the next section, we define a notion of cooperative level, and present modified optimization algorithms that incorporate the cooperation level as a parameter.

3. Cooperation level in multi-agent systems

In this section, we introduce and motivate our notion of cooperation level in private multi-agent systems. We calculate the expected cost achieved by the agents for a particular level of cooperation and privacy noise and use it to characterize the optimum cooperation level.

3.1 A notion of cooperation level

Agents cooperate to implement algorithm $S_1$. However, as discussed above, full cooperation may not be optimal if agents also want to preserve privacy. To formalize this, we introduce a cooperation parameter in the algorithm $S_1$. In many scenarios, in addition to minimizing the system cost $J_{\text{co}}$, the agents also have individual goals for which no cooperation is required. As explained in the
introduction, such conflicting goals are ubiquitous in optimization and game theory. We formalize
the individual agent goals by the following cost function
\[ J_{nco}(x) = \frac{1}{2}x^T \bar{Q}x + \bar{r}^T x + \bar{s}, \tag{14} \]
and assume that
\[ \bar{Q} \text{ is diagonal and positive definite.} \]

**A.3) \( \bar{Q} \) is diagonal and positive definite.**

Assumption A.3 implies that the states of all the agents are decoupled in \( J_{nco}(x) \). As a result, no cooperation is required to minimize the decoupled cost function \( J_{nco}(x) \).

We utilize these individual agent goals to introduce cooperation level in our framework. The costs \( J_{co}(x) \) and \( J_{nco}(x) \) represent two extremes on the cooperation scale. To minimize the former, full cooperation is necessary among the agents, while no cooperation is required for the latter. When the agents wish to keep private, it is prudent for them to give more weight to their individual goals as compared to the system goal. Following this reasoning and to capture the intermediate cooperation behavior, we consider a new cost function which is precisely the convex combination of \( J_{co}(x) \) and \( J_{nco}(x) \):
\[ J_\alpha(x) = \alpha J_{co}(x) + (1 - \alpha) J_{nco}(x), \tag{15} \]
where the parameter \( \alpha \in [0,1] \) is the agents’ cooperation level. Note that the new cost \( J_\alpha(x) \) is convex due to convexity of \( J_{co}(x) \) and \( J_{nco}(x) \). The gradient descent algorithm that minimizes \( J_\alpha \) inherently introduces the cooperation level in our framework and in presence of privacy noise can be written as
\[ S_{\text{priv}}^\alpha : \quad x(k+1) = x(k) - \gamma (\alpha Qx(k) + r) + (1 - \alpha) (\bar{Q}x(k) + \bar{r}) + H_\alpha n(k) \]
\[ \triangleq A_\alpha x(k) + b_\alpha + H_\alpha n(k), \tag{16} \]
where
\[ Q_\alpha = \alpha Q + (1 - \alpha) \bar{Q}, \quad A_\alpha = I_N - \gamma Q_\alpha, \]
\[ b_\alpha = -\gamma r_\alpha, \quad r_\alpha = \alpha r + (1 - \alpha) \bar{r}, \]
\[ H_\alpha \triangleq A_\alpha - \text{diag}(A_\alpha) = -\gamma \alpha (Q - \text{diag}(Q)), \]
and \( \gamma > 0 \) is the step size.

**Remark 4: (Auxiliary cost function)** Note that the decoupled cost function \( J_{nco} \), the new cost function \( J_\alpha \) and its minimizing algorithm \( S_{\text{priv}}^\alpha \) merely act as a means to introduce the cooperation level in our problem. The goal of the agents is to minimize the global cost \( J_{co} \), and thus we measure the performance the algorithm achieves also in terms of this global cost. \( \square \)

By varying the cooperation level in \( S_{\text{priv}}^\alpha \), the agents can achieve a range of private solutions of \( P \). In practice, agents should select a cooperation level that maximizes the system performance, as we will show in the next subsection. Notice that agents are still required to exchange their state information for all values of the cooperation level \( 0 < \alpha \leq 1 \), and that the cooperation level determines the weight given by an agent to the information coming from its neighbors.

**Remark 5: (Alternative approaches for variable cooperation level)** Different methods exist to capture the notion of cooperation level. For instance, agents may filter the exchanged measurements to reduce the effect of privacy noise on the performance, and use the filter weights
to measure their cooperation level. Yet, our formulation modulates cooperation in a natural and explicit way by balancing the individual and global goals of the agents, and it allows us to directly characterize critical tradeoffs between privacy and performance in multi-agent systems.

Remark 6: (Selection of the decoupled cost) There may be scenarios in which the agents do not have individual goals. In such cases, we can construct an artificial decoupled cost $J_{\text{nc}}$ to capture the non-cooperation extreme. Several choices of the matrix $\bar{Q}$ are possible. For instance, $\bar{Q}$ can be chosen to consist of the diagonal elements of $Q$, or it can be an arbitrary matrix that satisfies assumption A.3 (see examples in Section 4). Thus, our framework is applicable for a wide variety of multi-agent optimization problems. The selection of a decoupled cost that optimizes the agents performance is left as the subject of future research.

3.2 Performance analysis with privacy and cooperation

We now analytically characterize the expected cost for a given privacy and cooperation level. Note that due to assumptions A.1 and A.3, both $Q_\alpha$ and $A_\alpha$ are symmetric. Moreover, since the privacy noise has a normal distribution, the state $x(k)$ in algorithm $S_{\text{priv}}^{\alpha}$ is also normal. Let the steady state mean and covariance of $x(k)$ in algorithm $S_{\text{priv}}^{\alpha}$ be denoted by $m_\alpha$ and $P_\alpha$, respectively. Next, we present conditions under which the steady state mean and covariance exist. Note that Lemma 1 presents such condition for $\alpha = 1$.

Lemma 3: (Convergence of $S_{\text{priv}}^{\alpha}$ for $\alpha \neq 1$) Let $\alpha \neq 1$. Then, the steady state mean and covariance of algorithm $S_{\text{priv}}^{\alpha}$ exist if

$$\gamma < \frac{2}{\max\{\rho(Q),\rho(\bar{Q})\}}.$$ (17)

Proof. The proof is similar to that of lemma 1 by using the following facts: (i) $Q_\alpha > 0$ for $\alpha \neq 1$, and (ii) from Weyl’s inequality (Tao, 2012), $\rho(Q_\alpha) \leq \max\{\rho(Q),\rho(\bar{Q})\}$. 

Analogous to (4) and (12), the steady state mean and covariance of $S_{\text{priv}}^{\alpha}$ satisfy

$$m_\alpha = A_\alpha m_\alpha + b_\alpha$$
$$\Rightarrow 0 = Q_\alpha m_\alpha + r_\alpha \text{ and,}$$
$$P_\alpha = A_\alpha P_\alpha A_\alpha^T + \sigma^2 H_\alpha H_\alpha^T.$$ (18)

A closed form expression of $P_\alpha$ can be written as

$$P_\alpha = \sigma^2 \gamma^2 \alpha^2 \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} A_\alpha^k (Q - \text{diag}(Q))^2 (A_\alpha^T)^k.$$ (20)

Similarly to (13), the cost achieved by algorithm $S_{\text{priv}}^{\alpha}$ is

$$J(\alpha, \sigma) = J_{\text{priv}}(\alpha, \sigma) + J_{\text{ico}}(\alpha) \text{ where,}$$
$$J_{\text{priv}}(\alpha, \sigma) \triangleq \frac{1}{2} tr(QP_\alpha) \text{ and,}$$
$$J_{\text{ico}}(\alpha) \triangleq \frac{1}{2} m_\alpha^T Q m_\alpha + r^T m_\alpha + s.$$ (23)
Notice that \( J_{ico}(\alpha) \) represents the cost achieved by the agents for any intermediate cooperation level \( \alpha \) in the absence of privacy noise. Further, the cost term \( J_{priv}(\alpha, \sigma) \) quantifies the effect of the privacy noise at a given cooperation level since the covariance \( P_\alpha \) depends on noise level \( \sigma \). However, we omit that dependence in the notation for the ease of presentation. Moreover, \( P_\alpha \) also depends on the step size \( \gamma \). We do not analyze this dependence because \( \gamma \) dictates the number of iterations for algorithm \( S_{priv}^\alpha \) to converge, which is not the primary issue addressed in this paper.

Note that the optimum for \( P_\alpha \) is achieved only when \( \alpha = 1 \) and \( \sigma = 0 \) (that is, when the agents fully cooperate and no privacy noise is present). To clarify the notation, \( J^*_{co} = J(1, 0) \), \( J^*_{co}(\sigma) = J(1, \sigma) \) and \( J_{ico}(\alpha) = J(\alpha, 0) \). Also note that the functions \( J,J_{priv} \) and \( J_{ico} \) are continuous functions in their respective variables.

Intuitively, in the absence of privacy noise, the performance should increase as the agents cooperate more and should equal the best performance when they cooperate fully (\( \alpha = 1 \)). The following lemma proves this fact and justifies our definition of cooperation level.

**Lemma 4: (Performance without privacy)** The cost \( J_{ico}(\alpha) \) in (23) is monotonically decreasing for \( \alpha \in [0, 1] \).

**Proof.** By differentiating \( J_{ico}(\alpha) \) with respect to \( \alpha \), we obtain

\[
J'_{ico}(\alpha) = (m_\alpha^T Q + r^T) m'_\alpha. \tag{24}
\]

For \( \alpha = 1 \), from (18) we have, \( Qm_1 + r = 0 \). Thus, \( J'_{ico}(1) = 0 \).

For \( \alpha \in [0, 1) \), \( Q_\alpha > 0 \). Thus, \( Q_\alpha \) is invertible, and \( Q_\alpha^{-1} > 0 \). Differentiating (18), we get

\[
(Q - \bar{Q})m_\alpha + Q_\alpha m'_\alpha + r - \bar{r} = 0, \tag{25}
\]

\[
\Rightarrow m'_\alpha = -\frac{Q_\alpha^{-1}(Qm_\alpha + r)}{1 - \alpha}, \tag{26}
\]

where (a) follows from (18). Thus, we have

\[
J'_{ico}(\alpha) = -\frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (Qm_\alpha + r)^T Q_\alpha^{-1}(Qm_\alpha + r).
\]

and the derivative is non-positive, which completes the proof.

Lemma 4 implies that, in absence of privacy noise, it is beneficial for the agents to cooperate fully. Instead, in the presence of privacy noise, agents can achieve a range of private solutions of \( P \) by varying the cooperation level. In practice, agents should select a cooperation level that minimizes the cost \( J(\alpha, \sigma) \). The optimum cooperation level for the agents for a given level of privacy noise \( \sigma \) is characterized as

\[
\alpha^*(\sigma) = \arg \min_{\alpha} J(\alpha, \sigma). \tag{27}
\]

**Remark 7: (Finding the Optimum Cooperation Level)** The optimum cooperation level \( \alpha^*(\sigma) \) can be approximated numerically by discretizing the interval \([0, 1]\) for \( \alpha \), and evaluating the cost \( J(\alpha, \sigma) \) at each point.

Next, we show that under some conditions on cost functions \( J_{priv} \) and \( J_{ico} \), we can characterize the behavior of \( \alpha^*(\sigma) \).

**Theorem 2: (Characterizing the optimum cooperation level)** For all \( \sigma > 0 \), let \( J_{priv}(\alpha, \sigma) \) be strictly increasing for all \( \alpha \in (0, 1] \). Further, let \( J_{priv}(\alpha, \sigma) \) and \( J_{ico}(\alpha) \) be strictly convex for
Corollary 1: (Design of artificial cost function) Assume that $Q$ satisfies the following properties:

(i) $Q > 0$ and $\frac{\lambda_1(Q)}{\lambda_N(Q)} < 1.5$,

(ii) $\text{diag}(Q) = \mu I_N$ for some $\mu > 0$.

Then, there exists a $Q = \delta I_N$ with $\lambda_1(Q) < \delta < 1.5 \lambda_N(Q)$ and $\gamma < \delta^{-1}$ such that $J_{\text{priv}}(\alpha, \sigma)$ is strictly increasing for $\alpha \in (0, 1]$, and $J_{\text{ico}}(\alpha)$ and $J_{\text{priv}}(\alpha, \sigma)$ are strictly convex for $\alpha \in [0, 1]$.

Proof. See Appendix A.

4. Consensus and Voronoi tessellation

In this section, we illustrate our results through two prototypical problems, namely the consensus and the one-dimensional Voronoi tessellation problems.
4.1 Consensus with privacy and cooperation

Consensus algorithms are used by autonomous agents to agree on a common value in a distributed fashion. The algorithm involves sharing of state information among the agents. The iterations of the consensus algorithm in a discrete time setting can be represented as (Olfati-Saber et al., 2007)

\[ x(k + 1) = (I_N - \gamma L)x(k), \tag{28} \]

where \( L = [l_{ij}] \) is the Laplacian matrix of the graph representing the agents interaction. We consider an undirected consensus graph for which the Laplacian is symmetric, positive semi-definite with positive diagonal entries and non-positive non-diagonal entries. For such a graph, \( 1_N \) is an eigenvector of \( L \) associated with the eigenvalue 0, that is, \( L1_N = 0 \) and \( \lambda_N(L) = 0 \). Further, we assume that the graph is connected, which is equivalent to \( \lambda_N - 1 \succ 0 \). Then, the algorithm in (28) asymptotically achieves average consensus, that is, \( \lim_{k \to \infty} x(k) = \mu 1_N \), where \( \mu = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} x_i(0) \).

The consensus algorithm in (28) can be viewed as a gradient descent algorithm to minimize the following disagreement function (Olfati-Saber et al., 2007)

\[ J_{co}(x) = \frac{1}{2} x^T L x = \frac{1}{4} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j \in N_i} -l_{ij}(x_i - x_j)^2. \tag{29} \]

Thus, the consensus problem fits into our framework (Problem (1) and solution (3)) with \( Q = L, r = 0, \) and \( s = 0 \). Further, it also satisfies assumptions A.1 and A.2. To introduce the cooperation level, we select the following decoupled cost function

\[ J_{nco}(x) = \frac{1}{2N} x^T x - \frac{1}{N} a^T x + \frac{1}{2N} a^T a + b^2, \]

where \( a \in \mathbb{R}^N \) and \( b \in \mathbb{R} \). Note that the optimum of \( J_{nco}(x) \) is achieved at \( x = a \) and the optimum cost is \( b^2 \). Comparing the above cost function with (14), we obtain \( \bar{Q} = \frac{1}{N} I_N, \bar{r} = -\frac{1}{N} a, \) and \( \bar{s} = \frac{1}{2N} a^T a + b^2 \). Thus,

\[ Q_\alpha = \alpha L + \frac{1 - \alpha}{N} I_N, A_\alpha = I_N - \gamma Q_\alpha, b_\alpha = \frac{\gamma(1 - \alpha)}{N} a. \]

Further, the step size can be chosen according to Lemma 3 to guarantee convergence of the consensus algorithm. The resulting cost with privacy mechanism becomes

\[ J(\alpha, \sigma) = \frac{1}{2} (\text{tr}(LP_\alpha) + m_\alpha^T Lm_\alpha). \]

Notice that, for \( \alpha = 1, A_1 \) becomes marginally stable and thus, the covariance matrix \( P_1 \) becomes unbounded resulting in instability (see discussion below (12)). Thus, the agents have to choose a cooperation level \( 0 \leq \alpha < 1 \) for the cost to remain finite.

We now consider a specific consensus example with \( N = 4 \) agents, and the following Laplacian matrix

\[ L = \begin{bmatrix} 0.8 & -0.14 & -0.15 & -0.51 \\ -0.14 & 1.4 & -0.85 & -0.41 \\ -0.15 & -0.85 & 1.1 & -0.1 \\ -0.51 & -0.41 & -0.1 & 1.02 \end{bmatrix}. \]
Let \( a = [1.5, 1, 3, 0]^T \) and \( x(0) = [0.2, 0.6, 1.2, 2]^T \). Figure 1 shows the system costs \( J \), \( J_{\text{priv}} \), and \( J_{\text{ico}} \) in (21)-(23) as a function of \( \alpha \) for \( \sigma = 3 \). We can observe that \( J_{\text{ico}} \), which is the system cost in absence of privacy noise, is monotonically decreasing (c.f. lemma 4). This validates our understanding that it is always beneficial for the agents to have full cooperation if they do not desire any privacy.

The effect of privacy noise is included in the cost \( J_{\text{priv}} \). It is interesting to observe its behavior at different cooperation levels. Note that the noise has only a marginal effect on the cost at smaller cooperation levels. In fact, when the agents do not cooperate (\( \alpha = 0 \)), the noise does not affect the performance at all – which is natural because the agents do not share any information. In contrast, the effect of noise is significantly higher at larger cooperation levels, because the agents use the noisy states in their updates. Thus, the cost \( J_{\text{priv}} \) is a monotonically increasing function of \( \alpha \). The two cost curves \( J_{\text{ico}} \) and \( J_{\text{priv}} \) highlight the trade-off between having full cooperation vs. no cooperation. As evident from the resulting overall cost curve \( J \), an intermediate optimum cooperation level should be chosen to achieve best performance.

Figure 2 shows the overall cost \( J \) achieved as a function of the cooperation level for various levels of privacy noise. Observe that for each cooperation level, the cost increases with the noise level. These curves highlight that the optimum cooperation level changes with the privacy noise level which can be seen explicitly in figure 3. Note that along with the fact that \( J_{\text{priv}} \) is an increasing function, both \( J_{\text{priv}} \) and \( J_{\text{ico}} \) are strictly convex. Thus, \( \alpha^*(\sigma) \) is a monotonically decreasing function (c.f. theorem 2), which implies that it is always better for the agents to reduce their cooperation level if they desire to have a higher level of privacy. Finally, note that the consensus example does not satisfy the conditions in corollary 1 (see discussion below corollary 1).

### 4.2 Centroidal Voronoi tessellation

In this subsection, we show that our results and the intuition gained from the consensus problem, hold even when some of our assumptions are not satisfied; thus suggesting that a tradeoff between privacy and cooperation exists in a large class of distributed systems. We study a 1-dimensional centroidal Voronoi tessellation (CVT) problem over the interval \( \Omega = [0, 1] \). The goal of a CVT
The problem is to divide \( \Omega \) into \( N \) regions denoted by \( \{ \Omega_i \}_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \), and find \( N \) points in \( \Omega \), denoted by \( \{ x_i \}_{i \in \mathcal{N}} \) such that (i) \( \Omega_i \) is the Voronoi region\(^1\) of \( x_i \), and (ii) \( x_i \) is the centroid of \( \Omega_i \). The CVT problem can be expressed as the following optimization problem:

\[
\min_{x} J_{co}(x) = \int_{0}^{1} \min_{i \in \mathcal{N}} (x_i - y)^2 dy.
\]  

(30)

The 1D-CVT problem can be viewed as an optimal resource allocation problem, and it has wide applications including data compression and scalar quantization (Q. Du, Faber, & Gunzburger, 1999).

Without loss of generality, we assume that \( x_1 \leq x_2 \leq \cdots \leq x_N \). Then, the cost in (30) can be

\(^1\)The Voronoi region for \( x_i \) is defined by \( V_{x_i} = \{ y : |y - x_i| \leq |y - x_j| \quad \forall j \neq i \} \).
written as

\[ J_{co}(x) = \frac{1}{24} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left[ (x_i - x_{i-1})^3 + (x_{i+1} - x_i)^3 \right], \]  

(31)

where \( x_0 \triangleq -x_1 \) and \( x_{N+1} \triangleq 2 - x_N \) are dummy variables introduced for ease of analysis. It can be easily verified that \( J_{co}(x) \) is convex. Further, the \( i^{th} \) component of its gradient can be written as

\[ \frac{\partial J_{co}(x)}{\partial x_i} = \frac{1}{4} (2x_i - x_{i-1} - x_{i+1})(x_{i+1} - x_{i-1}). \]  

(32)

By examining (32), it follows that the optimum value \( x^* \) that minimizes \( J_{co}(x) \) also minimizes a different cost function, denoted by \( \tilde{J}_{co}(x) \), whose \( i^{th} \) component of the gradient is

\[ \frac{\partial \tilde{J}_{co}(x)}{\partial x_i} = \frac{1}{4} (2x_i - x_{i-1} - x_{i+1}). \]  

(33)

Since \( J_{co}(x) \) and \( \tilde{J}_{co}(x) \) have the same optimum, we can use the gradient of either cost functions in the gradient descent algorithm for solving the CVT problem. However, the gradient of \( J_{co}(x) \) is non-linear whereas the gradient of the \( \tilde{J}_{co}(x) \) is linear. We choose the linear gradient since it results in a linear gradient descent algorithm and fits into our framework (3). Using the individual components in (33), the gradient can be written as

\[ \nabla \tilde{J}_{co}(x) = Qx + r, \]  

(34)

where \( r = [0, 0, \cdots, 0, -0.5]^T \), and \( Q \) is the following tri-diagonal matrix:

\[
Q = \frac{1}{4} \begin{bmatrix}
3 & -1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
-1 & 2 & -1 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
0 & -1 & 2 & -1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & -1 & 2 & -1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & -1 & 3
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

**Lemma 5: (Properties of \( Q \))** \( Q \) is positive definite and \( \rho(Q) = 1 \).

**Proof.** From Yueh (2005), Theorem 5, we get

\[
\lambda_i(Q) = \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 + \cos \left( \frac{(i-1)\pi}{N} \right) \right) \quad \text{for} \quad i = 1, 2, \cdots, N.
\]

Thus, \( \lambda_1(Q) = 1 \) and \( \lambda_N(Q) > 0 \) and Lemma follows. \( \square \)

The new cost function can then be written as \( \tilde{J}_{co}(x) = \frac{1}{2} x^T Q x + r^T x \) and the gradient descent to solve the CVT problem in (30) becomes

\[
\text{S}_{\text{CVT}}: \quad x(k+1) = x(k) - \gamma_1(Qx(k) + r) \triangleq A_1x(k) + b_1. \]  

(35)

\footnote{For any \( x \in \Omega^N, y \in \Omega^N \) and \( 0 < \lambda < 1 \), \( J_{co}(\lambda x + (1 - \lambda)y) \leq \lambda J_{co}(x) + (1 - \lambda)J_{co}(y) \).}
The algorithm $S_{CVT}$ with $\gamma_1 = 1$ is the well known Lloyd’s Algorithm (Q. Du et al., 1999) for solving CVT problems in 1-D.

**Remark 8: (Generalization for non-quadratic cost functions)** Although the CVT problem has a cubic cost function, its optimum can be achieved via a linear algorithm so that our framework is still applicable. This suggests that our framework may be applicable to general non-quadratic convex cost functions, provided that the optimum can be achieved via a linear algorithm. $\square$

To introduce the cooperation level, we consider the following quadratic cost

$$J_{nco}(x) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \int_0^1 (x_i - y)^2 dy = \frac{1}{N} x^T x - \frac{1}{N} 1_N^T x + \frac{1}{3}. \quad (36)$$

Observe that the decoupled cost in (36) is the counterpart of the coupled cost in (30), and that $J_{nco}(x)$ satisfies assumption A.3. Further, note that $x = [0.5, 0.5, \cdots, 0.5]^T$ is the optimum of $J_{nco}(x)$. By comparing the above cost function with (14), we obtain $\bar{Q} = \frac{2}{N} I_N, \bar{r} = -\frac{1}{N} 1_N$, and $\bar{s} = \frac{1}{3}$, and the corresponding values of $Q_\alpha, A_\alpha, b_\alpha$ and $H_\alpha$ can be calculated using (16). Since $Q_\alpha$ is positive definite, the stability condition (17) for the CVT problem reduces to $\gamma < 2$. We next analyze the system cost and performance.

The cost in (31) can be simplified as

$$J_{co}(x) = \frac{1}{3} x_1^3 + \frac{1}{12} \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} (x_{i+1} - x_i)^3 + \frac{1}{3} (1 - x_N)^3. \quad (37)$$

We make the linear transformation $z = Gx + g$ to obtain

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 - x_1 \\ x_3 - x_2 \\ \vdots \\ x_N - x_{N-1} \\ 1 - x_N \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ -1 & 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & -1 & 1 & 0 & \cdots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & \cdots & 0 & -1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x \\ G \\ g \end{bmatrix}.$$ 

Let $m_\alpha$ and $P_\alpha$ denote the steady state mean and covariance achieved by algorithm $S_{\alpha}^{ Priv }$ in (16) for the CVT problem. Further, let $\eta_\alpha$ and $V_\alpha$ denote the steady state mean and covariance of $z$, and let $\eta_i$ and $v_{ij}$ denote the elements of $\eta_\alpha$ and $V_\alpha$, respectively. Due to the linear transformation, we have $\eta_\alpha = Gm_\alpha + g$ and $V_\alpha = GP_\alpha G^T$. Recall that, for a scalar random variable with distribution $y \sim N(\nu, \theta^2)$, it holds $E[y^3] = \nu^3 + 3\nu\theta^2$. Thus, the expected cost for the CVT problem becomes

$$J(\alpha, \sigma) = \frac{1}{3} (\eta_1^3 + 3\eta_1 v_{11}) + \frac{1}{12} \sum_{i=2}^{N} [\eta_i^3 + 3\eta_i v_{ii}] + \frac{1}{3} (\eta_{N+1}^3 + 3\eta_{N+1} v_{N+1,N+1}). \quad (37)$$

Consider now an example with $N = 4$ agents and $\gamma = 1$. Figure 4 shows how the steady state values achieved by the agents vary with the cooperation level, when they use algorithm $S_{\alpha}^{ Priv }$ in (16) in the absence of noise. Observe that, when $\alpha = 0$, the optimum of $J_{nco}(x)$ in (36) is $x = [0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5]^T$, so that the agents occupy the same location due to the lack of cooperation. When $\alpha = 1$, the agents cooperate completely and achieve the solution $x = [\frac{1}{8}, \frac{3}{8}, \frac{5}{8}, \frac{7}{8}]^T$, which is
the optimum of $J_{co}(x)$ in (30). Figure 4 shows the solution achieved by algorithm $S^\text{pr}iv_\alpha$ for the intermediate values of $\alpha$.

Figure 5 shows the system cost as a function of the cooperation level for various values of $\sigma$. Similar to the consensus example, we observe that the cost is a convex function of $\alpha$ and the optimum $\alpha$ is less than 1. Moreover, the cost increases when the noise level increases.

**Analysis with two agents:** The analysis of the cost function simplifies if we consider the simple, albeit useful, case of $N = 2$ agents. In this case, we can algebraically solve the steady state
equations (18) and (19) to obtain

\[ m_\alpha = \left[ \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha}{4} \right] \left[ \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\alpha}{4} \right], \quad \text{and} \quad P_\alpha = \begin{bmatrix} p_1 & p_2 \\ p_2 & p_1 \end{bmatrix}, \]

where \( p_1 = \frac{\alpha^2 \sigma^2 (8 - \alpha^2)}{32 (4 - \alpha^2)} \) and \( p_2 = \frac{\alpha^4 \sigma^2}{32 (4 - \alpha^2)} \). Thus,

\[
J(\alpha, \sigma) = \frac{1}{48} + \frac{(1 - \alpha)^2}{16} + \frac{\sigma^2 \alpha^2 (4 + \alpha)}{32 (2 + \alpha)}. \tag{38}
\]

It can be easily verified that this cost is monotonically increasing w.r.t. \( \sigma \) and is convex with respect to \( \alpha \). Consequently, an optimum \( \alpha \) exists for each value of \( \sigma \), and it is given by

\[
\alpha^*(\sigma) = \sqrt{\frac{(1 + 2\sigma^2)^2 + 8 - (1 + 2\sigma^2)}{2}}. \tag{39}
\]

As shown in Figure 6, the function \( \alpha^*(\sigma) \) is monotonically decreasing. This indicates that it is best for the agents to cooperate fully when no noise is present, and to reduce their cooperation level when the privacy noise increases.

**Remark 9:** (Similarity between consensus and CVT results) By comparing Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 in the CVT example (with cubic cost) with Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 in the consensus example (with quadratic cost), we observe a similar pattern in the variation of the cost and the optimum cooperation level. This observation strengthens our belief that a similar tradeoff should appear in problems with general non-quadratic convex cost function that can be minimized via linear iterations. This generalization is left as a subject of future research. \( \square \)
5. Conclusion

This paper considers a multi-agent system where the agents cooperatively optimize a quadratic cost function while ensuring privacy of their states over time. First, we developed a noise adding differential privacy mechanism to protect the privacy of agents’ states over time. Next, we characterized the system performance degradation due to the privacy noise and argued that the degradation occurs due to cooperation between the agents. Further, we developed a framework in which the agents can respond to the privacy noise present in the system by varying their cooperation level and studied the combined effect of privacy noise and cooperation level on the system performance. Using the performance characterization, we next showed that there exists an optimum cooperation level that minimizes the system cost and obtained conditions under which the optimum cooperation level is a decreasing function of privacy noise level. Finally, we studied two examples of consensus and Voronoi Tessellations, and showed that they fit into our framework. The results obtained in the paper illustrate a tradeoff between performance, privacy and cooperation, and suggest that, to optimize performance, agents should decrease their cooperation level if they want to increase the privacy level. Among directions of future research, it would be of interest to extend this work to arbitrary convex cost functions.

References


Appendix A. Proof of Corollary 1

Proof. Let \( \prime \) denote the derivative or partial derivative w.r.t. \( \alpha \). First, we derive conditions under which the cost term \( J_{\text{ico}}(\alpha) \) is convex w.r.t. \( \alpha \). By differentiating (24) with respect to \( \alpha \) we obtain

\[
 J''_{\text{ico}}(\alpha) = (m'_a)^T Q m'_a + (Q m_a + r)^T m''_a.
\]

From the proof of lemma 4, for \( \alpha = 1 \), we have \( Q m_1 + r = 0 \) and \( m'_1 = 0 \). Thus, \( J''_{\text{ico}}(1) = 0 \). Now let \( \alpha \in [0,1) \). By differentiating (25), we get

\[
 2(Q - \bar{Q}) m'_a + Q_a m''_a = 0,
\]

\[
 \Rightarrow m''_a = \frac{2}{1 - \alpha} Q^{-1} (Q - \bar{Q}) Q^{-1} (Q m_a + r),
\]

where (a) follows from (26). Substituting the derivatives \( m'_a \) and \( m''_a \) we get

\[
 J''_{\text{ico}}(\alpha) = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} (Q m_a + r)^T Q^{-1} \left( 3Q - 2\bar{Q} + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \bar{Q} \right) Q^{-1} (Q m_a + r).
\]

Condition (iii) in the corollary guarantees that \( 3Q - 2\bar{Q} > 0 \) and thus \( J''_{\text{ico}}(\alpha) > 0 \) for \( \alpha \in (0,1] \).

Next, we derive conditions under which the cost term \( J_{\text{priv}}(\alpha, \sigma) \) is convex w.r.t. \( \alpha \). Recalling (16), let \( A_\alpha = \alpha A + B \), where \( A \triangleq \gamma(Q - \bar{Q}) \) and \( B \triangleq I_N - \gamma\bar{Q} = (1 - \gamma\delta) I_N \). Further, let \( H_\alpha = -\gamma\alpha \bar{Q} \) where \( \bar{Q} \triangleq Q - \text{diag}(Q) \). Differentiating (19) and substituting the above expressions, we get

\[
 P'_\alpha = A_\alpha P'_\alpha A_\alpha + \underbrace{A_\alpha B^T + B A^T}_{W} + 2\alpha A_\alpha A^T + 2\sigma^2 \gamma^2 \alpha \bar{Q}^2 . \tag{A1}
\]

Note that due to (iii) and (iv), \( A > 0 \) and \( B > 0 \). Further, we have the following facts (a) \( QA_\alpha = A_\alpha Q \) and (b) \( Q\bar{Q} = \bar{Q}Q \) (by (ii)). Using (a), (b) and (20), it can be easily observed that
\[ AP_\alpha B^T = BP_\alpha A^T > 0. \] Thus, \( W > 0 \) and (A1) resembles to a Lyapunov equation. Hence, we conclude that \( P'_\alpha > 0 \).

Taking derivative of (A1), we get

\[
P'_\alpha = A_\alpha P''_\alpha A_\alpha + 2AP'_\alpha B^T + 2BP'_\alpha A^T + 2A(P_\alpha + 2\alpha P'\alpha)A^T + 2\sigma^2\gamma^2\tilde{Q}^2. \tag{A2}
\]

Again using (a) and (b) and taking the derivative of (20), we get \( AP'_\alpha B^T = BP'_\alpha A^T > 0 \). Thus, \( Z > 0 \) and (A2) resembles to a Lyapunov equation. Hence, we get \( P''_\alpha > 0 \). Thus, \( J'_{\text{priv}}(\alpha, \sigma) = \frac{1}{2} tr(QP'_\alpha) > 0 \) and \( J''_{\text{priv}}(\alpha, \sigma) = \frac{1}{2} tr(QP''_\alpha) > 0 \) and the proof is complete.