

## Health Consequences of Insurance Coverage

Health Economics  
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## Research question

- Research question: what does insurance status do for health?
- Why might help?
- Why not?
- What evidence have we seen to date?
- Problems for identification
  - insurance rates vary systematically across groups
  - People with poor health or more expected spending have higher demand for insurance
  - High socioeconomic status more likely to have insurance

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## MEPS, 18-64 Years of Age

Variable	Insured	Uninsured	Variable	Insured	Uninsured
Age	42.1	38.4	% Smoke	21.3%	28.4%
% Male	44.6%	50.4%	% w/ Phys. Limit.	11.9%	8.2%
% < HS	17.6%	43.0%	% diabetes	7.6%	5.2%
% College	27.0%	8.9%	% high chol	24.0%	11.4%
% Black	14.9%	14.0%	% high BP	24.3%	15.3%
% Hispanic	18.2%	47.7%	Dr. Visits	6.0	2.1
Fair/poor health	15.3%	17.0%	Hosp. Vis.	0.12	0.05
Fair/poor mental	7.7%	7.6%	Total \$ HC	\$3959	\$1041

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## Results so Far

- RAND HIE
  - No difference in health outcomes for the average person
  - Some evidence high coinsurance plays were detrimental to people with pre-existing conditions
  - Problem – key outcomes are rare (like mortality) so the experiment does not have the statistical power to detect differences
- Oregon HIE
  - No change in health based on medical tests (cholesterol, blood pressure, glycated hemoglobin, BMI, etc.)
  - Improvements in self reported health , especially mental health – people think they are healthier


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### Problems in this literature

- Have a very predictive measure of health, self reported health status, that is hard to scale across people
- In many situations, have good objective measures of health, biomarkers, that don't seem to move
- One definitive outcome, mortality, that is very rare, even in 65-74 age group – need enormous samples to use this as an outcome

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One year mortality rates by age, 2018



### Evidence from the start of Medicare

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### Medicare


- Health insurance for aged and disabled
- Become eligible when you turn 65
- Signed into law July 30, 1965 in Joplin, MO by President Johnson
- At the time, majority of the aged did not have insurance
- Rapid increase in insurance coverage for those 65+
- Think of as a difference-in-difference
  - Those aged 65+ are treatment
  - Near elderly are the control
  - Have data before/after age 65

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## Un-insurance rates

Age Group	1963	1970	1977
45-54	28%	18%	13%
55-64	28%	25%	13%
65-74	34%	2%	1%
75+	60%	4.6%	0.2%

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What might be wrong with this DnD model?

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## Affordable care act

- Passed March of 2010
- Mostly a bill to increase coverage
  - Expanding Medicaid
  - Established health ins. exchanges
  - Employer mandate
  - Individual mandate
- Different provisions introduced over time

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## Individual mandate

- Went into effect 2014
- Fines escalated over time
  - 2014: max of \$95/person (up to 3) or 1% taxable income
  - 2015: max of \$325/person (up to 3) or 2% of taxable income
  - 2016: max of \$695/person (up to 3) or 3% of taxable income
- Has survived substantial constitutional challenge
  - Will talk about this the last week of October
- Fines set to \$0 in 2019 by Tax Cut and Job Act of 2017

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## Goldin et al.

- In year 2015, 6.1 million returns were fined for not having health insurance
- Eliminate some
  - Those < 18 or >64
  - Multiple addresses
- Leaves 4.5 million returns, twice as many people

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## Goldin et al.

- Treasury selected 3.9 million households to receive notice in early 2016 – reminding them how to avoid a penalty
- Group was selected at random
- If pilot increases insurance holding coverage – can use to identify impact of insurance

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## (a) Baseline



Department of the Treasury  
Internal Revenue Service

January 12, 2017

### Why am I getting this letter?

The law requires people to have a minimum level of health coverage, qualify for an exemption, or pay a penalty when they file their taxes. Our records show you reported owing this penalty when you filed your 2015 taxes because you or someone in your family did not have health insurance during that year. If you don't have health insurance or an exemption next year, you'll likely owe a penalty for 2017 as well. We are writing to make sure you know how you can avoid this penalty by signing up for health insurance.

### How do I avoid the penalty next year?

If you don't have health coverage, you can avoid owing a penalty for most or all of 2017 by signing up for health insurance soon. One way to get insurance is to sign up at HealthCare.gov before January 31, 2017. If you already have health coverage, you won't owe a penalty as long as you stay covered.

### How much will my penalty be next year if I don't sign up?

The penalty for not having any health coverage in 2017 will be about \_\_\_\_\_ if your income and family size have not changed since 2015.

### How much does health insurance at HealthCare.gov cost?

Most people who enroll in a plan through HealthCare.gov can find plans for \$75 a month or less after financial help. At HealthCare.gov, you can compare plans to find one that meets your needs and budget.

### How do I sign up for health insurance or get help finding a plan?

You can apply online by computer or mobile device, or you can get help in-person or by phone.

- Visit HealthCare.gov, select your state, and follow the step-by-step directions.
- Find in-person help from someone in your community at LocalHelp.HealthCare.gov.
- For questions or help signing up, call \_\_\_\_\_

### When is the deadline to sign up?

January 31, 2017, is the last day to enroll in a 2017 plan on HealthCare.gov.

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## Study

- Tax records merged to Social Security master death file
- Identifies date of death but not cause of death
- Key – SSN is used in both so easy linkage

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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Balance Checks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All	No Full-Taxpayers	Experimental Sample			
		Your Coverage	All	Treatment	Control	Difference p-value
<i>Individual characteristics</i>						
Female	0.511	0.478	0.451	0.450	0.451	0.669
Age	38.6	38.3	38.1	38.1	38.1	0.395
0 - 18	0.239	0.265	0.271	0.271	0.271	0.374
19 - 26	0.111	0.128	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.756
27 - 45	0.242	0.290	0.349	0.349	0.349	0.681
45 - 64	0.261	0.230	0.230	0.230	0.230	0.977
65 or older	0.147	0.087	0.015	0.015	0.014	0.510
<i>Household characteristics</i>						
Married	0.554	0.450	0.414	0.414	0.414	0.860
Household income	75,424	30,159	12,710	12,099	12,723	0.349
Income: Federal Poverty Line	4.16	1.61	2.35	2.35	2.36	0.525
< 1.38	0.366	0.657	0.267	0.267	0.266	0.143
1.38 - 4.00	0.276	0.228	0.629	0.629	0.630	0.429
≥ 4.00	0.358	0.115	0.104	0.103	0.104	0.313
Household size	2.81	2.86	2.74	2.74	2.74	0.725
<i>Observations</i>						
Individuals	2,893,635	45,472,192	8,897,821	7,651,401	1,246,420	
Households	1,396,008	22,778,960	4,526,719	3,892,849	633,870	

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Figure 1: Coverage Rates by Month





Figure 3: Mortality Over Time by Treatment Group



$y_i = 1$  if died

$x_i =$  months of insurance

$z_i = 1$  if treated

first stage :  $x_i = \pi_0 + z_i \pi_1 + \mu_i$

Intention to treat :  $y_i = \alpha_0 + z_i \alpha_1 + v_i$

$\pi_1 = dx / dz$

$\alpha_1 = dy / dz = (dx / dz)(dy / dx)$

$\alpha_1 / \pi_1 = dy / dx =$  Treatment on treated

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Table 7: Effect of Intervention on Mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Mortality	Mortality	Prior-Year	Mortality Among
	(Controls)		Mortality	Prior-Year Insured
Treated	-0.063 (0.025)	-0.061 (0.025)	-0.002 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.037)
Control Mean	1.007	0.993	0.238	1.143
Observations	1,358,983	1,309,736	1,358,983	688,795

$$\alpha_1 = dy / dz$$

People in treatment group had .063 percentage points lower Mortality – mean mortality is 1 – so 6% lower mortality

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Table 8: Effect of Coverage on Mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Mortality	Covered Months	Mortality	Mortality	Mortality
	(OLS)	(First Stage)	(2SLS)	(2SLS)	(2SLS, no prior-year exclusion)
Covered Months	-0.026 (0.001)		-0.178 (0.070)	-0.166 (0.068)	-0.167 (0.068)
Treated		0.358 (0.026)			
Controls				×	×
Control mean	1.007	7.795	1.007	0.993	1.040
Observations	1,358,983	1,358,983	1,358,983	1,309,736	1,983,167

Intention to treat: -0.063

1<sup>st</sup> stage: 0.358

Treatment on treated: -0.063/0.358 = -0.176

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## Doyle, RESTAT

- Examine outcomes of people involved in serious car crash
  - Taken away by ambulance
  - All receive some care
  - Question: what does insurance status do for quality of care?
- Why restrict to ambulance admits to the hospital?

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## CODES Data

- Crash Outcome Data Evaluation System
  - Links police accident reports to hospital discharge data
  - Only 23 states link (all payer states)
- Paper used data from WI, 1992-1997
  - 80% of all crash-related hospitalizations were linked

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- Police report data
  - Driver characteristics (sex, seat location, belt use, insurance status)
  - Accident scene
  - Killed, incapacitating injury, non-incap injury
- Hospital data
  - Per discharge
  - Minimal demographics
  - Total charges and payer
  - Procedure use
  - Diagnostic characteristics

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TABLE 1.—INSURED VERSUS UNINSURED: SELECTED VARIABLES

Variable		Privately Insured		Uninsured		t
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Treatment	Length of stay	9.17	13.93	6.44	8.30	7.56
	Facility charges (\$1,000)	20.68	37.34	13.10	19.75	7.88
Outcome	Mortality	0.037	0.19	0.045	0.21	1.60
Personal characteristics	Female	0.38	0.49	0.28	0.45	7.24
	Restraint seat belt or child seat	0.30	0.46	0.19	0.39	9.59
Vehicle types	Car	0.61	0.49	0.60	0.49	0.53
	Motorcycle	0.14	0.35	0.15	0.36	1.20
	Vehicle weight: <2,420 lb	0.25	0.43	0.30	0.46	3.06
	Vehicle age: ≤4 years	0.28	0.45	0.19	0.39	5.71
Crash characteristics	Severe vehicle damage	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.98
	Trapped	0.17	0.38	0.15	0.36	2.34
	Head-on collision	0.13	0.33	0.12	0.32	1.12
	Angle collision	0.29	0.45	0.22	0.42	5.76
Road types	Urban street	0.20	0.40	0.22	0.42	2.12
	Rural street	0.36	0.48	0.39	0.49	1.75
	Rural highway	0.30	0.46	0.27	0.44	2.36
Day and hour	Weekend	0.53	0.50	0.56	0.50	2.53
	Between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m.	0.24	0.43	0.32	0.47	6.56
Major diagnostic categories	Nervous system	0.20	0.40	0.22	0.41	0.98
	Musculoskeletal and tissue	0.35	0.48	0.35	0.48	0.03
	Multiple significant trauma	0.20	0.40	0.16	0.37	3.16
Neighborhood characteristics	White	0.94	0.13	0.92	0.17	3.52
	Median household income	30,726	8,188	27,955	7,752	8.76
Observations		9,261		1,581		

Missing observations result in 6,608 observations for vehicle age, 6,113 for vehicle weight. The t tests for neighborhood comparisons use standard errors clustered by ZIP code and 10,383 observations.

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TABLE 2.—NO AUTO INSURANCE VERSUS NO HEALTH INSURANCE: SELECTED VARIABLES

Variable		Privately Insured with No Auto Ins.		No Health Insurance		t
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	
Treatment	Length of stay	9.06	10.91	6.66	7.90	4.77
	Facility charges (\$1,000)	21.03	32.85	14.60	22.65	4.29
Outcome	Mortality	0.019	0.14	0.036	0.19	2.05
Personal characteristics	Female	0.24	0.43	0.27	0.44	1.28
	Restraint (seat belt or child seat)	0.14	0.35	0.23	0.42	4.62
Vehicle types	Car	0.49	0.50	0.63	0.48	5.22
	Motorcycle	0.42	0.49	0.24	0.43	7.29
Road types	Urban street	0.23	0.42	0.17	0.38	2.80
	Rural highway	0.25	0.43	0.29	0.45	1.73
Day and hour	Weekend	0.60	0.49	0.57	0.50	1.09
	Between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m.	0.31	0.46	0.31	0.46	0.13
Major diagnostic categories	Nervous system	0.19	0.39	0.18	0.39	0.37
	Musculoskeletal and tissue	0.39	0.49	0.38	0.49	0.13
	Multiple significant trauma	0.17	0.38	0.16	0.37	0.66
Neighborhood characteristics	White	0.93	0.14	0.93	0.14	0.03
	Median household income	29,432	7,162	28,890	7,657	1.27
Driver indicators	At fault	0.71	0.45	0.77	0.42	2.36
	DUI alcohol	0.38	0.49	0.42	0.49	1.24
Observations		807		671		

Data are for drivers only.

The t tests for neighborhood comparisons use standard errors clustered by ZIP code and 1,447 observations.

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TABLE 3.—THE UNINSURED RECEIVE LESS TREATMENT THAN THE PRIVATELY INSURED							
	ln(Facility Charges)			ln(Length of Stay)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
A. Privately Insured versus Uninsured							
No health insurance	-0.273	-0.149	-0.137	-0.145	-0.238	-0.203	-0.170
HMO	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Full controls	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Hospital fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,840	10,840	10,840	9,861	10,842	10,842	9,863
R <sup>2</sup>	0.24	0.25	0.39	0.39	0.15	0.12	0.23
B. Privately Insured with No Auto Insurance versus No Health Insurance							
No health insurance	-0.262	-0.178	-0.148	-0.155	-0.229	-0.218	-0.190
HMO	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Full controls	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Hospital fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,478	1,478	1,478	1,380	1,478	1,478	1,380
R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.26	0.43	0.43	0.19	0.14	0.29
Full controls include all personal, vehicle, crash, road, and neighborhood characteristics, as well as hour-of-the-day, day-of-the-week, and year indicators. Robust standard errors in parentheses.							

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TABLE 4.—THE UNINSURED HAVE HIGHER MORTALITY				
	Mortality			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Privately Insured versus Uninsured				
No health insurance	0.012	0.013	0.015	0.016
HMO	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Full controls	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Hospital fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	10,842	10,842	10,842	9,863
R <sup>2</sup>	0.06	0.03	0.07	0.07
B. Privately Insured with No Auto Insurance versus No Health Insurance				
No health insurance	0.016	0.022	0.017	0.020
HMO	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Full controls	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Hospital fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,478	1,478	1,478	1,380
R <sup>2</sup>	0.12	0.05	0.15	0.16
Full controls include all personal, vehicle, crash, road, and neighborhood characteristics, as well as hour-of-the-day, day-of-the-week, and year indicators. Robust standard errors in parentheses.				

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Card et al, *QJE*





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## Sample

- CA hospital admissions 1992-2002
- Restrict sample to those admitted through emergency department
  - e.g., Chronic bronchitis, heart attack, stroke
  - Why?

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


FIGURE VII  
Estimates of the Discontinuity in Mortality Rates at Age 65 over Various  
Follow-Up Periods