Published and Working Papers:
"Medical Malpractice Reform, the Supply of Physicians, and Adverse Selection" forthcoming in Journal of Law and Economics, 2014, 57(2), 501-527.
Abstract: Consumers have rarely known the price of medical care before receiving it, but access to price information is becoming more common. For a group of consumers with access to price information, I use detailed data on search, health care use, and negotiated prices to show that search leads consumers to pay significantly lower prices. I provide suggestive evidence that insurance coverage inhibits the use of price information which could rationalize the relatively low rates of search. The results suggest that availability of price information could have large impacts on prices, but that these impacts are mitigated by insurance coverage.
Research in Progress:
"Costs and Benefits of In-Kind Transfers: the Case of Medicaid Home Care" with Lee Lockwood (Northwestern)
"The Marginal Product of Medical Care: Evidence from Screening Guidelines"