God and Nature
I. The Existence and Nature of God (Natural Theology)
- A. The Big Picture
- B. Stage One: Proof of a First
Efficient Cause
- C. Stage Two: Via Remotionis
- D. Stage Three: Via
Affirmationis
II. The Emanation of Creatures from God: Creation and
Conservation
- A. The Nature of Efficient
Causality
- B. The Nature of Creation ex
nihilo
- C. God as Pure Actuality and
Unparticipated Esse
- D. Creation vs. neo-Platonist
Emanation
III. The Emanation of Creatures from God: General Concurrence
- A. The Problem of Secondary
(or Creaturely) Causality
- B. Three Positions
- C. Intrinsic and Extrinsic
Teleology in Nature
IA. The Big Picture
In Summa Contra Gentiles 1 St. Thomas divides
his natural
theology into three distinct stages:
- Stage One: Proof of a First Efficient Cause
- Critique of a priori arguments for God's
existence (chaps. 10-11)
- The possibility of natural theology (chap. 12)
- Proof a First Efficient Cause -- and of other god-like beings as well (chap. 13)
- Stage Two: Via Remotionis
- Explanation of the via remotionis (chap. 14)
- Derivation of the negative divine attributes (chaps.
15-27)
- Conclusion: The First Efficient Cause is a perfect being
(chap. 28)
- Stage Three: Via Affirmationis
- Explanation of the via affirmationis (chaps.
29-36)
- Derivation of the positive divine attributes (chaps.
37-102)
IB. Stage One: Proof of a First Efficient
Cause
- Genus of Proof:
- a posteriori (from the effects to the cause of
those effects) and
- not a priori (from the concept of God to
His existence, ala
St. Anselm, or from the claim that all our intellective cognition begins with a "preconceptual" grasp of infinite being, ala Karl Rahner and other so-called Transcendental Thomists. It is this latter position which, as far as I can make sense of the term, is disparagingly branded as ontotheology by certain modern and contemporary opponents of natural theology).
- Definition of a First Efficient Cause (FEC)
FEC = A being that acts (or causes or effects movement) and is not acted
upon (or caused or moved) = God in the Gallup Poll sense. That
is, 'God' is here functioning as a general or common term, and not
as a proper name, and its content is undetermined beyond the
description under which the being in question is proved.)
(Note: First of all, the argument is temporally vertical rather
than horizontal; that is, it is not an argument for the beginning of
the world, but an argument for the necessity of an FEC for any change
to take place in the present. Second, we can do just as well, I
believe, with the notion of a
Necessary Being or Uncaused Cause. So it is not the case that the
whole edifice depends on just one argument for the existence of a
god-like being.)
Question: Your proof of an FEC presupposes
that the world
is eternal. But what if the world is not eternal?
Answer: Then it is absolutely obvious that there is
an FEC!
- An interlude: The dangers
Anthropomorphism:
The position according to which God is a being who has perfections
proportionate to those of creatures, only to a much higher degree (God
as superman). This is the target of the Via Remotionis.
Obscurantism:
The position according to which God is so utterly different from
creatures that none of the perfections belonging to creatures in any
way resembles any perfection belonging to God (God as wholly
incomprehensible). This is the target of the Via Affirmationis.
IC. Stage Two: Via Remotionis
- Explanation of the Via Remotionis:
- We have, pace St. Anselm, no positive
quidditative concept of God--the
sort of 'natural kind' concept that allows us to begin scientific
inquiry with a
taxonomy
of substances that we have a direct grasp of.
- So we cannot know a priori that there is a
perfect being.
- However, given that there is an FEC, we can argue
"negatively"
that
an FEC must lack various sorts of imperfection or finitude
characteristic
of
things we do have positive quidditative concepts of. This series of
arguments
constitutes the via remotionis.
- In this way -- and in this way alone -- we can come to
know, a posteriori,
that there is a perfect being (that than which no greater being
can be conceived).
- Negative attributes derived by the via remotionis,
given the
definition of an FEC:
- An FEC has no passive potentiality (or passive power), i.e.,
cannot be caused or
acted upon in any way (Chap. 16 & 19)
- An FEC has no beginning and no end, i.e., is
eternal (Chap. 15)
- An FEC is not intrinsically measured by time
(Chap. 15)
- An FEC is imperfectible and incorruptible (Chap.
16)
- An FEC is not the matter of which the physical
universe is composed
(Chap. 17)
- An FEC is simple and lacks composition, i.e., has
no composition
of any of the types of composition--each instantiating the basic
act/potency
duality--that are characteristic of finite beings in Aristotelian
metaphysics,
to wit: (Chap. 18)
- composition of integral (material or bodily) parts
(Chap. 20)
- composition of essential parts (form and matter,) (Chap.
20) -- a first cause lacks even the sort of matter had by the celestial
bodies, which is on an Aristotelian view subject only to change of place
- composition of substance and accident (since accidents
perfect substances)
(Chap. 23)
- composition of genus and difference (since the
difference perfects the
genus) (Chap. 24 & 25)
- composition of esse and nature (essence) (since
an FEC cannot
receive esse (being) from another) (Chap. 21 & 22)
- An FEC is not the form or structure of the universe,
either as a whole
or with respect to any particular bodily thing (Chap. 26 & 27)
Conclusion: An FEC is wholly lacking in imperfection and
so is
an utterly transcendent perfect being (= God in Anselm's sense)
(Chap.
28)
ID. Stage Three: Via Affirmationis
- The similarity of creatures to God
- Univocal vs. Equivocal Causality: God is an equivocal
cause
of creatures, since creatures do not have their attributes in the way
that
God 'has' (better: is) his attributes. For God's attributes are His
imperfectible
substance or nature--and not accidents that perfect a perfectible
substance. (In general, a univocal cause is one that communicates its own nature to the effect, as in generation, whereas an equivocal cause is one whose effect is different in nature from the cause.)
- Still, creatures are 'traces' or 'representations'--albeit imperfect
traces or representations--of the divine being, analogous to the way in
which artifacts instantiate the ideas or blueprints of the artisans who
make them. For the divine ideas are themselves indicative of modes in
which
God's being can be represented or imaged by finite creatures.
(Intellectual substances, such as angels and human beings, are
said to be 'images' of God rather than mere 'traces'. But we
can't go into that distinction here.)
- So we can come to a limited knowledge of those positive
attributes of God
that are reflected in His creation, but we must always be mindful of
His
transcendence as established by the via remotionis.
- Types of predication of positive attributions to God:
- Literal predications:
- Names that signify pure perfections (e.g.,
'wise', 'intelligent',
'good', 'living', etc.)
- Names that signify in the mode of supereminence
(e.g., 'First Efficient
Cause', 'Perfect Being', etc.)
- (Merely) metaphorical predications:
- Names that signify perfections but express a mode that
can belong only
to creatures (e.g., 'lion', 'rock', 'fortress', 'paper towel', as in "God is a paper towel that wipes away our
sins"). It is precisely the via remotionis that gives us the division of biblical predicates about God into literal and metaphorical.
- Types of literal predication:
- Univocal predication: Predication of a form or
concept that
is the same
in species in both subjects (e.g., 'Simba is a lion' and 'Ponto is
a lion')
- Equivocal (by chance) predication: Predication
of
two wholly disparate
forms or concepts that just happen to be associated with the same
linguistic term
(e.g., 'This
is
a bat' said of the animal and 'This is a bat', said of the instrument
for hitting a pitched
ball).
- Analogical predication: Predication of two forms
which, though different,
are ordered to one another in some non-accidental way (e.g., 'This is
intelligent'
said of you as a student and of your term paper; 'This is healthy' as
said of an animal and of food). So we have two different concepts
here, but concepts that are ordered in a certain way.
St. Thomas's thesis: Terms that are predicated
literally of both
God and creatures (viz., the pure perfections) are predicated
of
them analogically, always under the shadow of God's transcendence as
established
by the via remotionis. This is why St. Thomas and others
say
strange things like 'God is Wisdom'.
Dynamics of positive predication: God is wise ..... but
not wise
like Socrates (via remotionis) ..... God is super-wise or Wisdom
Itself -- the abstract term 'wisdom' reminds us of
God's simplicity but doesn't capture his subsistence
(unlike ordinary instances of wisdom, he's not an accident that exists
in another), whereas the concrete term 'wise' reminds us of God's subsistence
but doesn't capture his simplicity (unlike the wise beings
of our experience, he is not composed of his substance and the accident
of wisdom which perfects that substance).
- Some positive attributions arrived at by means of the
via
affirmationis--based
on principle that a perfect being has what it is more perfect to have
than
to lack:
- goodness
- uniqueness
- intelligence
- power
- freedom
- love
- mercy
- justice
- providence
- blessedness ........This is precisely what God offers us
a participation
in = human beatitude
IIA. The Nature of Efficient Causality
(a case
in which the light of faith leads to a conclusion that could have
been
discovered by natural reason, but probably would not have been
discovered without
revelation)
- Aristotle:
Agent A is an efficient cause of effect E
= The form
that constitutes E is given by A via A's acting
on
the subject of E
Note: The implication is that every instance of
efficient causality
involves both
- an action on a patient that constitutes a change, and
- the communication of a form or perfection
- St. Thomas:
Agent A is an efficient cause of effect E
= A,
by acting, gives esse to E (where esse
includes, but
is not limited to, form)
Note: The implication is merely that every instance
of efficient
causality involves
- the communication of esse, but not necessarily
action on a patient
- an action, but not necessarily a change in the strict
sense
So St. Thomas re-defines efficient causality in order to open up conceptual space for the possibility of creation ex nihilo -- which, if it is possible, is surely a kind of efficient causality.
IIB. The Nature of Creation ex nihilo
(See Summa Contra Gentiles 2, chap. 17-19)
- Similarities to ordinary efficient causality:
- Creation involves action, i.e., the communication of an
effect by an agent
- Creation involves the communication of esse
- Differences from ordinary efficient causality:
- Creation involves no patient and so is not a
change--either a qualified
(accidental) change or an unqualified (substantial) change
- Creation is both (i) instantaneous and (ii) such that no
causal processes
lead up to it.
- Creation involves the giving of esse-as-such
(i.e., esse
"from the bottom up" or, better, "from the top down") and not just such-esse (form).
- The heart of the doctrine of creation:
Necessarily, for any entity x distinct
from God, God gives x
esse-as-such at every moment x exists; that is, God gives esse
to
x and to all its accidents and parts and components (including
primary matter if applicable) at every moment at which x exists.
- Creation and Conservation:
- Creation de novo = giving esse-as-such to
an entity none
of whose constituents has previously existed
- Divine conservation = giving esse-as-such to an
entity that already
exists (i.e., the prolongation of the creative act)
Questions: What about the generation of one created
substance
by other created substances? What about accidental change? Stay tuned.
IIC. God as Pure Actuality and
Unparticipated Esse
- Initial question: Is there any being capable of
creating ex
nihilo?
- St. Thomas's answer: Only if there is an agent
whose proper effect
is "esse-as-such." That is, a creative agent
- must be able to give esse from the bottom up (or better: from the top down) to at least some entity and
hence must be Pure Actuality (intensive aspect), and
- must be able to give esse to any possible
finite being and hence
must be Unparticipated Esse (extensive aspect)
- Pure Actuality (an Aristotelian limiting notion):
Beings that have
passive potency are able to communicate only perfections which, like
their
own perfections, modify a presupposed subject. So beings of this sort
can
communicate only "such-esse," i.e., forms of various kinds. Only
a being
whose own esse is not the actualization of some passive
potentiality -- and
whose substance is thus not a subject perfected by attributes -- is
capable
of giving esse from the bottom up, i.e., without presupposing a
subject or patient to act on. Such a being is Pure Actuality
with
no admixture of passive potentiality. (See Summa Contra Gentiles
2, chap. 16, #3)
- Unparticipated Esse (a Platonistic limiting
notion): Beings
that have limited perfection have only a part of (or participation in)
the totality of all perfections, and thus they are 'participated'
beings
and have 'participated' (or 'partitioned') esse (e.g., aardvark-esse or oak-tree-esse). Since a being
cannot
give perfections that it in no way contains, a participated being
cannot
give esse to every possible finite being. Only a being which is
unlimited or unpartitioned or unparticipated esse -- and in
which
there is thus no distinction between esse and delimiting nature
(i.e. essence) -- can give every possible sort of esse.
(See Summa
Contra Gentiles 2, chap. 15, #5 and #7)
- Thesis:
- God = Pure Actuality = Unparticipated
Esse = has no distinction
between esse and essentia (or nature). All of
these
necessarily
go together.
- Creature = A limited actuality involving potentiality = esse
limited to
a particular nature = has composition of esse and essentia.
This holds for spiritual as well as material creatures.
IID. Creation vs. neo-Platonist Emanation
- Neo-Platonism:
- St. Thomas:
- In giving esse-as-such, God acts freely and not
by a necessity of
nature
- God's
effects are 'limited' only by what is
metaphysically possible (defined
by the divine ideas), and every possible creature is such that God is
able to bring it into existence directly (without any intermediaries)
and ex nihilo. (In fact, creation ex nihilo does not itself admit of intermediary efficient causes.)
- God is an intelligent and perfectly provident creator
Question: Doesn't an all-good being necessarily
diffuse goodness?
(St. Thomas: This necessary diffusion occurs within the divine
nature in the procession of the Son from the Father and the procession
of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.)
IIIA. The Problem of Secondary (or
Creaturely)
Causality (aka: the roots of the
(catastrophic, of course) 17th century rejection of
Aristotelian natures).
The following two theses appear to be in tension with
one another when
we are talking about actions that, unlike creation and divine
conservation,
are actions on a subject or patient:
(T1) God gives esse-as-such to every creature at
every moment
it exists
(T2) Creatures themselves act as genuine (secondary)
causes of other
creatures (substances and accidents) and thus
give them esse.
IIIB. Three Positions
- OCCASIONALISM :
- (T1) is true and (T2) is false
- So God is the only active cause in nature.
- Comments:
- 'Cause' followed by 'effect' vs. effect emanating
from cause;
occasional causality (counterfactual dependence) vs. genuine efficient
causality (where do you think Hume got it from?)
- Laws of nature = the norms God has chosen to impose on
things from without
- The
aim of natural science is not to discover the inner
natures of things -- or, equivalently, the real causes
of things -- but rather to discover the norms that God has chosen
to impose on his action in the world.
- Problems with the causal origin of evil
- For St. Thomas's response to occasionalism, see Summa
Contra Gentiles 3, chap. 69
- Protagonists: al-Ghazali, Gabriel Biel (sort of),
Malebranche, Berkeley
(Interested students may click here
to read a really interesting (well, at least mildly
interesting)
paper on occasionalism.)
- MERE CONSERVATIONISM:
- (T2) is true and (T1) is false
- In the ordinary course of nature, God gives esse-as-such
to certain creatures
only after they have been produced by other creatures.
- Comments:
- Stronger than deism, since it holds that God
continuously conserves all
created things and their active and passive powers. But it still denies
that every effect in the world is directly God's effect.
- Laws of nature = norms that are intrinsic to the
natures of things
- The aim of natural science is to discover the inner
natures of things or, equivalently, the real causes of things
- Protagonists: Durandus de Saint-Pourçain,
some moderns
- CONCURRENTISM:
- (T1) and (T2) are both true.
- In the ordinary course of nature God's manner of
giving esse-as-such
to natural effects is to act with or through created agents as a concurring
immediate
(i.e., direct) cause of their own proper effects. Thus a natural action is an action
of
both God and secondary agents.
- Comments:
- Laws of nature = norms that are intrinsic to the
natures of things
- The aim of natural science is to discover the inner
natures of things or, equivalently, the real causes of things
- The miracle of the fiery furnace (Daniel 3) or (Ghazal's example) Abraham in the fire
- Thomists [Dominicans] vs. Molinists and Suarezians [Jesuits] (famous 16th century dispute De Auxiliis)
- Protagonists: St. Thomas (see Summa Contra
Gentiles 3, chaps.
67 and 70) and virtually all the Scholastics
IIIC. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Teleology in
Nature
- Intrinsic Teleology: A function of the causal
tendencies built into
natural things insofar as they have natures (Aristotle)
- Extrinsic Teleology: A function of God's role as
Law-giver and provident
Ruler of the physical universe (Plato)
St. Thomas's View: By His eternal law God endows
creatures
with the causal tendencies and powers that define their natures, and by
that same law He "guides the actions and movements of all nature". Thus
there is no conflict between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology. Talk of
law emphasizes God's role as Law-giver, whereas talk about intrinsic
tendencies
and propensities emphasizes the relative autonomy of creatures endowed
by God with their own natures.
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