St. Thomas AquinasThe Summa TheologicaTranslated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province Index [<<
| >>]
OF THE ACT OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) What is "to believe," which is the internal act of faith? (2) In how many ways is it expressed? (3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above natural reason? (4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable by natural reason? (5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things explicitly? (6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith? (7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation? (8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity explicitly? (9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious? (10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith? Index [<<
| >>]
Whether to believe is to think with assent? Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not
to think with assent. Because the Latin word "cogitatio" [thought] implies
a research, for "cogitare" [to think] seems to be equivalent to "coagitare,"
i.e. "to discuss together." Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that
faith is "an assent without research." Therefore thinking has no place
in the act of faith.
Objection 2: Further, faith resides in the reason,
as we shall show further on (Question [4],
Article [2]). Now to think is an act
of the cogitative power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated
in the FP, Question [78], Article [4]. Therefore thought has nothing to
do with faith.
Objection 3: Further, to believe is an act of the
intellect, since its object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not
of the intellect, but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above
(FS, Question
[15], Article [1], ad 3).
Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.
On the contrary, This is how "to believe" is defined
by Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. ii).
I answer that, "To think" can be taken in three
ways. First, in a general way for any kind of actual consideration of the
intellect, as Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): "By understanding I
mean now the faculty whereby we understand when thinking." Secondly, "to
think" is more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect,
which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect's
arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of sight.
In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that "the Son of God is
not called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought realizes
what we know and takes form therefrom, it becomes our word. Hence the Word
of God must be understood without any thinking on the part of God, for
there is nothing there that can take form, or be unformed." In this way
thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet deliberating,
and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth. Since, however, such
a movement of the mind may be one of deliberation either about universal
notions, which belongs to the intellectual faculty, or about particular
matters, which belongs to the sensitive part, hence it is that "to think"
is taken secondly for an act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly
for an act of the cogitative power.
Accordingly, if "to think" be understood broadly according
to the first sense, then "to think with assent," does not express completely
what is meant by "to believe": since, in this way, a man thinks with assent
even when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is certain knowledge
of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.], or understands.
If, on the other hand, "to think" be understood in the second way, then
this expresses completely the nature of the act of believing. For among
the acts belonging to the intellect, some have a firm assent without any
such kind of thinking, as when a man considers the things that he knows
by science, or understands, for this consideration is already formed. But
some acts of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent,
whether they incline to neither side, as in one who "doubts"; or incline
to one side rather than the other, but on account of some slight motive,
as in one who "suspects"; or incline to one side yet with fear of the other,
as in one who "opines." But this act "to believe," cleaves firmly to one
side, in which respect belief has something in common with science and
understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of clear
sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence it is
proper to the believer to think with assent: so that the act of believing
is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect, which are about
the true or the false.
Reply to Objection 1: Faith has not that research
of natural reason which demonstrates what is believed, but a research into
those things whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such
things have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.
Reply to Objection 2: "To think" is not taken here
for the act of the cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as
explained above.
Reply to Objection 3: The intellect of the believer
is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore
assent is taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object
by the will.
Index [<<
| >>]
Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God and believing in God? Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith
is unsuitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing
in God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it
is one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three
acts of faith.
Objection 2: Further, that which is common to all
acts of faith should not be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith.
Now "to believe God" is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded
on the First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from
certain other acts of faith.
Objection 3: Further, that which can be said of
unbelievers, cannot be called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said
to believe in a God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.
Objection 4: Further, movement towards the end
belongs to the will, whose object is the good and the end. Now to believe
is an act, not of the will, but of the intellect. Therefore "to believe
in God," which implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned
as a species of that act.
On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes
this distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi---Tract. xxix in Joan.).
I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends
on the relation of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of
faith can be considered in three ways. For, since "to believe" is an act
of the intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above
(Article [1], ad 3), the object of
faith can be considered either on the part of the intellect, or on the
part of the will that moves the intellect.
If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then
two things can be observed in the object of faith, as stated above (Question
[1], Article [1]). One of these
is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is "to
believe in a God"; because, as stated above (Question
[1], Article [1]) nothing is proposed
to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to God. The other is
the formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account of which
we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is
"to believe God," since, as stated above (Question
[1], Article [1]) the formal object
of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to
assent to Its sake to whatever he believes.
Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far
as the intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is "to believe in
God." For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect
of an end.
Reply to Objection 1: These three do not denote
different acts of faith, but one and the same act having different relations
to the object of faith.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection. Reply to Objection 3: Unbelievers cannot be said
"to believe in a God" as we understand it in relation to the act of faith.
For they do not believe that God exists under the conditions that faith
determines; hence they do not truly imply believe in a God, since, as the
Philosopher observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) "to know simple things defectively
is not to know them at all."
Reply to Objection 4: As stated above (FS,
Question [9], Article
[1]) the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul
to the end: and in this respect an act of faith is "to believe in God."
Index [<<
| >>]
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason? Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation
to believe anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection
of a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now
matters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since they are things unseen
as stated above (Question [1], Article
[4]). Therefore to believe seems unnecessary for salvation.
Objection 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to
assent to matters, wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed
to him be true or false, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern
words?" Now a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith,
since he cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our judgments
are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters. Therefore
to believe is not necessary for salvation.
Objection 3: Further, man's salvation rests on
God, according to Ps. 36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the
Lord." Now "the invisible things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood
by the things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according
to Rm. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the understanding
are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not necessary for man's salvation,
that he should believe certain things.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb.
11:6): "Without faith it is impossible to please God."
I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate
to another, we find that two things concur towards the perfection of the
lower nature, one of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement,
while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus
water by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while
according to the movement of the moon, it moves round the centre by ebb
and flow. In like manner the planets have their proper movements from west
to east, while in accordance with the movement of the first heaven, they
have a movement from east to west. Now the created rational nature alone
is immediately subordinate to God, since other creatures do not attain
to the universal, but only to something particular, while they partake
of the Divine goodness either in "being" only, as inanimate things, or
also in "living," and in "knowing singulars," as plants and animals; whereas
the rational nature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of
good and being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.
Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists
not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that
which it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness.
Hence it was said above (FS, Question
[3], Article [8]) that man's
ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision
man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to Jn. 6:45: "Every
one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me." Now man
acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little
and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one who learns
thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire science in a perfect
degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that
"it behooves a learner to believe."
Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision
of heavenly happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple
believes the master who is teaching him.
Reply to Objection 1: Since man's nature is dependent
on a higher nature, natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection,
and some supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as man assents to first
principles, by the natural light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man,
by the habit of virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue;
and in this way, by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man
assents to matters of faith and not to those which are against faith. Consequently
"there is no" danger or "condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus,"
and whom He has enlightened by faith.
Reply to Objection 3: In many respects faith perceives
the invisible things of God in a higher way than natural reason does in
proceeding to God from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25):
"Many things are shown to thee above the understandings of man."
Index [<<
| >>]
Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason? Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe
those things which can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous
in God's works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is superfluous
to employ other means, where one already suffices. Therefore it would be
superfluous to receive by faith, things that can be known by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, those things must be believed,
which are the object of faith. Now science and faith are not about the
same object, as stated above (Question [1],
Articles [4],5). Since therefore all
things that can be known by natural reason are an object of science, it
seems that there is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically
[*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its
demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of them
are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the others should
also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is not necessary to
believe those things which can be proved by natural reason.
On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that
God is one and incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural
reason.
I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of God. The second reason is, in order that the knowledge of God may be more general. For many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations, and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived of the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were brought
to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is for the
sake of certitude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning
God. A sign of this is that philosophers in their researches, by natural
investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have
disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have
knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine
matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, as
it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.
Reply to Objection 1: The researches of natural
reason do not suffice mankind for the knowledge of Divine matters, even
of those that can be proved by reason: and so it is not superfluous if
these others be believed.
Reply to Objection 2: Science and faith cannot
be in the same subject and about the same object: but what is an object
of science for one, can be an object of faith for another, as stated above
(Question [1], Article
[5]).
Reply to Objection 3: Although all things that
can be known by science are of one common scientific aspect, they do not
all alike lead man to beatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed
to our belief.
Index [<<
| >>]
Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly? Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound
to believe anything explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in
his power. Now it is not in man's power to believe a thing explicitly,
for it is written (Rm.
10:14,15): "How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not heard?
And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless
they be sent?" Therefore man is not bound to believe anything explicitly.
Objection 2: Further, just as we are directed to
God by faith, so are we by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts
of charity, and it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced
by the precept of Our Lord (Mt.
5:39): "If one strike thee on one [Vulg.: 'thy right'] cheek, turn
to him also the other"; and by others of the same kind, according to Augustine's
exposition (De Serm. Dom. in Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound
to believe anything explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe
whatever God proposes to be believed.
Objection 3: Further, the good of faith consists
in obedience, according to Rm. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all
nations." Now the virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain
fixed precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according
to Ps. 118:60: "I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy commandments."
Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man should be ready to believe
whatever God may propose, without his believing anything explicitly.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb.
11:6): "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder
to them that seek Him."
I answer that, The precepts of the Law, which man
is bound to fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining
salvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above (FS,
Question [60], Article
[5]) depends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two
things may be considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which
is the proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is accidental
and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it belongs properly
and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the dangers of death,
and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself, for the sake of the common
good: yet that, in a just war, a man be armed, or strike another with his
sword, and so forth, is reduced to the object of fortitude, but indirectly.
Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the
fulfilment of a precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should
terminate in its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the
fulfilment of the precept does not require that a virtuous act should terminate
in those things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the proper
and direct object of that virtue, except in certain places and at certain
times. We must, therefore, say that the direct object of faith is that
whereby man is made one of the Blessed, as stated above (Question
[1], Article [8]): while the indirect
and secondary object comprises all things delivered by God to us in Holy
Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son of
Jesse, and so forth.
Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of
faith, man is bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith;
but as to other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly,
but only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he is
prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then
alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is clear to
him that they are contained in the doctrine of faith.
Reply to Objection 1: If we understand those things
alone to be in a man's power, which we can do without the help of grace,
then we are bound to do many things which we cannot do without the aid
of healing grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to
believe the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this,
for this help "to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully given;
and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a punishment of
a previous, or at least of original, sin," as Augustine states (De Corr.
et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct. viii.]).
Reply to Objection 2: Man is bound to love definitely
those lovable things which are properly and directly the objects of charity,
namely, God and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of
charity which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.
Reply to Objection 3: The virtue of obedience is
seated, properly speaking, in the will; hence promptness of the will subject
to authority, suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper
and direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental
or consequent to that proper and direct object.
Index [<<
| >>]
Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith? Objection 1: It would seem that all are equally
bound to have explicit faith. For all are bound to those things which are
necessary for salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now
it is necessary for salvation that certain things should be believed explicitly.
Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith.
Objection 2: Further, no one should be put to test
in matters that he is not bound to believe. But simple reasons are sometimes
tested in reference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are
bound to believe everything explicitly.
Objection 3: Further, if the simple are bound to
have, not explicit but only implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied
in the faith of the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible
for the learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also
have explicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have
explicit faith.
On the contrary, It is written (Job
1:14): "The oxen were ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them,"
because, as Gregory expounds this passage (Moral. ii, 17), the simple,
who are signified by the asses, ought, in matters of faith, to stay by
the learned, who are denoted by the oxen.
I answer that, The unfolding of matters of faith
is the result of Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural
reason. Now Divine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those
who are over them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the
angels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius explains
(Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding of faith
must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher degree. Consequently,
just as the higher angels, who enlighten those who are below them, have
a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the lower angels, as Dionysius
states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of higher degree, whose business
it is to teach others, are under obligation to have fuller knowledge of
matters of faith, and to believe them more explicitly.
Reply to Objection 1: The unfolding of the articles
of faith is not equally necessary for the salvation of all, since those
of higher degree, whose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe
explicitly more things than others are.
Reply to Objection 2: Simple persons should not
be put to the test about subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected
of having been corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith
of simple people in such questions. If, however, it is found that they
are free from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due
to their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.
Reply to Objection 3: The simple have no faith
implied in that of the learned, except in so far as the latter adhere to
the Divine teaching. Hence the Apostle says (1
Cor. 4:16): "Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ." Hence
it is not human knowledge, but the Divine truth that is the rule of faith:
and if any of the learned stray from this rule, he does not harm the faith
of the simple ones, who think that the learned believe aright; unless the
simple hold obstinately to their individual errors, against the faith of
the universal Church, which cannot err, since Our Lord said (Lk.
22:32): "I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not."
Index [<<
| >>]
Whether it is necessary for the salvation of all, that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ? Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary
for the salvation of all that they should believe explicitly in the mystery
of Christ. For man is not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are
ignorant about: since the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine revelation,
which reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above (Article
[6]; FP, Question
[111], Article [1]). Now
even the angels were in ignorance of the mystery of the Incarnation: hence,
according to the commentary of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they
who ask (Ps. 23:8):
"Who is this king of glory?" and (Is.
63:1): "Who is this that cometh from Edom?" Therefore men were not
bound to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ's Incarnation.
Objection 2: Further, it is evident that John the
Baptist was one of the teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him
(Mt. 11:11) that
"there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater than"
he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the mystery of Christ
explicitly, since he asked Christ (Mt.
11:3): "Art Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?" Therefore
even the teachers were not bound to explicit faith in Christ.
Objection 3: Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it would seem that the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith in Christ, since they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that it was not necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia
vii; Ep. cxc): "Our faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young
is delivered from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except by
the one Mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ."
I answer that, As stated above (Article
[5]; Question [1], Article
[8]), the object of faith includes, properly and directly, that thing
through which man obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ's Incarnation
and Passion is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written
(Acts 4:12): "There
is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved."
Therefore belief of some kind in the mystery of Christ's Incarnation was
necessary at all times and for all persons, but this belief differed according
to differences of times and persons. The reason of this is that before
the state of sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ's Incarnation, in
so far as it was intended for the consummation of glory, but not as it
was intended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and Resurrection, since
man had no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however, seem to have
had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the fact that he said
(Gn. 2:24): "Wherefore
a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife," of
which the Apostle says (Eph.
5:32) that "this is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the Church,"
and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about this sacrament.
But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only
as to the Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby
the human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else,
have foreshadowed Christ's Passion by certain sacrifices both before and
after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the learned
explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those sacrifices,
believed them to be ordained by God in reference to Christ's coming, and
thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so to speak. And, as stated
above (Question [1], Article
[7]), the nearer they were to Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge
of Christ's mysteries.
After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple
folk are bound to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as
regards those which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed,
such as the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of which we have spoken
above (Question [1], Article
[8]). As to other minute points in reference to the articles of the
Incarnation, men have been bound to believe them more or less explicitly
according to each one's state and office.
Reply to Objection 1: The mystery of the Kingdom
of God was not entirely hidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen.
ad lit. v, 19), yet certain aspects thereof were better known to them when
Christ revealed them to them.
Reply to Objection 2: It was not through ignorance
that John the Baptist inquired of Christ's advent in the flesh, since he
had clearly professed his belief therein, saying: "I saw, and I gave testimony,
that this is the Son of God" (Jn.
1:34). Hence he did not say: "Art Thou He that hast come?" but "Art
Thou He that art to come?" thus saying about the future, not about the
past. Likewise it is not to be believed that he was ignorant of Christ's
future Passion, for he had already said (Jn.
1:39): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sins
[Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world," thus foretelling His future immolation; and
since other prophets had foretold it, as may be seen especially in Isaias
53. We may therefore say with Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked
this question, being in ignorance as to whether Christ would descend into
hell in His own Person. But he did not ignore the fact that the power of
Christ's Passion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo,
according to Zach. 9:11: "Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament hast
sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no water"; nor
was he bound to believe explicitly, before its fulfilment, that Christ
was to descend thither Himself.
It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his
commentary on Lk. 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance
but from devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that
he inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his
disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the latter
framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing to the signs
of His works.
Reply to Objection 3: Many of the gentiles received
revelations of Christ, as is clear from their predictions. Thus we read
(Job 19:25): "I
know that my Redeemer liveth." The Sibyl too foretold certain things about
Christ, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we read
in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine Augustus
and his mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a man on whose
breast was a golden plate with the inscription: "Christ shall be born of
a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the lifetime of Irene and
Constantine, thou shalt see me again" [*Cf. Baron, Annal., A.D. 780]. If,
however, some were saved without receiving any revelation, they were not
saved without faith in a Mediator, for, though they did not believe in
Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing
in Divine providence, since they believed that God would deliver mankind
in whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the revelation of
the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: "Who teacheth
us more than the beasts of the earth."
Index [<<
| >>]
Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity? Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary
for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says
(Heb. 11:6): "He
that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that
seek Him." Now one can believe this without believing in the Trinity. Therefore
it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.
Objection 2: Further our Lord said (Jn.
17:5,6): "Father, I have manifested Thy name to men," which words Augustine
expounds (Tract. cvi) as follows: "Not the name by which Thou art called
God, but the name whereby Thou art called My Father," and further on he
adds: "In that He made this world, God is known to all nations; in that
He is not to be worshipped together with false gods, 'God is known in Judea';
but, in that He is the Father of this Christ, through Whom He takes away
the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name of His, which
hitherto they knew not." Therefore before the coming of Christ it was not
known that Paternity and Filiation were in the Godhead: and so the Trinity
was not believed explicitly.
Objection 3: Further, that which we are bound to
believe explicitly of God is the object of heavenly happiness. Now the
object of heavenly happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood
to be in God, without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not
necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.
On the contrary, In the Old Testament the Trinity
of Persons is expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis
it is written in manifestation of the Trinity: "Let us make man to Our
image and likeness" (Gn.
1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was necessary for salvation
to believe in the Trinity.
I answer that, It is impossible to believe explicitly
in the mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery
of Christ includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the
world through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was conceived
by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of Christ
was believed explicitly by the learned, but implicitly and under a veil,
so to speak, by the simple, so too was it with the mystery of the Trinity.
And consequently, when once grace had been revealed, all were bound to
explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity: and all who are born again
in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the invocation of the Trinity,
according to Mt. 28:19: "Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing
them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost."
Reply to Objection 1: Explicit faith in those two
things was necessary at all times and for all people: but it was not sufficient
at all times and for all people.
Reply to Objection 2: Before Christ's coming, faith
in the Trinity lay hidden in the faith of the learned, but through Christ
and the apostles it was shown to the world.
Reply to Objection 3: God's sovereign goodness
as we understand it now through its effects, can be understood without
the Trinity of Persons: but as understood in itself, and as seen by the
Blessed, it cannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover
the mission of the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.
Index [<<
| >>]
Whether to believe is meritorious? Objection 1: It would seem that to believe in not
meritorious. For the principle of all merit is charity, as stated above
(FS, Question
[114], Article [4]). Now
faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore, just as an act
of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by our natural gifts,
so neither is an act of faith.
Objection 2: Further, belief is a mean between
opinion and scientific knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically
known [*Science is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through
its demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not meritorious,
nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is not meritorious.
Objection 3: Further, he who assents to a point
of faith, either has a sufficient motive for believing, or he has not.
If he has a sufficient motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply
any merit on his part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to
believe: whereas if he has not a sufficient motive for believing, this
is a mark of levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: "He that is hasty to give
credit, is light of heart," so that, seemingly, he gains no merit thereby.
Therefore to believe is by no means meritorious.
On the contrary, It is written (Heb.
11:33) that the saints "by faith . . . obtained promises," which would
not be the case if they did not merit by believing. Therefore to believe
is meritorious.
I answer that, As stated above (FS,
Question [114], Articles
[3],4), our actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from
the free-will moved with grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding
from the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the
act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth
at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject
to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently the act of faith
can be meritorious.
Reply to Objection 1: Nature is compared to charity
which is the principle of merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared
to charity as the disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it
is evident that the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of
the form, nor can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form:
but after the advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding disposition
act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle of action, even
as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial form of fire. Accordingly
neither nature nor faith can, without charity, produce a meritorious act;
but, when accompanied by charity, the act of faith is made meritorious
thereby, even as an act of nature, and a natural act of the free-will.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things may be considered
in science: namely the scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his
consideration of that fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to
free-will, because the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration,
wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual consideration
of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his free-will, for it
is in his power to consider or not to consider. Hence scientific consideration
may be meritorious if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the
honor of God or the good of our neighbor. On the other hand, in the case
of faith, both these things are subject to the free-will so that in both
respects the act of faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion,
there is no firm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher
observes (Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect
act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent, it does not
appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the actual consideration.
Reply to Objection 3: The believer has sufficient
motive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching
confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the
Divine invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however,
sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose the
merit.
Index [<<
| >>]
Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith? Objection 1: It would seem that reasons in support
of what we believe lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi
in Evang.) that "there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason."
If, therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith
is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human reasoning
in support of matters of faith, diminishes the merit of believing.
Objection 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure
of virtue, lessens the amount of merit, since "happiness is the reward
of virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning
seems to diminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential
to faith to be about the unseen, as stated above (Question
[1], Articles [4],5). Now the
more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen. Therefore human
reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the merit of faith.
Objection 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so. Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith. On the contrary, It is written (1
Pt. 3:15): "Being ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you
a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: 'Of that hope which is in you.' St. Thomas'
reading is apparently taken from Bede.] and hope which is in you." Now
the Apostle would not give this advice, if it would imply a diminution
in the merit of faith. Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of
faith.
I answer that, As stated above (Article
[9]), the act of faith can be meritorious, in so far as it is subject
to the will, not only as to the use, but also as to the assent. Now human
reason in support of what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to
the will of the believer. First, as preceding the act of the will; as,
for instance, when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will,
to believe, unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way human
reason diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above
(FS, Question
[24], Article [3], ad 1;
Question [77], Article
[6], ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which precedes choice
makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just as a man ought to perform
acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment of his reason, and not
on account of a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not on
account of human reason, but on account of the Divine authority. Secondly,
human reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer. For when a
man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he thinks
out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof;
and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of faith but is
a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral virtues a consequent passion
is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated above (FS,
Question [24], Article
[3], ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words of the Samaritans
to the woman, who is a type of human reason: "We now believe, not for thy
saying" (Jn. 4:42).
Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is referring to the
case of a man who has no will to believe what is of faith, unless he be
induced by reasons. But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith
on the authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration
of some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith is
not, for that reason, lost or diminished.
Reply to Objection 2: The reasons which are brought
forward in support of the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which
can bring intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do
not cease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing
that what faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do not
diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand, though demonstrative
reasons in support of the preambles of faith [*The Leonine Edition reads:
'in support of matters of faith which are however, preambles to the articles
of faith, diminish,' etc.], but not of the articles of faith, diminish
the measure of faith, since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet
they do not diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready
to believe them, even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit
is not diminished.
Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is in opposition
to faith, whether it consist in a man's thoughts, or in outward persecution,
increases the merit of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more
prompt and firm in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith,
through not renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise
have greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account
of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in opposition
to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to faith, do not
always diminish the promptness of the will to believe, and therefore they
do not always diminish the merit of faith.
|