St. Thomas AquinasThe Summa TheologicaTranslated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province Index [<<
| >>]
OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (THREE ARTICLES)(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin? (2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind? (3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh? Index [<<
| >>]
Whether blindness of mind is a sin? Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind
is not a sin. Because, seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself
a sin. Now blindness of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (Jn.
9:41): "If you were blind, you should not have sin." Therefore blindness
of mind is not a sin.
Objection 2: Further, punishment differs from guilt.
But blindness of mind is a punishment as appears from Is. 6:10, "Blind
the heart of this people," for, since it is an evil, it could not be from
God, were it not a punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
Objection 3: Further, every sin is voluntary, according
to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary,
since, as Augustine says (Confess. x), "all love to know the resplendent
truth," and as we read in Eccles. 11:7, "the light is sweet and it is delightful
for the eyes to see the sun." Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons
blindness of mind among the vices arising from lust.
I answer that, Just as bodily blindness is the
privation of the principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the
privation of the principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has
a threefold principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light,
since it pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never forfeit
from the soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from exercising its proper
act, through being hindered by the lower powers which the human intellect
needs in order to understand, for instance in the case of imbeciles and
madmen, as stated in the FP, Question [84], Articles [7],8.
Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual
light superadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes
forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a punishment,
in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a punishment. Hence
it is written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): "Their own malice blinded them."
A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible
principle, through which a man understands other things; to which principle
a man may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens
in two ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man's will is deliberately
turned away from the consideration of that principle, according to Ps.
35:4, "He would not understand, that he might do well": whereas sometimes
it is due to the mind being more busy about things which it loves more,
so as to be hindered thereby from considering this principle, according
to Ps. 57:9, "Fire," i.e. of concupiscence, "hath fallen on them and they
shall not see the sun." In either of these ways blindness of mind is a
sin.
Reply to Objection 1: The blindness that excuses
from sin is that which arises from the natural defect of one who cannot
see.
Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the
second kind of blindness which is a punishment.
Reply to Objection 3: To understand the truth is,
in itself, beloved by all; and yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone,
in so far as a man is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.
Index [<<
| >>]
Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind? Objection 1: It seems that dulness of sense is
not a distinct sin from blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary.
Now dulness is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory
(Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding denotes
a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness
of mind.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45)
in speaking of dulness describes it as "dullness of sense in respect of
understanding." Now dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems
to be the same as a defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness
of mind. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.
Objection 3: Further, if they differ at all, it
seems to be chiefly in the fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as
stated above (Article [1]), while
dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is not a sin:
so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not be a sin, which is contrary
to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he reckons it among the sins
arising from gluttony.
On the contrary, Different causes produce different
effects. Now Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises
from gluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these others
are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also.
I answer that, Dull is opposed to sharp: and a
thing is said to be sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called
dull through being obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by
a kind of metaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives
its object from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to perceive
the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence in corporeal
things the senses are said to be acute when they can perceive a sensible
object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent, while on the other hand
they are said to be dull, through being unable to perceive, except sensible
objects that are near at hand, or of great power.
Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of
sense in connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect
of certain primals and extremes, as stated in Ethic. vi, even as the senses
are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of knowledge.
Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does not perceive
its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but through certain
other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a thing's essence through
a property thereof, and the cause through its effect. Consequently a man
is said to have an acute sense in connection with his understanding, if,
as soon as he apprehends a property or effect of a thing, he understands
the nature or the thing itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its
slightest details: whereas a man is said to have a dull sense in connection
with his understanding, if he cannot arrive at knowing the truth about
a thing, without many explanations; in which case, moreover, he is unable
to obtain a perfect perception of everything pertaining to the nature of
that thing.
Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes a certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual goods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the knowledge of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of understanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost nature. This dulness has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that is, in so far as it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to his affection for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful consideration of spiritual things. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Index [<<
| >>]
Whether blindness of mind and dulness of sense arise from sins of the flesh? Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind
and dulness of sense do not arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine
(Retract. i, 4) retracts what he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, "God
Who didst wish none but the clean to know the truth," and says that one
might reply that "many, even those who are unclean, know many truths."
Now men become unclean chiefly by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness
of mind and dulness of sense are not caused by sins of the flesh.
Objection 2: Further, blindness of mind and dulness
of sense are defects in connection with the intellective part of the soul:
whereas carnal sins pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh
does not act on the soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of
the flesh do not cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.
Objection 3: Further, all things are more passive
to what is near them than to what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer
the mind than carnal vices are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness
of sense are caused by spiritual rather than by carnal vices.
On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45)
that dulness of sense arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.
I answer that, The perfect intellectual operation
in man consists in an abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the
more a man's intellect is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly
will it be able to consider things intelligible, and to set in order all
things sensible. Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to
be "detached" in order to command, and that the agent must have power over
matter, in order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that pleasure
fixes a man's attention on that which he takes pleasure in: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4,5) that we all do best that which we take
pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do them either not at all,
or in a faint-hearted fashion.
Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned
with pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most
impetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices cause
man's attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so that in
consequence man's operation in regard to intelligible things is weakened,
more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as sexual pleasures
are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore lust gives rise to
blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely the knowledge of spiritual
things, while dulness of sense arises from gluttony, which makes a man
weak in regard to the same intelligible things. On the other hand, the
contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and chastity, dispose man very much to
the perfection of intellectual operation. Hence it is written (Dan.
1:17) that "to these children" on account of their abstinence and continency,
"God gave knowledge and understanding in every book, and wisdom."
Reply to Objection 1: Although some who are the
slaves of carnal vices are at times capable of subtle considerations about
intelligible things, on account of the perfection of their natural genius,
or of some habit superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the pleasures
of the body, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently withdrawn
from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the unclean can know some truths,
but their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge.
Reply to Objection 2: The flesh acts on the intellective
faculties, not by altering them, but by impeding their operation in the
aforesaid manner.
Reply to Objection 3: It is owing to the fact that
the carnal vices are further removed from the mind, that they distract
the mind's attention to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind's
contemplation all the more.
|