Date |
Topics |
Reading
green=optional
|
| Tuesday, January 13 |
Introduction to the course |
none |
| Causal theories of intentional action |
| Thursday, January 15 |
Intentional action, belief, and desire |
Davidson, "Actions, reasons, and causes" |
| Tuesday, January 20 |
Criticisms of the belief/desire theory |
Frankfurt, "The problem of action"
Hursthouse, "Arational actions" |
Thursday, January 22
Tuesday, January 27 |
Some questions about theories of intentional action
Davidson on pure intending
Bratman on intentional action, belief, and intention |
Davidson, "Intending"
Bratman, "Two faces of intention"
|
Thursday, January 29
Tuesday, February 3
Thursday, February 5 |
Intentional actions, appearances of the good, and weakness of the will |
Plato, Protagoras (352-end)
Aquinas, ST IaIIae q8
Stocker, "Desiring the bad"
Tenenbaum, "The judgment of a weak will"
Davidson, "How is weakness of the will possible?"
|
Tuesday, February 10
Thursday, February 12 |
Setiya on intentions & acting for a reason |
Setiya, Reasons Without Rationalism (excerpt) |
| Alternatives to the causal theory |
| Tuesday, February 17 |
Anscombe's Intention, §§1-31
Some questions about Intention |
Anscombe, Intention (excerpt)
Wilson, "Davidson on intentional action" |
Thursday, February 19
Tuesday, February 24 |
Naive and sophisticated action theory
Thompson on aspect and the primacy of naive explanations
Objections to naive action theory |
Thompson, Life and Action (excerpt) |
| Believing at will |
Thursday, February 26
Tuesday, March 3
|
Deciding to believe
Is believing ever an intentional action? |
Williams, "Deciding to believe"
Shah, "Clearing space for doxastic voluntarism"
Setiya, "Believing at will" |
| Thursday, March 5 |
Midterm exam (in class)
|
| Spring break |
| Free will & determinism |
| Tuesday, March 17 |
van Inwagen's consequence argument |
van Inwagen, "The powers of rational beings"
van Inwagen, "How to think about the problem of free will" |
| Thursday, March 19 |
Frankfurt's compatibilism |
Frankfurt, "Freedom of the will and the concept of a person"
Frankfurt, "Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility"
|
| Tuesday, March 24 |
Compatibilism v. incompatibilism, continued |
Warfield, "Compatibilism and incompatibilism: some arguments" |
| Thursday, March 26 |
Incompatibilism and event causation |
O'Connor, "Indeterminism and free agency: three recent views"
Nozick, "Choice and indeterminism" |
| Tuesday, March 31 |
Chisholm's agent-causal theory |
Chisholm, "Human Freedom and the Self" |
Thursday, April 2
|
van Inwagen's criticisms of agent-causal theories |
van Inwagen, "Free wil remains a mystery"
O'Connor, "Agent causation"
Clarke, "Toward a credible agent-causal account of free will"
Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will §§9.2-3
|
| Tuesday, April 7 |
The scope of free will |
van Inwagen, "When is the will free?"
|
| Easter break |
| Free will & divine foreknowledge |
| Tuesday, April 14 |
The core argument for incompatibilism + two replies |
Edwards, Freedom of the Will (excerpt)
Warfield, "Ockhamism and Molinism: Foreknowledge and prophecy"
Freddoso, Introduction to Molina volume |
| Thursday, April 16 |
An argument for compatibilism |
Warfield, "Divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible"
Hasker, "No easy way out: a reply to Warfield"
Brueckner, "On an attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of foreknowledge and human freedom"
Warfield, "On Freedom and foreknowledge: a reply to two critics"
van Inwagen, "Fatalism"
|
| Thursday, April 23 |
Aquinas' compatibilism |
Aquinas, ST Iaq10, "The eternity of God"
Aquinas, ST Iaq14a13, "Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things"
Stump & Kretzman, "Prophecy, past truth, and eternity"
Stump, Aquinas (excerpts)
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V
|
| Problems of moral responsibility |
| Tuesday, April 28 |
Moral responsibility and luck |
Nagel, "Moral luck"
Rosen, "Skepticism about moral responsibility" |
| Tuesday, May 5 |
Final exam, 10:30-12:30, in the usual class room |