Syllabus

Date

Topics

Reading
green=optional
Tuesday, January 13 Introduction to the course none
Causal theories of intentional action
Thursday, January 15 Intentional action, belief, and desire Davidson, "Actions, reasons, and causes"
Tuesday, January 20 Criticisms of the belief/desire theory

Frankfurt, "The problem of action"
Hursthouse, "Arational actions"

Thursday, January 22
Tuesday, January 27
Some questions about theories of intentional action
Davidson on pure intending
Bratman on intentional action, belief, and intention

Davidson, "Intending"
Bratman, "Two faces of intention"

Thursday, January 29
Tuesday, February 3
Thursday, February 5
Intentional actions, appearances of the good, and weakness of the will

Plato, Protagoras (352-end)
Aquinas, ST IaIIae q8
Stocker, "Desiring the bad"
Tenenbaum, "The judgment of a weak will"
Davidson, "How is weakness of the will possible?"

Tuesday, February 10
Thursday, February 12
Setiya on intentions & acting for a reason

Setiya, Reasons Without Rationalism (excerpt)

Alternatives to the causal theory
Tuesday, February 17 Anscombe's Intention, §§1-31
Some questions about Intention

Anscombe, Intention (excerpt)
Wilson, "Davidson on intentional action"

Thursday, February 19
Tuesday, February 24
Naive and sophisticated action theory
Thompson on aspect and the primacy of naive explanations
Objections to naive action theory

Thompson, Life and Action (excerpt)

Believing at will

Thursday, February 26
Tuesday, March 3

Deciding to believe
Is believing ever an intentional action?

Williams, "Deciding to believe"
Shah, "Clearing space for doxastic voluntarism"
Setiya, "Believing at will"

Thursday, March 5 Midterm exam (in class)
Spring break
Free will & determinism
Tuesday, March 17 van Inwagen's consequence argument

van Inwagen, "The powers of rational beings"
van Inwagen, "How to think about the problem of free will"

Thursday, March 19 Frankfurt's compatibilism

Frankfurt, "Freedom of the will and the concept of a person"
Frankfurt, "Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility"

Tuesday, March 24 Compatibilism v. incompatibilism, continued Warfield, "Compatibilism and incompatibilism: some arguments"
Thursday, March 26 Incompatibilism and event causation

O'Connor, "Indeterminism and free agency: three recent views"
Nozick, "Choice and indeterminism"

Tuesday, March 31 Chisholm's agent-causal theory Chisholm, "Human Freedom and the Self"
Thursday, April 2
van Inwagen's criticisms of agent-causal theories

van Inwagen, "Free wil remains a mystery"
O'Connor, "Agent causation"
Clarke, "Toward a credible agent-causal account of free will"
Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will §§9.2-3

Tuesday, April 7 The scope of free will

van Inwagen, "When is the will free?"

Easter break
Free will & divine foreknowledge
Tuesday, April 14 The core argument for incompatibilism + two replies Edwards, Freedom of the Will (excerpt)
Warfield, "Ockhamism and Molinism: Foreknowledge and prophecy"
Freddoso, Introduction to Molina volume
Thursday, April 16 An argument for compatibilism

Warfield, "Divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible"
Hasker, "No easy way out: a reply to Warfield"
Brueckner, "On an attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of foreknowledge and human freedom"
Warfield, "On Freedom and foreknowledge: a reply to two critics"
van Inwagen, "Fatalism"

Thursday, April 23 Aquinas' compatibilism

Aquinas, ST Iaq10, "The eternity of God"
Aquinas, ST Iaq14a13, "Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things"
Stump & Kretzman, "Prophecy, past truth, and eternity"
Stump, Aquinas (excerpts)

Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V

Problems of moral responsibility
Tuesday, April 28 Moral responsibility and luck

Nagel, "Moral luck"
Rosen, "Skepticism about moral responsibility"

Tuesday, May 5 Final exam, 10:30-12:30, in the usual class room