Summary. In this course, we will be discussing a number of questions about the nature of perceptual experience and its relation to our representation of the world in thought and language.

The first topic we will discuss concerns the objects of perceptual experience. We will ask whether perceptual experiences are relational and, if so, what sorts of things the objects of perceptual experience are.

We will then turn our attention from the objects of perceptual experience to the contents of perceptual experience: the way that perceptual experiences represent the world as being. We will ask discuss the relationship is supposed to be between the objects and contents of experience, whether the view that perceptions have objects commits us to the view that they have contents, and what sorts of things the contents of experiences might be. We will also ask what sort of qualities might figure in the content of a perception. It seems fairly clear that the contents of perceptions can include, for example, color and shape properties; but it is less clear whether perceptual experiences can have ‘richer’ contents including, e.g., kind properties and evaluative properties.

Next, we will discuss the relationship between the contents of experiences and the phenomenal qualities of experiences (‘what it’s like’ to have the experience). We will discuss a number of problem cases for the view that the contents of an experience determine its phenomenal qualities, including the inverted spectrum, internalism about the phenomenal qualities of experience, and perhaps some others.

Finally, we will discuss the relations between the contents of perception and the contents of thoughts and linguistic expressions. One important cluster of questions here concerns the directions of explanation between representation in perception, thought, and language. To what extent can the contents of our perceptual experiences be used to explain the contents of thoughts and linguistic expressions? Do conceptual and linguistic capacities ever help to determine the contents of experiences? We may also discuss a puzzle which seems to show that there are aspects of perceptual content which can be entertained in thought, but which are not expressible in language.

Prerequisites. This course will be taught as a high-level graduate seminar. Undergraduates are welcome, but must be Honours students in the Philosophy Department. Students who do not meet this criterion should obtain permission from me to take the course. If you are unsure about whether you should take the course, you may want to look at some of the readings listed below; alternatively, you should feel free to contact me by e-mail or schedule an appointment.

Grading. Students will be graded on the basis of their participation in the course, and on a term paper which will be due at the end of the semester.

Texts. The readings will be made available for photocopy as the semester progresses.

For a link to a detailed syllabus with a list of readings and links to those readings which are available online, click here.

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”L’université McGill attache une haute importance à l'honnêteté académique. Il incombe par conséquent à tous les étudiants de comprendre ce que l’on entend par tricherie, plagiat et autres infractions académiques, ainsi que les conséquences que peuvent avoir de telles actions, selon le Code de conduite de l’étudiant et des procédures disciplinaires (pour de plus amples renseignements, veuillez consulter le site http://www.mcgill.ca/integrity).”