CHAPTER V: THE ANALOGY OF NAMES

We are now in a position to examine the doctrine of the analogy of names. Since, as we have already pointed out, the analogy of names is for St Thomas a kind of equivocation, it will be well to examine in some detail the logical doctrine of equivocation and univocation. These matters are discussed at the outset of the Categories and they are numbered among the considerations which have come to be called the antepredicaments.

1. THINGS NAMED EQUIVOCALLY

"Things are said to be named equivocally when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each."^{1} This is the first sentence in the Aristotelian corpus and, like every statement which follows, its meaning must be carefully unpacked. The translation given is not entirely happy. The Latin rendering is as follows: "Aequivoca dicuntur quorum solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa."^{2} Both translations indicate that the definition begins with the things named and not from the name itself. A recent book insists on this in a rather curious way, and its author would have us believe that for Aristotle equivocation is something of things and not of terms.^{3} It is Aristotle, however, who points out that our names  refer to things insofar as they are known,^{4} and when we are talking about equivocals, we are talking about something which happens to things thanks to our mode of knowing, not something which belongs to them as they exist in rerum natura. Nevertheless, it is true that Aristotle is speaking of things, not of names, when he says, "aequivoca dicuntur." This does not mean that things are equivocal apart from being known and named; they are said to be equivocal: dicuntur, et non sunt.^{5} If man with his distinctive mode of knowing did not exist, there would be no equivocals, that is things named equivocally, But this is quite obvious from our previous considerations.

    Things named equivocally are said to have only a name in common: as soon as one goes beyond the name, there is diversity, for the common name does not signify the same definition with each use. The English here relies on our rather loose use of "definition,"something which is avoided in the Latin ratio.^{6} A definition in the strict sense of a proximate genus and specific difference is not necessarily intended by ratio in the definition of equivocals. Indeed, if it were, the apparent purpose of speaking first of equivocals then of univocals would be defeated. Aristotle is preparing to speak of the ten supreme genera of which "being" is said, not univocally, but equivocally. And, since the supreme genera cannot have definition in the strict sense, they could not be said to be named equivocally if ratio had the restricted sense.

    Aristotle's definition begins from things; these things are said to be equivocal; they are not equivocal in themselves, but they are named equivocally. Nevertheless, Aristotle is not talking about equivocation, but about equivocals, about things named equivocally. The Categories divides these things, but not things as they exist, for then it would not be a logical work. rather, the division is in terms of the different mode of existence (and hence of signification) which things have in our mind. Things are said to be equivocal or univocal, then, because of what happens to them due to our mode of knowing.^{7} This is the reason for the distinction, mentioned by Cajetan^{8} and John of St Thomas,^{9} between aequivoca aequivocans (the name) and aequivoca aequivocata. The latter are the things named, and they are equivocal, not as things, but as named. This is a logical discussion.

    There is a difficulty which can arise in trying to understand Aristotle's statement that things named equivocally have the same name. What constitutes a name as a name is the fact that it signifies something. But how can it be said that a sound which signifies different rationes is the same name? It would seem that something designating the merely physical aspect of the word should have been used, so that the Latin, for instance, would read, "quorum solum vox est commune."

    St Albert goes into this problem at some length, distinguishing between a first and a second form of the name. The physical sound, the vox, is what is material, but the first form to determine it is an accent, a pronunciation, and, as written, letters and syllables. This first form of the vox, is what is material, but the first form to determine it is an accent, a pronunciation, and, as written, letters and syllables. This first form of the vox introduces something besides the merely physical, and the result of this formation is a word or name. In this sense, St Albert says, things named equivocally can be said to have the same name.^{10} The idea is that, unless the vox has received the first form, it is not apt to take on the further form of signification, and, since it can retain this first form even when its significations vary, we can say that the same name is retained. It is of course essential to the understanding of the definition of equivocals that the second form of the vox, its signification, be understood as well. In things named equivocally, not only has the vox received the first determination of accent, letters and syllables, but it is also taken as signifying. The point is that it signifies different things. Support for this explanation of St Albert can be found in St Thomas.^{11}

    With regard to the phrase in the definition, "secundum nomen substantiae ratio diversa," St Albert seems to be the only one who has referred this to the classical dictum: "omne nomen substantiam significat cum qualitate."^{12} The ratio substantiae is that which the name is imposed to signify; the quality of the name, we recall, is that a quo nomen imponitur. The substance of the name is that to which it is attributed, or that for which it supposes; it underlies the quality which is the ratio signified by the name. In things named equivocally, therefore, there is the same name, but it signifies different rationes.

    Aristotle insists, in his definition, that it is according to the name which equivocals have in common that they are said to be named equivocally. Given another name, it could happen that things now named equivocally, could be named univocally. It is according to the proper signification of the common name that univocals are said to be such. It is because the common name signifies different notions that other things are said to be named equivocally.^{13}

    What things named equivocally have in common, then, is the name itself; there is simply a community of the name. When one looks to what the name signifies, it is found that now it signifies this ratio, now another different from the first. Let this suffice for a preliminary glance at things named equivocally.

2. THINGS NAMED UNIVOCALLY

"On the other hand, things are said to be named univocally which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common."^{14} Once again Aristotle begins from the things named, and once again there is a community of the name. But here, in opposition to equivocals, the community extends beyond the name to the definition or ratio signified by it. When a man and an ox are named animals, they have the name "animal" in common, but that which is signified by the name is also shared by each, and, from this point of view, shared equally. Both man and ox are "animate sensitive substance." The term "animal" is imposed to signify what man and ox have in common with a generic community.

    The difference between things named equivocally and those named univocally is now clear. The latter have a common name and the ratio signified by the name is common to them all. In equivocals, on the other hand, although they have a common name, that name signifies different rationes as applied to them. A point of extreme importance which warrants repetition is that things are said to be (dicuntur) equivocals or univocals. In themselves, in rerum natura, they are neither, for in order to be univocals or equivocals they are neither, for in order to be univocals or equivocals they must be known and named by us. We are talking about the things signified insofar as they are signified. The problem of equivocals is a logical problem; the problem of univocals is a logical one.

    At this point it is of interest to note the fourfold way in which things can be named. This is found in Boethius,^{15} who observes that things are univoca, diversivoca, multivoca or aequivoca. That is, they either have one name which signifies the same ratio; or they have different names which signify different rationes; or one thing receives many names which signify the same ratio (thus multivoca are those things we would say are named by synonyms; συνώνυμα is Aristotle's word for univocals.) Finally, many things have one name which signifies diverse rationes. It is with the latter, the equivocals, that analogy is numbered.

3. THINGS NAMED ANALOGICALLY

We have already seen that for St Thomas analogy is a kind of equivocation, but when we were discussing the equivocals we said nothing about analogy. We must now return to the definition of things name equivocally and see how it leaves room for things named analogically.. In doing so, we will draw on the commentaries of Boethius, St Albert and Cajetan before turning to St Thomas. St Thomas did not comment on the Categories, but by referring the analogy of names to the definition of things named equivocally he explicitly calls into play the doctrine of Aristotle on this point. It is for that reason that we have found it advisable to spend time on that doctrine; only by understanding equivocation and its status as a logical doctrine can we come to an adequte understanding of St Thomas' teaching on the analogy of names.

    Things are said to be named equivocally which have a common name, although they differ with regard to what the name signifies in each case. Obviously things can receive a common name which, as it is said of each of them, does not signify entirely different notions. The clearest example of equivocation is had when the notions are entirely diverse, of course. For example, "pen" used to signify a writing instrument and an enclosure for pigs is an equivocal name. When, however, a cow and a picture of it are name "animal," the notions signified by the name are not wholly diverse. The example of "pen" is one of pure equivocation, that of "animal" is not. In such cases as that of "pen," it would seem that the same name just happens to be imposed to signify different things; it is completely adventitious. We would not feel, however, that "animal" is imposed fortuitously to signify the cow and its picture. True, "animal" won't mean exactly the same thing in each case, but its meanings are not unrelated. Such considerations as these are behind Boethius' division (garnered from Aristotle elsewhere) of equivocals into those which are such by chance and those which are such by design.^{16}

    It is interesting that commentators seem unanimous in pointing out that the example given by Aristotle in defining things named equivocally is not one of pure equivocation. It is only fitting that it not be, of course, when we consider the purpose of the discussion for the doctrine of the supreme genera. The definition, then, covers things named purely equivocally as well as those which are not, depending on whether the diversity of the notions signified is complete or partial.^{17}

    Where there is only partial diversity in things named equivocally, there must also be partial sameness. The sameness is had, St Albert notes, in this that the name principally signifies one of the equivocals and the others inso far as they refer in some way to what is principally signified. He illustrates this with the familiar Aristotelian examples of "being," "medicine" and "medical." "Et hic quidem modus vocatur multiplex dictum secundum analogiam, sive proportionem ad unum quod principaliter in nomine significatur."^{18}

    We might point out here that Cajetan, in his commentry on the Categories, is quite explicit about the fact that analogy is a kind of equivocation. Having pointed out that diversa in the definition of things named equivocally should be understood as comprising both complete and partial diversity on the part of the rationes signified by the common name, he goes on to say that the example given by Aristotle is one of "aequivocatio a consilio seu analogia."^{19} It is precisely here that he promises a separate treatise on this type of equivocation.^{20} That separate treatise was to be the De nominum analogia and in it analogy, which is a kind of equivocation, unaccountably becomes something metaphysical. In turning now to the texts of St Thomas, we will begin the study which will enable us to see if Cajetan was explaining equivocation or employing it.

    At this point, we must reiterate that St Thomas did not devote any separate treatise to the subject of the analogy of names. His thought on the matter must be drawn from the many places where he is discussing the application of analogy, or an instance of it. Because of this, we should keep in mind what has gone immediately before. There is little danger that equivocation or univocation will be considered metaphysical rather than logical. Analogy, however, is constantly treated as if it were something metaphysical. We are not here concerned with other interpretations of St Thomas, but it should be clear throughout what follows that the analogy of names is something of logic. This is obvious enough in St Thomas.

    It was in commenting on the example Aristotle gives in the Categories of things named equivocally that St Thomas referred analogy to equivocation.^{21} Just as Aristotle sometimes says that "being" is predicated equivocally of substance and the other categories, so too he says that "animal" is said equivocally of an animal and a painting of one. In both cases, St Thomas remarks, it is a question of analogy. As other commentators had before him, St Thomas distinguishes between things named equivocally by chance and those which are not chance equivocals.^{22} Chance equivocals are things which receive the same name, but the name signifies something entirely different in each case. The most obvious example of chance equivocals, according to St Thomas, are two men who receive the same name quite accidentally.^{23} Things which are named equivocally by design are said to be named according to analogy so as to distinguish them from pure or chance equivocals.

    As we have already noted, St Thomas seldom mentions analogy without contrasting it with pure equivocation and univocation. Pure equivocation, again, is had when several things receive the same name which signifies totally different notions or rationes in each case. St Thomas' example is usually "dog" said of an animal and a star.^{24}

Quandoque vero secundum rationes quae partim sunt diversae et partim non diversae: diversae quidem secundum quod diversas habitudines important, unae autem secundum quod ad unum aliquid et idem istae diversae habitudines referuntur; et illud dicitur analogice praedicari, idest proportionaliter, prout unumquodque secundum suam habitudinem ad illud unum refertur.^{25}

    It is well to notice that analoga dicuntur just as aequivoca dicuntur and univoca dicuntur. The contrast between dicuntur and sunt must be retained in things named analogically just as it is in things named equivocally or univocally. As such, there is nothing analogical in being a sign of something else, or in causing or sustaining it, anymore than there is anything as such equival about being a star and being an animal which barks. The last two are said to be equivocal (aequivoca dicuntur) if the same word "dog" is taken to signify them both. So too a thing and its cause and its sign willl be analogates if the same name is imposed to signify them all. Of course, unless things are related in some way we would not purposely impose a common name on them. Nevertheless, the question of analogy does not arise in discussing things as they exist, but as they are
known and named. That is why St Thoma compares the analogy of names with equivocation and univocation. They are all three second intentions.

    When things are named analogically, the multiple signification of the common name can be reduced to a certain unity. But, if this is the case, it would seem that we are reducing analogy to univocity. When things are named univocally, the common name signifies the same ratio in each case. Does not the unity of the many rationes signified by the analogous name imply univocity? The answer to this lies in the different ways in which what is univocally common and what is analogously common are divided.

Dicendum quod duplex est divisio: una qua dividitur genus univocum in suas species, quae ex aequo participant genus, sicut animal in bovem et equum; alia est divisio communis analogi in ea de quibus dicitur secundum prius et posterius; sicut ens dividitur per substantiam et accidens, et per potentiam et actum; et in talibus ratio communis perfecte salvatur in uno; in aliis autem secundum quid et posterius...^{28}

    Analogy, like equivocation and univocation, is a way of naming things. St Thomas insists that equivocal, analogical and univocal names are each divided differently. The equivocal name is divided according to the things signified; the univocal name is divided according to specific differences; the analogical name is divided according to different modes.^{31} Analogy is midway between equivocation and univocation.

Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem vunivocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; set nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum significat causam eiusdem sanitatis.^{32}

Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet corum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur.^{33}

Dicendum quod in omnibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, necesse est quod omnia dicuntur per respectum ad unum; et ideo illud unum oportet quod ponitur in definitione omnium. Et quia "ratio quam significat nomen est definitio," ut dicitur in IV Metaph., necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de ea quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis, secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illus primum vel magis vel minus; sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana inquantum causat sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, quae dicitur san inquantum est signum sanitatis animalis.^{34}

    The fact that the analogous name names one thing primarily is manifested by the fact that, if the name is used simply, it will be taken to mean that thing.^{36} We have seen that this thing is principally named because it perfectly saves the ratio propria of the name whereas the secondary analogates do so only imperfectly, that is, with reference to what saves it perfectly. There is no question of such an inequality among things named univocally. That is why we must never confuse the ratio communis of an analogous name (e.g. id quod habet esse) with the ratio communis of the univocal name.^{37} Analogates do not participate equally in the ratio communis of the analogous name. The ratio of the univocal name, on the other hand, is saved perfectly and equally by all univocals. It is the inequality among the things named as named by it which makes the analogous name analogous; it names one thing principally.^{38}

    The analogous name is a name of multiple signification, but the multiplicity has a unity of order, secundum prius et posterius. Moreover, this multiplicity is one of signification, not of supposition. "Nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis praedicationem, sed secundum significationem."^{39} The univocal name has a multiplicity of supposits, but it always signifies the same form. Supposition is attached rather to predication than to signification, to the second operation rather then to the first, as we indicated in the previous chapter.

    These remarks are sufficient for a preliminary understanding to the analogy of names. We turn now to the division of the analogy of names and the difficulties attendant on that and subsequent discussions will enable us to flesh out what isthus far but a skeletal statement on analogy.

NOTES

{1} Categories, 1a1-2: Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος.

{2} It will be helpful to have the complete Latin text. "Aequivoca dicuntur quorum solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa. Si quis enim assignet quid sit utrumque eorum, quo sint animalia propriam assignabit utriusque rationem."

{3} Joseph Owens, S. SS. R., The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, Toronto, (1951), pp. 49-53. But see his, A History of Ancient Western Philosophy New York, (1959), pp. 297-8.

{4} On Interpretation,  1613-4: Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα.

{5} Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis, Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 64. col. 164B: "Aequivoca, inquit, dicuntur res scilicet, quae per se ipsas aequivoce non sunt, nisi uno nomine praedicentur: quare quoniam ut aequivoca sint, ex communi vocabulo trahunt, recte ait, aequivoca dicuntur. Non enim sunt aequivoca, sed dicuntur."

{6} Notice the similarity between the various meanings of ratio given by St Thomas in his commentary on the De divinis nominibus, lect. 5, n. 735,, and those given by Boethius. "Ratio quoque multimode dicitur. Est enim ratio animae, et est ratio computandi, est ratio naturae, ipsa nimirum similitudo nascentium, est ratio quae in diffinitionibus vel descriptionibus redditur. Et quoniam generalissima genera genere carent, individua vero nulla substantiali differentia descrepant, diffinitio vero ex genere et differentia trahitur, neque generalissimorum generum, neque individuorum ulla potest diffinitio reperiri. Subalternorum vero generum, quoniam et differentias habent et genera, diffinitiones esse possunt. At vero quorum diffinitiones reddi nequent, illa tantum descriptionibus terminatur. Descriptio autem est, quaequamlibet rem proprie quadam proprietate designat. Sive ergo diffinitio sit, sive descriptio, utraque rationem substantiae designat." - loc. cit., col. 166A.

{7} "Et dicuntur univoca per oppositum modum ad aequivoca, res scilicet univocatae in nomine uno, ut res ipsa ad dici et ad sermonem referatur, quia aliter non esset logicum quo dicitur: quia res in se considerata, non secundum quod stat sub dictione, non ad logicum, sed ad Philosophum pertinet. Et ideo additur, dicuntur,  non dicitur univoca sunt. - St Albert, In praedicamenta Aristoles, tract. 1, cap. 3. Cf. Cajetan, Commentaria in praedicamenta Aristotelis,  p. 9: "Signanter quoque dixit, dicuntur'et non dixit, sunt', quia rebus non convenit aequivocari ut sunt in rerum natura, sed ut sunt in vocibus nostris. Aequivocari enim praesupponit vocari, quod rebus ex nobis accidit."

{8} Cajetan, loc. cit., p. 8.

{9} John of St Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus, T. I, p. 478: "Sed quia non dicuntur aequivocata nisi ratione intentionis alicujus, quae dicitur aequivocatio, et haec, ut statim dicemus, non convenit rebus significatis nisi ut subsunt nomini, non vero conceptui ultimato, ideo traditur definitio per nomen, in ordine ad quod sumitur intentio aequivocationis."

{10} St Albert, loc. cit., cap. 2.

{11} John of St Thomas directs our attention (loc. cit., p. 479) to Quodl. IV, q. 9, a. 2: "Manifestum est autem quod unitas vocis significativae vel diversitas non dependet ex unitate vel diversitate rei significatae; alioquin non esset aliquod nomen aequivocum: secundum hoc enim si sint diversae res, essent diversa nomina, et non idem nomen."

{12} St Albert, loc. cit.,  cap. 2. "...et id quidem cui imponitur nomen est significata substantia ipsius; proprietas autem ejusdem rei sive substantiae quae afficit imponentem dum nomen imponit, est qualitas significata per nomen."

{13} Cf. Boethius, loc. cit., col. 165C: "Idem etiam in his nominibus quae de duabus rebus communiter praedicantur, si secundum nomen substantiae ratio non reddatur, potest aliquoties fieri, ut ex univocis aequivoca sint, et ex aequivocis univoca; namque homo atque equus cum secundum nomen animalis univoca sint, possunt esse aequivoca, si secundum nomen minime diffinita sint. Homo namque et equus communi nomine animalia nuncupantur, si quis ergo hominis reddat diffinitionem dicens, animal rationale mortale, et equi, animal irrationale hinnibile, diversas reddidit diffinitiones, et erunt res univocae in aequivocas permutatae. Hoc utem idcirco evenit, quod diffinitiones non secundum animalis nomen reditae sunt, quod eorum commune vocabulum est, sed secundum hominis et equi,"

{14} "Univoca dicuntur quorum nomen commune est, et secundum nomen eadem ratio substantiae." - Categories, 1a6-7: συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός.

{15} Boethius,  loc. cit., cols. 164-5.

{16} Ibid. col. 166: "Aequivocorum alia sunt casu, alia consilio, ut Alexander Priami filius et Alexander Magnus. Casus enim id egit, ut idem utrique nomen poneretur. Consilio vero, ea quaecumque hominum voluntate sunt posita."

{17} St Albert spells this out in his prolix fashion. "Quando ergo idem est nomen quantum ad ea quae sint nominis in littera et accentu: et id quod significatur in nomine, non est idem vel aeque participatum ab illis quibus nomen imponitur, nec etiam proprietas a qua impositum est omnino eadem est, quamvis forte referatur ad unum: tunc nomen est aequivocum, quia ratio substantiae cui nomen imponitur (quae est ratio substantialis a qua nomen imponitur) sic duobus modis est secundum aliquid vel simpliciter diversa: substantia enim aliqua (ut diximus) est secundum aliquid per modum quo rationi substat, cui nomen ipsum imponitur quod est nomen qualitas, est substantialis ratio quae datur de nomine secundum illud quod nomen est. Quando ergo illa etiam non penitus est eadem, iterum ratio substantiae, hoc est, substantialis ratio nominis diversa: ita quod nihil rei cui imponitur nomen, aequaliter participant significata per nomen." - loc. cit. cap. 2.

{18} Ibid. Boethius too speaks of equivocals by design which represent and aequivocatio secundum proportionem. Cf.  loc. cit., col. 166: "...secundum proportionem, ut principium namque principium est in numero unitas, in lineis punctum. Ali vero sunt quae ab uno descendunt... Alia quae ad unum referuntur..." It is interesting to see Boethius moving easily from what could be called the proportionality of "principle" to proportions ad unum and ab uno. It is noteworthy that Boethius distinguishes equivocation secundum proportionem  from that secundum similitudinem. It is the last kind of equivocation which he feels is involved in the example given by Aristotle in the Categories.

{19} Cajetan, loc. cit. p. 10.

{20} Ibid., p. 11. "Quot autem modis contingat variari analogiam et quomodo, nunc quum summarie loquimur, silentio pertransibimus, specialem de hoc tractatum, si Deo placuerit, cito confecturi."

{21} Ia, q. 13, a. 10, ad 4. Why does the theologian concern himself with the analogy of names? Cf. I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 4,  divisio textus In seeming contradiction to this, St Thomas elsewhere says, "sapientis non est curare de nominibus." (Cf. II Sent. d. 3, q. 1, a. 1) The theologian is concerned with the meanings of words, in the sense of the ratio attached to this burst of sound, that pile of ink. Thus, in disputes as to whether the potency in angels should be called matter or not, it is the meaning "matter" is thought to have which, in the final analysis, matters - not the vox itself. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that the meanings which have previously been attached to a given vox can make it a more adaptable instrument for what the theologian wants to say. But this should not lead the theologian into purely verbalistic disputes.

{22} In I Ethic., lect. 7, n. 95; cf. I Sent., d. 31, 1. 2, a. 1, ad 2.

{23} In I Ethic., lect. 7, n. 95.

{24} In IV Metaphys., lect. 1, n. 535; In XI Metaphys., lect. 3, n. 2197; I Sent., d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2.

{25} In IV Metaphys., lect. 1, n. 535.

{26} De principis naturae, cap. 6, n. 366: "Analogice dicitur praedicari quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes et definitiones sunt diversae, sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem: sicut sanum dicitur de corpore animalis et de urina et de potione, sed non ex toto idem significat in omnibus tribus. Dicitur enim de urina ut signo sanitatis, de corpore ut de subjecto, de potione ut de causa; sed tamen omnes istae rationes attribuuntur uni fini, scilicet sanitati."

{27} In XI Metaphys., lect. 3, n. 2197: "In his vero quae praedicto modo dicuntur, idem nomen de diversis praedicatur secundum rationem partim eamdem, partim diversam. Diversam quidem quantum ad diversos modos relatiionis. Eamden vero quantum ad id as quod fit relatio. Esse enim significativum, et esse effectivum, diversum est. Sed sanitas una est. Et propter hoc huiusmodi dicuntur analoga, quia proportionantur ad unum."

{28} Q.D. de malo, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1.

{29} See below, chapter VI.

{30} In IV Metaphys., lect. 1, . 536. "Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non solum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur."

{31} I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2: "...dicendum quod aliter dividitur aequivocum, analogum et univocum. Aequivocum enim dividitur secundum res significatas, univocum vero dividitur secundum diversas differentias; sed analogum dividitur secundum diversos modos. Unde cum Unde unicuique generi debetur proprius modus praedicandi."

{32} Ia, q. 13, a. 5.

{33} Ia, q. 16, a. 6.

{34} Ia, q. 13, a.6.

{35} I Contra Gentiles, cap. 34.

{36} Q.D. de ver., q. 7, a. 5, ad 3: "...dicendum quod aliquid simpliciter dictum intelligitur quandoque de eo quod per posterius dicitur, ratione alicuius additi; sicut ens in alio intelligitur accidens; et similiter vita ratione eius quod adiungitur, scilicet liber, intelligitur de vita creata, quae per posterius vita dicitur." - CF In XI Metaphys., lect. 3, n. 2197: "Nam ens simpliciter dicitur id quod in se habet esse, scilicet substantia. Alia vero dicuntur entia, quia sunt huius quod per se est, vel passio vel habitus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Non enim qualitas dicitur ens quia ipsa habet esse, sed per eam substantia dicitur esse disposita. Et similiter est de aliis accidentibus. Et propter hoc dicit quod sunt entis. Et sic patet quod multiplicitas entis habet aliquid commune, ad quod fit reductio." Cf. In I Periherm., lect. 5, n. 19.

{37} This is shown in the example of the analogous name "principle." "Respondeo dicendum quod idem iudicium est de principio et de origine super quam fundatur ratio principii. Potest autem origo considerari dupliciter: aut secundum communem rationem originis, quae est aliquod ab aliquo esse, et sic una ratio est communis ad originem personarum et originem  creaturarum, non quidem communitate univocationis, sed analogiae; et similiter etiam nomen principii. Potest etiam considerari secundum determinatum modum originis; et sic sunt diversae speciales rationes originis et principii; sed hoc non facit aequivocationem; quia sic etiam secundum Philosophum I de anima, text 8, animalis ratio secundum unumquodque est alia." - I Sent. d. 29, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2. Cf. as well, I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5: "...dicendum quod ratio personae importat distinctionem in communi; unde abstrahitur a quolibet modo distinctionis; et ideo potest esse una ratio analogice in his quae diversimode distinguuntur." See below, chapter VIII, section 4.

{38} Q.D. de malo, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1.

{39} Ia, q. 13, a. 10, ad 1.