Jacques Maritain Center : The Logic of Analogy / by Ralph McInerny


How many kinds of analogous name are there? If we should put this question to Cajetan, the answer received could be that there are four kinds, or it could be that there is but one. Recent interpreters have often proposed different types than Cajetan; some even tend to treat every instance of analogous name as a special type. The texts of St Thomas, at first reading, give us a straightforward answer to our question. In the majority of texts, we find a twofold division of analogous names. however, on one occasion,{1} St Thomas gave a threefold division and, as it happened, it is that division which forms the structure of Cajetan's De nominum analogia. Indeed, when the threefold division is considered together with Quaestio Disputata de veritate, question two, article eleven, the interpretation of Cajetan seems to command assent; we find ourselves disposed to accept his way of treating the twofold division which is to relegate it to the status of a subdivision of what is not really analogy at all, namely, "analogy of attribution." In this chapter, we shall first examine the texts in which the two fold division is given; the other two texts will then be taken up as difficulties to be resolved in the light of the twofold division. The result of this analysis should make it clear that Cajetan has based his opuscle on texts which adopt a very special point of view and do nothing towards calling into question the fact that, for St Thomas, there are but two kinds of analogous name.


Things are named analogically when they have a common name which signifies neither the same ratio nor wholly diverse rationes as said of each of them. Analogous signification is said to be as it were midway between univocal and equivocal signification, participating something of each.{2}

Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in vunivocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum de urina dictum significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis.{3}
That which saves the ratio propria of "healthy" is the thing which has the quality from which the word is imposed to signify, and normally we will take the word to mean that thing.{4} The things which do not so save the ratio propria  will be referred to what does insofar as they receive the common name. The rationes signified by the common term as applied to these secondary things will not be utterly other than its ratio as applied to what it principally signifies, precisely because of the refernce, stated in the secondary rationes, to what is chiefly signified by the term.5 There is therefore an order among the various notions signified by an analogous name; and, if there are types of analogous name, they will be distinguished with reference to what is formal and proper to analogical signification. It is this kind of formal difference St Thomas has in mind when he says that several things are named analogically in either of two ways.

    It can happen that what a name properly signifies is not one of the things which are said to be named analogically. For example, if urine and food are said to be healthy, they receive the common name because of their reference to a third thing, to that which "healthy" signifies per prius and most properly. So too, quality and relation are named being because of their proportions to what that term signifies per prius and most properly, namely, substance. This type of analogy is called that of several to one (multorum ad unum). Sometimes, on the other hand two things receive a common name because one has a proportion to the other. For example, when food and animal are said to be healthy, this is because food has a proportion to the health of the animal. Animal, of course, is not called healthy with reference to some other thing. So too when substance and quantity are named being; quantity has a proportion to substance. This type of analogy is called that of one thing to another (unius ad alterum){6}

    This twofold division of things named analogically does not go beyond the logical doctrine of signification. What is important here is not the examples, but what they exemplify. We name things as we know them and sometimes things have a common name which is neither univocal nor purely equivocal. If we ask what the name means, we sometimes find that the different notions include a reference to a third thing, sometimes that one notion refers to the other. It is difficult to envisage any other type of analogical community. Doubtless this is why, in the texts with which we are now concerned, St Thomas seems so emphatic in saying that things can be named analogically in either of two ways. He clearly intends the division to be exhaustive. Nevertheless, there is a series of difficulties to be faced before the exhaustiveness of this division can be accepted, difficulties which arise from other texts of St Thomas.

    St Thomas often speaks of the proportions of things named analogically as ad unum, ab uno or in uno.{7} Is this a division of the analogy of names? Cajetan seems to feel it is a division of "analogy of attribution."{8} But if this were a division of the analogy of names, it would have to introduce some differences into what is proper to that mode of signifying. And this it does not do. A cursory examination of a text where this division of what can be the per prius of the analogous name is used suffices to show this.

    The listing of the various causes which can serve as the primary analogate of an analogous name is in function of showing that the unity of analgous names is not a oneness of ratio, as is the case with univocal names. "Item sciendum quod illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis, est unum numero, et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur."{9} Things named being which do not perfectly save the ratio propria of that term are referred to what does, "quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura." So too with urine, food and medicine when they are called healthy; they are referred to one end. "Nam ratio sani secundum quod dicitur de diaeta, consistit in conservando sanitatem."{10} Sometimes several things are referred to one efficient cause: the doctor is said to be medical, and when instruments and potions are called medical, it is by reference to the doctor as efficient cause. (Notice that the efficient cause to which the things secondarily signified refer is not here their efficient cause,{11}) Sometimes many things ae referred to one subject, as in the case of "being."

    That this division of the various causes which can be the per prius of an analogous name does not divide the logical notion itself is clear from the fact that as analogous names they are all explained in the same way. Whether it is a material, efficient or final cause to which other things are proportioned, their notions will include it insofar as they share a common name with it. Thus, no difference in the logic of analogy is generated. Moreover, the two fold division already discussed can be exemplified no matter what kind of cause is the per prius. For example, "medical" said of scalpel and aspirin gives us an instance of multorum ad unum, whereas said of Doctore Kildare and the scalpel it give us an instance of unius ad alterum.


The texts presenting the two fold division of things named analogically are emphatic and clear. Yet the knowledgeable reader will be annoyed by the prominence we give this division; must we not distinguish between proportion, which can be divided in the manner discussed, and proportionality, which seemingly cannot? As soon as one moves from the Summa theologiae to the texts which play a priviledged role in Cajetan's opuscle, the clarity of the twofold division begins to blur and one becomes sensible of the attractiveness of Cajetan's schema. That succumbing o this attractiveness can be fatal is revealed by a close exegesis of the main texts. We want now to examine them, first Quaestio Disputata de veritate, question two, article eleven, and then the exposition of Sentences, Book One, distinction nineteen, question five, article two, the reply to the first objection. Let it be understood that the cogency of our interpretation is intended to be cumulative and cannot be fully assessed until the end of Chapter X.

    In the Summa theologiae, St Thomas introduces the twofold division we have discussed in order to make a precision about names common to God and creatures. These names are said to involve an analogy unius ad alterum.
Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque pure univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic hoc quod dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones.{12} There is no third thing to which God and creature could be referred in receiving a common name, for whatever is not a creature is God, whatever is not God is a creature.{13} Let us turn now to Quaestio Disputata de veritate, question two, article eleven.

    St Thomas is asking whether "science" is predicated univocally of God and creature. In the body of the article, he rejects the possibility on grounds that the result would be pantheism. Whatever is in God is identical with his existence, something which would be true of his knowledge or science, and creatures could only attain "ad eamdem rationem habendi aliquid quod habet Deus" if they were identical with God's existence. Terms common to God and creature need not be equivocal, however; if there were no similarity (convenientia between God and creature, we could neither know nor name God. The only possibility remaining is that such names as "science" are common "secundum analogiam, quod nihil est aliud dictu quam secundum proportionem." But he adds immediately, "Convenientia enim secundum proportionem potest esse duplex: et secundum hoc duplex attenditur analogiae communitas." Mathematical examples exhibit this division.

Est enim quaedam convenientia inter ipsa quorum est ad invicem proportio, eo quod habet determinatam distantiam vel aliam habitudinem ad invicem, sicut binarius cum unitate, eo quod est eius duplum: convenientia etiam quandoque attenditur duorum ad invicem inter quae non sit proportiom, sed magis similitudo duarum ad invicem proportionum, sicut senarius convenit cum quaternio ex hoc quod sicut senarius est duplum ternarii, ita quaternarius binarii.
The first type of similarity (convenientia) is one of proportion, the second of proportionality. Some things have a name in common because one is proportioned to the other: it is in this way that "being" is said of substance and accident and "healthy" of urine and animal. But things can also have a common name, not because one is proportioned to the other, but because they are proportioned in similar ways to different things. That is, one proportion is similar to the other. Thus is "sight" said of the eye and the mind.{14}

    In the Summa theologiae, St Thomas spoke of names common to God and creature in terms of a proportion of one to the other. Is he denying
this is the text before us? This conclusion has sometimes been drawn and it leads in turn to a strange issue. We might be told in the present case, for example, that the analogous word "science" means that "as our science is to our intellect, so is God's to his." To this may be added, "-only proportionally," a curious addendum to the statement of a similarity of proportions. Now this does not seem to be a particularly enlightening statement, anymore than "as sight is to the eye, so is understanind to the mind" seems to say what the common word "sight" means. What is lost sight of when such statements are taken to give the meanings of analogous names is that one proportion is the means of knowing and naming the other. God's knowledge is known and named from ours just as, when we speak of understaning as seeing, we are moving from something obvious to something less so, a movement which should be revealed in the notions signified by the common name. In other words, where there is a similarity of proportions, one is very often the per prius with respect to the signification of a common name. But we shall return to this.

    Why is there no conflict between the proportion of the Summa and the proportionality of the De veritate? We must notice, first of all, that proportion is an analogous name. According to its first signification, it means a determinate relation of quantity to another, e.g. double, triple, equal. Secondly, it signifies any relation among things, and in this extended sense we can speak of a proportion of creature to God.{15} Since neither the relation of accident to substance nor that of creature to God are quantitative ones, neither is a proportion in the first sense of the term. Moreover, the extended meaning of "proportion" is any relation of one thing to another (quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum); given this, the phrase "secundum proportionem" in the Summa theologiae covers both determinate and indeterminate proportions. There is surely no contradiction in saying that in names common to God and creature, there is a community "secundum proportionem" and that this community is "non secundum proportionem, sed secundum proportionalitatem." Proportion in the common sense cannot be divided against its subjective part. It is very much like saying on one occasion, "Man is an animal" and, on another, "Man is not an animal." The first statement is true when "animal" is the name of the genus; the second is true when "animal" is the name of the species opposed to man.{16} But of course this is clear from the De veritate itself. We are told that "science" is said of God and creature according to analogy "quod nihil est aliud dictu quam secundum proportionem." Only then is proportion subdivided into proportion and proportionality. What St Thomas is getting at is that between some things named analogously there is a finite distance or other determinate relation while between others there is not. It is interesting that he manifests both determinate and indeterminate relations by quantitative, numerical relations. In a numerical proportionality, however, 4 can be like as astronomical a number as you wish, not because there is a determinate distance between them, but because the astronomical number, like 4, is double another number. Thus 4:2 :: 2,000,000,000: 1,000,000,000.{17} Of course there is a determinate distance between four and two billion, but the point is that no determinate relation between them is envisaged when both are called double. Are they called double univocally?{18} St Thomas seems to suggest that "double" is an analogous term. On this basis, when 2 and 6 are called double in 2:1 :: 6:3, we have an analogy unius ad alterum and in 6:3 :: 4:2, the example of the text, we have an analogy multorum ad unum, since 6 and 4 receive the name "double" by reference to 2.

    A similarity of proportions whereby one thing is referred to another is not as such the explanation of an analogically common name. "As seeing is to the eye so is understanding to the mind" expresses a similarity of proportions which permits us to say we see the answer to this question, nor does adding "- only proportionally" help, since our question is posed on the assumption of the proportionality. What we must decide is the meaning or ratio of "seeing" as applied to understanding. We may find a common notion shared per prius et posterius by the activity of eye and intellect, or we may decide that the similarity of proportions gives rise to only metaphor. Or both, depending on our point of view;{19} even, let it be conceded, neither, for we may want to allow the view of one who feels there is no difference. In any case, it is not the similarity of proportions alone which decides the signification of the common name.

    The text of the De veritate does not deny that there is a proportion unius ad alterum in names common to God and creature. Rather it stresses that some things named analogically are separated infinitely, something clearly the case with God and creature. Yet, even here, one is known and named from the other: could we explain what we meant by the divine science without appeal to human science? It is just this that St Thomas seems to deny in the text before us. The sixth objection maintains that "in omnibus analogicis" it is the case that one enters into the definition of the other or some third things into the definition of both (our twofold division). "Sed creatura et Deus non hoc modo se habent, neque quod unum ponatur in definitione alterius, neque quod unum ponatur in definitione utriusque, eo quod sic Deus definitionem haberet." The concluding phrase is not unimportant. The objection ends by denying that "science" is analogically common to God and creature. here is St Thomas' reply.

Dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de communitate analogiae quae accipitur secundum determinatam habitudinem unius ad alterum: tunc enim oportet quod unum in definitione alterius ponatur, sicut substantia in definitione accidentis; vel aliquid unum in definitione duorum, ex eo quod utraque dicuntur per habitudinem ad unum, sicut substantia in definitione quantitatis et qualitatis.{20}
This text has been taken to be proof positive that the two fold division is the result of a limited view and not a division based on what is formal to the analogy of names. There are several things to keep in mind at this point. First of all, the two fold division is presented in the Summa theologiae precisely in discussing the divine names. This has led some interpreters to the "mixed case" theory, something Lyttkens has effectively called into question.{21} The only conclusion to be drawn is either (1) the division has relevance for the divine names, or (2) St Thomas is hopelessly confused (whether simultaneously or, at one time not confused, later confused). That the second alternative does not impose itself is clear from a diligent reading of the troublesome text. Names common to God and creature are not purely equivocal; if they were it wouldn't matter what name we applied to God. But it does mater and therefore we must be able to know and name God from creatures because of a "habitudo unius ad alterum." What St Thomas is stressing in the De veritate is that this proportion or relation is indeterminate; it is not determinate as if by moving from our knowledge we could know what God's knowledge is. Note that this is the tenor of the objection and the response. God cannot be defined, cannot be expressed determinately in a ratio. Properly speaking, substance and the other supreme genera cannot be defined either,{22} but the rationes signified by their names express determinately what they are. No ratio of "science" can express determinately the nature of God's knowledge, which is one with his existence. But the ratio the name expresses when it is applied to God is dependent on that which it signifies as applied to our knowledge: God is known and named on an analogy with creatures. Our first chapter has indicated the difficulties which attend this matter; we shall give an explanation of the divine names in Chapter IX when we will have in hand more of the elements required for an adequate statement of the doctrine.

    Now we must face a further difficulty in the text before us, a dificulty which will lead us into our discussion of I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1. We have in mind an apparently flagrant contradiction between the Summa theologiae and the De veritate. In the former, st Thomas writes:

dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et picto, non dicitur pure aequivoce; and Philosophus largo modo accipit aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod analogice dicitur, quandoque dicitur aequivoce praedicari de diversis praedicamentis.{23}
In the De Veritate we read
dicendum quod hoc nomen animal imponitur non ad significandam figuram exteriorem, in qua pictura imitatur animal verum, sed ad significandum naturam, in qua pictura non imitatur; et ideo nomen animalis de vero et picto aequivoce dicitur; sed nomen scientiae convenit creaturae et Creatori secundum id in quo creatura Creatorem imitatur; et ideo non omnino aequivoce praedicatur de utroque.{24}
At the sure risk of over explicitness, let us underline the contradiction. First we are told that "animal" is analogically and not purely equivocally common to the animal and its picture; then we are told that "science" is analogically common to God and man and, unlike "animal" in the case mentioned, non omnino aequivoce praedicatur. Which leaves us with the statement that "animal" said of a beast and its picture is omnino,  that is, pure aequivoce so said. What are we to make of this?

    Let it be said, first of all, that the difference between the texts just cited brings out in an unmistakable fashion the difference between the treatment of analogy in the Summa, question thirteen, and this article from the De veritate. In the former, St Thomas gives us the characteristics of the logical intention of analogical signification, an intention discussed formally on the level of the diverse rationes signified by a word. From this vantage point, it is clear that when "animal" is said of the picture because it is a representation of the real animal, its ratio will include the ratio propria of the name. Thus the term is analogous and based on the relation unius ad alterum. Now, if we ask what in fact the similarity is between Peter and his portrait,the similarity which founds the analogy of the term "animal" as common to them, we must admit that it is an imperfect similarity.{25} The picture resembles Peter via his shape, which is a sign of his nature (since their various shapes enable us to distinguish species of animal.){26} The picture resembles the man in that which is only a sign of the form which is the id a quo of the word.{27} It is this similarity at third remove which is stressed in the answer to the eighth objection of article eleven, question two, De veritate. "Science," on the other hand, is common to God and creature because of a similarity in that from which the name is imposed to signify.{28} In the case of the animal, then, St Thomas is stressing the dissimilarity between the image and the imaged, something which can also be done with respect to human and divine science.{29} Moreover, St Thomas can be said to be more concerned here with the esse horum rationum{30} than with the rationes themselves when he says that "animal" is said purely equivocally of the animal and its picture. On the level of rationes, there is no doubt that "animal" is an analogous name in the use in question. It is only when attention is shifted from rationes to their foundation in reality that the community can seem so tenuous as to evaporate completely. The significance of this shift of attention is something we shall be discussing at great length later in this chapter. This being the case, we can leave the present analysis, recognizing its incompleteness. Some things, however, seem already clear. There is no need to see an opposition between proportion and proportionality. Names analogically common to God and creature involve a proportion unius ad alterum. What St Thoms is after in the De veritate is the recognition that such a proportion does not put us in possession of determinate knowledge of God. Furthermore, when the analogical community of the name is based on one thing's imitation of another, this similarity can be more or less perfect depending on whether the imitation is in terms of id a quo nomen imponitur in the rich sense, or a sign of the form from which the name is imposed. This is not constitutive of a gradation of analogous names nor, as we shall point out later, can it be said that in names common to God and creature, both God and creature save the ratio propria of the name. Cajetan maintained this and then tried to show, unsuccessfully we think, that this does not make such names univocal. Nonetheless, as we shall see, there are extenuating circumstances for his attempt. As for proportionality, we shall attempt to put its role in the divine names into a new perspective in Chapter VIII, section 4.


The first condition of what Cajetan calls analogy of attribution is that it is according to extrinsic denomination only.{31} That is, the per prius of the name realized the perfection formally and the others have it only by extrinsic denomination. We have seen in our first chapter that Cajetan wants this rule to be understood "formally," a counsel which turned out to be somewhat baffling, since "healthy" and "medical" only happen (accidit){32} to involve extrinsic denomination, a curious way to speak of what is supposed to be a condition of "analogy of attribution" formally as such. We want now to point out that intrinsic and extrinsic denomination are accidental, not to a putative type, but to the analogy of names formally as such.

    First of all, a brief recalling of what is meant by these two kinds of denomination. Being is divided into the ten categories not univocally, "sed secundum diversum modum essendi."{33} But modes of being are proportional to modes of predication and it is according to the latter that the genera of being are distinguished. St Thomas distinguishes three major types of predication in this connection, the first being had when the predicate expresses the essence of that of which it is said; the second is had when the predicate pertains to the essence. "Tertius autem modus praedicandi est, quando aliquid extrinsecum de aliquo praedicatur per modum alicuius denominationis: sic enim et accidentia extrinseca de substantiis praedicantur; non tamen dicimus quod homo sit albedo, sed quod homo sit albus."{34} Extrinsic denomination, in things other than man, is of two kinds. "Communiter autem invenitur aliquid denominari ab aliquo extrinseco, vel secundum rationem causae, vel secundum rationem mensurae; denominatur enim aliquid causatum et mensuratum ab aliquo exteriori." St Thomas argues that the effect is denominated only from efficient cause and that the exterior measures are place and time.

     It should be noticed that extrinsic denomination is here spoken of only as it applies to substance. Properly speaking, denomination is based on the relation of accident to substance.{35} That is, denomination is extrinsic denomination. In a wide sense, however, we can speak of intrinsic denomination, something involved in the id a quo ex parte rei. St Thomas has distinguished two ways in which something can be denominated by reason of a relation to another. First, when the relation itself is the cause of the denomination. It is in this way that urine is said to be healthy, i.e. it is the sign of the health of the animal and a sign is in the genus of relation.{36} Thus, urine is not denominated healthy from any form inherent in it.{37} Secondly, when it is not from the reference to the other, but from the other as cause that a thing is denominated.{38} Here there must be a similitude of effect to cause, so there will be an inherent form whereby the effect is denominated from its cause. In this second case, Cajetan denies that there is extrinsic denomination and claims that, in fact, we have an analogy not of "attribution" but of "proper proportionality."{39)

    The striking thing about Cajetan's treatment of the analogy of names is that he interprets in terms of extrinsic denomination the statement that, in things named analogically, the ratio propria of the name is saved in one alone. Let us look again at the text involved. Is there but one truth in terms of which every being is said to be true? Well, yes and no, St Thomas replies. In things named univocally the ratio propria of the name is found in each of them.

Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominatur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illus significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit, illud autem significat sanitatem.{40}
In his commentary, Cajetan rejects this rule as something applicable to analogous names; rather, he says, it applies to things which have a common name because they are ad unum or in uno or ab uno. He denies that "true" is analogous as said of things and judgments of our mind, but is analogous as said of various minds. "Veritas autem, respectu intellectu divini et aliorum, proportionale nomen est."{41} The reason for this is that the ratio propria of truth is found in the mind but not in things. The difficulty with Cajetan's view, of course, is that "true" cannot mean the same thing as said of our judgments and God's knowledge - in other words, it signifies different rationes and one of these will be the ratio propria, the other will not.{42} Illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum" and the other will be denominated from it. Where there is no denomination of one thing from another according to diverse rationes, there is no analogy of names: notice that, on this basis and so understanding extrinsic denomination, every analogous name involves extrinsic denomination. Things are said to be named analogically when they have a common name which signifies one of them principally, secundum rationem propriam, and the other secondarily and with reference to the first - that is, the second is denominated from the first. This is as true of "true" as it is of "healthy." If truth is a reflexive recognition of the conformity of thought and reality, simple apprehension and extramental things will not save the ratio propria of the term.{43} When the name is extended to God, the term will not signify the same ratio as when said of creature, anymore than it signifies the same rationes as said of our judgments and of extramental things. In both cases there is something in each of the analogates which founds the extension of the name to include them; but only one of them will found the ratio propria. In names common to God and creature, the underlying reference of effect to cause always explains the community of the name. And, since omne agens agit sibi simile, the similarity of effect to cause must be based on something intrinsic to the effect.{44} This is not to say, of course, that the analogy of names demands that the per prius be the efficient cause of what is denominated from it. In the examples of "healthy" and "true" (said of judgments and things), the causes are denominated from their effects.{45} The point is this: it does not matter that our judgments can be denominated "true" without reference to God because of their intrinsic possession of this perfection; when the name is common to our judgments and God, there will be a per prius from which the other is denominated true.

    What we are suggesting is that the intrinsic possession of the perfection is irrelevant to the intent of the phrase that something said analogically of many is found in only one of them with respect to its proper notion. Cajetan, speaking of "analogy of attribution," holds that only the primary analogate realizes the perfection formally while the others have it by extrinsic denomination. But what are we to make of an analogous name which applies to its per prius by extrinsic denomination? Place is an extrinsic measure of body; consequently to say of a body that it is located is to denominate it extrinsically.{46} But to be in place is analogically common to bodies and angels: "angelo convenit esse in loco: aequivoce tamen dicitur angelus esse in loco, et corpus."{47} the ratio propria of "located" will be saved only by bodies; in an extended sense, intelligible only by reference to the proper signification of the name, the angel is in place. Surely this example does nothing towards diminishing or changing the formal rules of the analogy of names; neither do the examples of "being," "good," "true" and "science" said of God and creature.

    In his commentary on Aristotle's Ethics,{48} St Thomas says some things which have always been of interest to students of his doctrine of analogy, particularly because the text in question is one of the few which figure explicitly in Cajetan's De nominum analogia. Aristotle is making the point, against Plato, that if the good is separated as Man is supposed to be, "good" would signify univocally whatever it is said of.{49} But that cannot be, nor can "good" be a purely equivocal term. So it would seem to be a name signifying many as from one cause or ordered to one cause or, better, things which are one according to analogy.{50} Let us look at St Thomas' commentary.

    He begins by pointing out that a name is said of many things according to diverse rationes in two ways, either according to wholly diverse rationes (and then we have pure equivocation and things so named are aequivoca a casu), or the rationes are not wholly diverse but agree in some one thing.{51} He goes on to subdivide this last possibility. (1) Sometimes several things are referred to one principle, e.g. "military" as said of weapons and armor refers them to him who has the art of making war. (2) Sometimes several things are referred to one end, e.g. "healthy." (3) Sometimes according to proportion, and this either (a) by diverse proportions to the same subject, e.g. quantity and quality to substance in the case of "being," or (b) by one proportion to different subjects, e.g. sight to eye, understanding to mind.

    This division is reminiscent of those we found in the commentary on the Metaphysics and in the De principiis naturae.{52} The primary analogate may be either an efficient, final or material cause. As we have seen, this is not a division of the analogy of names as such, since it introduces no difference into the common doctrine. In any case, the ratio propria of the common name is saved in one alone and others are denominated from it. There is, however, an added note in the text before us, namely that of similar proportions to different subjects. Since the other subdivisions do not alter the common doctrine of the analogy of names, that is, are not types of analogous name, it is unlikely that this added note will do anything different. Now what is added is precisely the similtudo proportionum and it is exemplified here, as it was in the De veritate, by seeing and understanding, but now insofar as both can be called good. When they are so named, the one is not referred to the other as to its efficient or final cause. So it is, in the text of Aristotle, that, having rejected the Platonic separated good from which all things might be denominated good as from their efficient or final cause, Aristotle prefers to stay in the order of things more accessible to him (and more relevant to ethics); concern with things existing separately in the manner of the idea of good belongs to another branch of philosophy.{53} The similarity of proportions, as we have seen and will see again, does not involve another doctrine of the analogy of names: if "good" means one things  with reference to sense, and another with reference to mind, and these meaning are not wholly diverse, they will be related per prius et posterius. It is very important to notice that St Thomas makes the phrase secundum analogiam common to every nonchance equivocation, something Aristotle does not do with the phrase κατ᾿ ἀναλογίον.{54} The text of the commentary hardly provides a basis for the claim that "good" is common to God and creature according to a similarity of proportions. On the contrary, it is only when that community of the name has been set aside that the question of similarity of proportions, of similar proportions to different subjects, comes into the picture. And this, note, both in the text of Aristotle and in the commentary of St Thomas.


While moving from "analogy of inequality" through "analogy of attribution" to "analogy of proportionality," Cajetan pauses at each step to discuss the terminology of St Thomas with respect to these three, which are and are not, according to Cajetan, types of analogous name. In each case, it is the same text of St Thomas to which appeal is made, a text in which we are told that something is said according to analogy in three ways.{55} Now, as it happens, the text in question is the answer to an objection and consequently must be read in terms of that objection, the more so because the division given is to be found nowhere else in St Thomas. The objection occurs in an article which asks a question St Thomas often poses, viz. whether all things are true by uncreated truth.{56} The first objection is an attempt at an affirmative answer.

Videtur quod omnia sint vera veritate, quae est veritas increata. Sicut enim dictum est (I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1), verum dicitur analogice de illis in quibus est veritas, sicut sanitas de omnibus sanis. Sed una est sanitas numero a qua denominatur animal sanum, sicut subjectum ejus, et medicina sana, sicut causa ejus, et urina sana, sicut signum ejus. Ergo videtur quod una sit veritas qua omnia dicuntur vera.
Before turning to St Thomas' highly nuanced discussion of this arument, there are a few things to be said by way of preliminary. What is the meaning of "una est sanitas numero" in the objection? If it should be understood in the sense examined earlier where the one to which analogates refer is unum numero and not only unum ratione, as is the case with univocals, it will be difficult to understand the example of "being" in the third member of this division. It will be recalled that the distinction of unum numero and unum ratione figures in a context which would explain the many meanings of "being." What the objector has in mind is this. In the example of "healthy" only the primary analogate possesses the form in virtue of which it is denominated healthy. "Healthy" is the analogous name, but so too is "true." Since they have this in common, it would seem that they should also have in common the fact that only one of the things can be denominated "true" in virtue of an intrinsic form. Now this, we shall argue, is to argue from what they do have in common, the logical intention of analogy, to something which, though true of things named healthy, is not true of them insofar as they are named analogically. That is, it is accidental to the analogy of names. If it were not the argument would be valid. If it is accidental, and the reply of St Thomas will be seen to be arguing just this, to confuse the logical intention and the extralogical properties of the things which happen to be named analogically, is to exhibit a faulty understanding of the logical intention. Moreover, the claim of the objector will be seen not to be merely a restatement of the law that, in all things named analogically, the ratio propria of the name is saved only in one.

    And yet St Thomas begins his answer with the observation that "aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter." What we must come to grips with is the significance of the couplet in terms of which this division is made, secundum intentionem, on the one hand, secundum esse, on the other. Furthermore, much will depend on our identification of the logicus of the second member of the division, for it is he who is at work in the objection.

(a) Secundum intentionem, non secundum esse

Ad primum igitur dicendum quod aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter: vel secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse; et hoc est quando una intentio refertur ad plura per prius et posterius, quae non habet esse nisi in uno; sicut intentio sanitatis refertur ad animal, urinam et dietam diversimode, secundum prius et posterius; non tamen secundum diversum esse, quia esse sanitatis non est nisi in animali.
The familiar example in the setting of this division has some unfamiliar things said about it, though they may seem to be the same things said in a text we were looking at a moment ago.{57} There is no need to repeat why "healthy" is an analogous name. Given the fact that it is, we know that it will name something primarily, that which saves its ratio propria. Let us say that that ratio propria is "the quality whereby there is a proper equilibrium of the humors." Of animal, urine and diet, only animal is chiefly denominated from this quality; the others do not possess this quality and are called "healthy" only with reference to the animal.{58} Of couse there must be something in the diet and in urine which founds the rationes signified by "healthy" as said of them. This is generally true of analogates - it is generally true of names. However, when we inquire into what founds the various rationes of this analogous name as opposed to that, (and by "founds" we mean the remote foundation), we are concerned with differences, not in the logical order, but among the res as such. Somethings are named analogically which have such and such ontological characteristics, others which do not have those characteristics. Some things can save the ratio propria of a name and yet be said to receive the name with reference to something else.{59} This is true of "true" and of all names common to God and creature. Our judgments save the ratio propria of the term "true" and, as created judgments, can be called true with reference to God. This does not mean that both our judgments and God found the ratio propria of a term common to them, for then it would be a univocal term. So too creatures, that is substances, can found the ratio propria of "good" insofar as they have existence, but they can also be called good with reference to God who is Goodness and the exemplar, efficient and final cause of created goods. Yet we cannot say that both God and creature found the ratio propria of the term, for this would make it univocal. The phrase "illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum" has nothing to do with possessing the perfection intrinsically. To say that, among things called healthy, only animal can be so denominated from a perfection intrinsic to it, is to say more than is said when we are told that animal, urine and food are called healthy analogically. Whether this ontolotical situation holds or not, all the rules given for the analogy of names are valid and unchanged. We cannot argue from the fact that things are named analogically to one ontological situation or the other, for what they have in common is to be named analogically - not to be this way or that, but to be named in this way.

(b) Secundum esse, non secundum intentionem

Vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicujus communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus, sicut omnia corpora parificantur in intentione corporeitatis. Unde logicus qui considerat intentiones tantum, dicit, hoc nomen, corpus, de omnibus corporibus univoce praedicari: sed esse huius naturae non est ejusdem rationis in coroporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus, ut patet in X Metaph.
Several things can be made equal in this that they are all signified by a name signifying a common notion or intention even though that common note has a different kind of being in each of them. For example, all bodies are made equal, are one, insofar as each is signified by "body" the ratio of which is the notion or intention of corporeity. What all bodies have in common is what is signified by "body." The logicus, noting this, says that the term is predicated of all bodies univocally; or, conversely, that they are all named body univocally. What else could he say if the same intention or notion is signified each time something is called a body? What is this example doing in a discussion of the way things are said to be secundum analogiam?

    Let us look closely at the verb, parificantur. There is equality on the level of the intention or ratio when things are named univocally. Now this is not true of things named analogically: they are not equalized in a common notion, but share in it per prius et posterius, unequally. Thus, in things named analogically, there is inequality on the level of the common intention or notion. In the second division of the text before us, we are faced with an example of things named univocally. That is, they are made equal on the level of the common intention: if there is analogy or inequality, if in some way they are related per prius et posterius, this will not be according to the common intention. Their inequality is said to obtain in the esse hujus rationis, and not on the level of the intention, that is, the common intention, itself.

    What does it mean to say that things named univocally are analogous because "illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus"? Does this mean that bodies are named both univocally and analogically? Not that such a claim would in itself be surprising. Things can be named univocally with respect to one name and analogically with respect to another. for example, man and herb are named univocally with respect to "substance" and analogically with respect to "healthy." But we are not at present asking if several things can be called "body" univocally and be named analogically with respect to some other name. Rather we must ask if the text before us says that bodies are named  "body" univocally and analogically, depending on our point of view.

    The logicus says that the name "body" is univocal; it satisfies the definition of things named univocally. Will the observation that the notion signified by "body" enjoys a different mode of existence in celestial and terrestial bodies, following Aristotle's hypothesis,{60} lead to the view that the same word "body" is analogous? St Thomas, we see, refers us to the tenth book of the Metaphysicsi for light on the subject.

    In the text referred to it is again a question of celestial and terrestial bodies being named body univocally. We will be returning to the context of the discussion, but right now we want to cite a passage which clarifies the distinction made in the second division of our text in the Sentences. Contrariety is sometimes the cause of specific diversity, sometimes of generic diversity.

...corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt genere diversa. Manifestum est enim quod contraria quae sunt in uno genere, non sunt de substantia illius generis. Non enim rationale et irrationale sunt de substantia animalis, sed animal est potentia utrumque. Quodcumque autem genus accipiatur, oportet quod corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt de intellectu eius. Unde impossible est quod communicent in aliquo genere. Et hoc rationabiliter accidit. Name corruptibilium et incorruptibilium non potest esse materia una. Genus autem, physice loquendo, a materia sumitur. Unde supra dictum est, quod ea quae non communicant in materia, sunt genere diversa. Logice autem loquendo, nihil prohibet quod conveniant in genere, in quantum conveniant in una communi ratione, vel substantiae, vel qualitatis, vel alicuius huiusmodi.{61}
The genus can be considered from a physical as well as from a logical point of view. Obviously an understanding of this option will clarify the whole division in the text of the Sentences.

(1) Genus logice loquendo

Since we have already discussed the manner in which genus is a second intention, a logical relation, it will seem redundant to speak of the genus logice. Let us recall what the logical relation of genus is. We saw that second intentions are accidents which accrue to natures as they exist in our mind. We say, for example, "Animal is a genus." What is the meaning of this predicate? A genus is that which is said of many things which differ in species and which expresses what they are.{62} Obviously, in order to be thus predicable, the nature must be in our mind.{63} To be generically common is something which belongs to animal as it is known by us; to be a genus does not belong to "animate sensitive substance" as such, nor to this animal or that. In the De ente et essentia, where he is interested in showing the relationship between essence and such intentions as genus, species and difference, St Thomas distinguishes carefully between the nature as such, the natura absolute considerata, and the accidents which accrue to it as it exists in singulars or in our intellect. Thus, it is not of the essence of animal to be a genus; nevertheless, it is the nature, not the logical intention, which is predicated of many.{64}

    Since we name things as we know them, it is the nature as known that is named. What is immediately signified by the word "animal" is, as we have seen, the ratio of the name. And, again, things are said to be named univocally when the name they have in common signifies the same ratio as applied to each of them. Thus "animal" as applied to man or brute signifies "animate sensitive substance." This notion expresses something of the essence of quiddity of those things to which the name is applied. It is of the essence of genus to signify univocally.{65)

    Those things which are in the same genus are said to be made equal thanks to an intention or concept of something common. Man and brute are made equal thanks to the common notion, "animate sensitive substance." All bodies are made equal in the common intention of corporeity. We might wonder why the genus is singled out for attention here, for the same thing would seem to be true of species. Are not all men made equal in the common intention signified by the term "man?" There is, however, an important difference between genus and species in this regard, if by species we mean the species specialissima, the common notion which is not further divisible by formal differences.{66} Obviously "animal" is a species with respect to "living body," but it has in common with its genus that the things signified by it are made equal thanks only to the intention of something common. The species specialissima has a greater unity than the genus because it is based on something which is absolutely one in nature.

Et huius ratio est, quia species sumitur a forma ultima quae simpliciter una est in rerum natura, genus autem non sumitur a forma aliqua quae sit una in rerum natura sed secundum rationem tantum: non est enim aliqua forma ex qua homo sit animal praeter illam ex qua homo sit homo. Omnes igitur homines, qui sunt unius species, conveniunt in forma quae constituit speciem, quia quilibet habet animam rationalem; sed non est in homine, equo aut asine aliqua anima communis quae constituat animal, praeter illam animam quae constituit hominem, vel equum vel asinum: quod si esset, tunc genus esset unum et comparabile, sicut et species; sed in sola consideratione accipitur forma generis per abstractionem intellectus a differentiis. Sic igitur species est unum quid a forma una in rerum natura existente, genus autem non est unum: quia secundum diversas formas in rerum natura existentes diversae species generis praedicationem susipiunt. Et sic genus est unum logice et non physice.{67}
The unity of the genus follows in a special way on our mode of knowing since it does not signify the same form or essence in each of the things which fall under it. The form of man and the form of horse differ formally in reality; they are unified in the generic notion only because we do not attend to what is formally peculiar to each, but seize upon that which they have in common. Thus, the common notion is not based on some one form in rerum natura and its unity is due in a special way to our mind. "Animal" and "man" do not signify different forms,{68} but the same form from the vantage point of different degrees of understanding. The possibility of the generic notion lies in the fact that, viewed in a confused manner, things with different forms can be made equal.{69} Moreover, this confusion and the hierarchy of genera to which it gives rise is seen to follow necessarily on the kind of intellect we have.{70} St Thomas gives us a lengthy statement on the hierarchy of genera and we want to examine it closely, particularly since it leads us into a consideration of the genus physice loquendo.

    This statement is to be found in a commentary on Boethius{71} where the question is raised as to whether accidental differences are the cause of the numerical distinction of substances. In addressing himself to that question, St Thomas discusses generic, specific and numerical diversity. The composite which falls in the genus of substance involves three things: form, matter and the composite itself, and it is in these that we must seek the causes of the various kinds of diversity. "Sciendum igitur quod diversitas secundum genus reducitur in diversitatem materiae: diversitas vero secundum speciem in diversitatem formae, sed diversitas secundum numerum partim in diversitatem materiae, et partim in diversitatem accidentis."{72} It is the widening of the question to include the cause of generic diversity which makes this article relevant to our inquiry. The assignment of matter as the cause of generic diversity raises a serious problem. The genus is a principle of knowing, a sign of which is that it is the first part of the definition of anything. Matter, however, is said to be unknowable in itself. Nevertheless, St Thomas states, matter can be known, and in either of two ways.

    First of all, matter can be known by analogy; in another way, it can be known through the form which makes it to be in act.{73} It is the second way of knowing matter which gives rise to a hierarchy in the genus of substance.

Alio modo penes materiam sumitur generis diversitas, secundum quod materia est perfecta per formam. Et cum materia sit potentia pura, et Deus sit actus purus, nihil alius est materiam perfici in actu, qui est forma, nisi quatenus participat aliquam similitudinem actus primi, licet imperfecte; ut scilicet id quod est iam compositum ex materia et forma, sit medium inter potentiam puram et actum purum.{74}
There is, however, an unequal participation in actuality on the part of matter, for some material things possess perfection in this that they subsist, some in that they live, others in that they know, yet others in that they have reason. The similitude with First Act in all of these is their form "Sed forma talis in quibusdam facit esse tantum, in quibusdam esse et vivere; et sic de aliis in uno et eodem. Similitudo perfecta habet omne id quod habet similitudo minus perfecta, et adhuc amplius."{75} It is thanks to one substantial form that man is, lives, senses and understands. A stone is matter in act to the degree that it subsists. Matter taken with this common perfection, subsistence, gives rise to a notion which is material with respect to further perfection, in the case of man, to imperfection in the case of the stone. That is, "that which has existence in itself" when taken as common to stones and living things is material with respect to the perfection "living" and the imperfection "non-living": "et ex hoc materiali sumitur genus: differentia vero ex perfectione et imperfectione praedicata."{76}
Sicut ex hoc communi materiali quod est habere vitam, sumitur hoc genus quod est animatum corpus; ex perfectione vero superaddit, haec differentia, sensibile: ex imperfectione vero haec differentia, insensibile: et sic diversitas talium materialium inducit diversitatem generis, sicut animalis a planta. Et propter hoc dicitur materia esse principium diversitatis secundum genus.{77}
Thus the tree of Porphyry has its roots in the imperfection of our mode of knowing which is such that we first form confused notions whereby things of diverse perfections are made equal "in intentione alicujus communis." This concept or intention to which the logical intention of generic community attaches is one thanks in a special way to the operation of our mind; unlike the specific notion it is not based on some one type of form in rerum natura.{78}

    It must not be thought that, because the generic notion does not express the full perfection of the things it signifies, it signifies only a part of these things. If this were the case, the genus could not be predicated of them,{79} surely a strange pass for something of whose very nature it is to be predicable. The species does not differ from the genus by signifying the whole as opposed to a part. We can say both, "Socrates is man" and "Socrates is animal." Both predicates signify the whole, but they differ in that the genus is indeterminate, confused, non signatum, and the species is determinate, distinct, signata.{80} The genus "body" signifies the whole of that of which it is said.

    Or does it? St Thomas has said that the genus cannot signify a part because no integral part is predicated of its whole. He has in mind the fact that we are unlikely to say, "The house is lumber" or "Man is bone." However, though we do say, "Man is a body," we can also say, "Man is composed of body and soul," and we would mean composed as of integral parts. Doesn't this make the genus an integral part? Furthermore, the genus enters into the definition of a thing, but shouldn't the parts of the definition relate to the parts of the thing defined as the whole definition relates to the whole definitum? This last question is raised in the Metaphysics,{81} and it receives a decisively negative answer. When he comments on the Metaphysics, St Thomas remarks that it is patently false that the parts of the definition are the parts of the thing defined. His reason is again that the integral parts of a thing cannot be predicated of it as a whole; but genus and difference, the parts of the definition, are predicated of the whole thing: Man is animal, Man is rational.{82}

Sed dicendum est quod partes definitionis significant partes rei, inquantum a partibus rei sumuntur partes definitionis; non ita quod partes definitionis sint partes rei. Non enim animal est pars hominis, neque rationale, sed animal sumitur ab una parte et rationale ab alia. Animal enim est quod habet naturam sensitivam, rationale vero quod habet rationem. Natura autem sensitiva est ut materialis respectu rationis. Et inde est quod genus sumitur a materia, differentia a forma, species autem a forma et materia simul. Nam homo est quod habet rationem in naura sensitiva.{83}
The genus is part of the definition, an integral part of the species, but not of the thing defined.{84} That it is not a component or integral part is clear from the fact that it signifies the whole definitum.  "Animal" means "animate sensitive substance" or "what has a sensitive nature" and this signifies Socrates as a whole, not just part of him. We must, then, distinguish between the integral parts of the definition and the integral part of the thing defined.{85} The thing defined is composed of matter and form, but the genus is not matter, the difference is not form.
Unde dicimus hominem esse animal rationale, et non ex animali et rationali, sicut dicimus eum esse ex anima et corpore. Ex corpore enim et anima dicitur esse homo, sicut ex duabus rebus quaedam tertia res constituta, quae neutra illarum est. Homo enim nec est anima neque corpus. Sed, si honmo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali dicatur esse, non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus, sed sicut intellectus tertius ex duobus intellectibus.{86}
What then of the difficulty we posed a moment ago? Body is a genus and yet the animal is composed of body and soul. But body as a component part of man cannot be a genus. Precisely, and it is because it is not that we must ask after the meaning of "body" in these two uses. What has happened is that the same word is taken to signify the generic notion and matter, an integral part of the thing defined. St Thomas likens this situation to the taking of the word signifying matter to signify as well matter together with a privation. Thus, we might say, "The statue came to be from bronze." Despite their grammatical similarity, we would not want to interpret that statement as we would this one: "The musical comes from the non-musical" or "The shaped comes from the unshaped." In the statement about the statue, bronze does not disappear when the statue is finished, but is a component of the product. Musical, on the other hand, displaces non-musical as shaped does unshaped. If we use "bronze" as we do in the first sentence, it is because we have no word for the opposite of statue.{87} So too when we have no special word for a form, we sometimes use the name of matter, understanding it to mean the matter together with a common perfection.{88} St Thomas gives two examples of this state of affairs. One is vocal sound (vox).{89} This may mean the sound which is the subject and thus other than its determination into various syllables, and then vox names matter. On the other hand, vox may mean the sound together with the determination into sylllables and divisible into the various species of syllables, and thus it is the name of a genus. The other example is that of "body."
Si enim in intellectu corporis intelligatur substantia completa ultima forma, habens in se tres dimensiones, sic corpus est genus, et species eius erunt substantiae perfectae per has ultimas formas determinatas, sicut per formam auri, vel argenti, aut olivae, aut hominis. Si vero in intellectu corporis non accipiatur nisi hoc, quod est habens tres dimensiones cum aptitudine ad formam ultimam, sic corpus est materia.{90}
But let us return to the other way of looking at genus.

(2) Genus physice loquendo

Logically speaking, genus is a relation which attaches to a common notion susceptible of further determination in somewhat the same way as matter is subject to form. Thus the genus is said to be material. We remember that this material notion amounts to a grasp of matter together with a common determination. In other words, the generic notion comprises a form, the determination, and matter: it is this composition which is the basis for the distinction between the genus logicum and the genus physicum. "Sciendum tamen quod cum illud materiale unde sumitur genus, habeat in se formam et materiam, logicus considerat genus solum ex parte eius quod formale est, unde eius definitiones dicuntur formales; sed naturalis considerat genus ex parte utriusque."{91} Logically considered, the genus is abstract, formal; physically speaking, the genus is concrete, taking into account both form and matter. This gives rise to the possibility that some things can be said to communicate in a genus, logically speaking, that is, be made equal in the intention of some common note, which from a physical point of view would not communicate in a genus.{92} This opposition is developed in the commentary on the Metaphysics when the different meanings of "genus" are discussed.{93}

    Of the four meanings of "genus" distinguished only two have philosophical importance, as St Thomas points out.{94} Genus as the connected generations of things having the same form (as in genus humanum), or the closely allied meaning of family or clan, are the less important ones. although they reflect more closely the etymology of the word. The two remaining meanings contribute to our discussion. "Genus" sometimes means subject matter, as surface is the genus or subject of figures.

Genus autem hoc non est quod significat essentiam speciei, sicut animal est genus hominis; sed quod est proprium subiectum specie differentium accidentium. Superficies enim est subiectum omnium figurarum superficialium. Et habet similitudinem cum genere; quia proprium subiectum ponitur in definitione accidentis, sicut genus in definitione specie. Unde subiectum prorium praedicatur de accidente ad similitudinem generis.{95}
The fourth meaning of "genus," as will have been surmised and as this passage brings out, is that which occupies first place in a definition, "et praedicatur in eo quod quid, et differentiae sunt eius qualitates."{96} Genus subiectum, the matter of a composite, is compared to the logical genus in terms of predication; St Thomas goes on to compare them in terms of subject,{97} a comparison we have already examined. What is the significance of the comparison in terms of predication? Earlier, it was the fact that matter could not be predicated of its whole which distinguished it from the logical genus. Indeed, in this very text, the distinction is between the genus praedicabile and the genus subiectum. In what way is the genus subiectum also predicable?

    The proper subject enters into the definition of its accident in a way similar to that in which the genus enters into the definition of the species. This puts one in mind of the second mode of predication per se, and if we turn to St Thomas's discussion of that doctrine, we find him speaking of two ways in which the subject is put in the definition of its proper accident, directly or obliquely.

Cuius quidem ratio est, quia cum esse accidentis dependeat a subiecto, oportet etiam quod definitio eius significans esse ipsius contineat in se subiectum. Unde secundus modus dicendi per se est quando subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati, quod est proprium accidens eius.{98}
Direct or oblique positing of the subject in the definition of the property is a quesstion of concrete or abstract signification, e.g. "snub" and "snubness." The first can be defined as "concave nose," the second as "the concavity of the nose." In either case, the proper subject, nose, enters into the definition. Thus, the subject functions as does "animal" in the definition "rational animal." This same example is used in the Metaphysics when the question is raised as to whether or not the copulatum (of substance and accident) can be defined. If we say it can, we must recognize that it is a definition ex additione, i.e. something other than the essence of accident enters into its definition, namely substance. The genus as subject does not express in an indeterminate way the essence of the accident.{99} Indeed, the subject and its accident differ genere.{100}

    Depending on whether "genus" is taken as the genus subiectum or as the genus praedicaabile, there will be a twofold meaning of "generically different" or "differing in genus." Moreover, things can be one in genus in the second sense and differ in genin the first.

Patet autem ex dictis quod aliqua continentur sub uno praedicamento, et sunt unum genere hoc modo secundo, quae tamen sunt diversa genere primo modo. Sicut corpora caelestia et elementaria, et colores et sapores. Primus autem modus diversitatis secundum genus consideratur magis a naturali, et etiam a philosopho, quia est magis realis. Secundus autem modus consideratur a logico, quia est rationis.{101}
Things univocal for the logicus, and thus equal in their participation in a common notion, can be unequal for the naturalis who looks to the genus subiectum, the matter. Before continuing our consideration of both sides of this option, we would do well to notice that there is another inequality or per prius et posterius on the part of things falling under the same genus praedicabile, an inequality which does not seem to be at issue in the second division of our text from the Sentences.

    Things which are equal from the point of view of the common notion which is the genus can be unequal in that one is more perfect than the other. "Si quis enim diligenter consideret, in omnibus speciebus unius generis semper inveniet unum alia perfectiorem, sicut in coloribus albedinem et in animalibus hominem."{102) The inequality at issue here is taken from the differences which are related as act and privation. The division of the genus into species which are related as prior and posterior does not mean, of course, that the name signifying the generic notion is predicated analogically of them. Their inequality has to be explained in terms of something else, for in terms of the generic notion and the name signifying it the species are univocals; the name of the genus does not cease to be univocal when the species are discerned. An analogous name, on the contrary, signifies a common notion which is common per prius et posterius. That is why the inequality among the species of a genus must not be confused with the inequality of the common notion of an analogous name,

Dicendum quod quando genus univocum dividitur in suas species, tunc partes divisionis ex aequo se habent secundum rationem generis; licet secundum naturam rei una species sit principalior et perfectior alia, sicut homo aliis animalibus. Sed quando est divisio alicuius analogi, quod dicitur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius; tunc nihil prohibet unum esse principalius altero, etiam secundum commun rationem, sicut substantia principaliter dicitur ens quam accidens.{103}
Things which share in the common generic notion can be unequal and related per prius et posterius if we look to that which constitutes them specifically, namely the differences which divide the genus and are not expressed by it. Here the inequality is based on what is formal to the species and that is why this type of inequality cannot obtain in the species specialissima which is not subject to further formal determination. "Impossibile est autem naturam speciei communicare ab individuis per prius et posterius, neque esse, neque post secundum intentionem, quamvis hoc sit possibile in natura generis..."{104} Note that St Thomas takes into account here the inequality just mentioned as well as that at issue in our text from the Sentences. It is not the inequality which follows on specific differences{105} which is at stake in the division "secundum esse et non secundum intentionem." The source of the inequality envisaged by this phrase is not the differences which divide the genus, but matter. As is pointed out in the commentary on the De trinitate,{106} the generic notion is based on a grasp of matter under a common determination. Since the genus is susceptible of further formal determinations productive of less confused notions which more adequately express the essence of material things, the genus is said to be materiale. But in that materiale  there is form and matter and the logicus concerns himself only with the form. The genus praedicabile expresses a perfection of matter, but the logicus does not consider the matter. Thus, the genus praedicabile is said to be formal and abstract, and it is this which enables it to embrace things in which the generic notion is saved thanks to different kinds (genera)  of matter, or even in the absence of all matter.
Sicut patet quod lapis in materia, quae est in potentia ad esse, pertingit ad hoc quod subsistat; ad quod idem pertingit sol secundum materiam quae est in potentia ad ubi et non ad esse, et angelus omni materia carens. Unde logicus inveniens in his omnibus illud ex quo genus sumebat, ponit omnia haec in uno genere substantiae; naturalis vero metaphysicus, qui considerant principia rerum, omnia non invenientes convenientia in materia, dicunt ea differre genere, secundum hoc quod dicitur in X Metaph., quod corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt generic et quod illa conconveniunt genere quorum est materia una, et generatio ad invicem.{107}
Let us turn now to the physical matter which is the source of unity of genus for the natural philosopher.

    From the point of view of the natural philosopher, who considers the principia rerum those things are of one genus which have a common name expressing ratio found in the same kind of matter in each of them{108} We want now to examine the context of the remark quoted earlier from the commentary on the Metaphysics.{109} Having shown that contraries are in the same genus and that they constitute the species of the genus, Aristotle goes on, St Thomas observes, to touch on two exceptions. Some contraries pertain not so much to the species as to the individual and consequently do not constitute specific differences. For example, white and black are contraries, but they do not found the differences of the species of animal.{110} If it is true to say, "Animal is black," this is because a particular animal happens to be black. But black/white is not a contrariety within the genus of animal, since things not falling in this genus can be white or black. Thus, white and black are accidents of the individual, reducible to matter in the same way that individuality itself is. But the contraries which sonstitute species of a genus pertain to form.

    It also happens that contrariety can be constitutive of generic and not merely of specific difference. The example is corruptible/incorruptible. Such contraries are opposed in terms of potency and non-potency, for the corruptible is that which can not-be, whereas the incorruptible lacks this potency. Why should this contrariety found a generic difference? "Et hoc ideo, quia sicut forma et actus pertinet ad speciem, ita materia et potentia pertinent ad genus. Unde sicut contrarietas quae est secundum formas et actus, facit differentiam secundum speciem, ita contrarietas quae est secundum potentiam, facit generis  diversitatem."{111} Although this second qualification of the general position also involves appeal to matter, it is important to see how corruptible/incorruptible differs from black/white although both agree in not being the type of contrariety which constitutes specific difference. White and black are accidents of individuals and thus, though we cannot say "Socrates is white and black," we can say, "Man is white and black." The truth of the statement about the universal nature is founded on the different individuals Alcibiades and Othello. But is it possible truly to say of any universal nature that it is corruptible and incorruptible?{112} The reply is negative: corruptible and incorruptible are not predicated per accidens as are white and black.

Non enim corruptibile inest secundum accidens alicui eorum de quibus praedicatur;quia quod est secundum accidens contingit non inesse. corruptibile autem ex necessitate inest his quibus inest. At si hoc non sit verum, sequeretur quod unum et idem sit quandoque corruptibile et quandoque incorruptibile: quod est impossibile secundum naturam.{113}
If it is not predicated accidentally, "corruptible" must express the substance, or something of the substance, of that of which it is predicated. "Est enim unumquodque corruptibile per materiam, quae est de substantia rei. Et similis ratio est de incorruptibili..."{114} Since they express the substance of that of which they are predicated, corruptible and incorruptible cannot be in the same genus: contraries which divide a genus into its species are not of the substance of that genus. But any genus is such that corruptible or incorruptible would pertain to its very notion (de intellectu eius). Such opposites, then, cannot communicate in any genus. "Et hoc rationabiliter accidit. Nam corruptibilium et incorruptibilium non potest esse materia una."{115} It is just at this point that the now familiar distinction is made between the genus physice loquendo, which is the one we have just been discussing and which sumitur a materia, and the genus logice loquendo. What communicates in one common notion can be in the same genus, logically speaking, but if things do not communicate in one matter they will be said, by the natural philosopher, to be generically different.

    The natural philosopher is concerned with the principia rei,{116} and physical things are composed of matter and form as of integral parts of their substance. The logical genus expresses the essence of the thing suo modo, but as a whole; it does not express merely a part. The physical genus is based on the matter which is part of illud materiale whence the logical genus is taken, the material notion which is subject to further perfection and imperfection expressed by the contraries which divide it. Things will be said to be in the same physical genus when they are linked by the substratum of absolute change.{117} Contraries of the physical genus will be those things one of which can be the term from which, the other the term to which of a physical change: they thereby have a common subject.{118} To be in the same physical genus is to be one in matter{119} - and not merely one in a "material" notion. And, since the matter from which the physical genus is taken is a component of physical things, it can be predicated of them as part of whole, i.e. denominatively, in the way discussed earlier.{120} Thus the common notion, "illud materiale unde sumitur genus," logice loquendo, can be considered as a form which can be found in different kinds of matter or in things which are in no wise material. "...corporeitas secundum intentionem logicam univoce in omnibus corporibus invenitur; sed secundum esse considerata, non potest esse unius rationis in re corruptibili et incorruptibili: quia non similiter se habent in potentia essendi, cum unum sit possibile ad esse et ad non esse, et alterum non."{121}

    Just as genus logicum and genus physicum differ, so too difference naturaliter loquendo is not the same as what satisfies the logician's demands. For the natural philosopher, differences are the contrary forms which are terms of change thanks to their common subject matter: there is generatio ad invicem. The differences dividing the logical genus need not be contraries in that sense: "...dicendum quod naturaliter loquendo de genere et differentia, oportet differentias esse contrarias: nam natura, super quam fundatur natura generis, est susceptiva contrariarum formarum. Secundum autem considerationem logicam sufficit qualiscumque oppositio in differentiis, sicut patet in differentiis numerorum, in quibus non est contrarietas; et similiter est in spiritualibus substantiis."{122} The species of number are not contrary to one another, nor is there contrariety, properly speaking, in the genus of number: to maintain otherwise would imply the absurdity of a greatest number.{123}

(3) Univocal or analogous?

We must now return to the question with which we began: does the division "secundum esse sed non secundum intentionem" mean that things are named body univocally from the logical point of view and named body analogically from the natural point of view? If this question seems paradoxical, this is because things are said to be named univocally which have a common name which signifies the same ratio as said of each of them, whereas things are said to be named analogically which have a common name which does not signify exactly the same ratio, but different rationes related per prius et posterius. How can things, the same things, be named by the same name in both ways? The answer is found in the distinction between the abstract notion which satisfies the logicus and the ratio concreta of the philosopher. We have seen that the material notion which is the genus contains form and matter and that the logical genus expresses only the form. Thus, logically speaking, "body" means "that in which three dimensions can be designated," saying nothing about the kind of form this is due to, whether that of stone, plant, star or man, and without saying anything about the matter which is actuated by the form. It is thanks to this indifference to matter that "body" can be taken to signify terrestial and celestial bodies univocally. The concrete notion which answers to the philosopher's use of "body" involves a determinate statement about the matter in which the form is found. This gives rise to two different rationes of "body" when it is question of terrestial and celestial bodies. The notion of terrestial body expresses a matter which is in potency to another substantial form: thus the body of which such matter is a component can cease to be; on Aristotle's hypothesis, celestial bodies could not thus cease to be (i.e. corrupt) and if they are to be said to have matter, this will be in a different sense of the term. Thus, the two concrete rationes render the common name equivocal, i.e. analogical. "Et sic non est eadem materia corporis caelestis et elementorum, nisi secundum analogiam, secundum quod conveniunt in ratione potentiae."{124} A similarity of proportions is set up so that celestial bodies are spoken of in terms of what we know to be the case with terrestial bodies. These latter are composed of matter and form (a position arrived at by observation of substantial generation and corruption). Celestial bodies, since long observation has revealed no substantial change (the ground of Aristotle's hypothesis), if they are bodies are not bodies as are terrestial things. And, if we want to speak of matter in celestial bodies, setting up a proportion between their form and their matter, we will manifest the meaning of "matter" in this proportion by appealing to its meaning as applied to terrestial things. And we will negate of it the potency to non-being which follows on prime matter, since it is matter's potentiality to forms other than that presently actuating it which explains the corruptibility of terrestial bodies. The matter of celestial bodies was said, consequently, to be the root of the potentiality involved in local motion. Thus, since "matter" does not mean the same thing and the ratio concreta of the philosopher expresses the matter determinately, "body" is not said univocally of terrestial and celestial bodies, but analogically, signifying different bodies per prius et posterius. The same thing can be seen in terms of a ratio communis which could be formed with the aid of "potency."

    It is because the genus is, as we saw earlier, one thanks to our mode of knowing, and not because it expresses one essence in rerum natura{125} that Aristotle has warned that "iuxta genera latet multa," i.e. that the unity of the genus can make us fail to see many equivocations. This happens, not because of further formal differences expressed by differences, but because a concrete notion takes into account matter as well as form and reveals the inequality. Before turning to St Thomas' comments on this remark, let us seek some initial clarity from his commentary on the Metaphysics.{126} The text we have in mind is one which will occupy us again in Chapter VII when we discuss univocal and equivocal causes. A generation is wholly univocal when the form of what is generated preexists in the generator "secundum eumdum modum essendi et simili materia." A generation may be partly equivocal and partly univocal when the form exists immaterially in the generator and materially in the generated; e.g. the form of the house in the mind of the artisan and the form of the house realized in lumber and cement and bricks. It is this case which interests us, for it seems to answer to the univocity of the genus logice loquendo where the form alone of the genus is considered. The first type, where both form and matter are considered, seems to answer to the genus physice loquendo. the physical genus reveals the equivocity concealed by the abstract notion.

    St Thomas, commenting on Aristotle's remark that the genus conceals many equivocals, gives a division which is most interesting if somewhat difficult to understand.{127} To understand it, we must see that he is not enumerating the equivocations which can be hidden by the logical genus (this is one member of the division), but the way in which equivocations can be hidden because a genus, i.e. a physical genus, seems to be invoved. Thus, even pure equivocations enter into his division, although all they have in common with the genus is that one name is applied to many things; pure equivocation, however, has only the unity of the word: inquiry into what that word means in its various uses reveals totally different meanings.

    It is difficut to know whether the remainder of the text contains two or three members. St Thomas ends by noting that either the unity of the logical genus or similarity can conceal the equivocation. And yet there are two types or, if not, two examples of equivocals concealed because of similarity. "Man" is said of Socrates and a painting of him because the latter is like the former. We have encountered this example before, and we saw how it can be said to involve an analogous name although sometimes spoken of as omnino aequivoce. It is analogous because the notion signified by the term as applied to the painting includes the notion signified by it as applied to Socrates. The second similarity, "master" as applied to the head of a household and the teacher in school, is based on a similarity of proportions or functions. Though both are directors (rectores), the one is in the home, the other in school. Is there any univocity involved here as there is in the case of "body"? That is, could we find at leasst a logical genus? Or is magister thought of as transferred from the majordomo to the teacher? The last possibility could render the name analogical and seems the preferable interpretation, for it explains the twofold similarity with physical genus with which St Thomas ends, namely that of the logical genus and similarity. We might add that "being" too has a similarity with the genus, something which can conceal its equivocation.{138}

(4) Who is the 'logicus'

There remains an important question. We have seen that the genus logice loquendo is distinguished from the genus physice loquendo, that some things are named equivocally from the point of view of the natural philosopher which are named univocally so far as the logicus is concerned. Just who is this logicus? The question gains importance from the fact that univocation and equivocation are logical intentions. If this is the case, what is the point of speaking of logical univocals and physical univocals? What has been called the abstract ratio  which constitutes the genus,  logice loquendo, brings to mind a discussion from the commentary on On the Soul.

Si quis ergo assignet definitionem, per quam non deveniatur in cognitionem accidentium rei definitae, illa definitio non est realis, sed remota et dialectica. Sed illa definitio per quam deveniatur in cognitionem accidentium est realis et expropriis et essentialibus rei.{129}
St Thomas manifests the difference between a logical or dialectical definition and a natural definition by the example of anger. One might define anger as desire for revenge or, on the other hand, as the "churning of the blood around the heart." The former is the logical or dialectical definition; the latter, or better, both together, would be the natural definition.
Quod autem definitio prima sit insufficiens manifeste apparet. Nam omnis forma quae est in materia determinata, nisi in sua definitione ponatur materia, illa definitio est insufficiens: sed haec forma, scilicet appetitus vindictae est forma in materia determinata: unde cum non ponatur in eius definitione materia, constat quod ipsa definitio est insufficiens. Et ideo necesse est ad definitionem, quod in definitione ponatur hoc, scilicet forma, esse in materia huiusmodi, scilicet determinata.{130}
The definition which does not take into account the determinate matter in which the form is found is said to be logical as opposed to natural: "illa quae considerat formam tantum, non est naturalis, sed logica."{131}

    To encounter a logical as opposed to a natural or real definition is puzzling since there is a logical doctrine on definition which presumably has application in any of the sciences. What is the relationship between the logical definition and the logic of definition? Every science is such because it satisfies the canons of logic. What then is the meaning, within the science of nature, of the distinction between logical and natural definitions, between logical and natural arguments?{132}

    Consider the distinction, within the logic of argumentation, between reasoning which concludes necessarily (demonstration), reasoning which concludes with probability (dialectics), and reasoning which is only apparently conclusive (sophistics), The logical doctrine of each of these types puts us in possession of scientific knowledge of how they proceed.{133} That is, the logic of sophistical reasoning (sophistica docens) is a science; the logic of dialectics (dialectica docens) is not probable, but necessary, a science. so too is the logic of demonstration. To use dialectics, however, is to argue in such a fashion that only probable knowledge is attained. To use sophistics is to appear to reason validly. This use is spoken of by St Thomas as if it constituted only a modality characterizing arguments about reality (modo adiuncto).{134} That more than this is involved is clear from his rejection of any distinction between demonstrativa docens and demonstrativa utens.

Sed in parte logicae quae dicitur demonstrativa, solum doctrina pertinet ad logicam, usus vero ad philosophiam et ad alias particulares scientias quae sunt de rebus naturae. Et hoc ideo, quia usus demonstrativae consistit in utendo principiis rerum, de quibus fit demonstratio, quae ad scientias reales pertinet, non utendo intentionibus logicis. Et sic apparet, quod quaedam partes logicae habent ipsam scientiam et doctrinam et usum, sicut dialectica tentativ et sophhistica; quaedam autem doctrinam et non usum, sicut demonstrativa.{135}
To argue demonstratively is not to make use of the logical intentions considered in the logic  of demonstration, but to argue from the principia rerum: the result is philosophy of nature, mathematics or metaphysics, not a logica utens. Logica utens,  then, consists of the use of logical intentions in arguing and he who does this will be called the logicus as opposed to the philosophus. The demonstrator, on the other hand, is always the philosopher of nature, the mathematician or the metaphysician - and, of course, the logician setting forth logica docens.

    The logicus or dialectician who reasons about things by making use of logical intentions is not the logicus who expounds logical doctrine; if he were, the result would be science. But the result of the efforts of the logicus or dialectician is only probability. The dialectician can be considered as a kind of rival of the metaphysician because of the equal scope, so to speak, of logic and metaphysics. Since all being is the object of reason and logic is concerned with the relations reason sets up among things as known, logical entities comprise as much as the object of reason itself.{136} It is just this that permits the dialectician to operate. "Dialecticus autem procedit ad ea (i.e. communia accidentia entis) consideranda ex intentionibus rationis, quae sunt extranea a natura rerum. Et ideo dicitur, quod dialectica est tentativa, quia tentare proprium est ex principiis extraneis procedere."{137}

    In commenting on the De trinitate of Boethius, St Thomas distinguishes two modes of logica utens when he is discussing three ways in which we can be said to proceed rationabiliter. "Rational process" can be denominated from logic, the  scientia rationalis, in two ways.{138} First, because of the principles from which it proceeds, as if someone were to try to prove something about reality from the intentions of genus, species, opposites, analogy, etc. This is to make use of logical propositions in arguing about things. Say we know that love is a passion of the sense appetite and argue that since love and hate are opposites, and opposites are in the same genus, hate must be a passion of the sense appetite. We are using a logical truth to argue about non-logical entities. "Sed hic modus procedendi non potest competere proprie alicui particulari scientiae, in quibus peccatum accidit, nisi ex propriis procedatur."{139}

    Secondly, reasoning can be called a rational process from the point of view of the end or term. Science is had when we are able to resolve a conclusion into its principles that we see its necessity. When reason does not achieve this term and is not determined to one of contradictory propositions, opinion or faith is the result, and the argument leading to it only probable. Such a dialectical procedure is legitimate in any science as a preparation for necessary conclusions. It is this second type St Thomas seems to have in mind in commention on the Physics. "Dicuntur autem primae rationes logicae, non quia ex terminis logicis logice procedant, sed quia modo logico procedunt, scilicet ex communibus et probabilibus quod est proprium syllogismo dialectici."{140} The arguments in question proceed from what is common in the sense of what is commonly held or believed.{141}

    It would seem to be the first type of rational process which answers most closely to the use of the adjective "logical" in speaking of definitions. To group terrestial and celestial bodies under a common notion which ignores the principia rerum is to depend on a unity which results from our mode of knowing. The definition and genus are logical not as pertaining to logical doctrine, but as using logical entities to speak of real entitites. Logica docesn will mention real things by way of examples, it is dependent on a psychology which teaches how our knowledge attains real entities,{142} but as such logica docens is not about things as they exist and would have nothing to say about terrestial and celestial bodies. The logic of definition cannot decide what is a proper mode of defining in any science, anymore than the logic of demonstration decides what is the proper mode of this science or that.For this there is required a proper methodology which applies the common mode of logic to the degree this can be done given the subject matter of the science in question.{143} By the same token, the logic of analogical signification does not decide what in a given science will be considered to be named analogically, any more than logic can decide wht in a particular science will be said to be named univocally. This does not mean that the common logical doctrine is altered by a consideration of what is a good definition or ratio in a given science. And, if one settles for a common or abstract notion in speaking of univocity in a determinate area, he will be proceeding logically in the sense of dialectically. To note the inadequacy of this approach is not to call logica docesn into question, nor to demand further development of the properly logical doctrine.{144}

By way of conclusion to this lengthy analysis of the way in which things are named analogically "secundum esse sed non secundum intentionem," let us state briefly what we have found. Faced with a situation where things have a common name, we can say they are named both univocally and analogically. They are named univocally insofar as the term signifies an abstract, formal, common ratio which owes its unity only to our mode of knowing. Logice loquendo, they are in the same genus and are named univocally, where logice means "dialectically." If the common name takes into account both the form and the matter of "illud materiale unde sumitur genus," several concrete notions can result, as in the case of "body," and then the name is no longer common univocally but analogically, secundum prius et posterius, insofar as the matter of celestial bodies is made known from what we know of the matter of terrestial bodies and denominated from the latter. All terretial bodies will be named such univocally insofar as the term "body" signifies the appropriate concrete notion; the common doctrine of univocation is saved, just as the common doctrine of analogical signification is saved when "body" signifies the diverse concrete notions appropriate to terrestial and celestial bodies, or a ratio communis formed in terms of potency. By identifying the logicus as the dialectician, we are enabled to avoid the erroneous conclusion that a different logical doctrine of univocation and of the analogy of names is required when it is a question of concrete notions. Rather what we see is a particular science determining, thanks to its proper subject, what will and what will not satisfy the canons of univocity and the analogy of names.

(c) Secundum intentionem, secundum esse

Vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse; et hoc est quando neque parificatur in intentioni communi, neque in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente; et de talibus oportet quod natura communis habet aliquod esse in unoquoque eorum de quibus dicitur, sed differens secundum rationem majoris et minoris perfectionis. Et similiter dico, quod veritas, et bonitas et omnia hujusmodi dicuntur analogice de Deo et creaturis. Unde oportet quod secundum suum esse omnia haec in Deo sint, et in creaturis secundum rationem majoris perfectionis et minoris; ex quo sequitur, cum non possint esse secundum unum esse utrobique, quod sint diversae veritates.

We are reading the present text as presenting, not a division of the analogy of names, but as pointing out that the foundation of analogous names is not always the same. In such an example as "healthy," that from which the name is imposed has existence in only one of the things named by it. Various references or proportions to that in which sanitas exists are the foundation for the extension of the word sanum. In the second division, we were apprised of a remote and proper way of looking at things. These different vantage points can give rise to univocity and analogy with respect to the same name and the same things named by it. In the third division, we are told of analogous names which are so founded that that from which the name is imposed exists in each of the things named analogically, but "secundum rationem majoris et minoris perfectionis." Although the text makes its point with particular reference to the divine names, the names common to God and creature, we are not presently concerned with those. But we do want to say a word or two now about the phrase just quoted, a phrase which could be rendered as "unequal participation in a common perfection." This inequality must not be confused with the manner in which species participate in a genus, a contextually important point, since St Thomas teaches that God and creature cannot communicate in a genus, even logice loquendo.

    Greater and lesser possession of a common perfection can be understood in such a way that it is not productive of even specific diversity, or in such a way that it does result in different species, or in such a way that it is productive of generic diversity and excludes all univocation. In the first place, then, we can speak of things as more and less white, but, since it is the same form that is possessed, such a "magis et minus non diversificant speciem."{145} The term "white" applied to the more and less white signifies the same ratio; nevertheless, their similarity is imperfect.{146}

    The more and less which diversifies species is read in terms of that which is primary in a given genus. "Diversi enim colores specie sunt secundum magis et minus propinque se habent ad lucem..."{147} The measure in the genus of color is white, defined as disgregativa visus.{148} Notice that this magis et minus does not destroy the univocity of the genus, since the per prius et posterius involved is that read in terms of specific differences, something we discussed above; the differences assigned are taken from the effect on our sight because the real differences are unknown.{149}

    Greater and lesser possession of the form in terms of which things can be called similar sometimes gives rise to generic diversity. St Thomas, following Aristotle, uses the example of the sun as cause of the heat of terrestial things. "Sicut sol ext causa caloris in istis inferioribus; non tamen inferiora corpora possunt recipere impressionem solis aut aliorum caelestium corporum secundum eamdem rationem speciei, cum non communicent in materia. Et propter hoc non dicimus solem esse calidissimum sicut ignem, sed dicimus solem esse aliquid amplius quam calidissimum."{150} Fire is first in the genus of hot terrestial things; the sun is outside of this genus entirely. The reason St Thomas gives takes us back to the second member of the tripartitie division of the Sentences, something productive of a problem. He sometimes uses this example to show how creatures can be similar to God and yet, as we have seen, between celestial and terrestial bodies there can be similarity secundum genus logicum. Taking this into account, St Thomas writes: "Si igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere contineatur, effectus eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad similitudinem formae agentis:non tamenita quod participent similitudinem formae agentis secundum eandem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus."{151} While allowing that a logical genus can contain angels and material things, St Thomas will always deny that God can be included in a genus - at least a genus univocum.{152}
    It will be appreciated that a full commentary on the member "secundum intentionem et secundum esse" at this point would not be in keeping with the order of our discussion. Subsequent chapters will return to the points just mentioned, particularly those concerned with analogical cause and with the divine names.


Noting that both "healthy" and "true" are admitted to be analogous names, the objector moves from the fact that things named healthy are such that the form sanitas from which the name is imposed to signify exists in only one of them, to the conclusion that the same must be true of the things called true. St Thomas has set out to show that you cannot argue from identity of mode of signifying to identity in the remote foundation of this mode, since things named analogically may found this mode of signifying in utterly different ways. The names common to God and creature, like "being" said of what falls into the various genera, happen to be such that the perfection from which the name is imposed to signify is in each of the things, but according to a scale of greater and lesser perfection, a magis et minus which will be revealed in the various rationes of the common name. thus there will be a participation per prius et posterius or, in the case of the divine names, God will have the perfection essentialiter, be one in substance with truth, for example, and creatures will be true per participationem. That is, "illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum." Thus it is clear that this is not a division of that mode of signifying which is the analogy of names, but the pointing out of a difference among kinds of things which can be the remote foundation of this mode of signifying. "To be named analogically" is always an extrinsic denomination of things, not something which belongs to them as they exist in rerum natura. This is something which attaches to things as known, and on this level, the reason is always the same: many things receive a common name insofar as they are denominated from what the name principally signifies. The remote foundation for this can be of various kinds. However, it is not the case that there is no foundation in the secondary analogates of "healthy" thanks to which they receive the common name; it is not in this that they differ from the things which are named "being" and "true" secondarily, but in the kind of foundation. But the mode of signifying which is founded in any instance of an an analogous name will be explained by the logical doctrine insofar as we are talking of things named analogically. It is just here that the similarity between things named healthy and God and creature as receptive of a common name lies, not in the remote foundations, the things as such. If the analogy of names were to be distinguished on the basis of real differences among the things so named, where would we draw the line? There would be as many kinds of analogous name as there are instances of it, and those who have tended to go in this direction are not doing anything essentially different from what Cajetan did. For it is not the same foundation in re which underlies "good" and "true," at least in the case of creatures.

    We know that Cajetan equates this third division with what he calls proper proportionality. Later, when we have seen that "proper proportionality" is not a mode of analogous name, the significance of this third member and of the division in which it occurs will be seen to be what we now take it to be: a warning that though things may be alike in this that one group is named analogically just as is another group, the first group is not thereby like the second apart from the way a name is common to it.
We cannot argue from what they have in common, a mode of being named, to what is in no way decided by the way in which they have a common name. "Dicendum quod non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem (or similarity) in rebus naturalibus accipere..."{153}


{1} I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.

{2} II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 3.

{3} Ia, q. 13, a. 5.

{4} Lyttkens several times raises the objection that if the analogous name signifies things insofar as they refer to some first thing, that first thing is not signified by the analogous name. Cf. Lyttkens, op. cit., pp. 55-8. As we shall see below in Chapter VIII, a name first has a ratio propria and then acquires the ratio communis which renders it analogous. Obviously what saves the ratio propria of the name is not named with reference to what saves the ratio propria. A name is analogous when it signifies things which do not save its proper notion, and these things are signified by it precisely insofar as they are referred to what does save that proper notion.

{5} Ia, q. 13, a.6.

{6} This division is found in Ia, q. 13, a. 5; Q.D. de pot, q. 7, a. 7, I Contra Gentiles, cap 34.

{7} Cf. In IV Metaphys., lect. 1, nn. 537-9

{8} Cf. De nominum analogia, nn. 9, 18

{9} In IV Metaphys., lect. 1, n. 536; cf. In VII Metaphys.,  lect. 4, n. 1337.

{10} I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.

{11} Q.D. de ver., q. 1, a. 2.

{12} Ia, q. 13, a. 5.

{13} Q.D. de pot., q. 7, 1. 7.

{14} Q.D. de Ver., q. 2, a. 11: "Prima ergo convenientia est proportionis, secunda autem proportionalitatis; unde et secundum modum primae convenientiae invenimus aliquid analogice dicitur de duobus quorum unum ad alterum habitudinem habet; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente ex habitudine quam substantia et accidens habent; et sanum diciturde urina et animali, ex eo quod urina habet aliquam similitudinem ad sanitatem animalis. Quandoque vero dicitur aliquid analogice secundo modo convenientiae; sicut nomen visus dicitur de visu corporali et intellectu, eo quod sicut visus est in oculo, ita intellectus est in mente."

{15} Ia,  q. 12, a. 1, ad 4: "Dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa habitudo unius quantitas ad alteram: secundum quod duplum, triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse proportio creaturae ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad causam, aut potentia ad actum."

{16} The recognition of the common notion of "proportion" does not mean that the term is univocally common to determinate and indeterminate relations. See below, Chapter VIII.

{17} Q.D. de ver., q. 2, a. 11, ad 4.

{18} As I suggested in "The Logic of Analogy," The New Scholasticism, XXXI, (1957), pp. 149-171. Cf. In V Metaphys., lect. 17, n. 1015:Primi autem termini in quibus invenitur aliqua proportio, dant speciem ipsi proportioni. Unde in quibuscumque aliis terminis consequenter inveniatur, in venitur in eis secundum rationem primorum terminorum. Sicut proportio dupla primo invenitur inter duo et unum. Unde ex hoc proportio recipit rationem et nomen. Et propter hoc, si etiam unus numerus respectu alterius numeri sit duplus, tamen hoc est secundum quod minor numerus accipit rationem unius, et maior rationem duorum."

{19} See below, Chapter VIII, section 4.

{20} Q.D. de ver., q. 2, a. 11, ad 6.

{21} Cf. Lyttkens, op. cit., pp. 298-300.

{22} Cf. e.g. I Sent., d. 2, g. 1, a. 3.

{23} Ia, q. 13, a. 10, ad 4.

{24} Q.D. de ver., q. 2, a. 11, ad 8.

{25} Q.D. de ver. q. 2, a. 11, ad 1: "homo...non dicitur suae imagini similis, sed e converso: si autem imperfecte imitetur, tunc potest dici simile et dissimile id quod imitatur ei ad cuius imitationem fit: simile secundum quod repraesentat; sed non simile, inquantum a perfecta repraesentatione deficit."

{26} Ia, q. 35, a. 1.

{27} Cf. Q.D. de pot. q. 7, a. 7, ad 3 in contr.

{28} That is, the id a quo ex parte rei. Cf. Q.D. de ver.,  q. 4, a. 1, ad 8.

{29} Q.D. de ver., q. 2, a. 11, ad 1.

{30} Cf. I Sent.,  d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, See below, Chapter IX.

{31} Cajetan, op. cit., n. 10.

{32} Ibid. n. 11.

{33} In III Physic. lect. 5, n. 15. Our discussion follows this text, but see as well, In V Metaphys., lect. 9, n. 892; I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a.1.

{34} In III Physic., lect. 5, n. 15.

{35} I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 1; IIIa, q. 63, a. 2, ad 3.

{36} Cf. IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 1; IIIa, q. 63, a. 2, ad 3.

{37} It seems to be the case that, of the secondary analogates of "healthy," urine would fall under the first member of the division quoted in the following note, medicine in the second. Cf. Q.D. de ver., q. 1, a.4

{38} Q.D. de ver., q, 21, a. 4, ad 2: "...dicendum quod dupliciter denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum: uno modo, quando ipse respectus est ratio denominationis, sicut urina dicitur sana per respectum ad sanitatem animalis. Ratio enim sani, secundum quod de urina praedicatur, est esse signum sanitatis animalis. Et in talibus, quod denominatur per respectum ad alterum, non denominatur ab aliqua forma sibi inhaerente, sed ab aliquo extrinseco ad quod refertur. Alio modo denominatur aliquid per respectum ad alterum, quando respectus non est ratio denominationis, sed causa, sicut si aer dicatur lucens a sole; non quod ipsum referri aerem ad solem sit lucere aeris, sed quia directa oppositio aeris ad solem est causa quod luceat. Et hoc modo creatura dicitur bonum per respectum ad bonum; unde ratio non sequitur."

{39} Perhaps it would be more accurate to say he would claim we have both.

{40} ia, q. 16, a. 6.

{41} Cajetan, Ia, Iam.,  q. 16, a. 6, n. VI.

{42} As we shall see in Chapter IX, section 4, in names common to God and creature, there is special need to distinguish the per prius secundum rationem nominis  from the per prius secundum rem.

{43} Q.D. de ver.,  q. 1, a. 3.

{44} Q.D. de ver., q. 21, a. 4: "...omne agens invenitur sibi simile agere; unde si prima bonitas sit effectiva omnium bonorum, oportet quod similitudinem suam imprimat in rebus effectus; et sic unumquodque dicetur bonum sicut forma inhaerente per similitudinem summi boni sibi inditam, et ulterius per bonitatem primam, sicut per exemplar et effectivum omnis bonitatis creatae."

{45} Q.D. de ver.,  q. 1, a. 2.

{46} In III Physic.,  lect. 5, n. 15.

{47} Ia,  q. 52, a. 1.

{48} Nicomachean Ethics, 1, 6.
{49} 1096b25.

{50} 1096b25-30.: οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τί κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ ἒοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις, ἀλλ᾿ ἄρα γε τῷ ἄφ᾿ ἑνὸς εἶναι; ἢ πρὸς ἕν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν; ἢ μᾶλλον κατ᾿ ἀναλογίαν; ὡς γὰρ έν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δή ἐν ἄλλῳ. Cf. Q.D. de ver. q. 21, a. 4.

{51} In I Ethic., lect 7, n. 95: "Et haec quidem quaestio locum habet, quia aliquid dici de multis secundum diversas rationes dupliciter. (A) Uno modo secundum rationes omnino diversad non habentes respectum ad unum. Et ista dicuntur aequivoca a casu, quia scilicet casu accidit, quod unum nomen unus homo imposuit uni rei, et alius alil rei, ut praecipue patet in diversis hominibus uno nomine nominatis. (B) Alio modo unum nomen dicitur de multis secundum rationes diversas non totaliter, sed in aliquo uno convenientes. (1) Quandoque quidem in hoc quod referuntur ad unum principium, sicut res aliqua dicitur militaris, vel qui est instrumentum militis, sicut gladius, yel quia est tegumentum eius sicut lorica, vel quia est vehiculum eius, sicut equus. (2) Quandoque vero in hoc quod referuntur ad unum finem sicut medicina dicitur sana, eo quod est factiva sanitatis, dieta vero eo quod est conservativa sanitatis, urina vero eo quod est sanitatis significativa. (3) Quandoque (a) secundum proportiones diversas ad idem subiectum, sicut qualitas dicitur esse ens, quia est dispositio per se entis, idest substantiae, quantitas vero eo quod est pensura eiusdem, et sic de aliis, (b) vel secundum unam proportionem ad diversa subiecta. Eamdem enim habent proportionem visus quoad corpus, et intellectus ad animam. Unde sicut visus est potentia organicorporalis, ita etiam intellectus est potentia animae absque participatione corporis."

{52} In IV Metaphys., lect. 1, nn. 537-9; De principiis naturae, cap. 6.

{53} 1096b30-1: ἀλλ᾿ ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν, ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴν φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον.

{54} In I Ethic, lect. 7, n. 96: Sic ergo dicit, quod bonum dicitur de multis, non secundum rationes penitus differentes, sicut accidit in his quae sunt a casu aequivoca, sed magis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem eamdem, inquantum omnia bona dependent ab uno primo bonitatis principio, vel inquantum ordinantur ad unum finem. Non enim voluit Aristoteles quod illud bonum separatum sit idea et ratio omnium bonorum, sed principium et finis. Vel etiam dicuntur omnia bona magis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem eamdem, sicut visus est bonum corporis, et intellectus est bonum animae. Ideo hunc tertium modum praefert quia accipitur secundum bonitatem inhaerentem rebus. Primi autem duo modisecundum bonitatm separatam, a qua non ita proprie aliquid denominatur." See once more Q.D. de ver., q. 21, a. 4, quoted above in note 44.

{55} I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.

{56} Cf. Contra Gentiles, cap. 35; III Contra Gentiles, cap 82, 84; Ia, q. 16, a. 6; Q.D. de ver.,  q. 1, a. 5.

{57} Ia, q. 16, a.6.

{58} Should "healthy" be taken to mean "that which is so disposed as to live well," the grain in the field could be called healthy, not insofar as it is food, but from its own condition or quality.

{59} This paradoxical statement will be explained in Chapter IX.

{60} Cf. On the Heavens, I. 3, 270b10. In commenting on this passage, St Thomas stresses that the incorruptibility of heavenly bodies is only a hypothesis. Cf. In I de coelo, lect. 7, n. 6.

{61} In X Metaphys., lect. 12, n. 2142. Why does St Thomas say of the genus physicum alone that it is a materia sumitur? The physical genus is based in a special way on matter, since in " illud materiale unde sumitur genus," there is both form and matter and the physical genus comprises both. Cf. In Boethii de trin., q. 4, a. 2.

{62} Topics, I, 4; Porphyry, Isagoge, chap. 4.

{63} One might recall the diverse kinds of supposition mentioned in Chapter IV, section 6.

{64} De ente et essentia, cap. 4: "Praedictio enim est quoddam quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens tamen fundamentum in re, ipsam unitatem eorum quorum unum de altero dicitur. Unde ratio praedicabilitatis potest claudi in ratione huius intentionis quae est genus, quae similiter per actionem intellectus completur; nihilominus id sui intellectus intentionem praedicabilitatis attribuit, componens id cum altero, non est ipsa intentio generis, sed potius id cui intellectus intentionem generis attribuit, sicut quod significatur hoc nomine animal."

{65} Q.D. de pot., q. 7, a. 3, ad 6.

{66} See below, note 100.

{67} In VII Physic., lect. 8, n. 8.

{68} Q.D. de spirit. creat., a. 1, ad 3: "...dicendum quod cum animal sit id quod vere est homo, distinctio naturae animalis ab homine non est secundumdiversitatem realem formarum, quasi alia forma sit per quam sit animal, et superaddatur altera per qum sit homo; sed secundum rationes intelligibiles. Secundum enim quod intelligitur corpus perfectum in esse sensibili ab anima, sic comparatur ad perfectionem ultimam quae est ab anima rationaliinquantum huiusmodi, ut materiale ad formale. Cum enim genus et species significentquasdam intentiones intelligibiles, non requiritur ad distinctionem speciei et generis distinctio realis formarum, sed intelligibilis tantum."

{69} Cf.  II Sent., 17, Q. 1, A. 1.

{70} Ia, q. 85, a. 3.

{71} In Boethii de trin., q. 4, a. 2 (ed. Calcaterra: lect. 1, q. 2, a. 2).

{72} Ibid.

{73} On knowing matter by analogy, see below. Chapter VIII, section 3.

{74} In Boethii de trin., q. 4, a. 2.

{75} Ibid.

{76} Ibid.

{77} Ibid.

{78} An important precision on the way things made equal in a generic notion are said to be one is found in Metaphysics, Delt, 6. Figure is divided by such species as circle, triangle, etc. Triangle, in turn, is generic with respect to isocles and scalene. Isoceles and scalene are not one and the same triangle (proximate genus), but rather one and the same figure (remote genus), "Cuius ratio est quia hi duo trianguli non differunt per differentias quibus dividitur figura. Differunt autem per differentias quibus dividitur triangulus. Idem autem dicitur a quo aliquid non differt differentia." - In V Metaphys., lect. 7, n. 863.

{79} "Si enim animal non esset totum quod est homo, sed pars eius, non praedicaretur de eo; cum nulla pars integralis praedicetur de suo toto." - De ente et essentia, cap.3; cf. In X Metaphys., lect. 10, nn. 2113-9.

{80} Cf. De ente et essentia, cap. 3.

{81} A somewhat similar question is asked in the third book of that work. Do genera amount to principles of the being of things? St Thomas, anticipating the later solution, argues that genera are principles of knowledge and could only be principles of being if they existed separated from the things of which they are the genera. "Quia enim separatim accipitur a ratione genus sine speciebus, est principium in cognoscendo. Et eodem modo esset principium in essendo, si haberet esse separatum." - In III Metaphys., lect. 8, n. 442; cf. Ia, q. 85, a. 3, ad 4. We are now asking if the genus is an intrinsic principle, an integral part, of the thing defined.

{82} In VII Metaphys., lect. 9, n. 1462.

{83} Ibid. n. 1463.

{84} Since the species is also said to be part of the genus, we may seem to be faced with a contradiction. But there are wholes and wholes, parts and parts. The genus is a predicable whole of which the species is a subjective part. That is, the genus can be predicated of the whole of which the species is a component or integral part. If the species were taken to be integral parts of the genus, the genus would be a contradictory notion - as if animal were composed of rational and irrational, Cf. In V Metaphys, lect. 21, nn. 1094-7; Ia, q. 85, a. 3, ad 2; In X Metaphys., lect 12, n. 2142.

{85} For example, in commenting on the fourth way in which something can be said to come from something else, according to Aristotle, St Thomas notes a twofold way we can understand that the species comes from parts of the species. "Secundum rationem, sicut bipes est parts hominis, quia est parts definitionis eius, quamvis secundum rem non sit pars, quia aliter non praedicaretur de toto. Toti enim homini competit habere duos pedes. Secundum rem vero sicut 'syllaaba est ex elemento,' idest ex littera sicut ex parte speciei." - In V Metaphys.,  lect. 23, n. 1088.

{86} De ente et essentia, cap. 3; cf. I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.

{87} See In I Physic. lect. 12, n. 9, and below, Chapter VIII, section 3.

{88} "Sciendum est autem quod licet idem secundum nomen possit esse genus et materia, non tamen idem eodem modo acceptum. Materia enim est pars integralis rei, et ideo de repraedicari non potest. Non enim potest dici quod homo sit caro et os. Genus autem praedicatur de specie. Unde oportet quod significet aliquo modo totum. Sicut enim propter hoc quod est innominata privatio, aliquando simplici nomine materiae significatur materia cum privatione, ut supra dictum est, quod aes accipitur propaere infigurato cum dicumis quod exaere fit statua; ita etiam quando forma est innominata, simplici nomine materiae intelligitur compositum ex materia et forma, non quidem determinata, sed communi; et sic accipitur utgenus. Sicut enim compositum ex meteria et forma determinata est species, ita compositum ex materia et forma communi est genus." - In VII Metaphys., lect. 12, n. 1546. Think of St Albert's discussion of "quorum vox est commune" in the definition of equivocals.

{89} Ibid. n.  1548.

{90} Ibid. n. 1547; cf De ente et essentia, cap. 3; I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.

{91} In Boethii de trin., q. 4, a. 2.

{92} In VII Physic.,  lect. 7, n. 9: "Est autem considerandum, quod multa quidem secundum abstractam considerationem vel Logici vel Mathematici non sunt aequivoca, quae tamen secundum concretem rationem. Naturalis ad materiam applicantis aequivoce quodammodo dicuntur: quia non secundum eamdem rationem in qualibet materia recipiuntur, sicut quantitatem et uniatem, quae est principium numeri, non secundum eamdem rationem contingit invenire in corporibus caelestibus et in igne et in aere et aqua." On applying mathematics, see In V Metaphys., lect. 7, n. 859.

{93} In V Metaphys. lect. 22, nn. 1119-27.

{94} Ibid., n. 1124.

{95} Ibid., n. 1121.

{96} Ibid., n. 1122. On differences as qualities cf. In V Metaphys. lect. 16, n. 987.

{97} In V Metaphys., lect. 22, n. 1123: "Hoc enim modo se habet genus ad differentiam, sicut subiectum ad qualitatem. Et ideo patet quod genus praedicbile, et genus subiectum, quasi uno modo comprehenduntur, et utrumque se habet per modum materiae. Licet enim genus praedicabile non sit materia, sumitur tamen a materia, sicut differentia a forma. Dicitur enim aliquid animal ex eo quod habet naturam sensitivam. Rationale vero ex eo quod habet rationale naturam, quae se habet ad sensitivam sicut forma ad materiam."

{98} In I Post. Analyt. lect. 10, n. 4.

{99} Cf. In VII Metaphys. lect. 4, nn. 1343-53.

{100} Just as the compound of subject and accident involves a definition ex additione, so too we can say that the property includes its subject in its definition ex additione and differs from it genere and that substantial form includes its matter in its definition ex additione and differs from it genere. "Sicut species et materia sunt diversa genere, si secundum suam essentiam considerentur quod nihil est commune utrique." (In V Metaphys. lect. 22, n. 1125) Moreover, the genus and difference are other in essence and cannot be mutually predicated per se. These last two cases are difficult to understand and for somewhat the same reason: the essence of a material thing is composed of matter and form, how then can matter and form be genericall different? Likewise, the species or definition is composed of genus and differences, how then can genus and difference be generically different?

The answer to the first difficulty is found in St Thomas' discussion of what he considers the metaphysician's filling of a lack left by natural philosophy, namely the proof (other than from induction) of the existence of prime matter, a proof which proceeds by appeal to modes of predication (Cf. In VII Metaphys., lect 2, nn. 1286-9) Prime matter in itself is neither substance, quantity, quality nor anything else by which something is placed in a determinate genus of being. That there is such a thing is clear from the fact that there must be something of which each of these is predicated and which is other than any of them. What kind of predication is this? It is not, St Thomas holds (ibid., n. 1288),  praedicatio univoca, but praedicatio denominativa. the first is exemplified by the predication of genus of species: the genus enters into the definition of the species "quia non est aliud per essentiam animal et homo." Denominative predication is exemplified by "Man is white," where the quiddity of the predicate differs from that of the subject. "Unde subiungit, quod alia genera praedicantur hoc modo de substantia, substantia vero praedicatur de materia denominative.(ibid) Althoughj "Man is white" may be true, neither "Man is whiteness" nor "Humanity is whiteness" could be true unless the essence of man and whiteness were the same. So too "Materia est homo" and "Materia est humanitas" are false, but "Hoc materiatum est homo" is true. "Ipsa ergo concretiva, sive denominativa praedicatio ostendit, quod sicut substantia est aliud per essentiam ab accidentibus, ita per essentiam aliud est materia a formis substantialibus." (ibid, n. 1289) "...in definitione formae substantialis oportet quod ponatur illud cuius est forma, et ita definitio eius est per additionem alicuius quod extra eius genus est, sicut et definitio formae accidentalis." (De ente et essentia, cap. 7) That is, one integral part of the substantial composite is essentially different from the other. (On denominative predication, see In IX Metaphys., lect. 6, nn. 1839-43.)

So too with the integral parts of the species or definition. The genus and difference are essentially different: "genus non est in differentia sicut pars essentiae eius, sed solum sicut ens extra quidditatem sive essentiam; sicut etiam subiectum est de intellectu passionum: et ideo genus non praedicatur de differentia per se loquendo...nisi forte sicut subiectum praedicatur de passione." (De ente et essentia, cap. 3) Thus, the difference is predicated of the genus in the second mode of perseity and of the species in the first mode, although both genus and difference are predicated of the whole of the species. It is because genus is drawn from matter and difference from form that the essential differences of these integral parts of the thing is reflected in the intentions drawn from them, although, again, both genus and difference signify the whole of the species and not parts of it. With respect to the modes of "genus" distinguished In V Metaphys., lect. 22, "animal" is a genus in the fourth mode with respect to the essence, but a genus in the third mode with respect to the difference. One will appreciate the significane of the notion of genus subiectum  for the logic of demonstration, since demonstration, properly speaking, consists in showing that the property follows on the subject because of what it is. In conclusion, substantial form, accidents whether contingent or proper, and difference have this in common, that they are essentially different from their subjects and include their respective subjects in their definitions ex additione.

{101}  In V Metaphys., lect 22, n. 1127; Cf.  In II de anima, lect. 22, n. 524.

{102} In librum de causis, 4a.

{103} IaIIae,  q. 61, a. 1, a 1. Cf. In I Periherm, lect. 8, n. 6: "Sed dicendum quod unum dividentium aliquod commune potest esse prius altero dupliciter: uno modo, secundum proprias rationes, aut naturas dividentium; alio modo, secundum participationem rationis illius communis quod in ea dividitur. Primus autem non tollit univocationem generis, ut manifestum est in numeris, in quibus binarius secundum propriam rationem naturaliter est prior termnario; sed tamen aequaliter participant rationem generis sui, scilicet numeri; ita enim est ternarius multitudo mensurata per unum, sicut et binarius. Sed secundum impedit univocationem generis. Et propter hoc ens non potest esse genus substantiae et accidentis: quia in ipsa ratione entis, substantia, quae est ens per se, prioritatem habet respectu accidentis, quod est ens per aliud et in alio."

{104} Il Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 4; cf. Q.D. de ver., q. 1, a.6.

{105} Q.D. de malo, q. 2, a. 9, ad 16: "...omnia animalia sunt aequaliter animalia, non tamen sunt acqualia, sed unum animal esst altero maius et perfectius..."; cf. Ia, q. 77, a. 4, ad 1.

{106} In Boethii de trin., q. 4, a. 2.

{107} Ibid.

{108} In X Metaphys. lect. 4, nn. 2019-20: "Genere quidem differunt, quorum non est communis materia. Dictum est enim supra in octavo quod licet materia non sit genus, tamen ab eo quod est materiale, sumitur ratio generis. Sicut natura sensibilis est materiale in homine respectu rationis. Et ideo illud quod non communicat in natura sensibili cum homine, est alterius generis. Et quia ea quae non communicant in materia, non generantur adinvicem, sequitur ea genere esse diversa, quorum non est generatio ad invicem. Quod etiam necesse fuit addere propter ea quae non habent materiam, sicut accidentia sunt. Ut sint genere diversa quaecumque sunt in diversis praedicamentis, ut linea et albedo, quorum unum non fit ex alio."

{109} See above, p. 100.

{110} They are of course productive of different species of color. Cf In X Metaphys., lect. 12, n. 2144.

{111} Ibid.,  n. 2137 bis.

{112} Ibid.,  n. 2138. It may be well to recall that the universal nature, as such, is corruptibile only per accidens. Cf. In VII Metaphys., lect. 7, nn. 1419-23.

{113}  In X Metaphys., lect 12, n. 2140. Cf. Q.D. de malo, q. 5, a. 5.

{114} In X Metaphys.,  lect 12, n. 2141.

{115} Ibid., n. 2144.

{116} In Boethi de trin., q. 4, a. 2.

{117} Ibid. "...quorum est materia una et generatio adinvicem."

{118} In I de gen. et cor., lect. 19, nn.5-6: "Dicit ergo quod, quia non quaecumque apta nata sunt agere et pati adinvicem, sed solum illa quae sunt contraria, vel habent contrarietatem, necesse est quod agens et patiens in genere sint idem et similia, et diversa specie et contraria. Et non sumitur hic genus logice: quia hoc modo alia corpora essent eiusdem generis; sed sumitur genus naturaliter: et hoc modo omnia quae communicant in materia, sunt eiusdem generis (...) Quaecumque agunt et patiuntur adinvicem, sunt contraria; contraria autem sunt in eodem genere, ut probatur in X Metaphys.; ergo activa et passiva sunt in eodem genere; et ideo necesse est ipsa qualiter, idest quodammodo, esse similia, quia eadem et similia genere, et qualiter, idest quodammodo, altera et dissimilia specie, ut dixerunt antiqui."

{119} Ibid. lect. 20, n. 2: "Subiungit ad horum declarationem quae dicitur materia nuna aliquorum. Et dicit quod dicitur esse una materia cuilibet, quae est susceptiva contrariorum: quae licet sit una subiecto, differt tamen secundum esse; et propter hoc dixit ut ita dicam. Et ipsa materia dicitur ut genus, non quidem praedicabile, sed dicitur genus secundum quod genus dicitur subiectum primum, quod substat duobus contrariis aut pluribus: contrariorum autem unum in activo, alterum in passivo: et ideo una materia est activi et passivi."

{120} See note 100.

{121} Il Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1; cf. In X Metaphys.,  lect. 12, n. 2145.
{122 } Q.D. de anima, a. 7, ad 18.

{123} Cf.  In V Physic., lect 3, n. 5.

{124} Ia, q. 66, a. 2.

{125} Cf. I Sent., d. 30, q. 1, a. 3.

{126} In VII Metaphys., lect. 8, nn. 1444-6.

{127} In VII Physic.,  lect. 8, n. 8: "Quia ergo enus quodammodo  est unum, et non simpliciter, iuxta genera latent multa: idest, per similitudinem et proprinquitatem ad unitatem generis, multorum aequivocatio latet. Sunt autem quaedam aequivocationum multum distantes, in quibus sola communitas nominum attenditur; sicut si canis dicatur caeleste sidus, et animal latrabile. Quaedam vero sunt quae habent quandam similitudinem; sicut si hoc nomen homo dicatur de vero homine et de homine picto, inquantum habet similitudinem quandam veri hominis. Quaedam vero aequivocationes sunt proximae: aut propter convenientiam in genere (sicut si corpus dicatur de corpore caslesti et de corpore corruptibili, aequivoce dicitur, naturaliter loquendo, quia eorum non est materia una. conveniunt tamen in genere logico: et propter hance generis convenientiam videntur omnino non aequivoca esse): aut etiam sunt propinquae secundum aliquam similitudinem; sicut ille qui docet in scholis dicitur magister, et similiter ille qui praeest domui dicitur magister domus, aequivoce, et tamen propinqua aequivocatione propter similitudinem; uterque enim est rector, hic quidem scholarum, ille vero domus. Unde propter hanc propinquitatem vel generis vel similitudinis, non videntur esse aequivocationes, cum tamen sint."

{128} Cf. e.g. In IV Metaphys., lect. 4, n. 583.

{129} In I de anima,  lect. 1, n. 15.

{130} Ibid. lect. 2, n. 25; cf. In VIII Metaphys., lect. 2, n. 1700.

{131} In I de anima,  lect. 2, n. 27.

{132} Cf. In III Physic., lect. 8, n. 1.

{133} In IV Metaphys.,  lect. 4, n. 576: "Licet autem dicatur, quod Philosophia est scientia, non autem dialectica et sophistica, non tamen per hoc removetur quin dialectica et sophistica sint scientiae. Dialectica enim potest considerari secundum quod est docens, et secundum quod est utens. Secundum quidem quod est docens habet considerationem de ipsis intentionibus, instituens modum, quo per eas procedi possit ad conclusiones in singulis scientiis prohabiliter ostendendas; et hoc demonstrative facit, et secundum hoc est scientia. Utens vero est secundum quod modo adiuncto utitur ad concludendum aliquid probabiliter in singulis scientiis; et sic recedit a modo scientiae. - Et similiter dicendum est de sophistica; quia prout est docens tradit per necessarias et demonstrativas rationes modum arguendi apparenter. Secundum vero quod est utens, deficit a processu verae argumentationis."

{134} Ibid.

{135} Ibid. n. 577.

{136} "Dialecticus autem circa omnia praedicta procedit ex probabilibus; unde non facit scientiam, sed quamdam opinionem. Et hoc ideo est, quia ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae. Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus quas ratio adinvenit in rebus considertis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae. Huiusmodi autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus aequipaarantur, eo quod omnia entia naturae sub consideratione rationis cadunt. Et ideo subiectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur. Unde concludit, quod subiectum logicae aequiparatur subiecto philosophiae, quod est naturae." - In IV Metaphys., lect. 4, n. 574; cf. In VII Metaphys.,  lect. 2, n. 1287; ibid.. lect. 3, n. 1308;  In Boethiis de trin., q. 6, a. 1.

{137} In IV Metaphys.,  lect. 4, n. 574.

{138} "Et his duobus modis denominatur processus rationalis a scientia rationali; his enim modis utitur logica, quae rationis dicitur scientia, in scientiis demonstrativis..." - In Boethii de trin., q. 6, a. 1, ad primam quaestionem. Cf. Sheilah O'Flynn, op cit.

{139} In Boethii de trin., q. 6, a. 1, ad primam quaestionem.
{140} In III Physic.,  lect. 8, n. 1.

{141} Ibid., n. 4: "Attendendum est autem quod istae rationes sunt probabiles et procedentes ex iis quae communiter dicuntur."

{142} On Interpretation, 16a9.

{143} Cf. In II Metaphys., lect. 5, nn. 335-7.

{144} For criticism of arguments which proceed ex intentionibus, see  II Sent.,  d. 17, q. 1, a. 1; In I Physic. lectiones 2-6.

{145} Q.D. de anima, a. 7, ad 6; Q.D. de spirit. creat.,  a. 8, a 8.

{146} Ia, q. 4, a. 3.

{147} Q.D. de anima,  a. 7, ad 6.

{148} In X Metaphys., lect. 9, n. 2107;  De ente et essentia,  cap. 7;  I Sent.,  d. 8, q. 4, a. 3, ad 3.

{149} In X Metaphys., lect. 9, n. 2107.

{150} In II Metaphys.,  lect. 2, n. 293.

{151} Ia, q. 4, a. 3; cf. Q.D. de pot., q. 7, a. 7, ad 3.

{152} In Boethii de trin.,  q. 6, a. 3.

{153} Ia, q. 76, a. 3, ad 4.

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