Jacques Maritain Center : The Logic of Analogy / by Ralph McInerny


Our concern has been to present the doctrine of the analogy of names, a doctrine we have seen to belong to the logic of signification. If we now examine some particular analogous names, those common to God and creature, it is because so much of what St Thomas has to say of analogical signification occurs in discussions of such names; moreover, the uniqueness of the thing we are trying to name in this case has led to some of the misapprehension concerning analogy which we have sought to correct. To say that God and creature have a name analogously in common is manifested by appeal to the examples of "healthy" and "being" for the indisputable reason that the names involve the same mode of signification. On the level of the res named, however, there is all the difference in the wold (and out of it), but it is important to realize that is where the difference lies. The divine names are not a subdivision of the analogy of names, but instances of it. The present chapter has for its purpose to make that one point; consequently it should not be read as an essay on St Thomas' doctrine on the names of God, a subject which would demand a study at least as lengthy as this on the logic of analogy.


We name things as we know them so that our names signify things through the mediation of what we know of them. Thus a thing can be named by us to the degree that we can know it. The kind of being we are, a corporeal thing among corporeal things, has a decided effect on that mode of being which is our knowing, a mode which enables us to transcend the limitations of our individuality.{1} Physical contact with things is a prerequisite for sense knowledge whereby we are the forms of other things, their color, temperature, taste, shape, etc., possessing these forms, not as they are possessed by bodies, but intentionally, to some degree without the "conditions of matter"; that is, in seeing red, we are or possess that form differently from  the way it is had by the surface of the apple. It is from such sensible effects that we denominate that which has these sensible forms, their substance which is called sensible not because it is a per se object of sense, but because it is known through what is sensed. The quiddity of sensible things is said to be the connatural object of our mind because it is such that it is cognitively accessible by us in terms of our natural way of coming to know, through what can be sensed.{2} St Thomas holds that the sensible effects of such substances adequately manifest to us what those substances are; consequently, the ratio of the name of such a substance is said to declare sufficiently its essence.{3} The concept or species is that in which the sensible substance is known: it is not however something (quod) which is first known and from which we infer the thing; rather it is that by which (quo) something is known.{4} The sensible thing is known in itself through a concept which adequately expresses what it is.

    It is obvious that God cannot be considered the connatural object of our intellect, obvious in the sense that the discussion on which we are relying{5} follows on proofs that God exists and that he is not a body.{6} If God is to be known, he cannot be known through his sensible qualities since he has none. However, he can be known through the sensible things which are the connatual objects of our intellect, known as their cause. Thus knowledge of God follows on knowing something else as a quod and then arguing to God's existence: this is discursive knowledge and it is radically imperfect. For discursive knowledge may mean either now thinking of this thing, now of that; there is priority and posteriority here, but knowledge of the first thing is not cause of knowledge of the second.{7} Sometimes, however, knowledge of one thing is cause of our knowledge of another, but in either case there is imperfection. In the first, successive but not causative priority and posteriority, the imperfection of discursive knowledge is revealed because it indicates that we must now each nature by a concept proper to it and cannot form a concept which would distinctly represent diverse things."{8} The second type of discourse indicates that our knowledge of principles is not sufficient of itself to give us actual knowledge of what flows from them.{9}Discursive knowledge involves a passage "ex uno cognito in aliud cognitum,"{10} but of course there are degrees of discursive knowledge. What is called propter quid demonstration consists in coming to know that a property follows on the essential principles of its subject, and this is to know perfectly what a property is.{11} When we come to know a cause from its effects, we can attain perfect knowledge of the cause if the effects are proportionate to it. The discourse whereby we attain knowledge of God through creatures as his effects provides us with most imperfect knowledge of God, since God is an analogical cause. Since God can be known only through created effects, he can be named only from them.{12} "Sic igitur potest nominari a nobis ex creaturis: non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum exprimat essentiam secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo exprimit sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est..."{13}


Prior to raising the question of the divine names, St Thomas has argued that God is utterly simple by denying of him all the sources of multiplicity and complexity.{14} Since God is simple, it would seem either that one name should suffice for him, or, if we allow many names, that they are synonyms, all signifying one, simple reality. The resolution of both these doubts is based on the same point, the way in which names signify. If we apply many names to God, these names signify either one notion or many notions. Only if they all signified the same notion would they be synonyms, but "good," "wise," "being" and "true," though they are all used to name the one utterly simple thing which is God, have different significations and therefore are not synonyms.15} God is known and named from creatures in whom wisdom and injustice are different perfections and found different rationes. If these names are applied to God, they will signify him by way of the conceptions which answer to these names and, since no one of these conceptions alone adequately represents God (nor all taken together), there is a kind of foundation for their diversity in God, even though he is perfectly simple.{16} Indeed, St Thomas maintains that if the intellect, seeing God in his essence, should name what it understands, it would need a multiplicity of names. This is true of every created intellect, angelic or human: "...sed conceptio perfecte repraesentans eum est verbum incretum; et ideo unum tantum."{17}


We have already discussed the difference between the metaphorical use of a term and analogical signification. If a term involves in its principal signification corporeal conditions, it cannot properly signify God. The name "light," since its proper notion includes sensible matter, cannot signify spiritual things except in virtue of a common notion. But not all names attributed to God are like "light." What of those names in whose definition "non clauditur defectus, nec dependent a materia sescundum esse, ut ens, bonum, et alia huiusmodi?"{18} If God is called being, wise, etc., are these names devoid of corporeal conditions? It hardly seems so, since we must say of God either that he is good or goodness, living or life, being or existence, i.e. make use of either concrete or abstract terms, and such modes of signifying are intimately tied up with what is the connatuaral object of our mind. For, while the concrete term signifies something as subsisting, it implies composition: that which is good, wise, etc., whereas if we use abstract terms, we achieve simplicity at the expense of the connotation of subsistence, for life, goodness and existence are not subsistent things.{19} On this showing, all our words seem to involve corporeal conditions and, while we might agree that something is named good from what it is, it is rather difficult to see how "wise" can denominate except from an accident. Why then does St Thomas suggest that "living," "being," etc., do not signify defectively, whereas "lion," "angry" and other names used metaphorically of God do?

    Let us look first at such names as "wise" and "just" which are used to name God. When we say of Socrates that he is wise or just, we are not denominating him from what he is, but from an accident. A man is a man before acquiring wisdom and justice and if he should lose these virtues he does not for all that cease to be a man. They are, then, accidental predicates. How can they be said of God? When St.Thomas takes into account a statement of St John Damascene to the effect that such names predicate an accident of God, he says this: "Damascenus loguitur de istis nominibus non quantum ad id quod praedicant de Deo, sed quantum ad id a quo imponuntur ad significandum. Imponunturenim a nobis ad significandum ex formis accidentalibus quibusdam in creaturis repertis."{20} And yet, shortly thereafter, he says, "hoc nomen sapientia verificatur de Deo quantum ad illud a quo imponitur nomen."{21} We have seen that id a quo can mean two different things, either the etymology or the form from which the term is imposed to signify, but it is difficult to apply that distinction here. In the first text, the quod is distinguished from the a quo which seems to be precisely the form from which the name is imposed to signify. In the second text, the id a quo is expressly distinguished from the etymology. What is St Thomas getting at here?

    The clue is to be found in yet another answer to an objection in the same article.{22} Such a term as "just" signifies something in the genus of quality; that genus, therefore, will enter into its definition. As well there will be a difference, that from which the term is imposed to signify."Sapientia autem et iustitia non ex hoc nominantur, sed magis exaliqua perfectione vel ex aliquo actu; unde talia veniunt in divinam praedicationem secundum rationem differentiae et non secundum rationem generis."{23} "Wisdom" signifies "qualitas per quam sapientialia intellectualiter habentur": this is the ratio propria of the term and as such it was imposed to signify from an accidental form, something however which is formal in the definition. It is according to the whole notion that a man is called wise, but God is not so named according to the proper notion of the term. What is involved is the formation of a ratio communis by dropping the genus and retaining the difference, the id a quo. It is always in this fashion that St Thomas explains the extension of words to signify divine perfection. "Ex ideo dicendum est quod
omnia hujusmodi proprie dicuntur de Deo quantum ad rem significatum, licet non quantum ad modum significandi; et quantum ad id quod est proprium de ratione cujuslibet horum, licet non quantum ad rationem generis..."{24}

Dicitur autem nomen imponi ab eo quod est quasi differentia constitutiva et non ex ratione generis; et ideo quandocumque aliquid secundum suum genus dicit imperfectionem, et secundum differentiam perfectionem, illud invenitur in Deo quantum ad rationem differentiae, et non quantum ad rtionem generis: sicut scientia non est in Deo quantum ad rationem habitus vel qualitatis, quia sic habet rationem accidentis; sed solum secundum id quod complet rationem scientiae, scilicet cognoscitivum certitudinaliter aliquorum.{25}
These names do not signify the same notion as applied to God and creature; that is, they are rendered analogous.

    We can see now why it is that a term can be said to involve corporeal conditions in two ways, either with respect to what is principally signified by it, the id a quo, or with respect to the mode of signifying. The latter "proprie dicuntur de Deo, quamvis non perfecte ipsum repraesentet."{26} Such words as "lion," "angry," "fire" etc. involve corporeal conditions in that which they principally signify; such words as "wise" and "just" do not. "Dico autem aliqua praedictorum nominum perfectionem absque defectu importare, quantum ad illud ad quod significandum nomen fuit impositum: quantum enim ad modum significandi, omne nomen cum defectu est."{27} No difficulty to our exposition is presented by the fact that St Thomas sometimes says that both the specific and generic names can be said of God. For instance, both "science" and "knowledge" are said of God. Clearly this does not mean that the genus which would enter into the proper notion of each, quality, is part of the ratio signified by the name when it is applied to God; rather it means that the id a quo of both the generic and specific names does not involve corporeal conditions.{28}

    How can a name whose proper signification includes genus and difference be used to signify God in whom only one of these is verified? To the objection that such names are falsely attributed to God, St Thomas replies that he could agree only if they were intended to signify God and creature univocally.{29} Since this is not the case, it is hardly surprising that the names signify different notions as said of God and creature. And, of course, these names are said less properly of God,

cum in nomine duo sunt, modus significandi et res ipsa significata, semper secundum alterum potest removeri a Deo vel secundum utrumque; sed non potes dici de Deo nisi secundum alterum tantum. Et qui ad veritatem et proprietatem affirmationis requiritur quod totum affirmatur, ad proprietatem negetionis sufficit si alterum tantum desit, ideo dicit Dionysius quod negationes sunt absolutae verae, sed affirmationes non nisi secundum quid: quia quantum ad significatum tantum, et non quantum ad modum significandi.{30}
This enables us to appreciate the three steps in naming God which St Thomas borrows from Denis. First, we affirm a name of God, saying, God is good. Secondly, since the name is verified of God only because of the id a quo, we deny it of him, saying God is not good. Finally, we once more affirm it of him, intending to say that goodness is found in God supereminently and beyond all possibility of our grasping what the divine goodness is.{31} These names remain the names of creatures and do not become names of God in any full sense: "sic hoc nomen quamvis ei aliquo modo conveniat, non tamen convenit ei ut nomen eius, quia id quod nomen significat est definitio; causato vero convenit ut nomen eius."{33}

    But is this always true? Isn't there one name, Qui est, which is God's proper name? Of all the names which can be attributed to God, "being" is the most proper: qui est substitutes another gender for the quod in quod est and both are equivalent to ens.{34} The reason this name is most properly applied to God is this: "Non enim significat forma aliquam, sed ipsum esse."{35} God's essence is his existence and thus "being" or "He who is" properly names God; "unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma."{36} Any other name adds some determination of existence, but "being" is the most indeterminate of all words, not signifying any determinate mode of being, but indeterminate with respect to any mode whatsoever. "Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi..."{37} How can ens,  which means quod est or id quod habet esse, be said to signify only existence? Doesn't the notion signified by the word include quod  as well? Certainly, but St Thomas' point is that the subject is left wholly undetermined as to what it is; the word is imposed solely from the formality of actuality, which is existence, and the mode of reception or possession of that act is left wholly undetermined. Thus although the quod is primarily substance, substance is not expressed determinately by ens. The ratio entis is composite, but one component is formal with respect to the other, that component namely which is the id a quo nomen imponitur ad significandum. Every name principally signifies the id a quo; that is why "being" primarily signifies existence  and is the most proper name of God. Here, just as in the names discussed above, it is not the whole notion signified by "being" which is meant when God is called by that name. Rather, we drop the subject and retain only the form, the difference, the id a quo which is existence. To take only this as the signification of the term is to understand it less properly, since proper signification involves both res and modus.
    The thought will occur that by taking esse instead of ens, we can escape the impropriety just mentioned. St Thomas suggests this in reply to an objection which cites the Boethius of the De hebdomadibus to the effect that ens is that which participates esse. But God is ens, ergo etc. St Thomas writes, "dicendum quod dictum Boetii intelligitur de illis quibus esse competit per participationem, non per essentiam; quod enim per essentiam est, si vim locutionis attendamus, magis debet dici quod est ipsum  esse quam sit id quod est."{38} What is preferred here is the abstract term, esse, but abstract terms too involve a mode of signifying which will have to be denied when they are said of God. What does esse mean, properly speaking? Like any form, it must be defined ex additione, i.e. with reference to that of which it is the form. "Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum."{39}

Intellectus autem noster hoc modo intelligit esse quo modo invenitur in rebus inferioribus a quibus scientiam capit, in quibus esse non est subsistens, sed inhaerens. Ratio autem invenit quod aliquid esse subsistens sit: et ideo licet hoc quod dicunt esse significetur per modum concretionis, tamen intellectus attribuens esse Deo transcendit modum significnadi, attributes Deo id quod significatur, non autem modum significandi.{40}
Whether we call God ens or esse. these words will not signify the same ratio  as when they apply to creatures. That is why we need not fall into the error of those who maintain that God's existence is the existence of creatures, even though we say God is existence.{41} Omne nomen cum defectu est, and "cum esse creaturae imperfecte repraesentet divinum esse, et hoc nomen qui est imperfecte significat ipsum, quia significat per modum cujusdam concretionis et compositionis; sed adhue imperfectius significatur per alia nomina."{42} As Cajetan remarks, {43} it is the most proper name of God only in the sense that it is the least improper. That is why "being" and "existence" are sometimes denied of God. "Ad ultimum autem etiam hoc ipsum esse, secundum quod est in creaturis, ab ipso removeamus; et tunc remanet in quadam tenebra ignorantiae."{44}


In names common to God and creature, the creature is always the per prius of the name, in him only is the ratio propria of the name saved, a ratio which involves the subject as well as the act from which the name is imposed to signify. These names apply secondarily to God and, although the denial of the imperfection of the mode eliminates created perfection, the common notion is understandable only by reference to the proper notion. God is in no way comprehended or defined by such words, but inso far as we know that his infinite perfection founds the ratio of the name, they are truly affirmed of him. Thus, in these names  as in any analogous name, the "ratio propria non invenitur nisi in uno tantum" and the meaning of the word as extended is dependent for its intelligibility on the ratio propria of the word. As is always the case with analogous names, the  names common to God and creature must be discussed in terms of rationes; the creature is the per prius precisely secundum rationem nominis.{45} The order of the notions signified by a name reflects the order of our knowledge, since we name as we know. Moreover, since what is first known by us is not thereby what is most knowable in reality, we cannot argue from the ordo nominis to the ordo rerum. Sometimes these are the same, sometimes they are different (indicating that this order is accidental to the discussion of analogical signification) and in the case of names common to God and creature, the ordo rerum is quite the opposite of the ordo nominum, a fact certain to be stressed by the metaphysician and theologian.

    What is intended when names are attributed to God? As St Thomas points out, there are divine names and divine names; some of them signify negatively (e.g. incorporeal), some relatively (e.g. Lord), some substantially.{46} We are presently concerned only with the third type. Now some names of this kind are accidental predicates of creatures, e.g. "wise" and "just," but as we have seen, are essential or substantial predicates as said of God since he is utterly simple. Besides God's simplicity, the treatise on the divine names presupposes that God is first cause and that all created perfections preexist in him unified and eminently.{47} Although the via causalitatis is but one of the ways St Thomas mentions whereby we come to knowledge of God, {48} the fact that creatures are effects and God their cause underlies any attribution of names to God. Nevertheless, it is not our intention, when we say that God is good, simply to say that God is the cause of the goodness of creatures. If this were all we meant, we could say that God is a stone, since he is cause of the stone.{49} It is precisely the purpose of imposing such names which makes it hazardous to compare them with other analogous names on the basis of their foundation in reality. When we say that medicine is healthy, we don't intend this to be a substantial or essential predicate anymore than when we call the animal healthy. Moreover, if we want to talk about quinine or aspirin apart from their salutary effects on ailing animals, we have other more direct recourses, other names. But in the case of God, when we want to say something about what he is, we have no choice but to name him from creatures. And even when we name him from what in creatures is an accident, the name is imposed to signify what God is. Since the id a quo of names common to God and creature exists eminently in God, we can say that secundum rem nominis, God is the per prius of these names.{50} This is strikingly exemplified by the word "being" which, we have seen is least improperly attributed to God. With respect to that from which the word is imposed to signify, esse,  we can say that only God is being essentialiter and that creatures are beings per participationem.

... ens praedicatur de solo Deo essentialiter, eo quod esse divinum est esse subsistens et absolutum; de qualibet autem creatura praedicatur per participationem: nulla enim creatura est suum esse, sed est habens esse. Sic et Deus dicitur bonus essentialiter, quia est ipsa bonitas; creaturae autem dicuntur bona per participationem, quia habent bonitatem.{51}
At this point, it is useful to recall the difficulties of Cajetan and Sylvester with respect to the per prius secundum ordinem rerum. Medicine, since it is the cause of the health of the animal, is said to be prior in the real order although it receives the designation "healthy" by reference to its effect. But in names common to God and creature, God is prior in the real order. And yet there is a great deal of difference between the really prior in these two cases. Medicine is denominated healthy causaliter, something which involves, of course, a similarity between medicine and the quality in the animal. This similarity, however, is only partial: medicine possesses only part, or a part of a part, of what constitutes the quality healthy; for example, the medicine may be warm and warmth be considered as part of health.{52} That is why medicine is not denominated from this quality as if it possessed health, but only because it causes the health of the animal. And neither animal nor medicine is called healthy per essentiam. Now, if God were designated being or good only cuasaliter, an analogous name would be involved just as an analogous name is involved in "healthy." But we intend more than this when we call God good (a sign of this being that we don't call God  a stone); because that from which names like "being" and "good" are imposed need not connote created perfections, we can say that Godis good and being essentialiter.{53} Essentialiter here is not opposed to accidentaliter, but to participative.{54} This does not mean,as Cajetan and Sylvester thought, that in names common to God and creature, the ratio propria of the name is found in each. Creature and God are not called good or being secundum easdem rationes: according to the imposition of those names, secundum rationem nominis, in terms of the familiar and usual meaning attached to these words, these names are said properly of creatures and of God in only an extended sense. But God is essentialiter the perfection which functions as the id a quo of these words: God and goodness are one, God and existence are one. God is being; creatures have it. The perfection from which these names are imposed exists in God, not partially, but in a manner which wholly transcends the manner in which it is found in creatures. Thus God is prior not only secundum ordinem rerum, but secundum rem nominis: "haec in eo eminentius praeexistunt."{55} These perfections now appear to be merely nominally or verbally verified of creatures.{56} Thus the order of the things named is exactly the reverse of the order of the imposition of the name: God is named from creature with regard to the ratio nominis; creatures can be said to be named from God in the sense that that from which the name is imposed to signify is an effect of God who is this perfection eminently and essentialiter. Thus God is the per prius of these names and that precisely from the point of view of that from which the name is imposed to signify. Once a ratio communis is formed by dropping the mode of signifying, God is what the name signifies whereas creatures have or participate it. These metaphysical and theological considerations underlying the application of the intention of analogy do not alter the doctrine of analogous names. It is important to remember that God and creature could be named good analogically even if God were named such only causaliter; furthermore, it is a great mistake to identify "predicated causaliter" and "said metaphorically," although it is true that many things could be predicated of God causaliter which do not signify him proprie.{57}

    On the basis of our analysis, we can see why Sylvester distinguished three steps in the imposition of a name like "being." It is first imposed from a perfection which creatures have and substances are not called good with reference to God. Secondly, God is said to be insofar as he is the cause of creatures; thus God is denominated from creatures and the term may be taken causaliter. Thirdly, thanks to an analysis like our own above, God is said to be the perfection essentialiter and creatures can be said to be denominated from God.

    God is known and named from creatures; some names are analogically common to God and creature. To know what analogical signification is is to know what to expect here with regard to the notions signified by the common name, but analogical signification does not decide what order will obtain secundum ordinem rerum, nor does it decide differences between the kinds of per prius secundum ordinem rerum. Substance and accident are named being analogically; the animal and medicine are named healthy analogically; God and creature are named being analogically. The logical doctrine concerning things named analogically applies to each of these instances, and applies equally. Yet there are great differences between these examples. The question then arises as to whether we want to erect into differences of what it means to be named analogically these ontological diversities.To do so is somewhat like making rational a difference of the intention of species because the human species is rational. Logic, as St Thomas envisages it, is dependent upon reality, but not directly; it is immediately dependent on being as known. Concepts may be of real things, but insofar as concepts are named they take on the intention of ratio; a determinate kind of relation among the rationes signified by a common name is involved when things are said to be named analogically. The determinate content of these concepts may involve all kinds of differences which, from the viewpoint of analogical signification, are irrelevant. It is for this reason that we suggest that the real differences among things named analogically cannot be divisive of the intention of analogical signification.


{1} Q.D. de ver., q. 2, a. 2.

{2} Ia,  q. 85, a.1.

{3} Ia,  q. 13, a. 1.

{4} Q.D. de anima,  a. 7, ad 8; Ia,  q. 84, a. 5; ibid., q. 85, a. 2.

{5} Ia,  q. 13.

{6} Ia, q. 2, a. 3; ibid., q. 3, a. 1.

{7} Ia,  q. 14, a. 7.

{8} Cf. Charles De Koninck, "Concept, Process and Reality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, (1949), pp. 440-7.

{9} Ia, q. 58, a. 4.

{10} Ibid., a. 3.

{11} In I Post. Analyt.,  lect. 2, n.5.

{12} This is as true of revealed knowledge as it is of natural knowledge. "Unde de substantiis illis immaterialibus secundum statum viae nullo modo possums scire quid est, non solum per viam naturalis cognitionis, sed nec etiam per viam revelationis, quia divinae revelationis radius ad nos pervenit secundum modum nostrum, ut Dionysius dicit. Unde quamvis per revelationem elevemur ad aliquid cognoscendum, quod alias esset nobis ignotum, non tamen ad hoc quod alio modo cognoscamus nisi per sensibilia." - In Boeethii de trin.,  q. 6, a. 3.

{13} Ia, q. 13, a.1.

{14} Ia, q. 3.

{15} Ia, q. 13, a. 4; Q.D. de pot.,  q. 7, a.6.

{16} "Et sic patet quartum, quod pluralitas istorum nominum non tantum est ex parte intellectus nostri formantis diversas conceptiones de Deo, quae dicuntur diversae ratione, ut ex dictis patet, sed ex parte ipsius Dei, inquantum scilicet est aliquid in Deo correspondens omnibus istis conceptionibus, scilicet plena et omnimoda ipsius perfectio, secundum quam contingit quod quodlibet nominum significantium istas conceptiones, de Deo vere et proprie dicitur; non autem ita quod aliqua diversitas vel multiplicitas ponatur in re, quae Deus est, ratione istorum attributorum." - I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; ibid., d. 22, q. 1, a. 3.

{17} I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.

{18} Q.D. de ver.,  q. 2, a. 11.

{19} Ia, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2; I Contra Gentiles,  cap. 30.

{20} Q.D. de pot., q. 7, a. 4, ad 1.

{21} Ibid. ad. 9.

{22} Ibid. ad 2.

{23} Ibid.

{24} I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.

{25} Ibid.,  d. 4, q. 1, a. 1; cf. ibid., 22, q. 1, a. 2.

{26} I Sent.,  d. 8, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.

{27} I Contra Gentiles, cap. 30.

{28} I Sent.  d. 19, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4.

{29} Q.D. de pot., q. 7, a. 4, ad 3.

{30} I Sent, d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.

{31} Q.E. de pot., q. 7, a. 4, ad 2.

{32} Ibid., ad 14.

{33} Ibid., ad 5; Q.D. de ver.,  q. 2, a. 1, ad 11.

{34} Cf. I Sent,  d. 8, q. 1, a. 1: "...hoc nomen 'qui est' vel 'ens' imponitur ab actu essendi." The present discussion is substantially the same as that to be found in our, "Being and Predication."  Laval théologique et philosophique, xv, (1959), 2, pp. 236-274.

{35} Ia,  q. 13, a. 11.

{36} Ibid.

{37} I Sent.,  d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2.

{38} Q.D. de pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 8.

{39} Ibid., ad 9.

{40} Ibid., ad 7.

{41} De ente et essentia, cap. 6: "Nec oportet, si dicimus quod Deus est esse tantum, ut in errorem corum incidamus, qui Deum dixerunt esse illud esse universale quo quaelibet res formaliter est. Hoc enim esse quod Deus est, huius conditionis est ut nulla sibi additio fieri possit; unde per ipsam suam puritatem est esse distinctum ab omni esse (...) Esse autem commune, sicut in intellectu suo non includit aliquam additionem, ita nec includit in intellectu suo aliquam praecisionem additionis; quia si hoc esset, nihil posset intelligi esse in quo super esse aliquid adderetur." Cf. Q.D. de pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 6; I Sent.,d. 8, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1. One can see why St Thomas denies that God enters into the subject of metaphysics, though that subject is designated ens commune. See the proemium of his commentary on the Metaphysics.

{42} I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.

{43} In Iam,  q. 13, a. 11, n. V.

{44} I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; ibid., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

{45} In V Metaphys. lect. 5, n. 824; I contra Gentiles, cap. 34; Q. D. de malo. q. 1, a. 5, ad 19.

{46} Ia, q. 13, a. 2.

{47} Ibid.

{48} "Via remotionis, via causalitatis, via eminentiae." Cf. I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; ibid., d. 3, q. 1, a. 3.

{49} "Cum igitur dicitur 'Deus est bonus' non est sensus, 'Deus est causa bonitatis,' vel 'Deus non est nalus': sed est sensus, 'id quod bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, praeexistit in deo,' et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem." - Ia, q. 13, a. 2; cf. Q.D. de pot. q. 7, a. 5 .

{50} Ia, q. 13, a. 6.

{51} Quodl. II, q. 2, a. 1.

{52} In VIi Metaphys., lect. 8, n. 1449.

{53} Ia, q. 13, a. 2.

{54} Cf. In Boethii de hebdomadibus, lect. 2, for modes of participation.

{55} Ia, q. 13, a. 6.

{56} Cf. In Ephesios, cap. 3, lect. 4; "Utrum autem paternitas quae est in coelis et in terra derivetur a paternitate quae est in divinis, dubitatur. Et videtur quo non, quia nomina sic imponimus secundum quod res nominatas cognoscimus; quidquid autem cognoscimus, est per creaturas; ergo nomina imposita a nobis rebus ipsis, plus et prius conveniunt creaturis quam ipsi Deo. Respondeo et dico quod nomen alicuius rei nominatae a nobis, dupliciter potest accipi, quia vel est expressivum aut significativum conceptus intellectus (quia voces sunt notae vel signa passionum vel conceptuum qui sunt in anima), et sic nomen prius est increaturis quam in Deo; aut inquantum est manifestativum quidditatis rei nominatae exterius, et sic est prius in Deo. Unde hoc nomen paternitas secundum quod significat conceptionem intellectus nominantis rem, sic per prius invenitur in creaturis quam in Deo, quia per prius creatura innotescit nobis quam Deus; secundum autem quod significat ipsam rem nominatam, sic per prius est in Deo quam in nobis, quia certe omnis virtus generativa in nobis, est a Deo; et ideo dicit, 'Ex quo omnia Paternitas quae est in coelo et in terra nominatur,' quasi dicat: Paternitas quae est in ipsis creaturis, est quasi nominalis vel vocalis, sed illa paternitas divina qua Pater dat totam naturam Filio absque omni imperfectione, est vera paternitas."

{57} Ia, q. 13, a. 6.

© 2012 by the Estate of Ralph McInerny.
All rights reserved including the right to translate
or reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form.

<< ======= >>