IV. SOME ANALOGOUS NAMES

1. "Virtue" as Analogous Name

One need find no great difficulty in the bewildering number of habits which are called virtues by St. Thomas, since there are also many substances which fall under one supreme genus and are arranged hierarchically in such a way that the common name can be said univocally of each of them. But it is disturbing to find different virtues on different occasions singled out as the principal virtue. Thus, wisdom is said to be the chief intellectual virtue^{1} and since intellect has a more perfect mode of operation than will^{2} it follows that wisdom will be more perfect than virtues which have appetitive powers as their subject. Nevertheless, we read elsewhere that prudence, whose subject is practical intellect, habet verius rationem virtutis,^{3} and this because of its dependence on moral virtues which are in the appetitive part of the soul. Many habits are called virtues and this would lead us to believe that they save the definition of "virtue"; indeed, St. Thomas will say, when he has examined the elements of the definition of virtue given by St. Augustine, "All of these, however, belong to moral, intellectual and theological virtue, whether acquired or infused."^{4} This would seem to suggest that when temperance, justice, prudence, art, science, wisdom and faith are named virtues that the name is univocally common to them. This is far from being the case, however. As we shall see, "virtue" is analogously common and is said of all these per prius et posterius.

   The definition of virtue, one that is involved in calling anything a virtue, is drawn from Aristotle: "quae bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit."^{5} What is formal in this definition is the good and it is because they are diversly ordered to the good^{6} that different habits receive the name "virtue" in different ways. Now there are two fundamentally different ways in which something can be ordered to the good: formally, that is to the good as good, and materially, as when a habit is ordered to something which is good but does not look to it insofar as it is good (sub ratione boni). In order to grasp the meaning of this distinction, we must first recognize that human virtue will have to do with the good of man as man and what makes man to be man is the fact that he is rational. Thus the good of man must be a rational good. The rational or intellective part of man comprises both a cognitive and appetitive faculty; moreover just as well, the intellectual appetite, follows on the apprehension of intellect, so, in the sensitive part of the soul, an appetite is consequent on sense cognition and insofar as this appetite, divided into the concupiscible and irascible, obeys the command of reason it can be said to be consequent on intellect and thus participate in reason.^{7} In terms of the distinction between the cognitive and appetitive, we can see the meaning of the distinction between relating to the good formally and relating to it materially.  The good sub ratione boni is the object of appetite alone, for the good is that which all things seek. Thus only those habits which are in the appetitive part as in their subject^{8} or which depend upon appetite in a special way are ordered formally to the good. It is such habits that will save the definition of virtue most perfectly.^{9} Habits which are neither in the appetitive part as in their subject, nor dependent on it, can be materially ordered to that which is good, but not formally insofar as it is good; because of this they can only be said to be virtues in a less proper sense of the term.^{10}

    All of this raises a problem with respect to what are called intellectual virtues. How can they be called virtues if the definition of virtue implies an ordination to the good which is the object of appetite? In order to understand how intellectual habits can be called virtues, if less properly so than moral virtues, we must acquire a more determinate understanding of that ordination to the good which is such materially and not sub ratione boni. As has been already hinted, the problem is thought to be less pronounced with respect to some habits of intellect, namely those which depend in a special way on appetite. Other intellectual habits, however, are said to be perfected absoluely and in themselves such that they precede the will and are not consequent upon it. With these, the application of the term "virtue" constitutes a serious problem^{11} How do they save the ratio virtutis at all?

    In the Summa, St. Thomas speaks of habits which are virtues simpliciter and those which are such only secundum quid. Virtues in the perfect sense are those which make the one having them good and make his work good. Only habits of the appetitive part can do this. Secundum quid, habits of the speculative and practical intellect can be called virtues even without any ordination to will.^{12} How can there be a reference to the good without will? Some ordination to the good is necessary if a habit is going to be called a virtue. It is here of course that ordination to the good materialiter comes in, but what does that mean? Insofar as truth is the end of intellect, it is its good; to know the truth is the good of intellect and habits which determine it to this end can be called virtues. This is an ordination to the good materialiter, however: truth as a good is the object of appetite.^{13} Intellectual habits, therefore, do not perfectly save the ratio virtutis and "are not called virtues absolutely because they do not render a good work except insofar as they give a certain capacity, nor do they make the one having them good simply speaking."^{14} For this reason, science and art, while they are sometimes numbered among the virtues, are at other times divided against them.^{15} It is thanks to his good will that one having the science of grammar and thus the capacity to speak well, actually speaks well.^{16} Thus the use of the intellectual virtues of art, understanding, science and wisdom pertains to the will insofar as their objects are chosen as goods.^{17} This dependence on will for their use is accidental to intellectual habits.^{18}

    There are some intellectual habits, as we have already several times indicated, which have a special dependence on will and consequently are more properly called virtues than are art, understanding, science and wisdom: the intellectual virtues we are presently concerned with, namely prudence and faith,  habent verius rationem virtutis.^{19} Such intellectual habits follow on will and give not only the capacity of acting well but the will to do so. Let us look first at faith. Faith perfects the speculative intellect insofar as it is commanded by will, something clear from its act: "homo enim ad ea quae sunt supra rationem humanam, non assentit per intellectum nisi quia vult; sicut Augustinus dicit, quod credere non potest homo nisi volens."^{20} The object of faith is determined for it by the will. Now prudence is not dependent on will in this way, namely for its object, but only for the end, for it seeks its own object. Presupposing then end of the good from will, prudence seeks ways in which the good can be achieved and conserved.^{21} Of the intellectual habits, then, prudence and faith save more properly the definition of virtue because they depend in a special way on the will and thus relate more closely to the good sub ratione boni which is what is formal in the definition of virtue.

    We have, therefore, an unequal participation in the ratio virtutis. Virtues which have appetite as their subject, such as temperance and justice, participate most properly in the definition of virtue:  potissime habent rationem virtutis. Habits which have intellect, whether practical or speculative, for their subject, if they depend on will as do prudence and faith, participate properly in the definition of virtue; others participate in the definition, licet non ita secundum propriam rationem.^{22} "And althought all in some way can be called virtues, more perfectly and properly these last two (i.e. prudence and faith) have the notion of virtue; but it does not follow from this that they are more noble habits or perfections."^{23} This remark indicates that more and less proper participation in the ratio of a given name is not an absolute judgment on the relative perfection of the things named. As a matter of fact, intellectual virtues are more perfect than habits of the appetitive part.^{24} This is the resolution of the riddle we posed at the outset of our discussion of "virtue": prudence is named virtue more properly than is wisdom; wisdom is more perfect than prudence.^{25}

    Since it is the view of St. Thomas that there are three genera of virtues, the moral, intellectual and the theological, it is not surprising that they are not covered univocally by the term "virtue," but only analogically, per prius et posterius. It is just this inequality among the things named virtue that we have been examining. The ratio virtutis is not shared equally, but most properly by the moral virtues, less properly by intellectual habits. "It should be said that when a univocal genus is divided into its species, then the parts of the division are equal with respect to the generic notion, although according to the nature of the thing one species may be more perfec+t and prior to the other, as man is to the other animals. But when there is a division of something analogous, which is said by way of the prior and posterior of many, then nothing prevents one to be more perfect than the other even with respect to the common notion, as substance is more properly called being than is accident. And such is the division of the virtues because the good of reason is not found according to the same order in all.^{26}

2. "Passion" as Analogous Name

We have already looked at the discussion of signification at the outset of On Interpretation where words are said to be signs of concepts. Now, as it happens, Aristotle there uses the phrase "passions of the soul" (παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς) for concepts. This is a somewhat surprising use of the term "passion" and St. Thomas remarks that it is possible due to an extension of the word's signification.^{27} By following the extension of the meaning of "passion" we will be analysing another analogours name.To find the proper meaning of  'passion,'  we must turn to motion which is shown to involve action and passion. In his teaching on the nature of motion, Aristotle makes the point that motion is always between contraries, for what is received in the patient is contrary to what the patient or moved thing loses. The reception on the part of the patient is what assimiltes it to the agent or mover. Properly speaking, then, passion involves a contrariety and a loss on the part of the patient. Before discussing the nature of this loss, we must make it clear that passion in its proper sense is saved only in motion according to quality, that is, alteration, for in local motion there is no reception of something immobile: rather the mobile thing is received in a certain place.In augmentation and decrease, motion according to quantity, there is no reception or loss of form but of something substantial, such as food, which brings about a change of quantity.  In generation or corruption there is neither motion nor contrariety save by reason of the preceding alteration. Only in alteration, consequently is there properly passion where a form is received and its contrary expelled.^{28}

    Let us go back now to the notion of the loss involved in passion. Obviously the patient, in the medical sense, loses something if the ministrations of the doctor are successful, namely his illness, and this can only be called good riddance. We wouldn't commiserate with one who had lost a cold. The patient, in this example, is not the subject of passion in the most proper sense of the term: that is had when what is lost is better for the subject than the contrary gained as the result of an alteration. "Et hic est proprissimus modus passionis."^{29}

    Passion as implying loss is seen to involve a corporeal transmutation and we must ask how the term "passion" can be understood in the phrase "passions of the soul." Since the soul, by definition, is incorporeal it will have passion in the proper sense said of it only accidentally.^{30} The most proper animal passion will be read in terms of a change for the worst.^{31} None of this enables us to grasp the meaning of the phrase used at the outset of On Interpretation since intellectual cognition does not entail any consequent transmutation in the body. To understand that phrase, we are going to have to see a number of uses of the term "passion" as said of living sensitive things, i.e. animals, uses which will exhibit a scale of diminishing propriety with respect to the most proper sense of the word established in terms of physical motion.^{32}

    St. Thomas often introduces us to the fact that a term has taken on extended meanings by saying at the outset that it can be used in several ways; so when he is speaking of pati, he says immediately that it is used in three ways: communiter, proprie, propriissime.^{33} We have already seen what the most proper sense of "passion" is: when the term is used commonly it means any reception and is no longer restricted to the corporeal order. In terms of this, we can say that "passion" is applied to activities of sense appetite, will, sense cognition and intellection in such a way that there is a gradual falling away from the proper sense of the term.^{34}

    First, St. Thomas argues that passion is found more properly in the appetitive than in the cognitive part of the soul.^{35} The word "passion" implies that the patient becomes like the agent and since appetite is ordered towards things as they are in themselves (the good is in things) whereas the apprehensive is such that it assimilates the thing known to the mode of the knower (truth and falsity are in the mind), "unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in parte appetitiva quam in parte apprehensiva."^{36} Secondly, because sense appetition entails a bodily transmutation, which is passion properly speaking, whereas willing does not, sense appetite saves the notion of passion better. "Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis proprie invenitur in actu appetitus sensitivi quam intellectivi..."^{37} Thirdly, sense knowledge is said to be a certain passion. "Est enim sensus in actu, quaedam alteratio: quod autem alteratur, patitur et movetur."^{38} "Passion" here must be understood communiter and minus proprie,^{39} as any reception: just as what receives is in potency to what it receives, so sense is as potency to its operation. Fourthly, intellection can be called a passion.^{40} Intellection is less properly called passion than is sensation: "...passio et alteratio magis proprie dicitur in sensu quam in intellectu, cuius operatio non est per aliquod organum corporeum."^{41} Intellection then will involve passion in the most remote and least proper sense of the word. As for the phrase "passions of the soul," this would more properly designate operations of appetite than operations of sensation or intellection,^{42} although it is generally true that "passion" will signify something of soul only equivocally.^{43}

    "Passion" emerges as an analogous name whose signification is saved properly only where there is a corporeal alteration for the worse and less properly as the term is applied to animate operations until as used of intellection we have the most remote meaning of the term. Communiter loquendo in this discussion clearly means the least proper, most diluted meaning of the word. The ratio which is common per prius et posterius is the definition which is saved in physical alteration ad deterius. It is not common in the sense that it is saved perfectly and properly in every use, but in that some of it is involved in every extended use of the word, something which calls for reference back to the full and proper notion. In other words, it seems suggested that pati communiter is not the ratio communis passionis; and while the use of the word "passion" to speak of intellection runs the risk of an interpretation of it as passion in the strict sense, i.e. univocally, when we realize that the term is being extended
and is not to be taken proprie, the reference back to the most proper meaning is a reference to what we are attempting to say about intellection. The many things named passion are not made equal in a common notion, but rather participate per prius et posterius in a notion so that extended uses are explicable only in terms of the full, strict, proper notion and a hierarchy of meanings of "passion" is recognized. Just as with "virtue," what saves the ratio passionis most properly is not the most perfect from the point of view of reality: indeed, it is precisely the perfection of the mode of intellectual cognition which prevents it from saving the ratio passionis except in the most tenuous and diluted sense of the word.

3. "Word" as Analogous Word

An examination of the analogy of verbum has a double advantage for our purposes in that it reveals something common to words while casting light of the doctrine of the analogy of names. Moreover, there are are terminological features of St. Thomas' discussion of verbum which give the texts added interest.

    Verbum is imposed to signify from something sensible, a reverberation in the air,^{44} which is more easily known by the one imposing the name. Thus, according to the first imposition of the name, something is named verbum which does not best save that which the word is imposed to signify, the res significata.^{45} The distinction of imposition and signification is also expressed in terms of the interpretatio nominis and the res significata.{46) Verbum is taken to signify first of all the spoken word. By saying "first of all" we are suggesting, of course, that something is said to be a verbum in many ways. "Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod verbum tripliciter quidem in nobis proprie dicitur: quarto autem modo, dicitur improprie sive figurative. Manifestius autem et communius in nobis dicitur verbum quod voce profertur."^{47} St. Thomas indicates here that any non-metaphorical use of verbum is proper, though this does not preclude a scale of greater and lesser propriety; metaphor here is characterized by the adverb improprie. Another point of interest in this text is the way the first imposition of the word is described: it is manifestius and communis. "More common" does not seem to refer to our problem of the ratio communis, however, but simply indicates that the more obvious, familiar and manifest meaning of "word" is the spoken word and consequently that that is what will usually and commonly be meant by verbum.

    The extension of verbum is carried on in terms of the cause of what is first named such, namely the inner word which is both the final and efficient cause of the spoken word. "Finalis quidem, quia verbum vocale ad hoc a nobis exprimitur, ut interius verbum manifestetur: unde oportet quod verbum interius sit illud quod significatur per verbum exterius. Verbum autem quod exterius profertur, significat id quod intellectum est, non ipsum intelligere, neque hoc intellectum quod est habitus vel potentia, nisi quatenus et haec intellecta sunt: unde verbum interius est ipsum interius intellectum."^{48} The spoken word is not simply a reverberation of air, nor simply a noise emanating from the throat, a vox, but also a vox significativa ad placitum. That is, to understand the first imposition of word is to understand that it is expressive of what is understood by the mind.^{49} Now since what is understood is what is formal in the first imposition of verbum, it is not surprising to learn that what is understood should also be called a word.

    The inner word is also said to be the efficient cause of the spoken word: what is involved here is the working up in the imagination of what is to be spoken. "Similiter etiam voces significantes naturaliter, non ex proprosito aut cum imaginatione aliquid significandi, sicut sunt voces brutorum animalium, interpretationes dicit non possunt."^{50} "Primo, ponitur vox per per quod distinguitur nomen ab omnibus sonis, qui non sunt voces. Nam vox est sonus ab ore animalis prolatus, cum imaginatione quadam..."^{51} From this point of view, the spoken word is an artificat and, as such, has the will as a principle. There must then preexist an exemplar of the spoken word.

Et ideo, sicut in artifice tria consideramus, scilicet finem artificii, et exemplar ipsius, et ipsum artificium iam productum, ita etiam in loquente triplex verbum invenitur: scilicet id quod per intellectum concipitur, ad quod significandum verbum exterius profertur: et hoc est verbum cordis sine voce prolatum; item exemplar exterioris verbi, et hoc dicitur verbum interius quod habet imaginem vocis; et verbum exterius expressum, quod dicitur verbum vocis. Et sicut in artifice praecedit intentio finis, et deinde sequitur excogitatio formae artificiati, et ultimo artificiatum in esse producit; ita verbum cordis in loquente est prius verbo quod habet imaginem vocis, et prostremum est verbum vocis.^{52}

Sciendum est autem, quod reductio aliorum modorum ad unum primum, fieri potest dupliciter. Uno modo secundum ordinem rerum. Alio modo, secundum ordinem qui attenditur quantum ad nominis impositionem. Nomina enim imponuntur a nobis secundum quod nos intelligimus, quia nomina sunt intellectuum signa. Intelligimus autem quandoque priora ex posterioribus. Unde aliquid per prius apud nos sortiturnomen, cui res nominis per posterius convenit: et sic est in proposito. Quia enim formae et virtutes rerum ex actibus cognoscuntur, per prius ipsa generatio vel nativitas naturae nomen accepit, et ultimo forma.^{55}

    It is because what is most formal in the first imposition of verbum, the notion of manifestation, is better saved by the verbum cordis that the latter is per prius secundum ordinem rerum^{60} In somewhat the same way, the word "light" has as what is formal in its signification the notion of manifestation. According to its first imposition, the ratio propria of the name, "light" signifies the principle of manifestation in visual perception; if we consider only principium manifestationis as the signification of "light," we have a ratio communis.^{61} What makes "light" an analogous name is the fact that when considered as common to the sun, say, and intellectual evidence, the ratio propria of the name if found in one alone and the other is denominated from it. So too with verbum: the ratio propria of the name is saved by the spoken word alone and the others receive the name from it. And, though the spoken word is a word to the degree that it signifies the verbum cordis, that the concept should be called a verbum entails and extension of the name from what it is first imposed to signify. So too in the case of "nature": though generation implies matter and form,^{62} to call the latter natures involves an extension of the word from its first signification. In other words, to be naturally prior as cause to effect is not synonymous with being most perfectly the res significata of the name.

    With respect to the difficulty of Sylvester of Ferrara, then, we should point out that several things are said to be named analogically when they have a common name which is saved in one alone according to its proper notion and the other or others are denominated from that thing. This has to do with the rationes signified by the common name and it is true equally of "healthy," "word," "virtue," "passion," and of names common to God and creature. If there are dissimilarities, these are not such as to disturb the universality of the foregoing description of the analogous name. Particularly when it is question of the res significata of the name, it should not be thought that when this is found in both analogates, as wisdom is found in both creature and God, that this entails that the ratio propria of "wise" is saved in both, for then the name would be univocal.^{63} The ratio propria, the notion first and properly and more commonly associated with the name will be saved first of all in creatures and God will be denominated such from creatures. And, as in the case of lux, we can say that He receives the name accoring to a common notion (ratio communis) which will be other than what manifestius and communius^{64} is meant by the name. The order secundum rem^{65} need not be the same as that established by the successive impositions of the name, particularly when causes are denominated from their effects. And where the species of cause and grade of cause differ, there will be important differences between the things named analogically by one name and things named analogically by another name. However, these differences will be accidental to the analogy of names, that is, will not arise from the fact that these things are named analogically. For this reason, we would not want to elevate these differences into formal differences of the analogous name as if they constituted species of it. Were we to do this, the names common to God and creature would not be instances of analogical naming, but a special type of analogous name; moreover, one might want to go on to erect each name common to God and creature into a special type-but that way lies madness, and we would not so much as set foot on it if we became clear at the outset as to what it is for things to have a name analogically in common.

    Our discussion of "word" has made several appeals to texts concerning the analogy of "nature," so we need not concern ourselves with a separate development of the latter, something which would, moreover, take us very far afield. Perhaps the three instances of analogy we have discussed will provide us with an adequate base for indicating the fundamental unity of St. Thomas' various remarks on the analogous name, though the terminology in which he sets forth the doctrine is supple and fruitfully various. That variety, however, can obscure the answer to our central question. We have encountered the phrase, "communiter loquendo" which is opposed to proprie loquendo; we have seen the first imposition of a term referred to as what is communius,^{66} though the same word, "word," is said to be used proprie in three ways as opposed to a fourth which is figurative and improprie.^{67} So too we find the extended meaning of such a word as lux referred to as a ratio communis opposed to the ratio propria of that term. If it were not for that common notion, lux would be said only metaphorically of spiritual things, we are told, but we have also been told that what is named improprie is named metaphorically. Does this mean that what is said to be such-and-such improprie is spoken of metaphorically? If this were the case we would have to say that things extra animam are said to be true metaphorically. "Si autem accipiatur veritas improprie dicta, secundum quam omnia di cantur vera, sic sunt plurium verorum plures veritates; sed unius rei una est tantum veritas."^{68} That is, we would be faced with the somewhat unsettling recognition that to speak of true as convertible with being involves a metaphorical use of "true."

    Later on we will make explicit that all the elements for an answer to our central question (namely, "Is there a ratio communis of the analogous name?)," have been given in the texts already cited, though this is something the discerning reader will long since have seen. Before spelling out that resolution, however, we want first to examine the relationship between analogy and metaphor in order to sharpen a difficulty which emerges from the texts already considered. After that, we shall examine the doctrine that "being" is not a generic name, since this will bring out important issues for the discussion of the ratio communis of the analogous name, a matter to which we can then turn.

{1} IaIIae, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2.

{2} Ia, q. 82, a. 3.

{3} Q.D. de virtutibus in communi, a. 7.

{4} Ibid. a. 2: "Haec autem omnia conveniunt tam virtuti morali quam intellectuali, quam theologicae, quam acquisitae, quam infunsae."

{5} Nicomachean Ethics, II, 6, 1106a15.

{6} Q.D. de virt, in com., a. 7: "...virtus in unaquaque re dicitur per respectum ad bonum; eo quod uniuscuiusque virtus est, ut Philosophus dicit, quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit; sicut virtus equi quae facit equum esse bonum, et bene ire, et bene ferre sessorem, quod est opus equi. Ex hoc quidem igitur aliquis habitus habebit rationem virtutis, quia ordinatur ad bonum." - Cf. ibid., a. 12: "Illud autem quod est completivum et untitur: virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Unde et virtus hominis, de qua loquimur, oportet quod diversificetur secundum speciem secundum quod bonum ratione diversificatur."

{7} Ibid., a. 12: "Cum autem homo sit homo inquantum rationale est; oportet hominis bonum esse aliqualiter rationale. Rationalis pars, sive intellectiva, comprehendit et cognitivam. Pertinet autem ad rationalem partem non solum appetisus, qui est in ipsa parte rationali, consequens apprehensionem intellectus, qui dicitur voluntas: sed etiam appetitus qui est in parte sensitiva hominis, et dividitur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Nam etiam hic appetitius in homine sequitur apprehensionem rationis, inquantum imperio rationis obedit; unde et participare dicitur aliqualiter rationem. Bonum igitur hominis est et bonum cognitivae et bonum appetitivae partis."

{8} On this phrase, cf. Ibid., a. 3.

{9} Bonum autem sub ratione boni est objectum solius appetitiva partis; nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt, Illi igitur habitus qui vel sunt in parte appetitiva, vel a parte appetitiva dependent, ordinatur formaliter ad bonum; unde potissime habent rationem virtutis." - Ibid. a. 7; cf. ibid., a. 12: "Non autem secundum eamdem rationem utrique parti bonum attribuitur. Nam bonum appetivae parti attribuitur formaliter, ipsum enim bonum est appetitivae partis obiectum; sed intellectivae parti attribuitur bonum non formaliter, sed materialiter tantum. Nam cognoscere verum, est quoddam bonum cognitivae partis; licet sub ratione boni non comparetur ad cognitivam, sed magis ad appetitivam; nam ipsa cognitio veri est quodam appetibile."

{10} "Illi vero habitus qui nec sunt in appetitiva parte, nec ab eadem dependent, possunt quidem ordinari materialiter in id quod est bonum, non tamen formaliter sub ratione boni; unde et possunt aliquo modo dici virtutes, non tamen ita proprie sicut primi habitus." - Ibid., a. 7.

{11} Ibid: "Sciendum est autem, quod intellectus tam speculativus quam practicus potest perfici dupliciter aliquo habitu: uno modo, absolute et secundum se, prout praecedit voluntatem, quasi eam movens; alio modo, prout sequitur voluntatem, quasi ad imperium actum suum eliciens: quia, ut dictum est, istae duae potentiae, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, se invicem circumeunt."

{12} "Subiectum igitur habitus qui secundum quid dicitur virtus, potest esse intellectus, non solum practicus, sed etiam intellectus speculativus, absque omni ordine ad voluntatem." _ IaIIae q. 56, a. 3.

{13} "Dicendum quod bonum uniuscuiusque est finish eius. Et ideo, cum verum sit finish intellectus: cognoscere verum est bonus actus intellectus; unde habitus perficiens intellectum ad verum cognoscendum, vel in speculativis, vel in practicis, dicitur virtus," - Ibid., ad 2. "Nam cognoscere verum, est quoddam bonum cognitivae partis; licet sub ratione boni non comparetur ad cognitivam, sed magis ad appetitivam: nam ipsa cognitio veri est quoddam appetibile." Q.D. de virt. in com,  a, 12.

{14} aIIae q. 56, a. 3: "...non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes: quia non reddunt bonum opus nisi in quadam facultate nec simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem."

{15} Cf. ibid.

{16} Cf. Q.D. de virt. in com. a. 7: "Illi igitur qui sunt in intellectu practico vel speculativo primo modo, possunt dici aliquo modo virtutes, licet nonita secundum perfectam rationem; et hoc modo intellectus, scientia et sapientia sunt in intellectu speculativo, ars vero in intellectum practico. Dicitur enim aliquis intelligens vel sciens secundum quod eius intellectus perfectus est ad cognoscendum verum; quod quidem est bonum intellectus. Et licet istud verum possit esse volitum, prout homo vult intelligere verum; non tamen quantum ad hoc perficiuntur habitus praedicti. Non enim ex hoc quod homo habet scientiam, efficitur volens considerare verum; sed solummodo potens; unde et ipsa veri consideratio non est scientia inquantum est volita, sed secundum quod directe tendit in obiectum."

{17} IaIIae, q. 57, a. 1: "...possunt quidem dici virtutes, inquantum faciunt facultatem bonae operationis quae est consideratio veri, hoc enim est bonum opus intellectus; non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu. Ex hoc enim quod aliquius habet habitum scientiae speculative, non inclinatur ad utendum; sed fit potens speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam. Sed quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente voluntate."

{18} "Nam quidam in nullo a voluntate dependet, nisi quantum ad eorum usum; et hoc quidem per accidens, cum huiusmodi usus habituum aliter a voluntate dependeat, et aliter ab habitibus praedictis, sicut sunt scientia et sapientia et ars. Non enim per hos habitus homo ad hoc perficitur, ut homo eis bene velit uti; sed solum ut ad hoc sit potens." - QD. de virt. in com., a. 7; cf. CD. de ver., q. 14., a. 3 ad 3: "...bonum illud ad quod virtus ordinatur, non est accipiendum quasi aliquod ofiectum alicuius actus; sed illud bonum est ipse actus perfectus, quem virtus elicit. Licet autem verum ratione a bono differat; tamen hoc ipsum quod est considerare verum, est quoddam bonum intellectus..."

{19} Q.D. de virt. in com., a. 7.

{20} Ibid: "Ita est similiter erit fides in intellectu speculativo, secundum quod subiacet imperio voluntatis; sicut temperantia est in concupiscibili secundum quod subiacet imperio rationis. Unde voluntas imperat intellectui, credendo, non solum quantum ad actum voluntatis in determinatum creditum intellectus assentit; sicut et in determinatum medium a ratione, consupiscibilis, per temperantiam tendit."

{21} "Prudentia vero est in intellectu sive ratione practica, ut dictum est: non quidem ita quod ex voluntate determinetur obiectum prudentiae, sed solum finis; obiectuum autem ipsa perquirit: praesupposito enim a voluntate fine boni, prudentia perquirit vias per quas hoc bonum et perficiatur et conservetur."

{22} Ibid.

{23} Ibid.: "Et licet omnes quoquo modo possint dici virtutes; tamen perfectius et magia proprie hi duo ultimi habent rationem virtutis; licet ex hoc non sequatur quod sin nobiliores habitus vel perfectiores."

{24} "Et quia bonum magis congrue competit parti appetitivae, propter hoc nomen virtutis convenientius et magis proprie competit virtutibus appetitivae partis quam virtutibus intellectivae; licet virtutes intellectivae sint nobiliores perfections quam virtutes morales, ut probatur in VI Ethic." - Q.D. de virt. in com.,  a. 12; cf. ibid., a. 7, ad 1.

{25} Cf. IaIIae, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3;  ibid., q. 66, a.3.
^{26} IaIIae, q. 61, a. 1, ad 1: "Dicendum quod quando genus univocum dividitur in suas species, tunc partes divisionis ex acquo se habent secundum rationem generis; licet secundum naturam rei una species sit principalior et perfectior alia, sicut homo aliis animalibus. Sedquando est divisio alicuius analogi, quod dicitur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius; tunc nihil prohibet unum esse principalius altero, etiam secundum communem rationem, sicut substantia principalius dicitur ens quam accidens. Et talis est divisio virtutum: eo quod bonum rationis non secundum eundem ordinem invenitur in omnibus."

{27} In Periherm., lect 2, n. 6: "vel quia extenso nomine passionis ad omnem receptionem, etiam ipsum intelligere intellectus possibilis quoddam pati est."

{28} "Omnis motus est inter contraria; oportet illud quod recipitur in patiente, esse contrarium alicui quod a patiente abiicitur. Secundum hoc autem, quod recipitur in patiente, patiens agenti assimilatur; et inde est quod proprie accepta passione, agens contrariatur patienti;et omnis passio abiicit a substantia. Huiusmodi autem passio non est nisi secundum motum alterationis. Nam in motu locali non recipitur aliquid immobile, sed ipsum mobile recipitur in aliquo loco. In motu autem guamenti et decrementi recipitur vel abiicitur non forma, sed aliquid substantiale, utpote alimentum, ad cuius additionem vel subtractionem sequitur quantatis magnitudo vel parvitas. In generatione autem et corruptione non est motus nec contrarietas, nisi ratione alterationis praecedentis; et sic secundum solam alterationem est proprie passio, secundum quam una forma contraria recipitur, et alia expellitur." - Q.D. de ver., q. 26, a. 1.

{29} IaIIae, q. 22, a. 1; In V Metaphysic., lect. 20, n. 1067: "Et ideo magis proprie dicitur pati, cum subtrahitur aliquid de eo quod sibi congruebat, et dum agitur in ipso contraria dispositio, quam quando fit e contrario. Tunc enim magis dicitur perfici." Cf. ibid., lect. 14, n. 958.

{30} "Si ergo passio proprie dicta aliquo modo ad animam pertineat, hoc non est nisi secundum quod unitur corpori, et ita per accidens." - Q.D. de ver., q. 26, a. 2.

{31} "Quando huiusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius, magis proprie habet rationem passionis, quam quando fit in melius. Unde tristitia magis proprie est passio quam laetitia."- IaIIae, q. 22, a. 1.

{32} Cf. IaIIae, q. 22, a. 1, ad 1.

{33} IaIIae, q. 22, a. 1.

{34} Cf. Q.D. de ver., q. 26, a. 3.

{35} IaIIae, q. 22, a. 2.

{36} Ibid., cf. ad 1: "Et sic etiam in priori vi animae, scilicet apprehensiva, invenitur minus de ratione passionis."

{37} IaIIae, q. 22, a. 3.

{38} In II de anima, lect. 10, n. 350.

{39} Ibid., lect. 11, n. 366.

{40} In III de anima, lect. 7, nn. 675-6: "Ex hoc autem sequitur quod cum sentire sit quoddam pati a sensibili, ait aliquid simile passioni, quod intelligere sit vel pati aliquod ab intelligibile, vel aliquid alterum huiusmodi, scilicet passioni. Horum autem duorum secundum verius est."

{41} In II Ethic., lect. 5, n. 291.

{42} In VII Physic., lect. 4, n. 1833.

{43} "...passio aequivoce in anima sicut et actio..." - Q.D. de anima, a.6, ad 7.
^{44} Q.D. de ver., q. 4, a. 1, ad 8; cf. I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 1.

{45} Dicendum quod nomina imponuntur secundum quod cognitionem de rebus accipimus. Et quia ea quae sunt posteriora in natura, sunt ut plurium prius nota nobis, inde est quod frequenter secundum nominis impositionem, aliquando nomen prius in aliquo duorum invenitur in quo um altero res significata per nomen prius existit; sicut patet de nominibus quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, ut ens, et bonum et huiusmodi, quae prius fuerunt creaturis imposita, et ex his ad divinam praedicationem translata, quamvis esse et bonum prius inveniantur in Deo." -  Q.D. de ver., q. 4. a. 1. Notice the use of translata which indicates that the word is not restricted to describe metaphorical uses of terms.

{46} I. Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.

{47} Ia, q. 34, a. 1.

{48} Q.D. de ver., q. 4, a. 1.

{49} Cf. In evang. Ioann., cap. 1, lect. 1, nn. 25-6.

{50} In Periherm., proem., n. 3.

{51} In I Periherm., lect. 4, n. 3; "Operationes enim animales dicuntur, quae ex imaginatione procedunt. Et sic patet quod vox non est percussio respirati aeris, sicut accidit in tussi. Sed id cui principaliter attribuitur causa generationis vocis, est anima, quae utitur isto aere, scilicet isto acre, scilicet respirato, ad verberandum arem, qui est in arteria, ad ipsam arteriam. Aer ergo non est principale in vocis formatione, sed anima quae utitur aere, ut instrumento, ad vocem formandum." - In II de anima, lect. 18, n. 477. This would seem to be that first form of the word mentioned by St Albert, In praedicament., tract. 1, cap. 2; the second form would be that which makes it a vox significativa ad placitum: cf. St Thomas, In I Periherm., lect. 4, n. 3.

{52} Q.D. de ver., q. 4, a. 1. The production of the artifact which is the word involves a practical syllogism, as St Thomas explains elsewhere: "...ut quasi videatur esse quidam syllogismus cujus in parte intellectiva habeatur major universalis, et in parte sensitiva habeatur minor particularis, per virtutem motivam imperatam; ipsa enim operatio se habet in operabilibus sicut conclusio in speculativis..." - I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 1.

{53} Ia, q. 34, a. 1.

{54} I Contra Gentes, cap. 34.

{55} In V Metaphysic., lect 5, n. 825; cf. Q.D. de malo, q. 1, a. 5, ad 19.

{56} Sic igitur, quia ex rebus aliis in Dei cognitionem pervenimus, res nominum de Deo et rebus aliis dictorum per prius est in Deo secundum suum modum, sed ratio nominis per posterius. Unde et nominari dicitur a suis causatis." - I Contra Genes, cap. 34.

{57} In I Contra Gentes, cap. 34 nn. IV-V.

{58} I Ctntra Gentes, cap. 34.

{59} Cf. In Scti Pauli epist. ad Ephesios, cap. 3, lect. 4 apropos of "Ex quo omnis paternitas in caelis et in terra nominatur."

{60} Q.D. de ver., q. 4, a. 1, ad 7: "...ratio signi per prius convenit effectui quam causae, quando causa est effectui causa essendi, non autem significandi, sicut in exemplo proposito accidit. Sed quando effectus habet a causa non solum quod sit, sed etiam quod significet, tunc, sicut causa est prius quam effectus in essendo, ita in significando; et ideo verbum intnc, sicut causa est prius quam effectus in essendo, ita in significando; et ideo verbum interius per prius habet rationem significationis quam verbum exterius, quia verbum exterius non instituitur ad significandum nisi per interius verbum" Mention must be made here of the remarkaable series of articles by Bernard Lonergan, S.J., "The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St Thomas Aquinas," Theological Studies, VII (1946), pp. 349-92; VIII (1947), pp. 35-79, 404-44; X (1949), pp. 3-40, 359-93. These articles form the textual background for Fr. Lonergan's ambitious tome, Insight, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1957. Whatever one may think of the author's assessment of St Thomas and of his own fairly independent views, the articles mentioned are a veritable thesaurus of texts with often penetrating comments. For a critique which captures some of the flamboyant style of its target, see Cornelius Ryan Fay, "Fr. Lonergan and the Participation School," The New Scholasticism, XXXIV (1960), pp. 461-87.

{61} Il Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 2.

{62} Cf. In V Metaphysic., lect. 5, nn. 825-6.

{63} Ia, q. 16, a. 6.

{64} Ia, q. 34, a. 1.

{65} I Contra Gentes, cap. 34.

{66} So too moral virtue is virtue communius. Cf. Q.D. de ver., q. 14, a. 3, ad 1.

{67} Ia, q. 34, a. 1.

{68} Q.D. de ver., q. 1, a. 4.

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