VII. RESOLUTION AND CONCLUSION

From the foregoing diffuse and rather disconnected remarks we can derive the answer to the general question posted by this essay: is there a ratio communis of the analogous name? If our first impulse is to answer in the negative, this is because a ratio communis would be formulable in one set of words and we would seemingly then be in the position of having to say that the analogous name signifies one and the same notion as predicable of its analogates. Were this the case, however, the analogous name would be indistinguishable from the univocal name. It is by some such procedure as this that Scotus wants to maintain that "being" is univocal for, although the ratio substantiae differs from the ratio accidentis and the latter is analogous to the former, nonetheless "being" can be taken to signify some one notion apart from these determinate ones, as in the case where we know that something is but don't know whether it is substance or accident. What we know when we simply know that but, however, the analogous name would be indistinguishable from the univocal name. It is by some such procedure as this that Scotus wants to maintain that "being" is univocal for, although the ratio substantiae differs from the ratio accidentis and the latter is analogous to the former, nonetheless "being" can be taken to signify some one notion apart from these determinate ones, as in the case where we know that something is but don't know whether it is substance or accident. What we know when we simply know that the thing is is what "being" signifies as a univocal term. Now in Section I above, we brought together some representative texts in which St Thomas gives as the distinguishing mark of the analogous as opposed to the univocal name that it does not signify one notion but several which are related to one another as prior and posterior. But if there is no one notion common to all the analogates, it clearly follows that there is no ratio communis of the analogous name or, if there is, that it is quite unlike the ratio communis of the univocal name. This second possibility must be entertained because, as the texts cited in Section II indicate, St. Thomas does speak of a ratio communis of the analogous name. The ratio communis of the analogous name, however, is not some one notion signified without change by the name as it is predicable of its analogate (otherwise it would be univocal): the nature of this ratio communis, then, must be clearly understood if we are to maintain the distinction between univocal and analogous names.

    We have spoken of the ratio communis of the univocal name and by this we meant the one notion which is signified by the name as predicable of many. But this notion is also called a ratio propria. "Quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie animalis."^{1} If the generic name is said to signify a ratio communis and the specific name a ratio propria, the ratio propria here in question is not that of the generic name. We are speaking rather of a common and proper grasp of the thing named by both the generic and specific names, e.g. Socrates as named by "animal" and "man." If we look to the generic name itself, it is said of its species secundum propriam rationem eius. Now it is just this that is denied of the analogous name vis-a-vis its analogates and we must by means of the terminology gleaned from the texts already cited, ask what this denial entails with respect to an analogously common notion.

    We have seen that, in the case of the generic name, there is no need to distinguish its ratio communis from its ratio propria: what makes such a name univocal is that it is predicated according to its ratio propria of many things, in which sense its ratio propria communis or universal. Let us now ask if there is any need, in the analogous name, to distinguish between its ratio propria and its ratio communis. Consider the word "healthy." The word is imposed from health; it is from health that something is denominated healthy. Thus the ratio signified by "healthy" is "that which has health," habens sanitatem. Is this a ratio propria or a ratio communis? Since we can't talk of the univocity or equivocity of a determinate name apart from the determinate things to which it is taken to be common, let us first of all consider the proprositions, "Socrates is healthy" and "Plato is healthy." Here the predicate term can be taken to mean  exactly the same thing, habens sanitatem, and "healthy," considered as thus predicable, is a univocal name, i.e. illud in quolibet invenitur secundum propriam rationem. If we vary the example and consider "healthy" as predicably common to a man and medicine, it will not be common in the same way as it was in our first example, that is, it will not be said of these two things secundum rationem propriam, but only of man. "Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur."^{2} As said of medicine, "healthy" expressed a reference or analogy to what saves the proper notion of the name, what is directly denominated from the id a quo nomen imponitur ad significandum. If medicine is called healthy, it is not directly denominated from health but from what is directly denominated from health. Thus the ratio nominis is found in one alone proprie, perfecte, simpliciter, per prius and in others minus proprie, imperfecte, secundum quid, per posterius. From such considerations it seems to follow that the notion which is analogically common is none other than the ratio propria of the name. The ratio sani is "what has health" and this is founded properly by only one of the things named healthy analogically and is founded less properly, imperfectly, secondarily by other things insofar as they are referred or attributed or proportioned to what saves the notion per prius.

    This enables us to appreciate the comparison of the generic notion and the analogously common notion in terms of equality and inequality. Species are said to participate equally in the generic notion in that each is directly denominated by the id a quo and not by the one being referred to the other. What is called the ratio analogice communis is participated in unequally by the analogates in that one is directly and first of all denominated and the others receive the name by reference to what receives it per prius. This makes it clear that the "reduction to one" of the many modes of a commn name is not to some one notion which would be participated in equally; rather, it is a reduction of secondary notions to the proper notion and, consequently, of things secondarily named to what is first of all denominated. The ratio communis of the analogous name is not obtained by picking out the minimal content of all the meanings of the name, but is rather the most proper meaning of the term in question, a meaning which is not properly saved by all the things to which it is considered to be common. 

    We are now in a position to speak  of the relation between the phrases ratio communis and communiter loquendo. Insofar as the latter phrase refers to a way of receiving an analogous name less properly, it clearly must be distinguished from the ratio communis. Something can be named such-and-such communiter loquendo, minissime proprie, insofar as it saves very little of the ratio propria which is the ratio communis of the analogous name. We will see in a moment that this distinction requires some modification in the case of the Divine Names with respect to the per prius secundum rem nominis. But what is the relationship between the res significata and the ratio communis?

    As we have already seen, the notion of res significata is explained with reference to the mode of signifying the res. The res significata of "healthy" is health, but whether we speak of "healthy" or "health" (sanum or sanitas), a mode of signification is inevitably involved, for "health" signifies abstractly (namely, "the quality whereby one is healthy") and "healthy" concretely (namely, the one so qualified). Nevertheless, what takes on either mode is what the name principally signifies and from which the recipient of the name is denominated. Thus the res significata is the same as the id a quo ex parte rei. What is the relationship between the res significata and the ratio propria of the name? From the point of view of univocal and analogous names, the thing signified must be signified concretely, since, as signified abstractly, it cannot be predicated of what has the perfection and the question of univocity or analogy would not arise. In the Divine Names, this distinction between modes of signifying is not so important since we can say either "God is wise" or "God is wisdom." However, although we cannot say "Socrates is wisdom," we would nevertheless say that wisdom is what "wise" chiefly signifies and that substances of a certain sort participate in it. Not that participation is restricted to accidental forms: we can also say that what is named man participates in humanity, just as what is named ens participates in existence. In the case of names predicated of God, where these signify abstractly, we may think we thereby free them from all such imperfections as the composition implied by the concrete name. But the abstract name too involves a mode of signifying thanks to which it comes under the scope of the statement that, with respect to mode of signifying, omne nomen cum defectu est{3} when applied to God. Thus, "wisdom" will mean a quality of a certain kind, that is, an accident distinct from the substance which participates in it, something it cannot mean when applied to God. Thus, the notion signified by "wise" or "wisdom" cannot be the same when they are applied to God and creature. In the case of some names, however, names such as "wisdom," it can be said that quantum ad rem nominis they are said per prius of God. Quantum ad rationem nominis, however, the creature saves such names per prius and it remains true that the analogous name is said according to its proper notion of one alone.

    It may be well at this point to restate the difference between the analogous name and the metaphorical use of a name. We have seen that the analogous name is said according to its proper notion of only one of the things of which it is predicable and that it is said of others insofar as they refer to what saves the ratio propria. But isn't this true of the metaphor as well? A name is used metaphorically of what does not save its proper notion but which refers to what does save that notion. For example, I say "John is a tiger." In this case, although John does not save the proper notion of "tiger," the point of the metaphor is his similarity to what does save that notion. On this showing, then, metaphor seems identical with analogy. In reply to this, we call attention to the similarity to tiger which prompts our calling John a tiger and suggest that the underlying simile is something like "John is fierce as a tiger." Now, since fierceness is not part of the notion signified by "tiger," our solution is that, although a thing which receives a metaphorical name is referred to what saves the proper notion of the name, it is not referred to it as saving the proper notion, and that it is in this that metaphor differs from analogy.

    Exception might be taken to this solution by citing the admitted metaphor involved in speaking of "living waters." The waters are referred to living things insofar as water, like living things, seems to possess self-movement. But "life" is imposed from self-movement which must, consequently, figure in the proper notion of "living" and our distinction of metaphor from analogy collapses. This difficulty is removed by invoking the important distinction between the id a quo ex part imponentis and id a quo ex parte rei. Only the latter is the form chiefly signified by the term and since self-movement is an example of the first kind of id a quo nomen imponitur, it is not what the name chiefly signifies and our earlier solution is unaffected by the objection.

    A more serious difficulty, one already discussed in Section V above, arises from the fact that what is sometimes said to save a name communiter loquendo is at other times said to be name metaphorice. When a name is said to be saved only communiter loquendo it can also be said to signify minissime proprie. Thus, since the reference to what saves the proper notion is extremely tenuous and remote, one may either insist on the propriety, however minimal, or ignore it and, to emphasize the distance and paucity of propriety, say a metaphor is involved. In our attempt to name God, we seem ever faced with this choice, although, when we want to insist that some names are said of God proprie, we distinguish them quite rigorously from metaphors. Yet even with names said properly of God, we know so little of what we would speak that our terms seem improper, metaphorical. 

It is now clear that there is no opposition between the texts cited above in Sections I and II: what St Thomas calls the ratio communis of the analogous name is not like that signified by the univocal name and, indeed, is common in such a way that the unequal participation in it is productive of many secondary notions. There is, of course, no need to speak of a change of mind on the part of St Thomas - unless we misunderstand the nature of the common notion signified by the analogous name. More importantly, our investigation has shown that the terminology St Thomas uses to speak of the second intention of analogy is itself replete with words which signify analogically.

{1} Ia, q. 16, a.6.

{2} Ibid.
Chapter 1, VII, 1 [64]

{3} I Contra Gentes, cap. 30.

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