Jacques Maritain Center :
Studies in Analogy /
by Ralph McInerny
There seems little reason to doubt that within the Thomist
tradition it is assumed that a metaphor is one thing, an analogous
term another, and that while metaphor is justifiable - certainly
in poetry, but as well if for different reasons in Scripture - it
is, generally speaking, something the philosopher should take
pains to avoid, since it can vitiate arguments and obscure issues.
St Thomas himself often characterized the metaphor as improper
usage, thereby of course opposing it to proper usage. The question
arises, however, when we consider the texts carefully, whether
metaphor is opposed to the analogous name or whether proper and
improper usage of the kind at issue are subtypes of something more
commodious embracing them both; that is, it appears from a reading
of some texts that St Thomas does not so much oppose metaphor to
analogy as that he contrasts the analogous usage which is
metaphorical because improper to the analogous usage which is
proper. Cajetan's division of analogy of proportionality into
proper and improper responds to this suggestion of St Thomas, and
if the great commentator tends to regard metaphor as
something less than a full-fledged analogy, well surely that does
not mean that it is in no way an analogy.{1}
If it seems possible to say that the opposition
between analogy and metaphor is not one between analogy and
non-analogy but an opposition between modes of analogy, it seems
equally possible to consider "metaphor" as a term common to the
analogous term and the metaphor opposed to it; that is, as common
to proper and improper usage. This can be based on the way in
which Aristotle and St Thomas speak of the extension of the name
"nature" to signify any essence whatsoever; Aristotle used the
dative, μεταφορᾷ; St.
Thomas the phrase, secundum
quamdam metaphoram,{2} yet I think no one would want to
say we are speaking metaphorically, in the sense of improperly,
when we talk of the nature of the triangle, for example.
These few remarks serve to indicate that the
relative status of metaphor and analogy is somewhat problematic.
The aporia can be
tightened by recalling that Aristotle, in the Poetics, enumerates four
species of metaphor only one of which is χατ᾿ ἀναλογίαν{3} Does
this mean that only one species of metaphor is in play in the
foregoing considerations? If that be true, any resolution of the
questions which arise as to the opposition of metaphor to analogy
as proper usage would not as such enlighten us on the nature of
metaphor without qualification, i.e., the genus of which the
metaphor based on analogy is a species.
Although we have introduced this discussion as if it were merely a matter of clarifying alternate classifications suggested by texts of Aquinas, it is obvious that such an effort, if seriously pursued, must inevitably go beyond the fairly superficial plane on which it presents itself. What we are finally after here is an answer to the question, "What, for Aquinas, is a metaphor?" and our way of broaching it serves to call attention to the fact that an answer to the question presumes that we can answer the equally or more difficult question, "What is analogy?" Our opening paragraphs prepare us, moreover, for the likelihood that the answer to the question about metaphor may well begin, "Metaphora dicitur multipliciter..."
Before turning to the texts of St Thomas, we shall first of all
say a few things about Cajetan's teaching on the nature of
metaphor, and this without apology given Cajetan's generally
admitted influences on this and related discussions. It is well
known that in the De nominum
analogia, Cajetan links metaphor with proportionality
rather than with what he calls analogy of attribution. Having
explained what is meant by proportionality, Cajetan writes, "Fit
autem duobus modis analogia haec: scilicet metaphorice et proprie.
Metaphorice quidem quando nomen illud commune absolute unam habet
rationem formalem, quae is uno amalogatorum salvatur, et per
metaphoram de alio dicitur."{4} It is unfortunate that this cannot
be considered a good definition because of the occurrence of per metaphoram in what
purports to be an explication of metaphor. It should be noticed,
moreover, that Cajetan's faillure to define metaphor is not
without its impact on his attempt to define proper
proportionality: "Proprie vero fit, quando nomen illud commune in
utroque analogatorum absque metaphoris dicitur."{5}
When we turn to the discussions of chapter
seven of Cajetan's opusculum, we find further statements about
metaphor of which the following is most important. "In analogia
siquidem secundum metaphoram, oportet unum in alterius ratione
poni, non indifferenter; sed proprie sumptum, in ratione sui
metaphorice sumpti claudi necesse est; quoniam impossibile est
intelligere quid sit aliquid secundum metaphoram nomen, nisi
cognito illo, ad cuius metaphoram dicitur,"{6} Now, as Cajetan
points out in the following paragraph as well as in his commentary
on the Summa theologiae,{7}
in this the socalled analogy of improper proportionality and
analogy of attribution are as one, since this is the third
condition of Cajetan's analogy of attribution.{8}
If we ask why Cajetan has multiplied entities
here rather than making what he calls attribution coalesce with
his improper proportionality, the answer would seem to be the
necessity for a proportionality in metaphor and its absence in
attribution. The text on which Cajetan relies here is, of course,
Q.D. de veritate, q. 2,
a. 11, although it seems ambiguous on the question whether
metaphor is a kind of analogy. Consider the phrase "Sed tamen hoc
dupliciter contingit" which occurs after the description of
analogy as implying no determinate relation between things sharing
a common name. But the first member of the division is stated
thus: "quandoque enim illud nomen importat aliquid ex principali
significatione, in quo non potest attendi convenientia inter Deum
et creaturam, etiam modo
praedicto; sicut est in omnibus quae symbolice dicuntur
de Deo, ut cum dicitur leo, vel sol, vel huismodi, quia in horum
definitione cadit materia, quae Deo attribui non potest." To what
does etiam modo praedicto refer?
Does the occurrence of attribui
in the denial mean that it is Cajetan's analogy of
attribution which is being set aside? This seems unlikely, even if
we are willing to grant the accuracy of Cajetan's division of
analogy. What the text suggests is that a name is sometimes
predicated of God on the basis of a proportionality which, because
of its principal signification, argues for no similarity between
God and creatures so named with respect to that principal
signification. Does this make metaphor a kind of analogous name?
Does it mean that for St. Thomas unlike Aristotle, the meaphor is
always based on a proportionality? Whatever the answer to these
quetions, it must be said that the remarks of Cajetan we have
consulted are not very illuminating on the nature of metaphor.To
give the great commentator his due, we quote a definition he gives
in his commentary on the first question of the Summa. "In titulo uti metaphoris est uti
locutionibus quae non verificantur de his de quibus dicuntur,
secundum propriam significationem, sed secundum aliquam
similitudinem ad propria significata: ut cum dicitur quod 'Deus
noster ignis consumens est,' utimus metaphora; quia Deus non est
vee ignis sed se habet ad modum ignis consumentis."{9}
This appeal to Cajetan serves as an oblique
introduction to some of the problems which await us when we turn
to St Thomas. It will be noticed that if there is no formal
connection between metaphor and proportionality at least one
member of Cajetan's suggested division of analogy is gratuitous
and unnecessary. Moreover, what Cajetan calls analogy of
attribution would then be indistinguishable from metaphor and,
since most discussions of analogy in St Thomas include examples
which for Cajetan are examples of analogy of attribution, the
whole matter of a distinction between metaphor and analogy becomes
considerably obscured. But then the way Cajetan handles
difficulties presented to his division of analogy by Aquinas'
discussion of analogy indicates that that division is not formal.
Thus, when Cajetan asks us to notice that St. Thomas gives an
example of so-called analogy of attribution in discussing names
common to God and creature, he suggests that intrinsic and
extrinsic denomination are really irrelevant when we want to know
what an analogous name is.{10} But we have expatiated elsewhere on
the deficiencies of Cajetan's treatment of analogy and need not
repeat those criticisms here.{11} In short, our employment of
Cajetan here is intended to intensify our problem rather than to
commend the Cajetanian interpretation.
{1} Cf. De nominum analogia
(ed. P. N. Zammit, O.P. and P.H. Hering, O.P., Romae, 1952),
cap.3.
{2} Metaphysics,
Delta, 4, 1051a11; St. Thomas, ad loc., lectio 5, n. 823.
{3} Poetics, chap. 21,
1457b9, 16.
{4} Op. cit., n. 25.
{5} Ibid, n. 26.
{6} Cap. 7, n. 75, Cajetan doubtless has in mind here such
remarks as that in De
veritate, q. 7, a. 2, c.: "In his quae translative
dicuntur, non accipitur metaphora secundum quamcumque
similitudinem, sed decundum convenientiam in illo quod est de
propria ratione eius cuius nomen transfertur."
{7} In Iam,
q. 13, a. 6, n. IV: "Ad hoc breviter dicitur, quod analoga
inveniuntur duobus modis. Quaedam enim significant ipsos respectus ad primum
analogatum, ut patet de sano. Quaedam vero significant fundamenta tantum illorum
respectuum; ut communiter invenitur in omnibus vere analogis,
proprie et formaliter salvatis in omnibus analogatis. Proposi
tio ergo illa universalis in antecedente assumpta, intelligenda
est universaliter in primo modo analoggiae: ita quod sensus est,
quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice, idest
secundum diversos respectus, dicuntur, oportet poni unum. In
quaestione de Veritate
de secundo modo analogiae dixit oppositum. Et haec responsio est
universalior ea quam alibi assignavimus, ex Qu. de Ver., quia
ista responsio habet locum in analogis secundum
proportionalitatem, metaphorice tamen dictis: in his enim etiam
unum ponitur in ratione alterius." - As he had pointed out in
his opusculum (n. 76): "Et propter hoc huiusmodi analoga prius
dicuntur de his, in quibus proprie salvatur, et posterius de
his, in quibus metaphorice inveniuntur, et habent in hoc
affinitatem cum analogis secundum attributionem, ut patet."
{8} Op. cit., cap. 2,
n. 14.
{9} Iam q. 1, a.
9, n. 1.
{10} In Iam, q. 13, 1. 5, n. XIV, in fine.
{11} The Logic of
Analogy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961.
© 2011 by the Estate of Ralph McInerny. All rights reserved including the right to translate or reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form.