7. If we wish to determine with greater precision why and how these two cognitive habitus ought to be differentiated, we can do no better than to have recourse to the explanations which Cajetan gives in I, q. 1, a. 3 and 7, and which John of St. Thomas completed in his Curs. Theol. I. P., q. 1 disp. 2, a. 3 to 11. In this way we can apply to the present case the general doctrine elaborated by the Thomists in connection with the case -- so different in other respects -- of the distinction between the beatific vision and theology, which is subalternated to it.
"Consider that in science there are two perspectives in which an object may be known: that of the object as a thing, and that of the object as an object; or again, the aspect 'which' (quae) and the aspect 'under which' (sub qua).
"The formal perspective of the object as thing, or quae, is that perspective of the reality before the mind which first receives the operations of the particular habitus in question, and from which the properties of this or that subject of knowledge spring, and which serves as the first means of demonstration, for example: being in metaphysics, quantity in mathematics, and mutability in natural philosophy.
"The formal perspective of the object as object, or sub qua, however, consists in a certain type of immateriality, or in a certain mode of abstracting and defining, for example: without all matter in metaphysics, with intelligible matter only in mathematics, and with sensible, but not individual, matter in natural philosophy . . . "{9}
Taking this point of view of the ratio formalis sub qua, we notice that the objects of knowledge divide "into what can be known through the light{10} of metaphysics, that is, a medium illumined by an absence of every trace of matter; through the light of mathematics, that is, a medium illumined by sensible immateriality but darkened by intelligible matter; through the physical light, or a medium obscured by sensible matter yet illumined by abstraction from individual material conditions; and through the divine light, or a medium radiating a divine effulgence. This latter constitutes theological knowledge.
The unity and specific diversity of the sciences depend on the unity and diversity of the formal reasons of the objects as objects, under which (sub quibus) the reality is known. . . The reason why theology is one science is to be attributed to the unity of the formal reason sub qua, or of the object as object, namely, the divine light of revelation. Everything is said to be considered in theology insofar as divinely revealable.
There is only one adequate formal perspective of the object as object which corresponds to deity, and that is the divine light. Yet this formal perspective does not constitute a specific but a generic unity, and is divided into the divine evident light, the divine revealing light, considered apart from its evidence or inevidence, and the divine non-evident light. The first of these lights is the perspective sub qua of the theology of the blessed; the second, that of our theology; and the third, that of faith. And so, for the single formal reason of the object as a thing we have a specific diversity of the formal reasons of this object as an object, and consequently a specific diversity of habitus."{11}
Thus, in theology that which FORMALLY DETERMINES THE OBJECT AS A THING, the ratio formalis quae, is deity; and the FORMAL OBJECT, or formal subject, is God considered in His very deity, Deus sub ratione suae propriae quidditatis (Cajetan, ibid., a. 7). Although theology has this formal reason (ratio) and this formal object in common with the intuitive science of the blessed, it is specifically distinct from the latter by reason of what FORMALLY DETERMINES THE OBJECT AS AN OBJECT, or the ratio formalis sub qua, namely, revealability as such, or lumen divinae revelation is (abstrahendo ab evidentia et inevidentia).
And now what is the FORMAL DETERMINANT OF THE OBJECT AS A THING, or the ratio formalis quae of moral philosophy, that is, of moral philosophy adequately considered or in its completed state, in gradu verae scientiae practicae? -- It is the conformity of human liberty to its rule or its ordination toward the proper ends of human life.
What is its FORMAL OBJECT (or formal subject)? -- Human acts insofar as they can be directed toward these ends, subjectum philosophiae moralis est actio humana ordinata ad finem.{12}
This formal object and this formal reason or viewpoint are common to moral philosophy adequately understood and to the moral branch of theology, because the only true last end to which man is ordained factually or existentially, and which a veritable and complete science of human behavior must envisage, is the supernatural last end. Yet just as the beatific vision and theology have the same ratio formalis quae but a different specifying ultimate formal perspective (ratio formalis sub qua), likewise moral philosophy adequately considered and moral theology differ specifically in virtue of the ratio formalis sub qua.
What then is this FORMAL DETERMINANT OF THE OBJECT AS OBJECT, this ratio formalis sub qua of moral philosophy adequately considered? Certainly it is not the divinely revealable! Rather it is that (in human acts) which can be ordered and regulated by human reason (suitably completed).{13} This is the ultimate formal determinant to which the proper light of a specific habitus corresponds, namely, the habitus of practical philosophy elevated and completed, gratia materiae, by its subalternation to theology.
{9} "Nota duplicem esse rationem objecti in scientia, altera objecti ut res, altera objecti ut objectum: vel alterat ut quae, altera ut sub qua.
"Ratio formalis objecti ut res, seu quae, est ratio rei objectae, quae primo terminat actum illius habitus, et ex qua fiuunt passiones illius subjecti, et quae est medium in prima demonstratione, ut entitas in metaphysica, quantitas in mathematica, et mobilitas in naturali.
"Ratio autem formalis objecti ut objectum, vel sub qua, est immaterialitas talis, seu talis modus abstrahendi et definiendi: puta sine omni materia in metaphysica, cum materia intelligibili tantum in mathematica, et cum materia sensibili, non tamen hac, in naturali (CAJETAN, in I, i, 3).
{10} The word 'light' (lumen) should be understood here as related to the object and not to the way of knowing or the habitus. Cf. John of St. Thomas, Curs. Theol., I. P., q. 1, disp. 2, a. 7, Solesmes, I, p. b.
{11} ". . . in scibile per lumen metaphysicale, idest medium illustratum per abstractionem ab omni materia; et per lumen mathematicum, idest medium illustratum immaterialitate sensibili, obumbratum tamen materia intelligibili; et per lumen physicum, idest, medium obumbratum materia sensibili, illustratum autem ex separatione individualium conditionum; et per lumen divinum, idest medium divino lumine fulgens: quod scibile theologicum constituit.
Unitas et diversitas specifica scientiarum attenduntur penes unitatem et diversitatem rationum formalium objectorum ut objecta sunt, vel, quod idem est, rationum formalium sub quibus res sciuntur. Ratio quare theologia sit una scientia assignatur ex unitate rationis formalis sub qua, seu objecti ut objectum est, idest, luminis divinae revelationis. Omnia enim dicuntur considerari in theologia, inquantum sunt divinitus revelabilia.
Deitati respondet una tantum ratio formalis adaequata objecti, ut objectum est, et haec est lumen divinum. Sed illa ratio formalis non est una in specie, sed in genere: et dividitur in lumen divinum evidens, et lumen divinum revelans, abstrahendo ab evidentia et inevidentia, et lumen divinum inevidens: et primum est ratio sub qua theologiae beatorum, secundum nostrae, tertium fidei. Et propterea, cum unitate rationis formalis objecti, ut res, stat diversitas specifica rationum formalium illius, ut objectum; et consequenter diversitas specifica habituum." (CAJETAN, ibid.)
{12} Otherwise stated, actiones humanae secundum quod sunt ordinatae ad invicem et ad finem, seu homo prout est voluntarie agens propter finem (human acts insofar as they are ordered among themselves and toward their end, or man to the extent that he voluntarily acts for an end). Alamannus, Ethic, q. 1, a. 1.
For his part, Goudin writes: "Objectum materiale Moralis sunt affectus, seu actus humani; formale vero est moralitas, cujus tales actus seu affectus aunt capaces; ratio vero sub qua, sunt prima principia practica." (The material object of Moral Science is human dispositions or human acts; but the formal object is the morality of which these dispositions or acts are capable; and the formal reason 'under which' is the first practical principles.) Ethic., q. praeamb., a. 1.
{13} This is doubtless the meaning underlying Lesson I of St. Thomas' Commentary on Book I of the Ethics: "Sapientis est ordinare Secundum autem diversus ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae. . . . Ordo autem actionum voluntarium pertinet ad considerationem moralis philosophiae." (It is the office of the wise man to direct. . . . Furthermore, the different sciences correspond to the different orders considered by reason. . . . The order of voluntary action, moreover, belongs to the considerations of moral philosophy.) It does not suffice to say with Goudin (Cf. foregoing note) that the ratio sub qua of moral philosophy sunt prima principia practica. Strictly speaking, it is ordinabilitas (actionum voluntarium) a ratione practica.