8. It is manifest that there is an essential and absolutely decisive difference between this ratio formalis sub qua and that of theology, which is the divinely revealable. In one case we are dealing with a human and finite science that has been uplifted and completed, in the other with a certain created participation in the infinite science itself: "Science is first divided into infinite and finite; whereupon finite science divides into speculative and practical."{14} (CAJETAN, ibid., a. 4)
In other words, in theology judgments are resolved, thanks to faith, in the light of divine revelation and finally in the increate light.{15} It is for this reason that theology enjoys an absolutely superior unity (which corresponds to the unity of divine science itself) and is at once, in a formal and eminent way, a speculative and practical science: "The light of divine revelation (stands in relation to theology) as a perspective or a mode of knowing the object, under which (sub quo seu qua) the revealed matter is reached by the knower; in this way it bestows a scientific unity. . . . Sacred doctrine looks for a single common viewpoint in both speculative and practical matters, that is, insofar as they are divinely revealed . . . because, this science resembles God's knowledge, Who in the same act of knowing knows Himself and His works."{16}
In moral philosophy adequately considered, on the contrary, it is in the natural light of practical reason and experience, completed by principles necessarily received -- gratia materiae -- from theology,{17} that judgments are resolved. That is why it is wholly contained in one of the parts -- the practical part -- of the primary division of finite knowledge. Since therefore the ratio formalis sub qua is here commensurate to the subject matter itself, that is to say, to the agibile, the specific unity of this moral philosophy in its fullest sense is marked out and limited by this subject matter. The ratio formalis sub qua of theology, in contrast, transcends this same subject matter, which thereupon loses its specifying role entirely and is drawn up into the science which has God Himself as its subject: "The scope of a science is determined by the faculty which is the source of its light."{18}
Were we to refuse thus to differentiate moral philosophy adequately considered from moral theology, we should, I believe, either be failing to form a sufficiently elevated idea of theology, or else subjecting philosophy to a certain violation of its inherent rights. Moral theology, in point of fact, is not just a superelevated moral philosophy; indeed it is much more than that. And yet there ought to be a superelevated moral philosophy. In the first place, it is an essential requirement of human reason that a moral philosophy be set up which will stand as a counterpart of speculative philosophy in the primary division of finite knowledge. Then again, this moral philosophy would not be adequate to its object unless it were elevated, and the necessary and sufficient condition of this is subalternation to theology. Hence the practical philosophy adequately considered, the ratio formalis sub qua of which we have pointed out above.
Just as grace does not suppress nature, so theology suppresses nothing that duly belongs to philosophy. In fact, it is not because its object actually happens to be bound up with an order of mysteries over and above reason that the practical branch of knowledge -- one of the two members of the primary division of finite knowledge -- ought to renounce any attempt to set itself up in gradu verae scientiae practicae or as a practical science adequately considered,{19} and to truly regulate human action: it is simply asked to subalternate itself to the science of these mysteries for its own completion. By its own nature philosophical reason encompasses the agibile and scrutinizes the universe of human matters and the moral life, not only so as to discover, in the manner of natural ethics (Cf. supra, §§2-4), certain principles and notions which, however basically important, are insufficient in themselves for the regulation of conduct, but to order and regulate conduct really adequately -- albeit from a distance.{20} And this becomes possible and legitimate the moment it conforms to the actual conditions of human conduct, and borrows from theology the principles requisite to this end. The theologian's arrival on the scene does not put the philosopher to flight; far from vanishing or seeking oblivion at the theologian's approach the philosopher of morals turns to him for enlightenment. Just as theology continues to exist in heaven{21} below the beatific vision, to which it is subalternated without being suppressed, similarly on earth below in its practical and moral function there ought to exist an adequately conceived moral philosophy subalternated to theology though not suppressed by it -- an enlarged or uplifted philosophy of human acts.
And theology, to be sure, is not an enlarged or uplifted philosophy! Nor is moral theology in any sense an enlarged or uplifted moral philosophy! This would be a corruption of the concept of theology against which the whole Thomistic teaching on the sacred science protests. Theology is as it were a certain imprint [in us] of the divine science, which is one and simple, yet encompasses all";{22} and we have seen how Cajetan interprets this truth: the object of theological knowledge is constituted per lumen divinum, idest medium divino lumine fulgens. The ratio formalis sub qua here is "the light of divine revelation;" and everything is pondered by theology "simply insofar as divinely revealable."{23} Before finite science is in turn divided into the speculative and the practical, science itself divides into infinite and finite; and it is to the first member of this division, to the infinite or uncreated science, that theology attaches by the very fact that it is subalternated to the science of the blessed.{24} If speculative theology and practical theology were specifically distinct sciences and were to be regarded as nothing more than man-made philosophy, or our finite science in its two opposite genera of speculative and practical, which has been uplifted by faith{25} and assigned the revealed deposit for its subject matter, obviously practical philosophy adequately considered would be nothing else but moral theology itself. But once moral theology is related to the order of the infinite or uncreated science, and practical philosophy adequately considered is situated in the order of finite knowledge, it is necessary, on the contrary, to regard them as essentially distinct.
It is in so far as they are revealable that theology weighs all truths of its own, -- the laws of human action as well as the rest,{26} and without being specified by this practical object. It is specified solely by God as reached through the objective light of revelation. Moral philosophy (adequately considered), on the other hand, ponders human acts in so far as they are capable of being regulated by human reason (suitably completed), -- and is specified and limited by this practical object. And, in fact, it is only because the existential conditions of human action are actually tied up with realities about which revelation alone can teach us with certitude that moral philosophy adequately considered must of necessity take revelation into account -- and be subalternated to theology.
{14} "Scientia prius dividitur in scientiam infinitam et finitam: et deinde scientia finita dividitur in speculativam et practicam."
{15} ". . . Accipit haec scientia . . . immediate a Deo per revelationem." (This science receives its principles . . . immediately from God through revelation.) Sum. Theol., I, 1, 5, ad 2.
{16} "Lumen divinae revelationis (comparatur ad theologiam) ut ratio seu modus cognoscendi objecti, sub quo seu qua attingatur res revelata a cognoscente: et sic dat unitatem scientiae. . . . Sacra doctrina attendit unam rationem communem speculabilibus et operabilibus: scilicet in quantum sunt divinitus revelabilia . . . quia hujusmodi scientia est sicut scientia Dei, qui scientia eadem scit se et opera sua." (Cajetan, ibid., a. 4).
{18} "Juxta facultatem luminis est extensio scientiae." Cajetan, ibid., a. 7.
{19} "Adequately considered" here refers to this practical science in its own order and obviously not in the sense that this practical science is expected like moral theology to put together a treatise on the theological and moral infused virtues. As a science subalternate to theology it seeks enlightenment and receives conclusions from such a treatise; it does not institute one.
{20} It is prudence which regulates conduct from close at hand.
{21} Cf. John of St. Thomas, Curs. Theol., I. P., q. 1, a. 5, Solesmes, I, p. 365 if.
{22} ". . . velut quaedam impressio divinae scientiae, quae est una et simplex omnium." Sum. Theol. I, 1, 3 ad 2.
{25} The fact is that in such case it would not be uplifted by faith at all, but rather the contents of faith would be submitted to the light of philosophy; for faith would then merely supply the revealed data, while natural reason was allotted the task of seeking out their mutual relations and pondering their meaning. Theology would accordingly amount to no more than an application of philosophy to the revealed datum. The mere fact that dogmas should fall under the glance of the philosopher would be all that is necessary for the making of theology (Cf. my Dream of Descartes, ch. III). The reality of the matter is that theology is a habitus of wisdom which itself is rooted in faith and hence supernatural, at least in the radical and virtual sense; a habitus which uses philosophic knowledge instrumentally and evaluates it in its own light. A philosophical form of knowledge cannot be elevated by faith in the order of specification itself, unless it is subalternated to a theological science which is -- as in actual fact -- a created participation of the divine science.
{26} ". . . Theologia procedit ex principiis revelatis in Scriptura. Sed constat in Scriptura contineri multa pertinentia ad praecepta moralia et instructionem nostram; unde dicitur (II ad Tim., III, 16, 17): Omnis scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docendum, ad arguendum, ad corripiendum, ad erudiendum in justitia, ut perfectus sit homo Dei, ad omne opus bonum instructus. Ergo independenter a philosophia morali, ex suis principiis revelatis potest theologia discurrere circa res morales . . ." (Theology proceeds from principles revealed in Scripture. But it is obvious that Scripture contains many things pertaining to moral precepts and to our instruction; wherefore, it is written [II Tim. III, 16, 17]: All Scripture is inspired by God, and useful for teaching, for reproving, for correcting, for instructing in justice, that the man of God may be perfect, equipped for every good work. Therefore, independently of moral philosophy, theology in virtue of its own revealed principles can discuss moral matters.) JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, Curs. Theol., I.P., q. 1, disp. 2, a. 7, Solesmes, I, p. 377 a.