12. Bearing these thoughts in mind, ought we to say that moral philosophy adequately understood is a scientia media that is formally theological and materially philosophical? No, this is not possible. To be so, it would have to be subalternated to theology on account of its subject. But it is apparent that its subject does not add any accidental difference to that of moral theology. In both instances the subject matter is the same, namely, the agibile: in one, it is considered from the point of view of the divine or infinite science, or as virtually revealed; in the other, from the point of view of human or finite science, or as capable of being regulated by human reason (fittingly completed).
Moral philosophy adequately considered is subalternated to theology by reason of principles only. It is not a materially philosophic and formally theological science, but a formally philosophic science subalternated to theology.
It has an essential need of subalternation to theology, because it is from theology that it obtains its idea of man's true last end, and because in the practical order ends play the role of principles. We may say, therefore, that moral philosophy adequately considered is subalternated simpliciter to theology. On the other hand, it is because of the existential conditions in which the human subject happens to be, it is gratia materiae, that philosophy must thus be subalternated to theology when it enters the practical realm. Hence we may say that philosophy is subalternated to theology secundum quid; I mean, of course, when it enters the practical order and is adequate to its object therein.
It is, as we have seen earlier,{40} the characteristic of a subalternate science not to resolve its conclusions in naturally known principles save through the intermediary of the subalternant science; so that the habitus of the proximate principles of the subalternate science is by its very nature the subalternant scientific habitus. Does this mean, then, that moral philosophy adequately considered resolves its conclusions in naturally evident first principles by the intermediary of theology, whose proper principles are supra-rational and known by faith? Or does it mean that by the medium of theology it resolves its conclusions in the supernaturally evident principles of the science of the blessed? These two sweeping assertions are equally inadmissible.
From theology, itself subalternate to the science of the blessed, moral philosophy adequately considered receives principles that are resolvable in this self same science of the blessed, and ultimately in the increate light. Yet, this is not in order to resolve its conclusions in the light of divine revelation, in which case it would be identified with theology. When it makes use of principles resolvable in the light of divine revelation and finally in the increate light, its own distinctive movement does not thereby strive, with the help of theology and revelation, to attach itself to the evidence which, unattainable here below, belongs to the science of the blessed. In this regard, theological truths are simply data offered to it in the same manner as the mathematical or empiriological truths it has occasion to use. It relinquishes to theology not only the care of demonstrating these truths but also the scientific need (inefficacious here below) of finally effecting a union with the light of the intuitively perceived uncreated principles upon which these truths depend. Faith and theology are essentially and specifically orientated toward the beatific vision; by their very nature they seek -- that which the obstacles of this life preclude -- either to be eclipsed by this vision, as in the case of faith, or to keep in continuity with it, as in that of theology. Theology, in fact, strives for this continuity for the perfection of its state as a science.{41} Moral philosophy adequately considered, on the contrary, is orientated toward natural and terrestrial evidence; and it is in this evidence, fittingly completed, that it asks to resolve and actually does resolve, its principles.
On the other hand, it has no need of the offices of theology, as is all too clear, to attain naturally evident first principles; it does not need theology, for example, to gain possession of these principles in the manner that optics needs geometry to enter into possession of its own principles and resolve them (not by itself but by the intermediary of geometry) in immediately known principles. Philosophy resolves its conclusions in naturally evident first principles by its own powers.
But here we are confronted by the altogether special case of a radically natural or rational science subalternated to a formally natural but radically and virtually supernatural one.{42} It is not to enter into possession of its principles and its proper light, but to perfect these principles and this light, it is on a perfective or completive basis that it has need of theology -- and necessarily so given the existential conditions of its object -- for resolving its conclusions in the principles -- thus completed and elevated -- of practical reason. The subalternant scientific habitus in this case is not the habitus itself of the proximate principles of the subalternate science, but its necessary complement.
We do not say, then, that moral philosophy adequately considered resolves its conclusions in the light of revealed principles through the intermediary of theology, nor that it needs this intermediation of theology to resolve its conclusions in the principles of natural reason. We say that it is in need of theology and of principles which can themselves be resolved in revealed principles in order to resolve its own conclusions in the suitably completed and uplifted principles of natural reason. It is a science subalternated to theology by virtue of principles, in a pure and simple way which is not, however, radical or originative but completive and perfective.
A further distinction is needful here. In a strict manner of speaking at least, it should be said that moral philosophy adequately conceived is subalternated to theology and not to faith. In point of fact, a science is subalternate to another science, not to the principles thereof; its proper and proximate principles (or in the present instance, the principles necessarily required for perfecting and completing its proper principles) are the conclusions not the principles themselves of the subalternant science. If optics were to resolve its conclusions in the very principles of geometry and in the self-evident principles of the geometrical order, it would be continuous with geometry, existing as a part of geometry itself, and not as a science subalternated to geometry. Likewise, if moral philosophy adequately considered were to resolve its conclusions in the revealed datum, and in the very principles of theology, just as they are communicated to us by faith, it would merge with theology, of which it would become a part; it would not be a science subalternated to theology.
{40} See the quotation from Cajetan, p. 83 f.
{41} "Motivum ejus (sc. theologiae) non est pure naturale, sed originative et radicaliter supernaturale; et ideo continuabilis est cum lumine supernaturali claro, et in illud inclinat ex natura sua, secundum quod ex natura sua petit principia supernaturalia, sive fidei in via, sive luminis gloriae in patria." JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, Curs. Theol., I.P., q. 1, disp. 2, a. 5. Solesmes, I, p. 368 a.
"... Illa scientia (sc. subalternata) ex natura sua postulat continuari cum scientia subalternante." Ibid., a. 3. (I, p. 345).
"Fides importat motum quemdam intellectus ad visionem in qua quietatur, fides requirit visionem gloriae, tanquam terminus status viae." Ibid., II-II, q. 1, disp. 2, a. 1 (Vives, VII, p. 28-29).
(The motivating force of theology is not purely natural, but supernatural in its origin and roots. Hence it is continuous with the clear supernatural light, and by its very nature tends toward it, to the extent that by its nature it seeks supernatural principles, whether of faith in this life, or of the light of glory in the next.)
( . . . The subalternate science by its very nature requires to be continuous with the subalternant science.)
(Faith introduces a certain movement of the intellect toward that vision in which it finds rest; faith requires the vision of glory as the term of its earthly state.)
{42} Concerning this feature of theology, cf. JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS, Curs. Theol, loc. cit., a. 8 and 9.