13. The upshot of the preceding considerations is that although the theological habitus is, as recalled above, natural in itself -- inasmuch as it is acquired by human diligence "acquiritur studio humano," -- but supernatural virtually and in its roots (radicaliter seu originative), moral philosophy adequately taken is, on the contrary, natural in itself and in its roots. However, by the very fact that it is subalternated to theology it is the beneficiary of a complement or fulfilment, a superelevation that is supernatural in origin. We may say that moral philosophy adequately taken is formally and radically natural, but mediately or indirectly attached to a supernatural root.
In theology, which is rooted in faith but which takes shape in our minds through the labors, through the diligence and special industry of reason, the role of principal cause is played by the light of faith, which uses the light of reason to investigate for ends all its own whatever is virtually contained in the deposit of revelation (and in particular human action viewed under this aspect). In moral philosophy adequately considered it is the light of reason which, fittingly perfected and completed, and in the role of principal cause, scrutinizes for its own ends human action considered secundum se and on the level of experience and history.
From which we conclude that in theological reasoning the premises of reason (and this applies likewise to the first principles of reason themselves){43} are elevated and judged or approved by the supernatural principles of faith, and hence participate in the same formal reason as theology (which sees its object as divinely revealable); in a word, they are employed in a ministerial way by the superior light of faith.{44} In this way, the minor of reason taken under the major of faith and participating{45} in its certitude forms with it a unique medium or lumen of demonstration{46} whereby the conclusion is rationally established in virtue of the light of revelation.
But in the reasoning of moral philosophy adequately considered the union of truths of reason with those received from theology is not brought about in virtue of the light of (virtual) revelation; in which case it would give rise to a fresh theological conclusion. The moral philosopher leaves to the theologian all consideration and concern touching the possibility of resolving in the principles of faith the conclusion reached by his reasoning. For his part, he attends only to the possibility of resolving this conclusion in the fittingly completed principles of reason; and it is by virtue of the light of reason itself -- completed and illumined by faith{47} but for its own benefit or as principal cause -- that he resolves his conclusions in their principles. It is in this light which is superior to the light of pure philosophy and inferior to that of theology that he draws and employs the truths received from theology.
There are, thus, two ways of linking a new conclusion to an already acquired theological conclusion, since there are two ways of making use of a principle of inference. When a major premise is used insofar as known, it is the light of the science in virtue of which it was known that permits us to posit the conclusion. But when this major is used only insofar as believed, this can no longer hold true. Then it stands rather as a fact that is imposed on us than as a means of conveying evidence; and it is the proper light of the inferior science which takes the initiative toward the conclusion. Thus the truths seen by the blessed in the beatific vision are for the theologian principles believed not seen; and here we have the reason why the conclusions which theology draws therefrom are borne in virtue of the theological light, and not in virtue of the evidence proper to the science of the blessed.{48}
Now every subalternate science considered as such accepts on faith and does not see the principles which it receives from the subalternating science.{49}
The purely natural premises and the premises received from theology, therefore, certainly form for moral philosophy a unique medium of demonstration. Not that the former (the purely natural premises) are used therein as lifted up and approved by the supernatural principles of faith and as clothed by way participation with the formal viewpoint of revelation; on the contrary, it is the latter (the premises received from theology) which, drawn into a light inferior to their own (albeit superior to that of pure philosophy), are used as completing the principles of natural reason, and put on the specifying formal reason of moral philosophy (of how conduct can be regulated by reason). The conclusions of moral philosophy adequately considered are thus sustained in virtue of a light other than the theological; and even if materially they coincide with those of moral theology, formally and in their logical make-up they are different conclusions.
And, in fact, the moral philosopher will accordingly find his way to a host of conclusions, whose theological equivalent the theologian on his higher plane will not as much as have dreamt of discovering. (Only upon their discovery by the philosopher will he evaluate these conclusions in his own light, qua theologian, and set forth their formally theological equivalents.) This is so because the questions which experience puts to the moral theologian are never raised save in relation to a transcendent order, and "inasmuch as by his acts man is ordained to the vision of God, in which his beatitude consists."{50} The questions which engage the moral philosopher, on the other hand, although inevitably tied up in one way or another with the question of our ordination to the last end, are nonetheless not raised from the formal viewpoint of man's sharing in the intimacy of God's life. They are raised from the point of view of experience itself and under the formal aspect of the sundry modalities and conditions of human action which is to be brought under the rule of reason. The moral philosopher will seek to determine, for example, with Le Play, what are the conditions that an anthropological and historical study of the most exhaustive kind will permit us to correlate with the prosperity of human societies. With the "social anthropologists," he will look for a way to detect the strata of civilization, the centers and the atmosphere of expansion from which any particular cultural fact springs. Or again, to come to those very problems of the highest level which best exemplify subalternation to theology, he will try to discover what hypotheses the study of major currents of civilization like those of India and China suggests on the question of the part played in the divinely guided destinies of mankind by those communities which have remained alien to the Judaeo-Christian revelation. If the theologian in his turn finds his way clear to take a stand on these questions from his own particular viewpoint, it will be, it is easy to see, only after the moral philosopher has raised and worked on them for his own ends, and presented them to him for consideration.
{43} Cf. JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS, Curs. Theol. I.P., q. 1, disp. 2, a. 6 and 9, Solesmes, t. I, pp. 372b and 392b.
{44} Ibid., disp. 2, a. 6, Solesmes, I, p. 371a.
{45} In an extrinsic way; cf. JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS, ibid. disp. 2, a. 7, n. 22, Solesmes, I, p. 382a.
{46} Ibid., a. 6, p. 372a; a. 7, pp. 377 and 381b: "Non potest praemissa naturalis componere unum medium cum praemissa de fide, nisi per hoc quod illi subordinatur et ab ea corrigitur et judicatur, utpote a superiori a qua praemissa naturalis certitudinem suam regulat: et praemissa sic conjuncta praemissae superiori de fide, influit simul cum ipsa: non diversa ratione nec diverso lumine, sed inquantum de ejus lumine et certitudine participat; et sic constituitur una ratio formalis quae dicit virtualem revelationem et mediatam, sub qua eodem modo influit praemissa de fide, et naturalis ut elevata ab illa." (A natural premise cannot form a unified medium with the premise of faith except on condition that it be subordinated to the latter and approved and judged by it, as by a superior premise upon which the lower (natural) premise bases its certitude. Further, the natural premise thus linked to the superior premise of faith then proceeds in unity with this latter: not according to a different perspective or a different light, but inasmuch as it participates in the light and certitude of the premise of faith. And thus is established a single formal reason, which is that of virtual and mediate revelation, in virtue of which the premise of faith and the elevated natural premise proceed in the same way.)
{47} Here again the first principles of reason are superelevated -- not of course in such wise as to assume by way of participation the formal reason of the revealable (as occurs in theology due to their connection with the principles of faith), but as used, approved, and confirmed by a science which is itself subalternate to the science of the blessed.
{48} Cf. JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS, loc. cit., a. 5.
{49} St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum. Theol., I, 1, 2: "Sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab Arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo." (Just as music accepts on faith the principles taught by the arithmetician, so the sacred Science accepts the principles revealed by God.) Such is also the case even when the subalternate and subalternant sciences are continuous in the same human subject. Then the intelligence sees the conclusions of the subalternant science, but with the very habitus of this science. The subalternant science sees these conclusions, which are the principles of the subalternate science, while this latter, considered as such, believes them (if it saw them it would become confounded with the subalternant science).
{50} Sum. Theol. I, 1, 4.