9. "In sacred doctrine all things are treated under the aspect of God. . . . . . . All else that is reached in this sacred science are comprehended under God; not as parts, or species, or accidents, but as ordained in some way to Him."{27} "Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the unity of this science. is not impaired."{28} And St. Thomas writes in the Summa Contra Gentiles:{29} "Theology is interested in creatures inasmuch as they reflect a certain likeness of God, and forasmuch as error concerning them leads to error in divine things. And so they are looked upon in a different light by the philosopher and by the theologian.
"Human philosophy reflects on them according to what they are in themselves (secundum quod sunt hujusmodi); hence it divides into different parts in accordance with the different genera of things. On the other hand, the Christian faith does not look at them in this way, but to the extent that they represent the sublimity of God, and are in one way or another directed to God Himself. . . . The philosopher considers in creatures those things which pertain to them by reason of their proper nature; the believer considers in creatures those things only which pertain to them insofar as they refer to God, secundum quod sunt ad Deum relata: for example, as created by Him, subject to Him, and so forth.
"Accordingly, whenever matters relating to creatures are considered in common by the philosopher and the believer they are elucidated by different principles. For the philosopher takes his arguments from the proper causes of things; whereas the believer argues from the First Cause, ex prima causa (for example, that such a matter was divinely revealed, that it concerns the glory of God, or that God's power is infinite).
"Hence these two disciplines do not proceed in the same way. For in the scientific discipline originating in philosophic reason, which considers creatures in themselves (secundum se), and leads thence to the knowledge of God, the first consideration is of creatures, and the last of God. But in the scientific discipline originating in faith, which considers creatures only with respect to God (quae creaturas nonnisi in ordinem ad Deum considerat), the consideration must first be of God and thereafter of creatures. And so this form of knowledge is more perfect, since it resembles more closely the knowledge of God, Who in knowing Himself beholds all else."
These texts show quite clearly that on the practical level as well there ought to be two specifically distinct kinds of scientific discipline (doctrina): one considering human action secundum se, and commensurate with it, the other viewing it only in reference to God revealing Himself, and fitted to this divine object alone.
It is important at this stage to be on our guard against a possible ambiguity. Clearly, human action considered secundum se is directed toward God as the Final End. Nevertheless, let it be well understood, the fact of moral philosophy acknowledging the ordering of human acts to God no more suffices for it to consider them sub ratione Dei and thereby be transformed into theology, than the fact of theodicy recognizing the creation of things by God suffices for it to consider them sub ratione Dei and thus be changed into theology. A purely natural ethic which directed human acts to God as natural ultimate end would not for that reason be considering human acts sub ratione Dei. Nor, by the same token, does moral philosophy adequately considered, which in virtue of its subalternation to theology directs human acts to man's true -- and supernatural -- ultimate end, consider them on that account sub ratione Dei. It is only when the ratio formalis sub qua itself is of the divine order, it is only to the extent that they are referred to God in the formal viewpoint of revelation, or in function of a communication made to our minds of the knowledge God has of Himself, that human acts are considered strictly sub ratione Dei. And it is on this ground that they are the object of moral theology.
It is on this ground also that theology is "more speculative than practical." For not only is theology "chiefly concerned with divine things rather than with human acts,"{30} but even when treating of these latter, that is to say in its practical part, it does so on account of the perfect contemplation of God, "propter Dei speculationem,"{31} and "forasmuch as by them man is ordained to this perfect knowledge, in which eternal beatitude consists."{32} Otherwise stated, it treats of them from the formal point of view of the beatific vision, taken as their goal, and in being immersed in the light of revelation, which man has been given to guide him toward this goal, and which is in itself a certain lessened communication of this sovereign knowledge. In contrast to this, moral philosophy, even though it too refers human acts to felicity (to supernatural beatitude in the case of moral philosophy adequately considered), evidently cannot be called "more speculative than practical," because it constitutes exactly that practical part of finite knowledge which stands in contradistinction to its speculative part. The fact in point here is that although it actually refers human acts to God it nevertheless does not derive its proper light from a divine ratio sub qua. In order to be able to view the ordination of action to the last end in a human (but elevated) light or ratio sub qua, and still remain adequate to its object, it suffices that it be subalternated to theology. Instead of considering human acts themselves under the intelligible light (ratio formalis) of God's intimate life as revealed and communicated, moral philosophy adequately considered envisages even the supernatural end itself under the practical and human light of human acts being capable of regulation by reason (appropriately completed).
In other words, human conduct is considered therein not inasmuch as it is a supernatural mystery or inasmuch as connected, even in its most natural character and moments, with mysteries of the uncreated life, but rather inasmuch as even in its most supernatural character and moments it is human and created action.
Mutatis mutandis, we may apply to moral philosophy adequately taken and to moral theology what St. Thomas wrote about the gift of knowledge (scientia) and the gift of wisdom: "Since man knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to knowledge, to which it belongs formally, rather than to wisdom, to which it belongs materially. And when, on the contrary, we judge of creatures according to things divine, this pertains to wisdom rather than to knowledge."{33} When we treat of eternal life, viewing it from below, or in the light of reasons taken from our earthly life, we are in the realm of moral philosophy rather than in that of theology -- and inversely, when we form a judgment about our earthly life, regarding it from above or according to reasons drawn from eternal life, we have rather to do with theology. We might also add that theology looks on the supernatural ultimate end first and foremost as a sharing of the intimate life of God, and that moral philosophy adequately considered looks on this same ultimate end above all insofar as it brings completion to human nature.
{27} "Omnia pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei. Omnia alia quae determinantur in sacra doctrina, comprehenduntur sub Deo: non ut partes, vel species, vel accidentia, sed ut ordinata aliqualitur ad ipsum." Sum. Theol., I, 1, 7, c. and ad 2.
{28} "Sacra doctrina non determinat de Deo et de creaturis ex aequo, sed de Deo principaliter, et de creaturis secundum quod referuntur ad Deum, ut ad principium vel ad finem. Unde unitas scientiae non impeditur." Ibid., I, 1, 3, ad 1.
{29} Sum Contra Gent., II, 4.
{30} Sum. Theol. I, i, 4.
{31} Cajetan, ibid.
{32} Sum. Theol., ibid.
{33} "Cum homo per res creatas Deum cognoscit, magis videtur hoc pertinere ad scientiam, ad quam pertinet formaliter, quam ad sapientiam, ad quam pertinet materialiter. Et e converso, cum secundum res divinas judicamus de rebus creatis, magis hoc ad sapientiam quam ad scientiam pertinet." Sum Theol. II-II, g, 2, ad 3.