PROTESTANT writers on science and religious controversy show great unanimity in regarding the position and power which the Church holds in the Catholic view of life as a danger to the State, and as an obstacle to the Catholic in assisting in the work of modern life. According to many critics, a spirit of hostility prevailed even in early ages of Christianity against the State as the "kingdom of Satan." It is said that even to some of the early Fathers the State appeared to be not of divine origin, like the Church, but as "a work of the evil one."{1} In the opinion of the Church, the State was at best "an earthly, morally indifferent organization," having moral justification only "if it willingly submitted to the guidance of the Church."{2}
The dominant position of the Church in the Middle Ages was, we are told, the only position consistent with Catholic dogma and Canon Law; and it is said that this idea has been in our own day revived without modification in the Syllabus of Pius IX, in which "the fundamental opposition of the Church to the political supremacy of the State was clearly expressed."{3} The Church is said to be still, essentially, a power ever ready to attack the modern State, a foreigu element in the body of the State, always threatening to develop into a most dangerous parasite.{4} The weakening of the State is declared to be the actual raison d'être of the Roman Church.{5}
At the Congress of German Catholics in Strassburg in 1905 I delivered a lecture which serves as the basis for the following discussion. I took as my motto the words used by Leo XIII in his Encyclical of January 10, 1890, on the duties of citizens: "Supernatural love for the Church and the natural love of one's own country are sisters, springing from the same eternal principle, since God Himself is their author and originating cause. Our duties (to civil and ecclesiastical authority) are not antagonistic, but they must not be confused with one another. The former tend to the prosperity of the State, the latter to the general welfare of the Church, and both to the perfection of mankind. From this distinction of rights and duties it is evident that the rulers of States are independent in the management of their own affairs, and they are so not merely with the assent of the Church but with her constant support; for although she requires first of all the practice of piety, i.e., justice towards God, she promotes at the same time justice towards civil rulers."
The Encyclical to which I referred begins with the words Sapientiae christianae praecepta, and in it the Pope endeavoured to recall to the minds of men the precepts of Christian wisdom. These precepts are essentially unchanging; yet they are not unchanging in the way that a rock does not change, but rather they resemble a living tree, which is always growing and developing, although it remains the same tree. The moral ideas of Christianity are spiritually living forces, revealing their full value in their effect upon the mind of man and upon the history of mankind. While they remain ever the same, they may be clothed in various forms, according to the needs and capabilities of men in different ages. In his brief to the bishops of Italy, issued at Pentecost, 1905, our late Holy Father, Pius X, said: "The Church has at all times clearly shown that she possesses the admirable power of adapting herself to the changing conditions of society; so that, whilst preserving faith and morals in their integrity, she easily assimilates herself to all the unessential and accidental circum stances belonging to various stages of civilization and to the new requirements of human society."
Such moral law, a "word of everlasting life," is contained in our Lord's plain and dignified command to "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." Of the Jews was required obedience to the Emperor, a foreign pagan sovereign whose rule was most distasteful to their national pride. They were ordered to obey Tiberius, a wicked, cruel tyrant, for whom not even the Romans could feel any respect, and they were to obey him not simply under compulsion, but "for conscience sake."{6} This obedience was not, however, to involve the sacrifice of conscience itself: "Render to God the things that are God's." A limit is assigned to the secular power, and thenceforth the State ceased to be an embodiment of the deity. There is a sphere of human action over which decrees of the Senate and imperial orders have no control. A subject is no longer a slave; in what constitutes the true dignity of his personality he is free and responsible to God alone. Henceforth we belong to a kingdom "not of this world"; we are citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem, where the Eternal is king. And this kingdom, too, has its permanent and visible organization on earth, an organization embracing all the world: "Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them and teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you."
St. Peter, Christ's first vicar in this kingdom of the Church, followed in his Master's footsteps and taught respect for secular authority. At a time when signs of persecution were already visible, and the capital of the Empire could already be described as "Babylon," St. Peter nevertheless, in addressing the Christians, bade them "Be subject to every human creature for God's sake. Love the brotherhood, fear God, honour the king."{7}
The next occupant of the see of Peter who has left us a pastoral letter, St. Clement, gave evidence of his patriotism and loyalty in times of great trouble. During the persecution under Domitian he addresses a distant community in words that conclude with a touching prayer for the Church as well as for secular rulers: "Grant unto them health, peace, concord, and firmness, that they may carry on without offence the government that Thou hast intrusted to them. . . . Turn their counsels towards that which is good and pleasing in Thy sight, that in peace and mercy they may use the power that Thou hast conferred upon them and rejoice in Thy protection."{8}
How faithfully these directions were obeyed is shown in a document belonging to early Christian literature rediscovered not long ago -- the speech of Apollonius, a distinguished Roman, made in his own defence before the Senate during the time of Commodus. He refused to swear by the Emperor's Fortuna, and added: "According to God's commandment we pray to the one great God, who dwelleth in heaven, and implore him that princes may rule the world with justice, for we are convinced that the Emperor, too, has been appointed by God, the King who holds all things in His hand."{9}
A great deal more evidence might be adduced to prove that the early Christians by no means regarded the State as a "kingdom of Satan." Of course the officially recognized worship of false gods, the immorality displayed at the public games, and the cruelty and violence of the Caesars, all aroused the most determined opposition on the part of the Christians; these were the sins of ancient Babylon, and through them the State incurred the guilt of idolatry, adultery, and murder, three sins regarded as mortal in the discipline of penance. This opposition released the conscience of men from the supreme control of the pagan government and facilitated the rise of a new Christian civilization and social order. As Gierke writes: "The human being was thenceforth no longer lost in the citizen, and society was no longer merged in the State. The great rule, that we ought to obey God rather than man, began to prevail, and before it the omnipotence of the pagan State disappeared. . . . The right, and even the duty, of disobedience when the State attempted by force to control conscience was proclaimed and confirmed by the blood of the martyrs."{10}
In later times St. Augustine's opinions greatly influenced men's views on politics and the Church. To him is ascribed the theory that the State is an organization opposed to God, that it is an organism of sin, or at best an institution promoting physical power and prosperity, which can be morally sanctioned only on account of the service that it renders to God's kingdom, the Church. St. Augustine is far from setting the contrast between Church and State on a level with the imposing contrast between the kingdoms of God and of the world, which he represents as no less than that between light and darkness. If occasionally he speaks of egoism and the violent desire for conquest as the historical motives for the foundation of States, he expresses an opinion that some learned men at the present day share with him (Treitschke, Ihering). But he regards human nature and the will of God as the real title and justification of civil government: "God gave human justice through emperors and kings."{11}
Although elsewhere he traces back the rise of the civil power in its present form to the fall of man, this is not anything disgraceful in itself, for the same cause necessitated tlie foundation of the Church as a means of securing redemption. What St. Augustine really derives from the Fall is the harsh, tyrannical spirit displayed by the civil power, and the slavery and bondage that it imposes upon its subjects. In his opinion the State as such is a natural development of the family, a social unit superior to the community of the household.{12}
When St. Augustine extols the marvels of creation, he delights in looking beyond nature into the realm of the spirit, and almost always he alludes not only to the mind of man and his intelligence, but also to the organization of the State. "Consider," he says, "how the whole world is arranged in States governed by men! How many are the means of administration! how elaborate the gradation of power, the constitutions of cities and their laws, customs and arts!" {13} He describes eloquently all the natural and moral aims of the State, the maintenance of law and order, the preservation of peace, the development of civilization. There is no need of ecclesiastical sanction to keep off any demoniacal and sinful element from the State as such; nothing is sinful except the self-exaltation of the State, the symbol of which was the idolatrous worship offered it by pagans. The restriction of the State to worldly matters is allowed: "We must not blame the State for what it does for the reason that it does not do everything."{14} Hence the Church, too, rejoices in the prosperity and good order of the State: "She does not hesitate to obey the laws of the secular government, by which the affairs of this mortal life are regulated." The members of the Church are found in all nations, for she cares nothing for varieties of laws and customs, and "destroys none of the arrangements made for civil peace, but rather respects and complies with them."{15} Only in the service of God does she stand aloof from the State, but in this she confers the greatest benefit upon it, since she places the moral conditions of the State's prosperity upon the foundation of true religion.{16}
In the Middle Ages there prevailed a magnificent coöperation of Church and State for the welfare of mankind; and though not without glaring contrasts and deep shadows, the picture of this coöperation shows vigorous lines and great splendour. We are reproached for looking back regretfully at the departed glories of that period; we are told that as Catholics we could not do otherwise than to strive to restore, as far as possible, the mediaeval power of the Papacy. It is true that we cannot help admiring the position of the Church in the Middle Ages, but at the same time we do not hesitate to admit that, in the words of Pius X, her position may alter in accordance with new "stages of civilization and requirements of human society."{17} The mediaeval supremacy of the Church over all departments of social life was not the result of any love of power on part of the Popes, -- only fanatics nowadays maintain this to have been the case, -- but neither was it as a whole the outcome of a dogmatic principle of the "Catholic system," as many believe. In more than one respect this supremacy was the natural result of the historical development of national life and of spiritual nations, a result which, it is true, men endeavoured to defend and support by passages in the Bible and theological grounds. Even Treitschke says: "The intellectual superiority of the Church contributed to her position in the Middle Ages. We cannot say that at that time the State was the highest institution for educating the human race; the Church relieved the State of tasks which in the weakness of its youth it was incapable of performing. . . . Hence the theory of the superiority of Church over State came quite consistently into prominence, and was not unreasonable at that period."
The mediaeval States displayed "weakness of youth" in comparison with the Church; and, what is more significant, it was through the Church that they had come into existence as States; i.e., as well-regulated communities possessing authority and aiming at prosperous independence, after the migration of peoples had caused the ancient universal empire to break up. Pope Zacharias wrote to the Franks that the man possessing authority ought to rule in the State, and it was in this spirit that society in the Middle Ages felt it necessary for the Church to direct the nations of the West, because she had organized them, and alone possessed authority to guide them through the confusion and obscurity of the times, and to lead them onwards to greater aims. After the stubborn seclusion of the nations of antiquity, after the disrupture of the Germanic races, the Church introduced into the world the idea of unity amongst all civilized humanity and, to a great extent, carried this idea into realization. This was a task requiring infinite strength and patience, and we are still reaping the benefits of it, though unable to properly appreciate its difficulty. The Church of Rome had to give powerful support to her establishments in various nations to enable them to withstand the violence of rulers often disposed to acts of tyranny. In this way it is obvious that she could not help assuming a more and more prominent position in the eyes of the world. The Church promoted peace amongst the nations and often secured peace within States when their secular rulers could not maintain it. She exhorted the peoples of the West to forget their differences and to unite in protecting Christendom against the assault of Islam. It has been rightly said that at that time the sovereignty of the various States was overshadowed by the Roman empire. But this empire had to a great extent derived its prestige from the Papacy, and when this fact is borne in mind the well-known comparison of the spiritual authority with the sun and the secular with the moon (as used by Popes and theologians in the Middle Ages) becomes intelligible and justifiable.{18}
It is possible, nevertheless, to show from documents issued by the most powerful and self-assertive of the Popes, that, in spite of their claims upon temporal authority, -- claims sanctioned by the circumstances and the public opinion of the age, -- the independence of the secular power was recognized and not challenged. In his Apparatus decretalium, Innocent , says: "Things temporal and spiritual are distinct and have different judges. The one must not interfere with the rights of the other, although they should mutually support one another."{19}
Let us consider also a passage in St. Thomas Aquinas, which expresses a combination of two ideas, one of principle, and the other of contemporaneous history. "Both kinds of power, the spiritual and the temporal, are derived from God. Hence the secular authority is subordinate to the spiritual in as far as it is arranged so by God, namely, in matters affecting the salvation of souls, and for this reason we must in these respects obey the spiritual rather than the secular power. But in those matters which affect the prosperity of the State, we must obey the secular rather than the spiritual authority, since it is written in Matt. xxii: 'Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's,' unless, indeed, the secular and spiritual powers are united, as is the case with the Pope, who possesses both powers, namely the spiritual and the temporal, in their highest perfection, according to the ordinance (disponente) of Him who is Priest and King for all eternity."{20}
According to the unanimous opinion of scholastic writers the State is theoretically a thing required by the natural law and created by God. St. Thomas clearly distinguishes the higher character of public justice from the lower one of private justice, and says that the aim of the State is the "common welfare" of its members, or the "due order by which the citizens are constrained to respect the common benefits of justice and peace."
The obliteration of certain border lines between spiritual and temporal power in the Middle Ages was to some extent due to the unity of religious belief and the joint endeavour of the western nations in the cause of civilization, and not only the ecclesiastical but also the secular authority benefited by this. We see, for instance, that ever since the time of Charlemagne temporal rulers have enacted laws affecting the Church, have exerted their influence over assemblies convoked by her, and have apprehended and punished persons guilty of offences against religion. The stringent laws against heretics owe their origin to this connection. Apart from the revolutionary and disorderly tenets of some sects, even the revolt against the common faith of Christians was in the opinion of the age a revolt also against the State. H. Delbrück, in speaking of the intolerance of the Middle Ages, says that it was not merely a display of fanaticism but a political necessity. "It was characteristic of the whole period known as the Middle Ages that the State was too weak to stand alone, and consequently it sought support in the spiritual authority of the Church, and, in order to rule through her aid, the State assisted her in attaining supremacy, and used the secular power to put down deviations from the faith."{21}
The mediaeval principle that the ecclesiastical authority was not itself to inflict secular penalties, but to hand the guilty person over to the secular power, was not an empty formality. It expressed the far-reaching idea that the shedding of blood did not belong to the nature and spirit of the Church's office; and that in future times, when constitution and principles would forbid the State to punish heresy, all infliction of penalties for offences against faith would inevitably fall into disuse. Those who reproach the Middle Ages on this point ought to consider Paulsen's, remark on this subject. He says: "The discipline imposed on men by the Church may have been necessary for the transition to higher civilization, to such an extent that historically the Middle Ages were justified in using most energetic means to repress any attempt to withdraw from this discipline, and this as a rule was the aim of heretics." Our own modern humanity was rendered possible, in Paulsen's, opinion, by the harsh training of the Middle Ages.{22}
Mediaeval civilization was so completely steeped in the spirit of the Church as to save the nations of the West from the absolute authority exercised by the ancient State, and from the disastrous effects which such absolutism has upon moral and political liberty.
The superiority of the spiritual office, and the friction between Popes and Emperors, caused the limits of political authority to be clearly defined, and thus the western nations escaped the yoke of Caesaropapism, that rested so heavily upon Byzantium and Russia. Although the State now regards itself as no less absolute than it did of old, it recognizes the individual as possessing moral and judicial independence. Jellinek ascribes this advance very largely to the Middle Ages, first to the opposition between the people and their rulers, and, secondly, to that between Church and State, which by a long series of struggles set up an insurmountable barrier against any tendency to absolutism on the part of the State.{23}
The ancient world subordinated religion and the priesthood to the State; there were tendencies in the Middle Ages to place the temporal power in the hands of the Pope, and there were many who advocated the assumption of such a power; in modern times men have adopted the idea that Church and State are absolutely independent, as each has its own peculiar sphere, differing from that of the other in its purposes, extent, and dignity. The ancient Church simply accepted this idea; the mediaeval Church never questioned it in theory, but now it has been brought to full development. This has, however, been effected very gradually, and we may say that, apart from the guidance of Providence, the most various forces, intellectual and historical, and, in fact, the whole course of events since the close of the Middle Ages, have contributed to its growth.
An altered relation between Church and State was brought about by the Reformation, and, from the Christian and moral point of view, we cannot but regard it as a retrograde rather than a progressive change; indeed it is to some extent a lapse into the pagan idea of a State Church. The good things of the spirit and of the future life are far above all earthly interests, and the salvation of the soul is above all temporal prosperity and security, -- this is the fundamental thought of Christianity, -- and as a consequence the subordination of religion to political authority must be much more offensive to a Christian than the mediaeval dependence of the State upon the Church. From this point of view, A. Comte described the absorption of the rights of the Church by the State, due to the Reformation, as a "relapse into barbarism." A Protestant jurist refers, by way of excuse, to the revival of the ancient conception of the State in Catholic countries at the time of the Renaissance, but he goes on to acknowledge that the dominion of the temporal sovereign over the Church, as introduced by Luther, was "the most telling product of police rule in the sixteenth century."{24}
Starting with his subjective-spiritualistic idea, Luther proceeded by insisting upon the full religious liberty of the individual, and in his work on the temporal power ("Von weitlicher Obrigkeit"), published in 1523, he denied that princes had any right to interfere with matters of faith and religious worship. Then, however, he was speaking of Catholic rulers; and he also subsequently asserted his liberty as far as they were concerned. In the same manner, however, as he quickly revoked his doctrine about freedom of research and universal priesthood as soon as it was, within his own fold, used against himself and his colleagues, so he quickly appealed to Protestant princes for assistance, as soon as he saw that the authority of the preacher was not enough to ensure the spread of the "Gospel," to prevent Protestantism from splitting up into sects, and to avert the decay of morality. Luther denied and overthrew the teaching and pastoral authority of the Church as transmitted from Christ and His Apostles to Popes and Bishops. By an intolerable abuse of his power and by real coercion of conscience, he forced his own personal opinions and the views of certain "doctors" upon the people as "the compelling word of God." It was an abandonment of the Christian idea when he transferred to secular rulers the responsibility of watching over the Church, and impressed upon them, as a ruler's most important duty, that they must tolerate no "idolatrous" (i.e., Catholic) worship and no heresy in their lands. In this way the principle cuius regio illius religio came to underlie all subsequent development in the attitude of State to Church, and later even Catholic rulers with a tendency to absolutism were willing enough to adopt it.
From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century the State, acting as guardian to the Church, controlled religion far more than the Church in the Middle Ages had ever in practice dominated over the State. Not only were questions lying on the border line between the two powers assumed to belong to the State, but all spiritual matters were arbitrarily regarded as being subject to its authority.{25}
This reckless overthrow of the mediaeval idea of the Church, and of her relation to the State, makes it impossible to excuse Luther's intolerance on the plea that it was a remnant of mediaevalism. A man who rebelled so radically against all the principles of antiquity would certainly have thrown off the yoke of tradition on this point also, unless his personal inclination led him to retain it. Luther's own sanction of constraint in matters of religion is all the more offensive because he had ceased to recognize the universal authority and unity of faith, which formerly lay at the root of such constraint, and he denied and resisted it. In their persecution of heretics Luther and Calvin sought justification not in the tradition of the Church, but in the natural law, and in "the pious kings of the Jews," who put down idolatry and blasphemy with the sword.{26}
Even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the State showed little sign of toleration, because the tendency to meddle with every department of life was too strong. Whilst among philosophers and students of natural law more liberal opinions prevailed in regard to the rights of religion, even to them complete liberty of thought and conscience was as a rule an unknown ideal. Hence men like Locke and Rousseau imposed upon the State the duty of punishing atheists with banishment. In a letter dated April 8, 1773, Lessing remarks that with regard to liberal theologians he is convinced that "if once they get the upper hand they will in time rule more tyrannically than the orthodox have ever done." As a matter of fact, political Liberalism again and again revealed most plainly this characteristic trait of free thought in the years that followed. I do not question the fact that the resulting spirit of indifference has tended to produce a general disposition to toleration. Greater influence has, however, been exerted by external circumstances, -- the exhaustion following the long wars of religion, the increasing intercourse between men professing different creeds, and the closer communication between Catholics and Protestants in economic life and in various spheres of activity. It is a fact worthy of notice that the Catholic colony of Maryland in North America was the first State to pass a law giving freedom of conscience; this was in the middle of the seventeenth century.
Without surrender to an abstract doctrinarianism it is a very difficult task to draw a hard and fast line between ecclesiastical and State authority. Our antagonists delight in speaking of Catholic arguments and institutions as "out of date" and "behind the times," but many remains of a narrow ecclesiastical State policy are still found in Protestant States. Even in our own days, England, so proud of its freedom, has treated Ireland and Catholicism with contempt and violence. In one of his early works, "The State in its Relations with the Church," Gladstone expressed the opinion that it was the first duty of the State to spread religious truth, that every government, the same as every individual, must have a certain faith, and ought consistently to admit to official positions none but those professing that faith. Macaulay, the historian, wrote a very clever essay against this theory, pointing out that if Gladstone supposed himself to be more tolerant than men in the Middle Ages, because he wished only to exclude non-Anglicans from office, and not to deprive them of life or liberty, he should ask himself whether a Catholic nobleman would not feel it more deeply to see his son permanently shut out from all the honours and dignities of the State, than to know that he must spend a few months in prison as a sufferer for his faith. Some years later, Bismarck, then a young man, began to speak in the German Parliament, and in one of his first speeches challenged the right of the Jews to political equality, saying: "To my mind the words 'by the grace of God,' appended to the name of a sovereign, are not an empty sound, but I see in them the acknowledgment that earthly rulers intend to use the power given them by God according to His will. Now I cannot recognize as God's Will anything not revealed in the Christian Gospels, and I think I am right in holding that no government is Christian that does not aim at realizing the teaching of Christianity." If any one compares the political principles of the Catholic politicians of the last hundred years with those of men professing other creeds and opinions, he will find that Montalembert and O'Connell, v. Radowitz and v. Ketteler, Windthorst and Freiherr v. Hertling not only have strongly emphasized the Christian foundation of the State, but have judged political and ecclesiastical matters in an essentially modern spirit, tending to civic liberty in a higher degree than has been the case with Protestant Statesmen.
In the ninth century the great Pope Nicholas I, in writing to the Byzantine Emperor, said that Christ "distinguished the duties and rights of the two kinds of authority by giving them peculiar spheres of activity and separate dignities," so that the Emperor could not assume the rights of a high priest, nor the Pope the imperial title.{27} A thousand years later, Leo XIII expressed the same thoughts in vigorous and solemn language, surpassing that used by controversialists of the older schools, and thus he laid down a firm foundation, so as to prevent exaggerations on the one hand and bitter reproaches on the other. Let us examine carefully the chief points in his Encyclicals.
1. The State is not the work either of the devil or of mankind alone; it was designed by the Creator for the development and ordering of humanity in accordance with the natural law. "Every civilized community must have a ruling authority, and this authority, no less than society itself, has its source in nature, and has, consequently, God for its author. Hence it follows that all public power must proceed from God."{28}
The right of the State to exist does not depend upon any positive ordinance of God, nor upon any decision or permission on the part of the Church; it must be traced to the natural needs of mankind and to the goal assigned it by God. For this reason the Apostles and early Christians were most loyal in the discharge of their duty even to pagan States. This does not exclude the idea that the immediate occasion for founding a State may be the outcome of historical events, and not unfrequently it is due to the will of the people. As the need for authority is universal, it follows that "no one of the several forms of government is in itself condemned, inasmuch as . . . all of them are capable . . . to ensure the welfare of the State."{29}
The Church, on the contrary, was founded by Christ, the Son of God, who determined its essential features for all time, and at the same time made it a society "chartered as of right divine . . . to possess in itself and by itself, . . . all needful provision for its maintenance and action."{30} The Church is not merely the infallible guardian of Christian truth and the "embodiment" of Christian grace and worship, but Christians are a lawfully united people, one in having a common faith, a common goal, and the common means of reaching this goal; moreover, they are subject to one and the same authority, so that the natural social principle finds in the Church a higher, supernatural realization. As every community gains in unity and strength by authority, so did Christ found His Church upon Peter, and give to him and to his successors a real jurisdiction over the whole Church, and over the bishops collectively, and "not merely precedence in honour or the feeble prerogative of issuing counsels and admonitions." Bishops, too, belong essentially to the constitution of the Church; they are not only representatives (vicarii) of the Pope, but "regular" rulers (antistites ordinarii), because they possess an authority of their own.{21}
2. Church and State have a different authority; each has its own defined sphere of command, within which it can act freely, though it respects the other power. Consequently the Church, like the State, possesses real sovereignty, i.e., the highest authority within her own sphere. Owing to her supernatural and heavenly aim she is the highest of all societies. "This is the office appointed to her by God, that she may watch over, and may order, all that concerns religion, and may, without let or hindrance, exercise, according to her judgment, her charge over Christianity. Wherefore they who pretend that the Church has any wish to interfere in civil matters, or to infringe upon the rights of the State, know her not, or wickedly calumniate her."{32}
The Church acknowledges and teaches that secular matters are under the control and dominion (supremo imperio) of secular rulers.{33} "The Almighty has appointed the charge of the human race between two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, the one being set over divine, and the other over human things. Each in its kind is supreme (in suo genere maxima); each has fixed limits within which it is contained, limits which are defined by the nature and special object of the province of each."{34}
"The Church alike and the State doubtless both possess individual sovereignty; hence, in the carrying out of public affairs, neither obeys the other within the limits to which each is restricted by its Constitution. It does not follow, however, that Church and State are in any manner severed, and still less antagonistic."{35}
This frank recognition of the supremacy of the State may be compared with the principles of modern politicians, who regard the State as the sole power, and ascribe to it full authority to govern, even supreme ecclesiastical authority, although in practice this theory does not realize. A comparison of this kind will inevitably lead to the conclusion that this teaching of the Church tends far more than that of these politicians to bring about a peaceable understanding between Church and State.{36}
3. If we ask what are the special objects of Church and State respectively, we have already been told that the former controls "divine" and the latter "human" affairs. This distinction is worked out more fully as follows: "To the domain of the ecclesiastical authority belongs all that is sacred (sacrum), all that relates to the salvation of souls and the worship of God (cultus Dei), all that is heavenly, eternal, supernatural, and religious, all that tends to eternal happiness, peace, and the sanctification of souls, the welfare of the Church, and the pietas erga Deum. The State has to decide on matters affecting general prosperity and the common good, civil and political business, things connected with public order and well-being, the prestige of the country, the protection of public and civil interests, and of society in general.{37}
In as far as Church and State both owe their origin to God, and possess complete authority, independently one of the other, we sometimes hear of their "juxtaposition" or "coördination."{38} But the Church is superior to the State in virtue of her supernatural origin, her world-embracing magnitude, and, above all, through her lofty, supernatural object. Besides having power to rule (potestas regiminis), with regard to which alone she can be compared with the State, she has power to instruct and to dispense grace, and the State possesses nothing at all analogous to this. "Just as the end at which the Church aims is by far the noblest of ends, so is her authority the most exalted of all authority."{39}
"We are bound to love dearly the country whence we have received the means of enjoyment that this mortal life affords, but we have a much more urgent obligation to love with ardent love the Church to which we owe the life of the soul, a life that will endure forever."
That the Church should thus take precedence has always been a matter of course to Christians. But connected with this precedence is the superiority of her authority to govern, for thereby the whole life of the Church is supported and protected, and she is enabled to accomplish her peculiar aim, which is at the same time the highest aim of human life. Consequently, as the authors, to whom I have just referred, assert, a State law may lose its obligatory character if it is contrary to this highest aim. It would be, as Leo XIII says, a reversal of the proper order for things natural to be put above things supernatural.
4. The ecclesiastical and civil authority, having different aims, have also different spheres of action. In order to fulfil her mission, the Church has to attend directly to the supernatural element in faith and life, that is to say, she has to preserve and make known what has been revealed regarding faith and morals, and she has to administer the sacraments, In the second place, she is concerned with religion, i.e., with honouring God by observing festivals and by making vows and sacrifices. Individuals as well as society are bound by a natural obligation to support religion, and even among pagans public regulations, and in many cases laws, were made for this purpose. After the institution of the Church the management of public worship belonged to the administrative office of the Church, In the third place she regulates things that we describe as ecclesiastical in the narrower sense of the word, such as the organization, order, and discipline of the Church herself as the visible kingdom of God. This includes decisions regarding offices in the Church, the clergy, supervision of the buildings and property of the Church, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and penalties, etc. It would, however, be wrong to say that the Church is concerned with the spiritual so as to imply that she has no control at all over what is corporal, external, and visible. She is herself a visible society, and her means of grace and cultus have an outer side and require temporal means; her hierarchy and moral discipline both have a great effect upon the outward aspect of life; and thus there are temporal, external things directly subject to the authority of the Church.
On the other hand the State has to provide for what is natural, temporal, and civil, though here again it would be a mistake to refer these expressions too exclusively to the physical authority, since the State, being designed by God, also possesses a moral importance and authority, and in civil life not only may, but must protect the morals of society by punishing theft, murder, adultery, etc. Even if its special aim is to maintain order and promote earthly happiness, it cannot be indifferent to the training of mind and heart, and to the encouragement of good moral and religious principles, since external and internal matters stand in such close connection with one another. It is the duty of the State by means of good discipline to make its citizens obey the natural law; it has to care not only for worldly goods and advantages, but much more for spiritual ones, for morality of life, for justice, and purity, and it must keep, religion sacred and inviolate.{40}
Where the moral law, based immovably on God alone, is respected, the true prosperity of mankind, and peace and order in civil life, are effectually ensured.
We see then that Church and State have to some extent common aims and common activity. The relation between them may be expressed by saying that the "moral perfection of man," "Christian culture and civilization" is their common aim, and that this is the thing that unites their distinct spheres of activity.{41} This general aim extends beyond the direct sphere of influence of either Church or State, as becomes plain when we think of the numerous secular undertakings that are nevertheless not subject to any direct control on the part of the State. At the present time "society" is designated as the bearer of civilized life in general, and as a social force with neither definite limitations nor authority secured by law, and yet it undeniably possesses intellectual and economic unity, and within the boundaries of Church and State finds scope for free and beneficial activity.{42}
In the age of Gallicanism and intellectualism, men propounded theories which aimed at withdrawing everything connected with external life and activity from the jurisdiction of the Church in order to transfer it to that of the State. These theories originated partly in an excessively spiritualistic idea of religion, and partly in an erroneous conception of the relation between Church and State. In opposition to them Benedict XIV and Pius VI emphatically declared that the Church had a right to teach and exercise jurisdiction regarding visible and external things also.{43}
Recently Pius X condemned a similar tendency to subjectivity in the modernist idea of religion, -- a tendency to separate everything external from religion and to assign it to the State, the logical result of which would be to destroy altogether the independence of the Church. "Assuming that the State alone has anything to say in temporal matters, any one who from the interior practice of religion proceeds to exterior acts, such as the administration and reception of the sacraments, would come thus under the control of the State. What would become then of ecclesiastical authority? Since it can assert itself only by exterior acts, it would become completely subordinate to the State."{44}
The allusions to the administration of the sacraments and the exercise of ecclesiastical authority show that res temporales here mean not secular, but temporal, external things. The same expression occurs in the famous twenty-fourth thesis of Pius IX's syllabus, which aroused so much opposition: Ecclesia vis inferendae potestatem non habet, neque potestatem ullam temporalem directam vel indirectam. Heiner remarks that according to the authentic source, the subject discussed in this thesis is not "a mediaeval control over various States," but "only the preservation of the rights of the Church, with reference to her power to guide and govern the external life of the faithful, from which an attempt was being made to restrict and exclude her completely."{45}
As illustrations Heiner mentions the material aspect of the sacraments, contributions to the maintenance of public worship, Church property, appointments to benefices, and the infliction of ecclesiastical penalties that have temporal results. The first part of the condemned proposition deals with diminishing the power of the Church to impose such penalties, and thus it corresponds with the spirit of religious individualism. The assertion had been made that the Church could influence the lives of the faithful only by means of counsels, admonitions, and instructions, but possessed no power to legislate or punish. As a matter of fact, the Church possesses a peculiar power to govern as well as to teach; in order to discharge her mission she can make laws and see that they are observed, and hence she has also a right to inflict suitable punishment upon those who refuse to obey her (potestas coactiva vel exsecutiva).{46}
{1} Jellinek, Das Recht des modernen Staates, 1905, I, 180.
{2} Geffcken (Sell, Die Religion in Lehen der Gegenwart, 1910), p. 123; cf. Treitschke, Politik, 1897, I, 15. The latter author asserts that the Jesuits described the State as "a kingdom of sin and of the flesh, morally without justification, and capable of being justified before God only if it used its power in the service of the Church."
{3} Sell, Katholizismus und Protestantismus, p. 166. He says that the Curia is reckoning upon the bankruptcy of the modern national form of government, because it appears to the Church to be contrary to Christianity (p. 221); d. v. Hoensbroech, Moderner Staat und Katholisehe Kirche, 1906, p. 37, etc.
{4} Cf. the quotations from Hinschius and W. Kohler given by Böckenhoff, Katholische Kirche und moderner Staat, 1911, p. 5, etc.
{5} Chamberlain, Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (preface to the 4th edition).
{6} Rom. xiii. 5.
{7} 1 Peter ii. 13, 17.
{8} Clem. Rom.. Ep. ad Cor. c. 61.
{9} Report of the Akademie der Wiss. zu Berlin, 1893, P. 730.
{10} Das Genossenschaftsrecht, III, 123.
{11} In Job. Ev. Tr., 6, 25.
{12} De civ. dei, XIX, c. 15, 16.
{13} In Job. Ev. Tr., a. 2.
{14} De lib. arb., I, n. 13.
{15} De civ. dci, XIX, c. 17.
{16} Cf. Mausbach, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, 1909, p. 326, etc.; O. Schilling, Die Staats- und Soziallehre des hl. Augustinus.
{17} Cf. supra, p. 338. On July 20, 1871, Pius IX remarked in an allocution that certain rights of supremacy in secular matters had in the Middle Ages resulted to the Pope, "from the idea of public justice then prevailing, with the consent of Christian nations," the right for instance to depose sovereigns; but at the present time circumstances were altogether different. See Archiv für Kath. Kirchenrecht, XXVI (1871), 80; cf. Böckenhoff, op. cit., p. 19.
{18} In the historical growth of the temporal power of the Church, we must not overlook the judicial position given to early Christian bishops, in consequence of the stress of existing circumstances and bestowed by imperial legislation. They had power to try cases and inflict penalties, not only in spiritual but also in temporal matters. The idea underlying this arrangement was the same as that expressed by St. Paul (1 Cor. vi.), who called upon Christians not to carry their disputes before pagan tribunals, and suggested that a spiritually minded man was able to decide any question. Measures thus taken by the infant Church, when she was a small flock in the midst of paganism, in order to realize her ideals with vigour, gradually caused her, under the influence of the above-mentioned factors, to grow into the theocratic institution of the Middle Ages.
{19} S. Michael, Gesch. des deutschen Volkes, III, 269. On the other hand, with reference to other statements made by this Pope, we must, as Michael observes, "discriminate accurately between the theological and the historical elements" (267).
{20} In II dist. 44, q. 2, a. 3 ad 4. It seems doubtful whether it is possible to restrict the "Utriusque potestetis apicem tenere" to the supremacy of the Pope within the territory over which the Church has temporal dominion.
{21} Preuss. Jahrb., 96 (1899), 206; cf. Caragnis, Instit. iur. publ. 3d ed., I, n. 314: Tunc procedebat Ecclesia non tantum ut Ecelesia sed ut societas christiani populi, utens potestate civili in defectu organisationis civilis. Ibid., II, n. 260: Hinc titulis cumulativis procedebant (Pontifices) pluribus in negotiis, i.e., jure mere divino et iure etiam humano. Cf. III, n. 480.
{22} Op. cit., pp. 1, 22: cf. the remark made by Philip II in Schiller's "Don Carlos" (III, 10): "When, do you suppose, would these humane centuries dawn, had I trembled at the curse of the present one?" Cf. also Catagnis, op. cit., n. 316, and Vermeersch, La tolerance, Louvain, 1912.
{23} Op. cit., p. 297, etc.; cf. F. W. Förster, Autorität und Freiheit, p. 110, etc.
{24} O. Meyer in the Realenzyklopädie für Prot. Theologie, 3d ed., XVIII, 712.
{25} Cf. Lämmer, Institutionen des Kath. Kirchenrechts, 2 A., 430, note 2.
{26} Cf. N. Paulus, Luther und die Gewissensfreiheit (Glauben und Wissen, No. 4), 1905. W. Köhler remarks with reference to this article that Paulus and other Catholics were quite right in maintaining that the Reformers had not taught the doctrine of religious liberty, and in pointing emphatically to instances of their intolerance, and this not only in the case of Calvin (op. cit., p. 53). Wappler, a Protestant theologian, discusses in great detail the numerous death sentences carried out in the Electorate of Saxony, and says that Luther and Melanchthon officially declared it to be a duty to condemn heretics "unheard and undefended," and maintained that though a prince might be over-hasty in his dealings with the individual, he is nevertheless acting rightly in putting down heresy (Die Stellung Kursachsens zur Täuferbewegung, 1910, p. 121).
{27} Ap. Denz., Enchir., p. 333.
{28} Immortale Dei; The Pope and the People, p. 73.
{29} ibid., p. 92 C.T.S.; cf. Humanum genus, pp. 31, 35; Diuturnum ilud, p. 7, etc.; Libertas, p. 117 C.T.S.; Sapientiae Christ., p. 152, etc., C.T.S.; Annum ingressi, p. 21. TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. "The Pope and the People," Catholic Truth Society, contains several of these Encyclicals, and wherever C.T.S. is appended to the reference, it is to this volume.
{30} Immortale, p. 77 c. T. 8.; Sapientiae, p. 154 C.T.S.
{31} Satis cognitum, pp. 47, 55.
{32} Satis cognitum, p. 69.
{33} Diuturnum p. 29.
{34} Immortale, p. 79 C.T.S. It is clear from the context that causa (proxima) ought here to be translated "object." Reference to parallel passages in "Libertas," "Rerum novarum," and "Sapientiae" leaves no doubt on the subject.
{35} Sapientiae, p. 166 C.T.S.; cf. Arcanum, Praeclara, and Annum ingressi.
{36} Cf. Böckenhoff, op. cit., pp. 64, 72.
{37} Diuturnum, p. 13; Immortale, p. 80 C.T.S.; Libertas, p. 115 C.T.S.; Sapientiae, p. 150 C.T.S.; Rerum novarum, p. 198 C.T.S.
{38} See Hergenröther-Hollweck, Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts, pp. 63, 73; Lämmer, Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts, p. 436; Sägmüller, Lehrbuch des Katholischen Kirchenrechts, pp. 38, 107; Böckenhoff, op. cit., p. 81; Scherer, Staatslexikon, III, 123, 138; Bachofen, Summa iur. eccl. publ., pp. 133, 138, prefers the word correlatio.
{39} Immortale, p. 77 C.T.S. Sapientiae, p. 150 C.T.S.
{40} Libertas, p. 115; Sapientiae, pp. 150,166; Rerum novarum, p. 218 C.T.S.
{41} Cf. the passage quoted from the Encyclical "Sapientiae" on page 338: alterum genus ad prosperitatem pertinet civitatis, alterum ad commune Ecclesiae bonum, utrumque pariendae hominum perfectioni natum; cf. also Sapientiae, p. 166 C.T.S.: ejusdem (hominis indolis) curanda perfectia. Cf. Praeclara, p. 231 C.T.S., where the aim of both Church and State is said to be the commune societatis humanae bonum, and in "Annum ingressi" it is described as the explicanda christiana urbanitas. The fundamental ideas expressed by Leo XIII in his various Encyclicals are summed up briefly by Pius X, who in writing to Cardinal Fischer of Cologne, on October 31, 1906, said: "Obedience to the authority of the Church leaves to every one full and unrestricted liberty in matters unconnected with religion. It produces in men's minds a sense of harmony which, extending from the individual to society, confirms the welfare of society, which welfare depends upon two factors, one civil and one religious."
{42} Cf. infra, p. 414. A. Weiss, Apologia des Christentums, IV, 1117: "All these organizations, the family, the economic society, the State, the Church, free associations of every kind for educational and other purposes, are in themselves independent, like the limbs of a body . . . but they are mutually responsible to one another, just as individual men are mutually bound together as a whole. They must work together to realize the great aims of human society in general." With reference to civil society, see page 656: "The aggregate of all these great and small associations is what is called civil society. By society we mean, therefore, the sum total of all the institutions, confederations, and active agencies established for the purpose of promoting and ensuring spiritual, moral, and material progress." Cf. also Willmann, Didaktik, 1, 32; II, 507.
{43} See Denziger, Enchir., pp. 1504, 1505.
{44} Encyclical "Pascendi," p. 48.
{45} Heiner, Der Syllabus, 1905, p. 135.
{46} Hergenröther-Hollweck, op. cit., p. 536; Cavagnis, I, n. 277, etc.