5. St. Augustine demonstrates to the teachers of Roman law that the mere name and idea of "justice" are not enough to secure good government, as the greatest confusion prevails regarding the rules of justice and their binding force. Leo XIII similarly points out that the State cannot attain to and realize its aim, the maintenance of justice and morals, unless it makes faith in God its strongest and surest support. Because it reflects God's majesty, the kingly office, even if held by an unworthy ruler, is respected by the subjects, and reverence for God obliges men as a matter of conscience to submit to the laws of their country. Hence no State can dispense with religion, and an atheistic, naturalistic government sins against its own safety and prosperity. God has given us in Christianity a positive religion, most spiritual, most perfect, and suited to every age, and as in course of time a close connection between Church and State has grown up, the so-called separation of the one from the other is contrary both to the principles of the Church and the recognized interests of the State. As they both have the same subjects, their jurisdictions are interwoven so intimately that no absolute separation is possible, and where an attempt has been made to force them asunder it has generally resulted in persecution of the Church and the exclusion of all religion from public life.{1}
Leo XIII regards that State as having an ideal government which in its moral and religious principles listens to the Church as the medium of revelation and professes the Catholic faith in the same way as individuals profess it. We learn from our own experience and from history that when the authority of the Church is rejected in matters of faith, morality suffers and gradually decays, and the foundations of political and social life are undermined. The political autonomy of a State is not injured by its being inspired with Catholic ideas that promote rather than hinder its progress. Preference shown to the only true religion need not necessarily involve any injustice to other forms of worship. The Church is not the enemy of sane toleration, and she does not "condemn those rulers who, for the sake of securing some great good, or of hindering some great evil, allow patiently custom or usage to be a kind of sanction for each kind of religion having its place in the State. And in fact the Church is wont to take earnest heed that no one shall be forced to embrace the Catholic faith against his will, for, as St. Augustine wisely reminds us, "Man cannot believe otherwise than of his own free will."{2}
We read also in the Encyclical "Libertas"{3} that the Church does not ignore the circumstances of the age, and makes allowance for the difficulties encountered by those who govern. Although she herself cannot "concede any right to anything save what is true and honest, she does not forbid public authority to tolerate what is at variance with truth and justice for the sake of avoiding some greater evil, or of obtaining or preserving some greater good." If in other passages of this Encyclical the Pope calls upon the State to give preference to the Catholic faith and to ward off erroneous opinions, the form of the statement (promiscua libertas, infinita, immoderata licentia) shows that he was thinking of the contrary thereto, i.e., that all moral and religious opinions are to be deemed to be on a level; and, directly, of the propaganda of naturalism, freemasonry, and other tendencies hostile to the Church. In trying to establish the Catholic idea of the State, Leo XIII again and again points out that every man can easily recognize the Catholic Church as the only one founded by Christ.{4} In one place{5} he amplifies this statement by adding "especially in Catholic States"; and in another{6} he acknowledges that "very many are far from Christ more through ignorance than ill will." In writing to Cardinal Gibbons, on January 22, 1899, he says: "We believe that very many people (plurimos) stand aloof from Catholics more through ignorance than by deliberation." He refers also to the constitution of the United States, which is not of a definitely Christian character, but involves to some extent separation between Church and State, and says: "If by the name 'Americanism' are meant special mental qualities enjoyed by the nations of America, as also by others, or your civil constitution, your laws and customs, we have no reason to raise any protest against it."{7}
There are Catholic canonists and theologians who regard the country with a State religion, namely, "a Catholic State," as something that has disappeared forever. This is true if they have in mind a State such as existed in the Middle Ages, with its intolerance of all other forms of worship. Leo XIII was not thinking of the Catholic State religion as occupying any such favoured position; but where all, or at least the great majority of the people in a country, profess the Catholic faith, it is only natural that the citizens collectively, or, in other words, the State, should feel impelled to recognize the moral force and blessing of this faith by conceding to it particular public respect and by trying to further its growth; and there is in this nothing incompatible with toleration of other forms of worship. "From the very nature of the case Church and State then stand naturally in a close mutual relation to one another. On the one hand the State, being enlightened and guided by the principles of Christianity, will not only appreciate the great force that, in the fulness of its spiritual strength, it can exert for the preservation and prosperity of the State, but on account of the essential relation which it bears to the highest interests and aims of mankind, the State will regard Christianity as most vitally affecting its subjects, and will be filled with zeal and loyalty towards it. Hence the State will honour and protect the Church as the organ of Christianity, uphold her laws, support her institutions, and assist in furthering her aims by all suitable means. On the other hand, the Church will approach rulers filled with such a spirit with confidence, will gladly regard their wishes in regulating her own life, and will give civil institution the support of her moral prestige."{8}
As a matter of fact, in those countries where religious liberty prevails preference is shown to the officially recognized forms of Christianity, as against Jews, Dissenters, Adventists, etc. In England the king must be a Protestant, and the High Church party enjoys very considerable privileges, and yet we regard the English as a nation enjoying much liberty. In fact, countries where Protestantism is the official religion and where obstacles are put in the way of the practice of Catholicism are at the present time more numerous than the so-called Catholic countries. When attempts were made recently in Spain to destroy the Catholic character of the State, the Church protested against them, not because she wished to prevent Protestants from having fair liberty of worship, -- as a matter of fact there is more liberty in Spain than in most other countries, even for radical and destructive tendencies, -- but because the Liberal government was carrying out its reforms with reckless abuse of authority and disregarding long-established rights of the Church.{9}
6. Pope Leo XIII declares that "it is expedient to take part in the administration of public affairs, unless it be otherwise determined by reason of some exceptional condition of things. And the Church approves of every one devoting his services to the common good, and doing all that he can for the defence, preservation, and prosperity of his country."{10}
Were Catholics to withdraw from public life, the reins of government would very likely pass into the hands of those who are hostile to religion. The duty of taking part in public life remains even where much evil has crept into the State, as the example of early Christian soldiers and magistrates shows us, provided always that there is no abandonment of the fundamental law of God and of nature. It is impossible to lay down general directions for Catholics regarding their political activity; the means adopted must suit times and places widely differing from one another, and many purely civil questions admit of various answers and solutions. Where there are diversities of opinion in one and the same country, it is unjust and wrong to lower the advocates of one political opinion in the eyes of others, by suggesting that they are less loyal to their faith.{11}
7. A very difficult question arises when the two powers are in contact with one another and their interests apparently conflict, especially with regard to matters lying on the border line between them. Leo XIII declares that if Christians at times have the duty of resisting the authority of the State owing to convictions that are ever present in the Christian conscience, he is careful to mention, as the reason for doing so, the violation of God's law by the civil power. "There is," he says, "only one reason justifying men in disobedience, and that is when anything is required of them that is manifestly contrary to the divine or natural law. For in all things violating the law of nature or the will of God, it is equally wrong to command and to obey."{12} Elsewhere he refers more explicitly to antagonism between Church and State, but he invariably presumes that the Church upholds a divine law, made known through nature or by Revelation, and that she represents "truth and divine reason," the honour of God and of religion, which includes, of course, her own position as designed by God. Moreover, the Pope takes it for granted that the conflict of duties is unmistakable; but in such cases there cannot be a real State interest, and no one ought to hesitate for an instant as to which should be preferred.{13}
The Pope is not only bound to use his supreme authority in expounding the revealed truths of faith, but he is also entitled and bound to maintain Christian principles of action in every department of life. "Wherefore it belongs to the Pope to judge authoritatively what things the Sacred Oracles contain, as well as what doctrines are in harmony and what are in disagreement with them; and also, for the same reason, to show forth what things are to be accepted as right, and what are to be rejected as worthless; what it is necessary to do and what to avoid doing in order to attain to eternal salvation. For otherwise there would be no sure interpreter of the commands of God, nor would there be any safe guide showing man the way he should live."{14} The Church is not concerned with the political side of legislation, but as the men, who are subjects of the State, have certain moral and religious duties, she "cannot stand by, indifferent as to the import and significance of the laws enacted."{15}
The matters of so-called mixed jurisdiction (such as the education of the young, some points connected with marriage, holy days, and theological faculties in State-supported universities) lie on the border line between Church and State, and with regard to them the principle applies that the Church looks after their spiritual and the State after their secular arrangements. It is, however, not always possible to discriminate their spheres of action; hence: "In matters of mixed jurisdiction, it is in the highest degree consonant to nature, as also to the desigus of God, that so far from one of the powers separating itself from the other, or still less coming into conflict with it, complete harmony, such as is suited to the end for which each power exists, should be preserved between them."{16}
Such an agreement finds its most tangible expression in the compacts (pacta) and concordats between Church and State. In concluding them the Church shows generous love of peace, and, as experience shows, she adheres to her engagements more faithfully than most States.{17} Apart from such compacts, it must be borne in mind that God intended "an orderly connection" to exist between the two powers, similar to the connection existing in the physical causes, so that there will be no occasion for conflict of duty in the minds of their common subjects. This connection may be compared with the union of the soul and body in man. "The nature and scope of that connection can be determined only . . . by having regard to the nature of each power, and by taking account of the relative excellence and nobleness of their purpose. One of the two has for its proximate and chief object the well-being of this mortal life; the other the everlasting joys of heaven."{18}
Leo XIII's clear and vigorous statements quoted above are of great importance to the age in which we live, especially as technical terms and scientific theories are not everywhere understood in the same sense; and hence there appear to be differences in Catholic teaching, which, however, may be traced in most cases to a dispute about the meaning of words. For instance, as I have pointed out, some writers on Canon Law use the word "coördination" to designate the relation between Church and State,{19} whilst others retain the older term "subordination." Both parties, however, agree essentially, inasmuch as both admit the sovereignty and supreme authority of the State in its own sphere of action, both acknowledge the higher dignity of the Church, a dignity due to her divine origin and supernatural aim, and both give precedence to the ecclesiastical authority, which is rendered necessary in order that this aim may be realized. At first sight a new difference seems to present itself when this precedence is explained and defined; as there are various theories regarding what is meant by potestas directa, indirecta and directiva in temporalia. In this context the word temporalia has not the more general meaning of "external," "sensible,"{20} but is equivalent to "secular" or "civil." A full elucidation of the question, especially on its historical side, is possible only after profound research, but for practical purposes it is sufficient to remark that the use of words in various senses, and their application to different forms of government, cause much confusion. As to the latter point, many writers, especially the authors of Latin works, have had in view only Catholic countries. Cardinal Cavagnis dedicates about a hundred pages to such States, whereas he devotes only six to countries that are either heretical, indifferent or infidel, or tolerate all forms of religion. He attempts to describe "ideal relations" between Church and State, where God's designs are fully realized, and restricts himself accordingly to a form of government the members of which are Catholics, recognizing Catholic principles in legislation.{21}
Most German authors, on the other hand, think of States as they actually exist, a few of which are Catholic, some tolerate Protestantism as well as Catholicism, others are neutral in matters of religion, and others non-Christian. Such writers start with the simple idea of the State, not with that of the perfect State; and they ask what is valid and permissible for all States. Any one, therefore, who maintained that there was an antagonism between these two parties, because they do not altogether agree in determining the rights of the Church, or who found fault with the writers of the latter class for being less loyal to the Church, would not only be doing them an injustice, but would be at variance with those of his own party. Cavagnis, for instance, restricts the rights of the Church very considerably in the case of non-Catholic States, and with reference to non-Christian States he states, quite contrary to the claim otherwise made for subordinatio: Status infidelis non est subditus Ecclesiae, hinc minora sunt jura Ecclesiae erga ipsum etiam in abstracto (p. 573). In the same way any one reading the work in which R. Schultes deals with the subject under discussion must, if he wishes to do justice to the status questionis, bear in mind his introductory note: "In the following treatise the word 'State' always means a Catholic State."{22}
Whoever applies this point of view, which is objectively demanded, to the matter in hand, will find that there is not much practical difference between the two classes of writers, although the views of one appear to be strict, and those of the other less so. In order to avoid any obscurity arising from the diversity in the constitutions of States, other theologians maintain that instead of speaking of indirect subordination of States to the Church, it is better to say that the jurisdiction of the Church extends to mankind, and hence to princes and subjects who belong to the Church by baptism, as members of the human race.{23}
At any rate there is at the present day complete unanimity of opinion regarding the so-called potestas directa, which all admit is not maintainable. This theory was brought forward late in the Middle Ages, and upheld by many canonists and theologians.{24} According to it the Pope possesses not only supreme spiritual, but also supreme temporal power throughout the world, not, of course, for temporal, but for spiritual purposes. But in accordance with the will of Christ he has transferred his temporal power to secular rulers, and must not, under ordinary circumstances, cancel this transference. In cases, however, where the higher interests of religion demand it, the Pope is entitled to use the temporal power, which in its foundation always remained with him notwithstanding such transference. This view is incompatible with the principles laid down by Leo XIII concerning the independent origin and character of Church and State.
On the other hand, authors are unanimous, and rightly so, in thinking that the Church has indirect authority over temporal matters and public life, since, in all that concerns religion and morals in the highest questions of life, she is and must be the court of last resort. It is only with regard to the traditional interpretation of potestas indirecta that any difference of opinion exists. The term seems to have been used in the first instance by Innocent IV,{25} but the thought that it expresses was in the mind of Innocent III, when, in commenting upon a dispute between the kings of France and England about their feudal rights, he remarked that he had no intention of judging de feudo, since this duty belonged to the secular ruler, but he judged de peccato, since it was in his province as head of the Church to punish sin.{26}
Some great theological writers of the Middle Ages, and subsequently Bellarmine and Suarez, developed the theory that the Church has indirect authority over temporal matters, basing it upon these words of Innocent III, as well as upon other arguments, some of a speculative nature, and others derived from the Bible and from history. These authors say that the Church received from her Founder only one kind of authority, viz., spiritual. But as she has a very high, supernatural aim, far surpassing in importance and necessity that of the State, she can and must express a judgment in secular affairs, in so far as the glory of God and care for the spiritual welfare of the faithful require her to do so; and that she can logically deprive antagonistic enactments by the State of all their force (ratione peccati). When Suarez ascribes this power to the Church, he distinguishes it from direct authority by saying that it enables the Church to correct and abrogate laws prejudicial to morality, but not to replace them by new enactments.{27} In this way the Church would be using her own spiritual jurisdiction to carry out and uphold God's will and law against secular attacks; God's will, which must be respected in matters of the world as much as in those of the Church. She would not, however, proceed to lay down positive laws and regulations of a civil nature herself, but she can oblige those who hold the civil authority to do so (and, if necessary, constrain them by means of ecclesiastical punishments).{28}
Being influenced by the legal tradition of the time, Suarez, like Bellarmine, went a step further and ascribed to the Pope, in case of necessity, power to govern temporal affairs; e.g., to depose kings, to alter the boundaries of kingdoms and transfer them to other rulers, to reduce free nations to a state of dependency, and to assume jurisdiction in secular matters.{29}
Later advocates of this system agree as to the fundamental idea, but tacitly or explicitly abandon the last-named applications of it. But this very attempt, to avoid making any deduction from it that would affect politics, contributed to the setting up of a third system, according to which the Church possesses a potestas directiva. When Gallicanism prevailed, this expression was understood as desiguating authority to counsel and to teach, and nothing further. Cardinal Hergenröther, too, uses it primarily by way of contrast to real jurisdiction; but he goes on to show that Gerson, who originated the system, uses the word directiva only to contrast this power with the Pope's "potestas civilis et iuridica"; and that other, later, theologians include in the potestas directiva authority not only to teach, but also to command, judge, and punish.{30}
After surveying the whole dispute about the potestas indirecta and directiva, Her genröther asks: "Does not the controversy turn on the name rather than on the thing? . . . In essentials the two kinds of power appear to be identical." {31}
The modern advocates of the theory do not question the fact that the authority of the Church involves jurisdiction.{32} Some add, indeed, that strictly speaking, not the judicial but the teaching office of the Church is concerned, meaning that the foundation of jurisdiction in secular matters is the jus divinum, which the Church has to expound and observe in practice, viz., the carrying out of God's law; it is not a jus humanum which she creates as her own legislative will.
Since God has assigned to Church and State their respective offices, interference by the Church in secular matters must be justified by the aims given her by God and by her own rules and rights; whereas in the sphere of religion she is free to set up aims for herself, as circumstances require, and to make entirely new laws. Should any dispute arise, she can in all matters directly concerning religion and the Church assert that she has exclusive jurisdiction, and can act with a free will according to her own desires; but in secular matters she has to appeal to God's rights, and to her own duties towards Him, as the appointed guardian of His laws.{22}
Long before this, Suarez had expressed practically the same opinion (see p. 368, note 1){34}; and it is shared by the modern advocates of the theory of potestas indirecta. Referring to the ratio peccati, the starting point of the whole question of terminology, or to the internal moral ordering of things to their end, these writers mention, as formal justification for the interference of the Church in secular matters, any "violation of the moral law" or of "the will of God," or any urgent need for maintaining the aims and rights of the Church, as given her by God.{35}
In cases where greater claims are made, the authors have only Catholic countries in view; the close connection between the spiritual and temporal order in such countries is a reason why the State should support the Church more generously than elsewhere, but it also pledges the Church to use more extensive care in promoting the welfare of the citizens.{36}
Leo XIII did well to remind us of a beautiful remark made by Ivo of Chartres, in which he expressed the idea current in the Middle Ages regarding the relation between Church and State. "When kingdoms and priesthood are at one, in complete accord, the world is well ruled, and the Church flourishes and brings forth abundant fruit."{37}
The limitations assigned by the Church to the power of the State are in agreement with St. Peter's words: "We ought to obey God rather than men."{38} Such limitations are at the same time a powerful bulwark against the onslaught of a godless view of society, based upon nothing but purely human passions and power. St. Paul writes: "There is no power but from God, and those that are, are ordained of God."{39} Would it be possible to discover any more solid or more sacred foundation for the authority of the State? Every modern State acknowledges, or will at least not long refuse to acknowledge, that it needs such a foundation. It can no longer hope to maintain itself by compulsion, by the exercise of brute force, as was possible in the ages of barbarism and heathenism; now it must have authority, a moral right to command. As the masses increase in importance and in the consciousness of their own power, the more dangerous will become the reliance upon pure force and upon external repression. How can modern rulers succeed in inspiring the people with respect for authority if they themselves regard the State as merely the product of accidental development, and think that all rights, even their own, originate in nothing but the growth of power, or the historical impulse of the masses? Here the importance of the Church's idea of a natural law, derived from God Himself and firmly established in Catholic philosophy and science, receives emphasis, and shows that in the natural, social, necessities that lead to civil authority, there is evident the will of God, and that when we speak of the king as reigning "by the grace of God," we are not using an expression borrowed from obsolete mysticism. Freethinkers would never have ridiculed this title had not modern philosophy so persistently represented the natural law as something quite out of date and to be ignored.
The Catholic Church has always upheld a supernatural authority, surpassing all human moral force in strength and security; this authority has developed in millions of her faithful subjects from their very youth the spirit of moral subordination and of ready obedience, and has inculcated loyalty to the State as a sacred duty. There will be no remedy for the disintegrating individualism of our own day if religion, the thing that touches men most closely, is cut off from authority and thrown back upon its own resources, for in itself individualism lacks all rejuvenation. And where to-day, outside the Catholic Church, is there any deep religious feeling binding men to true, living authority?
It may be claimed that since the halo of authority has ceased to impress men of the present time, and since the dignity and prestige of princes have been diminished by democratic changes in the government, there is in every constitutional State an intensified perception of the sanctity of law, and of the inner necessity of State control. But is this really the case? Must not any one who studies the method of modern legislation acknowledge that it is frequently superficial and mechanical, dependent upon the will of a fluctuating majority? Do not immoral passions, excitement, and calumny often lead to measures which call forth indignant protests of the conscience? Do not the rapid changes in legislation seriously hinder the laws from taking root in the minds of the people, and prevent them from being incorporated in their moral perceptions and demands? The Church supplies a deeper and sounder foundation to the laws of the State, and to the legal status of marriage, family life, and industry, and she does this primarily by referring to the law of God, which is reflected in human nature, and is clearly and authoritatively made known by Revelation. Not only the government, but the whole life of the State breaks up if there are no "eternal laws" superior to the will of the State, "laws absolutely inalienable and indestructible as the stars in heaven."{40}
Throughout the course of history the Church has always raised the life of the people above the changes and caprices of the age; she brings the individual and the passing generations into touch with previous centuries and with their accumulated wisdom. The Church is the stout guardian of tradition as well as the bearer of authority. She respects and sanctifies every venerable tradition; alongside of the law she places customs through which we become familiar with and learn to love what is necessary and good for us. Many firmly established customs, that have come down to Germans from remote antiquity, indicate that the law and civilization of the Germanic people were most intimately permeated by their morals and piety. This strongly conservative feature, which is essentially indestructible in the Church, and which reveals itself in the legislative acts of recent Popes, has had the effect of imparting a conservative tendency to the ferment of political life. A population loyal to the Church and zealous in her service affords the strongest support to the government, and counteracts anarchical tendencies.
The last argument that might be adduced by those who think the State must be absolutely independent of the Church, is this: Because the authority and constitution of the State cannot stand alone, and are not enough to secure the welfare of the nations, we have nowadays States that make education and general prosperity their aim, and such States impress the people by their wisdom and progressive spirit, and by the intellectual and material benefits that they bestow; and in this way they become strong enough to resist all dangers. By this zeal for education and progress a modern State shows, we are told, that it has attained maturity as the highest social organization, and consequently is able to discharge the functions that formerly belonged to the Church; in other words, there is no further need for a Church at all. The direct contrary is actually the truth. The more a government goes beyond the organization of its authority and power, and begins to deal with the problems of social life in general, the sooner will it come to the conclusion that it cannot deal with moral and social questions unaided, and is forced to welcome the coöperation of the Church. We may describe the State governed by brute force as merely a body; the State governed by law possesses reason and will; the modern civilized State aiming at education and prosperity, has a soul. F. W. Förster writes: "The State must have a soul, unless it is to become an inanimate piece of machinery or fall into decay. But the soul of the State requires pastoral care, and this in turn must be independent of the authority and interests of the State, if it is consistently to foster the deeper spiritual conditions essential to all unity in the life of the State."{41}
Let us for instance think of the objects at which the reform of the penal system aims. The State governed by brute force is content to secure outward peace by inflicting punishment as a deterrent; the constitutional State sternly exacts retribution according to the letter of the law, but the civilized State, aiming at education and progress, wishes to reform and raise the criminal, and, by means of moral training to prevent the law from being violated. This is a result that cannot possibly be attained as long as the State itself is mistaken as to the true character of moral rules and forces, and despises the assistance offered by religion in affecting and raising the souls of men. Family life, the education of the young, and the encouragement and fostering of art all belong to the sphere of morality; hence it must be a short-sighted policy to use the authority of the State for combating the excesses of youthful scamps, and at the same time to exclude all religious instruction and the influence of the Church from the schools intended to complete the education of this young element. When a modern State earnestly desires the welfare of all classes, and turns its attention to encouraging every kind of movement for the good of the people, it has to decide whether it will adopt a purely worldly and naturalistic ideal of happiness and culture, which will eventually bring about its ruin, or return to the aims, rules, and the vital force of Christianity, which the Catholic Church alone preserves as a clear and definite whole, capable of influencing social life.
{1} Immortale, p. 90; Sapientiae, p. 154, etc.; Rerum novarum, p. 200, etc., C.T.S. In his brief "Vebementer nos" Pius X most emphatically condemns the Separation Law in France, that was the outcome of hatred for religion. Cf. Denziger, Enchir., p. 1995.
{2} Immortale, pp. 92, 93 C.T.S.
{3} Libertas, p. 124 C.T.S.
{4} Immortale, p. 76; Libertas, p. 116 C.T.S.
{5} Libertas, p. 118.
{6} Tametsi, p. 31.
{7} In his reply to the congratulations offered him by the Catholics of North America on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his elevation to the Papacy (1902), Leo XIII begins by contrasting the vigorous growth of the Church in America with her condition in some nominally Catholic countries, and goes on to say: "It is true that you enjoy no sort of legal preference on the part of the government, yet your rulers deserve gratitude because they do not interfere with your enjoyment of just liberty."
{8} Walter, Naturrecht und Politik, 1871, p. 374, etc.
{9} In these matters the State theories of philosophers are as little conclusive as the facts of history regarding States. Spinoza, for instance, imposed upon the State a most extensive religious task, even required it to organize an official Church; yet, on the other band, he demanded the greatest toleration for religious opinions of all sorts.
{10} Libertas, p. 129 C.T.S.
{11} Immortale, p. 97, etc., c. T. S.; cf. also Sapientiae, p. 165: Non dubium est quin quaedam sit in genere politico houesta contentio, cum scil. ineolumi veritate iustitiaque certatur, ut opiniones re usuque valeant, quae ad commune bonum prae ceteris conducibiles videantur. Sed Ecciesiam trahere ad partes aut omnino adiutricem velle ad eas, quibuscum contenditur, superandos, hominum est religione intemperanter abutentium.
{12} Diuturnum, p. 15.
{13} Sapientiae, p. 151 C.T.S.
{14} Sapientiae, p. 162 C.T.S. In his letter to the bishops of Italy (Acta S. Sedis, 1904 -- 5, p. 746) Pius X also expresses a wish that all the laws of the State might be subordinated to tbe divine laws of the Gospel, and that harmony might exist between the two powers, Church and State, so that whilst provision is made for the temporal welfare of the nations, their eternal good may not suffer injury.
{15} Sapientiae, p. 166 C.T.S.
{16} Immortale, p. 92 C.T.S.
{17} Diuturnum, p. 29; Libertas, p. 115 C.T.S.; Immortale, p. 80 C.T.S.; Praeclara, p. 230 C.T.S.; Rer. nov., p. 211 C.T.S., contains the remark that collegia et ordines religiosi claim rightly to be responsible to the Church alone qua parte religionem attingunt.
{18} Immortale, p. 80 C.T.S.; Arcanum, p. 62 C.T.S. Timid persons looked forward to disastrous results when Pius IX rejected the forty-second thesis of the Syllabus: "Where the laws of the two powers are at variance, the secular power takes precedence." The reference is not to any judicial and administrative requirements, but to laws; besides, the condemned thesis contains a general proposition to the effect that in every dispute the civil law ranks higher than the ecclesiastical (Heiner, Der Syllabus, p. 208); hence the direct contrary is asserted as a positive thesis: "The secular power does not take precedence in every dispute." The Church, however, goes further than this, and argues that, as her final aim is higher, natura sua, her law must take precedence, since it makes for this higher aim. This principle throws much light on ethical considerations, and in no way is detrimental to the civil order, since the Church, in construing her laws and in the practical application which she desires them to receive, takes account of all the true interests of human society. It may happen that some demand or service tends directly to the welfare of the State, and only indirectly to that of the Church. In times of great distress saintly princes of the Church have thought it their duty not to insist upon the immunity of her possessions and have deviated in other respects from the ecclesiastical law. We read in Hergenröther-Hollweck p. 68: "In any dispute between the ecclesiastical and civil law, preference naturally must be given to the former, since the Church has the higher aim. To individual cases we may apply the rule regarding conflicting duties, and distinguish between positive and negative obligations . . . moreover, we must take into account the degree of obligation and the greater or less necessity, etc." Cf. (Cavagnis, I, n. 410; Böckenhoff, p. 87 f.; Gisler, Der Modernismus, 1912, p. 206; Mausbach, Staatslexikon, II, 438.
{19} Cf. supra, p. 354, note 1.
{20} Cf. p. 356.
{21} Op. cit., I, n. 397.
{22} R. Schultes, Die Autorität der Kirche in weitlichen Dingen, 1912, p. 11.
{23} Biederlack, Zeitschr. fur Kathol. Theol., 1902, p. 159; Schneemann, Die Kirchi. Gewalt, 1867, p. 48; Bachof en, op. cit., p. 137. Cf. Denziger, Enchir., p. 1697; Cavagnis, n. 572, says with reference to "modern States" that in them the obligations of religion rested chiefly upon individuals (devolvi ad privatos) and their social activity. On these obligations as affecting Catholics, see Chapter IX.
{24} Suarez, De leg., III, c. 6, n. 1, speaks of multi doctores. The best known amongst them, and those who supported the theory most warmly, were Alvarus Pelagius and Augustinus Triumphus. As to isolated expressions used by mediaeval Popes, see Michael, Gesch. des deutschen Volkes, III (1903), 266.
{25} Michael, op cit., p. 270.
{26} Cf. J. Hergenröther, Kath. Kirche und christi. Staat, 1872, p. 403, etc.
{27} Suarez, De leg., III, c. 6, n. 6: Haec autem potestas indirecta, licet sufficiat ad corrigendas, interdum vel abrogandas leges civiles, quando vergere possunt in perniciem animarum, non tamen proprie ad ferendas et statuendas leges civiles, praesertim mere positivas et formaliter loquendo. Dico autem mere positivas; quia deciarando jus naturale . . . potest Papa legem condere, quia talis lex non est proprie constitutiva juris, sed declarativa et definitiva, quae definitio ad Papam spectat.
{28} Cf. also Wernz, Jus decretal., I (1898), 16.
{29} Suarez, III, c. 7, n. 12; c. 10, n. 6; IV, c. 11, n. 12. Defens. fid. cath., III, c. 23. Bellarmine, De controv. fid., I; De Horn. Pontif., V, c. 6. Regarding Molina, see J. Hergenröther, op. cit., §§ 423, etc., 443, etc. Cf. also the statement made by Pius IX on July 20, 1871, supra, p. 342, note 4.
{30} J. Hergenröther, I, 448, etc.; cf. v. Scherer, Staatslexikon, III, 133.
{31} Ibid., p. 452. Suarez himself employs and defends the expression potestas directiva (Def. fid. cath., III, 22, 1).
{32} This is true especially of Böckenhoff (p. 90), who would like to regard certain definite acts of recent Popes as instances of the exercise of the "directive authority" (e.g., the condemnation as invalid of the Austrian constitution and of laws connected with the Kulturkampf in Germany and the separation of Church and State in France). Cf. Böckenhoff in the Köln. Volksztg., 1913, No. 246.
{33} Within its own sphere of action every public authority has a right to impose as obligatory the means indispensable to the attainment to its end, and also to select any means as obligatory, when several, all equally suitable, are available. However, from the principle that secular matters should be left to the State, it follows "that the State alone is entitled to order secular affairs in accordance with the secular aim, i.e., in as far as they are not opposed to the spiritual aim, nor indispensable to it in the opinion of the Church." Cavagnis, I, ii. 80; 73, n. 399.
{34} Cf. also Lehmkuhl, infra, p. 386. a. 1.
{35} Cf. the quotations from Leo XIII (supra, p. 361, seq.) and from Pius X (supra, p. 404). Bellarmine, De controv. fid., I; De Rom. Pontif., V, 6: "Spiritualis potestas non se miscet temporalibus negotiis sed sinit omnia procedere, sicut antequam essent conjunctae (potestates) dummodo non obsint fini spirituali aut non sint necessaria ad eum consequendum." Schneemann, Die Kirchl. Gewalt, 1867, p. 47: The Pope "claims for the Church authority in political affairs, not because they are political, but because they are connected with the divine law, of which the Church is the appointed guardian. Whoever questions this assertion must either assume that sin is impossible in political matters, and that they are not subject to God and His law, or he must suppose that the Church has received no authority to warn men against sin and to judge concerning it." Lämmer, p. 419: . . . "only in as far as things temporal are opposed to the supernatural aim or necessary to its attainment." Hergenröther-Hollweck, op. cit., p. 70: "Only indirectly, in as far as they can be ordered to the aim of the Church and must be regulated in accordance with God's will. For man in the use of all earthly authority . . is dependent upon God, who in the moral law has given him a barrier that he cannot set aside." Cathrein, op. cit., II, 584: "The Church has indeed a right to take measures lest her subjects should be led astray into sin by the orders of the secular power, and so suffer the loss of their souls." Tauber (Manuale iur. canonici, 1908, p. 98): "non attingit temporalia, nisi inquantum necesse est, ut finis alterius ordinis, quem sibi proponit et necessario debet assequi, revera obtineatur" (apud Schultes, op. cit., p. 16). Cf. Laurentius (ibid., p. 23): "The authority to regulate temporal and political matters from the spiritual point of view is limited to cases in which temporal affairs are so badly managed that great harm to religion and the spiritual welfare of the nations threatens to result." Michael, op. cit., p. 265: "In the exercise of their rights in purely secular matters princes are absolutely free; the Pope claims no authority to interfere with them in any way, as long as they do not go beyond the purely secular sphere of action. The right of interference by the Pope, as the guardian of the higher spiritual order, begins at the point where the temporal ruler leaves his own sphere and encroaches upon that of morals." Cavagnis (I. c. I, n. 407): Ecclesia jure exercet potestatem suam et in rebus temporalibus, quatenus necesseriae sunt pro fine spirituali." In a previous passage be writes: "finis inferior fit inhonestus, quoties adversetur fini majori"; and again (n. 430): Res temporales "sunt competentiae civilis, salva subordinatione, i.e., dummodo moderando temporalia non impediantur aut frustrentur spiritualia." Cf. n. 570 and supra, p. 369, n. 4. Hergenröther, pp. 427-444, quotes similar statements from Turrecremata and Molina. It is scarcely necessary to draw attention to the fact that any attack upon well-established historical rights and positive laws of the Church may involve formal injustice, and is therefore a transgression of the law of God.
{36} Cavagnis, n. 175, 413, 558, and Walter, supra, p. 361.
{37} Immortale, p. 84, C.T.S.
{38} Acts v. 29.
{39} Rom. xiii. 1.
{40} O. Willmann, Gesch. des Idealismus, 111,973: "If the State creates rights, it can also create a right to property, and set aside private rights of ownership. . . . If the State is the sole source of law, hence also of the law of marriage, it does not exceed its powers when it allows marriage to be temporary, on trial, or terminable upon due notice."
{41} Autorität und Freiheit, p. 105.