ACCORDING to another charge brought against the Catholic Church by her antagonists, she "understands by morality the upright behaviour in a theocracy the laws of which are regarded and treated as one would regard and treat police regulations."{1} She demands "obedience to the Church and to her requirements and ordinances, and thus her morals become a matter of Church laws and of externals."{2} "Towards her own laity in particular, but also towards all other Churches and creeds, as well as towards the State, she displays such supreme consciousness of power, such intolerance and love of authority, as to suggest the Roman imperium rather than the spirit and endeavour of Christ's flock." (The promulgation of the dogma of papal infallibility is mentioned here as an illustration.){3} "The moral principle of ecclesiastical authority declares morality and immorality to depend upon one thing only -- viz., obedience or disobedience to the laws of the Church"; this principle, however, has a "poisonous effect upon nations not altogether barbarous, because it reduces the "active body to the condition of a lifeless machine."{4}
That the Reformation as a matter of principle denounced Catholic morality, with its immoral superficiality and worthless heed of ecclesiastical laws, is claimed to have been one of the achievements which altered the whole human life.{5} German Protestants are never likely to become Catholics, because they can never forget "the struggle against priest domination."{6} In works hostile to the Church, the term "ultramontanism" is much used to designate a tendency on her part to "unjustifiable interference in secular matters and to keeping the laity in clerical leading strings."{7}
The assertion that Catholic moral teaching insists exclusively, or even chiefly, upon obedience, not to God and conscience, but to the authority of the Church, and that Catholic morality is nothing but practical, exterior uprightness in a theocracy, has been shown by all that has been said to be due to foolish or malicious ignorance of the fundamental principles of Catholic teaching. On the other hand, however, it must not be denied that a Catholic is bound by the laws and regulations of the Church, and that it is difficult for a Protestant to place himself actually in the state of conscience of a Catholic loyal to his Church. The modern tendency to liberty and individualism makes it even harder for men of the present than it was for men in the past to subordinate their individuality, and to let it become a part of the well-ordered whole of the Church. The charges above quoted, against the "ultramontane system," and the compassionate tone adopted towards Catholics as the "victims" of this system, have not been without effect, especially amongst those Catholics who, in consequence of liberal surroundings or education, fear nothing so much as "priest domination." The objective intermingling of ecclesiastical ideas and demands with burning questions of modern life, and the diversity in the intellectual, social, and political circumstances in various countries, have carried certain difficulties into this eminently practical issue. Finally, the codification of Canon Law now in progress, and various decisions given by Rome, have contributed towards turning the attention of educated laymen to these questions. They show, however, that the order and discipline of the Church are working along definite lines, and are ready to cope with the new requirements of the age, without abandoning the old, fundamental principles. Hence, if we desire the conscience to obey the Church willingly and with conviction; if we desire to protect men against the attractive but misleading idea that Christianity is something "purely personal," it is indispensable that the laity of this day should be instructed in the theological principles regarding the extent and gradation of the Church's authority. On the other hand, the decay of all discipline in the Protestant Churches, and the resulting abandonment of all fixed religious ideas, is a portentous sign in the heavens of the present-day world.
I
Though we are considering the sphere of life and action, rather than that of faith and thought, it is nevertheless necessary to begin with a short explanation of what is meant by the infallibility of the Pope in his teaching office, because the charges against the moral and religious liberty of Catholics emanate invariably from a distorted or false interpretation of this dogma. The Vatican Council declared the Pope to be infallible when he speaks ex cathedra, i.e., when in the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, and in accordance with his supreme apostolic authority, he defines some doctrine regarding faith or morals as a doctrine to be held by the universal Church. This infallibility is based upon the "divine assistance" promised to St. Peter; it is that infallibility with which our divine Redeemer desired to endow His Church for the decision of points of faith and morals.{8} The assistance of the Holy Ghost, promised by Christ to the apostles, is especially given to their head; it is given in the most complete and absolute sense when that head speaks authoritatively and decisively. It is scarcely necessary to say that personal opinions expressed by the Pope in his activity as a preacher, as an author, or a bishop, have nothing to do with infallibility. Moreover, the great majority of his official utterances are not ex cathedra decisions.
According to the actual words used by the Council and the general consensus of theologians, "the decision must define a doctrine, that is to say, a truth or a principle of universal validity. This excludes any application of a universal principle to a particular case such as occurs in a decision given in a judicial capacity, or in rules laid down for the administration and discipline of the Church. It must be a doctrina de fide et moribus, i.e., it must affect the Church's teaching on faith or morals. . ." "For a decision to be made ex cathedra, it is not enough that the Pope should merely state a truth, but he must do so in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, and lay it down as a rule of faith or of moral and religious action, binding upon the whole Church and to be so accepted. The essence of a decision ex cathedra Petri is that, being a definite sentence given by the supreme judge of faith, it irrevocably binds the Church as a whole, and establishes an unchangeable rule that must be accepted with faith."{9} The acts of the Council show clearly that "not any manner of stating a doctrine is included, even when the Pope is exercising his office of supreme pastor and teacher; but that he must have the manifest intention (intentio manifestata) of defining a dogma, i.e., he must intend to put an end to all doubt regarding the doctrine or fact to be defined, by expressing a definite judgment; and furthermore the dogma in question must be made known to the whole Church as one to be believed."{10}
The enemies of the Church have always been fond of confusing ex cathedra decisions with utterances of the Pope in which he is liable to be in error. Bellarmine and Stapleton combated this trick of Calvin's, and in the same way Franzelin, Hergenröther and Scheeben have shown how the modern so-called Old-Catholics do the same thing. W. Cappellari, afterwards Gregory XVI, in his work on the "Triumph of the Holy See," pointed out that the obliteration of this distinction, even when due to zeal for the Church, does not conduce to her true glory. Cardinal Franzelin remarks: "There are papal documents, not only private, but even such issued by the Pope in his capacity as head of the Church, whose purpose it is to convey admonitions, counsels, and commands regarding matters of faith and morals, or to condemn certain opinions and prevent their spreading, but which do not aim at giving a decision, definite and binding, upon the whole Church; and for this reason they contain no ex cathedra announcement." By way of illustration Franzelin refers to the letters addressed by Pope Honorius I to Sergius, Patriarch of Constantinople.{11}
In support of the dogma, the Vatican Council referred not only to our Saviour's promises, but also to facts in the history of the Church and of dogma, and especially to the solemn declarations of General Councils in favour of papal infallibility.
Scholars have collected much evidence which show, in a convincing manner, that already at a very early period in the history of the Church men believed in the Pope's infallibility. When the decision of the Council was first promulgated, an attempt was made to represent it as a violent alteration of tradition; but even Protestant scholars{12} have been forced to admit that it was nothing more than the logical result of the whole development of the Church, whilst others confess that the essence of the dogma is contained in Holy Scripture, particularly in our Lord's words to St. Peter recorded in Matt. xvi. 18.{13} When considered with reference to the Church, to Christianity, and religion in general the logical character of the dogma and its suitability and propriety will commend it also to the reason.
All those who, like the Old-Catholics, believe in a divinely guided Church and in episcopacy, must admit that the concentration of the episcopal power in St. Peter's successor is in harmony with the earliest consciousness of the Church; and that in the weight attached to the voice of the Pope, we have a more suitable expression of the divine assistance guiding the Church in all truth than there would be in the vote of a majority. Moreover, the cases where a majority in the Councils of the Church has expressed an opinion afford additional evidence of the Pope's infallibility, for a matter was never regarded as settled until the Pope's voice endorsed the majority. Apart from the strong evidence derived from our Lord's words in Matt. xvi. 18., Protestants who reverence the Bible as the unerring word of God, are bound to acknowledge that this priceless written document is exposed to many attacks and misunderstandings, and that therefore there must be a living voice, a ministry, to bear witness to and defend the contents of this document, to preserve its true spirit, pure and living, from all the errors of the ages. In fact, any one who still believes in a Revelation, i.e., in the historical annourcement to mankind of the salvation in God, and whoever sees in the historical person of Christ the culmination of this Revelation, must also consider it natural and probable that this Revelation should be transmitted and protected by one holding a central position in history as the accredited vicar of Christ, rather than that this message, after being so forcibly proclaimed from heaven, should now be exposed to every current of controversy and abandoned as a prey to the laws of natural evolution. Indeed, I believe that every friend of religion as such, every man who values certainty and truth in the highest questions, to strengthen and renew both the moral and the social life, would thankfully acknowledge the importance and benefit of such an authority; and, as philosophy seems more and more to be fruitless, and the religion of sentiment untrustworthy, he would perceive that the existence of an infallible guide is a "postulate" of the human conscience.
With regard to the matter of infallibility, the Council says plainly that it is "a doctrine of faith or morals," and goes on to explain that "the Holy Ghost was promised to St. Peter's successors, not to make known new doctrines (eo revelante), but to assist in guarding and in faithfully expounding the doctrine transmitted through the apostles, viz., the deposit of faith." The doctrines in question were revealed, therefore, primarily by God, and preserved by tradition and by written documents. According to the universal Catholic opinion, however, the gift of infallibility is not actually restricted to the sphere of revelation, but extends to those natural truths and facts that are so closely connected with Revelation that their truth cannot be challenged without Revelation itself being imperilled. There are philosophical opinions regarding God and the world which are bound up with the Christian dogma of God and creation. Christian teaching on morals takes for granted certain truths about the soul and its freedom and its relation to the body, etc.; and again there are truths belonging not to the substance, but to the integrity of the faith. The Church could not shed forth her light upon the whole spiritual life of mankind, or really leaven all civilization with her grace and moral force, if, in her teaching capacity, she were entirely limited to what has been supernaturally revealed, and were cut off from all natural thought and action. As Cardinal Newman aptly points out, the teaching authority of the Church "could not properly defend religious truth, without claiming for that truth what may be called its pomoeria; or, to take another illustration, without acting as we act, as a nation, in claiming as our own, not only the land on which we live, but what are called British waters."{14}
The influence of the teaching authority of the Church is by no means limited to the sphere where its activity is infallible. To some extent it makes itself felt throughout all preaching and work for souls. It reveals itself effectually in pronouncements made by bishops, by the Roman Congregations, and the Holy See, which, though not infallible, are for other reasons binding upon the moral conscience and religious thought (assensus religiosus). Much is true, and accepted by the mind as true, and much is expedient and necessary for the welfare of the Church, that does not actually bear the unequivocal stamp of divine truth. Even in secular life, parents, teachers, and men conspicuous for their wisdom, knowledge, and ripe experience, have an authority so great that it would be an outrage to refuse them belief. Above them are the inheritances of moral and philosophical wisdom, the dignified utterances of the past, of saints and of sages, that are accepted by the average mind. Protestants, too, have creeds and religious opinions which they piously value and hold as sacred, without regarding them as infallible. To us Catholics the teaching and admonitions of the Church, even where she does not use her full authority, are worthy of reverence; for on the basis of her unique universality, experience and fundamental certainty, as well as on that of her supernatural gifts, she offers us salutary guidance and assurance that are both trustworthy and beneficial to our thought and action.{15}
No student of the history of the intellect can shut his eyes to the fact that for almost two thousand years Catholicism has possessed a unity and consistency that are all the more wonderful because this faith contains most subtle and far-reaching ideas, which, when logically developed, have led to results having an important bearing upon religion and morals; whilst all the time the Church has occupied a central position in the intellectual growth going on around her, and her doctrines have undergone considerable internal development. The stability and conciseness of Catholic dogma would be inexplicable if there were no higher power upholding the Church; for the history of philosophy and of heresies reveals to us so many conflicting opinions, so many deviations from and distortions of the truth, and the human leaders in the Church have varied so much in ability and education, in their political views and their attitude towards contemporary events, that without supernatural assistance she could not have stood firm. Many have attempted to make bold innovations, and their erroneous doctrines have seemed certain of triumph; but posterity has invariably been forced to acknowledge that these men did not abide by the Christian tradition, but strayed on to courses inevitably tending to the destruction of the spirit and truth of the Gospel. No other Church could rival that of Rome in her vigilance against heresy and in her dignified assurance in making known the truth. Wherever the successor of St. Peter led the way it has meant success for the Catholic Church in her resistance to the attacks of heresy.
Enough has been said to show that the gift of infallibility is not an "usurpation of divine predicates," nor does it presuppose omniscience. The Council distinguishes carefully the enlightenment imparted to the instruments of Revelation (revelatio) from the guidance given to the Church in her capacity as teacher (assistentia). Theology emphasizes this distinction, and sees in the inspiration of biblical authors (which need not invariably be a revelation of truths previously unknown) a more positive exercise of the influence of the Holy Ghost than is displayed in the assistance given to the teaching body in the Church. It is most important that the Revelation contained in the Bible and tradition should remain the immovable foundation of all subsequent development of doctrine. Those who are the official teachers of the Church must, aided by the Holy Ghost, bring their human faculties to bear upon this Revelation, and in clearly deducing from it the truth to be propounded they are preserved from error. "For this reason the Pope must, in accordance with his office and the importance of the matter, apply all suitable means of duly discovering and proclaiming the truth. Such means are the convocation of councils and the consultation of bishops, cardinals, theologians, etc. These means vary in different cases, and we must believe that in promising help to St. Peter and his successors, Christ promised to supply the means that are necessary and suitable to enable the Pope to give an infallible decision."{16}
Jeiler's remarks on the manner in which the guidance of the Holy Ghost affects the threefold authority of the Church are very much to the point, In the exercise of the priestly office, the Holy Ghost, who alone can infuse grace into the hearts of men, is the really active principle or cause; the priest is a completely subordinate instrument, In the exercise of her teaching authority, charged with the task of preserving and explaining revealed truth in its substance and integrity, the human activity of the Church is the efficient cause, but in the assistance of the Holy Ghost she possesses a guarantee of truth. In matters of government the Church enjoys the guidance of her divine Head, "but where only questions of discipline are concerned, bearing often only a distant relation to revealed truth, the guidance thus given is not the charisma of infallible truth."{17}
Truth is in itself everlasting and unchanging, but the object of government and legislation is something temporal and liable to change. Even Aristotle taught that in practical matters it was impossible to speak of one absolute truth, one unalterable necessity, in the same sense as in theoretical matters; since the practical reason has to deal with material that is subject to accidents and to change, because it orders and controls the manifold circumstances of life according to the needs of the time.{18}
The Church, in the exercise of her pastoral authority, has the right to legislate, to govern, and to decide. The highest of these functions is unquestionably legislation. Besides this threefold division of authority, analogous to the threefold ministry of Christ,{19} there is a twofold division by older theologians into the potestas ordinis, or power to consecrate, and the potestas jurisdictionis, or power to govern. According to this division, the teaching authority is, on the one hand, the chief part in the ruling power or jurisdiction of the Church; on the other hand, it is connected with the sacerdotal authority. Just as the priesthood dispenses the graces of the Holy Ghost, supplying and propagating supernatural gifts, so does the teaching authority dispense the truth of the Holy Ghost, supplying the supernatural doctrines of salvation to feed the minds of men.
This "feeding," in the sense of teaching and supplying spiritual nourishment, is at the same time "pasturing," as a shepherd guides and rules his flock. The bishops, who hold authority to teach, are not only witnesses of the truth (testes fidei), but also authoritative guides and judges in matters of faith (judices fidei); by expounding the doctrines of the Church, they impose upon their flocks the duty of believing these doctrines. This authoritative feature is still more prominent when the Church, in her office of teacher, proclaims Christ's doctrines regarding morals. Dogmatic decisions, in the narrower sense, aim only at protecting the purity of truth and facilitating its inward development; but when a moral question is decided it brings the morality of the Gospels to bear upon the actual circumstances of life and the practical acts of the faithful. There is an essential difference between the communication of a religious and a moral truth by a scientist or a saint, even if privately instructed by God, and the announcement of such truth with all the official authority of the Church.
As long as she restricts her activity in the moral sphere to expounding the law of God, both natural and positive, and to carrying it out to its necessary consequences, she is exercising a real jurisdiction, but a jurisdiction of a vicegerent and judge rather than that of a supreme legislator; and her activity remains bound to the jus divinum. But the Church exercises a jurisdiction of her own in the more precise sense, which includes legislation only when to the natural and to the revealed laws of God she adds new rules and regulations, which, however, must have an aim analogous to that of the divine law. In exercising this jus ecclesiasticum she acts freely and independently. The significance of the distinction appears most plainly in the moral and judicial principles regarding the power of the Church to alter laws and to grant dispensations.{20}
In speaking of the definition given by the Vatican Council (res fidei et morum) I have already shown that in virtue of his infallibility the Pope has to maintain the doctrines of faith in their integrity as well as to expound the law of God and impress on men the duty of obeying it. What is the case, however, with the Church's own jurisdiction? The general laws of the Church are the permanent and definite expression of what she desires and demands; therefore, through the assistance of the Holy Ghost that is promised to her, she is prevented from imposing upon men as a duty anything contrary to faith, to the will of God, or the welfare of their own souls. A practical law may differ formally from a definition intended to instruct; yet an error in the law would virtually be a falling away from the truth and the sanctity essential to the Church of Christ, and thus it would thwart the intention of the Church to lead mankind onwards to their moral end. In so far, therefore, an unchanging element, divinely protected, passes through the whole discipline of the Church.{21}
At the same time the disciplinary laws of the Church contain also an accidental and fallible element, owing to the relation in which they stand to actual contingencies and to the individuality of the legislator. All Catholic theologians are agreed on this point, although they do not of course admit that every one has a right to express an opinion on the subject. Bellarmine says that a law of the Church might possibly be inexpedient, ill-advised, superfluous, opposed to human rights and claims, or too severe in imposing penalties.
Many things, of themselves permissible or even praiseworthy, cannot be made universally obligatory, because they are too difficult; that which has a beneficial result in one country and in certain surroundings may be harmful elsewhere. What is profitable to an ideal people may be a stumbling-block to the less perfect. What is necessary in time of struggle may appear excessively strict under other circumstances.{22}
These considerations are not makeshifts, but express the intention and spirit of the Canon Law. There is no human legislation less deserving the reproach of unyielding severity and of harsh treatment of subjects than that of the Church. In my treatise "De Legibus," I have cited many proofs that these laws are interpreted objectively and by no means "mechanically," and that the necessity of diminishing or altogether removing an obligation is frequently recognized in cases where either the bishops consider it expedient, or where the customs and requirements of certain countries or some sudden crisis demands it, and even where conscientious individual decision considers it justified (epikeia).
The history of the Church shows, furthermore, that a demand for reform of discipline has never drawn upon its author the suspicion of being false to the Church, and has often even won for him the esteem of the Church, as long as he adhered to the true faith and remained within the limits of reverence and moderation. As a rule, a demand of this kind has been concerned less with the actual laws of the Church than with their administration. In applying the discipline of the Church to individual cases, it is plain that the ecclesiastical authorities are to an extent dependent upon human and therefore fallible factors, such as reports of events and private observations. On the subject of excommunication and its revocation, Innocent III says in his decretals: "God's judgment is always based upon truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived; but the judgment of the Church is based sometimes on mere opinion, which often is deceived and deceives."{23}
When Leo IX felt death approaching, he caused himself to be carried into St. Peter's, and there, close to the spot where he was to be buried, he prayed for the blessing of God to rest upon the Church, and begged for special grace for any one whom he might have excommunicated wrongfully.{24} The so-called case of Pope Honorius has nothing to do with the infallibility of the Pope in his office as teacher; but it cannot be denied that the Church herself subsequently condemned Honorius I for want of vigilance in dealing with questions connected with the faith. There are certainly few, if any, Catholic authors, who think that Clement XIV acted in the interests of the Church when he suppressed the Jesuit Order.
We have seen that the teaching authority of the Church, as well as the duty of accepting her doctrine, extend further than the gift of infallibility. With regard both to the natural and the supernatural, there are some things that we may reasonably be required to believe, and to which we must subordinate our own thought, although there is no divine charisma to vouch for their truth. This applies particularly to obedience, to the practical submission to the rules laid down by those in authority in the Church. All obedience, in the family, in the State, and in the army, is based upon the superior will of those in command, not upon their infallible knowledge. This will, of course, presumes reasonable judgment, but it commands in its capacity of will, by its own power and in the name of Him from whom all earthiy authority is derived. No education, no social order, would be possible if the subject, apart from the unusual case of a manifestly unjust command, were to make his obedience dependent on his own personal opinion; or if he were to demand absolute guarantees for the correctness of the view taken by his superior. This argument is applicable in a higher degree to the Church, whose laws depend so completely upon the moral sentiments, veneration, unanimity, and free submission of the people. In her the pastoral office is most closely connected with the teaching office, and though she is guided by men, such guidance rests upon a foundation of divine truth.
In the teaching body of the Church, and amongst the faithful, no doubt has ever arisen regarding the fact that our Lord bestowed upon certain men the right to rule the Church. The apostles and their successors felt themselves empowered to issue laws and to govern the visible Church, not merely to explain with authority the teaching and commandments of God. Plato's idea that philosophers ought also to be the rulers, was actually realized in the sphere of religion in the Church of Christ. When our Lord conferred upon the apostles, and especially upon Peter, the power to bind and to loose, His words, interpreted according to the usage of the period, conveyed a twofold power, viz., to teach and expound God's law and to lay down laws themselves. When He commissioned Peter to feed His sheep and lambs and to rule over His flock, He formally expressed the pastoral authority bestowed upon the prince of the apostles. The apostles founded and organized the first Christian communities, appointing men to govern them, threatening and punishing transgressors, and establishing a moral code; and they did all this not only in the Lord's name, but by their own authority.{25} Beginning with the words, "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us," they issued a command to the assembly at Jerusalem, that was not simply a repetition of a divine enactment, but was also the expression of their own will, and was intended to have a particular character to meet the needs of the time.{26}
The Modernists maintain that there is in the New Testament nothing about the hierarchy and obedience to the Church, but to us it seems not only to contain clear allusions to the whole of the hierarchy, but also to the rudimentary organization of the teaching, judicial, and sacerdotal office in the Church. Thus, for instance, in the pastoral epistles we find it expressed, as conviction and experience, that "the solid structure of the Church, her sound doctrine, and the sanctity of her office constitutes the only possible form for the religious life of mankind in general."{27}
We can trace the succession of bishops following the apostles back to the first centuries and observe that their authority was really the support of all ecclesiastical life, and that to their sacerdotal and teaching activity they added a vigorous exercise of spiritual authority. This authority extended from matters of public worship to the practice of charity, to morality, and to the expenditures of the Church, and, ultimately, to the settlement of disputes and to giving decisions on points of law. Although at first the officials of the Church did not bear the names by which they were afterwards known, they nevertheless existed. Although the manner in which they exercised their authority was in many respects personal and patriarchal, their exclusive right to govern the Church was acknowledged; and as the first outburst of enthusiasm amongst the faithful died away, this right had to be expressed by means of laws and formulae, stated with increasing stringency and lucidity. In St. Peter and his successors the firm foundation was laid, resting upon a rock, and this supports and holds together all the powers conferred upon the apostles. St. Peter received from our Lord Jesus Christ full authority to feed, guide, and govern the whole Church, namely, the supreme, regular, and direct jurisdiction of a chief shepherd over all other shepherds and over the faithful committed to their charge.{28}
{1} Herrmann, Röm. n. evang. Sittlichkeit, p. 31, etc.
{2} Luthardt, p. 15.
{3} H. Weiss, p. 175.
{4} V. Hartmann, pp. 80, 94.
{5} Ziegler, p. 512.
{6} Harnack, Protestantismus and Katholizismus, p. 30. 376
{7} Cf. Götz, Der Ultramontanismus als Weltanschauung auf Grund des Syllabus, 1905; Klerikalismus und Laizismus, 1906, p. 56: "On the whole we may probably sum up the instructions given by Leo XIII and Pius X as amounting to this: the laity are to be nothing more than the 'faithful'; i.e., that in everything, even in their ordinary work in the world, they have nothing to do but to obey the ;Church'; that is to say, to obey the clergy and the Pope. They are permitted to support and defend the claim of the clergy to direct the civilization of the world, but must not display any independent cultural activity."
{8} S. 4, c, 4.
{9} Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, II, 249.
{10} Granderath, Constit. dogm., ss. Cone. Vatic., 1892, p. 233.
{11} Franzelin, De div. trad. et script, p. 119.
{12} Lagarde, Hinschius.
{13} Pfleiderer, Krüger.
{14} Newman, Apologia pro vita sua, 1895, p. 257. Cf. also thesis 5, condemned in the Syllabus of Pius X, according to which the Church is in no way entitled to give an opinion regarding the assertions of human sciences (Denz., p. 2005).
{15} There are various kinds and degrees of intellectual assent, and not every certainty is infallible, and guaranteed by God's inability to deceive. Hence the same kind of assent is not required for all decisions of the Church. In saying that a statement is not infallible, it is admitted that it may possibly contain some error or deviation from the truth. Now truth is the highest law of the spirit, and in things, accessible to human reason, it demands admission to the mind of man, for truth is knowable. The Church has above all the desire to promote the knowledge of truth, according to St. Paul's words: "We can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth" (2 Cor. xiii. 8). Hence, for instance, the duty of accepting the decisions of the Roman Congregations cannot be so binding as that of accepting the infallible decisions of the Pope. Cf. Hurter, Theol. dogm. comp., I, n. 516; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. dogm., I, n. 521; Heinrich, Dogm. Theol., II, 553; Schiffini, de virt. inf., 1904, p. 349; Granderath, Zeitschr. fur Kath. Theol., 1895, p. 649; Grisar, Galileistudie., 1882, pp. 152-213, and especially p. 171.
{16} Report of Mgr. Gasser, prince-bishop of Brixen, on the Vaticanum (Granderath, p. 180, etc.).
{17} Kirchenlexikon, III, 1821.
{18} Eth. Nicom., V, 8; VI, 3.
{19} Cf. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.
{20} Cf. Hergenröther-Hollweck, op. cit., p. 145; Lehmkuhl, op. cit., I, 136: Illa (auctoritas ecclesiastica) duplicis generis est, una potius est divina potestas, altera vere humana. Nam quia Ecciesia vere humana societas est, humano modo dirigenda, propterea moderatorem supremum habet, qui propria auctoritate leges condit, praecepta fert: hanc voco auctoritatem humanam. Attamen etiam alia sunt, quae humanam societatem excedunt, in quibus Ecclesia aut instrumentum Dei et Christi agit aut legis divinae interpretem, cui Deus ipse infallibiliter assistit. Haec omnia, Si objectum legis aut praecepti fiunt per superiores vel ministros Ecclesiae, non propria potestate exercentur; immo ne ab ipso supremo quidem capite Ecclesiae visibili exerceri possunt nisi vicaria potestate.
{21} Cf. Bellarmine, De Rom. Pontif., IV, 5, 15. Suarez, De leg., VI, 7, 25; Tanner, De fide, I, 4, 7; Heinrich, op. cit., p.612, etc; Simar, Dogmatik, 4th ed., p. 747; M. Canus, De loc. theol., V. c. 5, q. 5: "Ecclesia in morum doctrina eorum, qui ad salutem necessarii sunt, errare non potest. . . . Ecclesia non potest definire, quippiam esse vitium, quod honestum est, aut contra honestum esse, quod est turpe; ergo nec sua edita lege probare quicquam, quod evangelio rationive inimicum sit. Si enim ecclesia expresse vel judicio vel lege lata turpia probaret aut reprobaret honesta, hic jam nimirum error non solum fidelibus pestem perniciemque afferret sed fidei etiam quodammodo adversaretur, quae omnem virtutem probat, universa vitia condemnat. Accedunt illa. . . . Qui vos audit, me audit. . . . Ita si errat illa, Christus nobis erroris auctor est. Quae qui videat, non modo indocte verum etiam impie faciat, si ecclesiam in morum doctrina errare contendat, praesertim si mores at praecepta vivendi sint ad salutem necessaria." Canus remarks in a subsequent passage: "Non ego hic omnes ecclesiae leges approbo. . . . Scio nonnullas ejusmodi leges esse, in quibus, si non aliud praeterea quicquam, at prudentiam certe modumque desideres."
{22} Heinrich, op. cit., p. 613: "Where it is only a matter of expediency, much freer scope is given to human discretion, and mistakes and sins of omission may occur, which are permitted by divine Providence in as far as they do not injure the faith and the law of God." Cf. the quotations above, note 1, and also Suares, op. cit., IV, c. 16, 4, 7; a. 9; VII, a. 18; (Cavagnis, II, 206.
{23} C. 28, X. 5, 39; cf. c. 5, X. 5, 20.
{24} Montalembert, Monks of the West, Eng. trans., 1879, VI, 340, 341.
{25} Cor. vii. 12.
{26} We read that St. Paul emphatically declared the Jewish law to be abrogated and that he insisted upon Christian liberty where the law was opposed to the Christian doctrines regarding salvation. Yet he "confirmed the churches, commanding them to keep the precepts of the apostles and the ancients" (Acts xv. 41); "the decrees . . . that were decreed by the apostles and ancients who were at Jerusalem" (Acts xvi. 4).
{27} Schell, Christus, 2d ed., p. 155.
{28} Vatic., s. 4, c. 3; cf. v. Dunin-Borkowski, Die Kirche als Stiftung Jesu (in "Religion, Christentum, Kirche"), 1913.