Let us now approach the question as to the authority which the Church exerts in her pastoral and administrative office over the secular life and work of her members. We must first recall the principles underlying the relation between Church and State, as stated in the Encyclicals of Leo XIII as well as in theology. The State is the most perfect organization of the mundane activity of mankind; and as the State has now in many places assumed an attitude of hostility, or distrust, towards the Church, not a few of the duties for the welfare of society properly belonging to the State, and connected with Christian life and social order, now fall upon the Catholic citizen and his social efforts.{1}
We have noticed, as an important point in the relation between Church and State, that the special and immediate task of the former is to realize the highest supernatural end of life, whilst the latter retains absolute independence in its own sphere; but inasmuch as the end kept in view by the Church is superior to, and controls, all things that are temporal and of a worldly nature, she may incidentally make her authority felt in such matters also. We arrived at this conclusion after studying the teaching and pastoral office of the Church. As Revelation consists of the truths of the natural moral law, as well as of the supernatural doctrines of faith, the Church, being the guardian of Revelation, possesses the right and duty of carrying out God's will in the natural life of mankind.
The history of the Church shows also that she is to be a kingdom, "not indeed of this world," but still "in it," as she has to fulfil her mission here. The side of her activity most appreciated by friends of education, culture, and civilization would be altogether absent in the Church's development, or at any rate less conspicuous, if her rulers had aimed only at the religious and supernatural improvement of humanity. I have already pointed out how, ever since the age of the apostles, the bishops used their exalted position to restore law and order to society, and how the Popes in particular promoted the advance of Christian civilization both by teaching and by forceful practical intervention. In a lucid description of "the spirit of the Eastern Church as contrasted with that of the Western," Harnack recently emphasized the fact that the Western Church was not so exclusively occupied as the Eastern with the things of the other world, with the mystical element, and with liturgical matters. Without losing sight of the future life, the Western Church, he says, always kept in view that "it was her task to permeate this world in every part with the forces of goodness and holiness." Having recognized this as her aim, she "never permanently allowed any power to deter her from directing the education of nations and of individuals, and resisted with energy and success all attempts to reduce her to the level of a mere institution for the maintenance of public worship. In the West the Church stood as an independent factor beside the State."{2}
On the other hand, many opponents who have, as they acknowledge, no objection to the religious and purely spiritual authority of the Church, cannot forgive her for making her influence felt in secular matters also, and for raising her voice in social, economic, and political questions. They maintain that in this way, and especially by "hierarchical tutelage," she seeks to recover the lost supremacy that she enjoyed in the Middle Ages. Götz, for instance, asserts that according to the instructions issued by the last two or three Popes, the laity, even in the secular work of clvilization, "are bound always to obey only the orders of the Church; i.e., of clergy and Papacy."{3} The "complete state of dependence" on the part of the laity is being justified, he says, by the fact that all, even the most thoroughly secular activity, is subject to the moral law, that the Church regards herself as alone competent to judge, and lays down rules for Catholics that bear the stamp of ultramontane narrowness, and that this keeping of the laity in leading strings constitutes a danger to modern States, especially since the clergy have created a very powerful instrument for the control of the masses in their ultramontane societies and associations (p. 87). Others acknowledge that we consider secular matters to be under the control of the Church only in as far as they concern morality; but, they say, has not all free action a moral character? Even the duties connected with business and politics are morally binding. Defending one's country, combating infectious disease, regulating private rights, -- all these are matters that belong to the moral problems of society, which every one will admit come within the province of the civil and not the ecclesiastical authority. Let us see what ground there is for these assertions and fears.
Leo XIII devoted an Encyclical to the discussion of human liberty, which he extols as one of the greatest gifts of nature and the moral order. He claims for the Church credit for having in theory always upheld the freedom of the will, and in practice promoted that of society. All freedom of choice must, however, be guided by regard for truth and goodness, and the will, being in itself blind, must be enlightened by the reason, by the laws of what is good and true. Precisely because the Church upholds the idea of the natural law and its universal validity, she has always used her influence "in the custody and protection. of the civil and political liberty of the people," against violence and tyranny, so as to enable the family and the State to have freedom for development.{4} The intimate connection between civilization and morality is, and always will be, a source of strength and benefit; "the higher the morality of States, the greater are the liberty and wealth and power which they enjoy."{5}
The Church does not indiscriminately sanction every modern development of liberty, for she cannot approve of error and moral corruption, but in all that is naturally permissible she leaves "a vast field . . . to man's industry and genius";{6} she even accommodates herself to the extravagant demands of the times for freedom as far as she can without losing sight of what is for the good of all. She is in sympathy with all the various forms of government, and considers men justified in desiring independence from foreign control, and constitutional government within their own countries, provided that these desires are not accompanied by deeds of injustice and violence. "Nor does she blame those who wish to assign to the State the power of self-government, and to its citizens the greatest possible measure of prosperity." The Church has always most faithfully fostered civil liberty, and this was seen especially in Italy, in the municipal prosperity and wealth and glory, which were obtained at a time when the salutary power ofthe Church had spread, without opposition, to all parts of the State."{7}
The words "the truth shall make you free," that occur in the Encyclical on Human Liberty (p. 122), are again used by Leo XIII when speaking of the spirit of the times (p. 95). He says in the same Encyclical (p. 98): "It is the duty of all Catholics . . . to make use of popular institutions, so far as can honestly be done, for the advancement of truth and righteousness; to strive that liberty of action shall not transgress the bounds marked out by nature and the law of God; to endeavour to bring back all civil society to the pattern and form of Christianity. . . . It is hardly possible to lay down any fixed method by which such purposes are to be attained, because the means adopted must suit places and times widely differing from one another." In religious matters the principle in dubiis libertas holds good, and in politics there is still greater liberty in thoughts and acts. But the Church will never agree to the theory that in private life a man may recognize the importance of morality and the authority of the Church, and disregard both in his public life.
Since the Church admits the moral necessity of the State as such, she does "among the various kinds of State rule not disapprove of any, provided the respect due to religion and the observance of good morals be upheld." "There is no doubt but that in the sphere of politics ample matter may exist for legitimate difference of opinion, and that, the single reserve being made of the rights of justice and truth, all may strive to bring into actual working the ideas believed likely to be more conducive than others to the general welfare."{8}
The immediate purpose of all civil society is to secure tranquillity of public order "that this may . . . supply the sheltering care which perfects a man's moral life," "therefore they who are engaged in framing constitutions and enacting laws should bear in mind the moral and religious nature of man, and take care to help him, but in a right and orderly way, to gain perfection, neither enjoining nor forbidding anything save what is reasonably consistent with civil as well as with religious requirements. On this very account the Church cannot stand by indifferent as to the import and significance of laws enacted by the State, not in as far, indeed, as they refer to the State, but in so far as, passing beyond their due limits, they trench upon the eights of the Church. From God has been assigned to the Church the duty, not only to interpose resistance, if at any time the State rule should run counter to religion, but further to make a strong endeavour that the power of the Gospel may pervade the laws and institutions of the nations."{9}
Would it be possible for the head of the Church to use other language in speaking of the relation of secular life to religion? Does he not here fully recognize the liberty of citizens within the natural limits of the order instituted by God, assigning to the Church the duty of preserving these limits? There is here no sign of "ultramontane narrowness" in reference to the natural law; when Leo XIII speaks of defining and expanding this law in secular matters, he says that to do so belongs to the civil and not to the ecclesiastical authority.{10}
We have already seen that Pius X points out how obedience to the authority of the Church imposes no restrictions on the liberty of Catholics in purely secular matters.{11} Some remarks in the Encyclical "Singulari quadam," issued in 1912, are very important in their bearing upon our subject. The Pope begins by stating emphatically that the principles of Christian truth, as made known by the Church, and as applied with great acumen by Leo XIII to the social question, ought to guide our actions, not only in private, but in social and public life. He then goes on to say: "Whatever a Christian does, even in worldly affairs, he is not at liberty to disregard what is supernaturally good, but he must order everything towards the highest good as his final aim, in accordance with the precepts of Christian wisdom. All his actions, however, as far as they are morally good or bad, that is to say, as far as they are in accord with or transgress the natural and divine law, are subject to the judgment and jurisdiction of the Church."{12}
In the first sentence, therefore, the Pope impresses upon every Christian that it is his duty to direct and order his whole life and work towards the supernatural and moral final end. The special task allotted to the Church is to support and uphold this final end, the aim of all religious life, raising it above all the personal and social aims of this world. We have seen how man's natural conscience and sense of duty urge him to strive after the highest good, how his desire for happiness leads him beyond the joys of earth to those of heaven, and how the objects of all morality and progress find their complete realization only in God's glory.{13} But besides this we have seen that this exalted aim imposes no invidious or petty restrictions in the choice of earthly goods, and that whatever is naturally precious, noble, and beautiful is naturally akin to the highest creative good, and, if used aright, can be consecrated to the service of God. God, the infinite, omnipotent Good, imposes, it is true, a general obligation upon all our actions; but precisely because we are required to order everything, great and small, spiritual and secular, with reference to Him, we are free to choose for ourselves and are not the slaves of any creature. The authority of the Church confers the greatest benefit upon the spiritual and social life of society by insisting, in so unyielding a manner, upon a morality which modern ethical and intellectual teaching does not care to understand.{14}
The Church is in duty bound to judge all human actions, in so far as they are morally good or bad. Man ought to turn to God, not with some vague kind of desire, nor simply with a general good intention; but he must aim at his final end by doing his duty in a practical, specified way. Hence any institution designed to lead men to God and to everlasting perfection must be able to point the way to the goal by means of instruction and commandments, and to distinguish clearly between good and evil in human actions. "Teach ye all nations . . . to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you."
The Church judges nothing but the moral quality of an action, and this depends upon whether it is directed towards our highest aim. Man is left perfectly free to decide whether any action having reference to his immediate worldly interests is beneficial or prejudicial; and there are a multitude of such actions that are permitted and in fact necessary for the completion of life, and though these actions are subordinated to his highest aim, yet they cover a wide field of activity. The question for the Church to decide is whether a thing is morally good or bad, not whether it is economically useful, advantageous to the State, beautiful in art, important in literature, or technically successful. This point is brought out still more clearly in the next sentence in the Encyclical: "as far as they (i.e., man's actions) are in accord with or transgress the natural and divine law."
The law requires all human action to be directed to the highest aim of life and of the world; now this law is twofold: there is the law that God has impressed on the very nature of things and of the mind of man, and there is also the positive law of Revelation.
All action is subject to the authority of the Church, in so far as it harmonizes with, or is opposed to, this expression of God's will, made known in our reason and in Revelation. With regard to this, the moral aspect of human action, the Church has a right to the final judgment (judicium), because, according to the will of Christ, she is the highest teacher of mankind on points of faith and morals. For the same reason she possesses also the jurisdiction (jurisdictio) necessary for that purpose, having received from Christ the keys of the kingdom of heaven, viz., the commission to govern the Church of God. Since the rulers of the Church declare "the natural and the divine law" to be binding, not only in matters of doctrine, but also in practical life, they exercise a true, spiritual jurisdiction. Since they use their power according to the meaning and substance of the divine law (quatenus . . . congruunt aut discrepant), they show that they are not tyrants, but servants; that they do not narrow down the natural law, acting as an intolerant hierarchy, but interpret it faithfully; that they do not wish to keep the laity in leading strings, but to train them to use a real maturity, which consists in serving God.
The contents of the Encyclical "Singulari" are in absolute agreement with what was said on pages 365 seq. regarding the relation between Church and State. Secular matters are only indirectly subordinated to the jurisdiction of the Church, and are left to the free disposition of the State or to the individual (see pp. 361, 384). The old description of this indirect relation -- sub ratione peccati -- means the same as quatenus bonae aut malae sunt in genere morum. The former expression refers primarily to the Church's power of punishment (Innocent III: censura), the latter to jurisdictio in general. It is obvious that what applies to sin is applicable also to the opposite of sin; for sin is sin because it is an offence against moral duty. In the passages quoted on page 370, on the potestas indirecta, emphasis was invariably laid upon the fact, that its exercise was to prevent sin, i.e., offences against the moral law, and also to secure what is necessary," i.e., compliance with the demands of this law. We raise the same alternative when we ask whether a given action is good or bad. When this question is answered, and when, having considered the contrast between duty and sin, on which depend our relation to our final end and our lot for all eternity, as well as all moral order on earth, we decide in favour of duty, we may proceed with a quiet conscience to use our freedom of choice in all other respects.
Between and beside the contrasting extremes of duty and sin, there is a wide range of things that are indifferent, permitted, more or less good, and yet not commanded. We are left free to choose amongst objects and actions of this kind. We have here a complete refutation of the objection mentioned before, according to which the indirect subordination of everything moral to the authority of the Church leaves practically nothing to free choice. The potestas indirecta does not limit our selection of things morally permissible, or of means desirable but not compulsory, in attaining our final end. When this selection has to be limited because of the general welfare, it is in spiritual matters effected by the Church and by the State in secular.
The Church is bound to watch over secular affairs only for the purpose of preventing the aim for which she was founded, the highest good of mankind, from being frustrated or imperilled, of which there is danger in a secular way because all aims are intimately connected. When this danger does not exist, the Church gives free rein to secular government and action.{15}
In matters of religion, on the contrary, even in the choice of things that are permitted and counselled, the Church imposes obligations binding upon the conscience of the individual; as, for instance, in defining how Sundays and feast days are to be observed, and in laying down rules for fasting, for ecclesiastical offices, vestments, rites, religious Orders, etc.
A similar refutation of the objection mentioned above may be derived from the words: quatenus . . . cum jure naturali et divino congruunt aut discrepant. In God's law as a whole there are laws that bind (leges imperantes), but also such as declare subjective rights and liberty (leges permittentes). If, therefore, the authority of the Church, in as far as it controls all things, and hence secular actions also, desires to conform to the standard and scope (quatenus) of the divine law, it must certainly have the purpose of maintaining and protecting, not of curtailing, the leges permittentes, the moral rights and liberty proclaimed by the natural law, when it declares secular aims and work to be universally permissible.{16}
The jurisdictio with which the Church watches over the natural and divine law may bring about permanent protective regulations in the form of canonical laws (leges humano-ecclesiasticae). Just as the State enacts positive laws and imposes penalties, thus adding weight to the natural law that forbids murder and theft, so the Church, too, has power to inflict punishment for spiritual and secular offences, and so support the law of God by ecclesiastical laws. As we have already seen, the ratio peccati does not only repress and limit, but it also prevents and averts sin. Not only sin committed but also the danger of sinning justify both State and Church in the issuance of laws. Hence when Suarez is trying to define the nature of potestas indirecta{17} he points out in reference thereto that theoretically this power aims at preserving the divine law inviolate, but that practically, in order to prevent any such violation, it is forced to have recourse to canonical legislation of its own. It would be possible to argue that in such cases the obligation even to avoid all danger of sin is already prescribed by the divine law. This is undoubtedly true in the case of many who are personally in danger of sinning, but it is seldom or never true for all. If then, for the sake of the public good, the authority proceeds to demand definite guarantees and to issue definite prohibitions and restrictions, they have a binding force for those Christians also who were previously not bound at all. In such cases the heads of the Church are as a rule satisfied with proclaiming what is strictly moral, with issuing paternal warnings and admonitions, and with using their influence to counteract evil and promote the welfare of souls. Sometimes, however, things not in themselves sinful, but only morally doubtful, are formally forbidden, as, for instance, when secular works are placed on the index, and when Catholics are ordered to refrain from joining certain secular societies, or from attending non-Catholic schools, etc.{18}
The Encyclical of Pius X contains, besides the important passages that we have already discussed, a number of others in which he speaks of bringing authoritative influence to bear upon secular life, and especially upon the labour associations of workmen, and he mentions as the motive for so doing its "direct or indirect contact with the sphere of religion and morality." The social question as a whole is not merely economic, but "also a moral and religious question"; and important problems connected with it, since they touch the sphere of religion and morality, come under the judgment of the Church. Under certain conditions associations of workmen of different creeds are permitted; but they involve or "may" involve dangers to the religion and morals of Catholics, dangers to their faith, their obedience to the Cburch, and to the virtues of justice and charity in their relations to other workmen; hence the Church, in her pastoral office, is justified in taking precautions. In carrying out their worldly objects, these associations are not allowed to uphold any doctrines or perform any actions contrary to the principles laid down by the Church. With regard to individual Catholics it is taken for granted that they are "to suffer no harm" through membership in such associations, and that they are "not to neglect the morality taught by Catholicism or to diverge from it even by a hair's breadth." Over these conditions the bishops are to watch most carefully (attentissime vigilabunt), since they are essential if Catholics are to be allowed to join these societies. With reference to the other precautionary measure, -- it stands first in the text of the Encyclical -- we are told, in a less peremptory fashion, that "care must be taken" (curandum est) to induce the Catholic members of trades unions to join also Catholic industrial associations; "we are certain" (pro certo habemus), writes the Holy Father, "that in their zeal for the integrity of the faith, these members will be ready to make some sacrifices to secure this end."
The Encyclical contains also an allusion to the difference between purely Catholic countries and those where various denominations prevail; and it points out the consequences, resulting from this difference, in the contact between things ecclesiastical and secular. If we look at history, we shall find many differences due to causes of this kind; in some cases we shall discover an extension of the spiritual authority beyond its theoretical limits, such as is sometimes called for by the backward, immature state of the people, sometimes due to the voluntary submission of the faithful to the bishops in a patriarchal relation between them, sometimes due to an historical intermingling of spiritual and civic rights and laws. There are cases where a newly connected community forms, as it were, one family; where a little flock of Christians holds closely together against a superior hostile power; where the faithful, on account of their natural weakness, or their Christian idealism, bestow upon their spiritual shepherd also the rights of a father and of a temporal shepherd, and where the shepherd stoutly upholds these rights and uses them for the benefit of the community. We have instances of such a theocratic rule in some of the early Christian communities and in the position occupied in them by the bishop in his religious, social, and judicial functions. In later times we have a very remarkable instance of theocratic rule in the Reductions founded by the Jesuits in Paraguay. In a different manner, and by a special dispensation of Providence, the secular authority of the bishops developed into the Church-State. Furthermore, as already stated, things spiritual and secular were throughout the Middle Ages in close contact and connection.
The Holy See at the present time watches authoritatively over the political organization and activity of Catholics in Italy, because the Pope claims a right to the Church-State, and the Italian government has in consequence assumed an attitude of hostility against him. Here again we have the ratio peccati, the danger of sanctioning this wrong, or any other injury to morals or religion which has given rise to the precautionary measure Non expedit. It contrasts with, and forms an exception to, the reserve displayed otherwise by Leo XIII and Pius X on questions of political life.
The first sentence of the new programme of the Unione Elettorale Cattolica contains a clear recognition of the fact that Italy occupies a peculiar position, unlike that of other nations. "If all the Catholic associations in Italy ought to be more closely connected with and more thoroughly subject to the Holy See than those of other countries, owing to the peculiar circumstances of our native land, the home of the Papacy, the association of Catholic voters (Unione Elettorale Cattolica) has still more urgent need of this close connection and submissive obedience."{19}
Throughout our defence of Catholic morals we have observed the profound and harmonious connection existing between liberty and necessity, between authority and rational independence. There is no less a harmonious connection between God's absolute dominion and power and a relative autonomy of the created intellect;{20} between the unyielding obligation of the moral law and personal freedom of choice in the case of probable duties;{21} between the absolute necessity and worth of the highest Good and the conditional value attaching to finite good and aims;{22} and between the complete submisson of the heart to the law of charity and the limited obligation of other virtues.{23}
In the question that we are now discussing it is also evident that all human action, in virtue of its moral nature, is connected with the one thing needful, the preparation for the next life, and with the authority of the Church; but that at the same time it retains its truly human liberty of movement, which is even more assured and more beneficial the more firmly it is based upon these religious forces. What could be more decisive for a man's moral lifework than his choice of a vocation? Yet the Church exerts her influence upon his choice only to the extent of upholding and making more important the seriousness of the moral decision; whilst at the same time she insists upon the liberty of the individual, and protects it from all coercion on the part of parents, teachers, or State -- yes, even from all ecclesiastical pressure.
The state of matrimony is regarded by the Church, not as a purely secular condition, but as sanctified by morality and religion, and from this point of view it is subject to her laws; but having once declared these laws to be binding, the Church, more than any other power, champions free choice of husband or wife; she protects the weaker partner and the children, and does not allow the happiness of married life to be violated by any destructive ideas of liberty.
In art she insists that moral aims and rules should be respected and forbids any productive genius to disregard them; but this severity is beneficial, since it guards the sanctuary of art from sensual desecration and yet leaves both religious and worldly artists free to choose their subjects and styles. Industrial and economic activity is regarded by the Church from a high, moral point of view, as connected "with justice and charity" (Singulari quadam). Only where justice prevails is a truly free interchange of service possible; only where charity is added to justice can men be just to human dignity. Even the effort to acquire wealth, an effort less in accord with ideal Christianity, has never been restricted by any attempt on the part of the Church to fix a limit to property, or to demand a definite sum to be given in alms. In the Encyclical the Pope expresses the wish that workmen may succeed in their efforts to attain to worldly prosperity and increase, and declares that they have a right to aim at securing a better position in life and at fairer (aequiorem) conditions of labour and wages.{24}
St. Thomas says: "All men are by nature equal, as, for instance, in what belongs to the preservation of the body and the propagation of the race. Hence, in matters relating to marriage, to the preservation of chastity, or in things of a similar nature, servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents."{25} In another place he says: "There are things regarding which man is so completely his own master, that he may do them contrary even to the commands of the Pope; for instance, in observing chastity and heeding other divine counsels."
Christianity proclaimed these "natural rights of man" long before humanism or the Revolution did so; and to the present day the Church defends them with greater fidelity than the politics or world views of Liberalism. Leo XIII insisted that the liberty of choice in the matters of matrimony and vocation, and in acquiring property, is a natural-born right of the human personality. He emphasized particularly the natural constitution and justification of the family. "The family, the society of the home, is a society, limited indeed in numbers, but no less a true society, anterior to every kind of State or nation, invested with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the civil community."{27}
A father's authority has the same exalted source as human life itself, and neither State nor Church can interfere with the natural rights that God has assigned to him. Family life leads to progress, to material effort, and mental education. The advance of civilization and the improvement of mankind by means of art and science, technical knowledge and industry, are to a great extent dependent upon the use made of liberty and upon the awakening of the energy of the individual. We have already seen that Church and State do not aim at bringing all human actions directly under their control, although occasionally the State has chosen to assume undue powers, and certain modern theories of government would assign to it the right to do so. Parents decide how to arrange their household, how to bring up their children, how to manage their property. A merchant may choose the market for his goods, a manufacturer may determine what he will produce, all without any interference from governmental supervision. A student is free to carry on his scientific research, and an artist creates his works at the impulse of his own inspiration; neither Church nor State is concerned with our place of residence, our work and recreation, our friendships, our social intercourse or our travels. All these things appear to be in the widest sense indifferent to Church and State and are not directly connected with either authority. "Civilization," too, extends beyond the direct influence of these two powers. When we speak of "society," we have a somewhat more definite factor of human life parallel to Church and State; its peculiarity consists chiefly in the freedom with which its functions are discharged.{28}
The indirect dependence of civil society upon these two supreme authorities remains, however, undisturbed, and there are plainly innumerable ways in which society benefits by its relation to them both. Civilization would break up into chaos and confusion without the strong support of these divinely instituted powers. The State affords outward protection, the security of the law, and the economic conditions of life; the Church, having actually given rise to modern civilization, stands in still closer connection with society, and supplies it with the moral ideas and forces and the religious inspiration and sanctification indispensable to its well-being. In order to carry out this task, the Church must have full independence and maintain her reputation inviolate. She knows that real liberty of thought and conscience invariably tends to her own good, and that an appeal to freedom is always a powerful means of awakening vigorous religious life.{29}
I have already pointed out how few restrictions the Church has laid down in matters of religion, matters which are peculiarly her own sphere; from the outset she has been guided by an idea, put into words by St. Augustine, that a religion which had received from its Founder only a few easy and simple means of salvation, ought not to be weighed down in her development by slavish burdens.{30} This is still more true with regard to general progressive activity. In civil and secular matters the rights of subjects have with the lapse of time largely increased in number and extent; the standard of education has been raised and the mental outlook expanded. At the present time individuals are more clearly differentiated, and are more capable of independent thought, feeling, and action. And the Church takes this into account; she has to see that her regulations are useful and efficacious to mankind as actually existing, and she knows, as Cardinal Cavagnis remarks, that whilst a too great restriction on liberty may deter men from much evil, it is also apt to destroy the energy to do good.{31}
In the same manner as the freedom of the individual mainfested itself first in the founding of the family, the earliest form of society, so does a high and progressive civilization lead to the establishment of various free associations. The more a State appreciates civil and intellectual energy, the more readily will it facilitate and encourage such associations.{32}
Such an association resembles a personality, with this difference, that it may single out certain aims of the human being and centre its interest upon them. During the ages of persecution the Church herself made use of the Roman system of association in order to secure her existence; and subsequently she gave free scope to the formation of religious and secular associations by her members. In doing so she was careful to prevent them from going astray and to maintain their living union with Christianity as a whole; and she accomplished this by intensifying the love of the Church in the members of these associations, and by introducing into them practices calculated to edify and to stimulate the religious spirit.
Leo XIII refers here to the guilds of the Middle Ages, and says: "they were not only the means of affording many advantages to the workmen, but in no small degree promoted the advancement of art." He alludes also to the confraternities and similar societies which, "in their religious aspect, claim rightly to be responsible to the Church alone."{33}
According to the ecclesiastical right of association religious societies are naturally subject to the authority of the Church, either because they have received special authorization, and so rank as Church associations, or because they owe their origin to the pious intentions of individuals, and so are private, religious associations. The Church does not only watch over such associations spiritually, but she may issue regulations for their practical organization and management. To this class belong associations formed simply for pious purposes, for beautifying public worship, for imparting religious instruction, for helping foreign missions, etc.{34}
Numerous other organizations exist amongst Catholics for the promotion of the social and spiritual welfare of the people, and to encourage education and the growth of arts and sciences, and in such a way as to include the treatment of questions of morals and world views, in the light of the final end of mankind. They deal also with subjects of a "mixed" nature, analogous to those that lie on the border line between Church and State; and so we have to recognize the right of the Church to issue orders and exercise supervision over all that affects the interest of religion. To this class of organizations belong mothers' guilds, charitable associations, the society of St. Vincent de Paul, associations of Catholic teachers, students' associations, boys' clubs, workmen's guilds, local or national Catholic women's leagues, and Catholic federations. All these have relation to the authority of the Church in many different ways. In some cases the bishops have taken a part in establishing these associations and in laying down their rules; in others they have grown from small beginnings and private undertakings, or have arisen spontaneously. Priests are official directors of some, advisers of others, whilst in others again there is only the consciousness of a community of interests between laity and clergy.
But there are still other associations of Catholics, formed for purely secular purposes, for asserting political rights, for trade and economic advantage, for promoting art and science, sports and social intercourse. From the point of view of civil and ecclesiastical law, these associations, too, must bear a moral character of some sort, and be morally permissible or beneficial.{35}
As their character is determined by their secular aim, we may say of them what we say of the State, the largest secular organization, and of the individual with regard to his secular occupation, viz., that they are subject to the authority of the Church only indirectly, in as far as their activity affects the sphere of religious and moral obligations. Of Catholic associations in general (as distinguished from ecclesiastical) Hollweck says: "These associations do not as such belong to the jurisdiction of the Church, unless they expressly and of their own accord submit to it. They are free in their sphere of activity as they are in their formation. But precisely because they call themselves Catholic, the Church is to some extent responsible for them, and cannot ignore them. It is also self-evident that they are bound to do honour to the Church, both in their official management and in their whole activity; they must support and not injure her. Consequently they must always stand in some sort of relation to the authorities in the Church, who doubtless have the right to interpose instructions and admonitions, or even to punish and to suppress any association that threatens to be prejudicial to the interests of the Church, or that encourages a state of affairs opposed to religion and morality." The Church, however, has no desire to restrict and limit the freedom of action, which alone renders possible a full development of the resources of such associations.{36}
Direct control by the Church, or representation of her authority "within the organization itself," is not necessary, nor even desirable, in the case of associations formed for secular purposes.{37}
We have seen how, in his Encyclical "Rerum novarum," Leo XIII refers to the splendid organization of civil life in the Middle Ages (see p. 402). The guilds and confraternities of artisans, artificers and merchants, were not only Catholic in fact, but they were most intimately connected with the Church, by special services, and by their own altars and chaplains. According to the best authorities, however, they were not, as economic organizations, directly under the control of the Church, and were neither sanctioned nor officially directed by the bishops, unless these happened to be also secular rulers. There are still many Catholic associations having a free relation with the Church, but not subject to her, and no abuses have arisen in consequence.
On the other hand, the dangers resulting from times of religious discord and unsettled social conditions are undoubtedly greater to the associations of to-day than they were formerly; and they effect more particularly such associations that have a wide range of activity and come into contact with various religious beliefs. Attention was drawn to these dangers in the introduction to the Encyclical "Singulari." In the case of associations designated "Catholic," it must be borne in mind that the public prestige of the Church is bound up with this title, and is affected by it even more than by the behaviour of an individual Catholic. Moreover, the force of any tendency is increased by the weight of corporate union and by the extent to which it is felt. Hence Church and State are both entitled to watch over the activities of corporations and associations, and, if necessary, to demand of them formal guarantees, such as would not be required of private persons. In joining an association the individual in some degree renounces his liberty and places his resources and his confidence at the disposal of its officers, and in this way these acquire a more or less public position and influence. The highest authorities in Church and State may, therefore, consider themselves bound to watch over the interests of the individual, and see to it that the associations are managed in accordance with the objects for which they were formed and for the general good.
In writing to the bishops of Italy, on June 11, 1905, Pius X urged them seriously to study the social question, and then to take firm, energetic, and organized measures for the revival of "Christian action" in Italy. Purely religious undertakings ought, he said, to be under the direct control of the bishop of the diocese; but other endeavours, having a more general reference to Christian life, may have a freer organization, adapted to their aims and extending beyond the limits of the various dioceses. "But these associations are not independent of the counsel and supreme guidance of the ecclesiastical authorities, and must be based upon the fundamental principles of Christian doctrine and morals; moreover, they are all subject to the 'motherly vigilance' of the Church. They must, however, from their nature enjoy reasonable freedom of action, as they are themselves responsible for what they do, especially in secular and economic matters and in things connected with the public administration of the State, with which the purely spiritual office is not concerned."{38} No less important is Rome's attitude towards the Sillon, a famous association of young men in France. Far from regarding it with suspicion, Leo XIII allowed these young Catholics to draw up their far-reaching programme themselves, and gave them much encouragement. The experience of the French bishops, however, showed that the Sillon was doing harm, and their report to this effect caused Pius X on August 25, 1910, to require the various groups of the association to be confined each to one diocese, and to be subject to the bishop of that diocese. The reason for this drastic proceeding is given in the introduction to the brief: "The directors of the Sillon maintain that their sphere of activity is not that of the Church, and say that they aim only at worldly, not at spiritual advantages, and that the Sillonist . . . is subject to the universal laws of morality in neither a greater nor a less degree than every Catholic labourer, artisan, agriculturist, or politician, without being in a social sense any more dependent upon the authority of the Church than they are. It is easy to answer this argument. Who will believe that Catholic Sillonists, and the priests and seminarists who have joined their association, have nothing in view in their social activity except to promote the material interests of the workers? . . . The truth is that the directors of the Sillon acknowledge themselves to be inveterate idealists; that they propose to raise the working classes by first raising human consciousness; that they possess a sociology as well as philosophical and religious principles, by which human society is to be rebuilt upon a new foundation; that they have ideas of their own regarding the dignity of man, freedom, justice, and fraternity, and that in order to justify their social dreams they appeal to an interpretation of the Gospel all their own, and -- what is still more fatal -- they have a distorted and degraded idea of Christ. Moreover, they propagate these views in their students' societies, impress the same upon their members, and allow them to appear in their writings. They actually profess, therefore, to uphold a peculiar social, civil, and religious code of morals."{39}
The bishops are required to direct the new Sillons, because it is their object "to work for the Christian and Catholic revival of the people and at the same time for the betterment of their lot as labourers." It is regarded as a matter of course that "every Catholic Sillonist is left free in other respects and may retain his political convictions after he has purged them of all that is not in harmony with the doctrine of the Church. If isolated groups refuse to accept these conditions, the bishops are required to regard them as actually refusing to submit to their guidance. They will then have to find out whether these associations restrict themselves to promoting purely political and economical interests, or whether they adhere to their old errors. In the former case the bishops have no more to do with them than with the business affairs of the faithful in general; in the latter, however, they have to deal with them with firmness as well as with prudence."{40}
The good and bad characteristics of the age in which we live have caused the rulers of the Church to give all possible freedom to the laity within their own sphere of action, and at the same time to insist upon the authority of the Church and to make it felt. There is a great deal of good(1) in the high value set upon the Christian character and the development of its personality. The advance of education and the growth of social freedom have made men wish to be guided in their actions by their own intelligence. Christian education aims at producing this inward independence. The cardinal virtue of prudence is a kind of moral self-guidance; fortitude adds decision in action to theoretical insight, and every Christian ought to possess both these virtues. Supernatural sanctity intensifies and does not weaken our ability to think and act. "They shall all be taught of God."{41} "His unction teacheth you of all things."{42} Just as a youth never develops into manhood if he is always kept by his parents in leading strings, so Catholics, who have grown up in seclusion under too close guardianship are often exposed to double danger when they encounter men of other religious beliefs. The inert strata of society may be easily guided, but when once they have been led astray, it is difficult to enlighten them and win them back to what is good and true. The Polish sect known as the Mariavites is an illustration of this fact.
If the erroneous socialistic doctrines now prevalent amongst the labouring classes are to be overcome, we must have Christian workmen with active minds who have received a moral and technical training, In the Encyclical "Singulari" we are told that the directors of Catholic workingmen's associations, since they have a clear insight into the circumstances of the time, especially with reference to the duties of justice and charity, would undoubtedly be prepared to instruct the workingmen concerning those commandments and precepts which it is necessary or expedient for them to know thoroughly, in order to be able to take part in the work of their associations in accordance with the principles of Catholic teaching.
(2) Every department of labour is constantly becoming more complex and more finely differentiated, and this makes it harder for priests to acquire enough technical knowledge to settle concrete questions that may arise out of secular occupations. Moreover, after individuals have been taught the Christian principles of morality, by means of sermons and religious instruction, they can decide ordinary matters concerning their occupation for themselves. But in the case of associations, the significance of their decisions is generally greater and affects more the public respect of their faith; but at the same time they benefit by gaining a wider experience, so that they afford to men, who are well disposed, an opportunity of obtaining information and correcting mistakes. Provided, therefore, that the conscience of the laity has been carefully trained in the manner mentioned above, and that the associations are following a normal course and not giving occasion for complaints, the concrete application of moral principles can frequently be left to their decision. Exceptional difficulties may occur in corporate, as well as in individual life, and then it is well to be able to have recourse to a spiritual adviser; it is also important for associations to be actively in touch with the clergy.{43}
(3) Too close a connection, between secular interests and disputes on the one hand and the pastoral activity of the Church on the other, would tend to make the Church responsible for failures, and thus might do considerable harm to the work of the clergy.
The Pastoral admonishes parish priests in general not to be too ready to interfere in secular disputes.{44} In a decree issued by Pius X in 1910, he forbids priests to act as trustees of the finances of charitable institutions, and points out that such occupations have tended to withdraw the clergy from the work of their high calling and to entangle them in secular business, with all the anxieties, troubles, and dangers inseparable from it. Similar and perhaps greater improprieties result when priests take too direct a part in the proceedings and quarrels of trades unions.{45} He goes on to say that a priest ought to stand superior to the conflicting interests of different classes. However much he would desire to promote Catholic economic organizations in general, he ought to think seriously how far he can practically coöperate in such business without involving himself in unedifying obligations, injurious to his spiritual dignity. In a brief addressed on April 22, 1911, to the Archbishop of Toledo, the Holy Father urges the Spanish bishops, in the interest of their own authority, not to take part in any political strife without very good reason for doing so. He says: "In all that concerns public elections and political combinations, honourable liberty of action should be left to Catholic men without detriment to the obedience due to the laws and authority of the Church." Preventive censorship of newspapers is to cease, and the corrective censorship prescribed in the Encyclical "Pascendi" is to be carried on opportune et secreto. The censors are to refrain from touching upon purely civil and political matters, "as on these subjects Catholic writers are perfectly free to say and think what they like, having due respect to charity and justice."{46}
In recent times, therefore, the Popes have repeatedly and most clearly expressed tbeir desire that the independent activity of the laity should be respected, where it rests on a foundation of Catholic faith and life. It would, however, be a disastrous error to assume that in our age of universal education and political and social liberty, the conscience of the faithful needs, on matters not concerned with supernatural dogmas, no longer to be guided by authority. On the contrary, reverence and practical obedience to the authority of the Church are still indispensable and most beneficial, since (1) they counteract the individualism that threatens to split up Christian civilization. Not dogma alone, but also the lofty morality of Christianity and the disposition of mind and social feeling engendered by it, have, through the spiritual authority and the obedience of the laity, become a great power in the world, and it cannot be detached from this support without destroying all its vitality, universal validity, and efficacy. Too many consider themselves qualified to criticise the rulers of the Church, although the tone and substance of their arguments show plainly how far they are from having fathomed the moral problem or grasped the bearing of the law upon society. They are rather influenced by their own personal experience and interests, and by their national and social prejudices. In the discussion of political legislation affecting only a single State, conflicting opinions and interests reveal themselves and appear almost irreconcilable, so that often men have to be admonished to use self-restraint and to regard distributive justice; indeed, the authority of the State is needed to prevent disruption. What would become of the Church, that embraces all the nations of the world, if the self-glorifying will of each individual be allowed to interpret the law of Christian morality as he thought fit; if the sense of reverence for Pope and bishops did not form a bond of union between Catholics far stronger than any external compulsion?
(2) A further reason for regarding obedience to the Church as indispensable may be found in the widely spread tendency to overvalue everything new, -- a tendency that might well be called Modernism if another definite meaning had not been assigned to this word. Never so much as at the present time has the spirit of the age been so perceptible a force; and never has it so thoroughly confused men's judgment. Never, too, have the phases of its development succeeded one another so rapidly. As the external conditions of life have changed so unmistakably, many people believe that they may base their moral life and aspirations on new foundations, or at least disregard Christian morality altogether in important individual matters. What is old is assumed to be obsolete, and the strict adherence to inherited laws and customs, upon which the Church insists, is regarded as opposed to all progress. Even Catholics are affected by these new theories of ethical reform, which are actually the outcome of an unworthy, pagan view of life; the marriage bond is loosened, forbidden practices prevail in married life, dangerous innovations in pedagogy, and dishonourable maxims in commerce and politics, corrupt the judgment of the masses and threaten to destroy national life. The "enlightened conscience of the educated classes often proves to be shortsighted and incapable of averting the danger; and it is not until the disastrous results of all these things are felt by society, not until some popular movement ends in a fiasco, not until some sober student of ethics utters impressive words of warning, that men to some extent return to their senses and to the tried wisdom of their ancestors, -- in other words, to the Catholic principles underlying society. Is it not therefore much more suitable and advantageous for Catholics to remember this wisdom in the first place and to be true to its practical expression, and to ascribe to the admonitions of the Church greater importance than to the current ideas of the moment, since she deals with these social problems dispassionately, having profound knowledge and experience of mankind? It is true of course that this submission involves some humiliation of human nature, and perhaps even painful self-renunciation in some cases where the demands of the Church clash with the favourite opinions of the individual.
(3) Finally there is a sort of naturalism, a tendency to follow one's own way, which rebels against all restrictions; sometimes also a disposition, that is not in fact arrogant self-assertion, but which desires to defend the natural human rights of Christians, and even the importance and reputation of the Church. However much justification there may be for this sense of human liberty, and how noble this enthusiasm for the Church, we must not forget that Christianity is professedly not a religion encouraging the unbridled development of a man's natural self, but that from the very beginning it has regarded humility in faith and life, and the willing acceptance of the Cross and suffering for the sake of eternal salvation, as the very central points in its doctrines. Christ came into the world, not to be served, nor to command, but to serve and be obedient even to the death on the Cross; and He taught His followers that the disciple was not to be above his Master, nor the servant above his Lord. The time will never come when the pure and devoted practice of the Catholic religion can vie with the "world" m encouraging unrestricted development of man's natural faculties, for this is impossible, unless our Lord's words and example and the constant teaching of Christianity are to lose all force.
A Catholic in such circumstances will inevitably be aware that in the eyes of the children of this world he is not "up to date"; but in compensation he enjoys peculiar privileges, natural as well as supernatural. Even an unmerited slight, a consequence which might seem undesirable to the individual, ought not to depress a true Catholic, or make him pessimistic and inclined to abandon his religion; it ought rather to prove and purify him, and add to the depth and maturity of his character.
Midway between the two extremes of individualism and socialism lies the truth regarding social life. It regards society as an organism; not simply an aggregate of private rights and interests, but having a higher life of its own, and embodying higher aims. The union of the atoms in a living organism does not preclude or replace their movement, and, in the same way, the union of men in society does not preclude or replace the activity of the individual, but gives it life and completeness, and makes men collectively capable of achieving what would be beyond their power singly. In the social organism more than elsewhere this union is preserved by authority, and by voluntary submission to and acquiescence in it.
Far more perfectly is this organic character realized in the Church, the Lord's body, than in the State. Not only does she in extent surpass all the kingdoms of the world, but there resides in her a higher, supernatural, and living spirit, binding individuals together to form one living whole; she possesses in abundance graces and forces, fertile in results, and such as no mere collection even of millions of units can claim. Here, again, the guarantee of this living unity is authority, an authority just as supernatural and owing its origin directly to God: "He that heareth you, heareth me, and he that despiseth you, despiseth me; and he that despiseth me, despiseth Him that sent me."{47} The vital warmth, the sense of union that animates the body of this society, is the heartfelt devotion to the Church and a cheerful obedience, based, not on compulsion, but on liberty; not on fear, but on reverence and love.
{1} See supra, p. 368, note 1.
{2} Report of the proceedings of the Royal Academy of Science, Berlin, 1913, VII, 182.
{3} Klerikalismus und Laizismus, 1906, p. 56.
{4} Libertas, p. 110 c. T. 5.
{5} Ibid., p. 118 c. T. 5.
{6} Ibid., p. 122.
{7} Ibid., p. 130; cf. Graves de communi, p.244 C.T.S., where workmen are commended for wishing to acquire economic independence.
{8} Sapientiae, p. 165 c. T. s. Non dubium est, quin quaedam sit in genere politico honesta contentio. cum scilicet incolumi veritate iustitiaque certatur, ut opiniones re usuque valeant, quae ad bonum commune prae ceteris conducibiles videantur.
{9} Sapientiea, p. 166 C.T.S.
{10} Libertas, p. 108 C.T.S.
{11} See supra, p. 356, note 1.
{12} Quidquid homo christianus agat, etiam in ordine rerum terrenarum, non ei licere bona negligere, quae sunt supra naturam, immo oportere, ad summum bonum, tanquam ad ultimum finem, ex christianae sapientiae praescriptis, omnia dirigat; omnes autem actiones eius, quatenus bonae aut malae sunt in genere morum, id est cure jure naturali et divino congruunt aut discrepant, judicio et jurisdictioni Ecclesiae subesse.
{13} See supra, Chaps. I, IV, VI.
{14} Cf. infra, Chap. 10, II.
{15} Cf. Bellarmine (supra, p. 370) and Leo XIII (supra, p. 402). To a genuine Christian attingere religionem et legem moralem means more than a mere external contract, such as would restrict purely secular action unaffected by ethical considerations. From the foundation of his religious consciousness and his conscience a Christian must in some way know that a worldly aim or action is morally permissible before he can venture upon it and use his liberty in connection with it. In this sense the word attingere implies touching the innermost moral centre of all life and action. The Church is vigilant to protect this centre and to uphold moral duty on all sides; what lies on the periphery in the sphere of the indifferent or permissible, is left free.
{16} H. Pesch, Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie, II (1909), 221: "On the other hand, none ought to question the Church's glorious mission to bring the divine law of morality to bear suitably upon every department of human, and therefore also of economic life; nor should she be hindered in directing the conscience of her members. In this sense there can be for us no separation between society and the Church." Biederlack, Theol. Fragen über die gewerkschaftl. Bewegung, 1910, p. 7: "Therefore the Church, being empowered to exercise both the teaching and pastoral offices, has a right, as well as the duty, to issue general regulations for the movements in the interest of labour, for the purpose of upholding the laws of morality, and, in case anything hostile to the Christian moral law is planned or carried out, to bring the movement back again into the right path." Cavagnis, op. cit., II, n. 204: Nemini jus est inboneste agendi; qui enim independens est, non subest alterius imperio, donec limites honestatis non egrediatur; intra hos limites libere administrat, cum modum eligendo, qui ei placeat. E contra, qui (directe) subditus est, tenetur parere praecepto superioris non modo, ut inhoneste non agat, sed etiam, ut eo tantum ex honestis modis utatur, qui a superiore praescribitur. . . . Qui independens est in suo ordine temporali, corrigitur ab Ecclesia, quia proprium ordinem praetergressus est, offendendo moralitatem, cujus ratione subditus est Ecclesiae. Hoc autem sub respectu generico omnes fideles subditi sunt Ecclesiae sive privati sive principes.
{17} See p. 368, note 1. Cf. also De leg., IV, c. II, 9.
{18} Cf. Cavagnis, III, n. 29.
{19} Westf. Merkur, 1911, No. 184; cf. the Encyclical of Pius X quoted on page 363, note 1.
{20} See Chap. I.
{21} See Chap. III.
{22} See Chap. VI.
{23} See supra, pp. 193, seq.
{24} To give a few more modern instances of the difference between indirect and direct authority: the Church can and does forbid the use of the cinematograph in churches; she may have reasons for forbidding priests and religious to ride bicycles, but she cannot generally prohibit bicycles, and to cinematograph performances in secular places she objects only if they are morally bad or dangerous.
{25} S. theol., II, II, qu. 104, a. 5.
{26} In IV sent. dist., 38, q. 1, a. 4 c.
{27} Rerum novarum, p. 184 c. T. S.
{28} Cf. supra, p. 356. H. Pesch (Nationalökonomie, I, 71) thinks that the collective name "society" expresses an important principle of social life, and emphasizes the prominence assigned in it to liberty.
{29} A. Weiss, op. cit., IV, 1084. "The growth of true education of heart and mind, and the strengthening of the sense of personal freedom, ultimately promote devotion to the interests of the Church. It is only in moments of excitement, when the masses become devoid of will and judgment and are swayed by catch phrases and the influence of so-called public opinion, that they allow themselves for a time to be stirred up to hostility against the Church."
{30} St. Augustine, Ep. 55, 35; 54, 1; De doctr. christ., III, 13. In writing against Calvin, Bellarmine remarked that these passages expressly justify the Church in making commandments, and by no means condemn her.
{31} Cavagnis, I, n. 117; cf. III, n. 114, In the passage quoted on page 363 Pius X also referred to "many radical changes in social and public life," especially to the present possibility and duty of making an energetic use of civil liberties.
{32} Rerum novarum, p. 210 c. T. s. "Natural impulse . . . binds men together in civil society, and it likewise leads them to join together in associations of citizen with citizen; associations which, it is true, cannot be called societies in the full sense of the word, hut which, notwithstanding, are societies. . . . The State has not the privilege to prohibit them as a general thing. For to form a "society" of this kind is the natural right of man; the State, however, is there to protect natural rights, not to destroy them." A. Weiss, op. cit., p. 117. "Of course all these proper, great, and necessary societies cannot be an obstacle to the formation of free associations, as long as the latter offer no hindrance to what is for the public good" (Cavagnis, III, n. 369).
{33} Rerum novarum, pp. 209, 211 c. T. S.
{34} Cavagnis, III, n. 358, etc.; Hergenröther-Hollweck, p. 398, etc.
{35} Cavagnis, I, n. 390; III, n. 365, etc.
{36} Hergenröther-Hollweck, op. cit., p. 405.
{37} Cf. H. Pesch, Nationalokonomie, II, 221. Biederlack, op. cit., p. 13. Ozanam's centenary has drawn attention particularly to the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, so highly esteemed by the Church. This society was founded by laymen, and according to its rules is managed by them, priests acting only as advisers, though the whole aim and object of the association is religious and moral.
{38} Acta S. Sedis, 1904-5, p. 760, etc.
{39} Cf. Etudes, Paris, 1910, tom. 125, p. 108.
{40} Etudes, tom. 125, p. 126, etc.
{41} 1 John vi. 45.
{42} 1 John ii. 27.
{43} Biederlack, op. cit., p. 16, etc.
{44} Luke xii. 14.
{45} Cf. the quotation on p.415 from the Pastoral of Pius X.
{46} The Latin text is given in the "Canoniste Contemporain," Paris, 1912, p. 216.
{47} Luke x. 16.