ART. I. -- ON WHAT THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS DEPENDS.
42. The morality of human actions conists in their relation to the end of man. -- Human actions are morally good when they lead man to his end; they are morally bad when they turn him from that end. For it belongs to every moral agent to act according to order, that is, with due subordination of means to its ultimate end.{1}
43. The ultimate external criterion of morality is the good of order apprehended by reason. -- Man's perfection consists in attaining his end, and his actions are the means by which he tends to that end. But, since God has given man both his being and his end, and since there is an intimate connection between the end and the means to attain it, it follows that these means are also given to man, and do not, in tbeir relation to his end, depend on his free choice. But this close dependence of the means on the end constitutes the good of order, which, however, does not become the term of a voluntary action until apprehended by reason. Therefore a human action is morally good when it is conformed to the good of order apprehended by reason, and it is morally bad in the contrary case. What constitutes the morality of an action is, then, something independent of man, and there is an intrinsic and objective difference between good and evil.{2}
44. The ultimate criterion of morality is not education, as Montaigne held; nor the opinion of peoples, as Saint-Lambert pretended; nor human laws, as Hobbes asserted; nor the good pleasure of God, as Puffendorf taught. -- The good of order which requires that each being should tend to an end conformable to its nature, is immutable like God himself, who being infinite wisdom cannot create a being destitute of an end, or with an end contrary to its nature. Therefore morality is immutable in its fundamental principles. But education, the opinion of peoples, and human laws are changing and variable; therefore they cannot be sources of morality. Besides, we judge of opinions, laws, and systems of education as to whether they are good or bad; therefore opinions, laws, and educational systems imply a higher principle on which they depend. As to the good pleasure of God, it is evident that, whatever Descartes (1596-1650) and Puffendorf (1632-1694) may say, what God could have willed otherwise than He does will, cannot be the source of morality, which is essentially immutable, since God having created man for a determinate end cannot but will honorable actions as leading to that end, and detest sinful actions as averting from that end.{3}
45. The judgment of the morality of actions belongs to intellect and reason alone. -- Truth is the proper object of intellect and reason; but, whether truth be speculative or practical, its nature does not change, since the difference is only accidental. Since, then, the judgment of the morality of actions is only a judgment about practical truth, it belongs to intellect and reason. Whatever sceptics may say, reason cannot be deceived as to first practical principles and their immediate consequences, any more than it can be deceived as to first speculative principles and the truths derived from them directly. The greater opposition manifested to first practical principles is explained by their end, which is to control the passions and subject them in all things to right reason.
46. It is absurd to say, with the Scotch school, that the judgment of the morality of actions belongs to a spiritual sense; still less is it to be admitted, with the materialists, that it belongs to a corporeal sense. -- The spiritual sense, as understood by the Scotch philosophers, Reid (1710-1796), Hutcheson (1694-1747), and Adam Smith (1723-1790), is a blind inclination that makes us judge spontaneously of moral good or evil. But man is intelligent and free, and can by no means be absolutely subject to the impulse of blind instinct. It is evident that the corporeal sense of the Sensists, Locke (1632-1704), Helvetius (1715-1771), Bentham (1748-1832), etc., cannot form moral judgments that are in themselves immutable and universal, for every sensation is essentially variable and particular.
ART. II. -- CONSTITUENT PRINCIPLES OF THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS.
47. The object of volition{4} apprehended by reason is the first principle of the morality of an action. -- The good of order is the foundation of morality. But the object presented to the will by reason, and viewed not simply but as agreeing with right reason, is the term of the action and specifies it. Therefore, according as this object is conformed to good order or not, the action will be good or bad, and the object will be the first constituent principle of the morality of the action, and by it the objective intrinsic difference between a good action and a bad one will be established. Therefore the object may be called the formal principle of a moral action, since it is, as it were, its substantial form; the free act or election of the will may be called the matter of a moral action.
48. The circumstances of an action are the constituent principle of its accidental morality. -- The object of the action and the unchangeable relation of the object to absolute order constitute the substance of the morality of an action; the accompanying circumstances are as the accidents of that morality. The perfection of the nature of beings depends not only on their substance, but also on their accidents; so, too, will the moral action be more or less perfect not only from its substance, but also from the accidents that accompany it, i.e., the circumstances. The principal circumstances are: The person who acted, what he did, by what means, in what manner, in what place, and at what time.{5}
49. The end of the subject operating is causally the constituent principle of the subjective morality of the action. -- Besides the natural end of the action (finis operis), there is the end depending on the subject operating (finis operantis), which may be identical with the former or different from it. If the object of the action is conformed to order, but the end of the subject is opposed to order, the end vitiates the action by the evil that it contains; in the contrary case it perfects it. If the object of the action is opposed to order, the end of the subject operating, even if it be conformed to order, will never make good what is intrinsically bad. This end, depending only on the will of the subject operating and distinct from the natural end of the action, determines the subjective morality of the action; the object and the circumstances constitute its objective morality.
50. That an action may be good, it must be without defect in its object, in its circumstances, and in its end. -- The three constituent principles of the morality of an action are the object, end, and circumstances; hence an action is good when each of these three principles is conformed to order (Bonam ex integra causa). If even one of these principles is contrary to order, the action will be bad, at least in part (Malum ex quocumque defectu).
51. Although abstractly there may be indifferent actions, in the concrete there can be none. -- It is the object that specifies the action. Now, as there are objects indifferent in themselves, i.e., presenting neither agreement nor disagreement with order, there are, therefore, actions indifferent in themselves. But in the concrete every action is vested with morality because of its circumstances, or, at least, of its end. For every action elicited with advertence of reason{6} is either ordained to an end or it is not. If it is so determined, it will necessarily be either good or bad. If it is not determined, it will in so far be bad, because every action ought to be in the order of reason, and reason demands that everything be conducted to its proper end. The external act that follows the action of the will, though in itself not free, and therefore not possessing a morality of its own, may yet accidentally affect the morality of the action of the will, since it gives to it greater intensity, implies a greater affection for it, and a fuller advertence to it.
52. Imputability is that quality in virtue of which every free action is attributed to some one as its author, just as an effect is referred to its cause. -- The man who acts freely is the true cause of the action; it is, therefore, with reason that every free action is attributed to him who does it. This attribution is called imputability, and although always joined to morality is yet distinct from it, since it does not constitute the morality of an action, but is rather a consequence of it.
53. From the imputability of human actions arises the reason of praise or blame. -- When a moral action is imputed to a man, he is considered as the author of the resultant good or evil, and is therefore judged worthy of esteem or contempt, of praise or blame. To praise or blame anyone is nothing but to impute to him the goodness or malice of his action.
ART. IV. -- MERIT AND DEMERIT.
54. Merit is that by which an action deserves recompense; demerit is that by which it deserves punishment. -- Conscience testifies to us that according as an action is good or bad it deserves to be rewarded or punished. Merit and demerit are, therefore, qualities that flow from an action as a consequence of its morality. The good merited is called a reward if preceded by no compact, otherwise it is pay. The evil merited is punishment, which, however, not all men may inflict upon those who injure them, for in most cases recourse should be had to the tribunals lawfully established for that purpose.{7}
55. Man by his actions may merit or demerit from his fellow-man. -- Man may do a good action that profits his fellow-man, or an evil action that injures him. Order requires that in the former case he receive a recompense in return; and, in the latter case, a punishment, that there may be a proportion between what he gives and what he receives.
56. Man by his actions may merit or demerit from society. -- Every man is a member of society. Therefore whoever does good or evil to his neighbor should receive a reward or a punishment not only from him, but from society, because to benefit or injure a member is to benefit or injure the whole body. If one does good or evil directly to society, he should first be rewarded or punished by it, and afterward by its members. If one even does good or harm to himself, he should likewise receive recompense or incur penalty from society, because he is a member.
57. Man may by his actions acquire merit or demerit before God. -- It is a duty for man to tend to God. Therefore if by his actions he departs from God, he deprives God of the glory due Him as the supreme good, and consequently he should be punished. Again, God is the sovereign legislator of the universe. Therefore an action merits or demerits before Him in proportion to its conformity or non-conformity to the universal order.
{1} Pantheists most logically deny the existence or the possibility of moral action, for they assert that God alone acts in creatures. Men, therefore, can be neither responsible nor free. A like conclusion must be drawn from the doctrines of those materialists who teach that morality is but a function of the brain.
{2} This conclusion overthrows the doctrine of Antinomies, set forth by the Transcendental School of Germany in its application to moral science.
{3} "No power in heaven above, nor on earth beneath, can dispense from any portion of the Natural Law. For the matter of the negative precepts of that law is . . . something bad in itself and repugnant to human nature, and accordingly forbidden by God; while the matter of the positive precepts is something good and nesessary to man, commanded by God." -- Moral Philosophy, Stonyhurst Series, p. 149.
{4} The object of volition includes both the end willed and the means to the end.
{5} It must be borne in mind that these circumstances are not elements essential to the physical integrity of a human action, for snch elements are contained in its object; but they are accidentally connected with the causes of the action. The priestly character of a person, for example, may affect the morality of an action. So, too, theft acquires a new species of malice when the object stolen is one consecrated to God.
{6} The discussion turns solely upon human actions, and therefore actions that are indeliberate, or necessary, or supernatural are excluded.
{7} Merit is condign (de condigno) if it is founded in the very work that is freely done, or in some compact. It is congruous if founded in the benevolence or liberality of him who bestows the reward.
The conditions requisite for acquiring merit or demerit are: 1, That the action be free ; 2, that it benefit or injure some other person than the agent; 3, that it be not obligatory from some previous contract