ART. I. -- MORAL DUTY.
58. Moral duty is the moral obligation resulting from the connection of the last end with the means necessary to attain it. -- Man is obliged to tend to his last end. But as it is necessary to take means to reach this end, it follows that these means are imposed on him as well as the end. The obligation of employing these means constitutes moral duty. If the means are conformed to the end, but not necessarily bound up in it, they are not imposed by an obligation in the strict sense of the word; if a man uses them he does a moral action, but he does not perform a duty, properly so called. Therefore a moral action is honorable when it is not commanded; it is just when it is obligatory. If the action be indifferent to the attainment of the end, it is then called lawful.
59. Moral duty is primitive or derivative, negative or positive. -- Primitive duty is that which is founded in man's necessary and essential relations to his end; such is the obligation "to love God." Derivative duty is that which arises from a primitive duty in consequence of some fact dependent on our liberty; as the duty "to fulfil an engagement one has made." Negative duty is that which forbids something; thus are we bound "not to lie." Positive duty is that which commands something; as the duty of "loving our parents." When a duty answers to some one's right, it is called juridical; such is the duty of "paying our debts."
60. The obligation of duty harmonizes with free will, because it is moral and not physical. -- A being is not free when subjected to physical violence; but when man apprehends by reason the necessary connection between means and end, he preserves in his will the power to employ these means or not. Therefore he remains free, and is under a moral obligation only.
61. Duty is absolute, immutable, and universal. -- Duty is absolute like man's end, since it is the necessary means of attaining the end. But though absolute as to the obligation that it imposes, it has degrees relatively to the greater or less moral perfection which it imparts to man. Thus duties to God are more perfect than any others; and duties to ourselves take precedence of those that we owe our neighbor. By the very fact that duty is absolute, it is clear that it must be universal and immutable; for all men have the same nature, which can no more change in its end than in its essence.
62. When several duties conflict, the most perfect is binding. -- Thus if, in a given case, a duty to God and a duty to ourselves cannot be accomplished without the sacrifice of one of them, it is patent that the second should be sacrificed. So, too, if a duty to ourselves conflicts with a duty to our neighbor, the latter should be sacrificed; for the bond of identity with ourselves is more intimate than that of likeness with our neighbor, which is the basis of our duties to him. Hence, in general, the perfection of a duty is determined from the dignity of the power that imposes it, or from the gravity of its matter, or the strength of its motive.{1}
63. In certain cases, necessity excuses from duty. -- The necessity is extreme, grave, or common, according as a man cannot fulfil the duty without exposing himself to an extreme evil, as death, or a grave evil, as loss of health, or an ordinary evil, as a slight loss of fortune. This last necessity never excuses from duty. The other two necessities do not excuse from a primitive and negative duty, because the natural law forbids what is essentially evil; and as no circumstance can change the nature of the evil, so is it equally incapable of rendering it lawful.{2} But if a duty is positive, an extreme or grave necessity may entirely exempt from it if the transgression of a negative duty is not thereby involved,{3} or allow one to put off fulfilling it to a more suitable time, because a positive duty does not always oblige us to perform the action commanded, but only in a fitting time and occasion. When the duty is derivative, excepting a few cases that are easily recognized,{4} necessity excuses from fulfilling it, because then the matter is indifferent in itself, and is binding only by reason of a circumstance freely posited by man.
ART. II. -- RIGHT.
64. The obligation of duty implies an inviolable moral power in respect to the actions and things necessary to fulfil the duty. This moral power is a right . -- If the obligation of attaining his end imposes a duty on man, it thereby grants him a right, that is, a moral power in respect to the necessary actions or things to fulfil the duty. This power is called moral, because it is found in moral beings only, and also to distinguish it from physical force. It is called inviolable, because as it rests upon order, no one can prevent its exercise. Lastly, this power is said to be exercised upon actions or things to indicate what the right is applied to, viz., action or the matter of action. Four things enter into the consideration of every right: a "subject in which that power is moral and inviolable; a term in respect to which that power is inviolable and which is bound not to injure it; a title which both produces that power in a subject and manifests it to others, by whom it is to be respected;" and the matter.{5}
65. Absolutely, right precedes duty; relatively, duty precedes right. -- Considered in itself right precedes duty, for it is from God's sovereign right over us that every duty flows. But if right and duty are considered relatively, i.e., as both are found in man, then we must say that duty precedes right, because man enjoys rights only in so far as he is bound to attain an end, for the gaining of which he must have the power to exercise his activity and to make use of many things.{6} When a duty is obligatory oniy because a right is actually exercised, then actual right precedes actual duty.
66. Right is necessary or arbitrary, connatural or acquired, negative or positive, rigorous or not rigorous, personal or delegated or real. -- Right is necessary or inalienable when it is the sole indispensable means of fulfilling a duty; such is the "right of a father to the respect of his son," corresponding to the father's duty of educating his son. Right is arbitrary or alienable when one may or may not exercise it without violating duty; as the "right of a creditor to be paid by his debtor." Right is connatural when it is founded in the very nature of man; as the "right to defend one's life." -- Connatural rights, says Russo (p. 102, § 139), are chiefly four: Man's right of tending to his ultimate end, arising from his personal dignity; the right to preserve his life unharmed; the right to independence in the lawful exercise of his faculties; the right to his own perfection. Right is acquired when it is founded on a fact freely caused either by one's own action, as the "right of dominion arising from occupation," or by the action of another person, as the "right of a child or minor," or from both together, as a "master's right to be served by his domestics." -- Negative right is that which imposes on others no obligation but that of not violating it, as the "right of property." Positive right is that which imposes an obligation of doing or giving something, as the "right to be paid by one's debtor." -- Rigorous or perfect right is that which rests on an evident title and has determinate matter; such is the "right to be paid a definite sum acknowledged by the debtor." If the matter be not determinate, the right is imperfect, as the "right to pity or friendship." A right is more or less rigorous according to the greater or less determination of the title and matter of the right. -- Right is personal when it is inherent in the person of its possessor. It is delegated when it has been communicated to another. It is real when it is considered as inherent in some thing which a person possesses.
67. Every right is essentially coactive. -- If intellect and will can act in virtue of right, they can likewise move the inferior powers to operate. Therefore, if in virtue of some right the will of a person can be morally compelled to some thing, so can the executive powers residing in the organism be compelled to some thing, and this is nothing else than coaction. It is to be noted, however, that coaction can be exercised only when the right is perfect; but very often in civil society it cannot be exercised by the possessor of the right, and then recourse should be had to the lawfully appointed guardian of the rights of the citizens.
68. In a conflict of rights{7} the less right yields to the greater. -- Thus, as divine right excels human, so should it prevail. But when the conflict ceases, the less right regains its power, because the order whence it is derived also exists.
69. Every right surpassing its natural limits is subversive of order. -- Absolutely, duty is the foundation of human right; if, therefore, a right passes the limits fixed by duty, which is its foundation, it is no longer according to order. Whence it happens that a right may have for its matter, (1) the means without which the end cannot be attained; (2) the means that lead to the end of the law, but not those that avert from the end and are evil; (3) finally, everything that one is bound by another person to preserve.{8}
ART. III. -- LAW IN GENERAL.
70. To the idea of right and of duty answers the idea of law. -- Where duty is, there also is necessarily a law which imposes it; just as where right is present, there is a moral power over an action or a thing, there also is necessarily a law which gives this right and commands it to be respected by others.
71. Law in general is a rule by which beings are directed to their proper end. -- In every created being there is a necessary connection between its nature and its end. Therefore, for every creature the directing of itself toward its end constitutes the rule of its perfection or its law.
72. Moral law is the direction toward its end imparted to a rational creature by his superior. -- The term law is applied to the tendencies flowing from the nature and constitution of irrational creatures and manifested, except on occasion of divine interference, in an invariable uniformity of "coexistence and succession, connecting certain effects with certain causes, so that when the conditions are present the effect invariably follows;" this is physical law. But the term has, an application special to Ethics; for, besides the condition of all law, which is to direct any being whatever to its end, moral law implies, first, the idea of obligation, and this idea supposes superiority in him who binds and dependence in him who ought to obey; secondly, moral law implies freedom in the subject, who is bound to obey not by physical necessity but by moral obligation.
73. Law is divine or human. Divine law is eternal, natural, or positive. Human law is ecclesiastical or civil. -- The eternal law is the imprescriptible order of what is to be done, such as it exists from all eternity in the divine mind. Natural law is a participation of the eternal law, by which the reason of man is enlightened and can discern good from evil. Positive law determines certain things that are according to the natural law indifferent.{9} It is defined as A prescription of reason for the common good promulgated by him who has the care of the community. When positive law is made by man it is called human, and is either ecclesiastical or civil according as it proceeds from the authority of Church or State.
74. The necessity of law for men arises from two causes: one objective, the creative act; the other subjective, the nature of man. -- Every creature by the fact that it has received its nature from God, has also received its law from Him. But besides his nature of mere creature, man has a rational principle, by which he perceives the intimate connection existing between his nature and his end, and his obligation of tending to that end by means that really lead thereto.
ART. IV. -- THE ETERNAL LAW.
75. Above all other law is the eternal law; from it all other laws derive their force. -- Since all law implies direction to an end, and since God is above all other ends, being the supreme end to which all others are subordinate, it follows that there is also a law on which all other laws depend. This is the eternal or divine law.
76. The eternal law is the imprescriptible order of what is to be done, as it exists from all eternity in the divine mind.{10} -- Order exists in the world; but this order supposes the intelligence of God which conceives it, and His will which causes it to persist. The eternal law is only the order so conceived and willed by God from all eternity.
77. The eternal law is the first fundamental principle of morality. -- The distinction between good and evil is founded on the unchangeable relations of things; but these relations are only the external realization of order as it exists from all eternity in the divine mind and will.
ART. V. -- THE NATURAL LAW OF CONSCIENCE.
78. The natural law of conscience is a participation of the eternal law in a rational creature, enabling him to discern good from evil. -- Man no sooner perceives order than he conceives it to be the expression of a will essentially right and just, and so he rises to a knowledge of God as the supreme legislator of this order. Therefore, as the law of order considered in God is the eternal law, so viewed as it is in human reason it is the natural law of conscience. These two laws differ as to the intellect that knows them, and as to their object; that of the eternal law being universal, that of the natural law being particular because referred exclusively to man.
79. The law of conscience has three principal marks: it is necessary, absolute, and universal. -- It is necessary because it rests on the necessary relation of nature to end, which has been determined from all eternity by the divine mind. It is absolute and immutable, because the ideal relations of things, being founded on the very essences of such things, are absolute and immutable. It is universal, because it is imposed upon all intelligent and free creatures, applies to all their free actions, extends to all times and places; for being founded on the very nature of rational beings it must prevail wherever that nature exists.
80. Conscience and the universal assent of mankind attest the existence of the natural law. -- Every man hears within him a voice telling him that such an action is good or evil; this voice he may disregard, but he can never completely silence. So all peoples in all times have admitted a distinction between justice and injustice, and upon it have based all their legislation.
81. The existence of the natural law is also proved from the nature of the human will and from our idea of divine wisdom. -- A faculty cannot act unless it be determined to action by its object. But the determining principle of the will must be a law or moral obligation that moves it without doing it violence. But since the will can be determined by law only, this law must necessarily be in reason, the faculty that directs the will. Besides, since God wishes man's good, He must have given him the means of attaining it; but in view of man's free will this means must be the command to do what is right and shun what is wrong.
82. It is an error to sustain, with rationalists, the autonomy of reason. -- If God exists, we must necessarily depend on Him. But if we are unwilling to admit the existence of God, evidently our reason cannot impose an obligation on us, since it is not above us; for an obligation, says Liberatore, implies an exercise of jurisdiction and power on the part of him who obliges, and therefore supposes a real distinction between superior and subject. Therefore, to admit the autonomy of reason is to destroy all morality.{11}
83. The natural law is known naturally by reason and conscience. -- To oblige, a law must be known and promulgated. But the natural law has for its proper object the first principles of morality, and for its secondary object the consequences of these principles. The first principles of morality, like the first principles of thought, are known by the intellectual light of which the human intellect is possessed, and which is a reflection of the intellectual light of God Himself. The application of these first principles to particular actions is made by reason. To aid his reason God has given man an interior voice that approves his conduct when he does good and reproves him when he does evil. This interior voice is called conscience.
84. The natural law is the foundation of the positive law. -- The positive law is of force only when it obliges to the observance of the positive precepts of God or those that proceed from lawful human authority and are not contrary to the commandments of God. Now, it is a principle of the natural law that we must obey God and those to whom He has communicated a share in His authority. Besides, the precepts of the positive law are most frequently only particular applications of some precept of the natural law, or determinations of what is undetermined by the natural law.
ART. VI. -- SANCTION OF MORAL LAW.
85. Sanction of moral law is the reward determined by the lawgiver for those who observe the law, and the punishment decreed for those who transgress it.{12}
86. Moral law necessarily has some sanction. -- Justice demands that for the merit inherent in good, and the demerit inherent in evil, there should be a corresponding recompense or penalty. Moreover, the sanctity of God requires that He should practically distinguish good from evil by rewarding the former and punishing the latter. Finally, the wisdom of God demands that He have means for securing the fulfillment of the law; but this can be effected only by rewards and punishments.
87. The sanction of the moral law is of three kinds: that of conscience, that of society, and that of God. -- The free actions of man refer to himself, to society, and to God; therefore sanction must be of three kinds. In the individual order there is remorse or peace of conscience; in the social order there are rewards and punishments established in society; and in regard to God there is the reward or punishment that He reserves for those that keep or break His law.
88. An adequate sanction of the natural law can be found only in the life to come. -- It is evident that neither the testimony of conscience nor the punishments and rewards of this life are a sanction proportionate to moral good and evil. For this good or evil has a direct or indirect reference to the infinite good; therefore the reward or punishment must be in some way infinite; but this cannot be here below. Besides, it is often necessary to give up one's life in the practice of good, or to expose one's self to great sufferings; therefore there must be another life where good receives its recompense. So, too, the commission of evil often brings temporal goods in its train; therefore it must be punished in a life to come.{13}
89. The sanction of the law consists chiefly in the possession or the loss of the sovereign good. -- Good actions are so many steps by which man tends to the sovereign good; whereas by evil actions he withdraws farther and farther from this good. Therefore it is meet that the just attain the end to which they tend, and rejoice in its possession, and that the wicked be deprived of that good. Since there are different degrees in the goodness of the former and in the malice of the latter, it is also just that there should be a diversity in their rewards and punishments respectively.
To those who object that everlasting punishment is unjust, the answer may be given that punishment is not merely "medicinal," or for the amendment of the culprit, but it is also deterrent, an example to the community, and retributive, as affording satisfaction to the injured party. Now, eternal punishment is the reparation due to God for a grievous transgression of His law. The justice of punishment is not to be estimated by its duration, but by its proportion to the offence. But the gravity of the offence is determined by its nature and by the dignity of the offended party. Now, God is the greatest of all beings, and sin is the greatest of evils. For, says St. Thomas,{14} "In the judgment of God the will is taken for the deed; for as men see what is done externally, so God beholds the hearts of men. Now, he who for a temporal good has turned away from his ultimate end, which is possessed forever, has preferred the temporal enjoyment of that temporal good to the everlasting enjoyment of his ultimate end. Whence it is evident how much more he would have wished to possess that temporal good everlastingly. Therefore in the judgment of God he ought so to be punished as if he had sinned everlastingly. But it is unquestionable that an everlasting sin merits an everlasting punishment. Therefore everlasting punishment is due to him who has turned away from his ultimate end."
ART. VII. -- THE FIRST PRECEPT OF THE NATURAL LAW.
90. All the precepts{15} of the moral law are reduced to one fundamental precept called the Categorical Imperative.{16} -- All the precepts of the moral law have a common element in which they are identified, and from which they draw all their force. This element, this first principle, must be known to give order and unity to moral science.
91. The first principle of the moral law must be irreducible; it must be evident and universal. -- The first moral precept must be irreducible, otherwise it would be neither the first nor the supreme principle. It must be evident, for it is destined to account for all other moral precepts. It must be universal, since it must include what all other moral principles implicitly contain, and serve as their foundation.
92. The first precept of the moral law is, Do good and avoid evil. -- As whatever is apprehended by the intellect has the note of being, so whatever is sought by the will has the nature of good. Every agent acts for an end, and this end is good. Therefore the first principle of practical reason is founded in the good, and is this: "Good is that to which all things tend." The first precept of the law is, therefore, "Do good and avoid evil." This principle cannot be reduced to any other principle, it is evident and universal. From it is derived the norm of moral excellence. Since man is constituted with reason, and order answers to reason, human good lies especially in order. From the first precept of the law is derived the precept of observing order.
ART. VIII. -- FALSE SYSTEMS OF MORALITY AS DERIVED FROM THEIR FIRST MORAL PRECEPT.
93. Since the first moral precept is the basis of the whole moral science the various systems of morality may be classified according to their first precept. -- Every system is determined by its principle; therefore an exact division of the systems of morality can be made according to the principle on which each rests. But the first moral precept is to do good; therefore systems of morality vary according to the diverse ways in which they understand the nature of that good to which man should tend. All subjective systems, says Zigliara,{17} are based on the principle that man is the measure of morality as he is the measure of the truth of things.
94. Utilitarianism, the system of interest, in which the only good is the usual, is false, because it excludes a constituent element of the good, i.e., the absolute. -- In Utilitarianism the only good is the useful, whether with respect to the individual or to society. The system of personal interest or individual utilitarianism was taught of old by Aristippus (B.C. 425), and in modern times by La Rochefoucauld (1613-1680) and Bentham (1748-1832).{18} The system of general interest has had Hume (1711-1776) for its principal master. It is evident that these systems lack the essential marks of moral duty, i.e., universality and immutability, since both public and private interest are relative and variable. In these systems, therefore, there is no duty, no moral law, and it is impossible to account for great deeds of disinterestedness. Egotism and might become the sole rule of human actions, and anarchy or despotism will be the normal state of society. The criterion of Utilitarianism is, therefore, inadequate, vague, and arbitrary.
95. Hedonism, or the moral system of pleasure, in which the sole good is the pleasurable, is false, because it confounds a consequence of the good with the good itself -- Materialistic and sensistic schools base morality upon love of pleasure and fear of pain. Epicurus (B.C. 340-270), among the ancients, Hobbes{19} (1588-1679), Helvetius (1715-1771), and Saint-Lambert (1716-1803), among modern moralists, are the most faithful interpreters of this system. To confound duty with pleasure is to reverse the very notion of good, of which pleasure is a consequence, but not the essence. It is to contradict reason and conscience as well as the common sense of mankind. Besides, materialists generally understand by pleasure only what is sensible and material, and despise those higher pleasures that have their source in the culture of the true and the exercise of virtue, and those also which we experience at the sight of good in our fellow-men.
96. The moral system of sentiment, in which good or evil is that which is perceived as such by a moral sense, is false, because the existence of such a sense as a distinct faculty is a mere hypothesis, and because a sentiment of sympathy for good, far from being a principle of that good, presupposes its idea. -- The Scotch school, designing to combat those who place morality in interest or pleasure, sought the basis of morality in a disinterested principle. This it claimed to have found in a certain instinct or moral sense, which in man would be a special faculty ordained to judge what is good and what is evil, not only in general but also in particular. Shaftesbury (1671-1713), Adam Smith, Hutcheson, and Reid, are the principal upholders of this system. To admit their doctrine is to assert that man is led by instinct, by a blind principle; but this is unworthy of a rational being. Besides, it bases morality on a variable and uncertain principle, takes away from good and evil their essential distinction, and eliminates their objective nature. In a word, it confounds effect with cause, since the sentiment experienced in presence of good or evil is only a consequence of our idea of good and evil.
97. The moral system of rationatists which exaggerates the idea of honorable or virtuous good, and excludes the notion of useful and pleasurable good, is false, because it is exclusive. -- The Stoics of old, Kant{20} in modern times, and the philosophers of the contemporary French school, in their efforts to frame a purer code, have perverted the nature of morality. Their first moral principles are all subjective, because the speculative principles of which they are the application are subjective. Kant said, "So act that the rule of your actions may be a law for all men." This principle is defective, because, it does not apply to good actions that are not obligatory, and because it points out rather what is to be avoided than what is to be done. Moreover, Kant fails to state the principle in virtue of which man should impose a law on his will, and even why man should be guided by law.{21} Jouffroy (1796-1842) and Pamiron (1794-1862) took as their first principle: "Perfect yourself." They forgot that human perfection is an effect of morality, and does not produce it; besides, their principle is too vague, obscure, and comprehensive. Cousin laid down as his primary principle, "Follow the light of your reason." Now, reason is either personal or impersonal. In the former case we are led into the inconsistencies of Kant's system; in the latter case, the principle is an abstraction, a creation of reason, and therefore incapable of imposing an obligation. Fichte adopted for the basis of his moral system the principle of absolute independence, and for the basis of his social system the principle, "Love thyself above all things, and other men for thy own sake."
ART. IX. -- CONSCIENCE.
98. Conscience is a practical judgment of reason, determining in a given case what is good and what is evil. -- It is not sufficient to consider the natural law theoretically, it must be applied practically. To do this is the work of conscience. It is a judgment upon an action to be done or to be avoided. This judgment is the conclusion of a syllogism, of which the law is the major, and the action to be done the minor. For instance, it is a law that "evil should not be done;" if, therefore, this particular action, as perjury, be evil, practical reason dictates the judgment, "This action of perjury should not be done." This syllogism is not always explicitly made by the intellect, but it is none the less real.
99. The judgment of conscience, though not an objective norm, is the subjective norm of an agent's moral actions. Therefore it is necessary to conform to the dictates of conscience. -- Conscience is not the moral law, but supposes it, as a consequent supposes its antecedent. To make conscience the sole foundation of the morality of obligations, as do rationalists, is to confound the application of the law with the law itself. It is even to attribute infallibility to conscience, and thus to contradict both faith and reason. It is certain that conscience is a subjective rule to which man is bound to conform, for law would be useless if not applied. But it can be applied by conscience only, and therefore the judgments of conscience should be followed.
100. Since conscience viewed as a faculty does not really differ from intellect, its various states in respect to its matter will correspond to the various states of the intellect in respect to truth. -- Conscience, says Zigliara,{22} is true when its judgments are true; otherwise it is false or erroneous. It is right when it dictates what reason would prudently judge to be good, though the judgment may be materially false; otherwise it is not right. It is invincibly erroneous when it judges according to principles which it holds to be true, and which, morally speaking, it could not have known to be false. But if it could have examined the principles more attentively, and ought to have done so, then conscience is vincibly erroneous in its judgment. It is certain when its judgment is free from doubt or fear of error. It is probable when its judgment rests on reasons which, though solid, do not exclude all danger of error. It is doubtful if it remains in suspense between two decisions. Conscience is scrupulous when it fears for trivial and groundless reasons that an action is wrong. It is perplexed when it fears evil whether an action be done or omitted. A lax conscience seeks to justify to itself an evil action; a rigorous conscience, on the contrary, tries by refined reasoning to persuade itself and others that a good action is evil.
The rules of conscience are "We are bound to obey a conscience that is true and certain, or even an invincibly erroneous conscience. We are not to act if conscience is doubtful as to the morality of the action viewed concretely. If we are bound to attain a certain end, and doubt as to the means to be taken, we may use those means that most avert the danger of not gaining the end."{23}
In the case of vincible error it is forbidden both to follow one's conscience and act against its judgment. We must suspend the action and examine to rectify the error, provided, however, that the thought or suspicion of such an obligation occurs to our mind. But if there be no such thought or suspicion, conscience is actually invincibly erroneous, and therefore must be obeyed.
{1} Cf. Russo, De Philosophia Morali Praelectiones, p. 106, 145.
{2} "Therefore negative precepts oblige always and at all times (semper et ad semper), as the Schoolmen expressed it, that is, in every place, at all times, and in every circumstance; . . . positive precepts oblige always . . . but not at all times, so as thereby to oblige a man; for instance, at all times, in all places and circumstances to perform a prescribed act of virtue." -- Zigliara, Sum. Phil., M. 30, v.
{3} For valid exemption, however, the necessity must be "a) independent of our will, . . . b) extreme or at least grave, such as a notable loss of reputation, health, or material goods." Russo, De Phil. Mor. Prae., p. 107, 147.
{4} As included iu these few cases Liberatore mentions neglect of duty when the public welfare or the security of the state would be menaced or impaired thereby ; or the breaking of a contract the observance of which would involve some danger, provided this difficulty had been supposed as reasonably included in the contract
{5} Russo, De Philosophia Morali Praeletiones, p. 99, § 134.
{6} This statement allows some exceptions. "A man may have a right conjoined with a duty not of justice, of course, but of some other virtue -- not to use that right. Such are sundry rights of the rich trenching on the poor." Moral Philosophy, Stonyhurst Series, p. 248.
{7} Viewed abstractly rights cannot conflict, but in their actual exercise one may impede another. If the conflict has been caused voluntarily, then its author loses his right. If the conflict is involuntary and the rights are equal, then he whose right is oldest prevails; if the rights were acquired at the same time, then might decides the conflict, unless the matter of the rights be divisible. If the rights are unequal, the more perfect should prevail. Cf. Russo, De Phil Mor. Prael., pp. 104, 105.
{8} Cf. Zigliara, Summa Philosophica, M. 28, viii.
{9} Those actions are said to be indifferent which are "not determined by the natural law, and are in conformity with it." Zigliara.
{10} St. Angustine defines it: The reason or will of God bidding the natural order to be kept, and forbidding it to be disturbed."
{11} This theory has been styled Independent Morality, and by Kant, who professes it, the Categorical Imperative. Kant's doctrine makes the human intellect absolutely independent of all law, and hence man is no longer a creature, but is identified with God.
{12} "It is tine that human law specifies no particular reward for obedience to it, because obedience to the law is sufficiently rewarded by the good which it does for the whole community and for every one in the community nor is it possible for human government otherwise to reward obedience to its laws. It is, perhaps, from this circumstance that some authors are led to conceive that the whole sanction of law consists in punishment." -- Hill, Moral Philosophy. pp. 154, 155.
{13} A perfect sanction should always correspond to tbe degree of virtue or vice, and should outweigh both the evil incurred in observing the law and the good to be gained in breaking it. Cf. Russo, De Mor. Phil. Prael., p. 87, § 119.
{14} Contra Gentes, 1. iii., c. cxliv., n. 4; cf. Russo, De Mor. Phil. Prael.,. p. 90 et seq.
{15} Law differs from precept in that the former looks to the common good; the latter to some individual benefit. Again, law refers to the end to be attained, whereas a precept refers only to means to that end. Cf. Zigliara, Sum. Phil., M. 22, vi.
{16} The Categorical Imperative, as here understood, is the fundamental principle of the moral law which obliges all men. Hence it is not exposed to the absurdities of Kant's Categorical Imperative, which, in the words of Joseph Rickaby, S. J., "makes the reason within a man not the promulgator of the law to him,, but his own legislator."
{17} Summa Philosophica, M. 11, i.
{18} Other utilitarians of a recent date are the two Mills, father and son, John Austin, and George Grote. Against the principle which they advocated it maybe argued: (a) It takes the sign and indication of moral evil for the evil itself. . . . It places the wickedness of an act in the physical misery and suffering that are its consequences. (b) "Mill tells us that 'utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action.' " (c) It does away with the distinction between harm and injury, "injury being wilful and unjust harm;" it confounds physical and moral evil, and ignores the meaning of a human action. (d) It "sees in virtue a habit of self-sacrifice useful to the community but not naturally pleasant," . . . in fact, "a natural evil, inasmuch as it deprives him of pleasure, which natural evil by habit is gradually converted into a factitious and artificial good." -- Moral Philosophy, Stonyhuret Series, pp. 177-189.
{19} "If every thought," as Hobbes holds, "is but a compound of sensations, then good and evil can be only expressions for agreeable or disagreeable sensations; they have no absolute character, but mean simply personal pleasure or pain, and the highest motive of life must be to attain the one and avoid the other. Moreover, as man does not determine for himself the law of sensation and the conditions of pleasure and pain, it follows that he is absolutely subject to circumstances, and the creature of necessity." American Encyclopaedia, sub. Hobbes.
{20} See pp. 81, 82.
{21} Cf. Zigliara, Summa Philosophica, M. 12, vi.
{22} M. 13, iv.
{23} Russo, De Morali Philosophia Praelectiones, § 110