OBVIOUSLY a subject so large, and so little definite, requires the utmost precision as to what we mean, if we are to discuss it to any purpose, and not to wander off into all the maze of topics which it suggests. The very idea of freedom, above all of mental freedom, is of necessity supremely dear to every right-minded man, so that it may at first sight appear an axiomatic truth that a system which claims distinctively the name of Freethought must be the most worthy of our rational allegiance.
Thought cannot be Free
But very little consideration is required to show us that to speak of Freethought is to use a phrase which in the strict and proper sense of the words cannot cannot be signify anything. Thought cannot be free, -- that is to say, it cannot be independent of the laws of thought, laws as rigorous and exacting as those of mathematics: and who will call mathematical thought "free," though it is a supreme example of the power and capacity of the human mind? Of all worthy thinking the object is truth -- the truth which makes us free, in the only rational sense of the word, -- and he who finds the path to its attainment, however strait and narrow that path may be, finds the way to intellectual liberty, to freedom from the dominion of ignorance and error. Most conspicuously is this manifest in regard of Science. When Science comes in, freethought goes out: once she discovers a new truth with certainty, we must perforce renounce all right to question or deny; yet, so far are we from considering such constraint as a bondage unworthy of intelligent beings, it is our greatest pride, and the whole object of those educational efforts which we so greatly esteem, and from which we anticipate so much, is to subject as many of our fellows as possible to the same yoke. He who should deny the laws of motion, or the rotundity of the earth, or the Norman Conquest, would be set down, not as a noble instance of intellectual freedom, but as either an ignoramus or a fool.
Freedom of Inquiry
It is obvious, according1y, that, when we speak of Freethought, we do not really mean freethought at all, but freedom of inquiry, freedom to seek truth, along any path that will lead us thereto.
But, here again, at once arises another question similar to the last. What about the choice of the path upon which to embark? It is obvious that, as in our thinking we may commit grave errors, if we neglect or mistake the laws of thought, just as we may go wrong in a mathematical calculation, -- so amongst the many roads that profess to lead to knowledge and truth, we may follow a wrong one instead of the right, and so be led not to truth but error. It is likewise evident, that it would be a sorry kind of liberty which left us absolutely free to follow our own devices, without ever a sign-post to tell us how to choose: just as it would never be said that a ship captain in unknown waters was free because he had no pilot, or an Alpine climber because he had no guide.
Right and Wrong Lines
Is it not manifest that as in order to think with any effect, we must submit to be controlled by the laws of right reasoning, -- so in order to have any prospect of attaining the goal of truth, we must choose a path that can conduct us thither, and the more strictly we be kept to it, the more the risk of straying from it be eliminated, the better
is our intellectual case. It is no infringement of our liberty that there are parapets to our London bridges which keep us from walking into the Thames.
It therefore appears that once again we must limit the meaning of our terms. Undoubtedly, those who advocate freethought, or the right of free inquiry, do not, and cannot, maintain that such freedom consists in the unshackled liberty of each individual to go his own way at his own sole discretion, that, as Newman puts it, a freeborn Briton has a right to think as he pleases, -- and that it is better to go wrong at large, than right in any sort of intellectual harness: -- to be left free to study nature, for example, according to the system of the Alchemists, Ptolemy, or Strabo, rather than in the light of modern chemistry, astronomy, or geography.
Truth without Bias
This, certainly, is not what the champions of Freethought wish to advocate, though from many of their utterances it might easily seem that their ideal of intellectual liberty were really such absolute mental licence. What they really do mean -- to come at length to our proper subject -- is, I suppose, this: that every man should claim the right of seeking truth without bias, prepossession or reserve, along any line of reasoning whereby it can really be attained: that this cannot be if he start his investigation believing himself to be already possessed of the truth, which should be its term: and moreover that there is in fact only one mode of attaining truth, namely, that of Science, -- by observation, experiment, and mathematical calculation. Thus interpreted, -- and I do not apprehend that such a statement of its creed will be impugned -- Freethought assumes a complexion differing considerably from what its name logically suggests, for this last article, the restriction of true knowledge to one line of search, introduces a new element having no necessary connection with the idea of freedom. Leaving this aside, however, for separate consideration presently, and confining ourselves to the radical notion of mental liberty, we shall be right, I think, in assuming as the fundamental principle of freethinkers, that intellectual freedom is impossible unless an inquirer starts with absolutely no convictions as to the objects of his inquiry, considering everything an open question, to be solved only by the arguments he may discover.
Faith and Reason
This system is of course antagonistic, and professedly so, to that of Christianity, and in particular of the Catholic Church, which will be accepted by all as the typical example of a principle directly opposed to it. A Catholic believes on faith, on the authority of the Church -- in God; in the Incarnation, Death, and Resurrection of Christ; in the immortality of his own soul, and its future destiny; in the supernatural generally, -- not because he has by philosophical, scientific, or historical investigation convinced himself on such points; but because he is so taught by a teacher whom he accepts as divine, and he can be a Catholic only on condition of such acceptance. To deny or deliberately to doubt any article of belief authoritatively enjoined, on the ground that his reason cannot certify its truth, is to cease to be a Catholic. Therefore, it is frequently argued, a Catholic cannot freely and fully exercise his reason in the field of either philosophy or science. He must, it is said, of necessity start every investigation with a fixed resolve that it shall have one issue and no other, and, consciously or unconsciously, loads his intellectual dice, and juggles with phrases or ideas, suppresses the true and suggests the false, so as to secure the predetermined result.
Grave and fundamental as such an objection may appear at first sight, very little reflection is required to show that in its general expression, and as an abstract principle applied to no concrete instance, it is radically false and irrational. It takes for granted that the inquirer starts with a conviction which is erroneous, that he fancies himself in possession of knowledge which in reality he has not. In such a case, of course, being under the sway of ignorance and prejudice a man would be unable to exercise his reasoning powers aright. But if we suppose a quite conceivable case, in which he already knows the truth before he begins to examine a particular process of thought which leads to it, are we to say that he is therefore incapable of following up the steps of argument or demonstration as keenly and validly as any other? Manifestly not.
True Knowledge cannot hamper Right Reasoning
True knowledge cannot possibly hamper or demoralize right reasoning, and the more assured one is of the truth of his opinion, as resting on solid grounds, the more should he insist upon rigorous and legitimate proofs, knowing that truth can never contradict truth, and that fallacious and erroneous methods of argument can alone prevent any valid line of reasoning from furnishing a fresh demonstration of what he already knows otherwise.
When we thus start under a new aspect, and from another point, the scrutiny of a truth of which we are already certain, we neither renounce our intellectual freedom, nor compromise the certitude of our convictions. It is only the character of our knowledge concerning it which is affected. Of this practical instances are furnished every day.
Examples of this Truth
For example. We find in the Almanacks that on the 30th of August, 1905, there will be an eclipse of the sun, which will begin at a certain definite time, being total or partial, in different parts of the world, and will terminate at another hour. Of this it is impossible for us reasonably to doubt. Our knowledge of the eclipse is certain, but it is not scientific, for we have not acquired it for ourselves, and probably have but the vaguest notion, or none at all, of the mode in which such occurrences are calculated. We accept the prediction on faith, on the authority of the astronomers in whose competence and honesty we confide, who have worked out the reckonings for themselves, and for whom consequently the knowledge is scientific. We are thus fully possessed of the truth; but nothing whatever hinders us from examining for ourselves the evidence, whether theoretical or practical, and so making our knowledge not only sure but moreover scientific. We may, if we are qualified so to do, make the calculations for ourselves, and prove by them that such an eclipse is inevitable. We may further observe and time its actual occurrence. We shall then have three modes in which the event is known to us, instead of one, but this does not mean either that we are more sure of it than we were in the first instance, or that this initial assurance has any tendency to impair our power of vision or our mathematical accuracy; just as we all know by experience that we can work a sum in arithmetic none the less freely and correctly because we are aware of the answer.
Or to take an instance of another kind. It is, I believe, on record that, some eighty years ago, certain persons seriously accused the great Duke of Wellington of a design to depose the reigning monarch, and make himself king; and they alleged that the unpopularity of the sovereign, and his own prestige as the conqueror of Napoleon, together with the devotion of the army to one who had so often led it to victory, would make success easy for him. But, save the small knot of its originators, no one could be got to take the charge seriously. The nation as a body remained unmoved, and did not even care to examine into the matter. Yet, in this case, they had not even any grounds for their assurance that could be stated in a form that could possibly seem convincing as logical argument. It was their confidence in the Duke, in his high character, his delicate sense of honour, his devotion to duty, that made them feel, and rightly feel, that the accusation was too absurd for discussion. Yet the whole basis of this estimate was but an impression gathered from observation of his career, an impression of which probably they could give no coherent or intelligible account, but which nevertheless they recognized as overwhelmingly sufficient to refute the slander. And if any of them thought it worth more formal refutation, would they, because of the intensity of their conviction, be likely to shirk or blink any jot or tittle of evidence that could be adduced? On the contrary; just in proportion to their confidence, would they insist upon the fullest scrutiny, and feel that it would be treason to their hero not to court the most searching inquiry, which could, they knew, have only one result.
True and False Belief
The whole question thus is seen to be whether the belief with which an inquirer starts be true or false; and unless we assume that it is false, we have no reason whatever for arguing that merely because he has such an initial belief, he is incapable of arguing as soundly and correctly as any one else. We may evidently go farther, with special regard to the questions of supreme importance to every man with which we are concerned. Why should we, in deference to a fallacious prepossession, hoodwink ourselves, and become blind to the force of evidence which to others is clear as noonday? It would appear to be commonly taken for granted, that the one object of believers, when they approach such questions, is to refute and score against antagonists; that having, for some inscrutable motive, pledged themselves to a false and baseless system, they endeavour, in a spirit of mere partisanship, to make some sort of defence on its behalf, and can find no weapon to serve the purpose but mere and palpable sophistry.
Personal Issues Involved
It seems quite to be forgotten that for each and all of us, in such examinations, the affair is first and foremost with his own soul. The truth of which we believe ourselves possessed concerns all that gives any real value to existence; it is literally for every individual a matter of life and death. Why should he be prone to delude himself in such a matter, and remain deaf to the warnings which reason continually shouts in his ear? Rather, it would seem, -- and so I know it certainly to be in my own case, -- just on account of the greatness of his stake, he should be more sensitive than others to any symptom of insecurity in his position; as one who has committed all his fortune to a bank or investment is likely to be more than ordinarily quick to detect any signs of its being less sound than he thought it when he made his venture.
Like the assumption that Christians adopt their creed upon no reasonable grounds whatever, this other, that in adopting it they lose their common-sense, is at the bottom of the freethinking arguments with which we are all familiar -- but it can hardly be said to be a favourable specimen of the modes of freethought.
Obviously, there is need of something better than assumptions, something more scientifically convincing; though, as I have said, in the vast multitude of instances it seems to be considered unnecessary to furnish anything more.
Authority
It is, for example, a constant objection that Catholics accept their faith on authority, as if that settled the matter: as if authority could not possibly be a sound foundation for knowledge. This is of course manifestly and absurdly untrue. It is a mere platitude to observe that we all alike owe to authority by far the greatest portion of our knowledge. The whole of History necessarily rests upon authority alone. So does for each of us by far the greatest part of Geography. The man who has never been to Pekin or Rio de Janeiro, is just as sure of their existence as the traveller who has visited both. Even in regard of scientific knowledge, of which we are so proud, and on the score of which we claim such superiority, -- for the great mass of men it depends wholly on authority, as in the instance of the eclipse already mentioned; and even the most eminent specialists have to rely on the authority of others outside their own particular branch.
False Authority
It is not authority then that is incompetent to furnish knowledge with any foundation more solid than a quicksand, but what pretends to be authority and is not. To say that belief on authority is of its very nature irrational, is to contradict common sense, and base argument upon a manifestly unreasonable principle. Of course the believer must be ready to show good grounds for his acceptance of the authority in which he puts his trusty The trustworthiness of authority is just as much a matter for rational argument and demonstration as anything else, and the fundamental point from which the Catholic starts is that reason establishes the genuine and trustworthy character of the authority to which he submits himself. "We believe," he says, "because the motives for believing appear to us more weighty than those for not believing --just as we perform good actions because the motives for these actions seem better than those for their opposites." Yet, is it not a cardinal point with the generality of the Church's antagonists that she stultifies herself by the very principle of authority? It seems never to be admitted even as a possibility that there can be any rational ground for such adoption.
Most Freethinkers believe on Authority
And at the same time, a very large proportion of those who thus argue, act upon the very principle which they condemn. Usually, it is nothing which they can in any sense call their own in the way of knowledge that serves as the ground work of their whole philosophy, but the supposed teachings of such leaders as Darwin and Herbert Spencer, or such a system as that which passes under the overworked name of Evolution, -- to which they swear allegiance; even though, as constantly happens, they have the vaguest possible idea, or no idea at all, as to what their authorities actually say, or what credentials they can furnish for their authority.
There is in fact nothing which so discredits so-called Freethought in our eyes, who do not call ourselves freethinkers, as to observe the extraordinary lack of precision and cogency which it exhibits in connection with our own beliefs. Over and over again freethinkers proclaim that we ground our faith on the absurd paradox which they attribute to Tertullian: Credo quia impossibile est -- "I believe because the thing is impossible" -- (which, by the way, is not what Tertullian said at all, but something quite different) -- and then they proceed to make it abundantly manifest that even if they have got so far as to have a clear conception of the doctrines which they themselves favour, they have none whatever of those against which they continually declaim. Freedom thus to cast adrift from all logical restraints is not the kind of freedom we desire or appreciate.
Truth
Thus, however the question be approached, we arrive always at one conclusion, that the pivot upon which everything turns is Truth. Whatever, in any way, secures or facilitates our possession of truth, makes for our intellectual freedom, -- for it is the truth that makes us free, and such possession can never hamper us in the smallest degree in the use of our reason. It is error alone that enslaves, whether it take the form of false principles, bad logic, or pseudoauthority.
Definition of Freethought
And here no doubt we come to the heart of our subject. It will immediately be answered that however loosely and inexactly the terms "Freethought and Freethinker" be employed (in our newest and best dictionary, the latter is defined as "one who refuses to submit his reason to the control of authority in matters of religious belief") -- the freedom implied in the terms is emancipation from false systems and false authority, and from these alone. This, for example, is what Professor Karl Pearson tells us, who is probably a witness whom all freethinkers will accept, and whose tone is usually temperate, as his scientific position is unquestioned. He writes: The holding of a myth explanation of any problem whereon mankind has attained, or may hereafter attain, true knowledge, is what I term enslaved thought or dogmatism.
The rejection of all myth explanation, the reception of all ascertained truths with regard to the relation of the finite to the infinite, is what I term freethought or true religious knowledge.
Similarly -- another leader of the School, W. Kingdon Clifford, declares that even should a believer believe sincerely, he has no right to believe on the evidence before him, and succeeds in doing so only by abstaining from inquiry and stifling his doubts; and the freethinker is one who sifts all possible evidence, and looks all questions fairly in the face.
What is Myth and what is Evidence?
But such explanations -- which might be indefinitely multiplied -- do not greatly help us, or take us very far. They tell us no more than that their authors give the name of "freethinking" to what others call "common-sense." Nobody can possibly deny or question that we must reject myths, and believe only on sufficient evidence. The whole question is, -- Which are the myths, and which the good evidence? and this, of necessity, is answered differently by every party or school of thought. If the freethinker declares that his opponent builds upon the fancies of men's brains, and shuts his eyes to rational demonstrations of their inanity -- the believer is no less convinced that the other's scepticism is absurd and irrational, and that he is obstinately blind to obvious truth. The important point, is not what either party says as to its own position and that of its adversaries, but how it can substantiate what it says. How shall we determine which is right?
It is obviously quite out of the question to institute on the present occasion any full examination of the case presented upon both sides. Our subject is Freethought alone, and all that can be attempted within the allotted time, is to understand at least in outline the grounds upon which freethinkers, according to their own programme, so confidently base their assurance, that they have an absolute monopoly of argument, and that to be a Christian "a man must be either dull or dishonest."
Sects in Freethought
At the first step in such an inquiry, we find that there are freethinkers and freethinkers; that their fundamental principles differ very widely, and that those who are practically most in evidence, and whom the world in general takes to be the typical representatives of Freethought, are denounced by their intellectual chiefs as altogether hostile to its spirit. Popularly, Freethought is preached as meaning denial and denunciation of Christian doctrines, generally in the most bitter and offensive terms, as being opposed to science, enlightenment, and the dignity of man; and it is as thus understood that it gains such multitudes of adherents. But this, we are told by its most authoritative exponents, is all wrong, and nothing less than a mischievous error.
The freethinker -- says Karl Pearson -- is not one who thinks things as he will, but one who thinks them as they must be. To become a freethinker it is not enough to throw off all forms of dogmatism. The true freethinker must be in possession of the highest knowledge of his day. . . . To reject Christianity, or to scoff at all concrete religion, by no means constitutes freethought, nay, is too often sheer dogmatism. The true freethinker must not only be aware of the points wherein he has truth, but must recognize the points wherein he is still ignorant.
To slur over such points with an assumed knowledge is the dogmatism of philosophy or the dogmatism of Science, -- or rather of false philosophy or false Science, -- just as dangerous as the dogmatism of a concrete religion. -- You will see what a positive, creative task the freethinker has before him. Similarly, Sir Leslie Stephen tells us:
Ignorant people it may be, see only the destructive side of rationalist teaching, and with their belief in the old sanctions, lose also their belief in the permanence of all morality, . . . or catching at the scientific jargon, they dress up new idols, whose worship in some cases is not less degrading than that of their predecessors. And whereas Kingdon Clifford, backed in this instance by Karl Pearson himself, declares that natural theology, or belief in a God, is a quagmire -- An awful plague which has destroyed two civilizations and but barely failed to slay such promise of good as is now struggling to live amongst men -Mr John Morley tells us, on the other hand, that, although the modern freethinker "explains" Christianity out of existence,
He traces it to men's cravings for a higher morality. He finds its source in their aspirations after nobler expression of that feeling for the incommensurable things which is under so many varieties of interwoven pattern the common universal web of religious faith. And although such flowers of speech make the explanation considerably less lucid than might be desired, it is at least clear that, instead of a mire or a plague, he regards the highest form of Theism as the creation of our noblest and best instincts.
Does Freethought offer a Positive System?
Manifestly, therefore, Freethought should not be negative only, but positive. It should not batter down other beliefs, but supplant them by providing mankind with something better.
Science
When we inquire how this is to be done; the answer returned by the vast majority of freethinkers, is undoubtedly that it must be by means of Science. As has already been observed, it is a fundamental principle, or rather the fundamental principle, explicitly or tacitly adopted by rationalists of every school, that through physical phenomena alone, which are subject to observation and experiment, can any real and solid knowledge be attained, and that all pretended knowledge, coming through any other channel, must necessarily be mere sophistry and delusion. Such is the explicit teaching of Hume, endorsed and approved by Professor Huxley, who bids us not to trouble ourselves with trying to discover anything concerning what lies beyond these limits, as, however important, we can never know anything concerning it.
Is this true?
But, in the name of Freethought itself as we have heard it expounded, we are bound to inquire how the truth of this principle itself is demonstrated, for assuredly it cannot be called self-evident and axiomatic. According to its own showing, it should be taught by our experience of the external world, and it is hard to imagine how this can be done in any mode but one. It would manifestly be ridiculous to argue that nothing exists beyond the ken of our senses because these senses can perceive nothing; it would be like arguing that there are no colours imperceptible to the human eye, because we cannot see them, and no notes inaudible to the human ear, because we cannot hear them. But, if the forces with which physical science can deal are proved capable of accounting for themselves, and for all the phenomena they produce, -- or if at least, we find good reasons for supposing that one day they may prove to be capable, -- there will then be no ground for postulating anything more, or for the introduction of a "miraculous" element in Nature, in the proper sense of the term, -- that is to say, of a power transcending these physical forces.
In endeavouring to satisfy ourselves upon this crucial point we must again remember that what concerns us at present is the intellectual position taken up by freethinkers in its regard. It would be obviously impossible on such an occasion as this to present with any adequacy the case for their opponents -- a large and supremely important subject, which requires to be treated apart. Yet this cannot be altogether omitted, if we would understand that which is ranged against it, but only so much of it shall be exhibited as seems necessary for our actual purpose.
Has Science fully explained Nature?
We have, therefore, to inquire whether modern Science has either revealed, in the physical forces with which she deals, powers sufficient to explain the phenomena we observe in Nature, or so progressed in that direction, as to persuade us that when her discoveries have advanced, as we may confidently anticipate they will, we shall be furnished with a complete scientific explanation of the universe.
That such is the case, we are constantly assured, not only by popular "Scientists," but by some who can claim to reckon as genuine men of Science. It will be sufficient to cite the late Mr Romanes, who although, as is well known, he before his death abandoned the rationalist creed, is yet an unexceptionable witness to the doctrines he previously held. He tells us, that all minds with any instincts of Science in their composition, have come to regard it as an a priori truth, or first principle, that all natural phenomena are fully accounted for by "natural causation," that is to say, by the laws which Science can experimentally verify; that nearly the whole field of explanation is occupied by naturalism; and that there remain comparatively few cases "where Science has not been able to explore the more obscure regions of causation."
Naturalism
Were such a statement justified, Naturalism, that is, a materalistic conception of the universe, might undoubtedly claim to hold the field, and those who stickle for something more than mechanical forces as an intellectual necessity, might reasonably be charged with making assumptions for which there is no warrant. But is the statement justified? On the contrary, it is absolutely contradicted by scientific men no less eminent than Mr Romanes himself. Our knowledge of Nature, Professor Huxley tells us, is to our ignorance, as a tiny islet, to the ocean in which it is set.
The Ignorance of Science
Still more explicitly, the distinguished Director of our National Museum of Natural History, Professor Ray Lankester, declares that only by unduly magnifying the "extremely limited results of Science," can any one pretend that she has shed, or can shed, any light whatever upon the fundamental problems which a study of Nature inevitably suggests. Science, he tells us, has indeed been able to trace the main features and many details of the network of mechanism which in all her parts Nature exhibits.
But no sane man has ever pretended, since Science became a definite body of doctrine, that we know, or ever can hope to know, or conceive of the possibility of knowing, whence this mechanism has come, why it is there, whither it is going, and what there may be, or may not be, beyond and beside it, which our senses are incapable of appreciating. These things are not "explained" by Science, and never can be.
Science has never discovered a Cause
But, more than this. Far from it being true, as Mr Romanes says, that the cases are comparatively few in which Science has been unable to explore the regions of causation, it is a patent fact that in no single instance has she discovered what can truly be termed a "cause" at all; for none with which she deals can account for itself and its own operations, and each requires some other cause to explain it.
Science in fact knows nothing whatever concerning the elements themselves upon which she has to work. The all-pervading and all-embracing Law of Gravitation, for instance, upon which she so confidently reckons -- what is it? Sir John Herschel termed it "the mystery of mysteries," as profound a mystery as the Trinity. Faraday went farther and pronounced it an evident paradox.
How and Why are Phenomena subject to "Law"?
So too, Matter, Force, Motion, Space, Time, Ether, Chemical reaction, Electricity, Magnetism, Heat, and above all, Life, what are the realities for which these terms stand? We are absolutely ignorant. From experience we learn that the phenomena which we attribute to such agents are subject to "law," that in similar circumstances the same force will produce the same effect, -- and this principle is the fundamental basis of physical Science; -- but how or why it does so passes the wit of man even to imagine. The fact that rivers always run downhill, or that the tide at certain intervals runs up, though both phenomena witness to the same law of gravitation -- tells us nothing as to its nature. And familiar as is the experience that eggs hatch into chickens, it remains true, as Professor Huxley confesses, that the evolution of each individual chicken is as inexplicable by us as that of the universe.
How account Hearing, Sight, Thought?
It is even more worthy of remark that we are equally in the dark as to our own most vital operations, -- those in particular to which we owe all our knowledge. To say for nothing of the operations of our mind, what can Science tell us concerning hearing and sight? Sound is conveyed to the tympanum of the ear by undulations of the atmosphere, and light to the retina of the eye, by undulations of the Ether. But what then happens, to translate sound into hearing, or light into sight, is a mystery absolutely dark. The chasm, says Professor Tyndall, "is intellectually impassable."
Or the Moral Sense?
Still more impossible, if that can be, is it to account for a phenomenon, which, just because it is of supreme and paramount importance, must be but briefly considered, or its treatment would inevitably exceed our possible limits. As a plain matter of fact, men agree that there is a distinction between good and evil, right and wrong, and that the difference is absolute. No man could possibly venture to say that cruelty, injustice, and intemperance could be otherwise than bad, or benevolence, generosity, and fortitude otherwise than right, though all the autocracts and all the parliaments of the world should decree the contrary. This is a phenomenon that like others requires to be explained, and even less than others does it find an explanation in any known or conceivable action of gravitation, electricity, or chemical affinities.
Everything is a Miracle to Science
Such, undeniably, is the state of the case. So far as any ultimate philosophy is concerned, Science knows nothing about anything, and if by "miraculous" we understand what transcends the forces that come within her scope, we must acknowledge with Pasteur that even as to the operations which she is able to follow, "everything is a miracle."
To the same effect, is the acknowledgment of the great champion of Freethought, Professor Karl Pearson.
Were I to tell you he says that certain forces were inherent in matter, that these forces
MODERN FREETHOUGHT 33
sufficed to explain everything, . . . and not say every now and then, Here we are really ignorant . . . I should be no true scientist; it would be the dogmatism of false science, every bit as dangerous as that religious dogmatism which would explain all things by the existence of a personal god or a triune deity.
Principle of Causality
This being so, what is the attitude, on the one hand of freethinkers, on the other, of the opponents whom they represent as stifling reason and listening only to unscientific prejudice?
To consider first that of the latter. Everything, they argue, which begins to be, must have a cause, and a cause capable of producing it. This principle furnishes the sure foundation which alone makes Science possible. Only because she can learn of causes from their effects, is she able to trace the course and the laws of Nature. Therefore, like everything else, such phenomena as life, sensation, consciousness, reason, our perception of beauty, truth, and goodness, -- must have a cause, a cause to which their origin is due, and which ever operates for their conservation. The physical forces known to Science are manifestly incapable of producing any such results, and especially as Science knows them; for it is also one of her fundamental principles, no less necessary than the former to her success, that the physical forces are absolutely determinate in their operation, so that she is able with supreme confidence to forecast their effects, knowing by unvaried experience that in the same circumstances they will produce precisely the same results. Her scrutiny of the material universe has not only disclosed to our wondering intelligence many unsuspected marvels therein exhibited, but of necessity, just because it has discovered so much, has demonstrated more plainly than ever, that there is a frontier which physical forces cannot cross, and a region beyond it where they are impotent.
Theism
Therefore, say such non-freethinking philosophers, our reason compels us to recognize another Power, inscrutable to the methods of physical Science, but no less obvious in its manifestation than the sun in the heavens, as heathen philosophers like Cicero declared. And so they argue, with Bolingbroke, that as there must have been something from eternity, because there is something now, so there must have been intelligence from eternity because there is intelligence now, since neither can non-entity produce entity, nor non-intelligence produce intelligence.
Such, briefly and summarily, is the line of argument which leads to what Professor Pearson and Mr Clifford style the quagmire of Natural Theology, to belief in an eternal, self-existent and intelligent First Cause, that is, God.
This belief it is against which the freethinker protests, as necessarily destitute of any reasonable basis. Should the believer in aught beyond sense chance to be right, his belief, we are assured, would still be inexcusable, for he has no solid grounds for believing. "Why," asks Professor Huxley, "trouble ourselves about matters of which, however important they may be, we know nothing, and can know nothing?"
The great danger [says Karl Pearson] of most existing systems lies in this -- that not content with our real knowledge . . . they slur over our vast ignorance by the help of the imagination.
It is of course perfectly obvious that if the Theistic line of reasoning be truly destitute of any rational basis, depending wholly upon mere phantoms of the imagination, common-sense bids us reject it, and freethinkers are abundantly justified in so doing. But this cannot be proved merely by taking it for granted. Those who wish in the name of freethought to sweep away the alleged foundations of religion, must either be ready to demonstrate that these are wholly illusory, or must furnish another philosophy of the Universe, appealing so clearly to reason as to put its rival out of court.
The contention that the principle of Theism can be refuted either upon a priori grounds, or from the data of Science, need not detain us; for this notion is sternly repudiated by such men as Huxley and Kingdon Clifford. Huxley plainly tells us that the a priori arguments to this effect are worthless, and that Science, so far from adding anything to the anti-Theistic argument, "effectually closes the mouths of those who would refute Theism from physical data." Professor Clifford "fully admits" that Theism is in itself "a reasonable hypothesis and an explanation of the facts." We are therefore left to consider the various modes by which eminent freethinkers undertake to explain the facts of the universe, without the intervention of a suprasensible First Cause.
Haeckel's Solution
Professor Haeckel solves the problem by declaring that the atoms of which the universe is ultimately composed, are endowed with intelligence and will, and that they have thus been able to evolve all things: while he vehemently denies that there is any such soul in man. On this it will be sufficient to cite the review of his latest work in our leading scientific journal, Nature.
It seems to us six of one and half a dozen of the other, whether we recognize soul at the top or at the bottom. In Aristotelian language, there is nothing in the end which was not also in the beginning; in plain English, we put into the beginning what we know to be in the end.
In other words, in order to deny the existence of soul, where our experience recognizes it, Haeckel assumes its existence in matter, where all experience proclaims its non-existence.
Tyndall
The system of Professor Tyndall is not very different. He "discerns in matter the promise and potentiality of all terrestrial life," and holds that human intellect and genius in all their shapes are "potential in the fires of the Sun." This belief he claims to reach by means of the imagination, scientifically used. How this works, may be understood by a signal instance.
Amongst the problems which confront us in Nature, none obtrudes itself more imperiously upon notice than the Origin of life. According to all human experience, life can be derived only from a living parent; -- the production of life from lifeless matter, by spontaneous generation, is not only unknown to Science, but all her observations and experiments show it to be impossible in the actual world, whereof alone has she any knowledge, and this no one has done more to establish than Professor Tyndall himself. But, unless matter was once capable of such spontaneous production, it is clear that some other power, unknown to Science, must have intervened, and since he assumes that there can be no such power, Tyndall considers himself justified in concluding, that the conditions of the world were formerly so utterly different from those we know, as to confer upon matter capabilities which all our knowledge contradicts. As he himself declares, believing in the continuity of Nature, -- that is in the materialistic continuity of all her operations -- he cannot stop where scientific methods cease to be of use. "Here the vision of the mind authoritatively supplements the vision of the eye" -- and accordingly "by a necessity engendered and justified by Science," he crosses the boundary of experimental evidence, and discovers beyond it what, in accordance with his assumed principle, must be found. The basis of his argument is that categorically enunciated by Virchow.
If I will not believe that there is a Creator, I must have recourse to spontaneous generation. There is no third alternative.
Huxley
According to Huxley, the fundamental principle of Evolution is that the whole world, living and not living, is the result of the interaction according to definite laws of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed, and that all which has since been produced necessarily followed from the mechanical structure of this infinitely complex machine.
Explains Nothing
But -- even supposing this to be so -- is it not evident that we have here no more explanation of the universe, than we have of an oak-tree from the fact that it springs from an acorn? An acorn is no whit less wonderful than the most giant oak, and is equally beyond the power of Science to explain; and no less than the Universe itself, would the marvellous germ, from which we are told that it proceeded, postulate a Cause, and one as to which Science as such has no conjecture to offer.
Weismann and Natural Selection
So again, Professor Weismann affords an illustration in connection with another principle with which we are all familiar, that of Natural Selection. Here I must endeavour to guard against a misconception which is only too common. If I cannot believe in the Darwinian theory as commonly accepted, it is purely on scientific grounds, because, as seems to me, the evidence is all against it. I have no antecedent quarrel with it, and am ready to accept it at once, if it can only be shown to explain the facts. There can be no philosophical or theological objection to it which I can imagine. Mr Darwin's hypothesis has nothing to do with the ultimate origin of anything, -- neither of matter, nor of life, nor even of species. Things must exist before they can be selected, and no one more explicitly taught than Mr Darwin himself that his system could work only for the improvement and development of what was actually in being. Nevertheless, this famous system is almost universally adduced as furnishing a mechanical explanation of organic nature, and thus considering it, Professor Weismann argues that we have no choice but to adopt it.
We accept Natural Selection he says, not because we are able to demonstrate the process in detail, nor even because we can with more or less ease imagine it, but simply because we must -- because it is the only possible explanation we can conceive. We must assume Natural Selection because all other apparent principles of explanation fail us, and it is inconceivable that there could be yet another capable of explaining the adaptation of organisms, without assuming the help of a principle of design.
So, as the late Lord Salisbury observed in his well-known Oxford address, a great philosopher uses the principle of design as a reductio ad absurdum, and prefers to believe that which cannot be demonstrated in detail nor even imagined, rather than run the slightest risk of such a heresy.
Summary
These are but samples of the modes of reasoning employed against those who mount from Nature up to Nature's God. They are not even in themselves the most instructive, for I have said nothing of the moral question, of the eternal distinction between good and evil, of the canons of beauty and truth which we all must recognize as absolute. I have not attempted the task, impossible on such an occasion, of threshing out the whole case for Natural Theology, nor even the line of argument in which I have sought my illustrations, as being that in which I can find examples that can be briefly and satisfactorily set forth.
The Radical Flaw in the System of Freethought
My business is with Freethought, its system and its methods, and I venture to think this at least to be plain, -- that freethinkers such as those to whom we have listened, commit themselves precisely to that fundamental false principle, which we have heard charged as fatal against their antagonists. They start with that as an assumption, which, by all rules of right reason, should be their conclusion. Taking for granted to begin with that all things must be capable of a material and mechanical explanation, they set aside whatever is inconsistent with such explanation, arguing, at least implicitly, that all must be false which is not in accord with their prepossession.
How, we must ask, can thought thus trammelled be called "Free"?