THE subject of the foregoing lecture being Freethought, it was not possible within the necessary limits to exhibit the contrary system except in the merest outline; but it seems advisable here to add a somewhat fuller exposition, difficulties manifestly arising in regard of this fundamental point more than any other.
Beyond question, it is commonly assumed by the opponents of Christianity, and especially of the Catholic Church, that the authority to which its disciples commit themselves cannot rationally establish its claim to unquestioning submission, and consequently that such submission is a mental bondage, of necessity antagonistic to freedom of thought. It is right and proper, they say, to entrust ourselves to a leader, whether a pilot, a guide, or a teacher, of whose qualifications we can have practical proofs, and even when we have thus accepted him we always reserve the right of withdrawing our confidence should we find good reason for so doing. No one can possibly deny that a guide who constantly conducts travellers to the summit of Mont Blanc is capable of so doing, yet, should he manifest symptoms of inebriety or imbecility no one would care to follow him, for each would feel more secure in trusting to his own mother wit. And, similarly, however eminent may be the authority of a professor of biology or chemistry, he will speedily forfeit it in the eyes of his pupils should he be so wedded to his old ideas as to ignore fresh discoveries, and learn nothing from information supplied by younger men. Submission therefore to such leadership has nothing in common with that which the Church demands.
Such is the objection which undoubtedly deserves to be fully considered. It evidently embraces two separate contentions. Firstly, that the Church cannot demonstrate her authority in such a manner as to demand our reasonable acceptance. Secondly, that in all cases the acceptance of authority can be but conditional, and that we must be ready to cast it off should our reason find good grounds for so doing.
As to the first of these objections,it must at once be granted that on the purely intellectual side the proof of the Church's authority can never be so absolutely demonstrative as to exclude the possibility of denial and compel the acceptance of every sane man. It is only the truths of mathematics, or of matter of fact and existence, that admit of such proof, that admit of being thus demonstrated, -- as the multiplication table, or the existence of the moon, or Newton's laws of motion. But no such truths have any vital bearing upon ourselves; they nowise affect the conduct of our lives; nor are they truths about which men really care. The truths of which we are certain with a certainty which no mere reasoning can produce, are of quite another order, and affect, not the mere intelligence alone, but the whole man. "After all," says Newman, "man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating,
APPENDIX I 45
acting animal," and in order to produce conviction really worth having his soul must be taken as a whole. In particular, where the idea of duty is introduced, the heart and will are no less important factors than the brain and intellect. Any man, whatever his principles and character, may be equally competent to solve a mathematical or physical problem, or argue a point of law, or play a game of chess, -- for these are purely intellectual operations. But he who has trained himself to study before aught else his own ease and comfort is not qualified even to understand the motive of those who freely of their own accord expose themselves to certain hardships, and grave risk of death, merely because their country is in peril: he whose one object in life is to make money, adopting as a first principle that he has a right to do as he likes with his own, feels no qualms of conscience, provided he keep within the limits of the law, in sweating his workpeople, or floating a speculation which brings grist to his own mill, and ruin to multitudes: he whose heart is hardened by self-indulgence, unhesitatingly sets down the self-denying philanthropist as a fool, and frequently will not even consider the curtailment of his pleasures in the interest of his own health. Yet who will deny that patriotism, benevolence, and temperance are virtues which have claims upon us all? It is not impossible to deny their claims, for it is not possible to establish these claims by any strict process of logic, such as would pass in a scientific lecture-room or a court of law. And yet it certainly is impossible to reject them reasonably, and we are certain of their validity with a certitude of a character far higher than that with which we assent to the binomial theorem or the law of gravitation.
And so it is with our recognition of the authority of the Church. Starting with the assurance that there is an essential antagonism between right and wrong, between good and evil, which no human power, and no change in the conditions of terrestrial life, no natural selection or struggle for existence, could possibly obliterate or alter, and moreover that it is manifestly our duty to do what is right, and eschew what is wrong, the inquirer is assured that there must be a Supreme Lawgiver -- God -- and that the moral law is the expression of His will in our regard. This being so, he is driven to the conclusion that there must be some appointed means whereby all men, the simple and ignorant, no less than the learned and wise, may have certain knowledge as to the course they should follow in all the circumstances of life. To some extent this want is supplied by the law of conscience engraven in each man's soul, but only to some extent, and that by no means adequate to practical needs. Conscience affords a sure foundation, a starting-point whence to begin. But experience abundantly shows that something more is needed to direct men amid the innumerable problems and perplexities of life, some system or institution to which our individual reason leads us, as the safeguard of our intellectual freedom. That this is so we have the most convincing evidence, in the fact that such hostile systems as Agnosticism, Positivism, Materialism, Pantheism, Monism, and Freethought generally, demand the submission of disciples no less imperiously than does Christianity itself, and claim like it -- in the words of the Rationalist Press Association -- "to promote the true moral and intellectual interests of humanity."
What we hold is, that the claim of Christianity in this regard rests upon grounds infinitely superior to any others; that, for example, it alone furnishes a fundamental philosophy which can satisfy our intellectual need for causality, and that in particular it alone is found in practice to harmonize with the instinctive aspirations of our own souls. Therefore we accept it as our divinely appointed teacher and guide, and such acceptance is even more truly rational than a man's confidence in the honour of a bosom friend or the virtue of his mother, for which he has no proof to offer which a mere logician or scientist would regard for a moment, but of which he is more profoundly certain than of anything else.
But, it is said in the second place, whatever grounds we may have for accepting the guidance of authority, we can never be justified in committing ourselves to it blindly, and unless we reserve our right to cast it off should we find sufficient reason for so doing, we submit ourselves to mere intellectual servitude.
Obviously, this means that there may possibly be occasions when we can convict any authority of ignorance and deceit, and when our reason is capable of teaching us better; and, no doubt, when we have but a merely human authority to deal with, such a possibility must ever be taken into account. But the precise point of supreme importance in the case under consideration is that the Authority in which we trust is not merely human, and can neither deceive nor be deceived, being that of Him who is the source and origin alike of wisdom and of goodness. Unless we assume or can prove that there is no First Cause to whom all truth is known, and from whom our fundamental principles of morality are derived, we have no right to take for granted that there can be no knowledge anywhere altogether transcending that of man, and no authority to which -- supposing that we can learn its teachings, -- we may, and therefore must, submit without reserve.
It is manifestly impossible in such a matter to find an adequate human analogy, but at least this is clear, -- that the more an authority is recognized as being based upon intrinsic qualities and faculties to which we ourselves cannot pretend, the less possible is it for us to refuse submission to it. So it is that a man of genius necessarily dominates his less gifted fellows, when they become conscious that he can discern in Science, in practical politics or in war, what is hidden from their own eyes. And so, pre-eminently, it must be with the Author of Nature in respect of the creatures He has wade, and the intelligence wherewith He has endowed them. If, as the Christian maintains, a means is actually afforded us of being led directly by His Authority, it is not freedom but folly to prefer our own:
This is not the place to attempt any exposition of the various lines of argument, drawn from the history and character of her Divine Founder as well as her own, by which the claim of the Church to be God's authoritative organ, making known His voice to men, is established. This is a large subject which requires to be treated by itself. No more is here essayed than to show that the position adopted by believers is not in itself, as Freethinkers commonly assume, irrational and self-condemned, unless it be first demonstrated that on the one hand the intellect of man is the supreme measure of all things, and, on the other, that it has no means whatever of knowledge concerning those truths which are in themselves the most important and fundamental of all, and concern us more closely than any others.